

ARTICLE

ON THE MECHANISM OF THE GENERATION  
OF AESTHETIC IDEAS IN KANT'S  
*CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT*

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A major thrust of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (Kant 1790) is towards the relationship between beauty and morality, through consideration of the 'supersensible substrate' of reality. Most commentators on this Critique have focused on this and related issues. However, I would like to consider another facet of aesthetics touched on by Kant, mainly in §49 and §59, concerning the actual mechanism of the construction of aesthetic ideas. In doing so, I will suspend, bracket, in effect, consideration of the supersensible and focus on Kant's explication of the creation of aesthetic ideas; I am not considering the why of aesthetic ideas, as so many commentators do, but the means by which they are produced: the how. In doing so, I will suggest that there may be a connection between certain aspects of §49 and §59, such that the creation of aesthetic ideas can be related to the process of 'symbolic hypotyposis' (§59.2). I will argue that the process of symbolic hypotyposis relates to the formation of aesthetic attributes, as symbols, through an analogical process; that a symbol acts, in effect, as one part of the four parts of an analogy, and that the aesthetic idea may result from the application of the process of analogy. I will suggest that aesthetic attributes may, in some cases, function as symbols, and induce what I will term 'conceptual overflow', in which the normal contents of the symbol are supplemented through the analogical process. I will speculate that consideration of these processes might lead to insight into the problem of the relation between the originality of genius and the necessity that the products of genius become standards: 'exemplars'.

Kant (Kant 1790) starts explicating the aesthetic idea in §49.3, commenting that an aesthetic idea 'prompts much thought' (Kant 1786). According to Crawford (Crawford 1974), the aesthetic idea arises through something very like a mistake: the artist attempts 'the impossible: the achievement. . . of the sensuous presentation of a rational idea' (p. 121), but since a rational idea cannot be represented, according to Kant, the artist must fail. The specific representation presented is an 'aesthetic attribute' (Pluhar 1987, §49.8), which 'prompts the imagination to spread over a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words' (§49.8).<sup>1</sup> For Crawford, this

explains how ‘the artist gets the mental powers of his audience into full, imaginative activity’ (Crawford 1974: 122). But how is it, exactly, that the mind is ‘opened up’ to view ‘an immense realm of kindred presentations’ (Pluhar 1987; §49.8)? Crawford and many other commentators seem to stop at this point in their explication of this process; the ‘prompting’, ‘getting’, or ‘quickenings’ the audience to ‘thought’ or ‘full, imaginative activity’ ends the search for the mechanism. The aesthetic idea, however, is presented in some cases through very prosaic materials and situations, and in all cases through quite definite presentations; why do these lead to more thought than can be ‘comprehended within a determinate concept’ (§49.7)?

Kant declares that an aesthetic idea is such that, ‘the understanding with its concept never reaches the entire inner intuition that the imagination has and connects with a given presentation’ (Pluhar 1987; section 57, comment 1, paragraph 7 [§57C1.7]).<sup>2</sup> That is, aesthetic ideas do not, in effect, complete the normal course of events, in which the understanding, through the imagination, connects a concept with a sensible presentation. Thus, Crawford terms aesthetic ideas ‘representations of the imagination which lie beyond the bounds of sense experience and for which, consequently, no concept is ever fully adequate’ (Crawford 1974: 120). In contrast, Kant, in the same section, speaks of rational ideas as ‘transcendent concepts’ (Pluhar 1987; §57C1.1),<sup>3</sup> because while the rational idea ‘contains’ a definite concept, that concept can never be supplied with an ‘adequate intuition’ or ‘experience’.

In addition, the aesthetic idea, as presented in the CJ, seems almost an anomaly, in that Kant has been expounding on the aesthetic judgment as involving form, not material content; in fact, no definite contents are possible for this type of judgment beyond the well-known feeling of pleasure at the cognitive harmony occasioned by, for example, fine art. However,

<sup>1</sup> ‘...was der Einbildungskraft Alnaß gibt, sich über eine Menge von verwandten Vorstellungen zu verbreiten, die mehr denken lassen, als man in einem durch Worte bestimmten Begriff ausdrücken kann’ (Kant, 1790, §49.8, p. 415, A193).

I am using the term ‘presentation’ throughout in accord with Pluhar’s usage. Pluhar employs ‘presentation’ instead of ‘representation’ to translate ‘*vorstellen*’. His argument is that Kant’s theory of perception is not representational, ‘despite the fact that Kant sometimes adds the Latin *repraesentatio*’ (1987, footnote, p. 14). While this may be an unconventional translation of *vorstellen*, I do not think it affects my argument. In translating ‘*darstellen*’, Pluhar employs the verb ‘to exhibit’.

Despite what may be regarded as some unconventionality, I utilize Pluhar’s translation of the *Critique of Judgment* because of the extensive notes, background, and justifications he provides, and because this recent and well-researched work explicitly takes into account the history of translations and usages in Kant. In this essay I will provide the original text for long passages; for short passages I will only use English, unless I judge these passages to be critical to my argument.

<sup>2</sup> ‘...der Verstand, durch seine Begriffe, nie die ganze innere Anschauung der Einbildungskraft, welche sie mit einer gegebenen Vorstellung verbindet’ (Kant 1790: §57C1.7, p. 449, A 239).

<sup>3</sup> ‘...in welchem Falle der Begriff ein transzendenter Begriff ist. . .’ (Kant 1790; §57C1.1, p. 447, A 237).

rather than being characterized by form, as is the aesthetic judgment, the aesthetic idea seems to be in part, at least, characterized by a kind of overflow of content, as we have seen above. Through an aesthetic idea, a concept is made richer than can be delineated; yet this richness, although not completely describable by rules (at least at that point), must in some sense be consistent with those rules which can, to some extent, describe it. What Kant does not indicate here is exactly how this process takes place, except to say that it requires 'genius', which is just the capability to produce such concepts, through 'spirit. . . the animating principle in the mind' (§49.1).<sup>4</sup> He does say, nonetheless, that genius is tied to the ability to have taste (e.g. 'judging beautiful objects to be such requires taste', and 'giving this form to a product of fine art requires merely taste' [Pluhar 1987; §48.1, §48.6]), and taste in turn is the ability to sense the cognitive harmony between imagination and understanding. But genius does not merely have and exercise taste; genius creates works of art: presentations of aesthetic attributes.

Thus, there is still a sense, I claim, in which the explication of the aesthetic idea is incomplete, or at least incompletely stated. While in general, aesthetic ideas may originate through the attunement of genius to the 'supersensible substrate', the problem of why an aesthetic idea, as presented, contains such an abundance of 'partial presentations' that it cannot be encompassed in a 'determinate' concept is not, I maintain, fully resolved even if the origin of that idea (or its form) is the indeterminate concept of the supersensible.

Kant does not quite characterize the 'supplementary presentations' (Pluhar 1987; §49.9)<sup>5</sup> or 'partial presentations' (§49.10)<sup>6</sup> of the aesthetic idea as 'indeterminate' concepts, but as such that 'no expression that stands for a determinate concept can be found' (§49.9) for them. In fact, the aesthetic idea communicates 'a concept that. . . is original. . . it reveals a new rule' (§49.11), and thus, *post hoc*, the possibility, at least, of a new determinate concept. Crawford (Crawford 1974), in fact, does mention this latter point: 'the artist's finished products, if successful, must display a rule-governedness. . . thereby it creates a rule' (p. 163), but he does not explore in depth the transition between the 'rule-governedness' and the creation of a rule. Gammon (Gammon 1997), perhaps, approximates most closely the concern of this essay when he speaks of the 'paradox' of the 'union of originality and exemplarity in works of genius' (p. 563). He resolves this issue on the basis, largely, of external constraints, 'powerful anchors which control the revolutionary impact of its originality' (p. 588).

I will argue that considerations internal to the productions of genius also influence and constrain this process. Cohen and Guyer (Cohen and Guyer 1982) also touch on this point when they state that

<sup>4</sup> 'Geist. . . heißt das belebende Prinzip im Gemüte' (Kant 1790; §49.1, p. 413, A 190).

<sup>5</sup> 'Nebenvorstellungen' (Kant 1790; §49.9, p. 416, A 194).

<sup>6</sup> 'Teilvorstellungen' (Kant 1790; §49.10, p. 417, A 195).

both the judgment and creation of a work of art require that someone have a concept of what such an object should be and mean... the creation of a particular work of art... requires a harmony between the imaginative presentation of an object and some rather more specific concept or idea' (p. 9).

Each work of art, then, reflects not merely the felt global harmony of taste, but also the harmony between the concept 'behind' the work of art (i.e. 'what such an object should be and mean'), and the imaginative presentation of the work of art. Further, if this is correct, an actual work of art should reflect a harmony between the above concept, the aesthetic idea expressed by the presentation of the particular object that is the work of art, and the aesthetic presentations of the work of art.

This latter conclusion, however, if correct, has uncovered a relationship between three entities: a concept, which may or may not be a rational idea; an aesthetic idea; and the aesthetic presentations associated with the aesthetic idea. These might be understood as three members of an analogy, with the fourth to be supplied. I will argue, then, that the process of 'symbolic hypotyposis' (§59.2) relates to the formation of aesthetic ideas through the analogical process, and that a symbol serves, in effect, as the fourth part of the analogy.

What does Kant mean by the term 'analogy'? In this Section, his answer is that 'judgment... applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only a symbol' (Pluhar, 1987, §59.4).<sup>7</sup> In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he explicates analogy in the following terms:

In philosophy, however, an analogy is the equality not of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. Here I can from three given members cognize, and give a priori, only the relation to a fourth, but not this fourth member itself. But I do have a rule for seeking the fourth member *in experience* [my Italics], and a mark for discovering it there. Hence an analogy of experience will be only a rule whereby unity of experience is to arise from perceptions (not a rule saying how perception itself, as empirical intuition as such, is to arise). And such an analogy will hold, as principle of objects (i.e. appearances), not constitutively but merely regulatively.

(Pluhar 1996, p. 251, A 180)<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> '... Urteilskraft... die bloße Regel der Reflexion über jene Anschauung auf einen ganz andern Gegenstand, von dem der erstere nur das Symbol ist, anzuwenden' (Kant 1790; §59.4, p. 460, A 253)..

<sup>8</sup> In der Philosophie aber ist die Analogie nicht die Gleichheit zweier *quantitativen*, sondern *qualitativen* Verhältnisse, wo ich aus drei gegebenen Gliedern nur das Verhältnis zu einem vierten, nicht aber *dieses* vierte *Glied* selbst erkennen, und a priori geben kann, wohl aber eine Regel habe, es in der Erfahrung zu suchen, und ein Merkmal, es in derselben aufzufinden. Eine Analogie der Erfahrung wird also nur eine Regel sein, nach welcher aus Wahrnehmungen Einheit der Erfahrung (nicht wie Wahrnehmung selbst, als empirische

In both instances, Kant refers to the application only of a rule, employed as a 'regulative' principle to enable one to seek the second member of the incomplete pair of relations in experience. This process is what Kant refers to at one point as 'symbolic hypotyposis' (§59.2), at another as 'symbolic exhibition' (§59.4).

In symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied with an intuition that judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in schematizing: i.e. the treatment agrees with this procedure merely in the rule followed rather than in terms of the intuition itself, and hence merely in terms of the form of the reflection rather than its content.

(Pluhar 1987; §59.2)<sup>9</sup>

In fact, the word 'hypotyposis' comes from the Greek *hypo*: under, and *typos*: image, and thus hypotyposis literally means the illustration or visual representation of an idea, its visual exemplification. An object thus seems necessary for this process. Judgment first performs its normal function, in which it applies a concept to an object; then, however, it applies only the rule 'the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition' to another object (§59.4); and so it serves as 'a transfer our reflection on an object of intuition to an entirely different concept' (Pluhar 1987; §59.4).<sup>10</sup>

A symbolic (in contrast with a 'schematic') hypotyposis results in the symbolic exhibition of an idea that only reason can think. This explanation of 'symbolic exhibition' seems to relate closely to the process of analogy:

Anschauung überhaupt) entspringen soll, und als Grundsatz von den Gegenständen (der Erscheinungen) nicht *konstitutiv*, sondern bloß *regulativ* gelten.

(Kant 1781: Elem. II, I(Ab): II(Bu): II(Ha):III., 2.3; p. 233, A 179)

<sup>9</sup> ...oder symbolisch [Hypotypose], da einem Begriffe, den nur die Vernunft denken, *und* dem keine sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein kann, eine solche untergelegt wird, mit welcher das Verfahren der Urteilskraft demjenigen, was sie im Schematisieren beobachtet, bloß analogisch, d.i. mit ihm bloß der Regel dieses Verfahrens, nicht der Anschauung selbst, mithin bloß der Form der Reflexion, nicht dem Inhalte nach, übereinkommt.

(Kant 1790: §59.2, p. 459, A 252)

Meredith renders this passage as

[in the case of symbolic hypotyposis] the concept is one which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate. In the latter case the concept is supplied with an intuition such that the procedure of judgment in dealing with it is merely analogous to that which it observes in schematism. In other words, what agrees with the concept is merely the rule of this procedure, and not the intuition itself. Hence the agreement is merely in the form of reflection, and not in the content.

(Meredith 1911; §59.2, 221–2)

<sup>10</sup> 'der Übertragung der Reflexion über einen Gegenstand der Anschauung auf einen ganze andern Begriff...' (Kant 1790; §59.4, p. 460, A 254).

Symbolic exhibition uses an analogy... in which judgment performs a double function; it applies the concept to the objects of a sensible intuition; and then it applies the *mere rule* by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object.

(Pluhar 1987; §59.4) [my Italics]<sup>11</sup>

That is, according to Kant, this process consists, roughly speaking, in the application of the rule for a concept (the schema) which is capable of being exhibited, to another concept, one not capable of being exhibited (§59.4). Some of Kant's examples of the ideas symbolically exhibited, however, such as the despotic state and the term 'depend' (§59.4), do seem capable of exhibition, to some extent, at least.

Further, and more speculatively, in §59, Kant's examples of symbolic hypotyposis seem largely linguistic, i.e. Kant states, 'the words foundation (support, basis)... to depend (to be held from above)... express concepts not by means of a direct intuition by only according to an analogy with one' (Pluhar 1987; §59.4).<sup>12</sup> In §49, however, while Kant employs specific examples from poetry, he also points out that genius may employ 'language or painting or plastic art' to 'express what is ineffable in the mental state' (§49.11). The words 'express concepts' in the former quote, coupled with the flexibility of the medium of expression implied by the latter, may indicate that Kant took symbolic hypotyposis, and thus analogical processes, more generally than linguistic usage, into the conceptual domain.

An *aesthetic idea* is one to which no 'determinate concept' can be adequate (§49.3), but which is presented through a sensible intuition. A symbolic hypotyposis, on the other hand, involves as one of its terms a *rational idea*, for which no sensible intuition can be adequate (§59.2), but for which, seemingly, a determinate concept could be adequate. As Kant states,

just as in the case of a rational idea the imagination with its intuitions does not reach the given concept, so in the case of an aesthetic idea the understanding with its concepts never reaches the entire inner intuition that the imagination has

(Pluhar 1987; §57C1.7)<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> die zweiten [Symbole Anschauungen] vermittelt einer Analogie... in welcher die Urteilskraft ein doppeltes Geschäft verrichtet, erstlich den Begriff auf den Gegenstand einer sinnlichen Anschauung, and dann zweitens die bloße Regel der Reflexion über jene Anschauung auf einen ganz andern Gegenstand.

(Kant 1790; §59.4, pp. 459–60, A 252–3)

<sup>12</sup> 'So sind die Wörter Grund (Stütze, Basis), abhängen (von oben gehalten werden)... Ausdrücke für Begriffe nicht vermittelt einer direkten Anschauung, sondern nur nach einer Analogie mit derselben...' (Kant 1790; §59.4, p. 460, A 254).

<sup>13</sup> So wie an einer Vernunftidee die Einbildungskraft, mit ihren Anschauungen, den gegebenen Begriff nicht erreicht: so erreicht bei einer ästhetischen Idee der Verstand, durch seine

These entities, then, are in a sense the converse of each other. In addition, there is no necessary implication, in the case of the rational idea in symbolic hypotyposis, of the 'conceptual overflow' which is essential to the aesthetic idea; and conversely, Kant does not state in §49 that the aesthetic idea must involve metaphor, or symbolic hypotyposis. To put this another way, the aesthetic idea seems to be distinguished by its involvement with content as contrasted with form; and symbolic hypotyposis seems to be involved with form as contrasted with content. I am suggesting, however, that there is a relation between the two: the aesthetic idea and the rational term in the symbolic hypotyposis. There is a hint of an answer, perhaps, in Genova's statement: 'aesthetic counterparts to rational ideas... are represented in sensible intuition... analogous to the procedure of schematism... what is analogous is not the content... but the form' (Genova 1985: 304).

I would like to suggest that if one analyzes the application of the form of the analogy inherent in the symbolic hypotyposis one may find the connection, in the reciprocity of form and content. Let us return to Cohen and Guyer's statement that

both the judgment and creation of a work of art require that someone have a concept of what such an object should be and mean... the creation of a particular work of art... requires a harmony between the imaginative presentation of an object and some rather more specific concept or idea.

(Cohen and Guyer 1982: 9)

If this is correct, an actual work of art should reflect a harmony between the above concept, the aesthetic idea expressed by the presentation of the particular object that is the work of art, and the aesthetic presentations of the work of art. We can now speculate on the application of symbolic hypotyposis to the analogical relationship between the concept, which may or may not be a rational idea; an aesthetic idea, and the aesthetic presentations associated with the aesthetic idea.

Suppose that we take Kant's example of the handmill (§59.4). Someone wants this sensible object to symbolize the despotic state in, say, the expression, 'The handmill of the state has but one handle'. There is, first, the concept of the handmill: a small hand-turned grinder for, say, corn. What the concept of the handmill 'should be and mean', is the state. The form of the concept of the handmill is the 'rule' that is 'applied' to the idea of the state. What is this causal (§59.4)<sup>14</sup> rule? Perhaps something like: the turning of the handle results in the uniform grinding of the grain. But applying this

Begriffe, nie die ganze innere Anschauung der Einbildungskraft, welche sie mit einer gegebenen Vorstellung verbindet.

(Kant 1790; §57C1.7, p. 449, A 239)

<sup>14</sup> 'Kausalität' (Kant 1790; §59.4, p. 460, A 254).

rule to a 'despotic state' necessitates the removal of content from it: the handle, the grain, even the turning motion as such are not present in a state. What remains, perhaps, is something like: one person forces a reduction to uniformity. The form of the idea of the despotic state, then, is now that form. But this is not sufficient for the analogical process. We have not completed the analogy; it requires a fourth term. There is the handmill, the symbol, which has both (A) form and (B) content; and the despotic state, which has, for the sake of argument, only form (C). The term (D), then, must be the content of this idea. But while in this particular example the despotic state may be an idea with content; according to Kant this process should be generally applicable to any idea, including a rational idea with no content. Yet Kant, as we have seen, compares this to the process of creating an analogy, which requires a fourth term.

Although Kant does not explicitly say so, he may have allowed means by which content can be supplied in this process. In the passage above from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant states, speaking of analogy;

But I do have a rule for seeking the fourth member in experience, and a mark for discovering it there. Hence an analogy of experience will be only a rule whereby unity of experience is to arise from perceptions (not a rule saying how perception itself, as empirical intuition as such, is to arise). And such an analogy will hold, as principle of objects (i.e. appearances), not constitutively but merely regulatively.

(Pluhar 1996: 251, A180 [see Footnote 8])

The key phrases in the above are, I believe, in the first and last sentences: 'a rule for seeking the fourth member in experience. . . will hold, as principle of objects, not constitutively but merely regulatively'. Perhaps this passage could be interpreted, in the context of symbolic hypotyposis, as allowing the fourth member of the analogy above not to be contents transferred from the symbol to the rational idea, as its form is transferred (i.e. 'not constitutive' of the object), but as allowing the fourth member to be the contents of the *symbol*. That is, the artist *seeks in experience* those contents and thus creates the work of art in order to find them. This would imply that the symbol's contents and/or form, after the process of symbolic hypotyposis, have to some extent changed, in order to supply the fourth term of the analogy. When, for example, Kant speaks of 'Jupiter's eagle with the lightning in its claws' as 'an attribute of the mighty king of heaven' (Pluhar 1987; §49.8), Kant is indicating that the eagle, as one of a set of aesthetic attributes which 'yield an aesthetic idea' (§49.8), has been 'conjoined with a given concept' (§49.10) and in addition 'connected' with 'a multiplicity of partial presentations. . .' (§49.10).<sup>15</sup> The eagle, then, cannot, as aesthetic attribute

<sup>15</sup> die ästhetische Idee ist eine einem gegebenen Begriffe beigeordnete Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, welche mit einer solchen Mannigfaltigkeit der Teilvorstellungen in dem

(and thus, I argue, as symbol), retain precisely the same form and content as before it became an aesthetic attribute. At the least, the 'partial presentations' with which it is now connected were not previously associated with that attribute. Similarly, the handmill, as symbol, is not merely the mundane handmill of everyday use.

The process could then be diagrammed as follows: (a) form of the handmill is to (b) content of the handmill as (c) form of the despotic state is to (d) content of the *handmill as symbol* of the despotic state.

One might still object to this on the grounds that the contents of the symbol, despite the altered use of the object, have no means of changing: no basis in content; that what has changed is perhaps only a feeling we have about the symbol. This might be the case if the rational idea whose form we are altering has in actuality no content. However, there are several of Kant's examples, including the one above, in which that object being symbolized, e.g. the despotic state, does in fact have sensible presentations one can exhibit, and thus content. One may read about, see images of, or even visit, if one is so inclined, despotic states. Another example might be love: this is not only a feeling, but, as with the despotic state, a complex of feelings, behaviors, and so forth, for some of which, at least, there are contents. One may point to couples in love, to the love of mother for child, and so forth as very specific examples of this idea. There is a source, then, for the alteration of content of the symbol, in such cases, at least.

In §49, then, Kant states that 'if a concept is provided with a presentation of the imagination such that, even though this presentation belongs to the exhibition of the concept, yet it prompts, even by itself, so much thought. . . and thereby . . . expands the concept itself' (Pluhar 1987; §49.7).<sup>16</sup> Further, he states, 'If forms do not constitute the exhibition of a given concept itself, but are only supplementary presentation of the imagination. . . then they are called (aesthetic) attributes of an object. . . whose concept is a rational idea' (§49.8).<sup>17</sup> Relating these passages to the example of the handmill and the process of symbolic hypotyposis, I suggest that we might find a result such as the following: if we supplement the imaginative presentation of the handmill with the forms of the despotic state, then these (presentations of the handmill) have become the aesthetic attributes of the despotic state,

freien Gebrauche derselben verbunden ist, daß für sie kein Ausdruck, der einen bestimmten Begriff bezeichnet, gefunden werden kann.

(Kant 1790; §49.10, p. 417, A 195)

<sup>16</sup> Wenn nun einem Begriffe eine Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft untergelegt wird, die zu seiner Darstellung gehört, aber für sich allein so viel zu denken veranlaßt, als sich niemals in einem bestimmten Begriff zusammenfassen läßt, mithin den Begriff selbst auf unbegrenzte Art ästhetisch erweitert. . . (Kant 1790; §49.7, p. 415, A 192)

<sup>17</sup> 'Man nennt die jenigen Formen, welche nicht die Darstellung eines gegebenen Begriffs selber ausmachen, sondern nur, als Nebenvorstellungen der Einbildungskraft. . . Attribute (ästhetische) eines Gegenstandes, dessen begriff, als Vernunftidee. . . ' (Kant 1790; §49.8, p. 415, A 192).

whose concept cannot be exhibited adequately. When these presentations are conjoined with that concept, they become ‘connected, when we use imagination in its freedom, with such a multiplicity of partial presentations that no expression that stands for a determinate concept can be found for it’ (§49.10).<sup>18</sup> Thus, in this example, because of the resulting partial presentations connected with it, the content, at least, of the handmill has changed; and because of the supplementation of its form with the form of the despotic state, its form has also changed. It now exhibits (inadequately) the idea of the despotic state. The presentations of the handmill employed in this process, then, are both symbols, because of their initial analogical function through symbolic hypotyposis; and aesthetic attributes, because of their final state as exhibitions of the idea of the despotic state.

Let us take another example. Suppose that we want to play a game of chess, and find, as we set up the board, that we are missing the white king. We grab a very small sculpture with a representation of the sun on it, and use that. At this point we have performed no symbolic hypotyposis, and the statue, although it is a symbol for the king in the game, is as much a concept with definite content (inasmuch as we employ it as a chess piece) as the original king was. However, if before we start play, we exclaim, ‘This statue is the Sun King!’, we have, if we know French history, suddenly radically altered our conceptions of that particular game (i.e. both the board and the play) wherein the statue is employed. We now, through symbolic hypotyposis, have created, through analogy, a sensory presentation, the chess game, which has aesthetic attributes which are in part those of the court of Louis XIV. Just as, when we contemplated a despotic reign, we understood it through the form of the handmill, so now as we contemplate the court of the Sun King, we understand it, to some extent, as having the form of a chess game. But this analogy, as with the previous example, also works the other way around. Thus, we also understand the chess game, as we play it, as presenting, to some extent, attributes, i.e. the content, of the court of Louis XIV.

Analyzing the example above in terms of the four parts of the analogy, we find the following. The form (a) of a chess game, is to the content (b) of a chess game, as the form (c) of the court of Louis XIV is to the content (d) of the *chess game as symbol* of the court. As in the previous example, the presentations of the chess game are aesthetic attributes, since they function as exhibitions of the idea of the court of Louis XIV. In addition, as with other aesthetic symbols, the chess game, as such a symbol, becomes imbued with a ‘multiplicity of partial presentations’, guided by that which it is symbolizing. As the handmill exhibited attributes of the despotic state after becoming an aesthetic symbol, so the chess game, when understood as a

<sup>18</sup> ‘...welche mit einer solchen Mannigfaltigkeit der Teilvorstellungen in dem freien Gebrauche derselben verbunden ist, daß für sie kein Ausdruck, der einen bestimmten Begriff bezeichnet, gefunden werden kann...’ (Kant 1790; §49.10, p. 417, A 195).

symbol of the Sun King's court, exhibits some of its attributes. As we play this chess game, then, we may consider the king to represent Louis; a bishop, perhaps, to represent Cardinal Richelieu, the competitiveness of the game as reflecting that of the court, and so forth.

This process might continue, generating new material, until a definite concept, in some minds, at least, results. The aesthetic idea then will have become institutionalized, in effect, and can now be analyzed, criticized, and employed as an exemplar. Thus, Gammon's statement that 'in the Critique of Judgment, Kant further distinguishes the influence of the genius on future artists as also igniting an inner talent, but which is guided by a rule' (Gammon 1997: 591), so that 'a 'new rule is won' for aesthetic instruction, but not for genius itself' (p. 592) is understandable in these terms. The genius creates the aesthetic idea before the rule can be formulated, by the processes above; finally, after those processes have run their course (which will perhaps never entirely end for many pieces), the new rule is created, the piece is understood, by some, at least, and future artists can be instructed. Thus, if these speculations are sound, §49 and §59 are intimately connected through these processes, which result in the prompting of reason by creative imagination to 'think more than what can be apprehended and made distinct in the presentation' (§49.7).<sup>19</sup>

It is also possible, I suggest, to extend this analysis to other realms of analogy. Johnson (Johnson 1985) has commented on the use of imagination in moral judgments. He starts by inquiring, 'Since the categorical imperative is, by its very nature, a purely formal principle not dependent upon any material content, how is it possible to apply it to specific cases involving ends and actions in the natural world?' (p. 269). That is, the categorical imperative, the objective principle, 'must abstract from all material content' (p. 269), which might seem to preclude its actual application to specific questions. However, the 'analogical presentation' (p. 271) of Kant's *typik* (Gregor 1997; §70) affords us a means, similar to the examples above, to supply that content, and indeed Johnson argues for the relevancy of symbolic hypotyposis in that process (Johnson 1985: 272). He does not, however, diagram specifically how the analogical process could work in this situation.

Suppose we want to apply the *typik* to a business situation: a factory. We might then have the following analogy, based on the analysis above. The form (a) of the factory is to the content (b) of the factory as the form (c) of the categorical imperative is to the content (d) of the factory as a symbol of that imperative. It is not necessary, then, that the categorical imperative have content in order to employ this analogical process. Through the process of symbolic hypotyposis, we are forcing, in effect, our understanding of the factory in question to take on, in part, characteristics of the

<sup>19</sup> '...mehr nämlich bei Veranlassung einer Vorstellung zu denken... als in ihr aufgefaßt und deutlich gemacht werden kann.' (Kant 1790; §49.7, p. 415, A 192).

categorical imperative, and that factory-as-symbol becomes, in this context, an aesthetic idea (or, perhaps, ‘the moral equivalent of an aesthetic idea’) as a result of that process. Thus, the form, ‘act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (Beck 1959: 421) guides the generation of the content, as aesthetic symbol, of the situation in the factory to which it is being applied.

But since the process of symbolic hypotyposis produces *aesthetic* symbols,<sup>20</sup> we cannot, as we have seen, specify a rule to produce those symbols’ content. Thus, the application of that process employing the categorical imperative (and similar guides) must, as Johnson points out, proceed by ‘structuring representations in a new manner’ (Johnson 1985: 276), through the creative imagination, which we might in this instance call ‘moral genius’ (also termed ‘wisdom’), although afterward that manner may be codified by others.

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<sup>20</sup> I am somewhat at a loss as to how to designate these symbols. They are not ‘aesthetic’ in the artistic sense employed by Kant in the sections of the Critique of Judgment I have focused on in this essay. However, given that they are arrived at through a process virtually identical to that producing those latter aesthetic symbols, and given that they must, in consequence, possess attributes which cannot be exhibited adequately, the term ‘aesthetic symbols’ more broadly, i.e. functionally, applied does seem appropriate. Perhaps one might also term them ‘moral exemplars’.

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