

# On Aesthetic Judgement and our Relation to Nature: Kant's Concept of Purposiveness

FIONA HUGHES

*University of Essex, UK*

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**ABSTRACT** *I offer a critical reconstruction of Kant's thesis that aesthetic judgement is founded on the principle of the purposiveness of nature. This has been taken as equivalent to the claim that aesthetics is directly linked to the systematicity of nature in its empirical laws. I take issue both with Henry Allison, who seeks to marginalize this claim, and with Avner Baz, who highlights it in order to argue that Kant's aesthetics are merely instrumental for his epistemology. My solution is that aesthetic judgement operates as an exemplary presentation of our general ability to schematise an intuition with a concept at the empirical level. I suggest that this counts as an empirical schematism. Although aesthetic judgement is not based on empirical systematicity, it can nevertheless offer indirect support for the latter in so far as it is a particular revelation of purposiveness in general.*

One of the most problematic theses of Kant's already demanding *Critique of Judgement* is his claim that aesthetic judgement is based on the principle that we can presuppose an order in the range of empirical laws. While this is a position that many have found both unintuitive and impossible to defend, it does at least have the interest of suggesting that aesthetic judgement stands in a more than contingent relation to experience in general. In contemporary Kant scholarship, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, it has become the norm to either ignore or reject a link that appears to be ridden with problems.

I offer a critical reconstruction of Kant's position. The point of this article is to rearticulate the connection between empirical cognition and aesthetic

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*Correspondence Address:* Fiona Hughes, Department of Philosophy, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK. Email: fhughes@essex.ac.uk

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judgement in such a way as to show that Kant's intuition is not so ill judged as many have thought. This will involve going beyond Kant's own presentation.

I begin by giving a sketch of the identity of the principle of the purposiveness of nature, before examining the way in which Kant links purposiveness with aesthetic judgement. Next I discuss how this poses a problem, recently identified by Avner Baz as leading Kant to the position that aesthetics is an expression of a 'cognitive craving'.<sup>1</sup> I assess Henry Allison's attempt to sideline the problem by arguing that there is no need to link the two species of reflective judgement.<sup>2</sup> As a first step to providing an alternative to both Baz and Allison, I examine the range of the principle of purposiveness, arguing that it has both a subjective and an objective trajectory. Klaus Düsing makes a further interesting distinction between two levels of purposiveness and I investigate this in the following section. However, I conclude that his account of a general level of purposiveness is ultimately teleological and propose that general purposiveness is best grasped as the possibility of empirical schematism and is revealed only by aesthetic judgement. This allows me to establish the *exemplary* status of aesthetic judgement for cognition. Aesthetic judgement achieves this status in so far as it is distinct from cognition, while displaying the general structure of the latter's possibility.

The central thought in my interpretation of purposiveness is that it is a *relational* concept. 'Purposiveness of nature' does not, as many have suspected, capture the projection of mind onto nature.<sup>3</sup> It denotes instead our reflective receptivity to the world within which we find ourselves. The very possibility of a relation between subject and world is expressed by 'purposiveness'. Moreover, an indirect reflection on this possibility and not, as Baz holds, a Heideggerian 'pure responsiveness' to things, is characteristic of aesthetic judgements.<sup>4</sup>

### **What is the purposiveness of nature?**

Kant's concept of nature is of a systematic order of objects in space and time. At its most general level, nature is ordered by the categories of the understanding. The categories determine objects in general in so far as they are synthesised with pure intuitions, as first established in both editions of the Deduction and elaborated in the Schematism chapter. This is nature analysed at the transcendental level, the fully articulated account of which is presented in the final part of the Analytic where Kant analyses the principles of the understanding. The four sets of principles enable us to treat nature as a unified system.

At the outset of the *Critique of Judgement* Kant announces that a further level of systematic order is required if the categories are to be applicable at the empirical level.<sup>5</sup> While Kant's aim from the outset of the *Critique of Pure*

*Reason* is to provide the legitimation for the possibility of empirical knowledge, he now adds a further level to the conditions that make that task achievable. The new principle of purposiveness establishes a systematic order within nature at the empirical level. Empirical systematicity operates principally at the level of empirical laws. Order can now be established not only with regard to objects in general, but also for empirical objects in so far as they fall under an order established by empirical laws.

Elsewhere I give an account of the relation in which empirical systematicity stands to the arguments of the *Analytic*.<sup>6</sup> For now, I will simply sketch the significance of this development for Kant's conception of nature. Nature at the transcendental level corresponds to the order of our minds, as laid out in the Table of Categories. At the empirical level order is a much more complex affair. The multiplicity of empirical laws is such that there is no Table of Empirical Laws under which they can be ordered. As Allison puts it, there is a danger of empirical chaos.<sup>7</sup> But the discovery of the new principle of the systematicity of nature allows empirical nature to be treated as systematically ordered and thus as capable of giving rise to cognition. Admittedly, cognition at the empirical level does not attain the level of determining judgement, that is, the certainty of the *a priori* synthetic judgements of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, nevertheless, we can attain knowledge of empirical phenomena based on a reliable framework.

The order of empirical nature qualifies as a system because it too, just like transcendental order, corresponds to the order of mind. However, in this case the complexity is such that it seems as if only an intuitive or divine intellect could grasp empirical nature as a whole. Our human intellect can only strive to introduce order into the range of empirical phenomena. But while we cannot grasp empirical systematicity as a whole, we can presuppose that, in principle at least, empirical nature is ordered in such a way that it is accessible to our judgement. Knowledge now emerges as a task of determination. The principle of purposiveness is the basis for a variety of devices through which we construct systematicity within empirical nature. For instance, we link phenomena using the distinction between species and genera and we also order organic things teleologically.

So nature is purposive in that it appears to display an order that is accessible to our power of judgement. At the empirical level it is principally reflective judgement that operates on the fine texture of concepts and laws. However, establishing empirical order also secures an indirect fit between empirical nature and determining judgement. The systematicity of nature acts as a bridge between the categories and particular empirical phenomena, making the former applicable to the latter. This does not give rise to synthetic *a priori* knowledge of empirical nature, but it does assure us that the broad framework of the categories, which is in any case minimal, provides a basis for our engagement with nature at the empirical level.

I have argued that the purposiveness of nature makes possible knowledge at the empirical level. If I am going to show that there is a relation between the purposiveness without purpose characteristic of aesthetic judgement and the purposiveness of nature, I must show that aesthetic judgements stand in some relation, yet to be established, to the possibility of knowledge at the empirical level.

### **Kant's claims about the relation between the purposiveness of nature and aesthetic judgement**

In the two versions of the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgement* Kant makes a number of claims that suggest a close link between aesthetic judgement and the purposiveness of nature. He even seems to say that aesthetic judgement is grounded on the purposiveness of nature. While this same claim is repeated in the main body of the text, it is not explicitly developed there. But unless we dismiss both Introductions out of hand, we must concede that Kant's intent was that this link would be sustained throughout the whole work.

The final sentence of the unpublished first Introduction prospectively puts the relation between aesthetic judgement and the purposiveness of nature in programmatic fashion:

The analytic will seek to accomplish, again in two chapters, first the *exposition* and then the *deduction* of the concept of a purposiveness of nature.<sup>8</sup>

In this passage Kant is referring to both parts of the *Critique*, that is, the aesthetic and the teleological.<sup>9</sup> However, while it is clear that he intends that both will serve as developments of the principle of the purposiveness of nature, only the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* qualifies as based on that principle alone. Kant made this clear in Section XI in the course of a discussion of judgement's 'own transcendental principle'.<sup>10</sup> This principle is identified as the concept of a purposiveness of nature necessary for the systematic unity of empirical laws. He then goes on to say:

the judgement that precedes any concept of the object, and hence the aesthetic reflective judgement, is the only one in which the basis determining [it] lies solely in the power of judgment, unmixed with an[y] other cognitive power ...<sup>11</sup>

Thus, according to this early version, the 'Analytic of Aesthetic Judgement' has a crucial role to play in laying out and even legitimating the principle of the purposiveness of nature, which is identified as the characteristic principle of judgement in general.

One of the clearest statements about the link in question comes towards the end of the second or published Introduction in Section VIII, where Kant suggests that the extended account of aesthetic judgement will be based on the principle of the purposiveness of nature:

In a critique of judgment, the part that deals with aesthetic judgement belongs to it essentially. For this power alone contains a principle that judgment lays completely *a priori* at the basis of its reflection on nature, in terms of its particular (empirical) laws, for our cognitive power, without which principle the understanding could not find its way about in nature.<sup>12</sup>

Here Kant begins by saying, as he did in the first Introduction, that only aesthetic judgement is *purely* based on the characteristic principle of judgement. All species of reflective judgement 'contain', in the sense of 'are based on' that same principle, but not all originate from it alone. Teleological judgement, for instance, is an expression of the power of judgement in relation to reason, the capacity for thinking infinity as a totality.

The next step he makes, just as in the first version, is to say that the principle in question establishes the order of the particular laws of nature for our judgement. In Section VI Kant had already argued that empirical order arises as a hierarchy of laws and concepts.<sup>13</sup>

Finally in the passage under consideration, he says that the principle of reflective judgement makes possible understanding's application within experience. Whereas Kant established the application of the categories to experience considered at a general level in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he now considers that the order of nature is only established at the empirical level on presupposition of the reflective principle of judgement, as I argued in the previous section.

It is clear that both these passages identify the characteristic principle of judgement as the basis for the systematic unity of empirical nature under laws and state that this principle stands in an 'essential' relation to aesthetic judgement. Were we not able to presuppose order at the level of experience, the rules of the understanding would not be applicable at the empirical level and so could not give rise to knowledge in experience. Order is achieved in so far as particular objects and events are capable of being ordered with reference to a range of empirical laws. Thus we must conclude that the principle of judgement makes possible a presupposition of such a hierarchy in the interests of the application of the categories within experience. The revision of Kant's epistemological project that this entails has not always been recognised. In the third critique Kant concludes that empirical knowledge can only be established once the principle of determining judgement is supplemented by the principle of reflective judgement.<sup>14</sup> What has given rise to most attention and unease is Kant's claim that, in some yet

to be established sense, aesthetic judgement is essentially linked to the systematicity of empirical nature.

There are many other occasions in both Introductions where Kant reiterates the same perspective. Indeed these claims are so pervasive that it would be impossible to rehearse them here.<sup>15</sup> In order to establish whether or not there is any justification for these claims, it will be necessary to further investigate the status of the principle of purposiveness. I intend to pursue this in two ways, first by identifying the full range of the principle and secondly by investigating the levels at which it operates. But in preparation for my positive proposal, we must consider the problem posed by the link Kant claims.

### **Why the link Kant draws between purposiveness of nature and aesthetic judgement is a problem**

Intuitively it seems odd to claim that aesthetic judgements are based on an order to be found in empirical nature. This could easily take us back to a pre-Kantian worldview where beauty was a cipher for the harmonious order originating from the divine. In the modern, post-theological era this claim strikes many as highly implausible. Moreover, such a perspective would also be inconsistent with Kant's critical turn away from the ontological concerns of traditional metaphysics towards a strictly transcendental framework of experience. Most succinctly, the link Kant makes seems to suggest that aesthetic judgement is a species of cognitive judgement. If the ground of aesthetic judgement is the principle that makes possible empirical cognition, then surely this conclusion cannot be avoided.

While many contemporary commentators conclude that Kant falls into this trap, Henry Allison has attempted to extricate the two forms of judgement, rejecting the link Kant makes between them. It is impossible to deny that Kant insisted on the link between aesthetics and nature both in the published Introduction to the *Critique of Judgement* and in the so-called 'First Introduction' that preceded it, as Allison concedes. He has, nevertheless, tried to marginalize this thesis, arguing that there is little trace of it in the main body of the text.<sup>16</sup> He then goes on to recast Kant's position as the claim that aesthetic judgement and empirical lawfulness or systematicity are founded on the same principle.<sup>17</sup> In his analysis of the Deduction of Taste Allison reveals that the principle in question is that of the power of judgement, that is, the subjective conditions that make cognition possible.<sup>18</sup>

In a recent article, Avner Baz has accused Allison of 'flying in the face of essentially all that Kant says on the subject (as Allison himself more or less admits)'.<sup>19</sup> Baz insists that the implicit point of Kant's aesthetics is that we have a shared cognitive project 'to conceptualise all that encounters us in our experience and fit it into one unified and comprehensive system'.<sup>20</sup> While Allison seeks to prise apart the principle of systematicity from the

purely subjective principle of aesthetic judgement, Baz jams them together. The result is that Kantian aesthetics is merely an expression of a 'cognitive craving'.<sup>21</sup>

While I am sympathetic to Allison's attempt to show the distinctiveness of aesthetic judgement, I agree with Baz that Allison has abandoned too quickly a thesis that is consistently pursued by Kant. Indeed it is an essential expression of the systematic need for a third *Critique*. Were aesthetic judgement not capable of revealing the possibility of empirical cognition, it would not be able to fulfil the role of serving as a 'bridge' between the critical foundations of cognition and morality. But I also believe that Baz has paid insufficient attention to the modality and specific nature of the connection between Kant's cognitive and aesthetic projects. Aesthetic judgement reveals the *possibility* of cognition, not its actuality. And aesthetic judgement can only do this in so far as it is *other* than cognitive. Moreover, while aesthetic judgement reveals the subjective resources that render possible the cognitive project, it also reveals the possibility of the realisation of moral agency in the empirical world. For, aesthetic judgement is not only an expression of the capacity for judgement—the *sensus communis*—but also a symbol of morality.<sup>22</sup> I will not, however, be concerned with the relation between aesthetics and morality in any detail here.

Later in this article I will argue for the response I have just sketched to Baz's claim that the link between aesthetic judgement and empirical systematicity reflects the cognitive bias of Kant's aesthetics. But first I need to assess Allison's account, for if he is right, there is no charge to answer. Allison's strategy is to argue that Kant does not need the claimed link and therefore it can be excised from his argument without loss. Allison raises five objections to Kant. His general standpoint is that there is no necessary relation between aesthetic judgement and what he calls 'logical purposiveness' or empirical systematicity. The first three objections sit naturally together. His first point is that Kant should not have assumed that even if there is an *a priori* principle of reflective judgement that founds empirical systematicity, it is identical to the principle that founds aesthetic judgement. Secondly, he points out that each of the two forms of reflective judgement has a distinctive scope. Whereas aesthetic judgements are concerned with particular forms, the principle of logical or formal purposiveness 'is concerned only with the relation between diverse forms'.<sup>23</sup> Thirdly, aesthetic judgement entails a disinterested pleasure that is not characteristic of the cognitive aims of judgements about empirical systematicity.<sup>24</sup>

Allison's next two points introduce rather different considerations. His fourth point is that 'the attempted grounding of aesthetic judgements in the principle of logical or formal purposiveness does not work, since the validity of the latter does not entail even the *possibility* of the validity of any instance of the former'.<sup>25</sup> For there to be a systematic order at the empirical level, there is no logical need for that order to count as beautiful, whether on one,

several, or all occasions. Even if beauty is considered to display a certain aesthetic order, there is no reason to conclude that the latter has anything to do with empirical regularity. Allison's fifth objection is that the supposed link would leave artistic beauty without an *a priori* basis.

The first three points insist (quite rightly and in a variety of ways) that the principles grounding aesthetic judgement and the systematicity of empirical laws are distinct. My reconstruction of Kant's position establishes their distinctiveness and thus I need not answer these objections. I agree that the different species of reflective judgement play distinct roles, but will argue that they are nevertheless systematically connected. In regard to the first objection in particular, I will argue that aesthetic judgements are not directly related to the hierarchy of empirical laws, which Allison takes to be the identity of empirical systematicity. In the course of my alternative account I will also explain why the pleasure and singularity that distinguish aesthetic judgements allow them to play a specific role in relation to the order of empirical nature. I do not consider that the fifth point is as damaging as Allison contends and believe that the aesthetic value of art can be addressed along the lines I offer here. In this article, however, I offer only a brief remark in response.<sup>26</sup>

It seems clear that the fourth objection is the principal one. Allison insists not only that aesthetic judgement and empirical systematicity are distinct, but also that they do not stand in any necessary connection to one another. I intend to show how this objection can be answered without denying the difference between empirical systematicity and aesthetic judgement. My solution will involve developing a systematic reading of the problematic link.

It is certainly true that there is no necessary logical link between the two sorts of reflective judgement, for it is conceivable that there could be a fully systematic relation among empirical laws and yet no aesthetic dimension to human experience. However, while it is *conceivable* that our experience could be ordered and not give rise to aesthetic judgement, a full phenomenological description of the reflective life of the human agent necessarily requires accounts of both empirical systematicity and aesthetic judgement. And if both are necessary components of any adequate account of our experience, we may at least suspect that they are related in some way that is not merely contingent. It will turn out, importantly, that the link between aesthetic judgement and the purposiveness of nature requires a distinction between the levels at which the latter operates. Once this distinction is in place, I will argue that the link between these two spheres of human judgement is symbolic rather than logical, in so far as aesthetic judgements give an exemplary insight into the *possibility* of empirical systematicity. Kant's own account requires and invites this concluding move, but does not supply it.

### The range of the principle of purposiveness

In order to be able to address the problem raised by the link Kant makes between aesthetic judgement and the purposiveness of nature, we need to examine the range of purposiveness more closely. While Guyer tends to treat this principle as if it operated with regard to nature, Allison insists that it is 'heautonomous' and thus only 'in a Pickwickian sense' is it about nature.<sup>27</sup> Allison is surely right in his positive characterisation, for the principle of purposiveness of nature is reflective in status. Reflective judgement gives the rule to itself and not to nature directly, in contrast to the understanding. Importantly, aesthetic judgement also counts as heautonomous. In Allison's eyes this is because both species of reflective judgement are founded on the strictly subjective principle of the purposiveness of judgement.<sup>28</sup> While I agree with this, I will argue that Allison has suppressed the range of the principle of purposiveness characteristic of the faculty of judgement.

The 'logical' or 'formal purposiveness of nature' is a reflective exercise of judgement in the sense that the principle establishes how nature is 'for us' and not how nature is objectively.<sup>29</sup> Now, even nature viewed objectively is distinguished from 'things as they are in themselves'. The objectivity established by the faculty of understanding is one of appearances accessible to the mind. We might then be tempted to conclude that in contrast to a discourse concerned with the objects of experience, the subjective principle of formal purposiveness entails a retreat to the interiority of mind. However, the case is somewhat more complex. The principle of formal purposiveness with regard to nature is the basis for our ability to make judgements at the empirical level. It allows our understanding to 'find its way about in nature' as we have already seen above.<sup>30</sup> This external orientation surely is what encourages not only Guyer's reading, but also Allison's worry about the link between aesthetic judgement and what he calls logical purposiveness and I will call formal purposiveness of nature.<sup>31</sup> The reference to empirical nature cannot be suppressed, even though the legislation of the principle is strictly a self-legislation.

It must be admitted that Allison's claim that formal or logical purposiveness is founded on a deeper principle of strictly subjective purposiveness gains *prima facie* support from Kant's claim that the 'technic' (or purposiveness) of nature is founded in the technic of judgement.<sup>32</sup> But the other side of the coin is that the technic of judgement is the subjective basis for thinking the systematicity of nature. My project is to show how the subjective basis of the technic of nature can be situated in relation to its orientation towards empirical nature. I intend to draw out how even at its deepest level judgement's reflection looks in two directions.

Kant's further elaboration of the founding status of judgement for the purposiveness of nature runs as follows:

we perceive purposiveness in our power of judgement insofar as it merely reflects on the object's empirical intuition so as to bring it to some concept or other (which concept this is being indeterminate), or on the empirical concept itself so as to bring the laws it contains under common principles. So it is actually the *power of judgment* that is technical; nature is presented as technical only insofar as it harmonizes with, and [so] necessitates, that [technical] procedure of judgment.<sup>33</sup>

Kant first talks of judgement's reflection on an empirical intuition and, secondly, on an empirical concept. In the first instance judgement seeks to associate the given intuition with a concept, the identity of which is indeterminate. This is the formal purposiveness of nature where we seek a rule or idea that is suggested but not exhibited by the intuition under consideration. We cannot pin down any particular concept or rule and thus we can only anticipate that there will be some concept or idea that explains the intuition. Kant goes on, without adequate explanation, to link formal purposiveness with aesthetic judgement where there is a harmony of the faculties. Although this association is not well explained, in this passage at least, it is clear that aesthetic judgement counts as a species of formal purposiveness.<sup>34</sup> In the second instance judgement operates teleologically, starting with an empirical concept. Here, it seeks to draw out the laws the latter expresses and situate these within a general framework of nature.<sup>35</sup> This also counts as an exercise of reflective judgement, because it moves from a given particular to a strictly ideal principle that *would* hypothetically explain the concept (*Begriff*) and the phenomenon it grasps (*begreift*). In reflective judgement in general we are thrown back on our power of judgement. But judgement's skill is in schematising a concept with an intuition or, it now emerges, situating a given concept within a wider theoretical framework. In both cases judgement does not merely reflect on itself, but more particularly on its relationship to nature.

While it is the power of judgement that is technical in a primary sense and nature is so only derivatively, in the passage under consideration judgement is characterised as necessarily oriented towards something given in experience. We are focussed either on a given empirical intuition when we are judging formally (and aesthetically) or on a given empirical concept when we are seeking order in empirical nature. In both cases we are thrown back on the power of judgement. Allison's insistence on the primacy of subjective purposiveness tends to conceal the link between aesthetic judgement and formal purposiveness in general, both of which are oriented towards something beyond the subject. I think it is helpful here to say that reflective judgement is 'intentional' in the phenomenological sense, that is, it is directed toward something other than itself. It is thus that I want to insist on the relational character of the principle of purposiveness even when it is traced back to its root in judgement. The subjective purposiveness of

judgement displayed in the aesthetic case is not merely a harmonious subjective play of the faculties, but a play that arises in response to a given phenomenon.

My suggestion has been that the technic of nature is two sided and so too is the technic of judgement. The technic of nature allows for the specification of nature at the empirical level, but it only does so in so far as it originates in a subjective capacity of the mind, i.e., the technic of judgement. Meanwhile, the latter, while arising from a co-operation of the subjective faculties, is always oriented towards a realm of possible objects. The technic of nature and the technic of judgement are thus deeply intertwined. Nature can have empirical order only for a judging subject and that subject always exercises its power of judgement in response to and anticipation of empirical nature. This is why the full title of the principle of the purposiveness of nature is 'the purposiveness of nature for our judgement'.<sup>36</sup> Establishing the full range of purposiveness is the first step in showing how aesthetic judgement is linked to formal purposiveness in the way Kant suggests in the two Introductions.

### **Klaus Düsing's link between 'general purposiveness' and aesthetic judgement**

In the discussion so far a 'deeper' sense of purposiveness, expressed in aesthetic judgements, has emerged. Allison insists this counts as 'subjective' purposiveness, while I have argued that the characteristic principle of judgement is dually oriented both towards the subject *and* towards nature in so far as it concerns the relation in which they stand to one another.

Allison mentions, and quickly dismisses, a promising attempt to salvage the connection between aesthetic judgement and the purposiveness of nature. Klaus Düsing suggests that the former is grounded strictly at a *general* level of purposiveness and not in the systematicity of empirical laws.<sup>37</sup> I will show how Düsing's interpretation is ultimately teleological, while in the next section I propose an alternative account of the distinction of levels of purposiveness, paying attention to the distinctive role played by aesthetic judgement.

Düsing distinguishes between two levels of purposiveness of nature in the following way.<sup>38</sup> The first level coincides with the concept of the systematicity of nature in its empirical laws, while the second is the 'more general (*allgemeiner*) principle of the technic of nature as the purposive order of the manifold and of the natural forms *in general (überhaupt)* for our judgement'.<sup>39</sup> Elsewhere Düsing makes it clear that the general level of purposiveness of nature establishes the possibility of the *empirical* manifold being taken up by our subjective faculties of cognition.<sup>40</sup> He suggests that aesthetic judgements are not grounded in the systematicity of nature but only in general purposiveness.<sup>41</sup>

Allison suggests that the limitation of Düsing's account lies in his not establishing how particular judgements would be 'licensed' by a general principle of the purposiveness of nature.<sup>42</sup> However, I believe that the problem is a different one, for, if anything, Düsing has too strong an account of how aesthetic judgement is grounded in general purposiveness, as I will argue.

Düsing situates his account of the purposiveness of nature and aesthetic judgement relative to the central notion of world (*Welt*).<sup>43</sup> He holds that 'world' functions as the idea that teleologically unites the Kantian project.<sup>44</sup> The teleological whole or world is only accessible through reflective judgement and is, strictly, ideal, being an end towards which we strive, rather than a determinate whole that could ever be realised. This is the distinctive character of Kant's *reflective* teleology, in contrast to objective teleology that would claim purposes *de re*.

Seen from an epistemological perspective, the principle of the purposiveness of nature is the simultaneous basis for the possibility and systematicity of empirical knowledge. Empirical knowledge is only possible if particular empirical concepts can be situated within an ordered whole, which at the highest level of ideality would count as a 'world'. At its deepest level, this systematicity is based on the possibility of the subsumption of empirical intuitions under empirical concepts.<sup>45</sup> In aesthetic judgement we compare a particular given intuition with our general ability to relate intuitions to concepts.<sup>46</sup> Aesthetic judgement thus displays the subsumptive activity that is necessary for any empirical knowledge.

Düsing thus has no problem in explaining how aesthetic judgements are 'licensed' by a general principle of the purposiveness of nature. He can simply say that the former are included within the range of the latter. Aesthetic judgements are instances of the general case of there being a 'fit' between nature and our subjective capacities. The particular case of the technic of nature that qualifies as aesthetic judgement arises from a reflection on the form of the given thing and is called *technica speciosa*.<sup>47</sup>

Düsing's interpretation has the advantage of showing how the *Critique of Judgement* can serve as a bridge between the first and second critiques, as Kant intended. On the one hand, reflective judgement has been shown to establish the possibility of empirical cognition, while on the other it has an ethical dimension in so far as our experience in general is goal-oriented (*zweckmäßig*). Ultimately we are oriented towards a strictly regulative idea of a world (*Welt*), that is, an organised system 'in which human beings think themselves as ends in themselves in accordance with moral laws'.<sup>48</sup> Beautiful natural forms, in so far as they reveal our capacity for disinterested judgement and thus our ability to detach ourselves from inclination, also reveal that we are at least in principle capable of ethical behaviour (*Sittlichkeit*).<sup>49</sup> Seen in this teleological light, it is even less surprising that Düsing supplies no further explanation of why particular aesthetic

judgements are grounded on the principle of general purposiveness. In his view, all human activity is goal-oriented and aesthetic judgements are particular instances of the general case.

The real problem with his account is that the derivation of aesthetic from general purposiveness is insufficiently specified. Although, as we have seen, Düsing recognises that aesthetic judgement displays the general case of empirical synthesis, he does not draw out the nature of the role played by the former. If we take seriously Kant's claims that aesthetic judgement contains the principle of judgement in an 'essential' way, then we must be able to account for this.

General purposiveness is ultimately teleological for Düsing.<sup>50</sup> Admittedly, in making this move he broadens the usage of 'teleology'. General purposiveness of nature is now teleological in a more foundational sense than are teleological judgements of organic entities. However, in rendering general purposiveness 'teleological'—a move Kant himself never makes—Düsing gives no account of how and why aesthetic judgements count as supplying an 'essential' expression of the former.

Düsing's account is extremely rich and has not been given the recognition it deserves in the English-speaking world. Nevertheless, his teleological interpretation does not sufficiently account for the primacy Kant gives to the aesthetic within the range of reflective judgement. Düsing's and my own are not, however, necessarily contradictory positions, for there is good reason to think that the combination of reflection with receptivity, revealed in aesthetic judgement, prepares the way for the *possibility* of ethically oriented agency in the world. I want, however, to leave open the gap between the aesthetically expressed possibility of both cognition and ethical action and their teleological fulfilment. In order to do so, we have to focus on the pre-objective orientation to things that is revealed in aesthetic judgement. Only then can the true force of the teleological notion of 'world' be grasped.

### **General purposiveness of nature as the activity of judgement per se**

I have shown that *all* exercise of reflective judgement, including aesthetic judgements, is dually oriented towards both nature and the subject. This is the peculiar activity of reflective judgement that can only ever respond to empirical nature indirectly through reflection on the subject's access to nature and can only ever count as self-reflection in the guise of a preoccupation with a given empirical intuition or concept.

But although I have argued for the relational structure of both empirical systematicity and aesthetic judgement, they clearly are not identical. Düsing's account took us some way towards recognising how aesthetic judgements reveal the general purposiveness of nature that makes empirical judgements possible. We have seen that Düsing's account establishes that

aesthetic judgements are not only species of empirical judgement, but also reveal how the subjective powers of cognition take up natural forms and thus make any empirical judgement possible. However, we have also seen that his teleologically oriented account does not explain how aesthetic judgement achieves this. In order to draw out the distinctive structure of aesthetic judgement we need to deploy both a distinction between levels and a recognition of the dually oriented structure of the purposiveness of nature, looking not only towards the subject but also towards the object.

I will show how the ‘harmony of the faculties’, distinctive of aesthetic judgements, symbolically reveals the possibility of empirical synthesis.<sup>51</sup> This will be achieved by examining the specific level at which aesthetic judgement is capable of revealing the characteristic structure of reflective judgement. The relational structure of reflective judgement, in general, is brought to light by the peculiarly free exchange between the faculties in the aesthetic case.

In so far as the principle of the purposiveness of nature for our judgement is necessary for the *possibility* of empirical synthesis, I think it makes sense here to speak of an empirical schematism. The schematism of the pure concepts of understanding is necessary for the application of pure concepts to appearances and not just to pure intuitions.<sup>52</sup> In the ‘Schematism’ chapter of the first *Critique* Kant thinks he has achieved this, because he announces that the schemata of pure concepts of understanding are the ‘true and sole conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess significance’.<sup>53</sup> The schemata count as rules ‘of synthesis of the imagination, in respect to pure figures in space’.<sup>54</sup> But Kant seems unaware of the fact that this would not yet qualify them as rules governing empirical appearances, which he earlier established as the criterion for a successful account.<sup>55</sup> If synthesis at the empirical level requires the principle of the purposiveness of nature then there is a case for concluding that only the *a priori* form of empirical schematism is established in the ‘Schematism’ chapter. Additionally, if the pure concepts of the understanding are to be shown to be applicable within experience, they must be articulated not only in relation to the pure intuition of time, but also in respect of the general form of empirical laws. This would count as the empirical schematism, which completes the project initiated in the official ‘Schematism’.<sup>56</sup>

In order to identify the specific status of aesthetic judgements, we must focus on the relation in which they stand to the *possibility*, not the actuality, of empirical schematism. In this regard it will be helpful to respond to Baz’s charge that Kant’s aesthetics ultimately operate in the service of his epistemology. The peculiar structure of aesthetic judgements is that they display a preoccupation with particular things given to us in the empirical world, yet they simultaneously allow us indirect access to the activity of judgement that makes possible access to that world. Beauty is not a mirror of empirical order, but rather a reflective insight into the activity of

reflection that first makes empirical order possible. Aesthetic judgement achieves this through a *double reflection*, simultaneously focussed on a particular phenomenon and on its conditions of possibility.

In the aesthetic case the pleasure arising from our attention to a phenomenon is disinterested, but clearly this does not mean that we are unconcerned with it. We have no (current) interest in knowing anything in particular about the thing; we do however reflect indirectly on what makes an object knowable in the first place. We are thrown back on the activity of judgement that first makes (empirical) cognition possible. Our faculties of intuition and cognition stand in an accord that *would* under other circumstances allow us to find a concept that could be schematised under an intuition, but in this case we linger with the intuition. What we are faced with is the possibility of empirical synthesis, but not its actuality. The possibility of synthesis is to be found in the productive relation in which the faculties stand to one another *in response to a given phenomenon*.

Indeed, the harmony between the given phenomenon and our capacity for judgement is such that it almost seems *as if* an empirical schematism—and an especially easy one at that—is about to be achieved. It is *as if* our aesthetic appreciation amounted to knowledge. The phenomenon offers no resistance to our apprehension of it. Neither does it appear resistant to our identifying it by a concept. However, despite this openness to our faculties of intuition and understanding, no determinate cognition results. This indirectness of access to the cognitive process, mediated by a liking for a particular phenomenon, is necessary for the specificity of reflection in question. Were the phenomenon to give rise to actual knowledge, it would not be capable of inciting a reflection on the *possibility* of empirical schematism.

As we have already seen, in an aesthetic judgement we are concerned first with an intuition.<sup>57</sup> The mere intuition suggests a possible resolution in a concept that in principle will never be given. Perhaps this beautiful thing means this or that, but we simply cannot tell what it finally means in so far as we remain at the level of aesthetic reflective judgement and the play of the faculties characteristic of it. This is a productive ignorance where a singular solution is refused and yet we contemplate the possibility of a plurality of different resolutions, which although unfulfilled, allow us further insights into the phenomenon under inspection.

Aesthetic judgement reveals the possibility of there being any judgement of a given empirical object in the first place, in so far as it allows us to reflect on the co-operative activity of our mental faculties, necessary for any cognition. The 'harmony of the faculties' is a particularly heightened form of this general condition of cognition. The harmony of the faculties is not a retreat into subjectivity, but instead reveals the way in which the mind is able to take up nature in the first place. In an aesthetic judgement we are receptive to a given phenomenon. In order for this to happen, empirical nature has to be purposive for our judgement, while our judgement must be

purposively oriented towards the empirical given. This is the purposiveness of nature for our judgement at the most general level, revealed in its dually oriented structure.

This deeper level of purposiveness is revealed by aesthetic judgements, in so far as they are particular instances of the purposiveness of nature for our judgement. But aesthetic judgements are principally pleasurable responses to particular things in the world, and are not merely exemplary of the general sense of purposiveness. The distinctive pleasure of an aesthetic judgement allows us access to the general purposiveness of nature that is the hidden presupposition of our empirical judgements.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, it is only through the pleasure arising from engagement with something in particular that a singular aesthetic judgement is capable of revealing purposiveness. Aesthetic judgements are the *ratio cognoscendi* for a process that cannot otherwise be accessed, although it is continually at work in our experience. Aesthetic pleasure displays the combination of receptivity and reflection necessary for any successful empirical judgement. Aesthetic judgement, alone, is a pure exercise of the reflective activity, which allows us access to the empirical world. Importantly, such an insight is not generalisable, as aesthetic judgements are strictly singular and arise in response to particular empirical objects or events. Our judgements concerning beautiful things count as exemplary exhibitions of our capacity for cognition in general. They do so necessarily through a peculiar lens that overtly allows us access to the thing or event under inspection, while indirectly allowing us a sidelong glance at the very activity of reflection.

So it simply is not the case, as Avner Baz claims in another recent article, that 'For Kant the particular thing in which we see beauty does not, in itself, *matter*—it is only against the background of some larger cognitive project that it does'.<sup>59</sup> The particular aesthetic event is only able to reveal the possibility of empirical cognition in so far as it resists our cognitive drive. There is something about the object or event that stimulates our cognitive activity while resisting our attempts to achieve cognitive synthesis. The universal structure of cognitive activity can only be displayed indirectly and in an exemplary fashion and this would not be possible were we not primarily engaged with the particular thing. The particular beautiful thing *must* matter for us if we are to be able to gain an insight into the mental activity that is necessary for cognition. We simply would not be able to reflect on that activity were there not already a primary commitment to the phenomenon on which we reflect. The indirectness of the reflective awareness of our own cognitive activity is characteristic of the structure of reflective judgement.<sup>60</sup> It is also consistent with Kant's general insistence that we cannot introspect our own transcendental activity.

Moreover, for Kant aesthetic objects or events are not 'unified wholes' as Baz suggests<sup>61</sup>: they are incomplete or, at best, virtual wholes. This is evident in the fact that they are not graspable by determining judgement. It

is also why they are able to give rise to an activity of judgement, which is accessible to our reflection just because we are not preoccupied with a cognitive end. The incompleteness of the aesthetic phenomenon is a necessary condition of its leading us to reflect on what it itself does not give rise to, namely, knowledge.

In general Baz overestimates the degree to which, for Kant, aesthetic judgements are subsumed under a general project of cognition, or at least he underestimates the duality of levels at which such judgements operate. The recognition of a general level of purposiveness revealing the possibility not the actuality of cognition would help correct Baz's 'one storey' interpretation of Kant's account. It is true that such judgements stand in a necessary connection to the cognitive project, but the crucial thing about Kant's account is that they are only capable of doing so in so far as they are *not* cognitive.

Baz believes that Kant is guilty of characterising human experience as essentially cognitive in its orientation. But the *Critique of Judgement* reveals that we are plurally oriented judging subjects, whose capacity for imagination mediates between cognitive and ethical interests.<sup>62</sup> The project of the third *Critique* is specifically to build a bridge between two irreducibly distinct orientations. I agree with Baz that Béatrice Longuenesse's Kant overplays the degree to which we exercise a will-to-know,<sup>63</sup> but this arises from the relative lack of attention she pays to Kant's account of aesthetic judgement and the *free* relation of the faculties that it displays.<sup>64</sup> For Baz, Kant's view is that aesthetics is simply an outpost of epistemology: for Kant, aesthetics is only able to unveil the possibility of knowledge in so far as it is independent of the latter. I wholly agree with Baz that the aesthetic calls for conceptualisation rather than being already fit for it, but this is just what Kant tells us.<sup>65</sup> Aesthetic judgement reveals only the *possible* fit between concept and intuition in so far as it displays a 'free lawfulness of the imagination'.<sup>66</sup>

We can now return to Kant's claim that judgements of beauty are grounded on the purposiveness of nature. I believe I have shown how this claim can be construed so as to render it coherent. Aesthetic judgements symbolically exhibit the possibility of empirical schematism and thus the general level of the purposiveness of nature for our judgement.<sup>67</sup> However Kant moves much too quickly from the level of the general possibility of empirical schematism to that of empirical systematicity, and it often sounds as if the latter, to which we now turn, is his real concern.

### **The principle of empirical systematicity and an instrumental concept of hierarchy**

The idea I have introduced is that the general level of purposiveness coincides with the possibility of empirical schematism, that is, the way in

which the co-operation of our faculties in response to a given intuition or phenomenon makes possible—although not actual—our knowledge of the latter. Empirical schematism is only possible in so far as we can presuppose that there is a form or order in nature that renders it accessible to our ordering minds. This presupposition is founded on the principle of the purposiveness of nature for our judgement. Aesthetic judgements can only reveal the accessibility of nature for judgement in a particular case and thus they establish the possibility of empirical cognition. Importantly, as we have seen, they can only do so in so far as they remain non-cognitive.

The next step in my argument is to establish that the systematicity of nature in a hierarchy of empirical laws is instrumental for the general level of purposiveness of nature. Empirical schematism is facilitated by making concrete the presupposition that there is an order across empirical nature. One way in which this occurs, as we have seen, is in aesthetic judgement. But the latter gives only singular examples and is not generalisable for empirical nature as a whole. Treating nature as if it were ordered according to a hierarchy of concepts and laws is another way of concretely treating empirical nature as if it were ordered in such a way that it is accessible to our minds. Importantly, this device has the structure of generality that is missing in aesthetic judgement. By suggesting that empirical knowledge is situated within a system, the principle of the formal purposiveness of nature encourages the further generation of empirical syntheses. If any particular empirical judgment can be situated relative to others within a hierarchy of concepts and laws, then one judgement leads on to others. Now this is characteristic of the way we actually proceed both in scientific investigation and in everyday life. In general we presuppose that our experience has *some* order, even though we anticipate that order rather than being able to state it once and for all. This order is thus strictly ‘for us’, but it helps us to make sense of the world. The empirical systematicity of nature is therefore a very helpful instrument for the specification of the general presupposition of the purposiveness of nature for our judgement.

Kant’s failure to strictly distinguish between two levels of purposiveness is perhaps understandable in so far as his primary focus is not the implementation of the principle of systematicity, but rather its transcendental basis in the faculty of judgement. In the third *Critique* Kant is not fundamentally interested in the further development of the workings of the hierarchy of concepts and laws, but rather in the way in which the latter throws us back on the distinctive principle of judgement.

A crucial account of the relation between the two levels of purposiveness comes in the transition between Sections VI and VII in the published Introduction. But, as we will see, although Kant clarifies part of the story by introducing the link between purposiveness and beauty, he also renders another part opaque in so far as he suggests that aesthetic judgement directly reveals the systematicity of empirical laws.

Kant argues that we need 'presentations' of the empirical order of nature because the idea is so indeterminate that we could assume the contrary position:

Yet judgment's presupposition [about this unity] is so indeterminate regarding the extent of that ideal purposiveness of nature for our cognitive power that if we are told that a deeper or broadened knowledge of nature based on observation must ultimately meet with a diversity of laws that no human understanding can reduce to a single principle, then we will be content with that too.<sup>68</sup>

In this passage the purposiveness of nature is immediately identified with its instrumental elaboration, that is, with the systematicity of empirical laws. The implication of what Kant says is that it could have been the case that our general view of nature was of chaos at the empirical level. Were there no possibility of unifying or systematising empirical laws, there could be no hope for empirical knowledge. For knowledge to be possible we must be able to unify what is given to us in experience at least to the extent of making sense of it. This does not require that we are able to achieve a final totality or unified field of all empirical laws, but it does entail that we are able to proceed *as if* such a final unification were possible. If we were forced to accept that it is equally likely that there is total chaos or unity at the empirical level, the cognitive project would be fundamentally undermined. What guards against this eventuality is our having available a principle of purposiveness, which, nevertheless, we find difficult to grasp.

Kant proceeds to suggest that the indeterminacy of our acquaintance with the principle that is necessary for our pursuit of empirical knowledge is compensated for in two ways: firstly, by the 'aesthetic presentation of the purposiveness of nature'<sup>69</sup> and, secondly, by the 'logical presentation of the purposiveness of nature'.<sup>70</sup> By these turns of phrase Kant refers to aesthetic and to teleological judgement, respectively. His suggestion is that both forms of reflective judgement supply 'presentations' of the principle that founds the unity or systematicity of the empirical laws of nature.<sup>71</sup>

In Section VII Kant goes on to examine the aesthetic presentation of the purposiveness of nature. He says that this is 'the purposiveness that precedes the cognition of an object'.<sup>72</sup> Pluhar suggests that this should be interpreted as 'the purposiveness we present in mere *intuition*'.<sup>73</sup> He is surely justified in this, as Kant says that the pleasure arising from this purposiveness 'is connected with mere apprehension (*apprehensio*) of the form of an object of intuition'.<sup>74</sup> So Kant is suggesting that the indeterminate idea of the systematicity of nature in its empirical laws is presented, that is, made apparent for us, in the intuitive or aesthetic contemplation of the form of an object. But how could this be so? The problem arises from Kant's running together the two levels of purposiveness of nature in Section VI. Aesthetic

judgements present singular and ungeneralisable instances of the *principle* on which empirical systematicity is based. This principle is the *general* purposiveness of nature for our judgement.

Elsewhere Kant seems to suggest that the systematic framework of empirical nature is an instrument for getting a grip on the general purposiveness of nature for our judgement, which would otherwise be indeterminate. In Section II of the 'First Introduction' we are told that if judgement is to be distinguished from the other faculties by its own concept or rule then this will be one of '*nature insofar as nature conforms to our power of judgment*'.<sup>75</sup> He then goes on to say: 'the only concept we could form of this character is that [nature's] arrangement conforms to the ability we have to subsume the particular laws, which are given, under more universal laws, even though these are not given'.<sup>76</sup> This suggests that the idea of nature conforming to our power of judgement is so indeterminate that we can only grasp it as a concept of empirical systematicity. A distinction between a more general and a more specified notion of the purposiveness of nature for our judgement is implied.

Despite the contrast at which this passage hints, Kant's point would be puzzling in conjunction with the passages we have just considered from the second Introduction, had we not already available to us a distinction between two levels of purposiveness. For otherwise it would appear that in the second Introduction he is saying that empirical systematicity is made accessible through aesthetic judgement, while in the first Introduction empirical systematicity counts as the mode of access to a more general level of purposiveness. And if aesthetic judgement is linked with the latter, this would result in his position being irredeemably incoherent. But now we can see that it is the general principle of purposiveness that is indeterminate, while both aesthetic judgement *and* the instrumental elaboration of purposiveness in the concept of a hierarchy of laws are distinct ways in which that indeterminacy can be partially grasped.

We now return to Kant's programmatic claim in the first Introduction that aesthetic judgements serve as an 'exposition' of the purposiveness of nature. They only count as such in so far as they are particular symbolic representations of the general principle of purposiveness. What probably encouraged Kant to collapse the levels of purposiveness is that aesthetic judgements may be seen as providing *indirect* encouragement for our expectation of empirical systematicity. This is because aesthetic judgements entail a reflection on the principle on which empirical systematicity is based. Aesthetic judgements are thus capable of showing that it is possible *in principle* that there is order across the range of experience. But the link between aesthetic judgement and empirical systematicity is much more indirect than many of Kant's statements would suggest.

The two concrete applications of the general purposiveness of nature are complementary. In the case of aesthetic judgement we have a sidelong

insight into the cognitive activity that makes knowledge possible. But this is strictly experienced in relation to a singular and ungeneralisable instance that matters for us in its own right. There is no immediate apperception of the mind's formative relation to the world, but we encounter an example that encourages our hope that we may be able to know empirical objects. In contrast to this, the presupposition of the possibility of empirical systematicity in our everyday experience is an application of our capacity for cognition and is instrumental in that success encourages further knowledge-seeking activity. Empirical systematicity does not throw us back on the pure activity of mind in response to a world, but rather encourages us to believe that we are capable of achieving empirical knowledge in the very process of judging. Aesthetic judgements count as concrete revelations of the transcendental presupposition on which this assumption is grounded. Both contribute to what must remain an *epistemological project, not a fait accompli*. The best we can do epistemologically is to maintain 'cognitive hope' in the face of the possibility of cognitive failure, for if we could not fail to know, we could never attain knowledge. The gap between the principle revealed by aesthetic judgements and the strategy of empirical systematicity is essential for the open field into which we venture when we seek to know something in the world.

### **Conclusion: the real point of aesthetic judgements**

So what is the value of aesthetic judgements according to Kant? Do they have a significance for the relation in which we stand to nature? Avner Baz has suggested that they do, in so far as the missing point of Kant's aesthetics is a shared cognitive project. I believe that he has correctly grasped part of the story, but has substituted a part for the whole of Kant's systematic position. In this he has undoubtedly been encouraged by many of the dominant readings of Kant and by Kant's own failure to fully clarify his position.

Baz is in considerable agreement with what he sees as the phenomenological description afforded by Kant's aesthetics. Thus he agrees that what we call beautiful calls for a 'prolonged and ever renewable perceptual engagement', is inexpressible without remainder in words, and gives rise to an inter-subjective appeal.<sup>77</sup> He takes issue, however, with the transcendental story that seeks to explain beauty as arising from a shared cognitive task. Baz argues that it is phenomenologically false that judgements of beauty are motivated by such a task, while a transcendental account of the general project of cognition has no explanatory value for why I or you call something beautiful.<sup>78</sup> He argues that if we are to understand the significance of calling something beautiful, we must start from the care we display for particular things in the world. We may then build a more general account on the basis of this.<sup>79</sup>

It would not be possible here to give an independent evaluation of Baz's alternative strategy for aesthetics, nor can I assess fully the disagreement between Baz and Kant on the status of the transcendental basis of aesthetic judgement. However I would like to suggest some ways in which Baz's account misrepresents Kant's position. As I have argued throughout this article, the transcendental basis of Kant's aesthetics is not aimed at defending a cognitive task. Nevertheless aesthetic judgements indirectly show how cognition first becomes possible as a development of a primary engagement with the world, characterised by our combination of receptivity with reflection. Moreover, aesthetic judgement displays a plurally constituted subject oriented not only towards the possibility of cognition, but also towards the possibility of morality.

I have further argued that, in Kant's aesthetics, the analysis of the structure of experience is exhibited only in the medium of a particular engagement with something in the world. Calling something beautiful starts with a singular judgement in response to a particular empirical object. If this is right, transcendental structure can no longer be detached from phenomenological description in the way Baz suggests. In aesthetic appreciation the transcendental is just about visible at a phenomenological level. This is only possible through the lens of things that matter to us much more directly than does our transcendental reflection on the possibility of the pleasure we take in them.

Clarifying these limitations in Baz's reading of Kant allows me to reinforce what I believe I have established in this article. Kant's aesthetics seeks to uncover something that is all too easily missed, namely that we stand in relation to empirical nature only in so far as we are capable of presupposing that, at least in principle, it will make sense to us. Aesthetic judgements foster this presupposition because the beautiful thing presents itself in a way that is conducive to the combination of receptivity with reflection, that is, with the general conditions for the possibility of cognition. This general transcendental truth is only accessible to us indirectly through a phenomenological engagement with the world. The elusiveness of our grasp of this possibility is the real hidden point of Kant's account of aesthetic judgement.

## Notes

1. Avner Baz (2005) 'Kant's principle of purposiveness and the missing point of (aesthetic) judgements' [from now on 'Kant's principle of purposiveness'] *Kantian Review* Vol. 10, p. 30. The phrase is Paul Guyer's. Baz refers to Guyer (1996) *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* (New York: Cambridge University Press [2<sup>nd</sup> edition]) pp. 104–5.
2. Henry Allison (2001) *Kant's Theory of Taste* (Cambridge University Press) p. 59.
3. The position that the principle of purposiveness of nature is *imposed* on nature by the mind, as distinct from the often accompanying conviction that the application of the categories of understanding also amounts to an imposition, is to be found in the

following interpretations: Gerd Buchdahl 'The Kantian Dynamic of Reason' in *Kant Studies Today* L. W. Beck (Ed.) p. 342; Robert Pippin (1979) 'Kant on empirical concepts' *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* Vol. 11, pp. 1–19, especially p. 16; Paul Guyer (1979) *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Cambridge University Press) p. 49. In contrast, see Konrad Marc-Wogau (1938) *Vier Studien zu Kants Kritik der Urteilkraft* [Uppsala] p. 17 'The principle of reflective judgement, according to Kant, is not a law that judgement lays down for nature'. [My translation.]

4. Baz, 'Kant's principle of purposiveness' p. 22. For an explicit discussion of Baz's relation to Heidegger, see 'What's the point of calling out beauty?' (from now on, 'What's the point?') *British Journal of Aesthetics* Vol. 44, No. 1, January 2004, pp. 57–72, see p. 69.
5. Kant *Critique of Judgment* (= *CJ*) Translated by W. Pluhar [Hackett, Indiana, 1987] and *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften* herausgegeben von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften [Berlin 1902– ] commonly referred to as the '*Akademische Ausgabe*' [=AA from now on], Band V. References to the unpublished first Introduction included in Band XX will be primed. The distinction between transcendental and empirical systematicity is referred to at AA 179–80.
6. See *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology* Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming 2007.
7. Allison *op. cit.*, pp. 38–9.
8. AA 251' [Section XII].
9. The 'Analytic of Teleological Judgment' is not organised in the way Kant suggests.
10. AA 242'.
11. AA 243', Section XI. Unless signalled otherwise, additions in square brackets are Pluhar's.
12. AA 193.
13. AA 187.
14. Allison *op. cit.*, Chapter One, especially p. 34. See also p. 33 on how the application of concepts entails order at the empirical level. This order can only be supplied by the reflective principle of empirical systematicity. I give an alternative, though complementary, account to Allison's of the role played by reflective judgement in empirical cognition in *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology*.
15. See Allison *op. cit.*, pp. 59–61, Baz 'Kant's principle of purposiveness' pp. 8–12.
16. Allison *op. cit.*, p. 59. However, see AA 246 and the discussion of purposiveness in the *Dialectic of Taste*.
17. Allison, *op. cit.* p. 64.
18. *ibid.*, pp. 176–7. I discuss this point in *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology*.
19. Baz, 'Kant's principle of purposiveness' p. 28, note 13.
20. *ibid.*, p.1. Baz is heavily influenced by Stanley Cavell in his focus on the 'point' of aesthetics. See 'On when words are called for' *Inquiry* Vol. 46 (4), 2003, p. 479 ff..
21. Baz, 'Kant's principle of purposiveness' p. 30.
22. It is for this reason that I would resist Baz's claim that Kant's aesthetics cannot articulate everyday concepts such as "love" and "gratitude" and "hospitality" and "forgiveness" and "resentment" and "avoidance" etc." *ibid.*, p. 17. Baz's is a very serious point, for were Kant's aesthetics incapable of accounting for such feelings and values it would be in a parlous state. But Baz has been too attentive to the cognitive bias of some of Kant's most influential interpreters, rather than to the complexity of the text itself. He is, I am sure, aware that other interpreters hold that the deduction of aesthetic judgements is not cognitive but, rather, moral. See Donald Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1974) p. 145 ff..
23. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
24. *ibid.*, p. 61.

25. *ibid.*, p. 61.
26. In a note at the end of the penultimate section.
27. Allison *op. cit.*, p. 62, in response to Guyer *Kant and the Claims of Taste* pp. 61–2.
28. *ibid.*, p. 64. He identifies the principle as that of the reflective use of judgement. In his account of the Deduction he identifies this as strictly subjective (p. 177).
29. Kant refers to this use of reflective judgement as ‘logical purposiveness’ in the First Introduction at AA 216’-217, whereas he refers to it as ‘formal purposiveness’ in the published Introduction AA 181.
30. AA 193.
31. Allison follows Marc-Wogau’s usage *op. cit.*, p. 28. See Allison *op. cit.*, p. 30. My preference arises from Kant’s also using ‘logical presentation of the purposiveness of nature’ to refer to teleological judgement. See AA 192. Allison may be motivated to select a terminology that does not suggest a systematic link between empirical systematicity and aesthetic judgements, which also count as formally purposive.
32. AA 219’, Section VII of First Introduction. Allison, however, does not raise this point. Just as in the expression the ‘technic of nature’, the ‘technic of judgement’ is another expression for judgement’s purposiveness.
33. AA 220’.
34. AA 220’-1’. I discuss this passage in *Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology*.
35. In this passage reflective judgement operates on an already existent empirical concept, whereas elsewhere the former is said to be the source of empirical concepts. See Allison *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31, on the diversity of roles played by reflective judgement and on the link between these. He draws our attention to Hannah Ginsborg’s argument that there is a connection between some of the central (cognitive) functions of reflective judgement. See Ginsborg (1990) *The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition* (New York and London: Garland Publishing Company) p. 190.
36. See, for instance, AA 192, 246, 202’, 214’, 215’, 216’ and 221’. AA 249’ is particularly important for here Kant says with reference to beauty ‘the form of an object even on its own, i.e., in mere intuition without concepts, is perceived as purposive for reflective judgement, and here we attribute the subjective purposiveness to the thing and to nature itself’. [My emphasis.] Kant also refers to the ‘[ideal] purposiveness of nature for our cognitive power’ at AA 184, 189, 193 and, even, to ‘this purposiveness of nature for our understanding’ at AA 187/8.
37. Klaus Düsing (1968) *Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff* [from now on *Die Teleologie*] (Bouvier u. Co. Verlag Bonn) p. 84.
38. Düsing does not claim to be the first to uncover this distinction in Kant. He cites, for instance, Cassirer’s *Kants Leben und Lehre*. See Düsing *Die Teleologie* p.14. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 63 remarks that Düsing recognises that Kant slips between these levels. He refers to Düsing, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
39. Düsing *op. cit.*, p. 84. My translation and emphasis.
40. See, for instance, *ibid.*, p. 11.
41. *ibid.*, p. 84. He further says that the hierarchy of empirical laws is founded on the same principle. Compare Allison’s conclusion *op. cit.*, p. 64.
42. Allison *op. cit.*, p. 63.
43. See Düsing *op. cit.*, ‘Introduction’ pp. 9–11.
44. See, for instance, *ibid.*, p. 52.
45. This is very close to what I will later call the possibility of empirical schematism.
46. Düsing *Die Teleologie* p. 81.
47. *ibid.*, p. 82 citing AA 233/4’.
48. Düsing *op. cit.*, p. 133.
49. *ibid.*, p. 132.

50. *ibid.*, p. 10 'Auch die allgemeine Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur soll hier mit Teleologie bezeichnet werden.' 'General purposiveness of nature should also count here as teleological.' [My translation.]
51. Although many commentators deny this, other authors also suggest that aesthetic judgements are related to the possibility of empirical synthesis. I have already shown that this is Düsing's position. See *Die Teleologie* p. 81. Another author who makes this connection is Christel Fricke. See her *Kants Theorie des reinen Geschmacksurteils* p.115. However, Fricke identifies the purposiveness of nature directly with the systematicity of empirical laws, whereas I argue that there is a more general sense of purposiveness prior to empirical systematicity. Fred Rush makes an interesting argument for a way in which aesthetic reflection, as a synthesis achieving 'proleptic unities', can be linked to perception and conception. However, he is not at all concerned with the problem of how to make sense of Kant's claim that aesthetic judgement is an exhibition of empirical systematicity. Nor is his argument focussed on judgements of taste but, rather, on their prior condition in aesthetic reflection. Fred L. Rush, Jr. (1992) 'The harmony of the faculties' *Kant-Studien, Heft 1*, pp. 38–61, especially pp. 59–60.
52. Kant *Critique of Pure Reason, Akademische Ausgabe*, Bände III & IV, A138, B177.
53. *ibid.*, A146, B185.
54. *ibid.*, A141, B180.
55. *ibid.*, A 137, B 176.
56. Christel Fricke speaks of empirical schemata. See *op. cit.*, p. 115, as does Robert Pippin in *Kant's Theory of Form* p. 143 ff.. Neither, however, speaks of an empirical schematism as such. In my *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology* I additionally argue that a spatial schematism can be uncovered in the 'Principles' chapter.
57. *CJ*, AA 220'.
58. Kant makes this argument in the published Introduction, Section VI 'On the Connection to the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Purposiveness of Nature' AA 186—188. The pleasure associated with aesthetic judgement is a presentation of the order in empirical nature, which is so indeterminate that we can easily lose sight of it. See, in particular, AA 188. This is my response to Allison's third objection to Kant.
59. Baz 'What's the point?' p. 69. He repeats this claim in 'Kant's principle of purposiveness' p. 20. Baz's general position, strongly inspired by that of Stanley Cavell, is set out in 'On when words are called for: Cavell, McDowell, and the wording of the world' *Inquiry* Vol. 46, pp. 473–500.
60. Earlier I alluded to this. It arises from the dually oriented focus of reflective judgement and is the basis for the peculiar status of aesthetic judgement as a *dual reflection*.
61. Baz 'What's the point?' p. 68. Here Baz is responding to Guyer's interpretation of Kant in the latter's *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* p. 105.
62. See, for instance, AA 210, where human beings are distinguished from purely animal and purely rational beings in so far as they are preoccupied with beauty: 'beauty [holds] only for human beings'.
63. Baz 'What's the point' p. 64. Baz refers to Béatrice Longuenesse (1998) *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) p. 42.
64. Baz tars Allison with the same brush in 'Kant's principle of purposiveness' p.14, but contrast the latter's criticism of Longuenesse in Allison *op. cit.*, p. 353–4 note 2. It is true that Allison's account is quite epistemic in orientation, but he is not insensitive to the distinctiveness of cognitive and aesthetic judgement. Indeed this is the point of his reading of the subjective status of the deduction of the third *Critique*.
65. Baz, 'Kant's principle of purposiveness' p. 22.
66. AA 240.
67. Building on the interpretation developed in this section, I believe I can begin to answer Allison's fifth objection to the link Kant makes between purposiveness of nature and

aesthetic judgements, namely that it leaves artistic beauty without an *a priori* basis. The possibility of empirical schematism is revealed not only by natural beauty, but also in our response to art works. In viewing a painting or an installation it is *as if* we were gaining knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation, while, in fact, cognitively speaking, we have only a tacit insight into what Kants calls 'cognition in general'. Moreover in our world there is very little, if any, 'pristine' nature and many artworks incorporate 'found' elements. Clearly, this is merely the beginning of a response to a very interesting challenge and an expression of my view, not Kant's.

- 68. AA 188, Section VI.
- 69. AA 188. This is the title of Section VII.
- 70. AA 192. This is the title of Section VIII.
- 71. AA 187–8, Section VI. I will not discuss the teleological presentation of the purposiveness of nature in this article.
- 72. AA 189.
- 73. Pluhar p. 29, Note 32 to AA 189.
- 74. AA 189.
- 75. AA 202' (Kant's emphasis).
- 76. AA 202'.
- 77. Baz, 'Kant's principle of purposiveness' p. 22.
- 78. *ibid.*, p. 20.
- 79. *ibid.*, p. 20.

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