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# PLATO

## *Gorgias*

Translated with notes by  
**TERENCE IRWIN**

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## Preface

The *Gorgias* discusses questions about the foundation and justification of ethics that deserve the attention of any thoughtful person; its main arguments and claims can be understood and appraised by someone with no previous knowledge of Plato or of philosophy. In my Introduction and Notes I have tried to help such a reader; my main aim has been to explain the philosophical doctrines, arguments, and assumptions found in the dialogue, and to suggest not always to answer some of the questions that a critical reader should ask. But the full understanding of the dialogue requires some knowledge of its place in Plato's development, and of its social, political, historical, and intellectual context; I have said something about all this, and could easily have said more. The *Gorgias* also deserves literary study for its style, structure, characterization, and dramatic and rhetorical techniques; and it is an important document in the history of Greek rhetoric and its relations to philosophy. On these points I have said little, not because they are uninteresting or unimportant, but because I could not both discuss these and fulfil my main task within the rigid limits of space.

Some people who have heard that Plato is a great philosopher are surprised and dismayed when they read a dialogue and find apparently bad arguments; others suppose that they cannot really be bad arguments; others believe that since the arguments are bad, Plato cannot mean them seriously. The *Gorgias* inescapably raises these questions, since it is amply stocked with apparently fallacious arguments. I believe that some bad arguments seem to Plato to be good arguments, and I have tried to say what is wrong with them. But I have tried not to stop there. A fair critic should ask whether the faults in the arguments are relatively superficial, and whether Plato's position can be defended with better Platonic arguments. This is the only fair way to evaluate Plato's views.

There are already some good English translations of this dialogue; most of them are smoother and more idiomatic than mine. Instead of doing what has already been done, I have tried to stay close to the

Greek, even at the expense of idiomatic English. As far as seemed reasonable, I have tried to translate important Greek terms in the same way throughout; where this did not seem reasonable. I have sometimes included the Greek term in brackets in the translation, and usually discussed the term and the translation in the Notes.

There is an excellent English commentary on the Greek text, by E. R. Dodds. It discusses thoroughly the textual and linguistic points; and it displays an interest in the philosophical content not always found in philological commentaries. I have not hesitated to borrow from Dodds, since I assume that not all my readers will be using his edition too; but naturally, my aim and approach are different from his.

I have benefited from the acute and careful criticism of translation and Notes by Michael Woods. For help and criticism I am grateful to Richard Kraut, who wrote detailed and helpful comments on my Notes, to Martha Nussbaum, and to my colleagues Gail Fine and Allen Wood. To Gregory Vlastos I am indebted for his criticisms of this book; for his own work, a model and a challenge for students of Plato's ethics; and for his generous help and advice.

T. H. IRWIN  
CORNELL UNIVERSITY,  
ITHACA, NEW YORK  
MAY 1978

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## Abbreviations

## Ancient Authors

Abbreviations used for ancient authors and works should be intelligible from the lists in LSJ and *OCD*. Some frequently used abbreviations:

Aesch.	Aeschylus
<i>Ap.</i>	Plato, <i>Apology</i>
Ar.	Aristotle
<i>Ch.</i>	Plato, <i>Charmides</i>
<i>Cri.</i>	Plato, <i>Crito</i>
<i>EN</i>	Aristotle, <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>
<i>Eu.</i>	Plato, <i>Euthyphro</i>
<i>Eud.</i>	Plato, <i>Euthydemus</i>
<i>HMa.</i>	Plato, <i>Hippias Major</i>
<i>HMi.</i>	Plato, <i>Hippias Minor</i>
Hdt.	Herodotus
<i>La.</i>	Plato, <i>Laches</i>
<i>Lys.</i>	Plato, <i>Lysis</i>
<i>M.</i>	Plato, <i>Meno</i>
<i>Phd.</i>	Plato, <i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Phdr.</i>	Plato, <i>Phaedrus</i>

*Pr.* Plato, *Protagoras*

*R.* Plato, *Republic*

*Thuc.* Thucydides

*Xen.* Xenophon

#### Other Abbreviations

*AJP* *American Journal of Philology*

*CP* *Classical Philology*

*CQ* *Classical Quarterly*

*DK* Diels, H., and Kranz, W., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. 6th edn., Berlin, 1951. Partial trans, in K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers*,

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Oxford, 1948 and in R. K. Sprague, ed., *The Older Sophists*, Columbia, S.C., 1972.

*HSCP* *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*

*JHP* *Journal of the History of Philosophy*

*JHS* *Journal of Hellenic Studies*

*LSJ* Liddell, H. G., and Scott, R., *GreekEnglish Lexicon*. 9th edn., revised by H. S. Jones and R. Mac-Kenzie, Oxford, 1925-40.

*OCD* *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard. 2nd edn., Oxford, 1970.

*PAS* *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*

*PASS* *Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*

*PQ* *Philosophical Quarterly*

*PR* *Philosophical Review*

*Phil.* *Philosophy*

*Phr.* *Phronesis*

*RM* *Review of Metaphysics*

*SVF* *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. H. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1905.

## Introduction

(For details of works cited see *Bibliography*)

1. Though much of the argument of the dialogue is self-contained, it also discusses general questions about Socrates' methods and doctrines which arise in dialogues probably written earlier (*Ap.*, *Cri.*, *Eu.*, *La.*, *Ch.*, *Lys.*, *Eud.*, *HMi.*, *Ion*, *Pr.*, of which the *Pr.* is probably the latest). To see the places of the *G.* in Plato's developing views, it is as well to consider some of the earlier dialogues and the questions they raise.

2. Socrates uses the method of 'cross-examination' or 'refutation' (*elenchos*, cognate verb *elenchein*; see 473b), applied to other people's accounts of particular virtues. He asks the question 'What is it?', e.g. 'What is piety (or the pious), courage, etc.?'; cf. *Eu.* 5cd, 6de, *La.* 190bc, *Ch.* 158e-159a (see Robinson (2), chs. 2, 3, 5. Nakhnikian (1)). The interlocutor offers an account of what the virtue is to answer the question. Socrates presents counter-examples to this account, or attacks it in some other way, until the interlocutor agrees that it is wrong and conflicts with his other beliefs about this virtue and other virtues. At *La.* 192b-d, for example, Laches is made to argue as follows:

(1) Endurance is courage.

(2) Courage is fine and beneficial.

(3) Not all endurance is fine and beneficial.

(4) Endurance is not courage.

This is Socrates' method for exposing the unsuspected ignorance of his interlocutors and making them clearer about the virtues (cf. *Ap.* 29e). Its successful working depends on the interlocutor's cooperation in answering sincerely (*G.* 487e, 495ab, 500b, *Cri.* 49d, *M.* 83d, *La.* 193c, *Pr.* 331bc, Robinson (2), 78), and facing the consequences of his own admissions. The method of refutation shows that we always have a choice between giving up our original definition, e.g. (1) above, or our judgement about examples, as in (3), or our general assumption that virtue is fine and beneficial. Socrates assumes that (1) or (3) (usually (1); but cf. *La.* 196e-197c) rather than

(2) should be given up in such cases. See further Vlastos (11), xxiv-xxxi.

3. Socrates also relies on (2) for further conclusions about the virtues. In assuming that each virtue is fine and beneficial, he assumes that it is always good for the agent (that is how he argues for (3) above; cf. *Ch.* 175e-176a, *Eud.* 278e-281d). 'Good for the agent' is explained as 'promoting the agent's "doing well" (*eu prattein*) or "happiness" (*eudaimonia*, *Eud.* 278e, 280b, *Ch.* 172a, *M.* 88c; see further *G.* 468b).

4. He relies further on (2) to argue that each virtue is knowledge of what is good for the agent. For in both the *La.* and the *Ch.* the argument concentrates eventually on knowledge, to the exclusion of feelings or emotions or other non-cognitive states (e.g. endurance, shame) which are the initial candidates for being virtuous states of character. See *La.* 194cd, *Ch.* 165c; after this point in each dialogue it is taken for granted that the virtue being investigated is no more than knowledge. Socrates speaks of this knowledge (*episteme* \*) as some kind of craft (*techne*\*), a productive skill and knowledge analogous in relevant and helpful ways to the craft of the shoemaker or carpenter (see *G.* 447c). He praises the rationality of crafts and the rational understanding of craftsmen (*Ap.* 22cd), and often speaks of virtue and knowledge in terms appropriate to a craft (see *Ch.* 165c-166b, 174b-175a, *Eud.* 288d-292e, *G.* 460b).

5. This analogy between virtue and craft needs to be defended against the natural reply that knowledge is always liable to be ineffective or open to misuse if it is not associated with the right desires; if this is so, virtue must apparently be more than knowledge, since virtue results in the right action, and knowledge alone apparently does not. This difficulty is suggested in the *HMi.*, especially 375d-376c. To defend the craft-analogy for virtue Socrates must show that knowledge is sufficient for virtue, that no non-cognitive states are necessary. He does not argue for this claim, but assumes its truth, in the *La.* and *Ch.* He does argue for it as *Pr.* 354e-357e. He argues in two stages:

(1) If A knows or believes at time *t* that *x* is better for him than *y*, then A chooses *x* in preference to *y* at *t*.

(2) Virtue is knowledge of what benefits the agent.

It follows that someone who knows what a virtuous person knows will act on that knowledge. See Penner (1); for different views on the *La.* and *Ch.* see Santas (3), (4).

Relying on these arguments, Socrates identifies each of the virtues with the knowledge of what benefits the agent, and so identifies each of the virtues with each other his doctrine of the Unity of Virtue, implicitly accepted at the end of the *La.* and *Ch.*, and explicitly defended in the *Pr.* See Penner (2), and for different views, Vlastos (15), Santas, *opp. citt.*

6. This summary should expose one paradox of the *elenchos*. Socrates seems to assert nothing positive on his own behalf, but only to expose conflicts in the interlocutors' claims. But it is not so simple. Clearly much depends on what is left unchallenged in the discussion. A sceptic about the *elenchos* might claim, as Polus and Callicles do, that Socrates reaches the conclusion he wants simply because the interlocutor naïvely or foolishly accepts an unjustified assumption (*G.* 461b, 482c-e). Polus and Callicles both challenge the assumption that ordinary justice is both fine and beneficial. Polus claims that it is fine but not beneficial; Callicles claims that it is neither. To defend himself Socrates needs to argue that the assumptions he relies on are legitimate; and he argues this in the *G.* At 467c-468c he argues that we always desire and choose what we think best; and he argues against both Polus and Callicles that one of the virtues, justice, is knowledge of what is good for the agent.

7. The assumptions about virtue and motivation which guide the *elenchos* raise a special question about justice (*dikaiosune* \*), the recognized virtue concerned with someone's behaviour towards other people, especially towards the associations and communities he belongs to, and especially towards his political community, the 'city' or 'state' (*polis*). It is fairly easy to see how my courage (roughly, vigour in pursuit of my rational plans) and my temperance (moderation in the pursuit of aims conflicting with my rational plans) benefit me as Socrates claims they do especially when he reduces both of them to knowledge of what benefits me. It is less obvious how my justice benefits me, as Socrates claims it does. If I keep a promise, or pay a debt, or respect your property, or serve in the army, I apparently benefit other people, not myself. I may

benefit from other people's justice (*Pr.* 327ab); but how do I benefit from mine? Socrates assumes in *Ap.* 28b-29b, *Cri.* 47d-48b, that the same assumptions work for justice as for the other virtues a man is always worse off if he is unjust and acts unjustly. But here Socrates does not argue for his claim. If he cannot justify it, his failure with justice may make us sceptical about the adequacy of the *elenchos* to reach a true view of the virtues; for it will apparently give us no reason to accept any moral requirement to respect or benefit other people.

8. These aspects of Socrates' methods and doctrines in the earlier dialogues underlie much of the argument in the *G.* It is Plato's defence of Socrates, his life, his methods and his doctrines, against various challenges.

(1) The methods of the *elenchos* are often discussed. Socrates is anxious to distinguish its methods from those of the rhetor and the politician. 447c, 461d-462b, 471d, 475e, 482cd, 487c. It is not mere cross-questioning to expose inconsistency in the interlocutor's views. 453bc, 457c, 461bc, 481d, 482cd, 497a. It relies on the sincere attention and agreement of the single interlocutor, 466e, 468e, 471d, 475e, 479c, 480b, 487e, 494d, 495ab, 505d-506a. If another interlocutor challenges the agreement, the question must be re-examined, 461 cd, 482cd, 513c, *Cri.* 46b. None the less the *elenchos* is a method for discovering the truth and reaching justified confidence in its results. 495b, 505e, 508e. It requires the interlocutor to lay open for examination his most cherished convictions on important questions, and seeks to change them radically (467a, 487e, 495e).

(2) It is natural to object that such results as Socrates appears to achieve in other dialogues depend on the common moral prejudices he shares with his interlocutors, and that if he faces a less pliant interlocutor, free of these prejudices, he will not be able to achieve these results (461bc, 482c-483a). Socrates replies that even the toughest interlocutor, Callicles, must find himself admitting, even reluctantly, the truth of Socrates' views. Agreement between Socrates and Callicles will show that Socrates' beliefs are inescapable for any rational person (487e, 508ab, 508e-509c).

(3) Socrates defends the claims about knowledge, motivation, and

action which are needed to support his claim that knowledge is sufficient for virtue (467c-468c; but see below § 9 (6)).

(4) He defends his assumptions about justice more systematically in the arguments with Polus and Calicles than in any earlier dialogue.

(5) Socrates often defends his own way of life, which he thinks is the wisest life to lead if and only if his beliefs about justice are true. And so the *G.* often refers to actions and attitudes found in the *Ap.* and *Cri.* (see 473e-474a, 480b, 486ab, 512d-513a, 521e-522c). The connection with the *Cri.* is especially close (see 461cd, 472ab, 473de, 474c, 477c, 480b, 481d, 482cd, 483b, 492e-493d, 508c-e, 511b, 521ab, 522e).

9. The place of the *G.* in the chronology of Plato's dialogues is hard to fix. Here is some relevant evidence:

(1) Aristotle distinguishes the historical Socrates from Plato on three grounds: (a) He did not 'separate' the forms (*Met.* 987b1-8, 1078b17-32, 108662-7). (b) He disclaimed knowledge (*SE* 18366-8). (c) He was concerned with ethics, not with nature as a whole (*Met.* locc. citt., *PA* 642a28-30). These three features associate the *G.* with the shorter 'Socratic' dialogues rather than with the *Phd.*, *Symp.*, and *R.*, which show the distinctively Platonic interests, or with the *M.* and *Cra.*, which show signs of some of these interests.

(2) Aristotle's claim about the separation of the forms raises one of the most important and difficult questions about Plato's philosophical development. In all the early dialogues Socrates thinks the answer to the question 'What is the *F*?' will pick out some single entity 'the *F*' (e.g. the pious, the just) present in all *F* things, explaining why they are *F*. This single entity is called a 'form' (*eidōs*) or 'character' (*idea*); see esp. *Eu.* 5d, 6de, *Pr.* 329c-330b, *La.* 189e-190c. The *Phd.* is normally taken to represent a change in Plato's doctrine. He now argues that the forms are 'not the same' as their sensible embodiments (*Phd.* 74a-d, 76a). This is the doctrine Aristotle calls the separation of the forms, which distinguishes Plato from Socrates. The *G.* regularly more often than other early dialogues uses some of the terminology of forms; but attention to its role in individual passages shows that the metaphysics of the *Phd.* is not presupposed. This evidence is consistent with, and even tends to support, the view that the *G.* is later than the shorter, 'Socratic'

dialogues (see the first list in § 1 above), but earlier than the *Cra.*, *HMa.*, *M.*, *Phd.* For different views on this controversial question see Ross chs. 1-2, Shorey (2) especially 27-40, (3) 65-73, Allen (1), (2), 129-66, White, ch. 1, Irwin, 291-3.

(3) Some have found a certain crudity and awkwardness of construction in the *G.*, and inferred a relatively early date; see A. E. Taylor, 103. The inference is insecure, and the initial assumption is not easily shared by anyone who has considered the very careful arrangement of the interlocking arguments of the dialogue. If the complex structure counts one way or the other on the chronological question, it suggests that the *G.* is later than the shorter and simpler dialogues; even the *Pr.* does not display the same interweaving of themes, and the carefully managed returns to earlier questions when materials have been provided for answering them (see analysis, § 15 below).

(4) Socrates' tone is much more positive and dogmatic than in the shorter dialogues. He does not search for definitions, answers to his 'What is it?' question, to the same extent as in the shorter dialogues. Indeed, he seems to provide answers freely and uncharacteristically for someone who knows only the shorter dialogues (454b-e, 464b-e, 475a, 491d, 507a-c). There are long speeches setting out Socrates' views, and long stretches with only periodic or perfunctory assent by the interlocutor (464b-e, 486e-488b, 507a-509c, 511c-513c, 517b-519d). Socrates' apologies for his speech-making suggest that it is not normal Socratic practice, and that in the *G.* Plato is unused enough to the new practice to think that it needs explanation (465e-466a, 519d). This difference from the shorter dialogues should not be over-stressed. The *Ap.* and *Cri.* include exposition of positive doctrine. But the *Ap.* is a special case, being a speech at a trial; and in the *Cri.* the positive exposition is partly placed in the mouth of 'the laws'. The *Pr.* expounds Socrates' positive doctrine; but the change from dialogue to pure exposition is much less marked than in the *G.* (cf. e.g. 353c-356c; cf. *G.* 506c-507c); while there are long speeches, they are not primarily presented as expositions of Socratic views. Nor should we contrast the *G.* with the shorter dialogues with the over-simple claim that it contains more positive doctrine. The shorter dialogues contain positive doctrine too (as we

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have argued above). What is different is the fairly systematic exposition and defence.

(5) Perhaps this also explains why Socrates' standard 'What is it?' question is less prominent in the *G.* Instead of searching for a definition, Socrates presents a definition of rhetoric, embedded in a fairly elaborate taxonomy of genus and differentiae (463a-466a), and showing none of his usual hesitation about giving definitions of his own. The *Pr.* is somewhat similar, in so far as it offers an account of what the many call 'being overcome by pleasure' (357cd), and assumes an account of courage (360d). But the *Pr.* ends with Socrates' claim not to know what virtue is (361cd); he is not satisfied that his claims have been supported by a satisfactory fundamental account of virtue. The *G.* is less hesitant. Even though Socrates does not explicitly set out to find a definition of the virtues, the argument with Calicles yields one, or at least a schema of one (507a-c), and Socrates expresses no doubts about its truth (but see 508e-509a).

(6) The *G.* sometimes seems to differ from the shorter dialogues in ways that plausibly suggest that Plato sometimes draws out consequences of his earlier views, sometimes raises objections, sometimes replies to objections: (a) The treatment of psychic conflict, and the account of virtue as psychic harmony, seem to conflict with the Socratic Paradox and the claim that knowledge is sufficient for virtue; see 491d, 507bc. (b) Socrates discusses the political implications of his moral doctrines more fully than in the shorter dialogues. (c) His views on hedonism seem to imply the rejection of the views of the *Pr.* (see § 10 below).

(7) The *G.* ends with a myth about the afterlife, displaying the interest in immortality not prominent in the shorter dialogues (see *Ap.* 40c-41c; but cf. *Cri.* 54bc), but evident in the *M.* (81a-e), and prominent in the *Phd.* and at the end of *R.* x, both of which include a myth about the afterlife, after more theoretical argument about immortality than the *G.* offers.

(8) Plato's interest in geometry seems to grow in the *G.*, and to grow further in later dialogues; see 465bc, 508a, *M.* 82b-87c, *Phd.* 73ab, *R.* 510c-e, 526e-527c. (See also *Eud.* 290c; 289cd, 304c ff. suggest that the *Eud.* may include an earlier sketch of questions treated in more detail in the *G.*; see 452e, 457c-458b. The reference

to geometry fits this relative date, though the date of the *Eud.* is disputable on several grounds.)

10. These are reasons for placing the *G.* later than the shorter, 'Socratic' dialogues. It is harder to decide its relation to the *Pr.* They are parallel in important ways. The *Pr.* defends Socrates' methods and doctrines by contrasting them with sophistic views, and examines a prominent sophist. The *G.* defends the Socratic point of view against the rhetorical point of view, and examines prominent rhetors and one of their supporters, Callicles. But the general tone and some important doctrines in the two dialogues are different. While we have suggested above some reasons why the *G.* appears to be later, the really crucial question concerns the attitudes of the two dialogues to hedonism, see 465a, 499ab. On the dating of the *G.* see Dodds, 18-24, Rudberg.

11. What is the dialogue about? At first sight it seems to be divided between slices of discussion on rhetoric and on justice. But the 'slices' are more closely connected; for Plato tries to show that certain questions about rhetoric lead inevitably into larger questions:

- (1) Rhetoric is examined as a craft or science claiming to benefit its practitioners.
- (2) Socrates argues that it is no real craft, because it is not concerned with the good.
- (3) He argues that rhetoric does not benefit the rhetor because the power it claims to offer is not a real good.
- (4) To justify this claim he needs to say what a real good is, and argues against Polus that we are better off being just than having the power claimed by the rhetor.
- (5) Callicles rejects this defence, and supports the rhetor's claims to secure power that benefits him; for he secures the power to pursue his own pleasure, rejecting conventional justice, and so achieves his own good.
- (6) Socrates replies to the hedonist position supporting Callicles.
- (7) The refutation of hedonism is used to show that rhetoric is no real craft, by showing how a real craft must be concerned with the good, while rhetoric is concerned only with pleasure, which is not the good.
- (8) The account of a person's good is used to show that justice is

good for a person, and that someone who thinks rhetoric is an unqualified good has a mistaken view of his own interest.

This is how Plato intends the parts of the dialogue to be linked. He believes that someone who esteems rhetoric as highly as most people do must esteem it for the power it seems to confer on the successful rhetor who can manipulate other people to serve his desires. To value this kind of power, Plato argues, is to hold a false view of what is worth while in someone's life. By seeing why this view is false, we are supposed to reach a true view of what is worth while in life, and especially to see why it is better to be just than to win the prizes promised by rhetoric.

12. The roles of the three major interlocutors, Gorgias, Polus, and Calicles, fit the general strategy of the dialogue. Gorgias' defence of rhetoric leads him into inconsistencies; each of the other two tries to avoid the inconsistency of his predecessor, and defends his predecessor's main claim by a more decisive rejection of ordinary morality. Since each of the first two interlocutors is found to need the support of his more extreme successor, the refutation of Calicles implies the refutation of his predecessors too (508a-c). More briefly, the structure is this (using initial letters for the positions of the three interlocutors):

- (1) If *G*, then *P*.
- (2) If *P*, then *C*.
- (3) But not *C*.
- (4) Therefore not *P*.
- (5) Therefore not *G*.

We must decide, then, whether Plato argues soundly against each interlocutor, but also whether he is right about the logical relations between their positions (see 484bc), and whether he presents them in the fairest way.

This last question is hard to settle. Is Plato (a) trying to portray three historical characters, with their actual inconsistencies; or (b) trying to develop the strongest anti-Socratic case for Socrates to refute? If (a) is his aim, we can examine the historicity of his portrayal; we will not necessarily object to avoidable weaknesses in the interlocutors' views if these are their real views. Judged this way, the portrayal of Gorgias is historically plausible. We know too little

apart from the dialogue to answer the question about Polus and Callicles. If (b) as well as, or instead of, (a) is not Plato's aim, the dialogue may not provide a convincing defence of Socrates; it does not help much if he can defend himself against foolish but historical opponents, or against straw men. It is more useful for assessing the philosophical merits of the dialogue if we suppose that Plato intends (b). But in that case we need to ask whether he has done the best he could for each opponent. See further 452e, 460a, 460e-461c, 468e, 474c, 475de, 482cd, 484c, 488a-489c, 491d-492a, 494a-c, 499ab, 500cd, 503a, 515c.

13. The *G.* raises many important questions in moral psychology, ethics, and political theory that occupy Plato throughout his career. In particular it often anticipates the questions raised in the *R.* However, the solutions are not always the same. A reader who finds some of the *G.*'s solutions sketchy and unsatisfactory should consider the later solutions offered in the *R.*, especially (a) *R.* ii-iv on justice as a good in itself; (b) *R.* iv on desire, motivation, and the virtues; (c) *R.* iv, viii-ix on the benefits of justice and the relation between Plato's conception of justice as psychic harmony and ordinary views of justice. Other relevant later dialogues; (d) the *Phdr.* discusses the status of rhetoric, relying on a different moral psychology from that in the *G.*, with different results; (e) *R.* ix and the *Phil.* reflect different views on the questions about pleasure that are ignored in the *Pr.* and raised, but not answered, in the *G.*; (f) the *Pol.* and *Laws* retract, revise, and elaborate various political doctrines implied in the *G.* and first worked out in some detail in the *R.*

14. Further reading on particular points is cited in the Notes. Here are a few general suggestions for the beginner.

(1) General reference: *OCD*. General history; see Bury & Meiggs; and for more detail on the fifth century, Ehrenberg (1).

(2) Intellectual background: Particularly relevant texts on moral and political questions are Hdt. 3.80-2; Thuc. 1. 75-7; 2. 35-46, 60-5; 3. 37-48, 82-4; 5. 84-116; 6. 38; Ps.-Xenophon, *Const. of Athens* (see Ste. Croix, 307-10); Aristophanes, *Knights*; Antiphon, Gorgias, Critias, and Anonymus Iamblichi in DK. On rhetoric and morals see esp. Isocrates 13, 15. See also Guthrie (1) iii, Part 1, Adkins (5), Irwin, ch. 2, De Romilly.

(3) On Socrates and Plato: Crombie (2), Vlastos (6), (11), Irwin. The *G.* is discussed in chapters of A. E. Taylor, Grote (2), Gomperz, Irwin. The best commentary by far is by Dodds; the other most useful ones are W. H. Thompson (1) and Lodge (incorporating most of Deuschle-Cron). The best English translation is by Cope; a lively recent one is Hamilton. Others are Jowett, Lamb, Woodhead, and Hembold.

(4) On some philosophical questions generally relevant to the dialogue see Prichard (1), Anscombe (2), Foot (1), Falk, Mabbott (2). General reference works on philosophical topics: Lacey (brief account of technical terms), Edwards (longer essays on central topics).

15. I have translated Burnet's text, the most generally available, and departed from it only when it seemed untranslatable or significantly misleading. Since Dodds provides a better, though somewhat adventurous, text with full discussion of difficulties and textual variants, I have not discussed textual questions in the Notes. I follow Dodds against Burnet at 482d5, 488e2, 494c3, 496e7, 498a8, 504d9, 508b2, 513c8, 522c1, 524c3.

16. Analysis of the dialogue. Some of these divisions are inevitably arbitrary, since Plato is careful to make one discussion blend conversationally into another. But the analysis shows the main divisions and some of the interlocking themes of the dialogue.

A. 447a-461b. Gorgias.

1. 447a-454b. Rhetoric and craft.

2. 454b-461b. Rhetoric, craft, and justice.

B. 461b-488b. Polus.

1. 461b-466a. Rhetoric, craft, pleasure, and good.

2. 466a-c. Rhetoric, power, and the agent's good (cf. 452e).

3. 466c-468e. Desire and the agent's good; definition of power.

4. 468e-481b. Justice and the agent's good.

(a) 468e-474b. Doing and suffering injustice.

(b) 474b-476a. The fine and the beneficial.

(c) 476a-479e. Justice, punishment, and the good of the soul.

(d) 479e-481b. Conclusion on the benefits of rhetoric.

C. 481b-527e. Callicles.

1. 481b-486d. Statement of Callicles' position.

(a) 481b-484c. Justice by nature; rejection of conventional justice.

(b) 484c-486d. The active and the contemplative life.

2. 486d-508c. Socrates' reply to Callicles.

(a) 486d-491c. Reformulation of Callicles' position.

(b) 491d-494a. Desire, temperance, and the agent's good (cf. B 3).

(c) 494a-495d. Introduction of hedonism.

(d) 495e-497d. First argument against hedonism.

(e) 497d-499b. Second argument against hedonism.

(f) 499b-503d. Rejection of hedonism and consequences

(i) for good and pleasure, rhetoric and craft (see B1);

(ii) distinction between the rhetor and the real political craftsmen (see 464a-465a).

(g) 503d-508c. The political craftsman and virtue in the soul (see B 1 and B 3(c)).

3. 508c-527c. Conclusions about individual and political action.

(a) 508c-515c. The good of justice and the uselessness of rhetoric (see B 4(d)).

(b) 515c-520e. Rhetors and political craftsmen. Eminent Athenians (see 455de, 503bc).

(c) 521a-522e. Socrates' self-defence (see C 1(b), 500c).

(d) 523a-527e. The myth; the importance of justice for the afterlife.

## Gorgias

*Callicles.* This is the way they say you ought to join a war and a battle, Socrates. 447a

*Socrates.* You mean we've missed the feast, as they say, and we're too late?

*C.* Yes, and a most elegant feast it was; for Gorgias put on many fine displays for us a little while ago. 5

*S.* But Chaerephon here is responsible for this, Callicles; he forced us to linger in the market-place.

*Chaerephon.* No matter, Socrates; for I'll cure the trouble too b  
For Gorgias is a friend of mine; and he'll put on a display for us now, if you think fit, or another time, if you wish.

*C.* What, Chaerephon? Does Socrates desire to hear Gorgias? 5

*Ch.* Yes; that's the very thing we have come for.

*C.* Then visit me at home whenever you want to; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he'll give you a display.

*S.* A good idea, Callicles. But would he be willing to have a dialogue with us? For I want to learn from him what the power of the man's craft is, and what it is that he advertises and teaches; the rest of the display he can put on another time, as you suggest. c

*C.* There's nothing like asking the man himself, Socrates. For indeed, that was one part of his display; just now in fact he was inviting anyone in the house to ask whatever question he liked, and said he would reply to them all. 5

*S.* A good idea. You ask him, Chaerephon.

*Ch.* Ask him what? 10

*S.* Who he is. d

*Ch.* How are you speaking?

*S.* Well, for instance, if he happened to be a craftsman of shoes, he would presumably answer you that he was a shoemaker. Don't you understand how I'm speaking?

*Ch.* I understand, and I'll ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is what Callicles here says true, that you advertise that you answer whatever anyone asks you?

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448a G. Quite true, Chaerephon. In fact I was advertising this very thing just now; and I tell you that no one has asked me anything new for many years now.

*Ch.* Then no doubt you'll find it easy to answer, Gorgias.

5 G. You have a chance to test that Chaerephon.

*Polus.* Look, by Zeus, test me, if you please, Chaerephon. For I think Gorgias is actually worn out. He's just finished a long performance.

*Ch.* What, Polus? Do you think you would answer better than Gorgias?

b P. What does that matter, as long as it satisfies you?

*Ch.* Not at all. Answer then, since you want to.

P. Ask.

5 *Ch.* Yes, I'm asking. If Gorgias happened to have knowledge of the same craft as his brother Herodicus, what would we rightly call him? Wouldn't it be the same as his brother?

P. Certainly.

*Ch.* Then if we claimed he was a doctor, we would be speaking well.

10 P. Yes.

*Ch.* And if he were experienced in the same craft as Aristophon the son of Aglaophon or his brother, what would we rightly call him?

c P. Clearly a painter.

*Ch.* In fact, though, what craft has he knowledge of, and what would we rightly call him?

5 P. There are many crafts among men, Chaerephon, found by experience from experience; for experience makes our age follow craft, inexperience chance. Various men in various ways share in various of these crafts, and the best men in the best. Among the best is Gorgias here, and he shares in the finest of the crafts.

d S. Well, Gorgias, Polus seems to be finely equipped for discussions (*logos*). However, he is not doing what he promised to Chaerephon.

G. How exactly, Socrates?

5 S. He doesn't seem to me to altogether answer the question he's being asked.

G. Well, *you* ask him, if you wish.

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S. No I won't, if *you* wish to answer yourself. I'd much rather ask you. For it's clear to me even from what he's said that Polus is more practised in what is called the rhetorical craft than in dialogue. 10

P. Why is that, Socrates? e

S. Because Chaerephon asked you, Polus, what craft Gorgias has knowledge of; and you are praising his craft, as though someone were attacking it; but you didn't say which it is.

P. But didn't I answer that it is the finest? 5

S. Indeed you did. But no one is asking you what Gorgias' craft is like, but what craft it is, and who Gorgias should be called. Just as Chaerephon offered the previous ones to you, and you answered him well and briefly, so too now say what the craft is, and what we ought to call Gorgias. Or rather, you tell us yourself, Gorgias, what we ought to call you, as someone with knowledge of what craft? 449a

G. The rhetorical craft, Socrates. 5

S. Then you ought to be called a rhetor?

G. Yes, and a good one, Socrates, if you really want to call me 'what I boast I am', as Homer said.

S. I do want to.

G. Then call me that.

S. And aren't we to say that you are capable (*dunaton*) of making other people rhetors too? b

G. Yes indeed. That is what I advertise, not only here, but elsewhere too.

S. Then would you be ready, Gorgias, to continue our present method of dialogue, asking one question, answering another, and to put off to another time long speeches like the one Polus began? Come now, don't betray your promise, but be ready to answer the question briefly. 5

G. Some answers require long speeches, Socrates; but still, I'll try to answer as briefly as I can. For indeed, this is also one of my claims, that nobody could say the same things more briefly than I can. c

S. Well, that's what is needed, Gorgias. And give me a display of that very thing, the brief style, and the lengthy style another time. 5

G. All right, I'll do it; and you'll say you never heard anyone speak more briefly.

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d S. Come, then. You say you have knowledge of the rhetorical craft, and that you can make someone else a rhetor. Which of the things that are is rhetoric really about? For instance, weaving is

about the production of clothes, isn't it?

G. Yes.

S. And isn't music about the production of melodies?

G. Yes.

5 S. By Hera, Gorgias, I do admire your answers; you answer as briefly as anyone could.

G. Yes, Socrates; I think I do it reasonably well.

S. You're right. Come, then, answer me in the same way about rhetoric too. It is knowledge about which of the things that are?

e G. About speech (*logos*).

S. What kind of speech, Gorgias? The kind that explains the treatment to make sick people well?

G. No.

S. Then rhetoric is not about all speech.

G. No, true enough.

5 S. But still it makes men powerful (*dunatos*) at speaking.

G. Yes.

S. And at understanding the things they speak about?

G. Certainly.

450a S. Now does the medical craft we've just mentioned make people powerful at understanding and speaking about the sick?

G. It must.

S. Then apparently medicine as well is about speech.

G. Yes.

S. Speech about diseases, that is.

G. Certainly.

5 S. And isn't gymnastics too about speech, about the good and bad condition of bodies?

G. Yes, quite.

b S. And indeed the other crafts too are this way, Gorgias; each of them is about the speech which is about the thing which each craft is the craft of.

G. Apparently.

S. Then why ever don't you call the other crafts rhetorical, when

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they are about speech, since you call whatever craft is about speech rhetorical? 5

G. Because, Socrates, practically all the knowledge of the other crafts is about manual working and suchlike activities, but there is not such manual work in rhetoric; all its activity and its achievement is through speech. That is why I claim that the rhetorical craft is about speech, and claim it rightly, so I say. c

S. Now do I understand what you want to say it is like? But I'll soon know more clearly. Answer me now we have crafts haven't we? 5

G. Yes.

S. Out of all the crafts, I suppose, some are mostly work, and need little speech, and some need none at all, but the task of the craft might be accomplished even in silence, as in painting, sculpture, and many others. I think you speak of crafts like these when you say that rhetoric is not about them. Is that right? d

G. Your assumption is quite right, Socrates.

S. But now there are other crafts which carry on everything through speech, and need practically no work, or only a very little, such as arithmetic, calculating, geometry, and indeed draughts-playing and many other crafts; in some of these the speech is equal to the activities, but in most it is predominant, and altogether the whole of their activity and achievement is through speech. I think you are saying that rhetoric is one of the crafts of this kind. e

G. What you say is true.

S. And yet I don't think you want to call any of those I've mentioned rhetoric though indeed your actual words were that the craft which achieves its results through speech is rhetoric, and if someone wanted to be quarrelsome in argument (*logos*) he might assume, 'So, Gorgias, you're calling arithmetic rhetoric?' But in fact I don't think you call either arithmetic or geometry rhetoric. 5

G. Yes, what you think is correct, Socrates, and your assumption is just. 451a

S. Come now, and finish the answer to my question yourself. I mean since in fact rhetoric is one of those crafts which mostly use speech, but there are also other such crafts try to say the craft achieving its result in speech *about what* is rhetoric? For instance, if 5

b someone asked me about one or another of the crafts I was mentioning just now, 'Socrates, what is the arithmetical craft?', I would tell him, as you just said, that it is one of those which achieve their results through speech. And if he asked me again, 'One of the crafts about what?', I would say that it is one of the crafts about the odd and the even, however many each of them may be. And if he next  
5 asked, 'And what craft do you call calculation?', I would say that this too is one of those which achieve everything by speech; and if he asked me over again, 'The craft about what?', I would say, like  
c those who draft resolutions in the people's Assembly, 'For the rest, calculation is the same as arithmetic, for it is about the same thing, the odd and the even; but it differs this much, that calculation considers how numerous the odd and the even are, both relative to themselves and relative to each other.' And if someone asked about  
5 astronomy, when I said that this craft too achieves everything by speech, and asked, 'And what is the speech of astronomy about, Socrates?', I would say it is about the movement of the stars, the sun, and the moon, how they are related in speed to each other.

G. Yes, what you say would be right, Socrates.

d S. Come, then, you too, Gorgias now rhetoric is actually one of those crafts which carry out and achieve everything through speech, isn't it?

G. That's right.

5 S. Tell me, then it is one of the crafts about what? Which of the things that are is it that this speech used by rhetoric is about?

G. The greatest things in human affairs, Socrates, and the best.

e S. But this is also something disputable that you're saying, Gorgias, and still nothing clear. For I suppose you've heard at drinking-parties people singing this song where they count up the best things best of all is health, the second is to be born fair  
5 (*kalon*), and the third so the composer of the song says wealth without deceit.

G. Yes, I've heard it. But why do you say this?

452a S. Because suppose you had standing in front of you all at once the craftsmen of the goods praised by the composer of the song a doctor, a gymnastic trainer, and a money-maker. And suppose first of all the doctor said, 'Gorgias is deceiving you, Socrates; for it's not

his craft which is about the greatest good for men, but mine.' Then if I asked him, 'And who are you who say this?', he would presumably say he was a doctor. 'Then what are you saying? Is the work of your craft really the greatest good?' 'Of course health is the greatest good, Socrates', he would presumably say; 'what is a greater good for men than health?' 5 b

And suppose after him the trainer said again, 'I would also be surprised, Socrates, if Gorgias could display to you any greater good from his craft than I can display from mine.' Then I would say again to him too, 'And you, my good man, who are you, and what's your work?' 'A trainer', he would say, 'and my work is to make men fair and strong in body.' 5

After the trainer I expect the money-maker would say, in complete disdain for them all, 'Well, look and see, Socrates, if Gorgias or anyone else clearly possesses any good greater than wealth.' Then we would say to him, 'What then? Are you the craftsman of that?' He would say 'Yes.' 'And who are you?' 'A money-maker.' 'Well then, do you estimate that the greatest good for men is wealth?' we will say. 'Of course', he will say. 'But look, Gorgias here contends that his craft is responsible for a greater good than yours', we would say. Well, it's clear that after that he would ask, 'Then what is this good? Let Gorgias answer.' c 5 d

Come, then, Gorgias, suppose you are being asked by these people and by me, and answer what this thing is which you say is the greatest good for men, and that you are the craftsman of it.

G. It is in reality the greatest good, Socrates, and is responsible for freedom for a man himself, and at the same time for rule over others in his own city. 5

S. Then what do you say this is?

G. I say it is the power to persuade by speech jurymen in the jury-court, council-men in the Council Chamber, assembly-men in the Assembly, and in every other gathering, whatever political gathering there may be. And I tell you, with this power you will hold the doctor as your slave, the trainer as your slave and this money-maker here will turn out to make money for someone else not for himself, but for you with the power to speak and persuade the masses. e 5

453a S. Now I think you have very nearly shown what craft you think rhetoric is, Gorgias, and if I understand you at all, you are saying that rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion, and that its whole business and the sum of it results in this; or can you mention any broader power for rhetoric than to produce persuasion in the soul of hearers?

G. Not at all, Socrates, but I think you are defining it adequately; for that is the sum of it.

b S. Now listen, Gorgias for be sure I am persuaded that if anyone ever has a dialogue with anyone else from a desire to know the thing which the discussion is about, I too am one of these people; and I'm sure you are too.

G. Well, Socrates, so what?

5 S. I'll tell you now. This persuasion from rhetoric that you mention, you can be sure I don't know clearly just what it is and what things it is persuasion about and yet I have a suspicion at any rate of what persuasion I think you're speaking of and what it is about; but none the less I'll ask you just what you say is the persuasion from rhetoric and about what. Now because of what am I going to ask you when I already have a suspicion, rather than saying myself? Not because of you, but because of the discussion, so that it will progress in the way that will make what is discussed clearest to us.

5 For see if you think it is just for me to ask you again. For instance, if I happened to be asking you who among figure-painters is Zeuxis, and you said to me that he is the one who paints figures, wouldn't it be just for me to ask you what sorts of figures he paints, and where?

G. Quite.

d S. Because there are other figure-painters too, painting many other figures?

G. Yes.

5 S. But if no one else besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer would have been a good one?

G. Of course.

10 S. Come now, and tell me about rhetoric too. Do you think only rhetoric produces persuasion, or do other crafts as well? I'm talking about this sort of thing; whoever teaches anything, does he persuade about what he teaches, or not?

G. He most certainly does persuade, Socrates.

*S.* Now let's talk again about the same crafts as just now. Doesn't arithmetic, and the arithmetician, teach us how many are the things belonging to number? e

*G.* Quite.

*S.* And doesn't it also persuade?

*G.* Yes.

*S.* Then arithmetic too is a craftsman of persuasion? 5

*G.* Apparently.

*S.* If someone asks us what sort of persuasion this is, and about what, won't we answer that it is persuasion which teaches about how many the odd and the even are? And we will be able to show that the other crafts we just now mentioned are all craftsmen of persuasion, and of what persuasion, and about what, won't we? 454a

*G.* Yes.

*S.* Then not only rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion. 5

*G.* You're right.

*S.* Then since it is not the only craft which produces this work, but others also do it, wouldn't it be just for us to ask the previous speaker over again after this, as about the figure-painter, 'Rhetoric is the craft of what sort of persuasion, and about what?'. Or don't you think it would be just to ask over again? b

*G.* Yes, I do.

*S.* Then answer, Gorgias, since you think so too.

*G.* Well then, Socrates, I say it is the craft of persuasion in jury-courts, and in other mobs, as I was saying just now indeed, and about the things which are just and unjust. 5

*S.* I also of course suspected you were talking of this persuasion about these things, Gorgias. But so that you won't be surprised if a little later also I ask you something of this kind again, which seems clear to me, but I ask it over again for, as I say, I ask questions so that the discussion will proceed to its conclusion in good order not because of you, but so that we won't get used to surmising and premature snatching at what each of us says, and so that you can proceed to your conclusion as you want to on your assumption. 10 c

*G.* And I think you are doing the right thing, Socrates. 5

*S.* Come then, and let's examine this as well. Do you call something having learnt?

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*G.* I do.

*S.* And do you call something being convinced?

d *G.* I do.

*S.* Then do you think having learnt and being convinced or learning and conviction are the same, or different?

*G.* Myself, Socrates, I think they're different.

5 *S.* Yes, you're right in thinking so; and you'll realize it from this: If someone asked you, 'Gorgias, is there any true and false conviction?', you would say there is, I think.

*G.* Yes.

*S.* Now then, is there true and false knowledge?

*G.* Not at all.

*S.* Then it's clear that it's not the same.

*G.* What you say is true.

e *S.* And yet, both those who have learnt and those who have reached conviction are persuaded.

*G.* That's so.

*S.* Then do you want us to lay down two forms of persuasion, one yielding conviction without knowing, the other yielding knowledge?

*G.* Quite.

5 *S.* Then which persuasion does rhetoric produce in jury-courts and the other mobs, about just and unjust things? The persuasion from which conviction comes without knowing, or that from which knowing comes?

*G.* Presumably it's clear. Socrates, that it's the kind from which conviction comes.

455a *S.* Then it seems rhetoric is the craftsman of persuasion which yields conviction but does not teach about the just and the unjust.

*G.* Yes.

5 *S.* Then neither does the rhetor teach juries and the other mobs about just and unjust things, but only produces conviction. For presumably he couldn't teach such great matters to such a large mob in a short time.

*G.* No indeed.

- b S. Come then, let's see exactly what we are saying about rhetoric;  
for I tell you, I can't yet grasp what I'm saying either. When there is  
a gathering of the city about the choice of doctors or shipbuilders or

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some other kind of craftsmen, surely the rhetor will not advise them on that? For it's clear that in each choice they should choose the best craftsman. Nor will he advise when there is a gathering about the building of walls or the equipment of harbours or dockyards, but the master-craftsmen; nor again when advice is given about the choice of generals or some disposition against the enemy or occupation of strong points experts in generalship advise then, not experts in rhetoric. Or what do you say about these cases, Gorgias? For since you say you are a rhetor yourself and make others experts in rhetoric, it's a good thing to find out from you what belongs to your craft. You must suppose that I'm also looking out for you now; for perhaps there's actually someone among those in this house who wants to become your pupil I notice there are some, indeed quite a few and they might be too embarrassed to cross-question you. And so you must suppose that when I ask you the questions, they are asking you too, 'What will be in it for us, Gorgias, if we are with you? What will we be able to advise the city about? Only about just and unjust, or also about these things Socrates was speaking of just now?' So try to answer them.

G. Yes, I'll try to reveal clearly the whole power of rhetoric to you, Socrates. For you showed the way well yourself. I take it you know that these dockyards and the Athenians' walls and the harbour-equipment have come from Themistocles' advice, some from Pericles', but not from the craftsmen.

S. Yes, Gorgias, that's said about Themistocles. And I was listening to Pericles myself when he was advising us about the middle wall.

G. Yes, Socrates, and whenever there is a choice of those people you were speaking of just now, you see that the rhetors are those who give advice, and who prevail with their opinions about these things.

S. Yes, that's what amazes me, Gorgias, and that's why I've been asking you all this time just what the power of rhetoric is. For it seems to be some superhumanly great power when I look at it like this.

G. Yes, and if only you knew the whole of it, Socrates that it practically captures all powers and keeps them under its control. And I'll give you a strong proof of this. I have often in the past gone

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5 with my brother and the other doctors to some sick man refusing to  
 drink a medicine or let the doctor cut or burn him; when the doctor  
 couldn't persuade him, I persuaded him, by no other craft than  
 rhetoric. And I tell you, if a rhetor and a doctor went into any city  
 you like and had to (*dein*) compete in speeches (*logos*) in the Assem-  
 c bly or in any other gathering about which of them should be chosen  
 a doctor, the doctor would end up nowhere, but the man powerful  
 at speaking would be chosen if he wanted it. And if he were compet-  
 ing against any other craftsman whatever, the rhetor more than  
 anyone else would persuade them to choose him; for there is nothing  
 5 on which he wouldn't speak more persuasively than any other crafts-  
 man, among a mass of people.

Well, that is the kind of power the craft has, and that is how great  
 it is. But now, Socrates, rhetoric should be used the same way as any  
 d other competitive craft. For indeed someone should not use other  
 competitive crafts against everyone, just because he has learnt to box  
 and to do mixed fighting and to fight in armour so as to beat friends  
 5 and enemies alike he shouldn't, just because of this, strike, wound  
 or kill his friends. Nor yet, by Zeus, if someone has his body in good  
 condition and has become a boxer after going to the training-school,  
 and then strikes his father and mother, or some other relative or  
 e friend, we shouldn't, just because of that, detest the trainers and  
 teachers of armed combat, and expel them from the cities. For they  
 transmitted these crafts to be used justly, against enemies and those  
 457a who do injustice, in defence, not in aggression; but these pupils per-  
 vert their strength and craft, and use it wrongly. And so it is not the  
 teachers who are base (*poneros* \*), nor is the craft responsible or base  
 because of this, but, I take it, those who don't use it rightly. And the  
 5 same account (*logos*) applies to rhetoric too. For the rhetor is  
 powerful at speaking against anyone about anything, so as to be  
 b more persuasive among masses of people about, in short, whatever  
 he wants; but that is no more reason why he should steal their  
 reputation either from the doctors, just because he has the power to  
 do that, or from the other craftsmen, but he should use rhetoric  
 5 justly as well, as any competitive craft should be used. But I think  
 that if someone acquires the rhetorical craft and then does injustice  
 with this power and craft, we should not detest his teacher and

expel him from the city. For he transmitted his craft for a just man to use, but the pupil is using it the opposite way; and so it is just to detest, expel, and kill the one who used it wrongly, but not his teacher.

c

S. I think that you as well as I, Gorgias, have had experience of many discussions (*logos*), and have noticed this sort of thing in them: People can't easily define for each other whatever things they undertake to have a dialogue about, and then learn from each other, teach each other, and so conclude the meeting. No; if they dispute about anything, and one says that the other is speaking wrongly or obscurely, they are annoyed, and think he is speaking from jealousy towards them, competing for victory, not inquiring into what is proposed in the discussion; and some end up by parting in the most shameful way, covered in insults, when they have said and heard such abuse of each other that the people present are annoyed for themselves that they have seen fit to give a hearing to characters like these.

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Now why do I say this? It's because I think now you're saying things which don't quite follow from or harmonize with the things you said at first about rhetoric. And so I'm afraid to complete my examination (*dielenchein*) of you, for fear you will suppose I am not competing to make clear the matter we are discussing, but to defeat you. And so, if you are the same kind of man as I am, I would be pleased to continue the questions; if not, I would rather let it go. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted (*elenchein*) if I say something untrue, and pleased to refute if someone were to say something untrue, yet not at all less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I think that being refuted is a greater good, in so far as it is a greater good for a man to get rid of the greatest evil himself than to rid someone else of it for I think there is no evil for a man as great as a false belief about the things which our discussion is about now. And so, if you also say that you are that kind of man, let us continue the dialogue; but if in fact you think we ought to let it go, let us let it go, and finish the discussion.

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G. Not at all; I do say that I am also the kind of man you suggest, Socrates. But perhaps we ought to have thought of these people here too. For look, I presented many displays to them for a good while

5

c before you people came as well, and now perhaps we'll prolong it too far if we have a dialogue. So we ought to consider them too, in case we keep some of them back when they want to do something else as well.

5 *Chaer.* You can hear the noise yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, from these men who want to hear whatever you say. And for myself I hope I'm never so busy that I would miss discussions like these conducted this way and find something else more pressing to be done.

d *Call.* Yes indeed, Chaerephon, I tell you, I've been present before at many discussions, but I don't know when I've been pleased by one as much as now; so you'll gratify me even if you want to go on with the dialogue the whole day.

5 *S.* Certainly, Callicles; as far as I'm concerned, there's nothing to stop it, if Gorgias is willing.

e *G.* It's coming to be shameful for me to be unwilling at this stage, when I have myself advertised that anyone could ask me whatever he wanted. If these people want it, then, go on with the dialogue, and ask what you want to.

5 *S.* Then I'll tell you what I am surprised at in what you are saying, Gorgias; for of course it may be that you are speaking correctly, and I take you up wrongly. You say you can make someone a rhetor if he wants to learn from you?

*G.* Yes.

459a *S.* That is, about everything, so as to be persuasive in a mob, not teaching, but persuading?

*G.* Quite.

*S.* Now remember you were saying just now that even about the healthy the rhetor will be more persuasive than the doctor.

*G.* Yes indeed, I was saying so in a mob, that is.

5 *S.* Doesn't 'in a mob' come to this among those who don't know? For presumably he won't be more persuasive than the doctor among those who know?

*G.* You're right.

*S.* So if he will be more persuasive than the doctor, he turns out being more persuasive than the one who knows?

*G.* Quite.

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S. Though he isn't himself a doctor isn't that right? b

G. Yes

S. And yet the non-doctor presumably has no knowledge of those things which the doctor has knowledge of.

G. Clearly not.

S. Then the man who doesn't know will be more persuasive than the man who knows among those who don't know, when the rhetor is more persuasive than the doctor. Is that what comes about, or something else? 5

G. That comes about in this case, anyhow.

S. And aren't the rhetor and rhetoric the same way with all the other crafts too? There is no need (*dein*) for it to know how things actually are, but only to have found some persuasive device so that to those who don't know it will seem to know more than those who know. c

G. And doesn't that make it very easy, Socrates? You needn't learn the other crafts, but only this one, and you never lose to the craftsman. 5

S. Whether the rhetor does or doesn't lose to the others because he's this way we'll consider that by and by if it's at all relevant to the discussion. But for the moment let's consider this first, whether the rhetor is the same way about the just and the unjust, the fine and the shameful, and the good and the bad as about the healthy and the other things which the other crafts are about he doesn't know the things themselves, what is good or bad, what is fine or shameful or just or unjust, but has devised persuasion about them so that though he doesn't know, among those who don't know he appears to know, rather than the man who knows. Or must he know these things, and should someone who is to learn rhetoric know these things before he comes to you? Or if he doesn't, will you, as teacher of rhetoric, teach none of these things to someone who comes to you since it's not your work but make him seem to know these things among the many when he doesn't know them, and to seem good when he isn't? Or will you be altogether unable to teach him rhetoric unless he already knows the truth about these things? Or how is it about these things, Gorgias? And by Zeus, do reveal the power of rhetoric, as you lately said you would, and tell us just what it is. 5 460a

G. Well, Socrates, I think that if someone in fact doesn't know these things, he will learn them also from me.

5 S. Hold it there you're speaking well. If ever you make anyone a rhetor, he must know the just and the unjust things, either previously, or else later, learning them from you.

b G. Quite.

S. Well now; is someone who has learnt carpenter's things a carpenter, or isn't he?

G. Yes, he is.

S. And isn't someone who has learnt musical things a musician?

G. Yes.

S. And isn't someone who has learnt medical things a doctor?

5 And in other cases by the same account (*logos*) isn't the man who has learnt each of these things such as his knowledge makes him?

G. Quite.

S. Then according to this account isn't also the man who has learnt just things just?

G. Certainly, I presume so.

S. And. I take it, the just man does just things.

G. Yes.

c S. Then isn't it necessary for the rhetor to be just, and for the just man to want to do just things?

G. Yes, apparently.

S. Then the just man will never want to do injustice.

G. Necessarily.

5 S. And it is necessary from this account for the rhetor to be just.

G. Yes.

S. Then the rhetor will never want to do injustice.

G. Apparently not.

d S. Well, do you remember saying a little earlier that we should  
not accuse the trainers or expel them from the cities if the boxer  
uses his boxing craft, and uses it unjustly and does injustice, and  
5 similarly if the rhetor uses rhetoric unjustly, it's not the teacher who  
should be accused or expelled from the city, but the man who does  
injustice, who uses rhetoric wrongly. Was that said, or not?

G. It was said.

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S. And now we find that this same man, the rhetor, would never do injustice don't we? e

G. Apparently.

S. Now it was being said in the opening discussions (*logos*), Gorgias, that rhetoric is about speech (*logos*), not speech about the odd and even, but speech about the just and unjust. Isn't that so? 5

G. Yes.

S. Well, when you were saying that, I supposed that rhetoric would never be an unjust thing, when it always produces its speech about justice; and when you were saying a little later that the rhetor might actually use rhetoric unjustly, that was why I was surprised, and thought that the things being said did not harmonize; and so I made those remarks (*logos*), that if you thought it a gain to be refuted, as I think, the dialogue would be worth while, but otherwise we should let it go. But now when we examine the question, you see for yourself that it's agreed on the contrary that the rhetor is powerless to use his rhetoric unjustly and to be willing to do injustice. And so how exactly these things stand by the dog, Gorgias, it will take quite a long meeting to investigate adequately. 461a 5 b

*Polus*. What, Socrates? Do you really believe what you're saying now about rhetoric? Do you really suppose just because Gorgias was ashamed not to agree further with you that the rhetor would also know the just, the fine, and the good things, and that if he didn't know them when he came to Gorgias, Gorgias himself would teach him, and then perhaps from that agreement some opposition came about in his statements (*logos*) the thing that you're so satisfied about, when you yourself led him into those questions for who do you suppose would deny that he himself knew the just things and would teach others? It's simply the height of bad breeding to lead the discussion (*logos*) to such things. 5 c

S. Finest *Polus*, that's exactly why we acquire companions and sons, so that when we get old and stumble, you younger people will come and set our lives straight, both in our actions and in our speech. And so now, if Gorgias and I are stumbling at all in our speech, you must come and set us straight that is the just thing and I'm willing to withdraw anything you like of what has been d

agreed, if you think it was wrongly agreed provided that you are careful about one point for me.

5 P. What's that?

S. If you restrain those long speeches you began earlier, Polus.

P. What? Won't I be at liberty to say as much as I want to?

e S. Indeed it would be hard on you, my good friend, if you came  
to Athens, where there is the most liberty to speak in Greece, and  
then you were the only one here denied it. But on the other hand  
consider this; if you made long speeches, and weren't willing to  
5 answer the question asked, wouldn't it be hard on me, if I'm not to  
462a be allowed to go away and not listen to you? No if you care at all  
about the discussion that has just finished and you want to set it  
straight again, as I was saying now, then withdraw whatever you  
please, ask and answer in your turn, like Gorgias and me, and examine  
5 (*elenchein*) and be examined. For I take it you also say you know  
what Gorgias says he knows, don't you?

P. I do indeed.

S. And don't you also tell people to ask you whatever they want to any time, claiming that you know how to answer?

10 P. Quite.

b S. Well then, do whichever of these you want to now; ask questions or answer them.

5 P. All right, I'll do that. Now answer me, Socrates: Since you think Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, which do *you* say it is?

S. Are you asking me which craft I say it is?

P. I am indeed.

S. Well, I think it's no craft, Polus, to tell you the truth.

10 P. Then what do you think rhetoric is?

c S. A thing which you say has produced craft, in the work I've recently read.

P. What's this you're talking about?

S. I say it's a certain knack.

P. Then you think rhetoric is a knack?

5 S. I do unless you say something else.

*P.* A knack of what?

*S.* Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure.

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*P.* Then don't you think rhetoric is a fine thing, the ability to gratify people?

*S.* What's that, Polus? Have you already found out from me what I say it is, so that you ask the next question, if I don't think it's fine? d

*P.* Yes; haven't I found out that you say it's a certain knack?

*S.* Well then, since you admire gratification, would you like to gratify me in a small thing? 5

*P.* Yes, I would.

*S.* Ask me now what craft I think cookery is.

*P.* All right, I ask you, what craft is cookery?

*S.* No craft, Polus. 10

*P.* Then what? Tell me.

*S.* All right; I tell you it's a certain knack.

*P.* What knack? Tell me.

*S.* All right, Polus, I tell you it's a knack of producing pleasure and gratification. e

*P.* Then is cookery the same as rhetoric?

*S.* No, not at all; but it's a part of the same practice.

*P.* What practice is this you're speaking of? 5

*S.* I'm afraid it may be a bit ill-bred to say what's true. For I shrink from saying it, because of Gorgias, for fear he may think I'm ridiculing his own practice. But anyhow, whether the rhetoric Gorgias practises is like this, I don't know for in fact nothing was made clear for us in our recent discussion about just what he thinks but anyhow what I call rhetoric is a part of something not at all fine. 463a

*G.* A part of what, Socrates? Tell us; don't be embarrassed for my sake. 5

*S.* Well, Gorgias, I think it is a practice, not of a craftsman, but of a guessing, brave soul, naturally clever at approaching people; and I call the sum of it flattery. I think this practice has many other parts too, and cookery is also one of them; it seems to be a craft, but on my account (*logos*) it isn't a craft, but a knack and procedure. I call rhetoric a part of this too, and also cosmetics and sophistry these four parts set over four things. And so if Polus wants to find out, he should find out; for he hasn't yet found out what sort of part of flattery I say rhetoric is; he hasn't noticed that I haven't yet b  
5  
c

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5 answered, but goes on to ask if I don't think it is fine. But I won't answer him whether I think rhetoric is fine or shameful until I first answer what it is that would not be just, Polus. But if you want to find out, ask me what sort of part of flattery I say rhetoric is.

*P.* All right, I'm asking you. Answer what part it is.

d *S.* Then would you understand if I answered? Well, on my account rhetoric is an image of a part of politics.

*P.* All right, then; do you say it is fine or shameful?

5 *S.* I say it is shameful, since I call evil things shameful for I must (*dein*) reply to you as though you already knew what I am saying.

*G.* By Zeus, Socrates, I don't understand what you're saying either.

e *S.* And reasonably enough, Gorgias; for I'm not saying anything clear yet. But Polus the Colt here is fresh and frisky.

*G.* Well, let him alone and tell me how you say rhetoric is an image of a part of politics.

5 *S.* All right, I'll try to explain what I think rhetoric is; and if it  
464a isn't really that, Polus here will refute me. You call something body and soul?

*G.* Of course.

*S.* And don't you also think there is a good condition of each of them?

*G.* I do.

5 *S.* Well then, is there also an apparent good condition which isn't one? For instance, I'm talking about this sort of thing: Many people appear to have their bodies in good condition, and no one would easily notice that they are not, except a doctor or a gymnastics trainer.

*G.* You're right.

b *S.* I say there is this sort of thing both for the body and for the soul. It makes the body or the soul appear to be in good condition, but it's still in no better condition.

*G.* That's right.

*S.* Come then, I'll try to display more clearly to you what I'm saying, if I can. For these two things I say there are two crafts; the

5 one set over the soul I call the political craft; I can't off-hand find a

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single name for the single craft set over the body, but still body-care is one craft, and I say there are two parts of it, the gymnastic and the medical crafts. The part of politics corresponding to gymnastics is legislation, and the part corresponding to medicine is justice. Each member of these pairs—medicine and gymnastics, justice and legislation, shares with the other, in so far as they are both about the same thing; but still they differ to some extent from each other.

c

Here are four crafts, taking care of either body or soul, aiming at the best. Flattery noticed them—I don't say it knew, but it guessed and divided itself into four impersonating each of these parts, and pretends to be what it impersonates; it does not care a bit for the best, but lures and deceives foolishness with what is pleasantest at the moment, making itself seem to be worth most. Cookery impersonates medicine, then, and pretends to know the best foods for the body; and so if a doctor and a cook had to (*dein*) compete among children, or among men as foolish as children, to decide which of them understands more about worthy and base food, the doctor or the cook, then the doctor would die of starvation.

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Well then, I call it flattery, and I say this sort of thing is shameful, Polus—since I'm saying this to you—because it guesses at the pleasant without the best. And I say it is not a craft, but a knack, because it has no rational account (*logos*) by which it applies the things it applies, to say what they are by nature, so that it cannot say what is the explanation of each thing; and I don't call anything a craft which is unreasoning (*alogon*). If you dispute any of this, I am ready to undergo a discussion (*logos*).

465a

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As I say, then, cookery is the flattery disguised as medicine; and cosmetics is disguised as gymnastics in the same way—crooked, deceptive, mean, slavish, deceiving by shaping, colouring, smoothing, dressing, making people assume a beauty (*kallos*) which is not their own, and neglecting the beauty of their own which would come through gymnastics. To avoid going on at length, I want to tell you, as the geometers would—for now perhaps you might follow me—as cosmetics is to gymnastics, so is sophistry to legislation, and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice. But as I say, this is how they differ by nature, but since they are so close to each other, sophists and rhetors are mixed up in the same area and about the

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same thing, so that they don't know what to make of themselves, and other people don't know what to make of them. Indeed, if the

d soul did not control the body, but the body controlled itself, and if the soul did not examine and distinguish cookery and medicine, but the body by itself discriminated by guesswork from the gratifications to it, then the Anaxagorean condition would be everywhere, Polus  
5 my friend you're familiar with that; 'all things together' would be mixed up in the same area, with no distinction between matters of medicine and health and of cookery.

What I say rhetoric is, then you've heard it. It corresponds to cookery, doing in the soul what cookery does in the body. Now perhaps I've done something absurd. I didn't allow you to make long  
e speeches, but I've drawn out my own speech to this length. Well, it's  
5 fair for you to excuse me; for when I was speaking briefly, you weren't understanding, and you couldn't do anything at all with the  
466a answer I gave you, but you needed an explanation. And so if I can't do anything with your answer either, then draw out your speeches; but if I can, let me do it; for that's only just. And now if you can do anything with this answer, do it.

5 *P.* All right then, what are you saying? You think rhetoric is flattery?

*S.* No. I said it's a part of flattery. Can't you remember at your age, Polus? What will you be like before long?

10 *P.* Then do you think that good rhetors count as worthless in the cities, as flatterers?

b *S.* Are you asking that as a question, or are you beginning some speech?

*P.* I'm asking.

*S.* I think they don't count at all.

5 *P.* What do you mean, they don't count? Don't they have the greatest power in the cities?

*S.* No not if you say that having power is a good to the man with the power.

*P.* Well, I do say so.

*S.* Then I think the rhetors have the least power of anyone in the city.

c *P.* What? Aren't they like tyrants? Don't they kill whoever they

want to, and expropriate and expel from the cities whoever they think fit (*dokein*)?

S. By the dog, Polus, I tell you, I can't decide about each thing you say whether you're speaking for yourself and presenting your own opinion, or asking me. 5

P. I tell you, I'm asking you.

S. All right, my friend. Then are you asking me two questions at once?

P. How are they two questions?

S. Weren't you just now saying something like this; 'Don't rhetors kill whoever they want to, like tyrants, and expropriate and expel from the cities whoever they think fit'?' d

P. Yes, I said so.

S. Then I say that these are two questions here, and I'll answer you both of them. For I say, Polus, that both the rhetors and the tyrants have least power in the cities, as I was saying just now; for they do practically nothing, I say, that they want to, but do whatever they think is best. 5 e

P. And isn't this having great power?

S. No at least Polus doesn't agree.

P. I don't agree? Of course I agree. 5

S. No, by the. ... Indeed you don't. For you said that having great power is a good to the man who has it.

P. Yes. I still say so.

S. Then do you think it is a good if someone does whatever seems best to him, when he has no intelligence? Do you call even this having great power? 10

P. No, I don't.

S. Then won't you show that the rhetors have intelligence and that rhetoric is a craft, not flattery, by refuting me? If you leave me unrefuted, the rhetors who do what they think fit in the cities and the tyrants will have gained no good by it; but power, you say is a good, and you also agree that doing what we think fit without intelligence is an evil, don't you? 467a 5

P. Yes. I do.

S. Then how are the rhetors or the tyrants to have great power in

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the cities, unless Socrates is refuted by Polus and convinced that

10 they do what they want to?

b *P.* This fellow ...

*S.* I say that they don't do what they want to. So come on, refute me.

*P.* Weren't you just now agreeing that they do what they think best?

5 *S.* Yes, and I agree now too.

*P.* Then don't they do what they want to?

*S.* I deny it.

*P.* Though they do what they think fit?

*S.* I agree.

10 *P.* This is shocking and monstrous stuff you're saying, Socrates.

c *S.* Don't abuse me, peerless Polus to address you in your own style. But if you have questions, display my mistake. If you haven't, answer yourself.

*P.* All right, I'm ready to answer; then I'll really find out what you're saying.

5 *S.* Then do you think people want the thing they are doing at any time, or the thing for the sake of which they do the thing they do? For instance, do you think that those who take drugs from  
10 doctors want what they're doing, to take the drug and suffer pain, or the thing being healthy for the sake of which they take it?

d *P.* It's clear they want to be healthy.

*S.* And similarly for seafarers, and those who do other kinds of business for profit. What they want isn't what they do at any time for who wants to go sailing and be in danger and have all that bother?

5 But, I take it, what they want is the thing for the sake of which they go sailing; to be wealthy for they sail for the sake of wealth.

*P.* Quite.

*S.* Then isn't it just the same in every case? If anyone does something for the sake of something, he doesn't want the thing he does,  
e but the thing for the sake of which he does it?

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Now is there any of the things that are which isn't either good or bad, or intermediate between them, neither good nor bad?

*P.* It must be as you say, Socrates.

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S. Then don't you say wisdom is a good, and health and wealth and other such things, and the opposities of them are evils? 5  
 P. I do.

S. And do you say that the neither good nor evil things are of this kind things which sometimes share in the good, sometimes in the evil, and sometimes in neither, things like sitting, walking, running, sailing, and again things like stones and sticks and other such things? Aren't these what you speak of, or do you call some other things the neither good nor evil things? 468a

P. No these things.

S. Then do people do these intermediate things for the sake of the good things, when they do them, or do they do the good things for the sake of the intermediate things? 5

P. Presumably they do the intermediate things for the sake of the good things. b

S. Then it is in pursuit of the good that we both walk when we walk, thinking it is better, and on the other hand stand still when we stand still, for the sake of the same thing, the good. Isn't that so?

P. Yes.

S. Then don't we also kill, if we kill anyone, and expel and expropriate them, thinking that it is better for us if we do it than if we don't? 5

P. Yes, quite.

S. Then it is for the sake of the good that those who do these things do them all.

P. I agree.

S. Now didn't we agree that whatever things we do for the sake of something, we don't want the things we do, but the thing for the sake of which we do them? c

P. Absolutely.

S. Then we don't want to butcher or expel from the cities or expropriate, just like that, but if these things are beneficial, we want to do them, but if they are harmful, we don't want to. For we want good things, you say, but we don't want the neither good nor evil things, nor the evil things. Is that right? Do you think what I say is true, or not, Polus? Why don't you answer? 5

P. It's true.

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d S. Then since we agree on this, if someone kills a man or expels him from the city, or expropriates him, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetor, thinking it is better for him, when in fact it is worse, he presumably does what he thinks fit. Isn't that so?

5 P. Yes.

S. Then does he also do what he wants to, if the things he does are in fact bad? Why don't you answer?

P. No, I don't think he does what he wants to.

e S. Then is there any way such a man has great power in this city, since having great power is some kind of good, according to your agreement?

P. No, there's no way.

5 S. Then I was saying what is true, when I said it is possible for someone who does what he thinks fit in a city not to have great power, and not to do what he wants.

P. Ha! I suppose you wouldn't choose to have the liberty to do what you think fit in the city, rather than to lack it, Socrates, and you aren't envious whenever you see that someone has killed or expropriated or imprisoned anyone he thought fit!

10 S. Justly or unjustly, are you saying?

469a P. Whichever he does, isn't it something to envy both ways?

S. Quiet, Polus

P. But why?

5 S. Because we oughtn't to envy the unenviable or the wretched, but to pity them.

P. What? Do you think that's how it is with the people I'm speaking of?

S. Of course.

10 P. Then whoever kills anyone he thinks fit, killing him justly, you think he's wretched and pitiable?

S. No, I don't; but not enviable either.

P. Didn't you say just now that he was wretched?

b S. I said the man who kills unjustly is wretched, my friend, and pitiable as well; but the man who kills justly is unenviable.

*P.* Well, I suppose the man who is killed unjustly is pitiable and wretched.

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S. Less than the man who kills unjustly, Polus, and less than the man who is killed justly.

P. And how's that, Socrates?

S. This way: because doing injustice is really the greatest of evils.

P. What? Is *that* the greatest? Isn't suffering injustice greater? 10

S. No, not at all.

P. Then would you want to suffer injustice rather than do it?

S. I'd *want* neither of them. But if it were necessary for me either to do or to suffer injustice, I'd elect to suffer injustice rather than do it. c

P. Then you wouldn't choose to be a tyrant?

S. No not if you say being a tyrant is what I say it is.

P. Well, I say it's what I said just now, having the liberty to do whatever you think fit in the city, so that you can kill, expel, go to all lengths, following your own opinion. 5

S. My splendid man, let me speak, and then object with your argument. Suppose I took a dagger up my sleeve, and said to you in a crowded market-place, 'Polus, I've just got a terrific tyrannical power. For if I think that one of the people you see should be dead on the spot, he'll be dead, whoever I think fit. And if I think one of them should have his head smashed, he'll have it smashed on the spot; if his cloak should be in pieces, it will be in pieces that's how great my power is in this city.' And now, if you didn't believe me and I showed you the dagger, when you saw it. I suppose, you'd say, 'Socrates, everyone could have great power that way; that way any house you thought fit might be burnt as well, yes, and the Athenians' dockyards and triremes and all the boats, private and public.' So after all, having great power isn't this, doing what you think fit; or do you think so? d 5 e

P. Well, not that way.

S. Then can you say why you object to that kind of power? 470a

P. Yes, I can.

S. Well, why? Say.

P. Because someone who acts that way is bound to be punished. 5

S. And isn't being punished evil?

P. Of course.

S. Then don't you think once again, my excellent friend, that if

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acting beneficially follows for someone acting as he thinks fit, then it is a good, and this is apparently having great power; but otherwise

b it is an evil, and is having little power. And let's consider this too: Don't we agree that it's sometimes better to do the things we were mentioning just now, to kill, expel, and expropriate people, and sometimes not?

5 *P.* Quite.

*S.* Then this apparently is agreed both by you and by me.

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Then when do you say it's better to do these things? Tell me

10 what definition you define.

*P.* No you answer that, Socrates.

c *S.* Well, Polus, if it pleases you more to hear it from me, I say whenever someone does these things justly, it's better, and whenever unjustly, worse.

5 *P.* Yes, it's hard to refute you, Socrates. Why, couldn't even a child refute you and show that what you're saying isn't true?

*S.* Then I'll be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to you if you refute me and rid me of nonsense; now don't be slow to benefit a friend, but refute me.

d *P.* Well, Socrates, there's certainly no need (*dein*) to refute you with old stories. For these things that have happened yesterday or the day before are enough to refute you thoroughly and show that many men doing injustice are happy.

*S.* What sorts of things are these?

5 *P.* I suppose you see this character Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, ruler of Macedon?

*S.* Well, if I don't, I hear of him.

*P.* Then do you think he's happy or wretched?

*S.* I don't know, Polus, I've never met the man.

e *P.* What? You could tell if you'd met him, but otherwise you can't tell at once that he's happy?

*S.* Indeed I can't, by Zeus?

5 *P.* Then it's clear, Socrates, that you'll say you can't even tell that the Great King is happy.

S. Yes, and I'll say what's true. For I don't know how he is off for education and justice.

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*P.* What? Is the whole of happiness in that?

*S.* Yes, so I say, Polus. For I say that the fine and good man and woman is happy, and the unjust and base is wretched. 10

*P.* Then this fellow Archelaus is wretched, on your account (*logos*)? 471a

*S.* Yes, my friend, if he is unjust.

*P.* Why, of course he's unjust! None of the rule he now has was fitting for him. He was the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas. By justice he was a slave of Alcetas, and if he had wanted to do the just things, he would have stayed a slave to Alcetas and been happy, on your account. But as it is, he's turned out incredibly wretched, since he's done the greatest injustices. For first of all he sent for this man Alcetas, his master and uncle, pretending that he would restore to him the kingdom taken off him by Perdiccas. He entertained the uncle and his son Alexander, his own cousin of almost the same age. He got them drunk, shoved them into a wagon, took them off at night, then murdered and got rid of them. And after doing these injustices, he became utterly wretched without noticing it, and didn't regret it. A little later he didn't want to become happy by justly bringing up his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven to whom the kingdom was coming by justice, and by restoring the kingdom to him. Instead he threw him into a well and drowned him, and then told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in and drowned when he was chasing a goose. And as you see now, since he's done the greatest injustices of anyone in Macedon, he's the most wretched of all the Macedonians, and not the happiest. And I suppose there is some Athenian, beginning with yourself, who would choose to become any other Macedonian rather than Archelaus. b

*S.* I praised you at the beginning of our discussion (*logos*) too, Polus, just as now, because I think you're well educated in rhetoric. But I still say, as I said then, that you've neglected dialogue. And now is this the argument (*logos*) by which even a child could refute me? And do you think I'm quite refuted by you now with this argument when I say that the man who does injustice is not happy? How's that, my good friend? I tell you, I agree with you on none of the things you say. 5 d

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e P. No, because you don't want to agree, though you think as I say.

S. My excellent friend, it's because you're trying to refute me rhetorically, like those who think they're refuting people in the jury-courts. For there one side think they are refuting the other  
 5 whenever they produce many respectable witnesses for whatever statements (*logos*) they make, and the man who says the opposite provides himself with only one or none at all. But this kind of refu-  
 472a tation is worth nothing towards the truth. For sometimes someone might actually be beaten by many false witnesses thought to amount to something. And in this case almost all Athenians and foreigners will agree with you on what you're speaking of, if you want to produce witnesses against me to say that I'm saying what is not true.  
 5 You will have for witnesses, if you want them, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, with his brothers, whose tripods are in the precinct of Dionysus standing in a row; or, if you want, Aristocrates, the son of Scellias, who in turn has that fine dedication in the precinct of  
 b Pythian Apollo; or, if you want, the whole house of Pericles, or whatever other family you want to select from those in Athens. But I, all alone, don't agree; for you don't compel me, but you produce  
 5 all these false witnesses against me and try to dislodge me from my property and the truth. But if I can't produce you, all alone by your- self, as a witness agreeing on the things I'm talking about, I think I  
 c have achieved nothing of any account (*logos*) in what our discussion (*logos*) is about. And I don't think you'll have achieved anything either unless I, all alone, bear witness for you, and you let all the others go. Here is one form of refutation, so you and many others think. But there is another one too, so I think, for my part. So let's  
 5 compare them with each other, and look whether they will differ at all from each other. For remember, the things we are disputing over are not at all trivial, but they are practically the things which it is finest to know, and most shameful not to know; for the sum of  
 d them is to come to know or not to know who is happy and who is not. Now first our discussion is about this; you think that a man who does injustice and is unjust is capable of being blessed, since you think Archelaus is unjust but happy. Are we to suppose that this is what you think?

*P.* Yes, quite. 5

*S.* And I say he's incapable (*adunaton*) of it. Here is one thing we dispute about. All right. Now will he be happy when he does injustice, if he meets justice and vengeance?

*P.* Not at all. For that way he would be most wretched.

*S.* But now if the man doing injustice doesn't meet justice, he'll be happy, on your account? e

*P.* That's what I say.

*S.* And on my view, Polus, the man who does injustice and the unjust man is wretched in any case, but more wretched if he doesn't pay justice and suffer vengeance when he does injustice, and less wretched if he pays justice, and meets justice from gods and men. 5

*P.* These are absurd things you're undertaking to say Socrates. 473a

*S.* And I'll try to make you say the same things as me, my friend for I regard you as a friend. Now at any rate the things we differ about are these. Consider for yourself. I said, didn't I, in the earlier discussion that doing injustice is worse than suffering it? 5

*P.* Quite.

*S.* Whereas you said suffering it is worse.

*P.* Yes.

*S.* And I said that those who do injustice are wretched, and I was refuted by you. 10

*P.* Yes, by Zeus.

*S.* So you think, Polus. b

*P.* Yes, and I think what's true.

*S.* Perhaps. Now you think those who do injustice are happy if they don't pay justice?

*P.* Quite. 5

*S.* Whereas I say that these people are the most wretched while those who pay justice are less wretched. Do you want to refute this too?

*P.* Oh, that's even harder to refute than the first claim was, Socrates.

*S.* No, Polus, it's impossible. For what's true is never refuted. 10

*P.* What do you say? If someone doing injustice is caught plotting against a tyranny, he's put on the rack, he's mutilated, his eyes are burnt out, and when he has himself suffered all kinds of other terrible

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5 outrages, and has seen his wife and children suffer them, he's finally  
 crucified or burnt in a pitch coat, will *he* be happier than if he  
 escapes punishment, becomes tyrant, and lives out his life ruling in  
 the city, doing whatever he wants to, envied and congratulated for  
 d his happiness by the citizens and by foreigners too? Is this what you  
 say can't be refuted?

5 *S.* You're trying to scare me with boggy-men this time, noble  
 Polus, and not refuting me. Just now you were calling witnesses. Still,  
 refresh my memory a little. You said, if he's unjustly plotting against  
 a tyranny?

*P.* I did.

*S.* Then neither of them will ever be happier, neither the one  
 who has achieved the tyranny unjustly nor the one who pays justice  
 for out of two wretched ones there couldn't be a happier one  
 e but still the one who escapes and has gained the tyranny is more  
 wretched. What's this Polus? You're laughing? Is this still another  
 kind of refutation, to laugh someone down whenever he says some-  
 thing, but not to refute him?

5 *P.* Don't you think you've been thoroughly refuted, Socrates,  
 when you say things like this, that not a single man would say? For  
 look, ask one of these people here.

474a *S.* I'm not one of the politicians, Polus. Last year I was chosen  
 by lot to sit on the Council, and when my tribe was presiding and I  
 had to put the question to the vote, I caused laughter when I didn't  
 know how to put the question. So don't tell me now either to put  
 the question to a vote, to these people present; but if you've no  
 better refutation than these, then do what I was saying just now  
 5 give me my turn, and face examination as I think it should be. For I  
 know how to produce just one witness to whatever I say the man I  
 am having a discussion with whoever he may be but I forget about  
 the many. I know how to put the question to a vote to one man, but  
 b I don't even have a dialogue with the many. And so see if you will be  
 willing in your turn to undergo examination, by answering the  
 questions asked. For I think that I and you and other men believe  
 that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, and that not paying  
 5 justice is worse than paying it.

*P.* And I think that I don't think it, and neither does any other

man. For look; would you choose to suffer injustice rather than do it?

*S.* Yes, and so would you, and so would all other men.

*P.* Far from it. I wouldn't; you wouldn't; no one else would. 10

*S.* Then you'll answer? c

*P.* Certainly; for I'm anxious to know what on earth you'll say.

*S.* Well then, so that you'll know, tell me this, as though I were asking you from the beginning: Which do you think is worse, Polus doing injustice or suffering it? 5

*P.* I think suffering it is worse.

*S.* Now then do you think it's more shameful to do injustice or to suffer it? Answer.

*P.* To do it.

*S.* Then isn't it also worse, if it's more shameful?

*P.* Not at all.

*S.* I understand. Apparently you don't think that the same thing is fine and good or evil and shameful. d

*P.* Certainly not.

*S.* Then what about this? All fine things, such as bodies, colours, shapes, sounds, practices do you look to nothing in calling them fine each time? First of all, for instance, don't you say that fine bodies are fine either because of use, for whatever each of them is useful for, or because of some pleasure, if they give onlookers enjoyment when they took on? Can you mention anything besides these things about what is fine in a body? 5

*P.* No. I can't. e

*S.* And don't you call all the other things fine too in this way shapes and colours either because of some pleasure or because of some benefit or because of both?

*P.* I do.

*S.* And don't you call sounds and everything to do with music fine in the same way? 5

*P.* Yes.

S. And further, the case of laws (*nomos*) and practices the fine ones presumably does not lie beyond this, being either beneficial or pleasant or both.

P. I agree.

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S. And isn't it the same with the fineness of branches of learning?

P. Quite. Indeed, you're defining finely now, Socrates, when you define the fine by pleasure and good.

5 S. And surely also when I define the shameful by the opposite, distress and evil?

P. That must be so.

S. Then when one of two fine things is finer, it is finer by exceeding either in one of these things or in both, either pleasure or benefit or both.

P. Quite.

b S. And further, when one of two shameful things is more shameful, it will be more shameful by exceeding either in distress or in evil. Mustn't that be so?

P. Yes.

5 S. All right, then. What was being said just now about doing and suffering injustice? Weren't you saying that suffering it is worse and doing it is more shameful?

P. I was.

S. Then if doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, then isn't it either more distressing, and more shameful by exceeding in distress, or by exceeding in evil, or in both?

P. Of course.

c S. Then first of all, let's see if doing injustice exceeds suffering it in distress, and whether those who do injustice are more in pain than those who suffer it.

P. That's certainly not right, Socrates.

S. Then it doesn't exceed in distress.

P. No indeed.

5 S. And if it doesn't exceed in distress, it couldn't any longer exceed in both.

P. Apparently not.

S. Then it remains open that it exceeds in the other thing.

P. Yes.

S. In evil.

*P.* It looks like it.

*S.* Then by exceeding in evil doing injustice is worse than suffering it.

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P. Yes. It's clear that it is.

S. Now didn't the mass of men and you agree with us earlier that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it? d

P. Yes.

S. And now it has turned out worse.

P. It looks like it.

S. Then would you choose the more evil and shameful over the less? Don't shrink from answering, Polus you won't be harmed at all; but present yourself nobly to the argument (*logos*) as to a doctor; answer, and say either yes or no to what I'm asking you. 5 e

P. Well, no; I wouldn't choose it, Socrates.

S. And would any other man?

P. I don't think so by this argument anyway.

S. Then I was saying what was true, that neither I nor you nor any other man would choose doing injustice over suffering it; for it's actually worse. 5

P. Apparently.

S. You see, then, Polus, that when this refutation is compared with that one it is not at all like it. You have everyone else agreeing with you except me, but I am quite satisfied with you just by yourself, agreeing and being my witness. I put the question for a vote to you alone, and let all the others go. Well, let us take this to be so. And after this, let's consider the thing we disputed about second, whether doing injustice and paying the just penalty is the greatest of evils, as you supposed, or not paying it is worse, as I supposed for my part. 476a 5

Now let's consider it this way. Do you call paying justice and being punished (*kolazesthai*) justly for doing injustice the same thing?

P. I do.

S. Then can you say that not all just things are fine in so far as they are just? Consider carefully before you say. b

P. No, I think they are, Socrates.

S. Now consider this too: If someone does something, must there also be something affected by the doer? 5

P. I think so.

S. Is it affected by what the doer does to it, and by such a thing

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as the doer does to it? I'm saying this kind of thing; if something strikes, must something be struck?

*P.* It must.

c *S.* And if the striker strikes hard or quickly, mustn't the thing struck also be struck in the same way?

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Then what is done to the thing struck as of whatever kind the striker does?

*P.* Quite.

*S.* And if someone burns, mustn't something be burnt?

*P.* Of course.

5 *S.* And if he burns hard or painfully, mustn't the thing burnt be burnt however the burner burns?

*P.* Quite.

*S.* And if something cuts, isn't it the same account (*logos*)? For something is cut.

*P.* Yes.

d *S.* And if the cut is large or deep or painful, the thing cut is cut with the kind of cut with which the cutter cuts?

*P.* Apparently.

*S.* Then altogether, see if you agree, as I was saying just now, about everything that whatever the doer does to it, that is how the thing affected is affected.

*P.* Yes. I agree.

5 *S.* Now if this is agreed, is paying justice being affected somehow or doing something?

*P.* It must be being affected, Socrates.

*S.* And by some doer?

*P.* Of course; by the punisher.

e *S.* And the man who punishes rightly punishes justly?

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Doing just things, or not?

*P.* Just tidings.

*S.* Then isn't the man who pays justice in being punished affected by just things?

*P.* Apparently.

*S.* And, I take it, just things are agreed to be fine.

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*P.* Quite.

*S.* Then one of these two does fine things, and one is affected by them, the man punished. 5

*P.* Yes.

*S.* If they are fine, aren't they good? For they are either pleasant or beneficial. 477a

*P.* They must be.

*S.* Then the man who pays justice is affected by good things.

*P.* It looks like it.

*S.* Then he is benefited?

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Does he get the benefit I suppose? Does he become better in soul if he is justly punished? 5

*P.* Yes, that's likely.

*S.* Then the man who pays justice is rid of evil of soul?

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Then is he rid of the greatest evil? Consider it this way: In the condition of his possessions do you see any other evil state of a man than poverty? b

*P.* No. Only poverty.

*S.* And what about the condition of the body? Would you say that its evil state is weakness and sickness and ugliness (*aischos*) and the like? 5

*P.* I would.

*S.* And wouldn't you also say that there is a kind of baseness in the soul?

*P.* Of course.

*S.* Then don't you call this injustice and stupidity and cowardice and the like?

*P.* Certainly.

*S.* Now for these possessions, body, and soul, three things haven't you mentioned three kinds of baseness, poverty, sickness, injustice? c

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Then which is the most shameful of these kinds of baseness?  
Isn't it injustice, and altogether baseness of soul?

*P.* Very much so.

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5 S. Then if it's most shameful, isn't it worst?

P. What are you saying, Socrates?

S. I'm saying this: Always the most shameful is most shameful by producing the greatest distress or harm or both, from what was agreed in the previous discussion.

P. Certainly.

S. And isn't it just now agreed by us that injustice and all baseness of soul is most shameful?

d P. Yes. It's agreed.

S. Then isn't it either the most painful, and the most shameful of them by exceeding in pain, or by exceeding in harm, or in both ways?

P. It must be.

5 S. Then is it more painful than being poor and sick to be unjust and intemperate (*akolastos*) and cowardly and stupid?

P. I don't think so, from what we've said, Socrates.

e S. Then it is by exceeding the other things in some remarkably serious harm and amazing evil that baseness of soul is the most shameful of all, since it doesn't exceed in pain, on your account.

P. Apparently.

S. But now presumably the thing which exceeds by the greatest harm would be the greatest evil of the things that are.

P. Yes.

5 S. Then injustice and intemperance (*akolasia*) and the rest of the soul's baseness is the greatest evil of the things that are?

P. Apparently.

S. Now which craft rids us of poverty? Isn't it money-making?

P. Yes.

S. And which rids us of sickness? Isn't it medicine?

478a P. It must be.

S. And which craft rids us of baseness and injustice? If you don't find this easy, consider it this way: Where and to whom do we take people sick in body?

*P.* To the doctors, Socrates.

*S.* And where do we take those who do unjust and intemperate (*akolastainontes*) actions?

5 *P.* To the court of justice, are you saying?

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S. And don't we take them to pay justice?

P. I agree.

S. Then don't those who punish (*kolazein*) rightly practise some kind of justice when they punish?

P. It's clear they do.

S. Then money-making rids us of poverty, medicine of sickness, and the administration of justice rids us of intemperance (*akolasia*) and injustice? b

P. Apparently.

S. Now which is the finest of these?

P. Of what?

S. Of money-making, medicine, and the administration of justice.

P. The administration of justice is far superior, Socrates. 5

S. Then again, doesn't it produce either most pleasure or most benefit or both, since it is the finest?

P. Yes.

S. Then is having medical treatment pleasant? Do patients enjoy it?

P. I don't think so.

S. But still it's beneficial, isn't it?

P. Yes. c

S. For he gets rid of a great evil, so that it profits him to endure the pain and be healthy.

P. Of course.

S. Now would a man be happiest, as far as his body is concerned, this way being medically treated or if he was never ill at all?

P. Clearly if he was never ill at all. 5

S. Yes, for happiness doesn't seem to be this, getting rid of evils, but never acquiring them at all.

P. That's right.

*S.* Well then, which is the more wretched of two people who have an evil either in body or in soul, the one who is treated and gets rid of the evil, or the one who isn't treated and still has it? d

*P.* The one who isn't treated, I think.

*S.* Now isn't paying justice getting rid of the greatest evil, baseness? 5

*P.* Yes, it is.

*S.* Yes, for presumably administration of justice makes people

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temperate and more just, and is in fact the medical craft to cure baseness.

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Then the man with no evil in his soul is happiest, since this appeared the greatest of evils.

*P.* Yes. That's clear.

*S.* And presumably second to him is the man who gets rid of the evil.

*P.* It looks like it.

*S.* And this is the man who is corrected and reprimanded and pays justice.

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Then the man who has the evil in his soul and does not get rid of it lives worst.

*P.* Apparently.

*S.* And isn't this man in fact whoever does the greatest injustices and exercises the greatest injustice and manages not to be corrected or punished (*kolazesthai*) and not to pay justice as you say Archelaus and the other tyrants and rhetors and dynasts managed to do?

*P.* It looks like it.

*S.* Yes, for these people have managed to do about the same thing, my friend, as if someone suffering from the most serious illnesses, managed not to pay justice for the faults in his body to the doctors and not to be treated afraid like a child of the burning and cutting because it is painful. Don't you think so too?

*P.* I do.

*S.* Apparently it's because he doesn't know what health and excellence (*arete* \*) of body are like. And from what we've agreed now, those who try to escape justice also seem to do the same sort of thing, Polus. They notice what is painful in it, but are blind to what is beneficial. They don't know how much more wretched than an unhealthy body is life with a soul that isn't healthy, but rotten, unjust, and impious. That's why they go to all lengths to avoid paying justice and getting rid of the greatest evil, but equip themselves with money and friends and the most persuasive speaking they can manage. But if what we are agreed on is true, Polus, do you observe

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the things that follow from the argument? Do you want us to work them out?

*P.* If you think we should.

*S.* Then does it follow that injustice and doing injustice is the greatest evil?

*P.* Yes, apparently.

d

*S.* And apparently paying justice is getting rid of this evil?

*P.* It seems to be.

*S.* Whereas not paying justice is the persistence of the evil?

*P.* Yes.

*S.* Then doing injustice is second in greatness among evils; doing injustice and not being punished is really the greatest of all and first of evils.

5

*P.* It looks like it.

*S.* Now didn't we dispute about just this, my friend? Didn't you call Archelaus happy who did the gravest injustices and paid no justice, while I thought on the contrary that it is fitting for Archelaus, or any other man who does injustice and does not pay justice, to be wretched beyond other men, and that always the man who does injustice is more wretched than the man who suffers it, and the man who does not pay justice is more wretched than the man who pays it? Wasn't this what I said?

e

5

*P.* Yes.

*S.* And hasn't it been proved that it was said truly?

*P.* Apparently.

*S.* All right. If these things are true, then what is the great use of rhetoric, Polus? For in fact from what has been agreed now a man should most of all take care for himself so that he doesn't do injustice, knowing that he will have a great enough evil if he does. Isn't that right?

480a

*P.* Quite.

5

*S.* And if he or whoever else he cares about does do injustice, he should go voluntarily wherever he will pay justice as quickly as possible, to the court of justice as to the doctor, eager to prevent the disease of injustice from being chronic and making his soul festering and incurable or what else are we saying, Polus, if our previous agreements remain firm? Mustn't what we say

b

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5 now agree with what we said then only this way, and otherwise not?

*P.* Yes indeed. What else are we to say, Socrates?

*S.* Then for someone's defence for his own injustice, or when his parents or his friends or his children or his native state do injustice, rhetoric is no use at all to us, Polus, unless someone supposes it is useful for the opposite purpose that he should denounce most of all himself, then his relatives, and whatever other friend does injustice; and should not conceal the unjust action, but bring it into the open, to pay justice and become healthy; and compel himself and others not to shrink in cowardice, but to close their eyes and offer themselves well and bravely, as though to the doctor for cutting and burning; he should pursue the good and fine, not counting the pain, but offering himself for flogging, if his unjust action deserves flogging, for prison, if it deserves prison, paying a fine, if it deserves a fine, accepting death, if it deserves death; he should himself be the first denouncer of himself and of the rest of his relatives, and use his rhetoric for this, to have his unjust actions exposed and get rid of the greatest evil, injustice. Are we to say yes or no to this, Polus?

*P.* Well, I think it's absurd. Socrates; but no doubt you find that it agrees with what was said before.

*S.* Mustn't those things be undone too, or else mustn't these things follow?

*P.* Yes; that's so anyhow.

*S.* And then, turning it around the opposite way, if we really should harm anyone an enemy or anyone at all as long as we don't ourselves suffer any injustice from the enemy for we must be careful about that but if our enemy treats someone else unjustly, we should take every precaution, in speaking and in action, to prevent him from paying justice and appearing before the court of justice. And if he appears, we must arrange it so that he escapes and doesn't pay justice, but if he has stolen a lot of money, we must see he doesn't pay it back, but keeps it and spends it on himself and his relatives, unjustly and godlessly; and if he has done injustice deserving death, we must see he does not suffer death best of all never, to be immortal in his baseness, but otherwise to live the longest possible life in this condition. For these sorts of things I think rhetoric is useful. Polus, since for someone who isn't about to act

unjustly, its use doesn't seem to me to be all that great if indeed it has any use at all, for it wasn't evident anywhere in what was said previously. 5

*Callicles.* Tell me Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest about all this, or is he joking?

*Chaerephon.* Well, to me he seems remarkably in earnest, Callicles. But there's nothing like asking him.

*C.* I'm certainly anxious to do that, by the gods. Tell me, Socrates, are we to suppose you're in earnest now, or joking? For if you're in earnest, and all these things you say are really true, then wouldn't the life of us men be upside down? And don't we apparently do everything that's the opposite of what we should do? c

*S.* Callicles, if some men were not affected one way, and others the same way, and if one of us had some private affection quite different from other people's, it would not be easy for anyone to indicate his own affection to another. I say this realizing that you and I are now actually affected the same way; each of us is a lover of two beloveds, I of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias and of philosophy, and you of two beloveds, the demos of Athens and the Demos of Ppyrilampes. Yes, I notice you each time, clever though you are - whatever your beloved says and however he says things are, you can't contradict him, but you change this way and that. In the Assembly, if you're saying something and the Athenian demos says it's not so, you change and say what it wants. And with this fine young man the son of Ppyrilampes you're affected in other similar ways. For you're incapable of opposing the proposals and speeches of your beloved; and if someone were amazed whenever you say the things you say because of your beloveds, at how absurd these things are, then no doubt you'd tell him, if you wanted to tell him what's true, that unless someone stops your beloved from saying these things, you'll never stop saying them either. 5  
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482a

And so you must suppose that you're bound to (*chrenai* \*) hear the same sorts of things from me. Don't be amazed that I say these things, but stop my beloved, philosophy, saying them. For she says what you hear from me now, my friend; and she's much less impulsive than my other beloved. For this son of Cleinias here says now this, now that; but philosophy says always the same. She says what b

amazes you now, and you were present yourself when it was said.  
 And so either refute her, as I was saying just now, and show that  
 doing injustice and doing injustice without paying justice are not the  
 5 worst of evils; or if you leave this unrefuted, then by the dog, the  
 god of the Egyptians, Callicles himself will not agree with you,  
 Callicles, but he will be discordant with you in the whole of your life.  
 And yet I think, my excellent friend, that it is superior to have my lyre  
 c out of tune and discordant, and any chorus I might equip, and for  
 most men to disagree with me and contradict me, than for me just  
 one man to be discordant with myself and contradict myself.

5 C. Socrates, I think you swagger in your speeches, as if you were  
 really a mob-orator. And now you're making this speech when  
 you've done the same thing to Polus that Polus was denouncing  
 Gorgias for letting you do to him. For remember he said that you  
 d asked Gorgias whether, if anyone wanting to learn rhetoric came to  
 him without knowing just things, he would teach him. Then Gorgias  
 was ashamed, said Polus, and said he would teach him, because of  
 men's habit, since they would be offended if someone said he couldn't  
 teach about just things. Because of this agreement, said Polus. Gorgias  
 5 was forced to contradict himself, and this is exactly what you like.  
 And then Polus laughed at you, rightly, I think. But now you have  
 done the same thing over again to him. And for just this I can't  
 e admire Polus myself, for his concession to you that doing injustice is  
 more shameful than suffering it; for from this agreement he himself  
 in turn was bound up by you in the argument, and was muzzled,  
 after being ashamed to say what he thought. For indeed, Socrates,  
 you lead things to these vulgarities and stock themes of mob-orators,  
 5 though you claim to pursue the truth things which are not fine by  
 nature, but only by rule (*nomos*). For mostly these are opposed to  
 483a each other, nature and rule; and so if someone is ashamed and dare  
 not say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself. And  
 this is the clever device you've thought of and use to make mischief  
 in discussion; if someone speaks according to rule, you craftily  
 question him according to nature, and if he speaks of what belongs  
 5 to nature, you ask him about what belongs to rule just as lately  
 about these things doing injustice and suffering it Polus was  
 speaking of the fine according to rule, but you pursued the argument  
 according to nature.

For by nature everything is more shameful which is also worse, suffering injustice, but by rule doing injustice is more shameful. For this isn't what happens to a man, to suffer injustice; it's what happens to some slave for whom it's better to die than to live for if he suffers injustice and abuse, he can't defend himself or anyone else he cares about. But in my view those who lay down the rules are the weak men, the many. And so they lay down the rules and assign their praise and blame with their eye on themselves and their own advantage. They terrorize the stronger men capable of having more; and to prevent these men from having more than themselves they say that taking more is shameful and unjust, and that doing injustice is this, seeking to have more than other people; they are satisfied, I take it, if they themselves have an equal share when they're inferior. That's why by rule this is said to be unjust and shameful, to seek to have more than the many, and they call that doing injustice.

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But I think nature itself shows this, that it is just for the better man to have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the less powerful. Nature shows that this is so in many areas among other animals, and in whole cities and races of men, that the just stands decided in this way the superior rules over the weaker and has more. For what sort of justice did Xerxes rely on when he marched against Greece, or his father against the Scythians? And you could mention innumerable other such things. But I think these men do these things according to nature the nature of the just; yes, by Zeus, by the rule of nature, though no doubt not by the rule we lay down we mould the best and strongest among us, taking them from youth up, like lions, and tame them by spells and incantations over them, until we enslave them, telling them they ought to have equal shares, and that this is the fine and the just.

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484a

But I think that if a man is born with a strong enough nature, he will shake off and smash and escape all this. He will trample on all our writings, charms, incantations, all the rules contrary to nature. He rises up and shows himself master, this slave of ours, and there the justice of nature suddenly bursts into light. And I think Pindar too indicates what I say, in the song where he says, 'Rule, the king of all, mortals and immortals. ...' This, he says, 'leads and makes just what is most violent, with overpowering hand; I judge this by the

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10 works of Heracles, since without paying the price. ...' He says some-  
 thing like this for I don't know the song but he says that without  
 payment and without receiving them as a gift from Geryon Heracles  
 c drove off the cattle, assuming that this was the just by nature, that  
 the better and superior man possesses the cattle and other goods of  
 the worse and inferior men.

Well then, that's how the truth is. And you'll find it out if you  
 5 move on to greater things and finally leave philosophy behind. For I  
 tell you. Socrates, philosophy is a delightful thing, if someone  
 touches it in moderation at the right time of life; but if he persists in  
 it longer than he should, it's the ruin of men. For even if someone  
 d has an altogether good nature, but philosophizes beyond the right  
 age, he is bound to end up inexperienced in all these things in which  
 anyone who is to be a fine and good and respected man ought to  
 have experience. For indeed they turn out inexperienced in the laws  
 (nomos) of the city, and in the speech they should use in meeting  
 5 men in public and private transactions, and in human pleasures and  
 desires; and altogether they turn out entirely ignorant of the ways of  
 e men. And so whenever they come to some private or political  
 business, they prove themselves ridiculous, just as politicians, no  
 doubt, whenever they in turn come to your discourses and discus-  
 sions, are ridiculous. For it happens as Euripides says; 'Each man  
 5 shines in that and strives for it, devoting the greatest part of the day  
 485a to it where he finds himself best', and wherever he is inferior, he  
 avoids it and abuses it, praising the other thing, from good will to  
 himself, supposing that this way he is praising himself.

But I think that the most correct thing is to have a share in both.  
 5 It is fine to have a share in philosophy far enough for education, and  
 it is not shameful for someone to philosophize when he is a boy.  
 But whenever a man who's now older still philosophizes, the thing  
 b becomes ridiculous, Socrates. I'm struck by the philosophizers most  
 nearly the way I'm struck by those who mumble and act childishly.  
 I mean whenever I see a child, when that kind of dialogue is still  
 fitting for him, mumbling and being childish, I enjoy it; I find it  
 5 charming, suitable for a free citizen, suiting the age of a child. And  
 whenever I hear a child speaking a clear dialogue. I find it unpleasing;  
 it annoys my ears; and I find it fit for a slave instead. But whenever

someone hears a man mumbling, or sees him act childishly, he finds it ridiculous, unmanly, deserving a beating. c

Well, philosophizers strike me the same way too. For when I see philosophy in a young boy, I admire it, I find it suitable, and I regard him as a free man, and a non-philosophizer as un-free, someone who will never expect anything fine or noble from himself. But when I see an older man still philosophizing and not giving it up. I think this man needs a beating, Socrates. For, as I was saying just now, this person is bound to end up being unmanly, even if he has an altogether good nature; for he shuns the city centre and the public squares where the poet says men win good reputations. He is sunk away out of sight for the rest of his life, and lives whispering with three or four boys in a corner, and never gives voice to anything fit for a free man, great and powerful. 5 d 5 e

Now, Socrates, I'm quite friendly towards you. And so I find you strike me now as Amphion struck Zethus in Euripides, whom I recalled just now. For indeed, the sorts of things come to me to say to you that Zethus said to his brother; 'Socrates, you are careless of what you should care for; you twist this noble nature of your soul in a childish shape; you could not make a speech correctly to the council of justice, nor seize anything likely and persuasive, nor propose any daring resolution to help another.' And look, my dear Socrates and don't be annoyed with me at all, when I'll be saying it out of goodwill to you don't you find it shameful to be the way I think you are, along with all those who go further and further into philosophy? 5 486a 5

For as it is, suppose someone arrested you, or some other philosopher, and threw you into gaol, claiming you were doing injustice when you were doing none; you know you'd have no idea what to do with yourself; you'd be dizzy, you'd gape, not knowing what to say; you'd go into court, to face some inferior wretch of an accuser, and you'd be put to death if he wanted the death penalty for you. Now how can this be wise, Socrates? 'this craft which takes a man of good nature and makes him worse' with no power to defend himself or save himself or anyone else from the greatest dangers, with only the power to be despoiled of all his property by his enemies, and to live altogether dishonoured in the city. With someone b 5 c

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like this, to put it crudely, anyone is at liberty to push his face in and get off scot-free.

5 My excellent friend, listen to me; 'stop these examinations, practise the culture of the world's affairs'; practise what will earn you the reputation of wisdom, 'leave these subtleties to others' whether we ought to call them nonsense or rubbish 'from which you will live in an empty house'. Don't emulate those who examine these trifles, but those with a living, reputation, and many other goods.

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5 S. If I had a soul made of gold, Callicles, don't you think I'd be delighted to find one of those stones on which they test gold the best one, so that if I brought my soul to it, and it agreed that my soul was well cared for, I would be sure I was in good condition and needed no other touchstone?

e C. And what's your point in asking that, Socrates?

S. I'll tell you. I think I've stumbled on that kind of lucky find now, by stumbling on you.

C. Why's that?

5 S. I know well that if you agree with what my soul believes,  
487a these very beliefs are the true ones. For I believe that someone who is to test adequately the soul which lives rightly and the soul which does not should have three things, all of which you have; knowledge, goodwill, and free speaking. For I meet many people incapable of testing me because they aren't wise as you are. Others are wise, but unwilling to tell me the truth because they don't care for me as you do. And these foreign visitors, Gorgias and Polus, are wise and friends of mine, but short of free speaking, and more prone to shame than they should be. Of course they are; for they are so far gone in shame that because of his shame each of them dares to contradict himself in front of many people, and on the most important questions. But you have all the things the others lack. You are educated adequately, many Athenians would say; and you're well disposed to me. What's my evidence? I'll tell you. I know that four of you have become associates in wisdom, Callicles; you, Teisander of Aphidnae, Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholargeis. And once I overheard you deliberating about how far wisdom should be cultivated, and I know that some opinion of this kind was prevailing with you not to be eager to philosophize as far as exactness; you

were warning each other to be careful not to become wise beyond what is needed, and so find you had been ruined unawares. And so now when I hear you advising me just as you advised your closest companions, it's good enough evidence for me that you are really well disposed to me. And as for being the type to speak freely without shame, you say it yourself and your speech a little earlier agrees with you. 5

Clearly, then, this is how it is now with these questions: if you agree with me about anything in the discussion, then this will have been adequately tested by me and you, and it will no longer need to be brought to another touchstone. For you would never have conceded it either from lack of wisdom or from excess of shame, nor would you concede it to deceive me; for you are a friend to me, as you say yourself. In reality, then, agreement between you and me will finally possess the goal of truth. e 5

And this inquiry is the finest of all, Callicles, about those questions on which you attacked me; what a man ought to be like, and what he ought to practise, and how far, when he is older and younger. For if I do something wrongly in my own life, be sure that my fault is not voluntary, but from my own stupidity. And so don't you give up reproving me the way you began to, but show me adequately what I should practise and how I might acquire it. And if you catch me having agreed with you now, and later on not doing the same things that I agreed about, count me a complete idiot, and don't bother to improve me ever again, since I won't deserve anything. 488a 5 b

But now repeat for me again from the beginning how do you say the just is, you and Pindar the just by nature? Is it for the superior man to remove by force what belongs to the inferior men, and for the better man to rule worse men, and for the nobler man to have more than the baser man? You aren't saying that the just is anything else, are you? Or do I remember correctly? 5

C. Yes. That's what I was saying then, and say now.

S. And do you call the same man better and superior? For I tell you. I wasn't able then or now to learn from you just what you were saying. Do you call the stronger men superior, and should the weaker men listen to the stronger man? I think that was what you indicated before, that great cities attack smaller according to the just by c 5

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nature, because they are superior and stronger on the assumption that the superior and the stronger and better are the same. Or is it possible to be a better man, but inferior and weaker, and superior but more wretched? Or does the same definition belong to the better and the superior? Define this very thing for me clearly; are the superior and the better and the stronger the same thing, or something different?

C. Yes. I'm telling you clearly that they're the same.

S. Aren't the many superior to the one man according to nature? For after all, they establish the rules against the one man, as you yourself were saying just now.

C. Of course.

S. Then the rules of the many are the rules of the superior men?

C. Quite.

S. Then aren't they the rules of the better men? For presumably the superior are better, on your account.

C. Yes.

S. Then aren't the rules of these men fine by nature, when these men are superior?

C. I agree.

S. Then don't the many recognize this rule, as you were saying yourself just now, that having an equal share is just and doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it? Is that so, or not? And mind you aren't caught being ashamed here. Do the many recognize the rule, or do they not, that having an equal share, not having more, is just, and that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it?

Don't grudge me an answer to this, Callicles; and then, if you agree with me, I'll be confirmed by you, because a man who is adequate to decide the question has agreed with me.

C All right. The many do recognize this rule.

S. Then it's not only by rule that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, or that having an equal share is just, but also by nature. And so it looks as though you aren't speaking the truth in what you said before, or denouncing me correctly, when you say that rule and nature are opposed, and that I realize this and make mischief in discussions if someone speaks according to nature.

leading him to the rule, and if anyone speaks according to the rule, leading him to nature.

C. This fellow here just won't stop his rubbish. Tell me, Socrates, aren't you ashamed to be hunting after names, at your age, and thinking it a bit of luck if someone goes wrong in a word? For do you think I'm saying that being superior men is anything else than being better men? Haven't I been telling you for ages that I say the better and the superior are the same thing? Or do you think I'm saying that if a rabble of slaves and all sorts of people worth nothing, except perhaps in bodily strength, collect together, and these people assert it, then what they assert is the rule? c 5

S. Well, wisest Callicles, is that what you say?

C. It certainly is.

S. Well, my splendid man, I've been guessing myself for some time that you're saying that the superior is something like that; and I repeat my question from eagerness to know clearly what you're saying. For presumably you don't think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you, just because they're stronger than you. But now say again from the beginning what do you say the better men are, since you say they're not the stronger? And teach me more gently, so that I don't desert your school. d 5

C. You're being sly, Socrates. e

S. No I'm not, Callicles, by Zethus, whom you relied on for all your sly attacks on me just now. But come, tell me; who do you say the better men are?

C. I say they're the worthier men.

S. Now do you see that you're just saying names, making nothing clear? Won't you tell me do you say that the better and the superior men are the wiser men, or some others? 5

C. Yes indeed. I say they are, very much so.

S. Then often one wise man is superior to thousands with no wisdom, on your account, and he should rule them, and they should be ruled, and the ruler should have more than the ruled. I think that's what you want to say and I'm not trying to catch you with a word if the one is superior to the thousands. 490a 5

C. Yes, that's what I'm saying. For this is what I think the just

by nature is that the man who is better and wiser should rule over the lower men, and have more than them.

b S. Now stop there. What exactly are you saying now? If many of us are all together in the same place as now, and hold a lot of food and drink in common, and we are people of all sorts, some strong, 5 some weak, but one of us is wiser about food and drink, being a doctor, while it's likely that he's stronger than some and weaker than others won't this man, since he's wiser than us, be better and superior in this area?

C. Quite.

c S. Then is he to have more of this food than us, because he's better? Or should he distribute everything, because he rules, but not take more in spending it and using it on his own body, to avoid 5 suffering himself? Shouldn't he rather have more than some and less than others? And if he turns out to be weakest of all, shouldn't the best man have least of them all, Callicles? Isn't that so, my friend?

d C. You talk about food and drink and doctors and a lot of rubbish. But I'm not talking about that.

S. Don't you say that the wiser man is superior? Say yes or no.

C. I do.

5 S. But shouldn't the better man have more?

C. No not more food and drink.

S. I see but perhaps more cloaks? Should the best weaver have the biggest cloak and go around dressed up in the most and the finest clothes?

10 C. Ha! Cloaks indeed!

e S. Then clearly the wisest and best in that area should take more shoes. Perhaps the shoemaker should walk around wearing the biggest and the most shoes?

5 C. Shoes indeed! What rubbish!

S. Well, if you're not talking about that sort of thing, perhaps it's something like this: For instance, a farming man, wise and fine and good about the soil he's the one, I presume, who should take more seeds and should use the most possible seed on his own soil.

C. Ah, you're always saying the same, Socrates.

10 S. Not only that, Callicles, but about the same things too.

491a C. That's true enough, by the gods. You simply never stop your

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endless talk about cobblers and cleaners and cooks and doctors, as though our discussion were about them.

S. Won't you say what the superior and wiser man has more of when he justly takes more? Will you neither put up with my suggestions nor say yourself'? 5

C. But I've been saying for a long time. First of all I say who the superior men are I don't say shoemakers or cooks; they're whoever are wise in the city's affairs, about how to govern it well, and not only wise, but also brave, and capable of fulfilling what they intend and who don't slacken because of softness of soul. b

S. Do you see, excellent Callicles, that you and I don't accuse each other of the same thing? For you say I'm always saying the same thing, and you blame me for it, but on the contrary I accuse you of never saying the same about the same things. Previously you were defining the better and superior men as the stronger, then as the wiser, now again you've come bringing something else. Some kind of braver men are what you call the superior and the better men. Come on, my friend, tell me once and for all, just who do you call the better and superior better and superior in what? 5 c

C. But I've told you those who are wise in the city's affairs, and brave. For it is fitting for these to rule cities, and the just is this, for them to have more than the rest for the rulers to have more than the ruled. d

S. But what about themselves, my friend? Rulers or ruled in what way? 5

C. What are you talking about?

S. I'm talking about each one of them ruling himself. Or shouldn't he do this at all, rule himself, but only rule the others?

C. What are you talking about, 'ruling himself'?

S. Nothing complicated, but just as the many say temperate, master of himself, ruling the pleasures and appetites within him. 10 e

C. How funny you are. You're calling the fools the temperate people.

S. What? Anyone would realize that's not what I'm saying.

C. But it certainly is, Socrates. For how could a man become happy who's enslaved to anything at all? No. The fine and just according to nature is this, what I'm speaking freely of to you now 5

492a the man who is to live rightly should let his appetites grow as large  
 as possible and not restrain (*kolazein*) them, and when these are as  
 large as possible, he must have the power to serve them, because of  
 his bravery and wisdom, and to fill them with whatever he has an  
 appetite for at any time. But I think this isn't in the power of the  
 many. And so they blame these people out of shame, concealing  
 5 their own powerlessness, and say that intemperance (*akolasia*) is  
 actually shameful, as I was saying previously, enslaving the men with  
 the best natures; and when they haven't the power to find fulfilment  
 b for their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice because of  
 their own unmanliness. For when men to begin with are sons of  
 kings, or themselves by nature have the power to obtain some sort of  
 rule, tyranny, or dynasty, what would in truth be more shameful or  
 5 evil than temperance and justice for these men? though they were  
 at liberty to enjoy goods without hindrance, they set up a master  
 over themselves in the rules (*nomos*) and speech and blame of the  
 c mass of men. Or how could they help being wretched in living under  
 what justice and temperance count as fine, doing nothing more for  
 their friends than for their enemies, even though they're rulers in  
 their own city? But in truth, Socrates the truth you say you  
 5 pursue it is this way; luxury, intemperance (*akolasia*), and freedom,  
 if it is well supplied, this is virtue and happiness; and those other  
 things, those ornaments, those agreements of men contrary to nature,  
 those are rubbish, worth nothing.

d S. You're carrying through your speech nobly, Callicles, and  
 speaking freely. For now you're saying clearly what the others think  
 but aren't willing to say. And so I'm asking you not to slacken at all,  
 5 so that it will really become clear how we should live. And tell me  
 this: Do you say that a man must not restrain (*kolazein*) his  
 appetites, if he's to be as he should be, but should let them grow as  
 great as possible, and find fulfilment for them from anywhere at all,  
 e and that virtue is this?

C. That's what I say.

S. Then it's wrong to say that those who need (*dein*) nothing are  
 happy.

5 C. Of course. Otherwise stones and corpses would be happiest.

S. But the life you speak of is a strange one too. For I tell you,

I wouldn't be surprised if Euripides speaks the truth in those verses where he says. 'Who knows if being alive is really being dead, and being dead being alive?' And perhaps we too are really dead. For once I heard from some wise man that we are dead now, our body is our tomb; and that of our soul with appetites in it is liable to be persuaded and to sway back and forth. And a subtle man, perhaps some Sicilian or Italian, who told this story, played on the name, and because it was persuadable (*pithanon*) and impressionable called it a jar (*pithon*), and called the foolish (*anoetous* \*) the uninitiated (*amuetous*\*), and said that in the foolish men that of the soul with appetites, the foolish, intemperate, and insatiable in it, was a leaking jar, because it couldn't be filled. This man indicates contrary to you, Callicles that of all those in Hades speaking of the unseen (*aides*) this way these are the most wretched, the uninitiated, and that they carry water to this leaky jar with another leaky thing, a sieve. And so he's saying so the man who told me said that the sieve is the soul; and he likened the soul of the foolish to a sieve because it was leaky, since it could hold nothing, from its unreliability and forgetfulness.

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Now this is all fairly strange. But he shows what I'd like to indicate to you, so that I persuade you, if I can, to change your mind, and instead of the insatiable and unrestrained life to choose the orderly life adequately supplied and satisfied with whatever it has at any time. But now do I persuade you at all to change your mind, and agree that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or even if I tell you many more stories like this one, won't you change your mind any the more?

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C. You're nearer the truth there, Socrates.

S. Come on then, I'll tell you another comparison, from the same school as that one. See now if you're saying something like this about the life of each of the two men, the temperate and the intemperate: Suppose for instance that each of two men has a lot of jars, and one has sound and full jars, one full of wine, another of honey, another of milk, and many others full of many things. And suppose the sources for each of these things are scarce and hard to find, provided only with much severe effort. Now when one man has filled up, he brings in no more, and doesn't care about them, but is

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at rest as far as they are concerned. The other man has sources like  
 the first man's that can be drawn on, though with difficulty. But his  
 494a vessels are leaky and rotten, and he is forced to be always filling  
 them day and night, or else he suffers the most extreme distresses.  
 Now if this is how each man's life is, do you say that the intemperate  
 man's life is happier than the orderly man's? When I tell you this, do  
 5 I persuade you at all to concede that the orderly life is better than  
 the intemperate, or don't I persuade you?

C. No, you don't, Socrates. For that one who has filled up has no  
 pleasure at all any more. It's what I was saying just now living like  
 b a stone once he has filled up, with no more enjoyment or distress.  
 No; living pleasantly is in this in having as much as possible flow-  
 ing in.

S. But if the inflow is large, mustn't the outflow be large too,  
 and mustn't there be big holes for the outflow?

5 C. Of course.

S. Then you're speaking of some kind of torrent-bird's life, not a  
 corpse's or a stone's. Tell me now; are you talking about something  
 like being hungry and eating when you're hungry?

C. I am.

c S. And being thirsty and drinking when you're thirsty?

C. That's what I'm talking about and about having all the  
 other appetites and having the power to fill them and enjoy it, and  
 so living happily.

5 S. That's good, my excellent man. You're continuing the way  
 you began, and mind you don't slacken from shame. And it looks as  
 though I mustn't (*dein*) slacken from shame either. And First of all,  
 tell me if itching and wanting to scratch, with no restriction on  
 scratching, and continuing to scratch all your life, is also living happily.

d C. How absurd you are, Socrates a real mob-orator.

5 S. Yes, Callicles. You see that's how I shocked both Polus and  
 Gorgias, and made them ashamed. But you certainly won't be  
 shocked or ashamed you're brave. Now just answer.

C. All right. I say that the scratcher would also live pleasantly.

S. And if pleasantly, then happily too?

C. Quite.

e S. Suppose he only wants to scratch his head ... or what am I to

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ask you now? See what you'll answer, Callicles, if someone asks you in order everything following that. And when these all come to a head considering what they're like in the life of catamites, isn't that strange and shameful and wretched? Or will you dare to say that these people are happy if they have what they need without restriction? 5

C. Aren't you ashamed to lead the discussion to such things. Socrates?

S. Well, is it me who's leading it there, my noble friend, or is it whoever says with no qualification that those who have enjoyment, however they have enjoyment, are happy, and doesn't distinguish among pleasures those which are good and bad? But tell me even now; do you say that the same thing is pleasant and good, or that there is something of pleasant things which is not good? 10  
495a

C. Well, so that I don't leave my argument (*logos*) inconsistent, if I say that they're different, I say they're the same. 5

S. You're destroying the previous discussion (*logos*), Callicles, and you'd no longer be properly searching for the truth with me if you speak contrary to what you think.

C. Of course I do; and you do it too, Socrates. b

S. Then I'm not doing the right thing, if I do that, and neither are you. But come, blessed man, consider. Surely this isn't the good, enjoying in any way? For all these many shameful things just hinted at clearly follow, if that's so, and many others. 5

C So *you* think, Socrates.

S. Then do you really insist on this, Callicles?

C. I do.

S. Then should we undertake the discussion on the assumption that you're in earnest? c

C. Absolutely.

S. Come then, since that's how it seems, distinguish these things: I presume you call something knowledge.

C. I do.

S. And weren't you just now saying that there is a kind of courage with knowledge? 5

C. Yes, I was saying that.

S. Then weren't you speaking of courage and knowledge as different, and so as two things?

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C. Very much so.

S. Well then, were you saying that pleasure and knowledge are the same or different?

d C. Different, of course, you wisest of men.

S. And that courage too is different from pleasure?

C. Of course.

5 S. All right then, let's remember this, that Callicles of Acharnae said that the same thing is pleasant and good, but knowledge and courage are different from each other and from the good.

C And Socrates here of Alopece doesn't agree with this; or does he?

e S. No, he doesn't. Nor Callicles either, I think, whenever he views himself correctly. For tell me, don't you think that those who do badly are affected the opposite way from those who do well?

5 C. I do.

S. Then since these are opposite to each other, mustn't it be the same with them as with health and sickness? For, I take it, a man isn't at the same time healthy and sick, nor does he get rid of health and sickness at the same time.

10 C. What are you saying?

496a S. Well, for instance, take any part of the body you like, and consider it. Can't a man have a sickness in the eyes, called 'eye-disease'?

C. Of course.

S. Then he is hardly healthy in these same eyes at the same time.

C. Not by any means.

5 S. And what about when he gets rid of the eye-disease? Does he get rid of health in his eyes, and is he finally rid of both?

C. Not at all.

b S. No indeed. I think that's an amazing and absurd result, isn't it?

C. Very much so.

S. But I think he gains and loses each thing in turn.

C. I agree.

*S.* Isn't it the same for strength and weakness?

*C.* Yes.

*S.* And speed and slowness?

5 *C.* Quite.

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S. And goods and happiness and the opposite of these, evils and wretchedness doesn't a man also gain each of these in turn and lose each in turn?

C. Certainly.

S. Then if we find some things that a man gets rid of at the same time and has at the same time, it's clear that these won't be the good and the evil. Do we agree on this? Consider carefully before you reply. c

C. I very much agree. 5

S. Then return to what has been agreed before. In speaking of hunger, were you saying that it is pleasant or painful? I'm talking about hunger itself.

C. I say it's painful. But I say that eating when you're hungry is pleasant.

S. I understand. But at any rate, being hungry itself is painful. isn't it? d

C. I agree.

S. And isn't thirst too?

C. Very much so.

S. Then will I ask still more questions, or do you agree that every lack and appetite is painful?

C. I agree. You needn't go on asking. 5

S. All right. Now don't you say that drinking when you're thirsty is pleasant?

C. I do.

S. And presumably 'when you're thirsty' in what you say is 'when you're in distress'?

C. Yes. e

S. And drinking is a filling of the lack, and a pleasure?

C. Yes.

S. Now don't you say that in drinking someone has enjoyment?

C. Very much so.

S. When he's thirsty, that is.

C. I agree.

S. When he's distressed?

C. Yes.

S. Then do you see what follows, that you say someone is 5

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distressed and enjoying at the same time, when you say he is thirsty and drinks? Or doesn't this come about at the same time and in the same place, in soul or body for I think it makes no difference? Is that so or not?

C. It is.

S. But now you say it's impossible for someone doing well to do

497a badly at the same time.

C. Yes, I do.

S. While you are agreed that it's possible to be in pain and enjoyment at the same time.

C. Apparently.

S. Then enjoying is not doing well, nor is being in pain doing badly; and so the pleasant turns out to be different from the good.

5

C. I don't know what sort of sophistry you're at, Socrates.

S. You know, but you're acting soft, Callicles. Go further on, and see how wise you are when you take me to task. Isn't each of us finished with his pleasure from drinking at the same time as he is finished being thirsty?

b

C. I don't know what you're saying.

5 *Gorgias*. No, no, Callicles. Do answer for our sakes too, so that the discussion can progress.

5

C. But Socrates is always like that, *Gorgias*. He keeps asking these petty, worthless questions, and cross-examines.

G. Well, what does it matter to you? Anyhow, it isn't for you to put a value on it, Callicles. Do allow Socrates to cross-examine as he wishes.

10

c C. Then go on you, and ask these petty trifles, since that's what *Gorgias* thinks.

S. You're a happy man, Callicles; for you're an initiate of the greater mysteries before the lesser. I didn't think that was allowed. Then answer from where you left off; doesn't each of us cease from his pleasure at the same time as he ceases being thirsty?

5

C. I agree.

S. And don't we cease from hunger and all the other appetites and from pleasures at the same time?

C. That's right.

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S. Then don't we cease from distresses and pleasures at the same time? d

C. Yes.

S. But now, we don't cease from goods and evils at the same time, as you were agreeing then; don't you agree now?

C. Yes, I do. So what?

S. Then goods turn out not to be the same as pleasant things, my friend, and evils not to be the same as painful things. For we cease from pleasant and painful things at the same time, but not from good and evil things, since they're different from pleasant and painful. Then how can pleasant things be the same as goods, or painful things the same as evils? 5

But if you wish, consider it this way too I don't think you agree to it this way either; but consider it. Don't you call good men good by the presence of goods, just as you call beautiful (*kalon*) those to whom beauty is present? e

C. I do.

S. Well then, do you call fools and cowards good men? You didn't just now, anyway; you were saying the brave and wise are good. Aren't these the ones you call good? 5

C. Quite.

S. Now did you never see a foolish child enjoying himself?

C. I did.

S. And did you never see a foolish man enjoying himself?

C. I think I did. What about it?

S. Nothing at all. Just answer. 498a

C. I did see one.

S. Well, did you see a man of intelligence in distress and enjoyment?

C. I did.

S. Which ones have more distress and enjoyment, the wise men or the foolish?

C. I think they don't differ that much.

S. Well, that's enough. Now did you ever see a coward in war? 5

C. Of course.

S. Now when the enemy withdrew, who did you think had more enjoyment the cowards or the brave men?

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- b C. I thought they both had enjoyment; perhaps the cowards had more, or if not, about the same.
- S. It doesn't matter. At any rate, the cowards too have enjoyment?
- C. Very much so.
- S. And the foolish men, it seems.
- C. Yes.
- S. And when the enemy advance, are only the cowards in distress, or the brave men too?
- C. Both.
- S. In the same way?
- C. Perhaps the cowards are in more distress.
- S. And when the enemy withdraw, haven't they more enjoyment?
- C. Perhaps.
- c S. Then don't they have distress and enjoyment, both the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave men, about the same, you say, but the cowards more than the brave men?
- C. I agree.
- S. But now the wise and the brave are good, the cowardly and foolish bad?
- C. Yes.
- 5 S. Then the good and the bad have about the same enjoyment and distress?
- C. I agree.
- S. Then are the good and the bad about equally good and bad, or are the bad even better?
- d C. By Zeus, I don't know what you're saying.
- S. You don't know that you say good men are good by the presence of goods, and evil men evil by the presence of evils? And that the pleasures are the goods and pains evils?
- C. I agree.
- 5 S. And aren't the goods, the pleasures, present to those having enjoyment, if they are having it?

*C.* Of course.

*S.* Then when goods are present men having enjoyment are good?

*C.* Yes.

*S.* Well, and aren't the evils, distresses, present to those in pain?

*C.* Yes, they're present.

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S. And you say that evil men are evil by the presence of evils? Or don't you say it any longer? e

C. Yes, I say it.

S. Then those who have enjoyment are good, and those in pain are evil?

C. Quite.

S. And those who have more enjoyment or pain are better or worse, those who have less are less bad or less good, and those who have equal amounts are equally good or bad? 5

C. Yes.

S. Now don't you say that the wise and the foolish, and the brave men and the cowards, have about the same enjoyment and distress, or the cowards even still more?

C. I do.

S. Then work out together with me what we find to follow from what has been agreed; for 'twice and thrice', as they say, it's a fine thing to say and consider fine things. We say that the wise and brave man is good, don't we? 499a

C. Yes.

S. And that the foolish and cowardly man is bad?

C. Of course.

S. And again that the man who has enjoyment is good?

C. Yes.

S. And that the man in distress is bad? 5

C. It must be so.

S. And that the good and bad men have pain and enjoyment similarly, but perhaps the bad man has even more?

C. Yes.

S. Then doesn't the bad man turn out to be good and bad similarly to the good man, or even better? Doesn't this follow, with those previous things, if someone says that the same things are pleasant and good? Mustn't this follow, Callicles? b

C. I've been listening to you for a long time and agreeing. Socrates, thinking that even if someone concedes something to you as a joke, you fasten on it gleefully like young boys. As though you really suppose that I or any other man don't think some pleasures are better and others worse.

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c S. Ah Callicles, what a scoundrel you are. You treat me like a child, telling me now that the same things are this way, and again that they're some other way, and deceiving me. And I didn't think at the start that you'd voluntarily deceive me, because I thought you were a friend. But it turns out I was misled; and it seems I must  
5 'make the best of what I have', as the old saying goes, and accept what you're offering me. And that is, you're saying now, that there are pleasures, some good and some bad. Isn't that right?

d C. Yes.

S. Then are the beneficial ones good, and the harmful ones evil?

C. Quite.

S. And those which produce some good are beneficial, and those which produce some evil are evil?

C. I agree.

5 S. Are you speaking of these kinds of pleasures in the body, for instance, among the pleasures found in eating and drinking that we were speaking of just now those which produce health in the body, or strength or some other excellence (*arete* \*) of the body, are  
e these good, and the ones which produce the opposites of these things evil?

C. Certainly.

S. And similarly among distresses, aren't some worthy, others base?

C. Of course.

S. Then mustn't we choose and do the worthy ones, both pleasures and distresses?

5 C. Certainly.

S. But not the base ones?

C. Clearly not.

500a S. Yes, for I take it we agreed that we must do everything for the sake of goods, if you remember Polus and I. Do you agree with us too, that the good is the end of all actions, and that for the sake of it we should do all the other things, not do it for the sake of the other things? Do you cast a third vote with ours?

C. I do.

S. Then for the sake of goods we should do other things, including pleasant things, not good things for the sake of pleasant things?

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C. Quite.

S. Now is it for anyone to select which kinds of pleasant things are good and which evil? Or does it need a craftsman for each thing? 5

C. It needs a craftsman.

S. Then let's recall another thing I was saying to Polus and Gorgias. I was saying, if you remember, that there are practices, some limited to pleasure, only that one thing, ignorant of the better and the worse, and other practices which know what is good and what is bad. And I was assigning to the practices concerned with pleasures the knack no craft of confectionery, and to those concerned with the good the medical craft. And for the sake of the god of friendship, Callicles, don't think you should make jokes at me, and don't answer capriciously, contrary to what you think, nor again take what I say that way, as making jokes. For you see that our discussion is about this and what would anyone with the slightest intelligence be more seriously concerned about than this? I mean what way ought we to live? The way to which you encourage me, doing what a real man does, speaking in the people's Assembly, practising rhetoric, conducting politics the way you conduct it now or the life spent in philosophy? And how does the one life differ from the other? Perhaps it's best, then, to divide these lives as I set about it lately; when we've divided them, and agreed with each other, if there are these two distinct lives, we should consider how they differ from each other, and which of them is to be lived. Perhaps you don't yet know what I'm saying.

C. No. Indeed I don't. 5

S. Well, I'll tell you more clearly. Since you and I are agreed that something is good and something is pleasant, that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there is a training and practice for the gaining of each, one a pursuit of the pleasant, the other of the good then accept or deny this point First of all. Do you accept it? 10 e

C. Yes, I do.

S. Come then, and accept what I was saying to these people too, if you really thought I was saying what was true then. I think I was saying that cookery doesn't seem to me to be a craft, but a knack, while medicine is a craft. I said that medicine has considered the nature of what it cares for and the explanation of what it does, and 5 501a

can give a rational account (*logos*) of each of these things. But the  
 5 knack concerned with pleasure, which all its care aims at, goes after  
 this entirely without a craft, not at all considering the nature or the  
 explanation of the pleasure, and altogether without reason, making  
 practically no distinctions. By habit and experience it keeps only  
 b memory of what usually happens, by which it produces its pleasures.  
 And so consider first whether you think this is adequately stated and  
 whether there are also other such practices associated with the soul.  
 5 some of them with craft-knowledge, with forethought for what is  
 best about the soul, and others which despise the best, and have  
 considered, as we said about cookery, only how the pleasure of the  
 soul might come about, but neither consider what pleasure is better  
 or worse nor care about anything else than giving gratification.  
 c better or worse. I think there are these practices, Callicles, and I say  
 that this kind of thing is flattery, for the body, for the soul, and for  
 anything else whose pleasure anyone cultivates, when he fails to  
 5 consider the better and the worse. Do you deposit the same opinion  
 about this as ours, or do you speak against it?

C. No I don't. I'm going along with you, to let the discussion  
 progress for you, and to gratify Gorgias here.

d S. Is this so for one soul, but not for two or for many?

C. No. It's so for two and for many as well.

5 S. And isn't it also possible to gratify souls all in a crowd at the  
 same time, not considering the best at all?

C. Yes, I think so.

S. Then can you tell me which are the practices that produce  
 this? Or rather, if you like, I'll ask the questions; agree with what  
 e you think is right, and deny what you think is wrong. And first of  
 all, let's consider flute-playing. Don't you think it is the kind of  
 practice we mentioned, Callicles, pursuing only our pleasure, and  
 concerned with nothing else?

C. I think so.

5 S. And aren't all of this kind similar such as lyre-playing before  
 large audiences?

C. Yes.

S. And what about the teaching of choruses, and the making of  
 dithyramps? Isn't it apparently something of the same kind? Or do

you think Cinesias the son of Meles cares at all about saying the kind of thing to make the audience better? Or does he care about what will gratify the mob of spectators? 10  
502a

C. That's clear, Socrates, about Cinesias anyway.

S. And what about his father Meles? Did you think he was looking to what is best when he sang on the lyre? Or didn't he even consider what was pleasantest? For he used to torture the spectators when he sang. But consider don't you think that all singing to the lyre and composition of dithyrambs has been discovered for the sake of pleasure? 5

C. I do.

S. Then what about this august and wonderful pursuit, the composition of tragedy, and its concern? Is its undertaking and concern, in your opinion, just to gratify the spectators? Or does it also struggle, if anything is pleasant and gratifying to them, but base, to avoid saying it, and if something is without pleasure but beneficial, to say and sing this, whether they enjoy it or not? Which way do you think the composition of tragedies is equipped? b  
5

C. This much is clear, Socrates, that it concentrates on pleasure and on gratifying spectators. c

S. And didn't we say just now that this sort of thing is flattery, Callicles?

C. Quite.

S. Well now, if someone took away from all poetic composition the melody, the rhythm, and the metre, doesn't what is left turn out to be speech (*logos*)? 5

C. It must be.

S. And isn't this speech addressed to a large mob of the people? 10

C. I agree.

S. Then poetic composition is a kind of public oratory.

C. Apparently. d

S. And surely public oratory is rhetoric. Or don't you think the poets practise rhetoric in the theatres?

C. Yes, I think so.

S. And so we've found a kind of rhetoric addressed to the people, including children and women and men all together, and slaves and free. And we can't altogether admire it; for we say it's flattering. 5

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C. Quite.

10 S. All right. What about rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people  
e and the other peoples of the cities, the peoples composed of free  
5 men, exactly what do we find this is? Do you think that rhetors  
always speak with an eye on what is best, and aim to make the  
citizens as good as possible by their speeches? Or do they too con-  
centrate on gratifying the citizens, despising the common interest for  
503a the sake of their own private interest? Do they approach the people  
in cities as children, trying only to gratify them, with no concern  
about whether they will be better or worse from it?

C. That's not just one question you're asking any more. There  
are some who care about the citizens when they say what they say,  
and others who are as you claim.

5 S. That's all right. For if there are really two types here, I presume  
one type is flattery, and shameful public oratory, while the other is  
fine trying to make the souls of the citizens as good as possible,  
and working hard in saying what is best, whether it is pleasant or  
b unpleasant to the audience. But you've never yet seen this kind of  
rhetoric; or if you can mention a rhetor of this type, why haven't  
you told me as well who he is?

5 C. Well, by Zeus, I can't mention any of the present rhetors to  
you.

S. Well then, can you mention someone of earlier times who's  
reputed to have made the Athenians better, after he began his public  
speaking, when they had previously been worse? For I don't know  
who this is.

c C. Well, don't you hear it said that Themistocles proved himself a  
good man, and Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles? he's lately died  
and you've heard him speak yourself.

5 S. Yes, Callicles; if real virtue is what you were saying before  
filling up appetites, our own or other people's. But if it's not that,  
but it's what we were forced to agree to in the later discussion  
that we should fulfil those appetites which make a man better when  
d they are fulfilled, and not fulfil those which make him worse, and  
that this is some kind of craft then I can't say that any of these  
men had that kind of virtue.

C. Well, if you look properly, you'll find one.

S. Then let's see, considering calmly this way, whether any of these men proved to be virtuous. Come now, the good man who speaks with a view to the best, surely he won't speak at random, but will look to something? He will be like all other craftsmen; each of them selects and applies his efforts with a view to his own work, not at random, but so that what he produces will acquire some form. Look for instance if you like at painters, builders, shipwrights, all other craftsmen whichever one you like; see how each of them arranges in a structure whatever he arranges, and compels one thing to be fitting and suitable to another, until he composes the whole thing arranged in a structure and order. All craftsmen, including those we were talking of just now, gymnastic-trainers, and doctors. form the body into order and structure, don't they? Do we agree that this is so, or not?

5

e

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504a

5

C. Let's say this is so.

S. Then when a house gets structure and order, it will be worthy, and when it lacks structure, wretched?

C. I agree.

S. And surely a boat the same way? 10

C. Yes. b

S. And don't we say the same about our bodies?

C. Quite.

S. And what about the soul? Will it be worthy if it lacks structure, or if it gains some kind of structure and order? 5

C. From what's been said before, we must agree on this too.

S. Then what's the name for what comes to be in the body from structure and order?

C. I suppose you're talking about health and strength.

S. I am. And what's the name for what comes to be in the soul from structure and order? Try to find and say the name for this as for the body. c

C. And why don't you say it yourself, Socrates?

S. Well, if it pleases you more, I'll say it myself. But you, if you think I speak well, agree, and if you don't, examine me, and don't give in to me. I think that the name for the structures of the body is 'healthy' from which health and the rest of bodily excellence (*arete* \*) come to be in the body. Is that so, or isn't it? 5

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10 C. It is.

d S. And for the structures and orderings of the soul the name is 'lawful' and 'law', from which people become lawful and orderly; and these are justice and temperance. Do you say so, or not?  
C. Let it be so.

5 S. Then won't that rhetor, the craftsman, the good one, look to these things when he applies whatever speeches he makes to souls, and when he applies all his actions to them, and when he gives whatever he gives, and when he takes away whatever he takes away? He'll always have his mind on this; to see that the souls of the citizens acquire justice and get rid of injustice, and that they acquire temperance and get rid of intemperance (*akolasia*) and that they acquire the rest of virtue and get rid of vice. Do you agree or not?

5 C. I agree.

S. Yes, for what's the benefit, Callicles, of giving lots of the most pleasant food or drink or anything else to a sick body in wretched condition, which won't help it one bit more than the opposite method, on the right account, and will help even less? Is that so?

505a C. Let it be so.

S. Yes; for I suppose it's no profit for a man to live with bodily wretchedness; in that condition you must live wretchedly too. Isn't that so?

5 C. Yes.

10 S. And don't the doctors mostly allow a healthy man to fulfil his appetites, for instance to eat and drink as much as he wants when he's hungry or thirsty? And don't they practically never allow a sick man to fill himself with what he has an appetite for? Don't you also agree with this much?

C. I do.

b S. And isn't it the same way, my excellent man, about the soul? As long as it's corrupt, senseless, intemperate, unjust, and impious, we should restrain it from its appetites, and not allow it to do anything else except what will make it better. Do you say so, or not?

5

C. I do.

S. For, I take it, that way it's better for the soul itself.

C. Quite.

S. And isn't restraining it from what it has an appetite for tempering it?

C. Yes. 10

S. Then being tempered is better for the soul than intemperance, which you just now thought was better.

C. I don't know what you're saying, Socrates. Ask someone else. c

S. This man won't abide being helped and tempered, and himself undergoing the very thing our discussion is about being tempered.

C. No; I don't care about anything you say; I've answered these questions of yours for Gorgias' sake. 5

S. Well, what will we do, then? Are we breaking off the discussion in the middle?

C. That's up to you.

S. Well, they say it's not right to break stones off in the middle either; we should put a head on it, so that it won't go around headless. So answer the rest of the questions too, so that our discussion will get its head on. 10 d

C. You're so insistent, Socrates. Listen to me, and let this discussion go, or have a dialogue with someone else as well. 5

S. Then who else is willing? Surely we mustn't leave the discussion incomplete,

C. And couldn't you finish the discussion yourself? Say it all in your own person, or answer your own questions.

S. Then Epicharmus' words will be true for me; I'll be enough, all alone, for what 'two men were saying before'. It seems that this will be absolutely necessary. But if we do it, I believe we all ought to compete to know what's true and false in the things we're speaking of. For it's a common benefit to all when this becomes clear. Well, I'll go through the discussion myself the way I think it is; and if one of you thinks that what I'm agreeing on with myself isn't what's true, you ought to seize on it, and examine me. For remember I don't have knowledge any more than you have when I say what I say. I search in common with you; and so if my opponent is clearly saying something, I will be the first to concede it. Now I'm saying this in case you think the discussion ought to be completed; but if you don't want that, let's let it go now and leave. e 5 506a

Gorgias. Well, I don't think we ought to leave yet, Socrates. You b

should go through the discussion; and I think the rest agree. For myself, I'd like to hear you go through the rest on your own.

5 S. Well, Gorgias, for myself I'd be pleased to continue the dialogue with Callicles here, until I've paid him the discourse of Amphion in return for the discourse of Zethus. But since you aren't willing to finish the discussion, Callicles, none the less listen to me, and pull  
c me up if you think I say anything wrongly. And if you refute me, I won't be annoyed with you the way you were with me, but I'll keep you inscribed as my greatest benefactor.

C. Say it yourself, my good man, and finish it.

5 S. Then listen to me while I take up the discussion again from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same?

Not the same, as Callicles and I agreed.

Then is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant?

The pleasant for the sake of the good.

d And the pleasant is that which, if it has come to be present, we take pleasure, and the good that which, if it has come to be present, we are good?

Quite.

Now we are good, and so is anything else which is good, when some virtue has come to be present.

I think it's necessary, Callicles.

5 But now, the virtue of each thing, a tool, a body, and, further, a soul and a whole animal, doesn't come to be present in the best way just at random, but by some structure and correctness and craft, the one assigned to each of them. Is this so?

I say so.

e Then the virtue of each thing is something structured and ordered by a structure?

I would say so myself.

Then it is some order the proper order for each of the things that are which makes the thing good by coming to be present in it. I myself think so.

5 Then a soul with its own proper order is better than a disordered soul?

It must be.

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But now the soul which has order is orderly?

Of course it is.

And the orderly soul is temperate?

507a

It certainly must be.

Then the temperate soul is good.

For myself I can say nothing else besides this, my dear Callicles.

If you can say anything else, instruct me.

C. Go on, my good man.

S. Well, I say that if the temperate soul is good, the soul affected the opposite way to the temperate soul is bad; and this was agreed to be the senseless and intemperate (*akolastos*) soul.

5

Quite.

And now the temperate man would do fitting things towards both gods and men. For surely he wouldn't be acting temperately if he did unfitting things?

This must be so.

b

Now by doing fitting things towards men he would do just things, and by doing them towards gods, he would do pious things. And someone who does just and pious things must be just and pious.

That's so.

And further he must be brave too. For it's not what a temperate man does to avoid or pursue unfitting things; he will avoid or pursue the things and people, pleasures and pains he should, and will resist and endure where he should. And so, Callicles, since the temperate man is just and brave and pious, as we described him, he definitely must be a completely good man; and the good man must do whatever he does well and finely; and the man who does well must be blessed and happy, and the base man who does badly must be wretched and this would be the man who is the opposite way to the temperate man the intemperate (*akolastos*) man whom you were praising.

5

c

5

And so I set these things down this way, and say that these things are true. And if they are true, then apparently the man who wants to be happy must pursue and practise temperance, and flee intemperance as fast as each of us can run. He must manage, best of all, to have no need of tempering (*kolazesthai*); but if he or any of his own, an individual or a city, needs tempering, justice and tempering must

d

5

e be imposed, if he is to be happy. I believe this is the goal a man should look to in living, on which he should concentrate everything of his own and the city's to see that justice and temperance are present in everyone who is to be blessed this is the way he should act. He should not allow his appetites to be intemperate and try to fulfil them an endless evil while he lives the life of a brigand.

5 For no other man would be a friend to such a man; nor would  
508a god. For he is incapable of community; and when there is no community with a man, there can be no friendship with him. Now the wise men say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men are bound by community and friendship and order and temperance and justice; and that is why they call this whole universe the 'world-order', not 'disorder' or 'intemperance', my friend. But I think you  
5 don't heed them, though you're wise yourself. You haven't noticed that geometrical equality has great power among gods and men; you think you should practise taking more, because you are heedless of geometry.

b Well then; either we must refute this argument and show that it is not by possession of justice and temperance that the happy are happy, and that the wretched are not wretched by the possession of vice; or else if this argument is true, we must examine what are the results that follow. All those previous things follow, Callicles you  
5 asked me if I was serious when I said them, when I said that a man should denounce himself and his son and his companion if he does any unjust action, and should use rhetoric for this. And those things you thought Polus conceded to me out of shame were after all true,  
c that doing injustice is as much worse than suffering it as it is more shameful; and after all someone who is going to be a rhetor in the right way should be a just man, one who knows about just things which again Polus said Gorgias had conceded out of shame.

5 Since that is so, let's consider what you're abusing me for, whether it's well said or not. You say indeed that I'm unable to help myself or any of my friends or relatives, or save them from the most serious dangers, but I'm in the power of whoever wishes, just as the dis-  
d honoured are at the mercy of whoever feels like it whether he wants to push my face in, in your vigorous expression, or to confiscate my money, or to expel me from the city, or finally to kill me

and this condition is the most shameful of all, on your account. Now what my argument is has often enough been said already, but nothing prevents it being said over again. I say, Callicles, that having my face pushed in unjustly is not the most shameful thing nor is having my body or my purse cut. But to strike and cut me and mine unjustly is more shameful and evil, and likewise robbing, enslaving, house-breaking, and in short, any injustice against me and mine is both worse and more shameful for the man who does the injustice than for me who suffer it.

These things which appeared true to us earlier in the previous arguments (*logos*) are held firm and bound down, so I say even if it is a bit impolite to say so by iron and adamantine arguments; so at least it appears so far. And if you, or someone more vigorous than you, doesn't untie them, no one who says anything besides what I say now can be right. For my argument (*logos*) is always the same, that I myself don't know how these things are, but no one I've ever met, just as now, is able to speak otherwise without being ridiculous.

Well then, again I lay it down that this is so. Now if it's so, and if injustice is the greatest of evils for the man who does injustice, and an even greater evil than the greatest, if that is possible, is doing injustice and not paying justice then what lack of power to defend himself would make a man really ridiculous? Won't it be the lack of power to defend himself against the greatest of harms to us? Surely this defence definitely must be the most shameful for us to lack power to provide, for ourselves and for friends and family. And the second most shameful will be the lack of defence against the second most serious evil, and the third most shameful against the third most serious evil, and so on in the same way the greater each evil is, the finer it is to have the power to defend ourselves against it, and the more shameful it is to lack the power. Is that how it is, or some other way, Callicles?

C. No other way.

S. Then of these two things, doing injustice and suffering it, we say that doing injustice is the greater evil, and suffering it the lesser. Then how should a man equip himself for self-defence, so as to gain both of these benefits, from not doing injustice and from not suffering it? Does he need power or wish? I'm saying this. Is it by not

5 wishing to suffer injustice that a man will avoid suffering it, or by equipping himself with some power for not suffering it?

C. It's clear that this is the way, by having a power.

5 S. And what about doing injustice? If a man doesn't want to do injustice, will that be enough, because he won't do injustice? Or for this too should he equip himself with some power and craft, since if he doesn't learn and practise them he'll do injustice? Why haven't you answered me that, Callicles, whether you think Polus and I were right or not when we were forced to agree in the previous discussion, when we agreed that no one wants to do injustice, but all those who do it do it involuntarily?

510a C. You can say that that's so, Socrates, so that you can complete the argument.

S. Then for this too, apparently, we must equip ourselves with some power and craft, so that we won't do injustice.

5 C. Quite.

10 S. Then what is the craft equipping us to suffer injustice not at all, or as little as possible? See if you think it's the one I think it is. I think it's this one: Either someone should himself be ruler in the city or even tyrant, or he should be an ally of the political system in power.

b C. Do you see how ready I am to praise you, Socrates, if you say something well? I think that was altogether well said.

5 S. Then consider if you think this is well said too. I think one man is a friend to another most of all when, as wise men of old say, like is friend to like. Don't you think so too?

C. Yes, I do.

c S. Then wherever a brutal and uneducated tyrant is the ruler, won't he surely be afraid of anyone in the city who is far better than him, and won't he be quite unable to become a friend to him with all his mind?

C. That's so.

5 S. And if someone is far worse than himself, he won't be a friend either; for the tyrant will despise him, and never treat him seriously as he would treat a friend.

C. That's true too.

S. Then the only friend to such a man worth consideration who's

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left is whoever has a similar character, blames and praises the same things, and is willing to be ruled by the ruler and to be subject to him. This man will have great power in this city; no one will do injustice against him without being sorry for it. Isn't it so?

d

C. Yes.

S. Then suppose some young man in this city thought, 'How might I win great power so that no one does injustice to me?' Apparently this is the road for him; he must accustom himself from youth to enjoy and hate the same things as the tyrant, and manage to be as like the tyrant as possible. Isn't that the way?

5

C. Yes.

10

S. And so won't this man, on your account, have gained protection against suffering injustice and gained great power on the account (*logos*) you offer in the city?

e

C. Quite.

S. Then will he also have gained protection against doing injustice? Far from it, surely, if he's to be like the tyrant who is unjust, and is to have great power with him. But I think myself that quite the opposite, he'll equip himself to be capable of doing the most possible injustice and avoid paying justice for it. Won't he?

5

C. Apparently.

S. Won't the greatest evil belong to him when his soul is wretched, and he is disfigured by his imitation of his master and by his power?

511a

C. Somehow you always twist the discussion upside down. Socrates. Don't you know that this imitator will kill that non-imitator of yours, if he wants to, and confiscate all he has?

5

S. Yes, I know it, my good Callicles, if I'm not deaf. I've often heard it from you and Polus just now, and from practically everyone else in the city. But now you listen to me too. He will kill him if he wants to, but it will be a base man killing a fine and good man.

b

C. And isn't that exactly what is deplorable?

5

S. Not if we have any intelligence so the argument (*logos*) indicates. Surely you don't think a man should equip himself for this to live the longest time he can, and should practise those crafts which save us from dangers any time, as rhetoric does the craft you encourage me to practise, which keeps us safe in courts?

c

C. Yes, by Zeus; and I'm giving you the right advice.

5 S. Well then, my good man; do you think that the knowledge of swimming is also something impressive?

C. No, by Zeus, I certainly don't.

d S. And yet it also saves people from death, when they fall into conditions where this knowledge is needed. But if this knowledge seems trivial to you. I'll tell you a more important kind than it the pilot's knowledge, which saves not only souls, but also bodies and property from extreme dangers, as rhetoric does. Now this science is plain and orderly, and does not put on impressive airs, dressed up as though it were achieving something extraordinary. When it has done the same as the forensic science, if it brings someone safely here from Aegina, I suppose it has earned two obols; if it brings us from Egypt or the Pontus, then at the very most, for this great service, when it has kept safe all the things I was mentioning just now the man himself, children, property, women and brought them ashore in the harbour, it has earned two drachmas; and the man with this craft who has achieved all this gets out and walks along by the sea and his ship with a modest attitude. For I suppose he knows enough to reason that it's not clear which passengers he has benefited by not

512a letting them drown, and which ones he has harmed; he knows he has put them ashore no better than they were when they boarded, either in body or in soul. He reasons, then, that if someone suffering serious and incurable diseases in his body who has not expired is wretched because he has not died, and has gained no benefit from him if that is so, then if someone has many incurable diseases in what is more honourable than his body his soul it will not be worth living for him, and the pilot will not benefit him by saving him from the sea or the law-court or anywhere else; the pilot knows it is not better for the wretched man to live; for he is bound to live badly.

5 That's why it is not the rule (*nomos*), my splendid man, for the pilot to put on imposing airs, even though he saves our lives, or for the machine-maker who can sometimes save us no less than the general, let alone the pilot or anyone else, can for sometimes he saves whole cities. Do you think he's up to the level of the advocate? And yet, if he wanted to say the things you rhetors say, Callicles, c making the thing sound imposing, he'd bury you with his speech

(*logos*), speaking and exhorting to show that we should become machine-makers, because other things amount to nothing he would have quite an adequate speech to make. But none the less you despise him and his craft; you would call him a 'machine-maker' by way of insult, and would never be willing to marry your daughter to his son, or to accept his daughter yourself. But on the grounds on which you praise what you have, what just argument (*logos*) have you for despising the machine-maker and the others I was speaking of just now? I know you'd say you are a better man and of better family. But if what is better isn't what I say it is, if just this is virtue for a man to save himself and what he has, whatever condition he may be in then see how ludicrous your reproaches turn out to be against the machine-maker and the doctor and whatever other crafts have been devised to preserve us alive.

5

d

5

But no, blessed man. See if what is noble and good is something else besides preserving life and having it preserved. For surely a real man should forget about living some particular length of time, and should not be anxious about his life. He should leave all this to the god, and believe the women when they say that not a single man can escape destiny. Then he should consider the next question; how best to live, for however long he is to live should he live conforming himself to the political system he lives under, and should you now become as much like the Athenian people as possible, if you are to be a friend of theirs and gain great power in the city? See if this benefits you and me, so that the same thing doesn't happen to us, my excellent man, as they say happens to the women who draw down the moon, the Thessalian women; for we will risk what is dearest to us when we choose this power in the city.

e

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513a

5

But if you think anyone will pass on to you some craft which will make you powerful in this city when you are unlike this political system, better or worse than it then I think you are planning wrongly, Callicles. For you shouldn't be an imitator, but like them in your own nature if you are to achieve anything genuine towards friendship with the Athenian demos yes, with Demos the son of Pylilampes too. And so whoever makes you most like them, he will make you a politician the way you want to be one, a politician and a rhetor. For each audience enjoys speeches delivered in its character,

b

5

c

and dislikes those in an alien character unless you disagree, my dear friend. Do we say anything against that, Callicles?

5 C. Somehow or other I think you're speaking well, Socrates. But the same thing happens to me as to most people; I'm not quite convinced by you.

d S. That's because the love of Demos is present in your soul and opposes me, Callicles. But if we thoroughly consider these same questions often and better, you'll be convinced. But now recall that we said that the practices concerned with the care of each thing, body and soul, were two, one which approaches it aiming at pleasure, 5 the other aiming at the best, not gratifying it, but struggling with it. Weren't these the things we defined then?

C Quite.

S. And doesn't the first one, the one aiming at pleasure, turn out to be a poor thing, nothing other than flattery? Isn't that so?

e C It can be so for you if you like.

S. And the other is concerned so that what we care for, whether it's body or soul, will be as good as possible?

C. Quite.

5 S. Then are we to set about caring for the city and its citizens in this way, aiming to make the citizens themselves as good as possible? For without this, as we were finding out in what went before, it is 514a no help to supply any other benefit at all, if the people's mind is not fine and good when they are to receive great wealth or rule over some others or any other power at all. Are we to say that it is so?

C. Quite if it pleases you more.

5 S. Then suppose, Callicles, we were encouraging each other in some building project, intending to undertake the city's public business in some large-scale buildings, city-walls, dockyards, or b temples: Should we not consider and scrutinize ourselves first of all to see whether we knew the craft or didn't know it, the building craft, and who we learned it from? Should we do this or not?

C. Quite.

5 S. And shouldn't we then consider this second, whether we have ever built any building in private business for any of our friends or c for ourselves, and whether this building is fine or ugly (*aischron*)? And if in considering we found we had had good and reputable

teachers, that we had built many fine buildings with our teachers' help, and also many of our own after we left our teachers if we were in this condition, we would be acting like intelligent men if we went in for public works. But if we could point to no teacher of ours, and to no buildings, or to many buildings, but worthless ones, in that case it would surely be senseless to undertake public works and encourage each other to it. Will we say this is correct or not? 5

C. Quite. d

S. And isn't it the same in all cases? For instance, if we had undertaken public business and were encouraging each other by saying we were competent doctors, then presumably we would scrutinize each other; 'Come now, by the gods, what is Socrates' own bodily condition, as far as health goes? Or has anyone else got rid of disease yet because of Socrates, either slave or free man? And I imagine I'd ask the same sorts of questions about you; and if we found that no one had become better as far as his body goes because of us, neither foreigner nor Athenian, neither man nor woman, then surely, by Zeus, wouldn't it be really ludicrous, Callicles, if people went to such lengths of foolishness that before they had many failures and successes in private business, and had adequate training in their craft, they tried to learn pottery on the big jar, as they say, undertook public business themselves, and encouraged others just as unqualified? Don't you think it would be senseless to do this? 5 e

C. I do.

S. But as things are, my good man, since you yourself are just beginning to engage in the city's business, and exhort me to do it, and abuse me because I don't, surely we'll scrutinize each other this way; 'Let's see, has Callicles ever yet made any citizen better? Is there anyone who was previously base, unjust, intemperate, and senseless, who because of Callicles has become fine and good a foreigner or an Athenian, a slave or a free man?' Tell me, if someone tests you this way, Callicles, what will you say? What man will you say you've made better by association with you? Do you shirk from answering, from saying whether there's something you achieved while you were in private life before you undertook public business? 515a 5 b

C. You're competitive, Socrates. 5

S. No, I'm not asking questions to be competitive, Callicles. It's

c because I really want to know just how you think the city's business  
 should be conducted here. Will we find that you have entered the  
 city's business concerned for anything else than for how we citizens  
 will be as good as possible? Haven't we agreed over and over that this  
 is what the politician should do? Have we or haven't we? Answer.  
 5 We have I'll answer for you. Then if this is what the good man  
 should arrange for his city, recall now those men you were speaking  
 of a little earlier, and tell me about them, whether you still think  
 d that they have proved themselves good citizens Pericles, Cimon,  
 Miltiades, Themistocles.

C. Yes, I do.

S. Then if they were good, it's clear that each of them was  
 making the citizens better from being worse. Was he or not?

5 C. Yes.

S. Then when Pericles was beginning to speak among the people,  
 weren't the Athenians worse than they were when he was speaking  
 for the last time?

C. Perhaps.

S. No; not perhaps, my good man. They *must* have been, from  
 10 what we've agreed, if Pericles was a good citizen.

e C. So what?

S. So nothing. But tell me this as well: Is it said that the Athen-  
 ians became better because of Pericles, or just the opposite that  
 they were corrupted by him? For that's what I myself hear said, that  
 5 Pericles has made the Athenians idlers and cowards, chatterers and  
 spongers, by starting them on drawing pay.

C. It's the people with torn ears you hear say that, Socrates.

10 S. Well, here's something I don't just hear said, but I know it  
 clearly, and so do you: At first Pericles had a good reputation, and  
 the Athenians never convicted him on any shameful charge, when  
 516a they were worse. But when they had been made fine and good by  
 him, at the end of Pericles' life, they convicted him of theft, and  
 nearly condemned him to death, clearly because they supposed he  
 was base.

C. So what? Did that make Pericles bad?

5 S. Well, a keeper of donkeys or horses or cattle who was like him  
 would be thought bad, if they did not kick or butt or bite him when

he took them over, and finally he left them doing all these things from wildness. Or don't you think anyone is a bad keeper of any animal whatever if he takes them over tame and finally leaves them wilder than they were when he took them over? Do you think so or not? b

C. Yes, quite just to gratify you.

S. Then gratify me by answering this too. Is man also one of the animals or not? 5

C. Of course.

S. Wasn't Pericles a keeper of men?

C. Yes.

S. Well then, shouldn't they, as we were agreeing recently, have become more just through him, after being more unjust, if he was their keeper and was good in politics? 10 c

C. Quite.

S. Now aren't the just tame, as Homer said? What do you say? Isn't it so?

C. Yes. 5

S. But now Pericles left them much wilder than when he took them over, and wilder against him, which he would have wanted least of all.

C. Do you want me to agree with you?

S. Yes, if you think I'm saying what's true.

C. Well, let it be so. 10

S. Then if they were wilder, weren't they more unjust and worse?

C. Let's say so. d

S. Then Pericles was not good in politics, on this argument (*logos*).

C. Well, you say he wasn't.

S. And so do you, from what you were agreeing. But now tell me about Cimon. Didn't those Athenians he was caring for ostracize him so that they wouldn't hear his voice for ten years? And didn't they do the same to Themistocles, and punish him with exile as well? And Miltiades of Marathon didn't they vote to throw him into the pit. and but for the prytanis wouldn't they have thrown him in? But if these had been good men, as you say they were, that would never have happened to them. Surely good drivers don't avoid being

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5 thrown out of the seat at the start, and then when they take care of the horses, and become better drivers themselves get thrown out after all that. That doesn't happen in driving chariots or in any other work. Or do you think it does?  
C. No, I don't.

517a S. Then what we said earlier was true, it seems, that we don't know of anyone who turned out to be a good man in politics in this city. You were agreeing about men now, but not about men of previous times, and you chose these men above others. But these have turned out to be in the same position as men now, so that if  
5 they were rhetors, they practised neither true rhetoric for then they wouldn't have been thrown out nor flattering rhetoric.

b C. But no, Socrates surely no one now will achieve such works as any one you like of those previous men.

5 S. My friend, I'm not reproaching them any more than you are, as servants of the city. No; I think they've proved to be better servants than the present people, and more capable of supplying the city with what it had an appetite for. But for forcing change in their  
5 appetites, not indulging them, persuading and forcing them towards what will make the citizens better here they were virtually no different from people now and that's the only work for a good  
c citizen. But ships, walls, dockyards, and many other things I too agree with you that the previous people were cleverer than the people now at supplying them.

5 Well, now we're doing a ridiculous thing, you and I in our discussion. All the time we're having a dialogue we never stop coming round to the same place all the time, with each not knowing what the other is saying. At any rate, I believe you've several times agreed  
d and recognized that the practice concerned with the body and with the soul is twofold; one practice is the serving kind, by which we have the power to provide food if our bodies are hungry, drink if they are thirsty, cloaks if they are cold, beds, shoes, other things  
5 bodies have appetites for and I'm deliberately using the same images to tell you, so that you'll grasp it more easily.

e If a vendor or a merchant or a producer of one of these things, a baker, cook, weaver, shoemaker, tanner, supplies these fulfilments of bodily appetites, it is not surprising that when he is like this, he

and other people suppose that he takes care of the body. Everyone supposes this who doesn't know that there is another craft, gymnastics and medicine, besides all these, which is really care of the body, and which fittingly rules over all crafts and uses their works for it knows what food and drink is worthy and base for the excellence (*arete* \*) of the body, while all the others are ignorant of it. And this is why these other crafts are slavish, with the tasks of servants, not free men, in the treatment of the body, while the gymnastic and medical crafts are mistresses of these, according to what is just.

That these same things apply to the soul too sometimes I think you understand what I say, and you agree as though you know what I say. But a little later you come along saying that fine and good men have been citizens in the city. Whenever I ask you who they are, I think the sort of men in politics you offer are just as if I had asked you about gymnastics which men have previously proved to be or are now good in care for the body, and you told me quite seriously, 'Thearion the baker, Mithaecus who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, and Sarambus the vendor, because they are terrific at care of the body one supplies terrific bread, one cooked dishes, the third wine.'

Now perhaps you'd be annoyed if I said to you, 'My dear fellow, you don't understand a thing about gymnastics. You're telling me about servants and suppliers of appetites who understand nothing fine and good about them. If it happens that way, they'll fill up and fatten people's bodies, and be praised by them for it, and then destroy their original flesh as well. And then the people themselves will be too inexperienced to hold the providers of the feast responsible for their diseases and the loss of their original flesh. No; they'll blame any who happen to be there giving them advice at the time. When their previous filling up brings disease to them much later since they had it without the healthy these are the ones they'll hold responsible and blame and do some evil to if they can, while those previous ones who were responsible for the evils they'll eulogize *them*.'

And what you're doing now, Callicles, is just like this. You're eulogizing people who feasted the Athenians, indulging them with what they had an appetite for. It's said that they made the city

519a great; but that it's swelling and festering because of these earlier  
 people no one notices this. For without justice and temperance  
 they have left the city full of harbours and dockyards and walls and  
 tribute and that sort of rubbish. And so when that crisis of the disease  
 5 comes, they'll hold responsible the advisers who are there at the  
 time, and eulogize Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, the ones  
 responsible for the evils. And perhaps they'll seize on you, if you're  
 b not careful, and on my companion Alcibiades, when they lose  
 both their more recent gains and what they had before, though  
 you aren't wholly responsible for the evils, but perhaps partly  
 responsible.

But it's a senseless thing I see going on now and hear about the  
 men of earlier times. For I notice that when the city lays hands on  
 5 any of the political men for injustice, they're annoyed and scandal-  
 ized, saying that it's a terrible thing being done to them; they've  
 done much good to the city and now they're being ruined unjustly  
 by it that's their argument. But the whole thing's false. For not a  
 c single leader of a city can ever be destroyed unjustly by the very city  
 he leads.

For it looks as though those who claim to be politicians and those  
 who claim to be sophists are the same. For the sophists too, though  
 5 they're wise about the other things, do an absurd thing here; they  
 claim to be teachers of virtue, but then they often accuse their  
 pupils of doing injustice to them, depriving them of their fees, and  
 d giving no other reward in return when they've benefited from them.  
 Now what could be less reasonable than this argument? They say  
 that men who have been made good and just, when they have lost  
 5 injustice and acquired justice because of their teacher, do injustice to  
 him, because of what they don't have. Don't you think this is absurd,  
 my friend? You've really forced me to be a mob-orator, Callicles,  
 when you wouldn't answer.

C. And you were the one who wouldn't be able to speak unless  
 someone answered you?

e S. Well, it looks as though I can. At least I'm stretching my  
 speeches (*logos*) to some length now, since you're unwilling to answer  
 me. Come now, my good man, tell me by the god of friendship,  
 don't you think it's unreasonable for someone who claims to have

made someone else good to blame the other man because he has become good from him, he is still good, and then he is base? 5

C. I think it is.

S. Don't you hear this said by those who claim to educate men to virtue?

C. I do. But what can you say about such worthless people? 520a

S. Then what can you say about those people who claim to be leaders of the city and to be in charge of it to make it as good as possible, and then accuse it, when the occasion arises, of being thoroughly base? Do you think these people are any different from the sophists? The sophist and the rhetor are the same, or close and very similar, as I was saying to Polus; but you because of your ignorance think that one, rhetoric, is altogether fine, and despise the other. In fact 5  
sophistry is finer than rhetoric, by just as much as legislative science is finer than judicial, and gymnastic science than medical. And I b  
thought only the public orators and the sophists were not in a position to blame the people they have educated for being base to them, unless 5  
by the same argument (*logos*) they condemned themselves too for having benefited not at all those whom they say they benefit. Isn't it so?

C. Quite. c

S. And only these, presumably, are in a position, it seems likely, to offer benefits for no fee, if what I was saying was true. For someone who has been given some other benefit, who has been made a quick runner, for instance, by a trainer, might deprive him of the reward if the trainer trained him free, and didn't agree on a fee and then receive payment, as far as possible at the same time as he makes the pupil speedy. For I suppose it's not from slowness that men do d  
injustice, but from injustice. Is that right?

C. Yes.

S. Then if someone removed this very thing, injustice, he need have no fear of suffering injustice. He's the only one who can safely confer this benefit for nothing, if he really had the power to make people good. Isn't that right? 5

C. I agree.

S. Then apparently that's why, when other advice is given, about building, for instance, or the other crafts, taking payment is not at all shameful.

e C. Apparently.

5 S. But in this activity, how to be as good as possible and how best to govern one's own house or the city, it's counted (*nomizein*) shameful to say you won't give advice unless you're paid. Isn't that right?

C Yes.

10 S. For it's clear that this is the explanation; this is the only benefit which makes its beneficiary anxious to confer benefits in return for benefits received. That's why you think it's a fine sign of having conferred this kind of benefit, that you benefit in return, and if you haven't, you don't. Is this so?

521a C. It is.

5 S. Then define for me what kind of care for the city you're urging on me. Do you want me to struggle, as a doctor would, to make the Athenians as good as possible, or to serve them and approach them aiming at their gratification? Tell me the truth, Callicles. Since you began by speaking freely to me, it's only just that you should go on saying what you think. Tell me now as well as before, well and nobly.

C. Well, I'm telling you you should serve them.

b S. Then it's flattery you're urging on me, my most noble friend.

C. Yes, if it pleases you more to call a Mysian a Mysian, Socrates. For if you don't do that. ...

5 S. Don't tell me what you've often told me, that anyone who wants to will kill me. Save me the trouble of telling you in reply, 'He'll be base, and I'll be a good man.' And don't tell me he'll take away anything I have, or I'll reply, 'But when he takes it, he'll have no good use for it. He took it from me unjustly, and in the same way  
c when he's taken it, he'll use it unjustly, if unjustly then shamefully, and if shamefully then badly.'

5 C. How confident you seem that none of these things will ever happen to you, Socrates. You think you live out of harm's way, and that you'll never be dragged into court, perhaps by some wretched scoundrel.

d S. Then I'm really senseless, Callicles, if I don't think that anything might happen to anyone in this city. But here's something I know full well. If I'm brought to court and face one of these penalties,

as you say, my prosecutor will be a base man for no worthy man would ever prosecute someone who wasn't doing injustice and it wouldn't be at all extraordinary if I were put to death. Do you want me to say why I expect this?

C. Certainly. 5

S. I think I am one of a few Athenians not to say the only one

who undertake the real political craft and practise politics the only one among people now. I don't aim at gratification with each of the speeches I make, but aim at the best, not the pleasantest, and I'm not willing to do 'these subtle things' that you advise me. That's why I won't know what to say in court. But the same account applies to me that I was telling to Polus. For I will be judged as a doctor might be judged by a jury of children with a cook as prosecutor. For consider how such a man would defend himself if he found himself before such a jury, if someone accused him and said 'Children, this man has inflicted many evils on you. He ruins the youngest of you by cutting and burning. He leaves you confused, slimming and choking you, giving you those terribly bitter potions, and compelling you to go hungry and thirsty. He's not like me. I used to feast you on many pleasant things of all kinds.' What do you think a doctor caught in this evil would be able to say? Or suppose he told the truth, and said, 'It was healthy, children, all that I was doing.' What sorts of protests would he hear from such jurymen? Wouldn't they be loud?

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C. Perhaps. We ought to suppose so.

S. Don't you think he'd be caught at a complete loss about what he ought to say? b

C. Quite.

S. And yet I know that the same thing would happen to me too if I came before a jury-court. For I won't be able to tell them the pleasures I have provided which they think are benefits and advantages, while I envy neither the providers, nor those provided with them. And suppose someone says that I ruin the younger men by confusing them, or that I speak evil of the older people by harsh remarks in private or in public. Then I'll be able to say neither what's true 'All this that I say and do is just, gentlemen of the jury' (as you rhetors say) nor anything else. And so perhaps whatever it turns out to be will happen to me. c

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5 C. Then do you think, Socrates, that it's a fine condition for a man in the city when he's like this, and without power to defend himself?

d S. Yes if he had this one thing which you have often agreed on, Callicles; if he had secured his own defence, by saying and doing nothing unjust towards men or gods. For we have often agreed that this is the supreme form of self-defence. And so if someone refuted me and showed that I have no power to defend myself or anyone else with 5 this defence, then I would be ashamed if I were refuted before many people or before few, or with the two of us by ourselves; and if I were put to death because I lacked this power, I would be annoyed. But if I died because I lacked flattering rhetoric, I know for sure that e you would see me bearing death easily. For being put to death itself no one fears that unless he's altogether unreasoning and unmanly; it is doing injustice that he fears. For if the soul is full of many in- 5 justices when it arrives in Hades, that is the ultimate of all evils. And if you wish, I'd like to tell you an account (*logos*) of how this is so.

C. Well, since you've completed everything else, complete this too.

523a S. Hearken then, as they say, to a perfectly fine account. I suppose you'll think it's a tale, but I think it's an account; for I'll tell you what I'm about to tell you in the belief that it's true.

5 Well, as Homer tells, Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided their dominion when they took it over from their father. Now there was this rule (*nomos*) about men in the time of Cronus, and it still remains always and until now among the gods that whoever b among men had gone through life justly and piously, when he died, he should depart to the Isles of the Blessed and live in all happiness, away from evils, but the man who had lived unjustly and godlessly 5 should go to the prison of retribution and justice, which they call Tartarus. In the time of Cronus, and early in Zeus' reign, these men were judged while they were still living, by judges still living, judging them on the day they were to die; and so the cases were being judged badly. And so Pluto and the overseers from the Isles of the c Blessed would come and tell Zeus that undeserving men were arriving in both places.

Then Zeus said, 'Well, I'll stop what's happening', he said. 'For

now the cases are judged badly. For those being judged (he said) are judged with clothes on; for they are judged while they're still alive. And so many (he said) with base souls are covered in fine bodies and noble birth and riches; and when their judgement comes, many witnesses come to support them and to testify that they have lived justly. And so the judges are impressed by all this; and at the same time they judge with clothes on, obstructed by eyes and ears and their whole body in front of their soul. All these things, then, are in their way, both their own coverings and the defendants'. 5 d 5

'First of all, then (he said), we must stop them knowing their death in advance; for now they do know it. And so Prometheus has actually been told to stop them. Next, they are to be judged stripped of all these things; for they should be judged when they are dead. And the judge should be stripped too, and dead; he should look with his soul by itself on the soul by itself of each man when he has died without warning, without covering, bereft of all kinsfolk, after leaving all that adornment behind on earth, so that the judgement will be just. Now I have realized this before you, and appointed sons of mine as judges two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthys, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And so when they die, they will judge in the meadow at the three ways from which lead the twin ways, the first to the Isles of the Blessed, the second to Tartarus. And those from Asia Rhadamanthys will judge, those from Europe Aeacus. To Minos I will give seniority, to make a further judgement if the other two are at a loss about anything, so that men will have the most just judgement possible about their passage.' 5 524a 5

This is what I have heard, Callicles, and believe to be true. And from these accounts (*logoi*) I infer (*logizomai*) that something like this follows: Death, it seems to me, is in fact nothing other than the separation of two things, the soul and the body, from each other. When they are separated, then, from each other, each of them keeps not much less its own condition which it had when the man was alive. The body keeps its nature, the ways it has been cared for, what has happened to it all clear to see. For instance, if someone's body was large by nature or by nurture or by both when he was alive, this man's corpse is also large when he dies. And if his body was fat, the corpse is fat also when he has died, and the other things the same b 5 c

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5 way. And again, if he grew his hair long, this man's corpse is also  
 long-haired. Again, if someone was a hardened criminal, and had  
 traces of the blows in scars on his body from whips or other wounds  
 when he was alive, when he is dead also his body can be seen to keep  
 them still. Or if someone's limbs were broken or twisted when he  
 d was alive, when he is dead also these same things are clear to see.  
 And in one account, just as each man's body had been equipped in  
 his life, these things are clear when he has died too, all or most of  
 them for some time.

5 Well then, I think the same is true about the soul as well, Callicles.  
 Everything is clear in the soul when it is stripped of the body, what  
 belongs by nature and what has happened to it, all that the man  
 acquired in his soul from each of his practices. And so, when they  
 e appear before the judge, those from Asia before Rhadamanthys, he  
 stops them and examines each man's soul. He doesn't know whose  
 soul it is, but often he has taken hold of the Great King, or some  
 5 king or dynast or other, and noticed that nothing in the soul was  
 healthy, but it was thoroughly whip-marked and full of scars from  
 525a false oaths and injustice all that each of his actions stained into  
 the soul and everything was crooked from lying and insolence,  
 and nothing straight, from being brought up without truth; and he  
 5 saw that from liberty and luxury and excess and incontinence in  
 actions the soul was full of disproportion and shamefulness. And  
 when he saw this, he sent this soul off dishonoured straight to the  
 guardhouse where it is to go and bear what is fitting for it to undergo.

b Now it is fitting for everyone undergoing vengeance and rightly  
 suffering vengeance from another either to become better and be  
 benefited, or to become an example to the rest, so that when others  
 see him undergoing whatever he undergoes, they will be afraid and  
 5 become better. Those who are benefited and pay justice at the hands  
 of gods and men are those who are at fault with curable faults; but  
 still their benefit comes to them through pain and sufferings both  
 here and in Hades for there is no other way to get rid of injustice.  
 c But those who commit the ultimate injustices and because of such  
 injustices become incurable, the examples are made from them. And  
 they no longer gain benefit themselves, since they are incurable. But  
 5 others are benefited who see that for their faults they are undergoing

the greatest, most painful, and most frightening suffering for all time, simply examples hung up there in Hades in the prison, spectacles and reproofs for the unjust arriving at any time.

And I say that Archelaus will be one of these, if what Polus says is true; so will anyone else who is that kind of tyrant. Indeed I think most of these examples have been made from tyrants, kings, dynasts, and those who conducted cities' affairs; for because they have the liberty, these are at fault with the greatest and most impious faults. And Homer too testifies to this; for he presents kings and tyrants as those who suffer vengeance in Hades for all time, Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But Thersites or any other base private man no one has presented him caught in terrible vengeance as an incurable; for, I take it, he didn't have the liberty, and so was happier than those who had it. Indeed, Callicles, while those who become thoroughly base come from the powerful, still nothing prevents good men from appearing even among these. And indeed those who do appear deserve great admiration. For it is hard, Callicles, and deserves much praise, if someone finding himself with large liberty to do injustice lives out his life justly. Such men appear rarely; but they have appeared here and elsewhere, and I think they will men fine and good in this virtue of justly managing whatever is entrusted to them. And one of them has become widely famous among the rest of the Greeks too. Aristides the son of Lysimachus but most dynasts, my excellent friend, turn out evil.

As I was saying, then, whenever Rhadamanthys there takes hold of someone like that, he knows nothing else about him, neither who he is nor whose son he is, but only that he's some base character. And when he noticed this, he sent him off to Tartarus, marking on him whether he seemed to be curable or incurable; and when he arrives there, he undergoes what is fitting. But sometimes he noticed another soul that had lived piously and with truth, of a private man or of someone else; but most of all, so I say, Callicles, of some philosopher who did his own work and was no meddler during his life; then he admired this and sent him off to the Isles of the Blessed. And Aeacus there does the same. Each of them holds a staff and pronounces judgement, while Minos sits overseeing them, the only one with a gold staff, as Homer's

d Odysseus says he saw him 'holding a gold staff, judging among the dead'.

5 For myself, then, Callicles, I am persuaded by these accounts, and I consider how to present my soul as healthy as possible before the judge. And so I dismiss the honours accorded by most men. I practise the truth. And I will try to be really the best that is in my power in life and, whenever I die, in death. And I call all other men, as far as e it is in my power yes, I call you, Callicles, in reply to your call to this life and this contest, which I say is worth more than all the 5 contests here. And I reproach you because you won't be able to defend yourself when you face that court of justice and that judgement I was speaking of just now. No, you'll come before the judge. 527a the son of Aegina, and when he gets hold of you and leads you off, you'll gape and reel you there no less than I here and perhaps someone will dishonour you by pushing your face in, and abuse you all ways.

5 Now perhaps you think these things I've said are a tale, like an old wife's, and you despise them. And certainly it wouldn't be at all surprising to despise them, if we could search and somehow manage to find something better and truer. But, as it is, you see that the three of you who are wisest among the Greeks now, you and Polus b and Gorgias you three can't manage to show that we should live any other life than this, which is shown to be profitable for there too. No; among so many arguments (*logos*), when the others are being refuted, only this argument is stable that we must avoid 5 doing justice more than suffering it, and above all a man must practise, not seeming good, but being good, in private and public life; if someone becomes evil in some way, he is to be punished, and this is c the second good after being just to become just and pay justice in being punished. All flattery, to oursevl'es or to others, few or many. we must shun; this is how we should use rhetoric always in the direction of justice and every other activity.

5 And so be convinced by me, and follow me to where you will be happy, both in life and in death, as the account signifies. And let anyone despise you for being senseless and abuse you if he likes; yes, b by Zeus, you should confidently let him strike you with that dishonouring blow. For nothing serious will happen to you if you're

really fine and good, and practise virtue. And then, when we have practised it together this way, then finally, if you think we ought to, we'll undertake political business, or we'll deliberate about whatever we think fit we'll be better at deliberating than we are now. For it's shameful for people in the condition we seem to be in now to swagger as though we were something, when we never think the same about the same questions, and when these are the greatest questions that is how uneducated we are. And so let us take as our leader this account revealed to us now, which signifies to us that this way is the best way of life to practise justice and the rest of virtue in life and in death. Then let us follow this account and call others to follow it, not that account you believe when you call me to follow it; for it is worth nothing, Callicles.

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## Notes

Cross-references are given by page and section of the Greek text, printed in the margin of the translation (e.g. '502c'). These cross-references normally refer both to the text and the notes on the passage, except when (e.g.) occurrences of a Greek word are listed.

The Bibliography gives details of works cited in the Notes. These are cited mainly for the use of someone who wants to pursue in more detail the questions raised here. They also refer the reader to other points of view not fully discussed here, and indicate some of my debts in writing the Notes. No complete bibliography is attempted here.

Greek words mentioned and discussed in the Notes can be investigated further with the help of LSJ, and especially, for Plato, with Brandwood's very useful work.

*The Dramatic Date.* Does Plato present the conversation in the dialogue as occurring at any definite time? For full discussion see Dodds. 17f., A. E. Taylor, 104f. Surprisingly, the indications offered suggest a range of dates from about 429 B.C. to 405. (Plato is normally supposed to have begun writing dialogues only after the death of Socrates in 399.) Some of the conflicting historical allusions are not incidental, but important for the theme and arguments of the dialogue:

1. The death of Pericles (in 429) is said to be recent (503c; see note for Plato's reason).
2. Archelaus (who came to power in 413) is a suitable example of a 'successful' tyrant likely to be widely admired especially when he was an ally of Athens and a patron of Athenian poets (470d).
3. Socrates makes a prediction about Alcibiades (519a, most appropriate before 415), a well-known popular leader and a notorious associate of Socrates. He is especially suitable to make Socrates' point, and to present the parallel with Callicles.
4. Socrates' behaviour at the trial of the generals after Arginusae (in 405; see 473e) is a good example of his concern with justice, also mentioned in the *Ap*.
5. Euripides' *Antiope* (probably produced in 408; see 485e) was a well-known treatment of the contrast between the active and contemplative lives. Plato reasonably wants to refer to it when he treats the same contrast.
6. It is easiest for Socrates to ask Gorgias basic questions about his

profession and aims if this is their first meeting, and Gorgias' first visit to Athens (in 427, the only visit attested).

When it suits Plato's purpose to allude to particular historical events as 'recent', he alludes to them without regard for chronological consistency. The conflicting chronological indications are not the result of carelessness; it is unlikely that Plato would have removed them if he had thought about it, or if they had been pointed out to him. Nor are they likely to be deliberate there is no reason to think Plato tries to confuse the reader. They are simply the result of indifference. Plato cares less about chronology than he cares about alluding pointedly to the significant events that he wants the reader to keep in mind.

*The Characters of the Dialogue.* See *OCD*, Dodds, 6-18. Gorgias is presented as a well-established teacher of rhetoric, Polus is a younger (461cd, 463e) rhetor, who has written on rhetorical theory himself (448c, 462b). Chaerephon, the disciple of Socrates (see *Ap.* 20e ff.) corresponds to Polus, the disciple of Gorgias; but Chaerephon's part is much smaller partly because Socrates defends himself better than Gorgias defends himself and his profession, and does not need to be helped out as Gorgias is helped out by Polus.

Callicles is a disciple of neither main character. He is probably a historical person, though unlike the other three he is unattested outside this dialogue. He has a deme. Acharnae (495d an Athenian normally called himself 'X, from deme Y'); a lover (481d) who is a historical person; and friends (487c) who are historical people. He is a wealthy, upper-class Athenian. He is interested enough in rhetoric to be Gorgias' host during his stay in Athens, but interested in rhetoric primarily for the sake of his own career in public life.

447a 'many fine displays'. As a visiting orator. Gorgias has been making speeches as a public demonstration or display (*epideixis*). Cf. *HMa.* 282bc. *Pr.* 310b-311a, 314c-315e. See 452b.

447b 'think fit (*dokein*) ... wish (*boulesthai*)'. Though these terms are casually introduced here with no obvious difference in sense, they become important at 466de. The next verb, 'desire' (*epithumein*), is important at 491d and later.

447c 'have a dialogue'. When Chaerephon says that Socrates wants to hear Gorgias, Callicles assumes that he wants another rhetorical display a set speech and offers to arrange it. But Socrates really wants a 'dialogue' or 'discussion' (*dialegesthai*). Socratic discussion (*dialektike* \*, also from *dialegesthai*) is conducted in a dialogue

(*dialogos*) by steady and repeated question and answer. Socrates often declares his preference for this kind of discussion over the long speeches of Protagoras and others; *Pr.* 329b, 334c-336d, 347b, *HMi.* 364b, *Ion* 530d, *Eu.* 6c, *Eud.* 275a. 'Dialogue' and its cognates translate *dialegesthai* and its cognates throughout the *G.* This term is a little too specialized to be quite an accurate rendering, since *dialegesthai* can have a quite general range, like 'conversation' or 'discussion' (this is used to translate *logos*). But in fact it has a fairly specialized use in the *G.* it refers to the kind of discussion which follows Socrates' rather definite rules insisted on e.g. at 462c ff., 495ab not just to any conversation.

'Dialectic' is the philosophical method Socrates considers correct systematic cross-examination. The method is considered further in dialogues probably close in date to the *G.*; cf. *Eud.* 290c, *Cra.* 390c, *M.* 75cd. The most elaborate account of dialectical method is *R.* 510bc, 533c-534b. In the *R.* the practice of the method is taken to involve separated Forms, but the procedure itself is not clearly different from the Socratic. See Robinson (2), ch. 6 on dialectic.

'what the power of the man's craft is'. 'Power' (*dunamis*; adjective *dunatos*. 'powerful' or 'capable') is an important term in the *G.* Here the question just means 'What is his craft capable of?', which amounts to asking for a definition of the craft; cf. Isocrates, 15.178, 186. 'Craft' (*technē* \*) is the normal term for any systematic productive skill, such as carpentry or shoemaking (see Socrates' examples at 447d); but it is also applied to less obviously productive abilities, such as arithmetic or geometry (*Ch.* 165e-166b), so that it is virtually interchangeable, in Plato's early dialogues at least, with *epistēmē*\* (knowledge, science). See Lyons, 159-63, Gould, 3-18. Socrates treats a craft as something more than a tendency to perform efficiently. He associates craft-knowledge with, systematic teaching and instruction, reliably successful performance (see 514a-c), and the ability to explain the actions of the craft and their over-all point; see 449a, 465a, 500e-501a, 503de, *La.* 186ab. These conditions are gradually explained during the dialogue.

Socrates' first question assumes that rhetoric has some power or capacity, and that it is a craft. Both of these assumptions are soon challenged, 462b, 466b.

'what it is that he advertises and teaches'. 'Advertise' or 'profess' (*epangellein*) is a standard term for a sophist or other educator who offers public instruction for a fee; cf. *R.* 518b, *Eud.* 273e, *PR.* 319a (where Protagoras says what kind of teaching he advertises), *M.* 95bc.

'one part of his display'. Gorgias regularly asked his audience to propose a topic or ask a question for him to speak on; see DK 82 A 1a, *M.* 70c, *HMi.* 363d, *Pr.* 315c. Callicles thinks of a single question

put to the orator from the audience, which he can then answer at length. He does not think of the *repeated* cross-questioning of the Socratic method which is about to be applied to Gorgias.

448b 'have knowledge'. *Epistemon* \* is used here naturally in the context of *techne*\*; see 447c. Chaerephon assumes that Gorgias has some kind of systematic knowledge, *episteme*\*, which qualifies him as a craftsman; the conditions of this knowledge are set out at 454d, 465a.

448c 'experience makes our age follow craft'. Chaerephon has associated experience and craft in speaking of someone's being experienced (*empeiros*) in a craft, 448b. Polus suggests that experience (*empeiria*) is what creates a craft; and this was apparently the view of the historical Polus in some writing on rhetoric, 462b. The relation between experience and craft is examined more closely at 462c, 501a. Polus' speech is composed in a mannered rhetorical style, perhaps meant to be typical of a disciple of Gorgias.

488cd 'the finest of the crafts' (cf. *Phil.* 58ab) ... 'finely equipped'. The term 'fine' (*kalon*) is prominent in later arguments; see 474cd. Polus introduces it into the discussion here, and Socrates picks it up in his comment.

448e 'not what Gorgias' craft is like, but what craft it is'. Socrates contrasts the question 'What is *x* like?' (*poion esti*) and the question 'What is *x*?' (*ti estin*). *Poion* can sometimes mean 'What sort of thing?', i.e. 'What kind of thing?', so that it is virtually equivalent to 'What is *x*?'. But here Socrates contrasts saying what something is like, mentioning some feature of it, with defining it, saying what it is. Contrast the use of 'what it is like' (*hoion*, relative form of the interrogative *poion*) in 450c, where Socrates means 'What kind?'. For these two uses of *poion* see 479b, *Ch.* 159a, *M.* 71b, Aristotle. *Catg.* 3b13-21, *Top.* 122b15-17, *Met.* v 4.

What is Socrates' objection to merely saying 'what something is like'? If we say that rhetoric is 'the finest of the crafts', that is a definite description; if true, it picks out just one craft, and is not too narrow or too wide, like other candidate definitions rejected by Socrates. But presumably it is because of something else about it that rhetoric is the finest craft, and that something else is what Socrates wants to be told the 'fundamental' or 'explanatory' property, to put it vaguely and problematically. For similar objections by Socrates cf. *Eu.* 11ab, *M.* 75b. (See Robinson (2), 54, Allen (2), 76-8.) The right definition must do more than cover all the right

cases; it must also explain why the thing has the other properties it has besides the defining property. Socrates' later definition of rhetoric is meant to meet this demand, 463c, 464b-d.

In general Socrates insists that we must say what  $x$  is before we can know anything about  $x$ ; cf. 463c, *M.* 71b, *Pr.* 361c. He has often been criticized for this demand; see Robinson (2) ch. 5. Geach, Santas (1), Beversluis. But the demand makes sense if it is a pre-condition for *knowledge* rather than just for belief about  $x$  (cf. 459d). If knowledge of what  $x$  is were a precondition for any true belief about  $x$ , and we need true beliefs about  $x$  if we are to acquire knowledge of what  $x$  is, then we could not acquire knowledge of what  $x$  is. (This is the point of Meno's Paradox in *M.* 80de.) But Socrates does not claim this. His demand allows true beliefs about  $x$  without knowledge of what  $x$  is, the knowledge that will be expressed in a definition of  $x$ . The definition is required only to convert beliefs into knowledge. Socrates' statement of his demand suffers from the lack of an explicit distinction between knowledge and belief; but the distinction is soon drawn see 454d, 465a, 479b, Irwin, 40f.

449a 'as someone with knowledge of what craft' (or 'as being knowledgeable, *epistemon* \*, about what craft'). Socrates assumes that Gorgias has expert knowledge, *episteme*\* of a craft. Gorgias' reply is literally 'The rhetorical' (*he*\* *rhetorike*\*), with 'craft' understood. Throughout rhetoric is referred to this way, even when Socrates denies that it is really a craft.

The dialogue does not distinguish the craft of the orator who knows how to produce certain effects on his audience from the craft of the rhetorician who knows how to teach others to produce these effects on audiences. But the double use of '*rhetor*\*' for both orator and rhetorical teacher might not seem strange to Plato's readers. Originally it probably means just 'speaker' (see Jebb, i. lxx) referring to public orators (see 455de; cf. Aristoph. *Ach.* 38, *Eq.* 60, 358, Thuc. 8.1). The same term is naturally applied to the rhetorician because early rhetorical instruction was teaching by example, prescribing model speeches to be memorized and reproduced, rather than systematic formal instruction in the elements of speech-making. See Guthrie (1), iii.176-81, Kennedy, ch. 3. Aristotle criticizes Gorgias for the unsystematic and untheoretical attitude reflected in this method, *SE* 183636-184a8.

449b 'capable of making other people rhetors too'. Socrates is thinking of Gorgias as a rhetor in the sense of rhetorician, a teacher of rhetoric; anyone who has a real craft is supposed to be able to teach it to others, and Gorgias claims to be able to teach his craft.

449d Socrates begins his systematic search for an account of what rhetoric is, by asking what it is about; a craft, like any other power (*dunamis*; see 447c) is identified by 'what it is set over and what it does' (or produces, *apergazetai*, *R.* 477cd). It is easiest for an artefact-producing craft (e.g. shoemaking), to satisfy this condition, when some definite artefact, e.g. a shoe, results from the production. But Socrates applies the same condition also to crafts producing no artefacts, such as mathematics (*Ch.* 165d-166b) and some of the crafts mentioned here.

'which of the things that are', i.e. are something or are real. Greek has no word apart from the verb 'to be' for existence.

449de 'About speech'. Gorgias says that rhetoric is about *logoi*. *Logos* refers generally to what is spoken or thought, words, sentences, discourses, and in particular to the expression of rational thought, hence to reason, argument, account, or definition. See Guthrie (1), i.420-4. These different uses appear regularly in the *G.* (1) Often *logos* refers just to speech or talk in general. (2) Sometimes a *logos* is a systematic, organized body of speech either a continuous speech delivered by an orator, or a 'discussion' (this word always translates *logos* in the translation) and so it is a common term for the dialectical conversation carried on in the dialogue. (3) It is a rational account contrasted with a mere story or 'myth'; see 505c, 523a. (4) It refers to giving reasons, explanations, and rational accounts, as opposed to mere habitual or unreflective or rationally unjustifiable action, 465a, 500e-501a. These are not necessarily distinct senses of *logos*, obvious to a native speaker; perhaps they are partially overlapping uses (cf. e.g. 519d). Socrates expects the *logos* in the *G.* to satisfy' all four of these conditions, eventually giving us a rational account and justification of the beliefs he accepts.

Here Gorgias has in mind the general sense, that rhetoric is about speaking; but Socrates plays on the suggestion that *logos* must be *rational* discourse, and later rejects the claim of rhetoric to be about *logoi* in this sense, saying that it is 'irrational', *alogon*, 465a. Gorgias suggests that rhetoric has speech as its subject-matter, as though it could be distinguished by a definite subject-matter and object as ordinary crafts are. Socrates uses the same technique of looking for the subject-matter to show the peculiarity of temperance and justice as crafts, *Ch.* 173d-175a, *R.* 332e-333e.

'powerful at speaking'. If rhetoric is a craft, it makes someone 'powerful' or 'capable' (*dunatos*) at something, by giving him some 'power' or 'capacity' (*dunamis*; see 447c). Socrates still concedes that rhetoric confers some power, though he suggests that it is hard to identify. Later he withdraws the concession, 466b.

449e 'understanding' (*phronein*). Gorgias readily agrees that if a rhetor is saying something, he understands (*phronein*) and knows the meaning of the words he uses. But Socrates apparently takes 'understanding' to imply more; the doctor 'understands' medical prescriptions in the sense that he can explain and justify them, while the layman does not understand them, even if he knows the meaning of all the words they contain (cf. the treatment of 'know', 459d).

450b Socrates performs a brief 'induction', moving from examples of crafts concerned with *logoi* to the general claim that all crafts can be called rhetoric, if Gorgias defined rhetoric correctly, since they are all concerned with *logoi*. On Socratic induction see *Ar. Met.* 1078b27-30, Robinson (2), ch. 4.

*Logos* here probably includes both speech and rational thought: see 449a it is reasoning which is the *logos* in mathematics and draughts.

450e Socrates avoids quibbling about words, which would be contrary to the spirit of dialectic; cf. 457c-458b, 489b.

451d Gorgias' claim that rhetoric is concerned with the greatest and best things in human affairs introduces an issue to be examined in the dialogue. He thinks that political skill and power are the most important things. Socrates challenges that claim later. Here he remarks that Gorgias' claim might be disputed; since people disagree about what is greatest and best, they will disagree about the reference of Gorgias' definition. 'Greatest' (i.e. finest or most excellent) and 'best' are like those other terms, 'good' (*agathon*), 'fine' (*kalon*), and 'just' (*dikaion*) which arouse disputes not settled by any agreed technique, *Eu.* 7b-d, *HMa.* 294cd, *Alc.* 111b-112d, *Phdr.* 263ab. What would satisfy Socrates' demand for a 'clear', *saphes*, answer? Presumably he will expect the answer to be in 'agreed' and 'undisputed' terms those which do not provoke the kinds of disputes provoked by 'good' and the rest; cf. perhaps *R.* 336cd, *Cleit.* 409b-d. This is rather a strong and controversial condition. See 475a, 489a, 507a-c, Irwin, 72.

451e This 'drinking-song' (*skolion*) runs; 'Health is best for a mortal man; second to be born fair (*kalon*) in nature; third to be rich without deceit; and fourth to be young with his friends.' Cf. *Eud.* 279ab, *M.* 87e, *HMa.* 291d, *Laws* 661a-d. 'Born fair' probably refers to physical beauty. But it suits Socrates not to be too specific here; and the question 'What is really *kalon*?' will be prominent later in the dialogue, which itself illustrates his claim that 'greatest', 'best',

'fair' arouse serious disputes. Socrates says 'So the composer of the song says', because he does not agree with the composer that justice (alluded to in 'without guile') is only third among goods see 523c. In a way Socrates agrees that health is the best of goods, when the right kind of health is properly understood; see 479b-d, 504b-d, 518e.

452a 'craftsman' (*demiourgos* \*); or 'producer'. 'Work', *ergon*, is used both for the process or function and for the product; see 503e, 516e, 517a.

452b 'display', *epideixai*, cf. 447a.

452d 'Freedom', *eleutheria*, includes probably not only the legal status of a free citizen as opposed to a slave, or keeping out of prison by rhetorical pleading in courts, but also 'living like a free man', not dependent on the power or goodwill of others; cf. 485bc. This kind of independence may need to be secured against possible threats of interference by others, and so may require the power and strength to maintain independence. This is why freedom and the absence of slavery are often naturally associated with 'rule over others'; for an individual this means prominence in the political life of his own state; and for a state it means a dominant role in inter-state relations. See 466bc, 491e-492c, *Pr.* 354b, *Thuc.* 2.62.3, 63.1, 3.45.6, Adkins (5), 68, 139. Gorgias defines virtue (*arete*\*; see 457c) for a man as a power to rule over men (*M.* 71e, 73c, 77b, 91a; cf. *Pr.* 318e-319a. Adkins (1), 3. The view that the best good is power over others and the best man the man with this power has deep-seated Greek sources; the Homeric hero and the post-Homeric aristocrat are expected to have the qualities needed to be powerful rulers, and these qualities are a central part of their virtue or excellence (*arete*\*), what makes them 'good men'; cf. Adkins (5), 111f.

Despite his later acceptance of justice, Gorgias suggests here that rhetoric is good for the rhetor because of the power it gives him. This reference to power is consistent with his general account of virtue as power (*dunamis*; see 457c). He praises what he takes to be a major virtue (i.e. an excellence to be welcomed by the agent himself), the power resulting from success in rhetoric. But if the pursuit of this virtue and its benefits conflicts with justice and other commonly recognized virtues, which should be chosen? This question is raised again by Polus' praise of the rhetor's power, 466bc; and Callicles argues later that someone faced with this choice has no reason to be just, 492b. Though Gorgias has not drawn these conclusions, he has not shown how he can avoid them.

452e Gorgias claims that rhetoric is the power to persuade all the public (or 'political', *politikon*, to do with the state or city, *polis*) bodies in which a large mass of the citizens make the decisions. Many important decisions were made by these bodies in Athens, and Gorgias' boast is not unrealistic, when rhetoric includes the functions of the lobbyist, the mass media, and the advertiser. Cleon complains that the Athenians' appreciation of rhetorical skill diverts them from the merits of the case, Thuc. 3.38.7. The large role of these mass meetings is stressed by Jones, ch. 5 (see also *OCD*, S. V. *Ekklesia* \*, *Dikasterion*\*), whose verdict on them is fairer than Plato's. See also 473e, Gomme (2).

Gorgias answers Socrates' case for the specialized crafts by arguing that the rhetor will control them all for his own purposes. Socrates himself has claimed that there is a superordinate craft which directs other crafts and uses their products for its own purposes; cf. *Ch.* 173a-174c, *Eud.* 288d-291b. Gorgias implies that rhetoric is the superordinate craft. (Contrast *Eud.* 289cd. Perhaps Plato was not content with the brief objection to rhetoric presented there, and decided to examine the question more carefully in the *G.*) See 455d-457c.

Gorgias could avoid some of these difficulties by saying more exactly how rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion. He might distinguish the formal and material elements of a convincing speech. There are some elements (e.g. coherent syntax, varied language, intriguing tricks of style) which might appeal to an audience whatever they think about the speaker's views on a subject; other elements reflect the speaker's views. An audience will normally be convinced by some combination of the formal and the material elements; though the form may no doubt make the matter more appealing, it would be absurd to suggest, and Gorgias does not, that a rhetor can expect to persuade by form alone, however crazy the matter might be. Now Gorgias might say that the rhetor is concerned only with the formal elements of a persuasive speech, that he teaches a body of techniques to be applied to different subjects, not the necessary acquaintance with a specified subject. We might compare rhetoric and formal logic (though Gorgias and Socrates could not compare them Socrates shows some concern with this kind of question at *Ch.* 170a-171c); knowledge of logic tells us how to make valid inferences, not how to reach the right conclusions on a particular subject.

Though this reply might have protected Gorgias against some Socratic attacks, it would rob him of central elements of his own conception of rhetoric. He does not think it is merely a specialized craft useful to someone who is also informed about the subject to be discussed. He also thinks a man fully trained in rhetoric will be a

good 'speaker', *rhetor* \*, i.e. generally convincing on topics of public interest. Rhetoric is a general education for public life, in Gorgias' view as much as in Isocrates' (cf. esp. Morrison, 216-18). Gorgias fails to distinguish the formal and material elements of persuasion, not because he could not draw the distinction (as Dodds suggests), but because it does not suit his purpose. His conception of rhetoric in public life is helped by some unclarity about moral and political knowledge. On the one hand people tend to suppose that political wisdom is not a specialized craft, that everyone has the relevant knowledge; on the other hand the sophist and the rhetor seem to have some advantage (see 460a). Gorgias takes advantage of this unclarity, which is legitimately exposed by Socrates.

453a 'the craftsman of persuasion'. At *Phdr.* 261a-c, *Phil.* 58ab. Gorgias is said to claim that rhetoric is the best of the crafts because it enslaves everything by willing consent, not by force. Cf. Gorgias' *Helen*, DK 82 B 11. § 14; the description here in the dialogue may be derived from him.

454b-e After a further apology, creating some irregular syntax. Socrates distinguishes two kinds of 'conviction', *pistis* the kind resulting from learning, *mathesis*\*, and systematic teaching, and the kind resulting from persuasion alone. The explicit distinction between knowledge, *episteme*\*, and mere conviction is the truth-relativity of knowledge. But in associating knowledge with teaching and learning Socrates also implies that it must be acquired in a way that produces justified, rational belief. Later he requires an account, *logos*, and explanation, *aitia*, in any craft, *techne*\*, or science, *episteme*\*; 465a, 500e-501a. Cf. the explicit demand for 'reasoning about the explanation', *aitias logismos*, *M.* 97a-98b.

Isocrates replies to Plato, and perhaps reflects the view of other rhetors, by praising 'belief' (or 'opinion', *doxa*, contrasted with knowledge in *M.* 97-8) about useful things over knowledge, *episteme*\*, about useless things; 10.1-5, 12.9, 15.184-5, *Ep.* 5.3-4. Plato here insists that it matters to examine the grounds of beliefs to see whether they count as knowledge.

454e 'two forms (or 'kinds', *eidos*; a term also used to refer to Platonic Forms). On Socrates' interest in systematic classification cf. 464bc.

454e-455a Socrates argues that the rhetor produces conviction resulting from persuasion, not the reasoned conviction and knowledge that a teacher would produce, and hence is not a teacher. Is this

necessarily discreditable to the rhetor? It turns out later in the dialogue that Socrates has only conviction, not knowledge, about his central ethical claims, 508e, 524a; he has to show what is better about his convictions than those of the rhetor and his audience.

455a-c Socrates often contrasts the Athenians' care to find expert advice in the area of some recognized craft with their readiness to listen to anyone on matters of greater importance; cf. 514a-515b, *La.* 184d-185e, *Pr.* 319a-320c. The Athenians are unreasonable only if there are experts, or at least better and worse qualified people, on these general questions. Socrates assumes that there might be political experts, who have knowledge about what is just and unjust, and that rhetors are not those experts. He suggests the role for himself, with important reservations, at 521d; cf. also 505ab.

'it's a good thing to find out from you yourself about your craft'. Socrates assumes that a real craftsman has some articulate knowledge about the nature and competence of his craft; a builder can pronounce on the merits of bricks and wood for building a house; cf. *La.* 190bc.

455cd For similar questions, about the benefits of a sophistic education cf. *Pr.* 310d-314c, 316b-319a, *M.* 91ab.

455d-457c Gorgias argues as follows:

1. Even in the situation Socrates mentioned, the rhetor is more powerful than Socrates admitted.
2. Rhetoric controls all the other crafts.
3. It is not to be blamed, any more than other crafts are, for its improper use by experts.

This is a defence of the 'power' notice how often '*dunamis*' and its cognates occur in this speech and value of rhetoric.

The 'walls' are the defensively vital 'Long Walls' connecting Athens and its harbour at Peiraeus; see Ehrenberg (1), 216-18. The dockyards at Peiraeus were important in Athenian defence and sea power. These examples of shrewd and far-sighted strategic projects undertaken on the advice of popular leaders by a democratic assembly are critically examined by Socrates later, 517e, 519a.

Gorgias thinks that these examples favour Ins case because Themistocles and Pericles were rhetors (in the general sense of 'speakers'; cf. 449a), not engineers. Someone might answer that they were generals, and therefore competent to advise on the strategic aspects of wall-building, applying a craft superordinate to the builder's. But they had no training in any specialized craft of generalship. Military and political authority often belonged to the same

people in fifth-century Athens less often in the fourth century, when the 'speaker' was even more important. Cleon and the other so-called 'demagogues' in the Peloponnesian War were the first known examples of speakers who were not also respected generals (see Finley).

456a 'captures (*sullabousa*) ... keeps them under its control' (*huph' haute'i' \* echei*), or 'includes ... subsumes under it'. Plato presents the superordinate status of rhetoric (cf. 452e) in perhaps suitably military terms, with rhetoric as a conqueror, continuing Gorgias' claim that the other crafts are its slaves (452e). The praise of rhetoric as the supreme craft because of its power is an important theme developed by Polus at 466bc.

On patients' fears of treatment cf. 479ab. Socrates thinks these fears should not be removed by rhetoric, but by knowledge of what is best for someone.

456b Gorgias' boast about the success of the rhetor in competitions with experts is critically examined by Socrates several times; see 459c, 464cd, 521e-522c.

456c 'should be used'. Plato uses two terms that might be translated by 'should' or 'ought' *dein* (normally translated 'should') and *chrenai*\* (normally 'ought'). *Dein* is used as follows:

(a) for necessity or compulsion; 456b8, 459e1 (with 'must', *ananke*\*), 510a8 (cf. *ananke*\*, 460c4; 'isn't it necessary');

(b) for what is needed; 470c9, 487a2, 491d8, 500a6;

(c) for what is required for the sake of some expressed goal or purpose; 491e8, 508c2, 509e1, 513a1, b4;

(d) for what is prescribed or required, with no expressed goal; 456c7, d1, 4, 8, 457b2, 6, 474a5, 480a2, e5, 481c4, 484d4, 485e7, 488c2, 490a2, c2, d5, e2, 7, 492d6, 499e9, 500a2, b6, 505b3, 507b6, d7, 515b7, c2, 5, 523e2, 527b1.

Some cases of (d) can easily be associated with (c) by supplying 'to achieve the purpose or goal being considered', e.g. 499e9, 500a2, a6 (cf. 505a2, 'for it's no profit'). No obvious purpose is evident at 456c7 ff., 488c2, 490a2 ff.; in these cases something is required by justice (cf. 457c2, 'it is just', 491a5, 'justly takes more').

*Chrenai*\* is not so closely associated with (a) or (b); but cf. 482a2, 522a9. For (c) see 484d1. For (d) see 447a1, 449a2 ff., 458b3, 5, c1, 469a4, 484a1, 486c7, 487e9, 500c3, 505e4 ff., 522b1, 527d3. In this dialogue it is hard to find any systematic difference of sense between *chrenai* and *dein* (for attempts to draw distinctions see Benardette). Both are used with the jussive subjunctive (449b1,

515c2), and with the gerundive verbal adjective (499e6, 500a2, c4, d4; see 499e-500a, note). And sometimes they are used on different occasions to make apparently the same point; cf. 484a1 with 488c2 (both associated with justice); 487e9 with 492d6; 500c3 with 481 c4; 469a4 with 480e5.

These facts support, with qualifications, Prichard's claim, (1), 205, that 'Plato's words for right and wrong are not to be found in such words as *chre* \* and *dei* ... but in *dikaion* (just; see 459d, note) and *adikon* (unjust) themselves.' Neither *chrenai*\* nor *dein* uniquely designates a moral obligation, and in some contexts the important Platonic question 'How ought we to live?' (492d, 500c) means 'How ought we to live to be happy?' (cf. 472c, *R.* 352d). At the same time *chrenai*\* and *dein* are not always to be explained by reference to some person's happiness, when they are associated with the requirements of justice; here we might say, with proper caution (see n. on 459d) that moral obligations are involved. This is not to say that any special *sense* of the terms is found in these cases. (It is not so easy to show that there is a specifically moral sense of 'ought' either; see Wertheimer.) The terms 'right' or 'correct' (*orthos*; negative *ouk orthos*, often translated as 'wrong' in e.g. 457a2, 460d5, 476d8, 478a7, 485a3, 487a1, 488a2, 491e8, and 'it is fitting' (*prosekein*\*) in 471a4, 479a3, 48563, 491d1, 507a8, b2, 6, 517e6, 525a7, b1, 526c1, display the same range of uses; sometimes they are associated with justice, but sometimes with what happens (e.g. 487a2, 488a2), and sometimes they are used in more general ways.

456c-457c Gorgias anticipates an objection; the possibility of misuse is present in every craft, and so is no special objection to rhetoric; cf. Isoc. 15.251-3, Guthrie (1) iv.308-11. If every craft is liable to misuse, this should be a general objection to any attempt to identify virtue with a craft. Socrates raises this question at 460a-c.

Is dialectical skill a good thing liable to abuse as well (cf. *R.* 537e-539c)? If rhetoric is no more liable to abuse than dialectic is, it may be no worse than dialectic if it is practised by a virtuous man. Socrates replies by making Gorgias claim that the rhetor will be a good man; he might also argue that rhetoric is not worth having anyway and he argues this later.

457c Gorgias' assertion of the neutrality of rhetoric between good and bad use may be connected with his reported disavowal of any claim to teach virtue; at *M.* 95c he is said to profess only to make people clever at speaking. At the same time this cleverness will produce power, which Gorgias regards as virtue, *M.* 71e, 73c. There is no inconsistency here, if the wide range of virtue is noticed; and

this point becomes steadily more important in the dialogue. The term *arete* \*, normally translated by 'virtue' or 'excellence', refers quite generally to whatever properties make a thing good, *agathon*, at something or for some purpose; horses, dogs, and hammers all have their characteristic virtues, *R.* 352d-353c. It is easy to see what is meant by 'the virtue of a policeman' or 'the virtue of a father' on this pattern. But what will be 'the virtue of a man' or 'a good man'? That depends on the relevant roles, expectations, and purposes considered in assessing virtues. If we think of someone's own purposes and interests, certain properties will count as virtues from that point of view; if we think of other people's expectations and of his role as a citizen, we may apparently reach a different conception of a virtuous man. When someone claims that a certain property is a virtue, it is important to know what expectations, roles, and purposes he has in mind; this question arises at 479b, 492c, 504e, 506d. Socrates' contemporaries refer to a wide range of conditions as human virtues; sometimes they think of strength, courage, wealth, and the other qualities of the traditional aristocrat; sometimes of the qualities of the good citizen who is just and law-abiding. The combination of these qualities can be seen in *M.* 71e, 73a-c, 91a, *Pr.* 318e-319a. Gorgias denies that he teaches virtue because, unlike Protagoras, he does not claim to teach the recognized virtues which will make someone an all-round good citizen. But still he can claim to teach *a* virtue, since he claims that the power gained by being a rhetor is a good for the rhetor himself. On the scope of virtue see Adkins (3), 156-63, 172-9, (5), 60-75, 111-19, Creed, Adkins (4), Dover, 66-9. For other views on Gorgias see Guthrie (1), iii.271f., E. L. Harrison, 180f.

457c-458b Socrates describes the good conduct of dialectical argument. Perhaps the *elenchos* had been criticized by those who could not distinguish it from contentious (*eristikon*, 'eristic') talking for victory; cf. 450e, 453bc, 489bc, *Phd.* 91a, *Lys.* 211b, *M.* 75cd, *R.* 454a. Dialectic is meant to differ from eristic in two ways: (1) It aims at the discovery of truth, not merely at victory for one side. (2) It aims at constructive results, not merely at the destruction of false theories. See Robinson (2), 64-8, Ryle (3), ch. 4, esp. 126-9, Sidgwick (2), 335-50, E. S. Thompson, 272-85, Gulley (2), 22-37. People's failure to distinguish dialectic from eristic is pardonable, if we consider e.g. Socrates' heavily ironical treatment of Hippias (in the two *Hippias* dialogues), and even of Protagoras, *Pr.* 334c-336e; cf. below 461bc, 482c-e, 515b, *R.* 340d-341a, 487bc. But perhaps he will defend his manner as a necessary device for goading the interlocutor and inducing the 'numbness' which he thinks is a precondition

of positive progress, *M.* 80ab, *Tht.* 150d-151d, *Sph.* 229e-231a. The destructive side of dialectic is often prominent in the dialogues, especially the earlier ones see 461bc, 462cd; but the examination is meant to result in some defensible positive convictions, 508e-509a.

Isocrates cites Plato and his school among the eristics, 12.26, 13.1-4, 15.258-61; see W. H. Thompson (2), 172f., Sidgwick (2), 329-31, E. S. Thompson, 284, Jebb, ii. 131. Plato is probably sensitive to this criticism. The *Eud.* seeks to distinguish the real eristics from Socrates' constructive dialectic; the ethical arguments at *Eud.* 278e ff., 288d ff., presented as specimens of what Socrates can do, 278d, raise questions discussed at more length in the *G.* *Eud.* 304c ff. defends Socratic philosophy against the criticisms of a speech-writer who identifies it with eristic (305c; W. H. Thompson (2), 179-83, and Gifford, 17-20, see an allusion to Isocrates here; cf. Guthrie (1), iv. 282f.). Though the *G.* does not directly address this criticism, it implicitly answers it, by stressing the constructive purpose of Socratic dialectic and questioning the authority of rhetoric.

457e 'things which don't quite follow from or harmonize with the things you said first about rhetoric'. Socrates seems to be alleging a fallacy or inconsistency in Gorgias' previous remarks: see 460e-461a.

457e-458a 'examination ... refute'. Both translate *elenchein*; see 473b.

458d Callicles says how 'pleased' (*hedesthai* \*) and 'gratified' (*charizesthai*) he is by the discussion. These are later identified as the characteristic effects of rhetoric (462cd). Callicles thinks of dialectical argument as a source of pleasure, like a rhetorical display; Socrates, by contrast, has claimed that it is a source of the greatest possible benefit to a man (458d), and takes his pleasure in that 'beneficial' pleasure (cf. 499de) introducing the vital contrast with rhetoric. Later Callicles finds that dialectical argument is less pleasant when he is being examined, and it is Gorgias who has to persuade him to go on (497b, 506ab). For him pleasure and benefit do not go together, since his pleasures and inclinations are misguided (cf. 475d, 479bc, 505a-c, 513c).

459c Gorgias has argued that the rhetor will be more persuasive than the expert among the non-expert and ignorant. Socrates now suggests that the rhetor makes himself appear to know more than the expert, which Gorgias has not so far conceded. Socrates must

assume that the rhetor can persuade his audience only by appearing to know more than the expert. But this assumption is dubious. Why could a rhetor not appear to know the *relevant* facts, even though in general the expert knows more about the subject? Or why could the rhetor not be more persuasive because he appeals vividly and powerfully to people's feelings? Socrates ignores this possible reply, as though the only successful persuasive device could be the appearance of knowledge; see 465a. He makes the rhetor appear a suspicious character with a false pretence to knowledge; but why is any such false pretence needed? On the other hand, the confinement of rhetorical success to the inexperienced is a good ground for suspicion. If the rhetor could claim to have the objectively better case, why should it not persuade the experts in the subject as well? And if the rhetor admits that he appeals mainly to people's feelings, not offering good reasons and arguments, would that not give us reason to, and perhaps cause us to, take his advice less seriously?

Gorgias might defend himself here by pointing to an ambiguity in the claim that the rhetor is more persuasive than the doctor 'about the healthy'. He may not be more persuasive about what medicine should be taken for heartburn; but he may still be more persuasive about the wisdom of taking the medicine (this is Gorgias' claim at 456b), because he understands the value of restoring health, and can present it persuasively to the patient. He will be more persuasive in a public gathering because he can present the implications for the public good of a particular expert's work. This claim is considered in Socrates' next question.

459d Socrates uses three terms, 'good', *agathon*, 'fine' (or 'admirable' or 'beautiful', *kalon*), and 'just', *dikaion*, to isolate the subjects that concern him. Either 'good' or 'fine' by itself might be too broad, suggesting that the question is about good walls or beautiful pictures. The inclusion of 'just' perhaps is meant to show that the question is about human actions and characters in their moral, social, and political context. Gorgias has previously suggested at 454b cf. 455a that justice is the whole field of the rhetor's competence. But 'just' alone might sometimes seem too narrow. While 'just' sometimes extends over the whole area of other-directed virtue (Ar. *EN* v.1), there may be other virtuous aspects of an action which are not other-directed. Two actions or policies might be equally just in violating no law and seriously harming no one, while one might be 'better', more beneficial to an individual or group, and 'finer' (more admirable, *kalon*), in displaying courage, magnanimity, and other qualities which seem to go beyond justice (cf. Dover, 190-5). Often the good, the just, and the fine actions will be the

same; but the different terms say different things about them; and the later argument with Polus shows that some people disagree about the general coincidence of these properties. But when we talk about 'moral' questions, the nearest Greek equivalent is probably the conjunction of these three terms. On their relation cf. Thuc. 5.105.4, 1.37.5, Adkins (3), ch. 9, Creed, Adkins (4).

Such phrases as 'the good' (*to agathon*, neuter singular definite article and adjective) may refer to:

- (1) the class of good things; or
- (2) the property goodness the adjectival phrase and the abstract noun are used interchangeably at e.g. *Eu*, 5cd, 14c.

And so here 'he doesn't know the things themselves, what is good or bad' might mean;

- (1) he does not know the class of good and bad things; or
- (2) he does not know the properties goodness and badness.

'Know' is also unclear (cf. 449e on 'understand'). Gorgias might take it to mean;

- (3) he cannot recognize examples of good.

But Socrates' normal doctrine about knowledge suggests:

- (4) he does not know what good is, i.e. he cannot give a Socratic definition of it cf. 448e.

On Socrates' view knowledge requires a Socratic definition to provide the justification expected of someone who knows cf. 454be; someone who really knows about the class of good things knows because he can provide a Socratic definition (cf. 448e) of the property goodness. Socrates implies that if the rhetor cannot justify his own judgements about good etc, by an account of these moral properties, his authority should not be trusted.

459e 'appear good when he isn't'. Socrates speaks as though 'being good' were logically parallel to 'being a doctor' and other craft-terms. This is true only if someone is good if and only if he knows what is good; see 460b.

460a Why should Gorgias obligingly give the answer that causes him trouble? Would he not have been better off insisting that the rhetor needs no special competence in justice and injustice? Polus suggests, 461c, that Gorgias was ashamed to say that he did not know what is just and could not teach others; but would less shame have avoided some difficulties? Gorgias' intended concession, however, may be reasonable.

(a) It is not clear what is meant by 'knowing just and unjust things'. Gorgias may have taken Socrates to refer only to ability to recognize them, as in (3) above, whereas Socrates referred to (4), explicit understanding.

(b) Gorgias does not promise to 'teach virtue' in the sense of making people virtuous. (His claim is consistent, *pace* Dodds, with *M.* 95c.) He only promises to tell his pupils the sorts of things that are just and unjust. Learning this and acting justly or being just are, for Gorgias and for most people, two very different things; it is Socrates who holds the beliefs which imply their identity, 460b.

(c) We have noticed that Gorgias does not present rhetoric as merely skill in using formal elements of discourse apart from their content. He also suggested that the rhetor is well trained to give advice on questions of public concern, 452e, 459c. For this he must have some views on just and unjust actions and policies. Gorgias may only be promising to tell his pupils the common beliefs about these questions. He does not distinguish this information from what Socrates has been asking about, expert knowledge of morals and politics. But Socrates' question is not very explicit cf. 459d and the distinction might well seem unimportant, if Gorgias thinks there are no experts in morals and politics here he will, in Socrates' view, agree with most Athenians. *Pr.* 319cd.

But still we might expect more from the rhetor than the common grasp of moral and political issues; for Gorgias has suggested that he is an authority on these matters. He has not conceded that he is an authority only because he *sounds* convincing, because he can use techniques of persuasion and manipulate common beliefs; but this must be conceded if the rhetor turns out to have no better grasp than anyone else of morals and politics.

Gorgias' claim here is not fatal to his case, as Polus and many critics assume. He supposes his pupils will be informed about virtue, since the information is generally available, and promises only that he will inform them if they happen to be uninformed when they come to him. Only Gorgias' following answers cause him serious trouble (but see 452e).

Some rhetors want to defend their moral respectability by claiming that virtue is the best and most persuasive recommendation; *Isoc.* 15.2 74-8, 13.21.

460b 'According to this account (*logos*) isn't also the man who has learnt just things just?' Socrates assumes that justice is analogous to the crafts in so far as learning about what is just is sufficient for being called 'just'; cf. 459e. Here are the two assumptions which cause trouble for Gorgias' previous claims:

- (1) Learning what is just is learning a craft.
- (2) I having learnt a craft is sufficient for being just.

Gorgias has been given no reason to accept (1) and (2); they are parts of the Socratic conception of virtue as a craft. We might be

inclined to reject either (1) or (2). We normally suppose that a virtue differs from a craft; a craft is a capacity which may or may not be exercised, while a virtue must, in the right conditions, be exercised. Someone who has learnt carpentry no doubt needed certain desires to acquire his craft; but he may have lost those desires now. If he does not want to make tables when they are needed, but could make them if he wanted to, he is still a skilled craftsman. But a just man is expected not simply to know what would be just to do if he wanted to, but to want to do it when it is needed. Cf. At. *EN* 1106a 6-13. Socrates does not agree that these beliefs justify a distinction between virtue and craft. See Intr. § 4, Gibbs.

The argument against Gorgias is illegitimate as it stands, since it depends on (1) and (2) above, which are not obvious, which Gorgias has been given no reason to accept, and which have not yet been proved in the argument so far. The argument is therefore elliptical, rather than purely fallacious; cf. 475de, 478e, 507ab, Robinson (1), 19f. Socrates can support (1) and (2) by this argument

(3) Someone who believes that something is in his own interest will do it.

(4) Being just and acting justly are in the agent's interest.

(5) Someone who knows that an action is just knows that it is in his interest.

(6) Therefore someone who knows that an action (or state of character) is just will do the action (or acquire the state of character). Step (5) is not defended. Socrates probably thinks it follows from his conditions for knowledge; if I know, and do not merely believe, that something is just, I can relate it to the definition of justice, which, on Socrates' account of justice and other virtues, will relate it to my over-all good. Contrast Santas (2), 159. But (3) is defended at 467c-468e, and (4) at 474c-479e. See 466cd, 475d, 482cd.

Socrates' doctrine here offends common beliefs, and needs further defence. See 491d, Intr. § 4, *Pr.* 352bc, Dover, 124-6, O'Brien, ch. 1. Contrast Dodds ad loc., and (2), 17.

Throughout this argument Socrates has assumed that virtue, including justice, is a craft, a systematic, rationally teachable body of knowledge. Gorgias never challenges this assumption. But we have seen that his responses to Socrates would be more convincing if he denied that there are experts in moral and political questions. A rhetor might claim that his moral and political beliefs are no truer than other people's, since there are no objective criteria of truth and knowledge in this area. Plato examines this conception of moral and political (and other) knowledge at *Tht.* 177b-179b. Socrates and Plato always assume that there are right and wrong answers about moral and political questions, because these deal with people's

interests, and there are right and wrong answers about what is in people's interests. No separate argument is offered for these views; but they are implicitly defended in the argument with Callicles (see 488b, 499ab, 506e-507c). That is why Socrates never recognizes a distinction between questions of fact, where truth and knowledge are possible, and questions of values, where they are not possible. Questions of value are a particular kind of questions of fact; and so our moral education, for Socrates, must include our acquiring true beliefs about our own interest, and the resultant true moral beliefs.

460e-461a Socrates' explanation for having suspected a conflict in Gorgias' previous remarks is poor. The term 'did not harmonize', *ou sunadein* \*, may refer to some looser mis-match than formal contradiction Plato's logical vocabulary is not sharp or specialized (see Robinson (2), 29f.). But even the allegation of a looser mis-match is not clearly justified. Socrates says that Gorgias claimed:

- (1) Rhetoric is concerned with speech about what is just and unjust; from which Socrates inferred:
- (2) Rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, when it always speaks about justice; and that conflicted with
- (3) The rhetor can use rhetoric unjustly.

Why does Socrates infer (2) from (1)? He might mean that the rhetor must 'learn justice' to talk about it, and that someone who learns justice will never be unjust. But that is simply to rely on Socratic assumptions. The 'disharmony' is between Gorgias' views and Socrates' views, not internal to Gorgias' views. Socrates might say that Gorgias' views are disharmonious, *given* the Socratic assumptions he has left unchallenged. But this reply shows only that the Socratic assumptions still need defence.

461bc Polus interrupts indignantly in a syntactically confused outburst against Socrates, accusing him of 'ill-breeding', *agroikia*

a crass and ill-educated pleasure in ruthlessly exploiting unwary admissions, to force a contradiction and to pretend to have scored some significant victory. But Polus misidentifies Socrates' false move. He suggests that Socrates has appealed unscrupulously to Gorgias' sense of shame, making him admit that he will tell his pupils about justice; Polus suggests that this admission did produce a real conflict in Gorgias' statements, which can be removed by simply rejecting Gorgias' sense of shame. He ignores Socrates' previous questions about the qualifications of rhetors to advise about just and unjust.

Polus is dissatisfied with the apparently smug and eristic manner of Socrates' argument (see 457c458b); the interlocutor seems to

have been trapped into contradiction by a trivial mistake he could easily have avoided. Socrates tries to show that his opponents cannot avoid self-contradiction so easily. See Intr. § 5.

461c Why should anyone be ashamed to admit that he does not know about just things and cannot teach others about them? Cf. 482bc. 'Know' and 'teach' must be taken fairly weakly, to mean that he can recognize just things and point them out to others; cf. 457d. This is the kind of 'knowledge' which qualifies any respectable moral agent to 'teach' others, in the way described in *Pr.* 323a-326e, *M.* 92c. Just as it would be a matter of shame not to have virtue and to be ignorant about it, *Pr.* 323bc, *Alc.* 118b, it would also be a matter of shame to be unable to tell others about it, *Amat.* 138d. But Socrates assumes that teaching and knowing justice involve teaching and knowing a craft. Is this more than can reasonably be demanded of a normal moral agent? We might demand some understanding of the grounds and reasons for virtuous action, not just ability to identify the action; but ought we to expect all that Socrates expects? Polus, as Plato presents him, does not see the difficulty in 'knowing' and 'teaching', and so overlooks the real source of Gorgias' troubles. Does Plato see the difficulty?

461cd The dialectical method rests on the agreement of the interlocutor, and the recent conclusion rests on Gorgias' agreement, open to challenge by another interlocutor. Dialectic can never certify that the conclusion is beyond challenge; it is reasonable for Socrates to test it repeatedly with different interlocutors (see Intr. § 8). He offered to do this with Crito, who declined the offer, *Cri.* 46bc. Polus now accepts the offer, raising questions about basic Socratic principles, e.g. the identity of living well, finely, and justly (*Cri.* 48b). Callicles' challenge at 482cd is more radical.

461e 'where there is most liberty (*exousia*; cf. 468a, 486c, 492b, 525a) to speak'. Socrates alludes to the 'freedom of speech', *parrhesia* \* (cf. 487c) which was a prized feature of Athenian democracy; see Eur. *Hipp.* 419-23, *Ion* 670-2, and for a less favourable view of the same thing see Ps.-Xen, *Ath. Pol.* 1.12, Isoc. 7.20. Socrates' allusion is not entirely innocent; for he will suggest that the rhetors do not really 'speak freely'; they flatter the people by telling them what they want to hear, rather than what would be best for them (cf. Dem. 9.3-4). It will appear later that Socrates is the only one who really speaks freely and tells the truth without concern for personal safety; cf. 521d-522a, *Ap.* 31b-32a, 36bc.

462b 'A thing which you say produced craft'. Quite probably Socrates alludes to a work of Polus on rhetoric which was quoted or parodied or alluded to in 448c.

462c Socrates says rhetoric is a kind of *empeiria*. This term often means 'experience', and here refers to the result of experience, a 'knack' or 'technique' (which would be a good translation except for its derivation from *techne* \*, which Socrates sharply opposes to *empeiria*). It is not clear how far Socrates relies on some accepted distinction between *empeiria* and *techne*\*, and how far he draws his own. The two are not always opposed; cf. 448b, Thuc. 2.85.2, 5.7.2. But here Socrates contrasts e.g. someone who simply prescribes some treatment for a feverish condition because it has worked in the past, and a qualified doctor, who is guided by some general theory of the causes of a disease; the theory might require different treatment for diseases with similar symptoms which someone going 'by experience' might treat in the same way; cf. *Laws* 720b-e, 857c-e, Hippoc. VM 20. Aristotle treats experience as a source of craft and knowledge, *episteme*\*, but sharply distinguishes it from them, *Met.* 980a27-981b10. See 501a.

The criticism of rhetoric as a mere knack attacks Polus' and, perhaps. Gorgias' stress on experience as the basis of rhetoric; cf. Isoc. 15.187-92. Socrates argues that this is a reason for distrusting rhetoric.

Polus asks whether rhetoric is not a fine, *kalon*, thing, when it makes someone able to gratify people. '*Kalon*' is used quite generally here; it is not clear whether it is meant to be desirable for us to have this power for ourselves because it benefits us, or because it benefits other people, or both; cf. 463d, 474cd.

Socrates also claims that rhetoric is concerned with the production of pleasure, and makes this a sufficient condition for being a knack. But is it? Perhaps (a) rhetoric is a knack, not a craft, and (b) it is concerned with pleasure, not with good. Both (a) and (b) may give good reasons for distrusting rhetoric. But how does (b) support (a)? See 500e-501a.

Polus' view that the rhetor's ability to satisfy people's desires counts in his favour reflects a view that Socrates rejects more and more strongly in the dialogue; see 503c, 505ab, 517b-519a. Many would agree with Polus, including some defenders of advertising; 'An advertising executive ... related ... that America was growing great by the systematic creation of dissatisfaction. He talked specifically of the triumphs of the cosmetics industry in reaching the billion-dollar class by the sale of hope and by making women more anxious and critical about their appearance. Triumphant he concluded;

"And everybody is happy." ... *Business Week*, in denying the charge that the science of behavior was spawning some monster of human engineering who was "manipulating a population of puppets from behind the scenes", contended; "It is hard to find anything very sinister about a science whose principal conclusion is that you get along with people by giving them what they want." But is "everybody happy"? And should we all be "given" whatever our ids "want"? (Packard, 255f.).

463a-c Socrates places rhetoric in the genus 'flattery' or 'pandering', *kolakeia*, defined by Theophrastus as 'a shameful, (*aischra*) association, but expedient to the flatterer', *Char.* 2. The flatterer does all kinds of services for his client which are humiliating for a free man, for anyone other than a slave, and incompatible with the flatterer's self-respect. But he does not do these services just to please the client, but for his own advantage; cf. At. *EN* 1127a8-10.

All these aspects of flattery are relevant in the dialogue.

(1) Here Socrates emphasizes the consumer-oriented attitude of the flatterer. His advertising, market research, product promotion, attractive packing and colouring, all aim to discover, enlarge, and cater to the desires of the consumer. The political aspects of this attitude become clearer later, 517b ff. The techniques of modern advertising and mass media, and their use for promoting the image (a term Plato would no doubt have approved of; cf. 463d) of political candidates, are perfect examples of what Plato regards as flattery. The economic aspects are explored in a comment of Marx's: '... the expansion of production and of needs becomes an ingenious and always calculating subservience to inhuman, depraved, unnatural and imaginary appetites ... No eunuch flatters his tyrant more shamefully or seeks by more infamous means to stimulate his jaded appetite, in order to get some favour, than does the eunuch of industry, the entrepreneur, in order to acquire a few silver coins or to charm the gold from the purse of his dearly beloved neighbour.' (Marx, 169.) Already here Plato hints at the conclusion he will draw more explicitly later, that the best politician will not be concerned with what people say they want, or what would satisfy their present whims, but with their real good; see 464c, 504d. The argument with Callicles is meant to show that the satisfaction of the desires catered to by rhetoric does not really promote a person's over-all good.

(2) Later Socrates suggests to Callicles that the moves and shifts of a rhetor to survive and to please his customers will be intolerable to anyone who cares about his own self-respect and about acting on his own values rather than adapting himself to other people's, 511b-513c; cf. 465b, 481d.

(3) Socrates also suggests, and claims at 502e, 503c, that the rhetor's flattery of the masses really aims, not at their pleasure as an ultimate good, but at the rhetor's own imagined good; all the time, as Polus and Callicles insist, and as even Gorgias has suggested at 452e, the rhetor is out for his own interest, exploiting and manipulating the masses. However, Socrates does not argue that there is anything wrong with self-interest; instead he argues that the rhetor has mistaken his real interest.

This conception of flattery is supposed to imply that no form of flattery can be a craft. The argument assumes that no craft can be concerned with pleasure, a claim Socrates does not defend until 500ab. See also 517c.

The claim that rhetors are flatterers is probably not original to Socrates. Aristophanes, e.g. *Eq.* 763-1110, attacks popular leaders for their flattery of the *demos*, the Athenian people; he denounces their combination of self-abasement and self-seeking; cf. 481d below. The political merits of this charge are harder to assess.

In calling rhetoric a mere 'procedure' or 'routine', *tribe* \*, Socrates suggests that the ability of a rhetor is acquired by habituation and practice alone, not by instruction and theory. He means much the same as when he calls it a 'knack', that the rhetor cannot give an explicit rational justification of what he does.

463a Socrates says that the flatterer's soul (or character; *psuche*\*) is 'brave' (or 'manly', *andreios*), a common use of *andreios* for someone who is resolute in pursuing his aims, and even ready, as Socrates insinuates, to be shameless and unscrupulous. For this use see also 491b. The flatterer is also clever in approaching (or 'dealing with', *proshomilein*; cf. 513d, 521a) people; like Aristotle, *EN* 1144a23-9, Socrates recognizes cleverness as a natural ability capable of misuse. The virtuous person has real knowledge of how to approach people, *La.* 199de; the flatterer, here as elsewhere, deceptively resembles him.

463c Socrates insists on the priority of the 'What is *x*?' question, demanding an answer to it before he answers questions about the value of rhetoric; cf. 448e. He does not say that we cannot say anything true about rhetoric before we know what it is, and (on Socrates' view of knowledge) are able to define it. He implies only that an account of what rhetoric is will affect our views on its value, and is necessary to justify them; cf. *R* 354bc.

463d Socrates calls rhetoric an 'image' or 'semblance'. *eidolon*\*, of politics (or 'the political craft' *politike*\*, with *techne*\* or *episteme*\*

understood), and Gorgias asks for an explanation of 'image'. Socrates has in mind the kind of relation just considered rhetoric has some features similar enough to features of politics to deceive someone into thinking it is politics. It is, however, necessary for the features of the original to be part of the causal explanation of the features of the image; it remains to be seen whether Socrates can show that this condition applies to rhetoric; see 464cd.

The relation between image and reality is important in later dialogues for explaining the relation between Forms and sensible things. The contrast between the genuine and the spurious or derived is important there as it is in the *G.*; cf. *R.* 476cd, 515a-c, 520c, 596e-598d. In each case the man who concentrates on the image of F and does not recognize how it differs from the original and real F will be misled and draw false conclusions about the nature of *F*s. But the *G.*'s remarks need not be part of a definite metaphysical theory of Forms, though they are obvious sources of such a theory.

'I call evil things shameful'. Socrates' claim anticipates 474c ff.

463e 'Polus the colt'. '*Polos* \*' in Greek means 'colt'.

464a 'You call something body and soul?' or 'you think there are such things as body and soul?' This is not meant to be a controversial move; cf. 465a, 512a, 517d. The soul is recognized in Greek thought as the source of life, and then as the source of knowledge, feeling, and action and this is what is meant here. Plato may be referring to Gorgias' comparison of medicine to rhetoric and rejecting it. (See DK 82 B 11.14; cf. Protagoras in *Th.* 167bc, and Plato himself. *Phdr.* 270b, where, however, rhetoric is treated as a craft, contrary to the *G.*) For Gorgias suggests that making a soul feel pleased and confident corresponds to making a body healthy. Socrates disagrees; these speeches only make the soul *feel* in good condition, when really it is not. See further De Romilly, 38-43.

464b-e Polus' incompetence as questioner and Gorgias' puzzlement give Socrates a chance to break his own rules against long speeches. See Intr. § 9.

Socrates' procedure here (cf. 454e) suggests an interest in systematic division and classification which Plato does not discuss theoretically until later dialogues, e.g. *Phdr.* 265c-266c, *Sph.* 253de, *Pol.* 285d-287b.

'Politics'; the use of the term is justified by Socrates' doctrines developed at 502d-503d, 513d-519a, perhaps expanding previous suggestions at *Eud.* 291b-d.

464b 'The legislative craft', *nomothetike* \*; concerned with *nomos*, on which see 482e.

464c 'aiming at the best'. This hallmark of the four genuine crafts is ambiguous, just as the previous talk of 'good condition' was. It might mean.

(a) aiming to make the soul or body as good as possible; or

(b) aiming at what is best for soul or body, what is most in its interest. The difference between (a) and (b) is easily overlooked with medicine, since we normally suppose that what makes the body better healthier, stronger is what is better for the body. But it is not so clear that someone who makes my soul good thereby does something good for me, for it is not clear that being good i.e. virtuous is always good i.e. beneficial for me. In the rest of the dialogue Socrates tries to remove these doubts by arguing that being virtuous, especially just, is beneficial to the agent; see 506d-507c.

'I don't say it knew (*gnousa*), but it guessed (*stochasamene*\*)'. Socrates regards the rhetor as a 'guessing' (or 'contriving'; cf. *stochastikes*\*, 463a) type of person; and just as he denied in 463a that the rhetor is a craftsman, *technikos*, he denies here that he has any knowledge about what he is doing.

464cd The various techniques of flattery are said to 'impersonate' crafts, or 'dress themselves up' (*hupodunai*) as crafts; cf. *Ar. Met.* 1004b17-22, *Rhet.* 1356a27-30. But surely Socrates is wrong to say that cookery pretends to offer healthy food. Children or foolish people may not know the difference between tasty or enjoyable food and healthy food, but surely adults know the difference and sometimes choose pleasant food? Socrates suggests that most people's moral and political judgement is as ignorant as children's judgement about healthy foods, 521e-522a, and that they will alter their choices when they know better; on his assumptions about knowledge and choice see 460b, 467c-468c, 506c-507c.

Socrates here returns to Gorgias' claim that the rhetor will beat the doctor in a contest about whose advice should be taken (456b). As in 459c, Socrates makes the rhetor's success a ground for suspicion of him (see 521 e-522c).

464d7-e1 'worthy (*chreston*\*) and base (*poneron*\*) food'. Here '*chreston*\*' and '*poneron*\*' just seems to mean 'good and bad', i.e. 'healthy and unhealthy', as in 517e8. The terms are also used for worthy and base people, as in 521d1-2, and hence as political terms for the 'good' and 'bad' side (cf. 470e8 on *kalos kagathos* and *poneros*\*).

This may, though it need not, influence Socrates' use of *chreston* \* in 499e2, 504a7-8. On *chreston*\* see Dover, 296.

465a Socrates mentions two objections to rhetoric; (1) It is shameful because it aims at the pleasant without the best. (2) It is not a craft because it offers no 'rational account', *logos* (see 449de) and cannot give the 'cause' or 'explanation' (*aitia*; the cognate *aitios* is translated by 'responsible' at 452d) of its treatment; cf. 462c. Some questions arise:

(1) Socrates does not deny the *Pr.*'s claim that what is pleasantest over all is also best over all; and so if the rhetor aims at what is pleasantest, will he not aim at what is best over all? This inference would not be valid as it stands, since it would involve illicit substitution of coreferential expressions 'what is pleasantest', 'what is best', in an 'opaque' context, where this kind of substitution does not preserve truth (see Quine; Lacey, S.V. 'Intensionality'). But if the rhetor pursues what is pleasantest over all *because* he thinks it is good over all (a view of over-all good supported by *Pr.* 354bc), he is still practising a craft. And so Socrates' objection does not exclude a hedonistic craft, if the *Pr.*'s theory is true; see further 495a.

(2) Socrates apparently contrasts rhetoric with a craft which can give a rational account of its procedures and of why they are right for its ends (the text here is doubtful). 'Applying' may refer especially to the application of medicines; cf. *Phdr.* 268a. For the contrast between medicine with a *logos* and without it cf. *Laws* 720b-e, 857c-e. But Socrates has not shown why there cannot be an 'Art of Rhetoric' explaining why each rhetorical device is the right one to use to persuade different audiences in different conditions. He apparently thinks that the concern of rhetoric with pleasure disqualifies it from being a craft. But why is that? See 500e-501c; contrast *Ar. EN* 1152b18-19, 1153a24-5.

(3) In demanding a rational account from a craft or science. Socrates relies on a further condition for knowledge besides truth, though it is not explicitly stated before the *M.* (see 454e). A craftsman with knowledge can say and explain what he is doing (cf. *La.* 190c). Does Socrates think this ability is necessary for competent, flexible performance in a variety of conditions? If he does, some would say that he ignores a distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'

e.g. knowing how to swim need not involve any explicit, storable knowledge that something is the case. See Ryle (1) ch. 2, Brown. Gould, chs. 1-2, Vlastos (14). But with more complex crafts in disputable situations, the demand for rational and storable understanding is more reasonable; cf. *M.* 97b-98a, Irwin, 90-2, 142-4.

(4) Socrates never objects against rhetoric that it appeals to the

emotions, hopes, fears, and other non-rational aspects of its audience, so that it can sway them against their better judgement; cf. 459c, 464cd, Gorgias in DK 82 B 11.8-14, Segal, 108. Socrates believes that no one acts against his better judgement at the time of his action (i.e. if at a later time I act contrary to what I thought best at an earlier time, that shows that I have changed my judgement about what is best between the earlier and the later time); see 491d, 493a, 502b. Contrast Plato's own later view in *R.* 602c-606d, *Phdr.* 237d-238e. 245c-252c, 261ab, 271c-272b.

'undergo discussion' (*logos*); see 449de, 523a.

465b 'Slavish' (or 'unfree'; *aneleutheron*). Flattery is unworthy of a self-respecting free man because it caters to its customers; cf. 463a-c. On freedom see 452de. 485c-e, 491e, 492c, 511c-512d. Dover. 114-16.

465b7-c1 'for now (*ede* \*) perhaps you might follow me'. Either (a) *ede*\* has a temporal force 'already' or 'by now', and Socrates means 'Since you should by now have understood my examples, I'll briefly summarize my point in geometrical terms'; or (b) *ede*\* has a logical force 'in that case' and Socrates means 'I'll use geometrical terms, for perhaps you'll grasp my point more easily in that case.' Here (a) suggests that the geometrical terminology is Socrates' preference, (b) that it is an expository device to help Polus, who must then be assumed to be familiar with it. Geometrical examples are used in the way suggested by (b) at *M.* 82b ff., 86e-87b, to illustrate a philosophical point. See 508a. Intr. § 8.

465c Whereas the sophist is concerned with general moral and political issues (*nomos* and *nomothetike*\* have a broad range; see 464b, 482c), rhetoric is concerned with the area of justice (see 464b), the observance of which is prescribed by the *nomoi*. The sophist does consider how the *nomoi*, general moral and political norms, should be, and so offers to teach people these norms and make them virtuous. The rhetor takes the *nomoi* for granted and appeals to them either in the law-courts, governed by rules of just procedure, or in the assembly, guided by rules of procedure and by more general norms. On sophistic and rhetoric see Grote (1), ch. 67, Sidgwick (2), 353, E. L. Harrison, Guthrie (1), iii.44.

'if the soul did not control the body'. Here as before (see 464a), the use of 'soul', *psuche*\*, implies no psycho-physical dualism involving two independent entities (contrast Dodds). Socrates means only that we are guided by thoughts, judgements, and so on in the way we distinguish these various pursuits in practice.

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466a Polus' bad memory; *HMi*. 369a, *Ion* 539e. Dodds suggests that here the focus shifts from the rhetorician, the teacher of rhetoric, to the practising orator himself (though he says 'there is no breach in logical continuity'). Plato does not draw this distinction; 449a. He criticizes the 'speaker', the rhetor, whether he is teaching others to be rhetors or using his rhetoric as a speaker himself; Socrates assumes that if rhetoric is a real craft, the same man can do both, 449b. To find out whether rhetoric is a craft, he has not asked whether the teacher teaches as a craftsman would teach. He has asked whether what is taught is a craft, whether the practising speaker is a craftsman.

466a9 'as (*hos* \*) flatterers', i.e. 'do people despise rhetors because they think they are flatterers?' Polus meets Socrates' claim that rhetors are flatterers with the reply that people don't *think* they are flatterers. Socrates' next remark about how rhetors 'don't count' returns to their real character.

466ab Polus asks Socrates whether he thinks rhetors do not 'count' (*nomizesthai*; or 'are not recognized') as important people in the cities. Here as later, Socrates states his reply in deliberately, and misleadingly, paradoxical terms. He probably does not really mean to deny what Polus meant to assert, that rhetors are in fact well thought of in their cities (contrast Dodds, who cites 481e, 513a-c, which are indecisive). He means that there is no reason to think well of rhetors, since in fact they 'don't count' or 'don't matter' (Lodge cites Aristoph. *Nub.* 962). '*Nomizesthai*' is used for coin, *nomisma*, which is legal tender. Perhaps this use influences Socrates in saying that rhetors 'count for nothing' and are valueless.

466b The discussion returns to Gorgias' earlier claims about the power, *dunamis*, of the rhetor (452d). Socrates replies that if power is a good to the man who has it, rhetors have no power. The reply is stated in deliberately paradoxical terms and, we will find, overstated.

466bc 'Aren't they like tyrants?' As an example of absolute power of life and death Polus mentions the tyrant, *turannos*. The term 'tyrant' initially refers to a leader with absolute, extra-legal, and extra-constitutional powers in the state, not necessarily implying that the ruler is bad or oppressive some of them, like Peisistratus in Athens, were respected in their lifetime and later; see Ehrenberg (1), 23-7, 77-90. However, the tyrant comes to be associated, especially in the literature of the fifth and fourth centuries, with

arbitrary, cruel, and reckless abuse of absolute power; Zeus in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Vincetus*, Oedipus in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, Creon in the *Antigone*, Jason in Euripides' *Medea*, Lycus in the *Heracles*, are all 'tyrant-figures'; see also Hdt. 3.80. The 'typical tyrant' appears again in *R.* 344a-c, and at length in *R.* viii-ix.

It is striking that Polus introduces this comparison, which would be shocking to anyone with democratic, or even constitutional, sentiments. Grote objects; 'Pericles would have listened with mixed surprise and anger if he had heard the monstrous assertion which Plato puts into the mouth of Polus That rhetors, like despots, kill or impoverish any citizen at their pleasure', (2), ii.370. (Socrates notes later that it is not so easy for all rhetors; 515d ff.) But Socrates is not necessarily saying that all rhetors would agree with Polus. He claims that someone who thinks rhetoric is an unqualified good for the rhetor must in consistency accept that power is an unqualified good, so that the tyrant who achieves supreme power achieves some unqualified good for himself. Earlier Gorgias praised rhetoric for the power it gives the rhetor, 452d; and Socrates now considers the moral attitude implicit in this praise. Nor is Plato's view of rhetors clearly unfair. (Isoc. 15.142 expresses a similar view of some rhetors, though from a strongly biased point of view.)

Many Greeks (like many others) could not restrain some admiration for the tyrant's powers or worldly success; like the successful capitalist 'robber-baron' more recently, he appears to be the embodiment of success and independence, however he may have achieved it; cf. 452d, 468e on freedom. Adam Smith, i.3.3, p. 62 (quoted by Grote (2), ii.333) remarks: 'The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness.' Polus does not go quite as far as disinterested admiration see 474c. But his attitude is not unfamiliar. Solon replies to those who think he was stupid to give up the good fortune of permanent tyranny in Athens; he answers that he will not be ashamed at having spared his city bloodshed, and indeed will win greater eminence this way (Solon 24, Diehl); this argument based on the effects of tyranny on others is not considered by Socrates at all (cf. Grote, 335). Pericles and Cleon are both presented telling the Athenians that they hold and must continue to hold their empire as a tyranny. Thuc. 2.63.2-3, 3.37.2; and in Aristoph. *Eq.* 1111-15, Demos (the Athenian people) is admired because he is feared as a tyrant. Polus thinks the rhetor, not the people, has the tyrannical power; Socrates replies at 510a-d, supporting his view of the rhetor as a flatterer (cf. 463a-c). For other expressions of admiration for

tyranny cf. Eur. *Tro.* 1168-70, *Phoen.* 523-5 (it is most *kalon* to do injustice for the sake of a tyranny).

By examining the tyrant Plato examines his contemporaries' admiration of power and success, suggesting that they must choose between this and their admiration for justice and the other recognized virtues. In particular he suggests that they cannot consistently admire justice the way they profess to if they think a man is best off with tyrannical power and success, whatever unjust methods are needed to achieve them.

466de 'want to ... think is best'. Polus has said that rhetors do what they 'want to' (*boulesthai*) and what they 'think fit' (literally, 'what seems, *dokein*, to them', perhaps alluding to the official formula in resolutions of the Athenian Assembly; 'it seemed (*edoxe*) to the Council and to the People'), intending these two phrases to refer to the same condition. Socrates replies that they need not refer to the same condition because I can do 'what I think best' (*dokein beltiston*; Socrates adds the 'best' to Polus' description without argument) without doing what I want cf. 447b.

466e Socrates says, rather surprisingly, that Polus himself does not agree with what Polus has said; see 495e, 482bc. Socrates means as 'For you said ...' shows that Polus has said things which, as the *elenchos* will show, conflict with his present claim and which he will maintain against it. His beliefs refute him out of his own mouth, but only the *elenchos* shows it. Socrates says the same at 474b, and explains himself at 516d. Cf. Intr. § 8, *Alc.* 112e-113c.

Socrates argues against Polus as follows:

- (1) Great power is good for the man who has it.
- (2) Doing what someone thinks best without intelligence ('when he has no intelligence', e 10) is not good for him.
- (3) Someone who does what he thinks best without intelligence lacks great power.

But (1) and (2) are ambiguous. 'Good' may mean

- (a) some good, i.e. good to some extent; or
- (b) good over all, so that I am always, on the whole, everything considered, better off with it than without it.

Now (2) is a convincing objection against (b), but not obviously against (a). We might insist that taken by itself power, like health or intelligence, is always some good (i.e. that if I know nothing else about the situation I know you are better off with power than without it); we could still admit that in some situations my having power will either not prevent my being badly off over all or will even positively harm me so might the other goods. Socrates thinks this

is true of most of the recognized goods, *M.* 87e-88d, *Eud.* 279a-281e, and assumes here that Polus does not accept this status for rhetoric. Is the assumption fair? Gorgias said that rhetoric produces the greatest and best things and that these things are freedom i.e. freedom to do what you like and power, 452d. Polus agrees with him. Neither has admitted that rhetoric is sometimes harmful to the rhetor Gorgias said only that it might be used unjustly, 456c-457b

nor that it needs to be controlled by some other knowledge or character-trait in the rhetor's own interest. Their praise of rhetoric and power assumed no such restrictions, and it is fair for Socrates to assume that they mean (b).

466e-467a Why does Polus have to prove that rhetors practise a craft if he is to prove that they do what is good for them? Perhaps Socrates means this:

(1) A knack is an 'unreasoning' thing, 465a, so that someone who has it will be 'without intelligence'.

(2) A knack, unlike a craft, is not concerned with the good, so that someone who has it will not thereby be able to achieve any good, and so will lack real power.

These are shaky reasons. Someone who uses an unreasoning knack might still use it intelligently and for his own good; Socrates can claim only that if rhetoric is only a knack, it cannot by itself constitute the rhetor's rational understanding of what is best that knowledge will have to come from some knowledge not included in rhetoric. However, even this claim refutes Polus and Gorgias, who think that rhetoric is not only a possibly useful technique, but an unqualified good, simply because it gives the rhetor power to direct other people. Socrates reasonably replies that this alleged power does not make rhetoric an unqualified good, unless the rhetor directs other people for his benefit; and to do this he must know what benefits him.

We might think that in the argument against rhetoric above (2) is equivocal. 'Concerned with the good' might mean

(a) concerned with producing a good (from some point of view) result; or

(b) concerned with the agent's good.

The relevant sense for distinguishing knacks from crafts was (a); but (b) is the relevant sense in (2). But Polus' case for saying that rhetoric equips someone to achieve his own interest still deserves examination. Though the connection between these questions and the previous comments is not as close as Socrates suggests, the questions are still fair.

467a 'refuting', *exelenchein*; see 473b, note.

467b Polus cannot see what Socrates is driving at in distinguishing 'doing what he wants to' from 'doing what he thinks fit'. And he is right to be puzzled, since Socrates is proposing a restriction in the ordinary range of 'want'. This exchange suggests that Socrates' claims about wanting are not comments on the ordinary correct usage of the word. Polus is right, as far as we can tell, to find it natural, in Greek as in English, to say that tyrants do what they want to; Socrates means to show that our beliefs about what is involved in wanting make it wrong for us to say this.

467c 'Peerless Polus'. Socrates uses the jingling style favoured by Polus' type of rhetoric (see Dodds). 'Display, *epideixon*, my mistake'; Socrates uses the term previously used for a rhetorical display at 447a, and asks Polus to offer a different kind of display.

467cd Why should we agree that when we do  $x$  for the sake of  $y$ , we don't want  $x$ , but  $y$ ? Socrates suggests cases where it seems implausible to say I want  $x$ , by asking 'Who would want to be in pain?' etc. But it sounds odd to say we want these things only because we have not described them in the way that explains our wanting them. It also sounds odd to say that I want to move my fingers rapidly over the piano keyboard, until I realize that that process can also be described as 'playing the Third Sonata'. While it is odd to say 'I want to stiffer this pain' by itself, it is not odd to say that I want to suffer it as a means of getting better. Socrates, then, is right to insist that the relevant description showing why I want  $x$  will mention the end I expect to be promoted by  $x$ ; but he is wrong to infer that therefore we don't really want  $x$  if  $x$  is a means to some further end; all he can say is that we don't want dangers, pains, etc. as such i.e. described only as 'dangers', 'pains', etc. His argument also seems to rule out wanting something both as a means and as an end' this is more clearly ruled out in *Lys.* 220ab. See further 468bc, Anscombe (1), 11f., 37-41.

Socrates' claim would be trivial if he were proposing to re-define 'want', *boulesthai*, to mean 'want for itself' rather than 'want' in general; but nothing suggests that this is what he wants to do (contrast O'Brien, 89). For a similar argument about means and ends cf. *Lys.* 219e-220b (which reaches a stronger conclusion than is asserted here in the *G.*, that we always aim at a single final end). Nor does Socrates suggest any distinction between what a person thinks he wants and his 'true will', which is taken to express what he 'really wants', whether or not he thinks he wants it (cf. Dodds, Gould,

ch. 3). Here the 'ends' mentioned are those someone thinks he wants as results of his actions.

467e-468a Socrates introduces a third class of things intermediate between good and bad. They are described in two ways:

- (a) neither good nor bad by themselves in all cases;
- (b) sometimes good, sometimes bad.

Socrates' descriptions and examples cover different cases:

- (1) An individual thing sometimes shares in the good, sometimes in the evil if and only if on some occasions it benefits and on other occasions it harms my fur coat shares in the evil for me on a hot day, but in the good for me on a cold day.
- (2) Types of things or events sometimes share in the good, sometimes in the evil if and only if some tokens of the types benefit and others harm, not necessarily at different times e.g. aspirin is sometimes good and sometimes bad if you take an aspirin now and get better and I take one now and get worse.

On Plato's treatment of types and tokens see Irwin (2). When Socrates says that these things 'share in the good' he avoids saying that they *are* good presumably they share in the good only in so far as they are means to it. He assumes that the only really good things are goods as ends in themselves. But he has not justified this restriction on 'good'. See 468bc.

Socrates assumes that when intermediate things are neither good nor bad they are indifferent. He assumes that the only description under which something is an object of pursuit is 'good'; but this has not been shown. Why can something not lie outside, rather than between, good and bad and be an object of pursuit because it is pleasant, interesting, intriguing, irresistible, etc? Socrates may reply that these are all various ways of being good. He might mean by this (a) whatever is desired is thereby believed to be good; (b) some further feature beside being desired is needed for something to be good, and whatever is desired is believed to have that further feature.

468ab rules out (a); For Socrates thinks that what is better than something else must better promote some over-all good, the agent's welfare. He must accept (b), and claim that whenever I want something I want it because I believe it promotes my welfare. This is indeed the assumption of the Socratic Paradox (468ab).

'wisdom, health, and wealth'. Socrates perhaps refers again to the drinking-song quoted in 451e the reference to wisdom is his significant addition to the list of goods.

468a 'share in the good'. The term 'share', *metechein*, is used in

later dialogues to refer to the relation between particular good, just, etc. things and the Form of Good, Just, etc. The technical use grows naturally from contexts like this one; but no technical, metaphysical use is implied here. Cf. 497e, note.

468ab Socrates describes the object of preference and wanting in three ways:

- (a) It is *a* good.
- (b) It is *the* good.
- (c) It is better.

Together (b) and (c) probably explain what 'the good' is supposed to be. For Socrates believes

- (d) When I choose *x* over *y*, I believe that *x* contributes more than *y* to my over-all good.

Now (d) does not follow from (a). We might say, following (a), that if I desire *x* I regard it as good to some extent; but (d) does not follow. For I might regard *x* as some good, a good to some extent, and choose *x*, but still believe that *y* is better than *x* (e.g. I might have some strong desire for food when I am very hungry or for revenge when I am very angry, which makes me choose it against my better judgement). Socrates implicitly denies this possibility; here as in 466e he takes '*x* is good' to imply '*x* is better than the other options' or '*x* contributes more to over-all good'.

In accepting (d) and claiming that I always do what I think is better than anything else, that I do not act against my belief about what is better, Socrates asserts a 'Socratic Paradox', the denial of incontinence (weakness of will, lack of self-control, *akrasia*; cf. At. *EN* 1145b8-29). I am normally supposed to act incontinently, on an incontinent desire, if, e.g., I believe I would be better off without another drink now (I would drive safely, stay polite, be clear-headed tomorrow), but still my desire for the drink is too strong, and I drink. Socrates' acceptance of (d) rules out this description of my action, at the time I act I must believe that it is better to drink, or be unaware of the badness of its results. Socrates does not argue here for his implicit rejection of incontinence; but it is central for his claim that knowledge is sufficient for virtue (460b; Intr. § 5). He argues for his claim at *Pr.* 353c ff. (probably earlier than the *G.*) and at *M.* 77b-78b (probably later than the *G.*). It is less clear that he can consistently maintain this position throughout the *G.*; see 491d, 493a. On the Socratic Paradox see Vlastos (12), Penner (1), Allen (3), O'Brien, chs. 3-4, Gulley (1), and (2), ch. 2, Nakhnikian (2), Gosling (2), ch. 2, Santas (2), Bambrough (2), Walsh. A recent discussion exposing some of Socrates' assumptions is Davidson. (Calogero implausibly attributes the Paradox to Gorgias himself.) See 479b, note.

What does Socrates mean by 'the same thing, the good'? If 'the good' is 'the over-all good', related to 'the better' in the way suggested above, he is saying that in any choice we pursue what we think best over-all at that time. This does not imply that there is a single good or set of goods constituting the over-all good which we pursue at all times. But this further claim is defended at *Lys.* 219c-220b; see Irwin, 51-3. The *G.* soon shows that Socrates accepts it here too, believing that all someone's actions aim at his own happiness.

468b 'thinking it is better for us if we do it'. This is a new move, to suppose that I aim not only at what I think good, but always at what I think good *for me*; but Socrates introduces the 'for me' casually, as though he had been assuming it all along. *M.* 77d makes the same move, assuming that what I reject as bad I reject as bad *for me*. The egoistic reference is perhaps meant to support the previous claims, especially the implicit rejection of incontinence. It is perhaps more plausible to think I will never do what I think is bad for me than to think I will never do what I think is bad in some more general way; cf. *M.* 78a. At *Eud.* 278e-279a Socrates assumes that we all want to be 'well off' (or 'fare well', *eu prattein*) or 'be happy' (*eudaimonein*, 280b). He does not say there that we choose everything else for the sake of our happiness; but he suggests no other reason in the *Eud.* or anywhere else, and the arguments against incontinence imply that this is our only reason. 'Welfare' or 'happiness' is not precise. It need not be identified with pleasure or feelings of satisfaction or contentment. Nor need it exclude concern for benefiting other people; it is not clear that concentration on my own happiness, in the sense involved here, rules out altruistic concern for others, which at first sight might seem to be an obvious counter-example to Socrates' claims. See further Prichard (1), (2), Mabbott (1), J. L. Austin, Von Wright, ch. 5. Socrates' doctrine here is a form of psychological egoism, claiming that people do in fact pursue what they believe to be their own good all the time; it is 'not in human nature' to act differently. *Pr.* 358cd. On psychological egoism see Broad, Feinberg (1), Irwin. 53f. On happiness see 470e, 492c, 494ab,d, 507c, notes.

468bc Socrates states his position in significantly different ways:

- (1) Whenever we do  $x$  for the sake of  $y$ , we don't want  $x$ , but  $y$ , 467d6-e1, 468b8-c1.
- (2) If we want  $x$  and  $x$  is not identical to the good, we want  $x$  for the sake of the good, as something beneficial, *ophelimon* \*, 468c3.
- (3) We want good things, not bad things or intermediate things, 468c5.

Here (3) is ambiguous between (1) and (2), depending on whether

we take 'good' means 'good as means or as end' or 'good as an end'. But (1) and (2) are inconsistent, leading Socrates to inconsistent descriptions of intermediate things. At 468a he says they sometimes share in the good and when we do them, we do them for the sake of something else; it follows, by (1), that we do not want them; and at 468c5-7 he reaffirms that we don't want intermediate things, but only good things this excludes our wanting intermediate things on the occasions when they share in the good. On the other hand, at 468c he says that we don't want an intermediate thing 'just like that' or 'without qualification', *haplos* \**houtos*\*, but we do want it on the occasions when it shares in the good, when it is beneficial, as in (2).

Socrates should choose (2) over (1). He sees that when the act-token of running satisfies the description of 'running to win the race' it is quite intelligibly something we want to do. He is right to say that to explain why I want to do something I need to refer ultimately to something I want for itself. But it does not follow that, as (1) suggests, this end is the only thing I want, that, in other words, the only thing I want is what I want for its own sake. Perhaps Socrates is led into (1) by (3) plus the belief that the only real good is what is good as an end since that is the only unqualified over-all good; even if something is an absolutely reliable means to some end, it is not always good, since it will not be beneficial when I have already achieved the end. But (3) is true only if 'good' includes both means and ends. Cf. 467cd.

468d Socrates' question, 'Does *A* do what he wants?', is misleading, since he seems to suggest that it must have a yes-or-no answer, when in fact the answer may be yes when the action is considered under one description the agent believed true of it, and no when it is considered under another description.

Socrates uses his conclusion to defend his previous claim that rhetors and tyrants have no power. He relies on the account of power in *HMi*. 366bc; *A* has the power to do *x* if and only if when *A* wants to do *x*, *A* does *x*. Socrates argues that if *A* wants what is good for him, but does *x*, which is not good for him, he does not want to do *x*, and therefore has no power, and does not do what he wants to do, even though he does *x*. This argument fails because of Socrates' previous unclarity in 468bc about wanting under a description. He unwarrantably assumes that *A* does or doesn't exercise power without qualification in doing *x*, whereas we should ask *which* power is exercised. If *A* wants to do something good for him, and *x* is not good for him, then his doing *x* does not display power to get what is good for him. But it does not follow that in doing *x*, *A* displays no power. For if he does want to do *x*, even because of a

false belief about the good results of  $x$ , and does  $x$ , then he does display his power *to do*  $x$ . And so Socrates' conclusion that someone who fails to do what is good for him thereby shows that he has no power is unjustified; Polus is still free to maintain that the rhetor or tyrant is powerful. But Socrates has shown that if I do not have correct beliefs about what is good for me. I lack the power to achieve my own good, which I want above all, and so I lack that power which is an unqualified good promoting my over-all welfare see 466a. And that is enough to undermine Polus' main claim. If the tyrant or rhetor lacks the power to do what is good for him, that is a serious lack. We might still say that his other great powers are goods to some extent for him; but they are not enough for his overall welfare. If Polus agrees to this, he will seriously weaken his earlier defence of the rhetor. Though Socrates' actual conclusion is unjustifiably strong, a weaker conclusion is all he needs for his main point as we often find in the dialogue.

468e 'according to your agreement'. Cf. 471d, 479c, Intr. § 8. Polus' admission that power is a good is supposed to have forced him to draw the conclusion conflicting with his other views. In fact Socrates has offered no argument for some of the most disputable assumptions used in reaching this conclusion:

- (1) In Polus' claim 'good' means 'good on the whole', not just 'good to some extent' (466e).
- (2) No one acts incontinently, or against his own believed interest in any other way.
- (3) If I don't do what is good for me, I don't do what I want to at all.

Polus has not challenged these assumptions. He apparently could withdraw his agreement to them without any further inconsistency in his position. If he had argued that rhetoric is only good to some extent, or that the rhetor and the tyrant have incontinent desires and satisfy them, or that they do something they want to even though they do not secure the good they want, his position would be consistent. But in this case the policy of the rhetor and the tyrant would lose much of its attraction, and Gorgias' and Polus' fervent praise would turn out to be unjustified. Socrates' arguments raise a legitimate question about Polus' case, though not by wholly legitimate methods.

Polus' reply to Socrates is fair (contrast Dodds). For even if Socrates has proved that I am not well off being a tyrant or rhetor if I do not know what is good for me, he has not proved that the tyrant or rhetor does not know what is good for him, or that I would not become a tyrant or rhetor if I knew what was good for me. And Polus replies that since we would all envy the holder of absolute power and would choose to be like him, it is clear that

someone with this power is better off than someone without it (granting, despite Socrates, that what he has is properly called 'power'). When Socrates asks whether the holder exercises his power justly or unjustly, Polus does not see the relevance of the question. We are not asking whether we would approve of someone with power as a just man, but whether we would envy him as someone who is well off, who has achieved his own good.

'You wouldn't choose' (*dechesthai*); cf. 474b, 475d. Since the Socratic Paradox has been accepted at 468ab, this claim about choice requires us to see whether someone is better off by his choice. 'Liberty' (or 'power', 'opportunity', from *exeinai*, 'to be possible') is the discretion of a ruler to do what he likes with other people, fulfilling one of the conditions of freedom; see 452d, 461d, 466bc, 486c, notes.

In saying that we would 'envy' the powerful man Polus follows a traditional pattern of Greek moral thought since Homer, which admires the rich, strong, and powerful as fortunate and successful people, and regards a man's virtues or excellences, *aretai*, as those qualities which promote this kind of result; see 466bc, Adkins (3), chs. 3, 8. This pattern of thought is not purely Greek; see 466bc (on Adam Smith). Polus does not explicitly endorse this whole line of thought. He does not say or deny that the powerful man is 'good'. *agathos*, or has virtue, *arete* \*; the discussion of 'agathon' and 'kakon' at 474c ff. is concerned with their application to actions, not to people. Polus might be willing to condemn the powerful man for his injustice, but he cannot refrain from admiring and envying him as happy, *eudaimon* \*. It follows that he separates the recognized virtues, including justice and, probably, temperance, *sophrosune* \*, from the conditions of *eudaimonia*; here he agrees with the ordinary people criticized in *R.* ii, esp. 364a. Socrates and Plato believe this is the cardinal error about virtue and happiness; it is avoided by Callicles, 492c, and Thrasymachus, *R.* 348c-349a, in their different ways which take them some distance from ordinary views about what is virtuous. We might not think this 'cardinal error' is such an obvious error at all; see 459d, note.

469b When Socrates says that doing injustice is the greatest 'evil', *kakon*, 'evil' means something like 'harm' and in particular 'harm to the agent'. This is clear when (a) Socrates is supporting his claim that the man who does injustice is to be pitied because he does not achieve his own benefit; (b) Polus at once replies that suffering injustice is 'more evil' than doing it, and clearly means that it is worse for the sufferer than doing injustice is for the doer.

'Doing injustice' and 'suffering injustice' (or 'doing (suffering)')

unjust actions', *adikein* and *adikeisthai*) refer to actions, not necessarily to someone's *being* just or unjust; the difference becomes important later; 472d, 477b, 478e, 522e.

469c 'want ... elect'. Socrates relies on claim (1) in 468bc, cf. 467cd, *SVF* iii.131, Rist, 12.

470b 'what definition (*horos*) you define'. '*Horos*' is rather less specialized than 'definition'. It originally means 'boundary' or 'boundary-marker', and so includes 'standard' 'rule' as well as 'definition'. Socrates is asking Polus how he distinguishes the cases where it is better not to act like a tyrant from the cases where it is not better, and demands some statement of the grounds for the distinction. Robinson (2), 54f., offers no convincing examples of Socrates' seeking a mere distinguishing mark rather than a definition when he seeks a *horos*; see 448e, 475a.

470de 'Happy' (or 'well off', *eudaimon* \*); cf. 468b. On the 'Great King', the king of Persia, see *Ap.* 40d, *Eud.* 274a, *Ar. SE* 173a26. Polus refers to Archelaus as a particularly striking figure well known in Athens because of his close relations with the city; see Dodds, and Meiggs and Lewis, no. 91. But Socrates had apparently refused invitations from Archelaus which others, including Euripides, had accepted; *Ar. Rhet.* 1398a24.

Earlier Greek writers try to show that unjust men will come to a bad end; like the Psalmists, they say that the unjust will be punished in this life or after death, or that their descendants will pay for their injustice; see e.g. Solon 1.9-32 (Diehl), Adkins (3), 65-70. However, not all of Socrates' contemporaries need have agreed with Hesiod, *Op.* 220, that there is no reason to be just unless we benefit by it. Some might agree with Polus' view that someone might benefit by being unjust, and still say that it is worth while to be just. Socrates ignores this possible response, without giving any good reasons. On Archelaus and the Persian king see 524e, 525d.

470e6 'how he is off (or 'what his condition is') for education, *paideia*, and justice, *dikaiosune*\*'. Socrates does not explain what he means by 'education' see 487c. Presumably it is training of the kind proposed at *La.* 185de, to develop the virtues, including justice, in someone. *Paideia* is the normal term for the moral education and 'good upbringing' of a citizen, such as Protagoras described in *Pr.* 323c ff. There Socrates' arguments implied a criticism of the standard view. Here, though he uses the standard term, he presumably has in

mind reasoned inquiry and knowledge, rather than merely habitual right action, as the proper result of *paideia*, cf. 510b, 527e.

Socrates is not eccentric in believing that a man's virtues contribute to his happiness, to his living his life successfully. Many interlocutors in the dialogues agree with him in taking this for granted; cf. *M.* 87e-88d, *Ch.* 174de, *Eud.* 279b. But many of his contemporaries combine this belief inconsistently with the belief that justice is a virtue which does not always contribute to the agent's happiness; at *Pr.* 327b Protagoras says that someone's justice benefits other people, not that it benefits the agent himself. A natural resolution of the conflict would be to say that virtues include, in Hume's terms, qualities useful or agreeable either to others or to the agent himself; cf. Hume, ix, Pt. 1. But Socrates is not content with this simple recognition of different grounds for calling something a virtue. He still wants to prove that they all benefit the agent. Hume also wants to prove this; see ix. Pt. 2.

470e8 'Is the whole of happiness in that?' (*en touto'i' \* he\* pasa eudaimonia estin*). 'In' is ambiguous, and makes Polus' question hard to understand. We might translate it by 'consisting in' (Cope and others; cf. Cicero, *TD* 5.35; *tu in ea sitam vitam beatam putas?*), suggesting that justice and education are the whole of happiness. Socrates' argument so far shows only that they are necessary for happiness; and if 'in' is taken to mean 'dependent on' (cf. Woodhead, Hamilton), that is what Polus is asking. Again Polus is not saying that justice is not worth while, but only that it is not worth while for my happiness. The egoistic assumption that this is the only way a character-trait or pattern of action can be worth while is Socrates' assumption, not Polus'.

The terms 'fine and good', and the corresponding quality, *kalokagathia*, naturally interest Socrates in the *G.*, since he is concerned with the relations between the fine and the good. A 'fine and good' man has the best and finest qualities, whatever they may be; but different people's views of what these qualities are affect the intended reference of the terms. For examples see Ste Croix, 371-6, and good criticisms by Dover, 41-5. Often the fine and good man is the gentleman whose fine and good qualities or virtues (*aretai*; 457c) consist in his good breeding, wealth, and accomplishments, as well as in more familiar virtues such as courage and justice. This conception of 'personal merit' is not purely Greek; it would not seem strange to Hume (see above). Naturally, the upper classes who think they have all these qualities, and those who agree with their view of themselves, use 'fine and good' for an aristocrat, and the term can sound like a 'party label'. This does not necessarily pick out a separate

*sense* of the term; those who call an aristocrat 'fine and good' would also as far as we can tell mean to imply that his aristocratic qualities are fine and good. The term is also used to refer to someone with virtues more accessible to everyone. The 'base'. *poneros* \*, man is the opposite of the fine and good man in all these contexts (cf. Isoc. 15.316 f., Aristoph. *Eq.* 186). See 464d7-e1, 499e. 526e.

Socrates rejects the special claims of aristocratic qualities to make someone fine and good. The term would naturally suggest the 'manly' qualities of the gentleman; but here he applies it to women as well he elsewhere argues, against Meno, that the virtuous condition is the same for men and women, *M.* 71e-73c. Later in the dialogue he develops his own conception of the central elements of being fine and good, 484d, 503c, 511b, 516e, 526a; cf. *Ap.* 20b. Already it is clear that justice is central and pre-eminent in being fine and good. It is not clear whether Socrates means to say it is the whole of being fine and good whether the three terms 'good', 'fine', and 'just' are meant to pick out three conditions of a person, or only one. We might try to decide by seeing which view would be a more suitable answer to Polus' question. Unfortunately the question was ambiguous on the crucial point. If 'in' meant 'dependent on', Socrates need only show that justice is necessary for being fine and good, and therefore necessary for happiness. If 'in' meant 'consisting in', Socrates must show that justice is the whole of being fine and good, and therefore sufficient for being happy. These obscurities also make it hard to say whether Socrates claims that justice is sufficient for happiness; he commits himself more clearly at 507c.

On happiness cf. 468b, 491e. Does Socrates mean justice to be instrumental to, or partly constitutive of, happiness? See 507c-e, note.

471b 'he became utterly wretched without noticing it, and didn't regret it'. Polus perhaps implies that if someone is unhappy he should suffer pains and regrets all the time. Socrates' conception of happiness and wretchedness does not involve any subjective test of this kind. We might agree with Socrates this far, and still insist that some pleasure is a necessary element of happiness; see J. Austin. It is not clear if Socrates agrees.

Isocrates dismisses Socrates' claim as a mere philosopher's paradox, offered by 'a few of those who make themselves out to be wise', which all sensible men would reject, 12. 117-8. He repeats Polus' reaction here.

471d Socrates recalls his reference to education, *paideia*, in 470e, saying that Polus is well educated in rhetoric, but not in what matters,

and especially not in the methods of 'dialogue' or 'discussion', *dialektike* \*; see 448c, Intr. § 8.

471e-472b The *elenchos* requires refutation of the individual interlocutor; 473de, 475e-476a. On 'refute', *elenchein*, see 473b.

472ab Socrates does not suggest that these eminent men are all flagrant examples of injustice. But presumably the emphasis on their wealth, power, and status is meant to imply that these were what they supposed to be means to happiness, or components of it; and that conception of happiness seems to make justice unnecessary for it; cf. *R.* 363e-365a. On the aims of Athenian politicians see 502e-503d, 517b.

Socrates' remarks expose one of the apparent paradoxes of the dialectical method. He recognizes that his view conflicts with common sense and recognized authority (cf. *Cri.* 49d; for the views of most people see Isocrates, quoted on 471b above). But he thinks he can convince any interlocutor who holds common moral beliefs that they imply the Socratic position; cf. 508e-509a. On 'the many' cf. 464de, 521e.

472c Socrates stresses the importance of the question being discussed; cf. 487e, 492d, 500c, *R.* 352d, 578c, *La.* 188a. Examination of these questions leading to knowledge about them is a common benefit for everyone, *Ch.* 167e, *Ap.* 36cd, 38a; and it is a benefit for each man because it shows him how to live for his own good and welfare, *Eud.* 278e-282d. Knowledge about this is finest of all and ignorance most shameful of all (487b, 527d, *Alc.* 118ab) because someone who wants to plan his life rationally for his own benefit can be expected to be concerned with this kind of knowledge.

472d Socrates' question about Archelaus shows that he is asking Polus both whether it is good for someone to be unjust and whether it is good for him to do injustice. The same arguments will not necessarily decide both questions; see 469b, 478e, 522e.

472d2 'blessed' (*makarios*) ... 'happy' (*eudaimon*), used with no clearly different sense here.

472de 'meets justice ... pays justice' (*didonai diken*\*). These phrases are standardly used for 'punishment' or 'paying the (just) penalty', as we use 'brought to justice' in English. Though the term translated 'justice' is *dike*\*, not *dikaiosune*\* (standard in Classical Greek), the

translation 'justice' is most suitable for Socrates' line of argument. On 'vengeance' see 525b1, note.

473b Socrates speaks as though Polus had said that unpunished injustice is sufficient for happiness. But Polus has said only that it is sometimes necessary to achieve the goods wealth, power, etc. which promote happiness. Presumably someone might do injustice without punishment, but do such tiny and ill-judged injustices that he does not achieve happiness by them. To show that injustice is never necessary for happiness Socrates must either (a) describe the constituents of happiness and show that they can always be secured without injustice, or, best of all, that they preclude injustice; or (b) show that doing injustice is so bad for me that no benefits could compensate for the harm caused by injustice. Socrates tries (b) with Polus and Callicles; see 478e. 507c.

473b10 Why does Socrates say 'What's true is never refuted'? The term translated by 'refute', *elenchein* (noun *elenchos*) covers different things (see 457e-458a):

- (1) cross-examination, as carried on in a Socratic inquiry;
- (2) completion of this examination, inducing the interlocutor to reject his initial claim;
- (3) correct completion of the examination, inducing in the interlocutor the correct belief that his initial claim should be rejected. Socrates has no separate term for (2) and (3). This is not surprising, when his method of inquiry makes it hard to tell them apart. It is sometimes hard to decide whether the interlocutor's defeat shows a genuine flaw in his position, or only a mistake in his defence of it, or failure to detect an illegitimate Socratic move.

In saying that what is true never suffers *elenchein*, Socrates may intend the formal point, relying on (3), that what undergoes *elenchein* is always false; *elenchein* will have to mean 'refute' you cannot refute what is true, just as you cannot know what is false. But he may be claiming something about the actual fortunes of true belief in dialectical argument, claiming that no case of (2) will ever be illegitimate i.e. that it will never induce an interlocutor to give up a true belief. If this is what he means, Socrates is being rather optimistic. Perhaps the optimism looks reasonable because he fails to distinguish (2) and (3). Perhaps he means that the proper use of the *elenchos* will elicit true beliefs from the interlocutor; but its infallibility can hardly be guaranteed, as Socrates seems to realize elsewhere (509a, *Cri.* 46bc; but cf. 487e). Perhaps, then, he just means the formal claim.

473c 'doing whatever he wants to' (*bouletai*). Polus assumes that the tyrant does what he wants to, forgetting his previous agreement with Socrates on the correct use of 'want', 468bc.

473de Socrates replies that Polus, like Crito in *Cri.* 46c, is trying to frighten him with a bogey-man, appealing to public opinion against the truth of the Socratic view. Socrates admits, indeed insists, that his beliefs are not those of the many, *Cri.* 49d. See 471e-472b.

473e Polus' attempt to ridicule Socrates' reply apparently follows standard practice, at least, this was one way Gorgias advised his pupils to make the opponent look foolish, *Ar. Rhet.* 1419b3-6.

'I'm not one of the politicians'. Socrates says he is not one of those who know about public business and participate actively in it. There were no professional politicians in Athens in the sense that modern states have salaried legislators and cabinet ministers, the ordinary citizen sat in the sovereign Assembly, and also in the Council (see *OCD*, S.V. *Boule* \*), on its committees (as Socrates did in the incident mentioned here), and in many other administrative and executive bodies. But there were semi-professionals, *hoi politikoi* or *hoi politeuomenoi* (see Demosth. 3.30-1, Jones, 130), who often spoke in public, sought public office, and generally led and formed public opinion. The growth of rhetorical training and the importance of persuasive public speaking meant that many politicians would have good reason to become rhetors. Socrates says he is not one of these active public figures. He has already introduced 'political knowledge' or 'politics' (*politike*\*, 464b) as the craft concerned with care for the soul. He does not concede here that those normally called *politikoi* are real craftsmen in *politike*\*. See 500c, 515c, 521d.

474a Socrates refers to his attempt to obstruct the illegal (in his view) procedure for the mass trial of the negligent generals after the battle of Arginusae, see Ehrenberg (1), 328. The *prytaneis* were a standing committee of the Council (see *OCD*, S.V. *Prytaneis*); and in the *prytaneis* Socrates opposed the motion for a mass trial. *Ap.* 32b *Xen. Hell.* 1.7.15, describe his role differently.

474ab 'Refutation' and 'examination' both translate *elenchos*; see 473b. In 473e 'refutation' is suitable; but in 474b Socrates does not explicitly ask Polus to undergo refutation, but only to give Socrates a chance to refute him, by undergoing examination.

474b 'Would you choose to suffer injustice rather than do it?' The argument is concerned with choice and action, and therefore it is

covered, though Socrates does not say so, by the Socratic Paradox. See 468e. 475d.

474c Polus agrees with Socrates that doing injustice is more 'shameful' (*aischron*, opposite of *kalon*; also, e.g. in 477a, 514b, 'ugly') than suffering it, while suffering it is 'worse' (or 'more harmful'. *kakon*, opposite of *agathon*) than doing it. The term '*kalon*' 'fine', 'admirable', 'noble', 'honourable', 'beautiful' in suitable contexts is applied to what is supposed admirable from some point of view. A face or body can be *kalon*, i.e. beautiful in appearance, but earth can also be *kalon* for growing things, shoes *kalon* for walking in, etc., even though they are not beautiful to look at. Socrates draws attention to this wide range of '*kalon*' in a paradoxical way at Xen. *Mem.* 3.8.4-7, 4.6.9-11; see also Dover, 69-73. It is doubtful whether we should speak of different *senses* of '*kalon*', especially of a 'moral sense' of the term. It is hard to say that the Greeks were aware of using it in different senses, as we might be aware of using 'bank' in different senses for a riverside and a finance house; a statue and a brave action might both be *kalon*, though different properties would make them *kalon*. It is even harder to pick out a 'moral sense' of the term, it is not easy to pick out specifically moral terms in Plato anyhow (see 459d, 462e, 463d, 470e). There is no reason to believe that the use of '*kalon*' for what we call moral properties indicates that the Greeks have a particularly 'aesthetic' attitude to morality, as the translation 'beautiful' might suggest. *Kalon* covers what is admirable from the aesthetic, the agricultural, the industrial, the prudential, and the moral point of view, and there is no reason to think any point of view primarily determines the sense or associations of the term.

Polus agrees that justice is more *kalon* than injustice, while injustice is more *agathon*, and therefore more beneficial. *ophelimon* \*, to the agent. Here, as before, 'good' and 'bad' refer to the agent's good and harm (468b, 469b, 469d-470a). It is natural to ask of something good 'good for whom?', while *kalon* is not linked so obviously with someone's benefit. Polus' claim that justice may be fine, and therefore have something to be said for it, even though it does not always benefit the agent, shows that his praise of the tyrant need not imply rejection of justice or complete refusal to be guided by it; it will imply that only to someone who cares only about his own interest, and Polus has taken no position on that question. The distinction is neither immoral nor unusual; cf. *Alc.* 115a-116d, Ar. *EE* 1214a1-8. Adkins (3), 266, says, 'Polus clearly wishes to advocate injustice'. But this is not so clear:

(1) Polus claims only that no one would choose to suffer rather

than to do injustice. He may simply be reporting what he thinks people would do, as a matter of psychological fact; he does not explicitly recommend or advocate doing what people would do. We might say that everyone will fight to keep his own job when it is threatened, no matter who gets hurt; we could say this and still regret it.

(2) Neither Polus nor Socrates clearly distinguishes

(a) doing injustice as a general policy; and

(b) doing injustice when it is the only alternative to suffering it (cf. 469c).

A normal person who acts justly in normal conditions, even when he would gain by doing injustice, might make an exception under the especially severe threat of suffering injustice; he need not be looking out for every opportunity for doing injustice. If Polus accepts only (b), his view is much more morally conservative than if he accepts (a). His praise of Archelaus suggested (a); but here (b) is the main question at issue.

Over all, we might say that Polus' distinction between the fine and the beneficial is quite legitimate, and indeed even a central feature of morality, since he sees, or at least does not deny, that we may have reason to act morally even against our own interests. This is not Socrates' view; see 468b.

Someone who probably agrees with Polus that doing injustice is more shameful but more beneficial than suffering injustice is Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*; see 108-20, 1224-51. However, others would disagree with Polus and say it is far more shameful to betray weakness and vulnerability by suffering injustice than to give proof of strength and resourcefulness by doing it; cf. 483ab, *R.* 348e, *Cri.* 46a, Adkins (3), Chs. 8, 9. (In *Cri.* 45c, however, Crito also thinks he has justice on his side Adkins, 230-2, does not mention this.)

Socrates agrees with those who deny that an action can be fine without being good; *Ch.* 160e, *La.* 193de, *Pr.* 349e-350b, 351bc, 359e-360a, *Cri.* 48b, *Intr.* § 3, Irwin, 49.

Though Polus thinks doing injustice is better for the agent than suffering injustice is for the victim, he never claims that it is virtue, *arete* \*, to do injustice, and vice to suffer it, or that someone like Archelaus is a good, *agathos*, and virtuous man. Given the very broad range of '*arete* \*' and '*agathos*', it would not be surprising if Polus had made these claims that he avoids (cf. 457c). His avoidance of them perhaps suggests that he does not definitely intend to advocate injustice; or it may show that *arete* \* and *agathos* tend to be associated, unless further explanation is offered, especially with justice and related virtues. Cf. *arete* \* in Thuc. 5.105.4, *andragathizesthai*, 2.63.2,

3.40.4, Dover, 165, Adkins (5), 135-7. Callicles goes further than Polus, and transfers these terms to his own preferred way of life; he transfers 'just' with them; 482c.

474d Socrates' two conditions for being *kalon*, pleasure, *hedone* \*, and use, *chreia*, or benefit, *ophelia*\*, are explained by the wide range of '*kalon*'. 'Pleasure' is meant to explain how faces, buildings, etc. are *kalon* in themselves. 'Use' explains how shoes are *kalon* for walking. But it need not apply only to means to further ends. Plato often says that what is good is beneficial, *M.* 88e, *R.* 379b, and he asks whether justice is profitable, *R.* 367c, 392b. He may only be saying that anyone who has justice is better off than anyone who lacks it; it might be an intrinsic or an instrumental good. *R.* 354a even says that being happy is profitable, while being wretched is not; instrumental benefit is not relevant here, and happiness is clearly an intrinsic good. At the same time it is unwise to assume that Plato is clear in the *G.*, as he is at *R.* 357b-358a, about the different kinds of goods he includes under 'beneficial'; he may regard them all as instrumental. Nor is his position on hedonism clear. He makes pleasure *one* good in itself, he does not say whether it is the only one, since he does not say or deny that something is beneficial only in so far as it promotes pleasure. See 465a, 499de.

475a Polus accepts Socrates' way of 'defining', *horizein* (cf. 470b), the *kalon*, presumably because it sounds realistic and down-to-earth, referring to people's pleasure and advantage. Socrates' readiness to give this account of the fine might seem inconsistent with his normal profession of ignorance, his claim that he cannot answer his 'What is it?' question. But

(1) The vagueness of '*horizein*' makes it uncertain whether this is being offered as a definition, i.e. an answer to the 'What is it?' question. But the question about what we 'look to', *apoblepein*, in calling something fine, 474d, does suggest a definition, or at least some kind of standard. See 495a, 503de, *La.* 197e, *Pr.* 354e, *Eu.* 6e.

(2) 'Benefit' or 'good' is surely one of those terms which Socrates said was 'disputed', when he rejected an account offered by Gorgias, 451de; cf. 'Courage is knowledge of good and evil', *La.* 199c. Perhaps Socrates thinks an adequate answer to his demand for a definition requires the elimination of these disputed terms; see Irwin, 89. On these grounds he might say he cannot define the fine, and does not know what it is. See 507c, note, *Intr.* § 9.

'Distress' (*lupe*\*); or 'pain'. See 495e-496a. In 475c2 'more in pain' translates *algousin*, and 'painfully' in 476c5 *algeinos*\*. No difference in sense between *lupe*\* and *algein* is obvious here.

475c Socrates argues as follows:

- (1) Doing injustice is more beneficial than suffering it (Polus' claim).
- (2) Doing injustice is more shameful (less fine) than suffering it (Polus' claim).
- (3)  $x$  is finer than  $y$  if and only if either  $x$  is pleasanter than  $y$  or  $x$  is more beneficial than  $y$ .
- (4) Therefore doing injustice is either more painful or more evil (i.e. more harmful) than suffering it.
- (5)  $A$ 's doing injustice is not more painful for  $A$  than  $A$ 's suffering injustice is for  $A$ .
- (6) It is not the case that  $A$ 's doing injustice is more painful than  $A$ 's suffering it.
- (7) Therefore  $A$ 's doing injustice must be more evil than  $A$ 's suffering it.

Here (1), (3), and (4) are ambiguous. After 'pleasant' (painful) and 'good/beneficial' (evil/harmful) we might substitute either (a) 'for those concerned' (i.e. for those taken to be relevant in any particular case); or (b) 'for the subject' (i.e. for the person who does the action or is in the state mentioned by the verb). In (1) Polus presumably meant (1b) (i.e. (1) read as in (b)); for he claimed that it is more beneficial *for me* to do injustice than to suffer it. But (3) is less clear. Socrates' mention of onlookers enjoying visual beauty (474d) might mean (a) that anyone onlooker or not, truly judges that  $x$  is beautiful if  $x$  gives pleasure to someone (in this case, the onlooker); or (b) that any subject looking on a beautiful thing will judge it beautiful by reference to his own pleasure. This ambiguity in (3) is important. For (3a) is a far more plausible account of something's being fine or beautiful; (3b) implies that I cannot truly judge that something is fine except when it pleases or benefits me. However, (3b) is necessary for Socrates' argument.

Socrates says to Polus, 'Let's see if doing injustice exceeds suffering it in distress, and whether those who do injustice are more in pain than those who suffer it.' When Polus says no to these questions, he accepts (5) and (6). Now only (6b) follows from (5); and only (7b) follows From (3b), (4b) and (6b). With (3a), (4a), and (6a) Socrates has a more plausible account of what is fine, but at the price of an invalid argument. For (6a) does not follow from (5); perhaps other people suffer more pain when they think of  $A$ 's doing injustice to  $B$  than when they think of  $B$ 's suffering injustice. (Of course any case of someone's suffering injustice from someone else will also be a case of someone's doing injustice to someone else.) Socrates has either a valid argument with an implausible and undefended premise, (3b), or a more plausible premise, (3a), and an invalid argument. Failure to disambiguate (3), (4), and (6) can easily

make the premises seem plausible and the argument seem valid; and Socrates may well be sliding between the two readings of the ambiguous steps. See further Grote (2), ii.334, Vlastos (16), Guthrie (1), iv.311.

475d Socrates continues the argument from (7) above:

(8) No one would choose (*dechesthai*, cf. 474b) the more shameful and evil over the less shameful and evil.

(9) Therefore no one would choose doing injustice over suffering it.

What is the status of (8) in this argument? Further choices are open.

(A) Perhaps these steps are meant to be justified by the previous argument. And indeed (8) follows from (7b) plus the Socratic Paradox (see 468b). The reference in (8) to the more shameful is superfluous once (2) and (7b) are accepted. (7b) rather than (7a) is needed for (8); for the Socratic Paradox concerns only what is good for the agent, not what is good for all concerned. (7b) requires (3b). (4b), and (6b). Socrates has not shown how to justify (9) from the plausible (3a). But from the implausible (3b) a valid argument can be found as long as (9) is taken to mean

(9a) No one who accepts (2)-(7) would choose doing injustice over suffering it.

For Socrates does not seem to mean to deny that someone might choose to do injustice when he falsely believes that he is doing justice, or that someone might correctly believe he is doing injustice and still do it because he is ignorant of some or all of (2)-(7). He does not mean that the belief that something is unjust is by itself, apart from (2)-(7), enough to prevent someone from doing it.

(B) Alternatively, Polus may accept (8) without relying on (3)-(7), if he thinks that something's being fine is a reason for choosing it (cf. 474c). Then Socrates can argue as follows:

(10) Everyone chooses what he believes to be finer over what he believes to be less fine (Polus' reason for accepting (8)).

(11) Everyone chooses only what he believes to be better for him over what he believes to be worse for him (the Socratic Paradox).

(12) Therefore everyone believes that the finer thing is better for him than the less fine thing.

This argument shows that Polus cannot accept (10) and (11) consistently with his initial claims (1) and (2).

While interpretation (A) makes 'shameful' in (8) redundant. (B) makes 'evil' redundant. But (B) makes (3)-(7) irrelevant to the proof of (8), and therefore to the over-all argument against Polus. The presence of 'shameful and evil' in (8) may suggest that Socrates confusedly combines (A) and (B). If he relies on (B), he may fail to see the weaknesses in (A) arising from the ambiguities in (1)-(7).

Both (A) and (B) imply that Polus cannot both accept (1) and (2) and endorse the Socratic Paradox, accepted in (8) or in (11). Socrates expects him to resolve the conflict in his position by rejecting (1). But why should he not reject (2), rejected by Callicles at 482cd? Or why should he not challenge the Socratic Paradox, which has so far been accepted with neither challenge nor defence?

476a 'Paying justice (see 472de) and being punished (*kolazesthai*) justly'. *Kolazesthai* indicates not merely the infliction of harm in punishment, but also something about the effects the treatment 'curbs' or 'checks' or 'moderates'; cf. *sophronizein* \*, 478d, Hippoc. *Reg. Acut.* 59, Xen. *Oec.* 20.12. Socrates relies on this association of *kolazein* in claiming later that it removes the vice of being unchecked, immoderate, or intemperate (*akolastos*; 477de). See 478d, 491e, and Lodge, ad loc., 492c, 493a, 505bc, and Thompson (1), ad loc., Lodge on 472d.

476a-d Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1397a23-b11, notices counter-examples to this argument from correlatives. It works only when the property of the action belongs to it intrinsically and non-relationally, or implicitly refers to the 'thing affected' (or 'patient' *paschon*\*) and not to the agent. If I strike a sudden blow which you receive, you are struck a sudden blow; but if I inflict pain with difficulty, it does not follow that you suffer pain with difficulty, though it follows that you suffer something done with difficulty by me. Socrates does not mention difficult cases; he sticks to those cases where his principle looks plausible.

476d2-3 'as I was saying just now'. Socrates might refer to the generalization in 476b5, or (perhaps more probably) to his demand for agreement in 476a1. His next remark emphasizes agreement again.

477a 'The man who pays justice is affected by (or 'undergoes') good things ... Then he is benefited.' Socrates makes the same slide as in his previous argument. He is entitled to say that I undergo something good for someone; but he has not shown why the someone must be me. The Greek for 'is affected by good things', *agatha paschei*, helps Socrates, since it looks like the passive of *agatha poiein*, which normally means 'benefit' cf. English 'do good'. But if that is how Socrates means to speak of *agatha paschein*. Polus should deny that in this sense the man who is punished really 'has good done to him', *agatha paschein*. To defend his moves Socrates must appeal to the same line of argument as before, supposing that

Polus thinks something's being fine makes it worth choosing.

Socrates at once assumes that the benefit someone receives from punishment is some improvement in his condition, and, since his physical condition is not improved, his psychic condition must be. Perhaps he relies on the association of *kolazein* see 476a with making moderate or temperate. But he has not shown that the harm inflicted by the state must have this effect. Nor is Socrates justified in his very quick move from 'A becomes better off' (i.e. A is benefited) to 'A becomes better' (i.e. A is improved). Why am I benefited if and only if I am improved? We might say that having a good soul is having a virtuous soul which benefits other people, not necessarily me. Here the analogy with physical health (cf. 464b) might seem to break down; the good condition of the body may be judged by what is best for me, but the virtuous condition of my soul may be judged by other people's benefit. By inducing Polus to agree that justice is fine, and adding his assumption that what is fine and choiceworthy must be good for the agent, Socrates has so far avoided explicit discussion of how justice is supposed to be good for the agent. He has assumed that punishment makes me a better person by making me more just, and that it is good for me because it is just treatment and therefore fine. But he has not justified these claims.

Grote (2), ii. 363, challenges the analogy between justice and health more radically: 'Good health and strength of the body ... are states which every man knows when he has got them ... Every sick man derives from his own senses an anxiety to get well. But virtue is not a point thus fixed, undisputed, indubitable.' Grote here combines the claims: (a) everyone knows that he is well or sick when he is; (b) everyone believes that health is desirable. His claim (a) is false; but (b) is a more serious challenge. Socrates has not yet shown how justice is as obviously desirable as health, so that someone who knows what it is will want it. See 504e.

477b Polus concedes more than he needs to in saying that injustice is 'baseness' (or 'bad condition', *poneria* \*; see 470e, 474c) of the soul parallel to sickness, disease, and ugliness in the body. These bodily defects are bad for me. But it is not equally clear how injustice is bad for me; Polus has been driven to agree that somehow it *is* bad for me, but Socrates has not explained how.

Here Socrates begins to argue about the evil of *being* unjust, rather than the evil of *doing* injustice, which has been the main topic of discussion so far though at 470e he said that happiness depends on *being* just, not that it depends directly on doing just actions. Here he argues that since someone who does injustice is punished, and becomes more just, and being just is better for him than being

unjust, it is good for him to be punished for doing injustice. But the argument from the badness of being unjust to the badness of doing injustice is not easy; see 469b, 478e.

'injustice and stupidity, *amathia*, and cowardice and the like'. Socrates seems to be listing the vices corresponding to the recognized 'cardinal virtues'; cf. 507c, Pindar, *Isth.* 8.24-8, Aesch. *Sep.* 610, North, 25, 41, 72, Dover, 66-9. Courage and justice are mentioned here. The other two recognized cardinal virtues are temperance (or 'sound mind', *sophrosune*\*) and wisdom, *sophia* or *phronesis*\*. 'Stupidity' is clearly lack of wisdom; but Socrates may also intend it to be lack of *sophrosune*\*. *Sophrosune*\* standardly includes cognitive or affective conditions or both, so that it can be contrasted with stupidity or foolishness, *aphrosune*\*, and with intemperance, *akolasia*; see 477d, 507a. *Amathia* is recognized elsewhere as a defect in virtue; see Eur. *El.* 970, Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.5., and Dover, 122 f. on opposites to *sophrosune*\*. Sometimes, however, knowledge and *sophrosune*\* are dissociated, Thuc. 3.37.4, 1.84.3, Eur. *HF* 347, *Tro.* 982, Dover, 119. In mentioning stupidity alone as the opposite of both temperance and wisdom Socrates presupposes his view that knowledge is sufficient for virtue; see 460b, *Pr.* 357de.

477c After apparently mentioning three vices Socrates reduces them to one. He assumes his doctrine of the Unity of the Virtues see Intr. § 5 but with a difference. Earlier dialogues, *La.*, *Ch.*, *Pr.*, suggest that the basic virtue is knowledge of the good. Here Socrates does not deny, and indeed assumes, that knowledge is sufficient for virtue; but he also thinks there is some reason to present justice as the basic virtue. *Cri.* 47d-48b also compared justice with health, but did not explicitly identify justice with the whole of virtue. This identification has some precedent (cf. Ar. *EN* 1129b27-31), if someone's other-regarding virtues are taken to be supremely important (cf. Adkins (3), 78 f.). But so far Socrates has not shown why justice, rather than any other virtue, should be the basic virtue; see 507a-c. We might also be surprised to see courage associated so closely with justice and temperance. Even if courage is only knowledge, why could someone not have enough knowledge to be brave without having the knowledge needed for the other virtues? See 491b, 491e-492a, 522e.

477c-e In his argument to show that injustice is 'worse' than various physical defects, Socrates does not say who it is worse for. But his analogy between injustice and sickness, and his implicit identification of injustice with ignorance require him to assume, for the same

reasons as before, that injustice is bad for the unjust man himself.

477de Socrates mentions injustice, intemperance (*akolasia*), cowardice, and stupidity, and then injustice, intemperance 'and the rest'. Here temperance is one of the primary virtues (cf. 477b); but the argument is the same. Socrates is entitled to his carelessness only if the unity of virtue is assumed. It is suitable to mention *akolasia* in the context, when *kolazein* is being discussed; cf. 476a.

'Pain' and 'painful' translate cognates of *aniaron* in dl-3. 'It is more painful', d4-5, and 'since it doesn't exceed in pain', e1-2, represent cognates of *algein*. See 475a, 495e-496a.

478a Socrates now uses 'baseness' (depravity, defect; *poneria* \*; see 474c) to refer only to injustice and vice in the soul, after beginning with a more general application to both physical and psychic defects. He is assuming that our basis for calling these different things 'defects' or 'basenesses' is the same that they are bad for the man who has them. But we might challenge this claim about injustice.

Socrates then assumes that the point of punishment must be the improvement of the criminal's soul. The argument he could offer might be this:

- (1) It is finer for me to be punished than to be unpunished, if I have done injustice.
- (2) If it is finer, it is more choiceworthy for me.
- (3) If it is more choiceworthy for me, it is more beneficial to me.
- (4) The only possible benefit to me from my punishment is improvement of my soul by the removal of injustice from it.
- (5) Therefore punishment must benefit me by removing injustice from my soul.

Polus has accepted arguments which require acceptance of (2) and (3). But he could still deny (4); perhaps, e.g., punishment benefits me by removing other people's indignation against me. Perhaps Socrates relies on the suggestion of *'kolazein'* ('punish'; 476a) that it removes *akolasia*, which he identifies with injustice. But here he would be pressing ordinary language too far. Punishment might leave someone 'checked' or 'moderated' without having changed his desires and aims, the sorts of changes Socrates has in mind.

Socrates' claim about punishment is not clear.

- (1) Does he mean that punishment as practised in his own society, the infliction of harm on law-breakers, actually benefits the soul of the law-breaker if the punishment is just?
- (2) Or does he mean that just punishment would be that treatment of law-breakers which improves their souls?

(3) What makes a punishment just? Is it merely its tendency to improve the criminal, so that it is an analytic truth that just punishment improves the criminal?

(4) Or is the justice of a punishment decided by the gravity of the offence and the suitability of the punishment to the offence, and is Socrates claiming that punishment which is just by this standard also improves the criminal?

(5) Or is just punishment decided by some combination of these considerations, so that improvement of the criminal is necessary but not sufficient for just punishment?

Socrates' remarks do not help very much:

(a) He does not suggest he refers to some possible scheme of punishment different from the one he knows. He speaks as though he is defending the present system, not demanding reforms.

(b) On the other hand, he considers *just* punishment, not saying that the present system is just.

(c) He does not say what makes a punishment just.

(d) But he offers no criterion apart from the improvement of the criminal, and his only account of 'just' applied to actions is 'promoting justice in the soul'; cf. 478e.

(e) If Socrates is considering just, remedial systems of punishment, and the system in the present society is not just by this standard, then Polus has no good reason to accept punishment in present society if he can help it. Socrates does not mention this restriction on his conclusion. For more systematic discussion of punishment see *Laws* 859d-864c.

Arguments about punishment have been concerned with the relative weight of different considerations affecting who should be punished, for what, and by what penalties. Some views are these:

(1) Retributive. Punishment should be guided by retrospective criteria the intentional action of the criminal, his intentions. It should be a proper response to the seriousness of the crime. (The *lex talionis*, providing for supposed equal return in punishment, is one, but not the only, form of a retributive theory. Nor is revenge a necessary part of it.)

(2) Deterrent. Punishment should deter the criminal from repeating his action, and deter other people from doing the same.

(3) Preventive. Punishment should prevent the occurrence of socially harmful actions.

(4) Remedial. Punishment should improve and rehabilitate the criminal.

Hart, ch. 1, surveys different views about the function and justification of punishment. See also Benn in Edwards, S.V. 'Punishment'. Aspects of punishment overlooked or rejected by

Socrates here are stressed by Feinberg (3) and by Morris.

Socrates here seems to insist on (4) as the only test for punishment. Attention to (4) will fulfil (3) to some extent, but only imperfectly; why should the most effective preventive measures also be remedial? He seems to forget (1) and (2) entirely; cf. *Pr.* 324ab, C. C. W. Taylor, ad loc., below, 525b. But if Socrates relies on (4) he faces questions:

(a) Why should (4) always involve infliction of harm? We normally assume that punishment involves this. And Socrates agrees when he says that punishment is painful; it must be harmful to some extent, though not necessarily harmful over all. Perhaps (4) would be better achieved by rewarding the criminal; but would that be just punishment?

(b) Why should (4) be confined to those who have done injustice? Socrates takes for granted the normal view, that punishment is to be inflicted only on those who have intentionally committed a crime. He believes that no one is intentionally unjust, in the sense that no one is unjust because he wants to be, but only because he falsely believes that injustice is good for him (see 460b). But he still believes that people intentionally commit crimes, i.e. want to do actions they know to be against the law, because they think these actions are good for them. But why should remedial treatment be confined to criminals when many others could probably benefit from being made more just? Socrates might reply:

(i) All and only criminals benefit from the infliction of harm involved in punishment.

Why should this be? If it depends on the punishment's being *deserved* and therefore just, we must appeal to some retributive, not purely remedial, considerations to see how punishment is just.

(ii) There is no difference; what we call punishment is just one way of making people more just, the general function of the state; someone need not commit a crime to be eligible for this remedial treatment.

This is the view of the state's functions taken later in the *G.*, 505ab, and developed further in the *R.* But if we reject such sweeping powers of coercion, remedial functions cannot be our only guide in punishment; retributive considerations must guide at least our choice of who should be punished.

(c) Why should worse crimes meet heavier penalties? Socrates might say that worse crimes are evidence of worse injustice in the soul, and heavier punishment is needed to remove worse injustice. But why should we agree? Remedial, preventive, and deterrent goals might be achieved by heavy penalties for small crimes e.g. for careless driving. If we think there is something unjust in punishing careless

driving as heavily as murder, we seem to be relying on retrospective considerations.

In these various ways we might doubt whether Socrates has really found the sole and sufficient criterion of just punishment.

478b Why does Polus agree that the administration of justice is far finer than the other two crafts? Dodds suggests that he thinks of the rhetor's role in courts of justice; cf. 452e. Perhaps Socrates also still relies on Polus' conventional respect for justice as something fine.

478c 'Happiest, as far as his body is concerned'. 'Happiest' translates the superlative of *'eudaimon'* \*. This term can be used to refer to a bodily condition, since it refers to success, prosperity, flourishing, with no necessary reference (often suggested by 'happy') to a certain kind of feeling though it can belong only to beings with consciousness and desires (and perhaps more, as Aristotle claims, *EN* 1099b32-1100a5). See 468b, note.

478d 'makes people temperate'. The verb used here, *sophronizein* \*, often means 'bring to one's senses', hence 'discipline', 'punish', and someone who administers it is a *sophronistes* \* (cf. the American terms 'correctional officer' and 'correctional facility'). But Socrates relies on the derivation from *sophron* \* see 477b and infers that this 'correction' really corrects someone and makes him better off. He has also assumed that *kolazein* (check, restrain, hence punish) will make someone less *akolastos* (unrestrained, hence intemperate) and so more *sophron* \*; see 476a, 477de, 478ab.

'Then the man with no evil in his soul is happiest.' Socrates finally defends the claim at 477a that someone punished justly is benefited. Until now he has argued that punishment improves a man by making him just and temperate. Now he argues, by exploiting the analogy between justice and health, that justice is better for the agent, and that the criminal who is punished is 'happier' or 'better off' (see 478c) than the unpunished criminal.

478e '... lives worst (*kakista*)'. 'Worst' is used here, as 'bad' or 'evil' has been used throughout, for what is bad or harmful to the *agent*. 'Living badly' does not mean 'living unjustly etc.', but 'living disadvantageously', the opposite of living well or being happy. It is sometimes said that Plato equivocates on two senses of 'live well' or 'do well', *eu prattein*; (a) 'living virtuously', and (b) 'living happily'. See 507c, Shorey (3) 482, Grote (2), ii. 352n., *Ch.* 171e-172a, 173d, *Eud.* 281bc, *R.* 353d-354a, *Alc.* 116b, 134a. But in each passage Plato need intend no more than (b); he always argues or

assumes that an agent's virtue promotes his happiness, and need rely on no equivocation. Here as elsewhere (see 460b, 475de, 507ab), the fault in the argument is not that it is fallacious, but that it relies on premisses that seem inadequately defended.

'does the greatest injustices and exercises the greatest injustice'. Socrates seems to refer to someone who (a) does unjust actions, and (b) is unjust, has an unjust soul; cf. 469b, 477b. If everyone who does unjust action benefits from punishment, Socrates must claim that (b) follows from (a). It is hard to say if he is entitled to claim this, since he has not fully described the state of soul he calls 'being just'. But why could I not take care to have a generally just character, and yet gain the benefit from selected unjust actions, without making my soul unjust? See 504c, 509b, 519d, 522b,e, 524d, 525a.

On 'dynasts' see 492b.

479a 'faults' (or 'errors', *hamartemata* \*); cf. 525b. 'Fault' and 'excellence', *arete*\*, do not refer exclusively to moral actions and states of character; and so they can be used, with no shift in sense, for both bodily and psychic conditions.

479b 'Apparently he doesn't know what (*hoion*; cf. 448e) health and excellence, *arete*\*, of body are like.' In saying that health is (or is at least closely associated with, depending on how 'and' is understood here) bodily excellence or virtue, and that justice is the psychic analogue to health, Socrates claims that justice is the soul's virtue; he has been implying this all along in saying that injustice is analogous to disease.

On fear of medical treatment cf. 456b. What is someone ignorant of when he shrinks from the knife? Socrates might mean either of two things:

- (1) He does not know what being healthy is like (so Jowett, Hamilton), e.g. that it involves having purified blood, so that it requires whatever measures are required to purify the blood.
- (2) He does not know how good it is to be healthy (so Cope, Croiset), so that he does not realize that its benefits outweigh the evils involved in this painful treatment.

The parallel with punishment suggests (2) here. People are aware of the evil involved in punishment, when it is painful, but blind to the superior benefits of having a healthy soul. How is this ignorance to be removed? We might suggest to someone

- (a) that physical health is a good in itself, to be chosen apart from its consequences, though it may also be good because of its consequences;
- (b) that it enables us to do many other things we want to do, so

that it is an instrumental good.

For (a) cf. *R.* 357c; for (b) cf. *Lys.* 219c, Irwin, 184. Is (a) or (b) the right way here to argue that justice is an even greater good than physical health? Socrates' craft-analogy (see 460b) suggests that (b) would be the defence he should use. If learning justice is analogous to learning a craft, then being just should be parallel to having craft-knowledge, good for me because it allows me to get other things I already want; my having a craft does not alter my views about what is intrinsically good, but only my views about suitable means to acquire it. We would expect the same to be true of justice, since Socrates suggests that I will come to value justice as soon as I am told what it really is nothing is said about changing my view of what is intrinsically good.

This argument has apparently violated the Socratic principle of the priority of definition see 448e; Socrates has argued about the benefits of justice before saying clearly what justice is. But he has not violated his principle, since he has not been claiming knowledge, but only arguing from some beliefs about justice to other beliefs. However, the principle is relevant here; reasonable confidence in these conclusions might well require an account of what justice is; see 507c, *R.* 354a-e.

Socrates assumes that fear of medical treatment or of punishment reflects the belief that it is worse to be treated than to be unhealthy, that we are blind to the benefits of justice or health. This Socratic explanation of wrong choice (cf. esp. *Pr.* 356c-357b, 359c-360b) follows from the Socratic Paradox (see 468ab). That is why Socrates neglects possibilities that might seem natural e.g. that I fear punishment more than is rationally justified, just as I might avoid going to the dentist from a fear which I know is irrational. Here, however, the neglect does not harm the argument against Polus; to say that the tyrant or rhetor is moved by irrational desires and fears is not the defence Polus intended.

479c The fallibility of the *elenchos*; 468e, 471d, Intr. § 8.

479d-480b Socrates has still not explained the relation between being just and doing unjust actions, or shown how being unjust is undesirable; and so he has not fully justified his conclusion here about Archclaus and about the real value of rhetoric. But these faults do not undermine the whole argument against Polus. Polus has agreed, 471a, that Archelaus is unjust, and Socrates' argument shows how that makes him worse off, challenging Polus' unreflective assumption that the benefits gained by being unjust are large enough to make being unjust worth while over all. Polus has been

shown, from his own beliefs plus Socratic assumptions he did not contest, that he must agree that someone is worse off by being unjust. But we have noticed several ways for Polus to avoid Socrates' conclusion; see 475de.

479e 'it is fitting' (*prosekei* \*). *Prosekein*\* (see 456c, n.) might mean here (a) it is to be expected and not surprising that it *does* happen; (b) it ought to happen even if it does not. The context suggests that Socrates means (a) here; he thinks not merely that the unjust man deserves to be unhappy, but that he is inevitably unhappy.

480a 'go voluntarily'. Here acting voluntarily (*hekon*\*), by one's own choice, is contrasted with being taken by force to be punished. Elsewhere, at 488a3, 499c3, 509e6, acting voluntarily is contrasted with acting because of ignorance; here 'intentionally' would be an apt translation. Aristotle discusses force and ignorance as two conditions excluding voluntary action, *EN* iii. 1.

480b For 'remain firm' see *Cri.* 48b, *Eu.* 11b-d.

'or his native state' (or 'fatherland', *patris*, naturally mentioned here with other relations and friends). Socrates alludes to the different attitudes of the rhetor and of the 'real politician' to the faults of the state; cf. 473e-474a, 502e, *Ap.* 30c-31a; contrast perhaps *Cri.* 51a-c.

480e Socrates tells Polus it is not enough to find the conclusions absurd unless we can decide what to reject in the premisses from which they follow. He assumes that the conclusions do follow from the premisses. He notices the danger of false premisses, but neglects the possibility of fallacious inference.

'if we really should harm anyone'. The conditional (cf. *HMi.* 376b) shows that Socrates does not necessarily endorse this use of rhetoric to harm enemies. He normally insists that we should harm no one, *Cri.* 49b-d, *R.* 333b-336a.

481b Socrates does not mention the possible use of rhetoric for avoiding unjust condemnation. It would be less important in this case than it seems to those who think that suffering injustice is most harmful of all; but it would still be doing something useful for us. On the uses of rhetoric see 504de, 508de.

481bc Chaerephon answers Callicles with the advice Callicles earlier gave Chaerephon when he told him to ask Gorgias himself, 447c; the focus of attention is now Socrates.

Callicles realizes the importance of Socrates' claims. Instead of simply saying with Polus (480e) that they are absurd, he sees that if they are true, they imply radical criticisms of most people's beliefs and values; 'wouldn't the life of us men be upside down?' Callicles probably refers immediately to the paradoxical conclusions of 480e-481b. But in general he also sees that if Socrates is right, most people spend more effort on supposed goods which benefit them less, and less effort on what will benefit them most (cf. *Ap.* 29d-30b). Probably Callicles means that Socrates' conclusions show that people's lives *are* upside down (Cope, Lodge, Jowett), not that his conclusions *will* turn their lives upside down (Croiset, Hamilton; other versions are ambiguous). Callicles' next words suggest the first view.

481d On Socrates' relations with Alcibiades, not further discussed here, see *Symp.* 215e-219d; cf. *Ch.* 155cd, Guthrie (1) iii. 390-8. Socrates puns on the names of Callicles' boy-friend, Demos, and the name of the Athenian people, the *demos* \*. Cleon and other popular leaders and rhetors are called lovers, *erastai*, and suitors of the sovereign *demos*\* in Aristoph. *Eq.* 732-40; cf. *Alc.* 132a, above 463c. Socrates emphasizes Callicles' readiness to follow the whims of the people, when Callicles is about to profess contempt for the masses and their conventional views; cf. 482bc. But his policy does not seem inconsistent; for flattery is his method to win power for himself. This defence raises the question whether the results power and its supposed benefits are worth while for the rhetor. The question discussed with Polus is reopened. See 503a, 513ac, Thuc, 6.89.3-6.

Socrates suggests that Callicles' two beloveds are really very similar, since they have rapidly changing views, and that Callicles tries to keep up with the whims of each. Socrates conspicuously does not suggest that he flatters the whims of Alcibiades; cf. *Symp.* 218b-219e. Plato implies that Socrates' values allow him the kind of integrity and self-respect in his attitude to others which Callicles can never achieve, despite his professed contempt for the masses. See 463a-c, 511b, 513c. And Socrates explicitly denies that philosophy is as capricious as the Athenian *demos*; cf. 508e-509a, *Cri.* 46bc.

The partly playful comparison here is a striking anticipation of Plato's later theory, when he suggests that someone's aim and ultimate attachment in his life is his 'love'; men are taken to be lovers of power, honour, or (if rightly directed) virtue and wisdom so that the best lover will be the philosopher, *Phd.* 66e. Plato traces someone's progress from love of persons to love of knowledge and

the Forms, *Symp.* 204d-206a, 210a-212a. Talk of 'love', *eros* \*, in these later dialogues is no mere metaphor; and Socrates' attitude in the *G.* suggests that it is no mere metaphor here either, though it is not supported by the theory found in later dialogues. See 513c.

482b7 'it is superior' (*kreitton*). 'It is better' would be more natural English; but '*kreitton*' becomes important in the following argument, which Plato perhaps anticipates here; see 488bc.

482bc Callicles' 'discord'; cf. 513cd.

482cd Callicles' speech is syntactically awkward and unclear at the beginning perhaps suggesting his haste and indignation (cf. 461bc). He accuses Socrates of acting like a 'mob-orator', or of 'playing to the gallery'; despite his objections to rhetoric he acts like a rhetor himself (cf. 519d), using popular prejudice rather than the truth to force his opponent into difficulties. Just as Polus offered a diagnosis of Gorgias' error, 461bc, Callicles now offers a diagnosis of Polus' error, as showing the same kind of conventional scruples as those which betrayed Gorgias (cf. 475d). This diagnosis is both right and wrong, just as Polus' was. Rejection of the view that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it would have been *sufficient* to block Socrates' argument, just as Gorgias could have blocked the argument in the way suggested by Polus. But once Gorgias or Polus made the concession criticized by Callicles, he could still have blocked the rest of the argument; see 475de.

The *G.* is one of the dialogues which criticize the methods and assumptions of the *elenchos*, cf. *Cleit.* 408d-410e, *M.* 79de. Here Callicles offers two related objections:

(1) He challenges the premisses of the previous argument. Socrates gave Crito a chance to do this, but Crito refused, *Cri.* 46b, 49ab, de. Polus (461d) and Callicles are less compliant.

(2) According to Callicles, Socrates depends on premisses conceded by the interlocutor; he simply relies on the interlocutor's, prejudices, or even on views which he does not really accept, but is too embarrassed to disavow; cf. 461bc, 487e.

Is this the most serious objection? Callicles remarks neither on the tacit acceptance of Socratic assumptions in the argument nor on the danger of fallacious inference; cf. 479c, 480b,e.

482e 'vulgarity and stock themes of mob-orators'. Socrates appeals to boring, commonplace moral clichés; cf. *R.* 442e, *Ar. EN* 1178b16.

'things which are not fine by nature (*phusis*), but only by rule' (or 'norm'; *nomos*). Callicles introduces the antithesis around which

he builds much of his case. *Nomos* is hard to translate by a single English word, and its complex behaviour is important for Callicles' argument. It tends to be correlated with *nomizein* (think, esteem, recognize; see 466b), and refers to anything that can be recognized, in the way that a rule is recognized; and so it includes customs, habits, rules, usual ways of behaving, conventions, laws, moral and social norms. The common feature seized on by Callicles is the way that *nomos* appears to owe its existence to human action and decision; it 'exists' only in so far as it is obeyed or recognized or enforced or accepted or observed, only when people agree among themselves, or act appropriately, or both. The problem is further complicated because *nomos* and its cognate adjective *nomimon* are sometimes applied not only to the recognized positive law or other forms of presently recognized law, and to what is 'legal', but also to what is 'lawful' or 'legitimate' in a more general way.

This variety of usage may lead to different conclusions:

- (1) The last use of *nomos* makes it plausible to identify justice with *nomos* observance; cf. *Minos* 314b-e, Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.12-25 for different arguments reflecting this view.
- (2) On the other hand, if we think of positive *nomos*, the laws in force or recognized at the time, and insist on the association between the lawful and the just, we will conclude with Protagoras that justice is what is prescribed by positive *nomos*; see *Th.* 167c, Vlastos (11), xii-xx.
- (3) If we think of *nomos* as positive law, and believe that the positive *nomoi* now in force are the result of the power of the present regime, we may infer that *nomos* as a whole is simply the expression of force exerted by the regime; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.40-6.

On *nomos* see esp. Ostwald (1), 20-40, Guthrie (1), iii.55-8; on *nomos* and *phusis* see Adkins (2), ch. 5, Sinclair, chs. 4-5, Barker (2), ch. 4, Field, 87-90.

When Callicles claims that Socrates appeals to what is fine by rule and not by nature, he means that it is only believed to be fine by those with conventional moral beliefs, and is not really fine. He is emphatically not a Protagorean relativist or subjectivist about morals or values. He never appeals to relativist or sceptical arguments about the variability of *nomoi* between societies, one standard way to draw the *nomos-phusis* contrast cf. Ar. *EN* 1134624-7, Gosling (2), 2-5. On the contrary, he claims that *nomoi* have a uniform effect, of keeping down the superior men. To show that we have no reason to obey the conventional rules of justice he must show that they are only thought to be just and fine, and are not really just and fine. This line of criticism requires an independent standard of what is just and fine and Callicles presents such a standard.

'Nature' or 'reality', *phusis*, is contrasted with *nomos*, often in two distinct ways:

(1) *Phusis* is how things are if human beings, especially human societies, do not act on them to change their behaviour; a river which 'by nature' flows into the sea may be dammed.

(2) *Phusis* is how things are apart from any human wishes or beliefs about them.

*Nomos* contrasts with *phusis* in two parallel ways:

(a) It is a human institution, which alters *phusis*.

(b) It reflects human beliefs with no basis in *phusis*, in the way things really are.

Democritus, DK 68 B 9, relies on this double contrast.

'For mostly these are opposed to each other, nature and rule ...' Here Callicles exploits the double contrast:

(a) *Nomos* alters *phusis* by making people sociable and non-aggressive instead of wild and aggressive.

(b) It is contrary to reality, *phusis*, and therefore always false, reflecting only what people believe and lay down.

Here (a) is plausible, and would be accepted by such defenders of *nomos* and non-aggression as Protagoras and the Anonymus Iamblichi (see DK 89 A 6.1-5, Guthrie (1) iii. 71-4, 314 f.). But (b) is more controversial. To justify (b) Callicles must show that the restraints of nature involved in (a) are a bad thing, so that they are not really just and fine, but only by rule. See 490a.

For different views on the opposition of *phusis* and *nomos* cf. *Pr.* 337d, *Laws* 889e-890a, Antiphon in DK 87 B 44A, 1.6-2.23 (this view is nearest to Callicles'; cf. Barker (2), 95-8, Guthrie (1), iii.107-13), Thuc, 3.45.3.

483a On Socrates' debating device cf. *Ar. SE* 173a7-18.

'For by nature everything is more shameful which is also worse, suffering injustice ...' Callicles appears to claim that suffering injustice is the whole of what is more shameful by nature; and alterations of the text have been suggested. But perhaps the text can stand, as a not untypical overstatement.

483b Callicles says, and Socrates later agrees, that some people live so badly that they would be better off dead; cf. 512ab. But Callicles thinks that such a person is someone who cannot defend (*boethein* \*) himself or those he cares about. Both in Homer and in later Greek thought the power and ability to defend friends, associates, and family is regarded as a part of someone's virtue; cf. 486bc, 492c, 509bc, 522c-e, 526a, *Cri.* 45cd.

'Having more' *pleon echein*, sometimes means simply 'getting

the better' or 'getting the advantage', with no implied criticism; cf. Hdt. 9.70, Thuc. 1.76.2, 4.62, Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.2, 2.18 (where the sense may, but need not, be critical), Adam, on *R.* 349b. 'Taking more', *pleonektein* (abstract noun *pleonexia*) sometimes has a similar sense; Dem. 9.52, Isoc. 6.81, 4.48, Thuc. 4.62.3, 86.6. But it often has a definitely unfavourable sense, 'overreaching, grasping, taking more than is just'; *R.* 344a, Ar. *EN* 1129a34 and Gauthier and Jolif, *ad loc.*, Thuc. 1.77.3, 3.82.8, 84.1 (4.61.5 might be taken favourably or unfavourably); cf. also Isoc. 15.284 (a deliberate paradox?), *R.* 349b-350c (a confusing combination of the two terms).

Perhaps Callicles uses the more neutral term, *pleon echein*, here to imply that what the many try to prevent is not merely definite harm and violence to them the obvious result of *pleonektein* but also the superiority of some people, expressed in any inequality of power, possessions, or accomplishment. When they say that 'taking more' is shameful and unjust, they are saying something plausible, since they may be taken to refer to 'taking more than is just'. But then Callicles makes them say 'and doing injustice is this, seeking to *have* more than other people', which is more controversial; in his view, the many interpret 'taking more than is just', *pleonektein*, to include any inequality, *pleon echein*, at all.

On conventional justice as an expression of the views of the weak and vulnerable majority cf. *R.* 358e-359b. Callicles treats conventional justice as a particularly characteristic product of egalitarian democracy. This is strange at first sight; for non-democratic regimes also prohibited aggression, insisted on law-observance, and enjoined the other things rejected by Callicles. Perhaps he suggests that democracy and complete equality are the logical result of respect for conventional justice that once we admit we are justifiably restrained from assaulting one of the weak majority for our benefit, we cannot claim justification for getting any advantage over him, and if *nomos* can justifiably forbid our getting the better of another by physical force, it can justifiably forbid getting the better of him in status or property. The situation described by Callicles is described from a similar political position by the 'Old Oligarch', Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.7, 2.20 (cf. Thuc. 4.61.5). The Old Oligarch, however, says that democracy gives more to the poor and inferior than to the rich and superior (1.2, *pleon echein*; 1.4, *pleon nemein*). Callicles expresses the radical character of democracy better when he says that it forbids having more altogether here is evidence of Plato's care in the construction of Callicles' position.

Callicles suggests that the same principles which prohibit superiority in power and political control to a minority also prohibit

superiority in wealth. His attitude to the implications of justice and equality is all the more interesting since most democrats of his own time as well as later times would probably not obviously correctly reject it. Athenian democratic doctrine did not demand such complete equality; cf. Thuc. 2.37.1, Jones, 54-60, Vlastos (4), (3), esp. 352-6. Conceivably, however, Plato was influenced by this demand for complete equality in justice. Equality of property is prescribed for the ruling class of the Platonic state in the *R.*, and taking more is rejected as unjust, 416d-421a, 464b-d; here private property is also abolished. On democracy and equality see *R.* 558c, *Laws* 756e-758a, which fall short of Callicles' criticisms (Plato does not say that democracies demand equality in everything). See 508a below. With Callicles' attack cf. esp. Thuc. 6.38-9. Callicles' criticisms of democratic equality associate trim with oligarchic critics (for another view see Kerferd). See 503a, 515c.

483cd 'nature itself shows this, that it is just for the better (*ameinon* \*, comparative of *agathos*) to have more than the worse, and the more powerful (*dunatoteros*\*) than the less powerful.' Callicles claims that what is counted just by conventional rules is not really just, and that real justice requires action against conventional rules. He does not provide an amended account of 'do injustice' and 'suffer injustice' to match his account of real justice; and so it is not clear whether his claim in 483a that it is more shameful and harmful by nature to suffer injustice than to do injustice is still true on his revised account of real justice; for in 483a 'injustice' meant 'injustice by rule'. But perhaps the claim is still true. For presumably doing real injustice will be doing what the Athenians do, thwarting the rule of the superior men; and it would be more harmful and shameful to suffer this treatment, a sign of defencelessness, than to inflict it, a sign of power.

Callicles states the principle of real or natural justice in two ways, one referring to the better man, one to the more powerful man. He revives Gorgias' and Polus' earlier praise of power see 466b; he challenges Socrates' attack on Polus, since he rejects Polus' eventual admission that being powerful and unjust is bad for a man. But does he simply repeat Polus' claim? See 488b-489b, 491ab, 491e.

483d On animals as the norm for legitimate behaviour cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 1427, Hdt. 2.64 (notice the disapproving comment).

'The superior rules over the inferior and has more.' Callicles appeals to the 'state of nature' in the actions of animals and of states unconstrained by conventional justice. Hobbes, ch. 13, argues that the behaviour of individuals in a state of nature can be inferred from

the behaviour of states, which are in a permanent condition of war of all against all. Hobbes also argues that where there is no common power there is no law and no justice. Callicles agrees with Hobbes in saying that there is nothing unjust in the rule of the strong over the weak in the state of nature; but, unlike Hobbes, he thinks this is really just.

In claiming that Darius and Xerxes had no basis in conventional justice for their attacks on Scythians and Greeks, Callicles is opposed to Hdt. 4.1.4, 7.8-18 (esp. 7.8a2). But these kings are presented as more typical despots and tyrants in Hdt. 4.126-7, 7.8c-d, 7.35, Aesch. *Pers.* 739-831. It is a bit odd that Callicles mentions them as illustrations of the 'justice of nature', since both were unsuccessful; many might point to their failures as examples of the penalty of conventional injustice. Perhaps Plato suggests that the critic of conventional justice has to endorse these sorts of actions, though an actual critic might not be as 'frank' as Callicles is; see 487ab.

How many would be shocked by Callicles' claim that aggression by powerful states is all right, and actually fine and admirable? In considering apparent parallels at Thuc. 1.75-6, 5.85-113, 6.83, two points should be noticed:

(1) Thucydides may be reporting, not what the Athenians actually said or would actually say of themselves, but only what it would be rational (in his view) for someone to say who did what they did. Perhaps explicit rejection of conventional justice and moral considerations was unusual.

(2) Even Thucydides' speakers do not say it is just and fine to do what they do against conventional justice. They suggest instead that questions about what is just and fine do not apply here (see Hobbes, cited above). Callicles, however, suggests that they do apply, and that the behaviour rejected by conventional justice is really just and fine. He, rather than the speakers in Thucydides, seems to believe that 'Might is *right*'. But 'might' is not exactly the quality which makes aggression just; see 488b. See further Andrewes, on Thuc. 5.89. Ste Croix, 16-25, Dover, 310-14, A. G. Woodhead, ch. 1.

483e 'by the rule of nature'. This is the first occurrence in Greek of a phrase translatable by 'law of nature'; after his sharp division between rule and nature, Callicles must mean it as a deliberate and striking paradox hence perhaps 'by Zeus' is added for emphasis. But what does he mean? All he has shown is that this is what normally goes on, and in that sense it is the norm or rule, *nomos*, in nature. But he seems to infer that this is what is lawful, *nomimon*, i.e. really just. Just as conventional justice is associated with *nomos*, natural justice has its *nomos*, though, unlike other *nomos*, it does

not depend for its existence on human institutions. On 'the law of nature' cf. Thuc. 1.76.2, 5.105.2. Thucydides' speakers suggest that this law is necessary, not that it is just; perhaps the plea of necessity is meant to avoid ordinary moral condemnation, which does not apply to those acting under necessity (cf. 4.61.5, 6.83.2-4). On nature and necessity see also Aristoph. *Nub.* 1075, Antiphon, DK 87 B 44A, 1.26, Ste Croix, 60-2. Callicles does not appeal to natural necessities, perhaps because he maintains that conduct following the 'law of nature' is not merely to be expected, and perhaps regretted, but to be valued as fine and just. See 490a.

Aristotle, *Rhet.* 137364-18 (cf. 1368b6-9) regards the law of nature as common and universal, unlike the law of a particular state. Callicles also thinks the law of nature is universal; but for him, unlike Aristotle, it is an observed regularity. Callicles offers evidence that this is what happens in the state of nature, while Aristotle does not believe that everyone in the state of nature observes the laws of nature; and Callicles does not attack the non-universality of ordinary *nomos*, but its tendency to frustrate nature.

But what right has Callicles to claim that the examples cited from nature show what is just? He might mean

- (1) What happens in nature unencumbered by human institutions is our best guide to justice.
- (2) We can see that the rule of the superior is just, and nature confirms our belief, since it follows that principle.

So far Callicles has hardly defended either (1) or (2). But even if he could show that I do not benefit as much from observing the *nomoi* of the many as I would from breaking them, how would he have shown thereby that it is not just to impose them on me, and that real justice requires me to break them? Callicles must assume this about justice:

(3) Real, natural justice prescribes the benefit of the superior man. How is (3) to be justified? Callicles is clearly not assuming that justice prescribes whatever promotes the common good of a community (cf. Ar. *EN* 1129b17-19) that is what *nomos* may claim to pursue when in fact it pursues what benefits the inferior at the expense of the superior. Callicles believes (3) because he assumes that real justice prescribes the way things objectively ought to be, the way someone has reason to behave apart from his feelings or inclinations. It is really just to give more to the superior man because justice is determined by someone's worth or desert, and the superior man deserves more. Both Plato and Aristotle accept this distributive principle, against the democratic presumption of equality for superior and inferior people; see 508a, Ar. *Pol.* 1280a7-25. Callicles' argument does not say that it is just for everyone

to violate conventional justice; the superior and the inferior person might equally violate it, but only the superior conforms to justice in pursuing his own interests. Callicles believes that the superior man deserves more in justice because he believes, and argues later, that such a man develops the best and finest human qualities. Plato does not reject this general principle; he just disagrees with Callicles over what are the best and finest human qualities, and over what he should have 'more' of these disagreements are made clearer in the following discussion.

In ordinary usage a just man is someone who (at least) does what justice requires; and so, on Callicles' view of justice, the superior man who pursues his own interest despite conventional justice should be the just man. Socrates agrees with him that any virtue must be in the agent's interest (*Ch.* 175c, *La.* 192cd, *M.* 87de, above on 474cd, *Intr.* § 3). Callicles can then argue:

- (1) Justice is a virtue.
- (2) Being virtuous is always in the agent's interests.
- (3) But conventional justice is not always in the agent's interests. (4) Therefore conventional justice is not real justice.

Though this line of argument is open to Callicles, he does not exploit it. He does not apply the terms 'just' and 'justice' to persons who do what natural justice requires. He uses the terms to refer to states of affairs when he applies them to real justice (e.g. 'it is just for the superior to rule the inferior', not 'the superior is just when he rules the inferior'). For Callicles' later usage see 491e-492a, n.

The account of education in *Pr.* 325c-326a illustrates the 'spells and incantations' mentioned by Callicles the remorseless pressure of conventional education from early life, producing mediocre and stunted people (so he believes). Callicles' attack may have directly influenced Nietzsche; in any case some parallels are striking (see Dodds, Appx.). See Nietzsche Part I, esp. I.13: 'But to return to business: our inquiry into the origins of that other notion of goodness, as conceived by the resentful, demands to be completed. There is nothing odd about lambs disliking birds of prey, but this is no reason for holding it against large birds of prey that they carry off lambs ... To expect that strength will not manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to have enemies, obstacles and triumphs, is every bit as absurd as to expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength.' See also I.10, on the contrast between 'truly noble morality' which 'grows out of triumphant self-affirmation' and 'slave ethics' which 'begins by saying *no* to an "outside", an "other", and that *no* is its creative act.' See further Foot (2).

Against the advice of someone like the Anonymus Iamblichi (see 482e) that conventional justice is the safest policy. Callicles

suggests that though the many try to make the superior man capitulate and conform, he should not; a safe way of life involves such frustration of his best capacities that no superior man should tolerate it. Socrates adopts this argument at 511b-513c.

484a Callicles returns to the praise of the tyrant, begun by Polus; see 466bc. Cf. *R.* 344a-c, 574d-575a on the rise of the tyrant.

484bc Callicles thinks that the 'rule', which Pindar says is king of all, is the rule of nature which shows that it is just by nature for Heracles to steal Geryon's cattle. But Pindar's meaning, and the sense of 'rule', are disputed. Hdt. 3.38 takes Pindar to mean 'usage, custom'; see further Ostwald (2).

484c Callicles mentions 'the worse and inferior men' (plural), but 'the better and superior man' (singular); see also 488b. Though he has been speaking of Heracles and Geryon, he returns to the tyrant who expropriates other people.

Callicles now seems to raise a different question, about the choice of life (a *bios*; cf. 494d). He discusses the contrast between a life of theoretical study and an active life in public affairs. This contrast was a standard theme of discussion; see the later reference to Euripides. But what has it to do with the question about conventional justice?

Callicles makes three claims at once:

- (1) We should not follow conventional justice.
- (2) We should not spend our adult life on philosophy.
- (3) We should be active in public and political life.

He suggests that someone who accepts (3) will accept (2), since philosophy disables someone for public life, and then accept (1), since that will be the wise thing for someone who accepts (3). Plato's view is not clear. Socrates does not clearly explain the relation between his rejection of (2) and (3) and his rejection of (1). It is easy to see how someone accepting (1) and (3) should accept (2); for him, philosophy will distract us from what is most worth while in life. If Socrates can show that Callicles' view of the ends of life is wrong, he can defend philosophy against this line of criticism.

But why should someone not reject (1) and still accept (2) and (3), because he thinks that philosophy is useless for a good citizen? (See Isocrates, cited on 485a.) Perhaps Socrates has wrongly conflated arguments about (1) with arguments about (2) and (3) because some people accepted all three. It would surely be unfair to claim that everyone who accepts any one of the three claims also accepts the other two. However, Socrates might say that if we reject (1), we have no good reason to accept (2), since philosophy.

properly understood, makes someone more virtuous and just (cf. *R.* 487b-500). But if this is his argument, it is not an argument for forsaking public life in favour of philosophy. See 485d, 500cd.

484cd Callicles praises 'philosophy', Socrates' type of argument and discussion, as a useful part of education, presumably because the habits of debate are useful for public life. Prolonged exposure to philosophy deprives someone of experience, *empeiria*; cf. 462c. Callicles aims to be a 'fine and good and respected man'. Socrates previously applied 'fine and good' to the best kind of person, 470e; Callicles now uses the terms in a more usual way, to refer to a 'gentleman', and uses 'respected' to show that he thinks of honour and good reputation. Though he has just spoken contemptuously of conventional rules and opinions, now he is guided by them at least to some extent, when he values good reputation. (See Adkins (3), 156-64, Dover, 236-42.) Plato suggests that Callicles cannot maintain his self-respect; his chosen way of achieving his goals makes him depend on the public opinion of the masses he despises. Cf. 474ab, 511b-513c, 526e-527a.

485a Callicles praises philosophy learnt only for the sake of education (or culture, *paideia*; cf. *R.* 487cd) to make someone a gentleman amateur, as opposed to learning it professionally as a craft. Cf. *Pr.* 312b. *Isoc.* 15.261-9, 12.26-32, 13.7-8, Guthrie (1), iv. 309, Jebb, ii.36-47.

485b Perhaps 'mumbling' (*psellizein*; leaving out letters and syllables, *Ps.-Ar. Probl.* 902623-7) was the sign of a well off, and therefore 'free' rather than slavish (452d), young man who did not need to work, and so talk to strangers, as a slave child would. Aristotle mentions mumbling and lisping, *traulizein*, as childish defects of speech, *HA* 492632-4, 53665-8, *PA* 660a26-8. Alcibiades retained a lisp later in life, *Aristoph. Vesp.* 44-5, *Plutarch, Alc.* 1.3-4. Perhaps this was a sign of prolonged adolescence, and therefore, in Athenian eyes, of effeminacy, explaining Callicles' remark that an adult who speaks childishly is being 'unmanly', i.e. (perhaps) effeminate. This might possibly be a gibe at young men like Alcibiades who hung around Socrates, suggesting their general effeminacy and immaturity.

485bc The philosopher is attacked for being useless to society in *R.* 480d (cf. *Thuc.* 2.40.2), 487b-d. Callicles, however, does not emphasize the uselessness of the recluse to society, but his failure to acquire the reputation and honour demanded by a real man. We

might find this incongruous with Callicles' contempt for popular opinions and sanctions, expressed in 483e-484a. We might ask if his preferred way of life would still be worth while apart from popular admiration (on which of. *R.* 344a-c, 364ab). If admiration matters a lot, then perhaps Callicles is not as free and self-respecting as he claims to be; cf. 521d, 526c.

The picture of a philosopher whispering in a corner has sometimes seemed more suitable for Plato's Academy than for the historical Socrates, who may have talked in public places, and at least did not avoid them (cf. Ryle (3), ch. 5, Thompson (1), xvii). But these controversies may have begun in Socrates' lifetime, and it is hard to point to any definite anachronism.

485e-486a Callicles quotes again from Euripides' *Antiope*, which included a debate between the shepherd Zethus and the musician Amphion, on the value of the active, practical life and the contemplative life, the life of study. See Snell (2), ch. 4.

486a 'Likely and persuasive' speeches are the mark of a successful rhetor, useful both in court ('the council of justice') and in the Council and Assembly, to pass resolutions helping our friends ('propose any daring resolution ...'). Euripides sums up the rewards of rhetoric praised by Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles so far.

486a-c Callicles' argument here depends on Athenian law and legal procedure. He implies that Socrates' life will leave him defenceless against attack, like those who are legally 'dishonoured' (*atimos*, c2, from *time* \*, 'honour'). In Athens an *atimos* was deprived of the normal legal protections against ill-treatment. He was excluded from 'market-place and temples' (i.e. from public meetings and ceremonies, including courts) 'so that he could not even execute justice when he suffered injustice from his enemies' (Lys. 6.24; cf. Demosth. 21.95, A. R. W. Harrison, ii. 169-72). *Atimia* could be inflicted without formal trial on those guilty of cowardice in military service or of homosexual prostitution (Aeschin. i.27-30; cf. perhaps above 485b, n.). Socrates' position is like the position of an *atimos* because he is incapable of defending himself in court or seeking redress from a particularly insulting attack (a blow with the open hand; 'push his face in', 486c3), while the *atimos* is legally prohibited from legal defence.

The law on *atimia* also explains 'arrested ... and threw you (*apagein*) into gaol', 486a7-8. *Apagein*, summary arrest and imprisonment (Harrison, ii.222-9) was prescribed for, among others, an *atimos* who violated the prohibitions imposed on him. The

penalties for such violations were at the jury's discretion (486b3, 'if he wanted ...', i.e. he would persuade the jury); see Demosth. 24. 105. By saying that Socrates' incapacity for political life makes him no better off than if he were legally prevented from defending himself (*atimia* prevented someone from defending himself or his property against attack; cf. Harrison, i.236), Callicles states his charge in strong and vivid terms.

486ab Callicles repeats the charge that Socrates could not defend himself or anyone else as a self-respecting man should. Plato no doubt intends readers to think of Socrates' own trial though in fact Socrates was not harmed by *ignorance* of normal procedure; he just chose not to follow it.

486b3 'inferior wretch' (*phaulos kai mochtheros* \*). *Mochtheros*\* corresponds to 'wretched' or 'miserable' in English, in so far as it can be used either to condemn someone for vice or to pity him for his unhappy position. The combination of these two uses is especially useful for Socrates who thinks that being vicious is being in an unhappy and pitiable position; he uses *mochtheros*\* to make this point at 505a2-3, and perhaps at 511a1. It is used to judge someone's nature or character rather than his happiness at 488a8, 504a8, where it is very close to *poneros*\* (see 464d7-e1). Here Callicles means that Socrates will be prosecuted in an especially shameful way, by his inferior in *arete*\*, his social, political, and moral inferior (cf. Thuc. 4.40.2).

'How can this be wise (*sophon*), Socrates?' *Sophon* is not restricted to theoretical wisdom; it refers also to practical wisdom, shown either in practical crafts and specialities, or in a more general understanding of what is worth my while to pursue in life. See Dover, 119-24, O'Brien, 24 f., 34-8. Callicles relies on these various associations of *sophon* here; despite all Socrates' claims to be looking for wisdom, his way of life denies him the wisdom which really counts, wisdom about his own good (cf. Aesch. *PV* 61-2, 944). Callicles praises the methods of gaining a reputation for wisdom, *phronein*; cf. 458e-459c, 464cd. On power, stressed by Callicles here, cf. 483cd.

486c 'to live dishonoured in the city'. 'Dishonoured'; see 486a-e. Callicles plays on both associations of the term, suggesting that Socrates is as defenceless as an *atimos*, and that he will lack the honour and reputation which Callicles thinks is a major good; cf. 484d, 485d, 525a.

'anyone is at liberty (*exesti*); cf. 461d, 468e.

'Examinations' (or 'refutations', *elenchos*); see 473b.

486d 'A living' (*bios*). *Bios* is used both for the means to live a life (like English 'living', 'livelihood', 'what I live off') and for someone's way of life. Both senses may be relevant here; Callicles claims that these people have the resources of a good life and the good life itself. On *bios* see 494d.

Euripides, *Med.* 816-19, and Theognis, 119-28, wish for a touchstone to determine the goodness or badness of other people's characters. Socrates, however, is more concerned with testing his own soul; cf. *Ap.* 36c. And he tests it to see if it has true beliefs, assuming that they determine character, according to the Socratic Paradox (467b-468e).

487a 'Free speaking', *parrhesia* \*; cf. 461e, 492d, 521a. Socrates calls on Callicles to display this reputed virtue, which Polus, despite his initial protestations, has proved to lack.

'Wise', *sophon*; cf. 486b. Here 'being wise' and 'having knowledge' (*episteme* \*; cf. 447c, 454bc) seem to be equivalent.

487b 'each of them dares'. Socrates suggests that Gorgias' and Polus' sense of shame was misplaced, since they could 'dare', *tolman*, or 'be shameless enough' to show their ignorance and confusion on questions they should be ashamed not to have considered carefully. Cf. 472c.

'you are educated, *pepaideusai*, adequately, many Athenians would say'. Socrates severely restricts his claim that Callicles has the knowledge needed for successful argument not even Socrates has that. All he says is that Callicles would generally be thought to have a good education, *paideia*; cf. 485a, 470e. The reference to the Athenians' view shows that Socrates rejects Callicles' claim to have a really good education; cf. *M.* 90b. In the *Pr.* Socrates argued that the traditional moral education praised by Protagoras did not equip someone to understand the relations between the virtues or their relation to the agent's happiness. Here he implies that this education leaves someone ill equipped to resist the attacks of Callicles on conventional morality.

487c Of these associates of Callicles Andron is the most significant. He was one of the Four Hundred, the oligarchic conspirators who took power in 411 (see Ehrenberg (1), 316-21), and an associate of Hippias, someone else who defended *phusis* against *nomos*; cf. *Pr.* 337cd, *Xen. Mem.* 4.4.14. Such oligarchic sympathies are not surprising in friends of Callicles, after we have seen his attacks on the

many and their doctrine of equality.

'Associates' (*koinonoi* \*). Callicles recognizes the value of friendship and association, and has expressed goodwill for Socrates, 485e. His preferred way of life for the superior man does not explicitly seek to exclude these attachments. See 507e.

The insistence on sincerity is no doubt meant to distinguish dialectic and rhetoric, where the rhetor is trained to argue on either side of the case (see Solmsen, 20-3), and also from eristic. Socrates was accused of disputation without regard for the truth, *Ap.* 19b; so was Protagoras, *Ar. Rhet.* 1402a3-28, DK 80 A 1. See 453bc, 457b-458c.

'philosophize as far as exactness'. 'Exactness', *akribeia*, is a complimentary term e.g. in *Thuc.* 1.22.2, *Hippoc. VM* 12, *Tht.* 184c, *At. EN* 1104a2. But it is also used in an uncomplimentary way for pedantic and useless pursuit of exactness, *Isoc.* 2.39, 10.5 especially referring to his more theoretical rivals, e.g. in Plato's Academy.

487e 'goal (or 'end') of truth', *telos tes\* aletheias\**. This is probably 'the goal consisting in the truth' (cf. perhaps *Ch.* 173d6). Others translate 'perfect truth' or 'truth in the end' (Dodds).

Plato considers a basic question about the *elenchos*, and perhaps replies to criticisms of his claim that its results could be used as a guide to the truth. Socrates assumes that he can rely on the truth of his results; cf. *Cri.* 49ab. In so far as he finds more and more interlocutors who agree with him after examination, he has better reason to believe his claims. But some interlocutors count for less than others; Crito is a disciple, Laches and Charmides perhaps lack the argumentative skill to resist Socrates, and Gorgias and Polus, Callicles says, have given way to shame. If Socrates can prove that Callicles also has better reason to agree with Socrates than to maintain his anti-Socratic beliefs, this will be much more significant. If Socrates' ethical doctrines can be defended not only to conventional and respectable people, but also to radical critics, they rely on something firmer than conventional prejudices.

We might object that this procedure makes Socrates' arguments merely *ad hominem*, since they depend on the sincerity and good judgement of particular interlocutors, and on their initial beliefs. But this *ad hominem* character may not be easily avoidable in moral argument, or even in other rational arguments, e.g. in empirical science. We always *could* maintain that observations apparently challenging a theory were illusory, or try to explain them away by some *ad hoc* auxiliary hypothesis (whatever exactly makes it *ad hoc*). What is less *ad hominem* about the claim that sometimes a rational

man will not protect his theory in these ways than about the claims Socrates relies on? See 505d, 508e.

'This inquiry is the finest of all'; see 472c.

488a Socrates applies the Socratic Paradox to his own case; cf. 509e, *Ap.* 25c-26a.

488bc Socrates does not reply directly to Callicles' attack on the philosophical life, but instead returns to his account of the just by nature. Callicles has appealed to what happens in nature, the fact that the superior dominate the inferior, to argue that this is 'justice by nature', i.e. real justice. He spoke of domination by the 'better', *beltion* \*, 484c, the 'superior', *kraitton*\*, 483e, and the 'more powerful', *dunatotos*\*, 483d, over the worse or inferior or less powerful. Socrates asks for clarification. *Kraitton*\* may refer to superior strength, but also to superiority in general (cf. 482b7). *Beltion*\* tends to suggest less purely physical superiority, and especially suggests social eminence *hoi beltiones* or *hoi beltistoi* (superlative) are often the upper classes, in social and political contexts (cf. 512cd). Here Socrates suggests that being superior and being stronger are the same, and asks whether the better and the superior are the same. He is right to see an ambiguity in Callicles' position, even though he wrongly ignores the ambiguity in 'superior' itself the gloss 'stronger' removes the ambiguity.

On the singular 'better man' and plural 'worse men' cf. 484c, n. 'Should' (c2); see 456e, n. 'More wretched'; 486b3, n.

488cd When Socrates asks whether the better, the superior, and the stronger are the same, we might understand the question in at least three ways:

(1) Are all superior men stronger and better, and vice versa, i.e. are all three classes coextensive? (Cf. 'Are all superior men redhaired?') This seems to be a straightforward empirical question. (2) Do the words 'stronger' and 'superior' and 'better' mean the same? (Cf. 'Is "vixen" the same as "female fox"?' Remember that Greek has no quotation marks.) Discovery of the identity would apparently yield what is often called an *analytic* truth, something true by meaning or definition (see Lacey, Edwards, S.V. 'Analytic'). (3) Are the properties of being superior, being stronger, and being better all the same property? (Cf. 'Is temperature the same as mean kinetic energy?') The answer to this question would not be an analytic truth following from the meanings of the words; the discovery about temperature requires scientific investigation and theory.

Socrates suggests that he is looking for something more than (1)

when he asks whether the 'definition' or 'standard' (*horos*; see 470b, 491b-d) of the better and the superior is the same; here (1) would not require the same definition. It is harder to decide between (2) and (3). It would be implausible for anyone to claim that all these terms have the same meaning; and a negative answer to (2) would not help Socrates much, since it is compatible with an affirmative answer to (3), which would support Callicles. What Socrates often asks for is 'that by which all *F*s are *F*' (e.g. *HMa.* 294ab, *Eu.* 6d), or 'what is the same in all *F*s' (*M.* 72e-73a, *Eu.* 5d), which is what we 'look to' in calling something *F* (see 475a). Considerations about the context and the kind of answer Socrates seeks suggest that he is concerned with (3) rather than (2). See further Putnam, Rosenmeyer, 93-7, Vlastos (15), 236-40, Penner (2), 37-43, Irwin, 63, Woodruff, for different views on this issue. See 495a.

488d Socrates' claim that the many are 'superior' (plural) to one superior man seems to combine two claims:

- (a) Each one of the many is individually superior to any one superior man.
- (b) The many collectively constitute something superior to any one superior man (or even though Socrates does not mention this to superior men collectively).

Socrates has argued for (b), not for (a). Thrasymachus is more careful about stating (b) at *R.* 338d-339a. Socrates might also defend (a), by arguing that when each of the many can rely on the collective strength of the others to defend himself against a superior man, he is himself stronger than the superior man, when the resources available to each of them are considered. With this conception of the state as a source of strength and protection to the weak cf. *R.* 358e-359b.

488a-489a Why should Callicles agree that the rules, *nomima*, of the many are really fine? He has said that the rule, *nomos*, of nature is fine, that the stronger dominate the weaker; but it does not follow that rules agreed by people who are stronger by nature will be fine. Socrates' inference from Callicles' position is illegitimate. But he still has a fair objection. If the stronger is the superior and better, then domination by the many weaker men over fewer stronger men is domination by the collectively stronger over the collectively weaker, and is therefore just and fine by nature, on Callicles' view. This is enough to show that Callicles' examples and explanation of what is just by nature are inconsistent with his claim that democratic repression of aristocrats is not just by nature. Thrasymachus in *R.* i avoids this claim. In rejecting Socrates' conclusion Callicles

shows that he rejects the position defended by Thrasymachus, that justice is simply the interest of the collectively stronger.

Socrates has sometimes wrongly been taken to endorse democracy, in this passage, as just by nature; see Popper, i. 91, 117, 254. But he is simply showing the inconsistency in Callicles' position, not endorsing the conclusion. The conclusion would require him to endorse oligarchy and tyranny as equally just, and to admit that the verdict of the Athenian court on him was just. But there is no reason to suppose that he would agree to any of this. He does argue for obedience to the laws in the *Cri.*; but his argument there is not confined to laws of a democracy. In general there is no reason to believe that Socrates was any less anti-democratic than Plato turns out to be in the *R.* See 505ab, Guthrie (1), iii 409-16.

489ab Since Callicles should not have agreed that the *nomoi* accepted by the collectively superior party are really just and fine, he has no reason to retract his earlier criticism of Socrates on doing and suffering injustice. Nor does Socrates need this retraction to show that Callicles' claims have been inconsistent.

489bc 'hunting after names'. Callicles accuses Socrates of picking on some merely verbal error, and not realizing, as any reasonable person would, how a word was being used; cf. *Tht.* 166c. Socrates denies that this is his concern; he is not, as Prodicus is, concerned with the meaning and correct use of words, but with their application whether they were applied to the same property or not; cf. *Pr.* 337ac, 358a, *Ch.* 163de, above, 450e, 457c-458b.

489c Callicles says that he thinks being superior men (*to kreittous einai*) and being better men are the same thing; and this is taken to amount to the claim that the better and the superior (neuter adjectives in Greek, not masculine) are the same. It is most plausible to suppose that Plato is concerned with property identity; see 488cd.

Callicles claims correctly that he has identified the better with the superior. He now gives up, and does not admit he ever accepted it, the identification which caused him trouble, of the superior with the stronger. But he needed this identification; his earlier appeal to the facts of nature showed only that the stronger people dominate the weaker, and that is relevant for his argument only if there is some close connection between being stronger and being superior; see 483d. Callicles now tacitly drops his appeal to the facts of collective behaviour in the state of nature. If he no longer identifies the better and the superior with the stronger, he must explain the better some other way.

Why should Callicles deny that what a mob of slaves and inferior men decide automatically becomes 'the rule' (or 'lawful', *nomimon*)? He certainly seemed to argue at 483bc that their decisions determine what is 'just by rule'. Perhaps he uses 'lawful' to mean 'really lawful', i.e. just, i.e. according to justice by nature, which he called the *nomos* of nature at 483a, so that being just by law (*nomos*) does not imply being lawful (*nomimon*).

489e Callicles says that the 'better' (*beltious*, comparative of *agathoi*) are the 'worthier' (or 'nobler', *ameinous*, also used as a comparative of *agathoi*, and so a near-synonym of *beltious*). Socrates tells him he is just 'saying names', without making anything clear simply offering verbal equivalents which do not show what sort of person he is talking about; see 451d. Socrates proposes a further specification of 'nobler' and 'better' as 'wiser', *phronimoteroi* \*, and tries to find the relevant kind of wisdom.

Why does Socrates suggest that Callicles had the wiser man in mind? Callicles earlier advised him to acquire a reputation for *phronein*, wisdom, 486e. *Phronimos* (abstract noun *phronesis*\*) especially suggests general practical wisdom. While *sophia* (486b) also includes this, it would be applied more naturally than *phronesis*\* would to knowledge and expertise in particular crafts. Socrates supposes that Callicles is speaking of people with *phronesis*\* people like Callicles himself, upper-class, well-educated, more capable people, who claim supreme power on that account. *Phronesis*\* is widely valued as a part of political skill and excellence, *arete*\*; cf. Aristoph. *Lys.* 547, Isoc. 2.14, Adkins (3), 244-6. On *phronesis* and craft see 495cd.

490a 'what I think the just by nature is'. Callicles offers another account of natural justice. But the appeals to nature do not work as they did before. Previously 'nature' showed us what in fact happens apart from what people agree should happen Callicles mentioned cases where the strongest rule. He cannot appeal to nature to show that the wise always dominate the ignorant. And so what does it mean to say that the rule of the wise is just by nature? Callicles must appeal to something which is 'just by nature' in the sense of 'really just, apart from what people agree on'; it will no longer be just by nature in the other sense, 'what would happen apart from human intervention' (see 482e). This 'justice by nature' must prescribe domination by the wise. Callicles has not yet justified this claim; for his previous appeals to what happens in nature do not support him. When his case is clarified, he loses his apparently 'realistic' arguments. Again contrast Thrasymachus

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and Thucydides' Athenians; see 483e, 491b.

Socrates, it will eventually appear, agrees with this claim of Callicles', though he does not understand wisdom the same way, and does not advocate the rule of the wise on the same grounds. Cf. 490b ff., 504d ff.

490b Socrates takes Callicles to mean that if *A* is wiser than *B* about *F*s, *A* is entitled to more *F*s than *B*. This general principle is not implied by Callicles' previous remarks. But it is fair for Socrates to look for the principle which is meant to justify the advantages of the wiser. Socrates rightly insists that some justification is needed, that superior wisdom does not by itself self-evidently justify privileges for the wise.

490c 'should (cf. 456c) he distribute everything, because he rules...' Socrates suggests that the expert 'rules' or 'has authority' (*archei*) in his particular area because he has knowledge, and should have the power to distribute because he will know what each person needs, and Socrates assumes the proper basis of distribution is need. But this assumption about the authority of the expert will apply only to the crafts which involve knowledge of people's needs e.g. the doctor may know that you need more food than I need, but the tailor does not necessarily know that you need more coats than I need. Socrates also assumes that the expert can be trusted to be fair, simply because he is an expert. Perhaps the doctor will not eat more than he needs, since he knows it is not good for him and by the Socratic Paradox he does only what he thinks good for him. But if he realizes he will make money by taking more food and selling his surplus, how will his medical knowledge prevent him? See further 503d-504a, R. 341c-347a.

Here and in 490e Socrates does not seem to distinguish 'have more', *pleon echein*, and 'take more' or 'outdo', *pleonektein*; cf. 483c. But 'getting the advantage', *pleonektein*, 491a, seems to be the result of getting a larger quantity, *pleon echein*. Perhaps Socrates argues: superior wisdom gives no claim to have more, *pleon echein*, and therefore, contrary to Callicles, it gives no claim to advantage, *pleonektein*. Callicles can fairly reply, 491ab, that he has some other kind of *pleonektein* in mind than simply having more; but then it is fair to ask why wisdom justifies this.

Socrates does not discuss the right criteria of distributive justice here. But he suggests that the doctor will distribute to each according to Iris need or according to his ability to use it well either principle might justify giving more to the sick. The second principle guides the distribution of responsibilities and benefits in the R., e.g.

at 433de. While Socrates successfully ridicules Callicles here, he does not show that he has himself adequately considered the questions of distributive justice (see further Feinberg (4)).

490de Callicles is especially annoyed because Socrates mentions vulgar, manual crafts (cf. 512c) as parallels to the man with political wisdom. Cf. *HMa.* 286d, *Symp.* 221e, *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.37 (cf. 449d). Socrates has a serious point (cf. 513e-515b, *Pr.* 319a-320c, *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.9, Guthrie (1), iii. 409-12). He believes that moral and political wisdom is a craft too see 505ab; and so he believes that it also confers no automatic title to privilege. See *R.* 416d-421c.

491ab Callicles clarifies his conception of the wise men, so that they are recognizable as the superior men, the aristocrats who were earlier said to be unjustly repressed by democracies. His account of the superior and wise man recalls *M.* 71e, 73c (derived from *Gorgias*; cf. *Alc.* 125b), and so resumes the earlier dispute about the value of the power achieved through rhetoric; cf. 483cd.

491b 'about how to govern it well'. Callicles does not say what counts as governing the city well; we should not suppose that he means 'for the benefit of the citizens', since they will include the many whose interests conflict with those of the superior man. More probably, he thinks of someone who is 'good at ruling', in so far as he can keep order and crush or forestall opposition to his rule. See also 504a.

Callicles demands 'courage' and resolution from his wise man; cf. 463a, *R.* 560cd, *Thuc.* 3.82.4. For Socrates' and Plato's view see *La.* 194d ff., *R.* 442bc, which demand knowledge in a brave man. The next question is whether Callicles' 'brave' men have this knowledge; 495d ff. Courage is contrasted with 'softness', *malakia*. applied (a) to cowards, *Thuc.* 6.13, *Xen. Hell.* 4.5.16; (b) to impractical and spiritless philosophers; *Thuc.* 2.40.1, *R.* 410de; (c) to self-indulgent, intemperate people; *Hdt.* 7.153, *Aristoph. Vesp.* 1455. Callicles has in mind (a) and perhaps (b); but (c) leads Socrates to raise the question at 491d.

How is it supposed to be just by nature for these wiser and braver men to dominate? Callicles might mean either of these two claims:

- (1) If *nomoi* do not interfere, the braver and wiser will naturally dominate the rest.
- (2) Even if this does not naturally happen, there is some reason, which can be found by examining nature, why we should make it happen.

From the start Callicles' argument has conflated these two attitudes

to nature; see 482e, 490a. Here the first, 'realistic' claim is not plausible, since the wisest do not always rule in the cities. It is more plausible to rely on (2), and this is the claim Socrates examines.

491d1 'it is fitting' (*prosekei* \*). *Prosekein*\* might suggest either (1) or (2) above. See 479e.

491d4 The point Socrates professes not to understand is Callicles' reference to ruling; he asks whether the brave man must also rule himself and be self-controlled and temperate. He claims that by 'self-control' he means just what the many mean, referring to some commonly recognized phenomenon. His claim raises two questions: (1) Though Socrates suggests that the many recognize the possibility of self-control, and says in *Pr.* 352b that they also recognize failures of self-control, it is actually quite hard to find evidence of this view in pre-Platonic Greek. But cf. Antiphon DK 87 B 58, Anon. Lamb. DK 89.4.1, Democritus DK 68 B 214 (if genuine). *Eur. Med.* 1078, fr. 718, Dodds (2), 186 f., 199, Walsh, ch. 1, Irwin (3), Dover, 124-6.

(2) Socrates here accepts the common view which conflicts with the Socratic position; contrast 460b, 467c-468c, *Pr.* 352-357. Controlling and overcoming suggest desires of different strengths, which may not reflect our comparative valuation of their objects. Tim only conflict allowed by the Socratic Paradox is indecision about what is best, caused by conflict between different considerations; but this conflict would cause hesitation, not the impetuous and demanding desires which a self-controlled man is supposed to restrain. The *Pr.* suggested, contrary to common belief, that 'being overcome by pleasure' (and so lacking self-control) is only ignorance. If this were Socrates' view here, we would expect him to qualify the common belief in a similar way; but he does not. See 493a, 499e, 505bc, 516c, 522e.

Why is it relevant to introduce questions about self-control and temperance into the argument with Callicles?

(1) Callicles has suggested, as Polus did earlier, that it is a good thing for a superior man to have all he needs to indulge his desires like a tyrant. If in fact someone is better off with restrained desires which will be unaffected by abundant resources, a powerful man may not be better off; for he may not have what is good for him.

(2) Callicles has recognized courage as a virtue of the superior man, and it is fair to ask whether this does not involve some kinds of self-restraint, to prevent action on cowardly desires (see 491b on *malakia*).

(3) Antiphon B 44 maintains a view of nature and convention rather similar to Callicles' view (see 482e). But in B 58 Antiphon advocates self-control for the agent's benefit (see Guthrie (1), iii. 259 f.). Now Socrates can fairly ask why Callicles and Antiphon should reject conventional justice because it restrains the superior man's desires, and then advocate temperance which involves restraint of desires. If Callicles' reason for rejecting *nomos* is simply that it restrains desires, he must argue that *all* restraint of desire is bad for the superior man, and so must reject temperance. If not all restraint is bad for the superior man, then Callicles must show that *nomos* imposes some restraint which we know, on other grounds, to be bad for him. See 491e-492a, 501ab, 504a.

When Socrates says that the self-controlled man will rule 'the pleasures and appetites, *epithumiai*, in him', the use of *epithumia* is puzzling. It can refer to desire in general, and in the earlier Platonic dialogues usually does; see 447b, 520e, *Lys.* 207e, *M.* 77b-78b; cf. *R.* 431b-d. But often it is used for cravings, lusts and especially insistent or irrational desires; cf. *Thuc.* 2.1.7, 2.52, 6.13, 7.84, Democritus B 234. Some such view is alluded to at *Ch.* 167e. *Pr.* 340a. Socrates may intend the more restricted sense of *epithumia* here, to refer to desires which aim at some pleasure rather than at the agent's good, as the agent conceives it (call these 'good-independent desires'). But it is hard to see how he can recognize good-independent desires consistently with 467c ff. See 493a, 505a-c, 517b.

491e '*Sophrosune* \*', here translated 'temperance' indicates 'sound mind', i.e. good sense and sagacity in general. Since it is commonly believed that a sound and sensible man will restrain some of his desires, *sophrosune*\* is often taken to include self-control; and this conception of *sophrosune*\* is criticized by Callicles. See 507a, C. C. W. Taylor on *Pr.* 332a7. On *sophrosune*\* and *akolasia* see 476a, 477b-e, 478a-d.

491e-492a Socrates' reference to self-control provokes Callicles into a statement of the views which explain his opposition to conventional justice and his advocacy of domination by the stronger. His argument is this:

- (1) Happiness consists in the full satisfaction of the most and most demanding desires.
- (2) Justice and temperance prevent the development and satisfaction of these desires.
- (3) The *nomoi* of the many require justice and temperance.
- (4) Therefore the *nomoi* of the many should be rejected.

Callicles supports his previous claim that the wise men he has mentioned will not be temperate, if temperance requires self-control; for he argues that self-control is foolish. To show this he argues that self-control does not promote my happiness, *eudaimonia* (see 468b); it is not in my interest, and therefore not a virtue. This is Callicles' reply to Socrates' claims at 470e, 478e. He appeals plausibly to the association between happiness and freedom, *eleutheria*, reasserting the claim of his way of life to embody freedom, and rebutting Socrates' earlier objections to Polus and Gorgias (see 452d, 465b, 485b-d, *R.* 344c, *Isoc.* 7.20). He suggests that happiness requires full desire-satisfaction, and therefore the complete freedom to satisfy desires. A man cannot be happy if he is a slave to anything or anyone, because a slave or anyone under authority is denied free expression of his desires (cf. *Lys.* 207e). Callicles then infers that self-control inhibits freedom, and therefore prevents the full satisfaction of desires that is required for happiness.

Callicles plausibly denies that if I manage to reduce my wants until all I want is e.g. enough to eat for bare survival, I am happy when I satisfy that want; happiness or welfare (*eudaimonia*; see 468b) requires a person to reach a certain level of demanding desires, to exercise a reasonable range of his capacities. Callicles then argues that the best development of desires and realization of my capacities requires the development and satisfaction of the 'greatest', i.e. the most extravagant, desires. That is why someone who is to achieve his happiness must have a large conception of the capacities he wants to realize in happiness, the power to realize these capacities, and the resolution, what Callicles calls 'courage', to exercise his power.

How is Callicles' criticism of justice in this passage to be reconciled with his previous advocacy of natural justice? When he spoke of what is just by nature, he did not speak of a virtue or state of character called 'natural justice' opposed to the state of character normally called justice. 'Just' was applied to the social and natural order in which the superior man rules, not to his states of character. Callicles has other names for the relevant states of character 'courage' and 'wisdom' and so he keeps 'justice' here for what the many call justice. He can consistently say 'It is just by nature for the superior man to be unjust.' See 483e.

Why must anyone who rejects conventional justice also accept Callicles' conception of a good life, and the resulting attack on temperance? Someone might surely reject particular laws as unjust because, e.g., he rejects the ideal of equality they imply. But Callicles goes further; he rejects *nomos* in principle when it interferes with the desires of a superior man; and so he needs some reason to claim that such interference is always, everything considered, bad.

This reason is derived from the present account of happiness and ways of achieving it. Perhaps Plato believes that someone who rejects *nomos* and its conception of justice as a whole can justify himself only by advocating the complete self-indulgence supported by Callicles. Plato does not show that Callicles' ground is the only reasonable ground for a general criticism of *nomos*; it is up to Plato's opponent to find a more defensible ground if Callicles is refuted. See 494ac, 499b, 500ab, 504a.

491e Callicles calls for the cultivation of 'desires' or 'appetites', *epithumiai*. Again, as in 491d, it is not clear how broad the range of *epithumia* is. Callicles later says that the many 'haven't the power to find fulfilment for their pleasures', 492a; since 'pleasures' here seems equivalent to '*epithumiai*' in 491e, pleasure and *epithumia* seem to be closely associated, as Socrates suggested in 491d. We also ask in English 'What's your pleasure?', meaning 'What do you want?'; and this can make hedonism seem deceptively obvious; see Sidgwick (1), 43 f. Cf. 470c, 496e, 504c, 'if it pleases you' (or 'if it is pleasanter for you, *ei soi hedion \* estin*'). Callicles suggests here that the superior man will maximize his pleasure in fulfilling his desires, and Socrates exploits the suggestion.

492a Callicles assumes that the many are aware of their incapacity to achieve happiness, since they can't achieve it except by harming others with impunity, and they are not strong enough to do that. They over-compensate for their own weakness; they gang up on the superior man, and actually persuade him and themselves that his policy is shameful, trying to transfer the shame from themselves to him (see Nietzsche, cited on 483e above). Callicles returns to the defence of Polus and Gorgias on power; see 488cd.

492b 'rule, tyranny, or dynasty'. A dynasty (*dunasteia*, related to *dunamis*, 'power'; cf. 479a) is the collective equivalent of tyranny, rule by a group of people without law this was the kind of regime that took power in Athens in 404, appropriately called the 'Thirty Tyrants'; see Bury-Meiggs, 318-21, *Ap.* 32cd, 490de above. Callicles, as earlier, keeps in mind the political implications of his position. See above 452d, 466bc, 468e, 474c (Callicles goes beyond Polus' view). On the cowardice of the many cf. 491ab.

492b 'At liberty' (*exeinai*); see 461e.

'set up a master over themselves'. A master (*despotes\**) has the absolute power of a tyrant, though he may hold it by *nomos* (e.g. a father's power over a son, or a slave-owner's power over a slave).

Callicles suggests that *nomos* itself is a tyrant over the superior man. Here he turns a common belief on its head. Defenders of government by law and constitution contrast the rule of *nomos* with the arbitrary will of a tyrant or some other regime with absolute power; cf. Hdt. 7.104.4-5, a deliberate paradox. For Callicles' attitude cf. Critias, DK 88 B 25.5-7, Antiphon B 44 A 3.1-7, Guthrie (1), iii. 68-70. The *nomoi* try to prevent superior men from following their usual practice of protecting and favouring their friends and allies (*philoï*), a traditional sign of power and nobility (*M.* 71e), reflected in the traditional view of virtue as helping friends and harming enemies (*R.* 332ab, Isoc. 1.26, Eur. *Med.* 807-10). This was a regular habit in political office; *R.* 343e, 362c. 'Even though they're rulers in their own city' shows that Callicles thinks of aristocratic office-holders in a democracy; he criticizes them for playing the game and observing democratic rules.

492c 'under what justice and temperance count as fine', literally (if the text is sound) 'under the fine of justice and temperance'.

Callicles concludes that luxury, intemperance (or licence, *akolasia*) and freedom are virtue and happiness. It is generally agreed that happiness involves being able to do what I desire (*epithumein*; cf. 491e, *Lys.* 207e); to be able to do what I want to do is to be free (cf. 491e-492a). This freedom seems to require *akolasia*, which is freedom from restraints or checks (on *kolazein* see 476a); any of these restraints would make me less able to do what I want, and therefore less happy. In so far as self-control requires frustration of desires, it seems to conflict with my happiness (though it may be necessary, e.g., because of the expected reactions of other people). Here as often, freedom is associated with ruling over others to satisfy one's own desires; cf. 452d. It is equally plausible for Callicles to claim that this way of life is *arete* \*; cf. 457c.

492e Both Callicles and Socrates appeal to a conception of *eudaimonia* as the fulfilment of desire. Socrates now remarks that we can fulfil our desires by reducing them to the level that we can realistically hope to satisfy, and so achieve another desirable goal, self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*; *Lys.* 215a, Ar. *EN* 1097b7). This principle is interpreted ascetically in Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.14, 1.6, Democritus B 284, Epicurus, *KD* 15, Lucretius, 5.1118, *SVF* 3.49, 67, 208. Socrates might claim to satisfy the demand for freedom by the same move; if freedom consists in being able to satisfy the desires I have, then if my desires are undemanding, it is easy for me to be free (cf. Feinberg (2), 6 f.). Callicles' reply is reasonable.

492e-493d On the sources of this myth see Dodds, Linforth, Guthrie (2), 161-4.

493a 'that of our soul with appetites in it'. It is natural to supplement 'that' with 'part' here and just below; but the Greek does not show whether Socrates thinks of parts, or, more generally, of aspects of the soul. The same question arises in *R.* 436a-e, 439b-d; cf. Robinson (3), 44. But at least Socrates seems to refer to a subset of desires in anyone's soul, which are particularly developed in the foolish man. He may mean this in speaking of 'appetites' (*epithumiai*; but cf. 491d). He thinks a subset of the foolish man's desires are intemperate, *akolaston*, and insatiable otherwise there would be no reason to say this about only one part of the soul. Though Socrates does not say so, these desires seem to be liable to conflict with other desires; if some desires are insatiable and others are not, conflict is liable to result. Socrates, then, has reason to advocate self-control because some desires are insatiable; Callicles' defence of intemperance allows freedom to insatiable desires, and since we can never satisfy these, we never achieve happiness (cf. 491e-492a).

But is this answer to Callicles consistent with the Socratic Paradox? The intemperate appetites must surely be good-independent. For either the foolish man's good-dependent desires are insatiable in the same way as his appetites are, or they are not. If they are, insatiability does not, as Socrates claims, distinguish the two parts of the soul. If good-dependent desires are not insatiable, they will conflict with insatiable desires, which must then be good-independent. This recognition of good-independent desires is incompatible with the Socratic Paradox (contrast *Xen. Mem.* 3.9.4-5, Guthrie (1), iii. 454-7, O'Brien, ch. 4). See 499e.

'played on the name'. The passage includes a series of puns, some perhaps etymological. These are taken quite seriously, e.g. at Aesch. *Ag.* 681-90, Soph. *Ajax*, 430-3; Plato considers similar things in the *Cra*.

493bc Socrates uses the image of the leaky jar (see Guthrie (2), 163, 190) to suggest that Callicles' advice to cultivate desires is less attractive than it might have seemed. For the desires which are cultivated will be insatiable; the more they are satisfied, the more demanding they will become, requiring further satisfaction creating further desires.

494a 'Orderly', *kosmios*, is more or less equivalent to 'temperate', *sophron* \*, the opposite of 'intemperate', *akolastos*, see 506e-507a.

494ab Callicles, like Socrates, believes that desires aim at 'filling' or 'satisfaction'. But Socrates has assumed that happiness consists in a permanent state of being filled if I could desire and get everything I need all at once and then always remain filled, I would be well off. Callicles justifiably disputes the assumption that the process of filling is valuable only for the result, the state of being filled. He thinks Socrates has left out the important thing, the pleasure which occurs in the process of filling; since pleasure depends on the influx of desire-satisfying elements, it requires the inflowing process to continue; and now the insatiable desire, far from precluding happiness, seems to be a prime source of pleasure, and therefore of happiness. We should not welcome the continence and self-control that restrains intemperate and insatiable desires.

Callicles says, 'living pleasantly is in this ...' 'In' is ambiguous between 'consisting in' and 'dependent on'; cf. 470e.

Here the argument shifts from general claims about happiness to specific claims about pleasure. Callicles has already advocated the development of appetites to find the necessary fillings for 'pleasures' (i.e. desires for pleasure; 492a); now he rejects Socrates' well-filled man because such a man lacks any pleasure, and so, for Callicles, is less happy than the intemperate man with a large inflow. This view requires pleasure to be at least the predominant component of happiness, i.e. no other combination of components must ever outweigh the value of pleasure.

Is Plato fair in making Callicles endorse hedonism? Callicles' claims so far are these:

J: Conventional justice should not be observed.

T: Conventional temperance should not be observed.

P: Pleasure is the good.

On J and T see 491e-492a. Plato has now suggested why T needs to be defended by P; if self-control and restraint of desire are mistaken, happiness must depend crucially on the process of satisfying desires; the component of happiness achieved in this process is pleasure; and so pleasure must at least be the predominant component of happiness.

Socrates might answer Callicles in two ways:

(1) He might reject this conception of what pleasure is.

(2) He might deny that pleasure is the good.

These replies are consistent, but only one is needed. Socrates chooses (2). Callicles has raised questions not raised at all in the *Pr.*, about the nature of the process or state of pleasure or enjoyment; is it just the same as the process of filling, or some condition resulting from it? And does this account of pleasure as filling apply to all pleasures, or must different accounts be given of pleasure

taken in different objects, e.g. in eating, listening to a symphony, lying in a chair, going for a walk? On pleasure and filling cf. *R.* 584b-585e, *Phil.* 34a-35d, 51a-52c, Gosling (1), ad loc., *Ar. EN* 1152b33-1153a7. On pleasure and processes see *Phil.* 53c-55a, Gosling ad loc., *EN* 1173a31-b20, 1174a19-b14, Gosling (3), chs. 3-5. The *G.* does not pursue any of these questions. Socrates does not challenge Callicles' account of what pleasure is (which does not imply that he accepts it). He thereby leaves open the possibility that a more sophisticated hedonism, with a different conception of pleasure, might avoid Socrates' objections; but then he might ask whether this sophisticated hedonism can defend Callicles' claims J and T.

494b The 'torrent-bird', *charadrios*, is normally identified with the stone-curlew, reputed to excrete as fast as it eats (cf. Dodds). It is named after the streams or torrents (*charadra*) where it normally lives (see *Ar. HA* 614b35-615a1); and perhaps its name, as well as its habits, appealed to Plato here.

On these demanding desires see *Phil.* 45d-47b.

494c 'The power to fill them and enjoy it' (*dunamenon pleroun \* chaironta*). Though the Greek is unclear, Callicles seems to mean that what I enjoy is the process of filling; this explains why the successions of emptying and filling are necessary for happiness.

494bc Whereas Callicles has previously encouraged us to develop a number of extravagant desires and satisfy them, Socrates suggests that if I have only one demanding desire for a very trivial satisfaction, such as scratching, and I can satisfy that without limit, then I have the enjoyment sufficient for happiness. Why should Callicles accept this apparently important alteration in his position? Socrates forces him to say what he meant by 'all desires'; does he mean:

(a) we should cultivate a variety of desires; or

(b) it doesn't matter which desire we cultivate, as long as we cultivate and satisfy it intensely?

Socrates suggests that Callicles means (b), and 494b suggested that too. Should Callicles have chosen (a)? It might have been a more plausible position; but it would not have supported T (see 494ab); for the cultivation of a variety of desires may require order and self-control, which Callicles rejects. The more extreme position (b) is needed to justify the rejection of that self-control which inhibits some intense desires and satisfactions. Cf. 491e, 499b.

494d 'and if pleasantly, then happily?' Callicles agrees that pleasure

is sufficient for happiness. He has already insisted, 494a, that it is necessary.

494e4 'when these all come to a head' or 'the conclusion (*kephalaion*) of these'. Socrates plays on *kephalaion* ('conclusion, summary') and *kephale* \* ('head'). used in el.

494e-495a Socrates sometimes appears to be asking questions of this form:

(1) Does my pleasure, e.g. in this meal or this piece of music, make me happy?

This is a normal use of 'happy' in English, but not a normal use of *eudaimon*\* in Greek (nor the normal use of e.g. 'the pursuit of happiness', which is closer to the Greek view). To be *eudaimon*\* is to be well off, to be a happy person living a happy life, and I can hardly decide that from looking at a single action (cf. Ar. *EN* 1098a17-19). This is the point of phrases like 'the *life* of a curlew', 'the life of catamites', 'continuing to scratch all your life'. In the first two phrases 'life', *bios*, refers to a whole way of life, not just to particular episodes of living (cf. 486d; Jaeger, ii.46, 'human existence regarded not as the mere lapse of time, but as a clear and comprehensible unity, a deliberately shaped life-pattern'; Cooper, 160), as in the two 'lives' contrasted in 485a ff.; Socrates suggests that the unattractive lives mentioned here are the logical result of the life Callicles advocated there. And so Socrates is asking, not (1), but (2) Does my having more pleasure than pain over my life as a whole make my life a happy one?

495a Socrates asks Callicles whether he thinks

(a) 'the same thing is pleasant and good', *to auto hedu\* kai agathon*; or

(b) 'there is something of pleasant things which is not good', *einai ti ton\* hedeon\* ho ouk estin agathon*.

'Something' might mean 'some part', i.e. some subset (cf. 488cd). In that case Socrates will be asking whether 'pleasant' and 'good' are coextensive, so that something is pleasant if and only if it is good. We might also take (a) to mean this. But it is idiomatic in Greek to omit definite articles after 'to be', so that (a) might be asking whether the pleasant and the good are the same thing, i.e. whether the property of being pleasant and the property of being good are the same property. If 'pleasant' and 'good' are merely coextensive. Callicles might be right to say that someone who pursues pleasure will always achieve the good, but still might not have explained what someone aims at in aiming at the good, or what makes

it good. But he has implied that the pleasure in a life is what makes it a good life over all; to justify this claim he should assert (a), as a claim about property-identity, which would not involve the implausible claim that 'pleasant' and 'good' mean the same. See 465a, 488cd, *Pr.* 354a-c, C. C. W. Taylor, on 355c1-5, Irwin, 104.

Socrates says that Callicles does not distinguish good from bad pleasures, but advocates the pursuit of all alike. But Callicles could easily distinguish good pleasures, those which offer more pleasure, from bad ones, those which offer less; if I enjoy eating steak more than I enjoy ice cream, then the pleasure of eating steak is apparently a better pleasure, because more pleasant, than the pleasure of eating ice cream. Socrates should not deny that Callicles can distinguish pleasures this way. He should say that Callicles cannot distinguish them on any other test apart from their yield of pleasure. Here Callicles seems to agree with the position of Socrates in *Pr.* 351b-e; see C. C. W. Taylor ad loc.

495b3 'blessed man'. On 'blessed', *makarios*, see 472d. This is a conventional form of address, but here it may have ironical point, when Callicles' conception of happiness and blessedness is being examined; cf. 'excellent man', 494c3, and 'you're a happy man' (i.e. 'you're lucky'), 497c3.

495cd Socrates returns to Callicles' previous claim that a brave man is wise, *phronimos*, and now assumes that he has knowledge, *episteme* \*. This move may be controversial. In speaking of *phronesis*\* Callicles was thinking of practical common sense and sagacity, not necessarily expressed in a formal body of knowledge, *episteme*\*, which Socrates identifies with a craft, *technē*\*; see 459e. But Socrates might ask how a claim to wisdom is to be justified, except by some theoretical knowledge which he identifies with a craft.

The argument returns to the earlier question about rhetoric and genuine knowledge. Callicles accepts two virtues accepted by Socrates, wisdom and courage (though he has a different view of brave and wise actions), and rejects two others, temperance and justice. Socrates argues that Callicles cannot accept the first pair without accepting the second pair.

Socrates again says that Callicles believes that 'the same thing is pleasant and good'; this might imply only coextensiveness of the two terms. But then Callicles is said to believe that knowledge and courage are different from each other and from *the* good, while the pleasant is not different from the good. Callicles is taken to believe that the pleasant and the good are the same, i.e. that pleasantness and godness are the same property. Sometimes the argument

mentions (1) pleasure (*hedone* \*, abstract noun) and the good (*to agathon*, neuter adjective functioning, as is common in Greek, as an abstract noun), as in 'the good for horses', i.e. what is good for horses, the condition in which they are well off. Sometimes it mentions (2) the pleasant (*to hedon*\*, adjective) and the good (*to agathon*, adjective), as in 'a good meal'. The abstract nouns designate the goal, the adjectives the states of affairs that promote the goal.

The hedonist position gives an account of both (1) and (2):

(1) The final good is pleasure, i.e. someone is happy when he has pleasure on the whole, i.e. when he has a large surplus of pleasure over pain.

(2) The goodness of an action or condition is its tendency to promote the good, i.e. the final good; since the final good is over-all pleasure, the goodness of an action is its pleasantness, i.e. its tendency to promote over-all pleasure.

Usually we say that an action or condition is pleasant if it is a source of pleasure by itself; in this sense it may be pleasant to eat a quart of ice cream, but it is painful to have a tooth filled because it is a source of pain by itself. Now (1) and (2) do not justify our tendency to call such an action pleasant without qualification. If my ice cream eating causes more pain than pleasure on the whole (because it gives me stomach-ache tomorrow, or makes me painfully overweight in the future), it is painful, while the tooth-filling may be both good and pleasant, when the consequences are considered. While we often use 'good' this way, to include good consequences, we do not so often use 'pleasant' this way. On 'good' and 'pleasant' see *Pr.* 353c-354e.

Callicles agrees that

(a) Courage and knowledge are different from the good.

(b) Courage and knowledge are different from each other.

(c) Pleasure is the same as the good.

Socrates clearly means to reject (c). It would be natural for Callicles, as for most people, to accept (b). If courage is the high spirit and resolution making us fulfil our purposes (491b). it might be present even in a foolish man. Callicles' superior man needs both courage and wisdom if he is to have the right aims for himself. Socrates has already assumed the identity of courage and wisdom (477e), and Callicles' conception of courage denies the identity. Socrates rejects (b) at 507b. It is harder to see whether Socrates rejects (a). Callicles has not claimed, and (a) does not say, that courage and knowledge are not good. To reject (a) Socrates would need to show that being brave and wise is a part of, not merely a means to, happiness. But he never shows this in the *G.*; see 507c.

495e1 'Nor Callicles either'. We might supply a verb in the present tense (the tense of the previous verb) or in the future. The tense and mood of 'whenever he views' (the aorist subjunctive, *hotan theasetai* \*) allow, as does 'whenever ...' in English, either a present or a future supposition. Socrates has previously suggested that Polus himself does not agree with what Polus himself is now saying, because his better-entrenched beliefs are inconsistent with it; see 461e. The point here may be the same.

495e-496a First Socrates makes Callicles admit that doing well and doing badly are opposites, like health and sickness, which cannot be compresent in the same thing; then he illustrates his point with examples from parts of the body, which shows what he means by 'in the same thing', i.e. in the same part.

'Pleasant' and 'painful' translate *hedu\** and *aniaron*, and 'pleasure' translates *hedone\**. 'Enjoyment' and 'distress' and cognates translate *chairein* and *lupeisthai* and cognates. Socrates uses no abstract noun derived from *chairein*; *hedone\** is the only corresponding abstract noun. It is hard to see any significant difference between the members of each of the pleasure-pain pairs.

496b-e The argument proceeds as follows:

- (1) Doing well and doing badly are opposites.
- (2) Opposites cannot be compresent in the same thing.
- (3) Therefore doing well and doing badly cannot be compresent in the same thing.
- (4) An appetite, e.g. thirst, is painful.
- (5) Drinking when we are thirsty is pleasant.
- (6) In drinking when we are thirsty we have pleasure and pain at the same time.
- (7) Therefore pain and pleasure can be compresent in the same thing.
- (8) Therefore having pain and having pleasure are not the same as doing well and doing badly.

There is no reason to reject the claim in (6); contrast Adkins (3) 280n., answered by Guthrie (1), iv. 291n. We might say that what is pleasant, strictly speaking, is not just 'drinking', but 'drinking-when-thirsty'; if we say this, we prevent Socrates from substituting 'pleasure when in pain' for 'drinking when thirsty'. But then we must also agree with him that 'drinking when thirsty when thirsty is pleasant' is true, though redundant; and if 'pleasure' is substituted here for 'drinking when thirsty', Socrates can still say 'pleasure when in pain is pleasant'. His substitutions are legitimate. But do they show that pleasure and pain can be compresent 'in the same thing'?

in the relevant way? If I am healthy and sick, I am healthy in one part or aspect and sick in another. Why might we not also say that I enjoy in one part and feel pain in another? Apparently we can treat pleasure and pain as ordinary opposites satisfying (2). (On a similar question about 'parts' in *R.* iv see above on 493a.)

But even apart from this difficulty, what does Socrates' conclusion prove? He shows that I can have some pleasure and some pain together. But equally I can in some ways be well off and in other ways be badly off at the same time. I cannot be well off over all and badly off over all at the same time; but neither can I be having pleasure over all (i.e. having more pleasure than pain) and having pain over all at the same time. Socrates does not show that having pleasure and pain over all are different from being well off and being badly off over all; see Crombie (1), i.247. Socrates' argument has ignored the distinction in the use of 'pleasure' mentioned at 495de. It does not follow that Plato is unaware of the distinction; for he does not rely heavily on this argument, but begins another at 497e. Perhaps it is only a preliminary argument, making clear how the hedonist position must be understood.

496d 'every lack and appetite'. The scope of 'appetite', *epithumia*, is not clear; see on 493a. If it includes all desire, Socrates means that it all involves the filling of some gap or 'lack'; but if it includes only the good-independent subset of desires, not all desire need involve emptying and filling. Cf. *R.* 584bc, *Phil.* 51a-52c.

496e 'and drinking is a filling of the lack and a pleasure?' 'Pleasure' here is apparently a source of pleasure, rather than the pleasure associated with it. Callicles' previous remarks have not shown how pleasure is associated with the process of drinking whether it just is the process of replenishment, or is some psychic state associated with it. Nor is it clear whether the replenishment is a purely physical, or a psychic, process (cf. *Phil.* 31d-35a). It is common enough, in any case, to describe an activity, as well as its resultant pleasure, as 'a pleasure'; e.g. Mill, ch. iv, calls music a pleasure; see also Kenny, 127. On pleasure see 491e, 499e; on pleasure and sensations see Ryle (2), ch. 4, Gosling (3), chs. 3-5.

497ac Callicles resorts to abuse (cf. *Ar. Top.* 160b10-13, 161a21-4) and objects to the dialectical refutation; see 453bc, 457e-458d, 461bc, 482de.

497e 'Don't you call good men good by the presence of goods (*agatha*, neuter plural adjective), just as you call beautiful those to

whom beauty (*kallos*, noun) is present?' Expressions of the form 'The *F* is present to *x*' or *F*-ness (abstract noun) is present to *x*' are standard ways of saying that *x* is *F*, that *F* is predicated of *x*; cf. *Lys.* 217c-e, *Ch.* 158e. The idiom itself presupposes no definite ontological doctrine (cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 391, *Soph.* Ant. 254). It fits neatly into Socrates' ontology however explicit this may be which makes 'the *F*' and '*F*-ness' refer to a constituent of the *F* thing; the pious in Socrates, or piety in Socrates, is some state of his soul, what is pious about him; see Penner (2), 44-9. Similar idioms are used in later dialogues to express the relation of separated Forms to particulars (e.g. *Phd.* 100d); but the idioms themselves do not require any doctrine of separated Forms; see Vlastos (2), 35 f., Guthrie (1), iv. 307.

Socrates suggests that just as *x* is beautiful by the presence of beauty, so *x* is good by the presence of goods; and since, on Callicles' view, pleasures are goods, a man who has pleasures will be a good man. Callicles might object:

(1) The presence of *F* in *x* is not always sufficient to make *x* *F*; cf. *Lys.* 217c-e. And so the presence of pleasures need not be sufficient to make *x* good.

(2) Socrates might reply that *x* is good in so far as *x* has goods present, so that the more pleasure *x* has the better *x* is (cf. *Phil.* 55b). Callicles might deny the parallel between 'beautiful man' and 'good man'. He can accept both (a) *x* is well off by the presence of intrinsic goods, and (b) *x* is good, i.e. virtuous, by the presence of virtue (506d), an instrumental, not an intrinsic, good. Socrates' illegitimate combination of (a) and (b) causes trouble for Callicles.

Callicles should maintain (2), and rely on Gorgias' definition of virtue as power; cf. 452d. If virtue is the power to acquire pleasure, I am not virtuous just because I stumble on some pleasure. How well does the rest of Socrates' argument work if Callicles' position is understood this way?

497e-498c Callicles now agrees that sometimes cowards have greater pains, and greater pleasures, than brave men have. The greater pains are relevant because they have previously agreed that to gain large pleasures, we must have large gaps to be filled, and therefore large pains; and so the coward seems more capable of maximum pleasure than the brave man is.

499ab Socrates' argument is illegitimate for the reasons noticed on 497e. But suppose he had begun with what Callicles could fairly be expected to admit; how effective would his argument have been? He would have had to claim that the coward is no less capable of securing

pleasure for himself than the brave man, and is therefore just as wise, on Callicles' view of wisdom. Callicles might deny this, and say that though the coward may have episodes of pleasure more intense than the brave man's, still it is the brave man who on the whole has the knowledge to maximize his *over-all* pleasure in life; cf. 496bc.

But this defence would cause trouble for Callicles:

(1) Suppose that the brave man enjoys more pleasure over all, even though on particular occasions he may have less intense episodes of pleasure. In that case the way to maximize pleasure may not be Callicles' way, to make episodes of pleasure as intense as possible; and then Callicles loses his argument for an uncontrolled life devoted to intense present satisfaction.

(2) Socrates might reject the claim that the brave man is a more successful long-term pleasure-seeker than the coward. For how do we know that the coward will not achieve more and more intense pleasures which may seem to him to outweigh the increased pain he suffers? Indeed, this seems very likely for the pleasures advocated by Callicles. Since they can be maximized only by maximizing the pains which they remove, surely the coward alternating between severe pain and huge relief is best equipped to maximize pleasure? The claim that Callicles' preferred types of pleasure will be maximized by prudent planning is not easy to defend. If this is Socrates' reply, it is a general challenge to hedonism, including the doctrine of the *Pr.*, which defended courage as a virtue because it maximized the agent's over-all pleasure, 359c-360a. Socrates must now deny that there is any purely hedonistic reason for valuing bravery over cowardice. Since hedonism advocates the maximization of pleasures, it cannot reject the maximization of Calliclean pleasures; and if they are not best maximized by prudent planning, hedonism cannot justify prudent planning, and therefore cannot show that courage is a virtue.

The argument so far makes (2) the better reply to Callicles. If we agree that the maximum surplus of any pleasure is the good, as Callicles claims, then the *Pr.*'s assumption that the normal virtues of courage and temperance maximize pleasure is questionable. The argument here tends to undermine the hedonism of the *Pr.* Contrast Guthrie (1), iv. 203 f., Shorey (1), 24-7.

These possibilities about the *G.* and the *Pr.* remain open:

(a) Plato would appeal to (1) above, to show that Callicles' preferred life does not maximize pleasure; this appeal would rely on the hedonist doctrine of the *Pr.* (cf. 465a). Nothing follows about the relative date of the dialogues.

(b) Plato believes when he writes the *G.* that these objections refute hedonism; but he later sees that because of (1) he has taken too

crude a view of hedonism, and the *Pr.* defends hedonism.

- (c) Plato accepted hedonism in the *Pr.*; but then (2) suggests to him that hedonism should be rejected.
- (d) Plato never accepts hedonism when he writes the *Pr.* Nothing follows about relative dates.
- (e) Plato changes his mind about hedonism, but for some other reason.

Here (a) and (b) assume that Plato thinks that (1) adequately answers Callicles. The pleasures advocated by Callicles make this hard to believe; for these are just the sorts of pleasures for which (1) is least plausible (see discussion of (1) and (2) above). The *Pr.* signally fails to consider these pleasures, even though they make it hard to defend courage and temperance as virtues within a hedonist theory there Socrates was refusing to distinguish good and bad pleasures except by quantity of pleasure (337c, 351b-e, 358a). If Plato wrote the *Pr.* before the *G.*, it would be strange if he prominently displayed the Calliclean pleasures in the *G.* and supposed that they made no difference to the argument of the *Pr.* If he wrote the *G.* first, it is curious that the Calliclean pleasures are not discussed in the *Pr.*, when they are relevant to the main theme of the dialogue. It is more reasonable to suppose that Plato accepts (2), and draws the reasonable inference from the argument with Callicles; this is why he departs further from the *Pr.* at 499de, in recognizing both good and bad pleasures. Both *R.* ix and the *Phil.* follow the *G.* in recognizing good and bad pleasures, and examine their varieties more carefully than the *G.* does. It is natural to suggest that these dialogues reflect Plato's conviction that his initial over-confident acceptance of hedonism in the *Pr.* rested on an oversimplified conception of pleasure and its value. The *G.* is the first sign of that conviction.

These points support (c) above. Further questions about the interpretation of the *Pr.* are raised by (d); see C. C. W. Taylor, on 351c-e, 360e, Hackforth, Sullivan, Irwin, 106, 121.

Socrates alleges a conflict in Callicles' beliefs between his advocacy of courage and resolution and his advocacy of unlimited satisfaction for any present desire. And whether (1) or (2) above is Socrates' answer, this conflict is demonstrated. Callicles himself presented courage as an ordering of desires, so that someone could fulfil his plans without distraction by conflicting 'cowardly' desires, 491b; but if it is best to satisfy present desires without restraint, then the restraint needed for courage is also proscribed. Callicles' initial view of a good and wise man presented someone who fulfilled his longer-term plans resolutely; but his advocacy of unrestricted desire-satisfaction conflicts with that view. Socrates has shown

that Callicles cannot consistently accept courage and reject temperance; the two virtues go together, and indeed are scarcely distinguishable, since both require someone to pursue his longer-term goals and avoid distraction by present satisfactions.

We might try to defend Callicles' hedonism by rejecting courage Socrates, following the usual practice of the *elenchos* (see Intr. § 2) does not consider this option. Socrates must assume that someone will think the rational planning of his life and the coherent pursuit of an ordered set of goals is preferable to the disorderly life of desire-cultivation and desire-satisfaction advocated by Callicles. Someone who follows Callicles' advice will not live without a plan altogether, since he will be planning to cultivate and satisfy his most demanding desires. But his desires will frustrate each other; for the immoderate pursuit of one will frustrate his pursuit of others, and even make it harder for him to plan for future satisfactions; someone who gets drunk frequently may make it harder to get other things he wants, even the resources needed for getting drunk. Socrates must say that it is part of happiness or living well to exercise our powers of rational planning in arranging coherent and ordered goals. If this claim is hard to reject, it is hard to accept the 'consistent' hedonist's reply to the argument against Callicles.

499b Callicles suggests that he has been joking with Socrates, and that Socrates should have realized it; cf. 482c, 485a, e. But he has been beaten. For he has not vindicated his rejection of temperance if his unrestricted hedonism is not accepted; as Socrates will show, his admission of good and bad pleasures conflicts with the central part of his previous arguments. ('Young boys': cf. 485de.)

If Callicles' hedonism has been refuted, how much of his original attack on conventional justice has been undermined? See 491e-492a, 494a-c. He must now admit that courage and temperance are virtues, and good for the agent; he cannot justifiably criticize conventional justice simply because it requires self-control. But is the self-control belonging to temperance all that is required by conventional justice? Self-control and temperance have been defended by their promotion of the agent's interest; why should a critic not say that conventional justice demands self-control from me in other people's interest, not my own? The critic must show by some other argument than Callicles' that conventional justice requires something against my interest. Socrates can fairly leave the burden of proof here, if he simply means to refute one line of attack on conventional justice. But if he wants to vindicate conventional justice, he must show how conventional justice is required by conventional temperance, and so benefits the agent. See 507b.

499de Socrates' apparent denial of the identity of pleasure and good would be surprising if he were assuming the hedonist doctrine of the *Pr*. It is more reasonable to suppose that he believes correctly that he has raised serious difficulties for that doctrine, for the reasons considered on 499ab.

What is meant by the division of pleasures into the 'beneficial', *ophelimon* \*, and the 'harmful', *blaberon* (equivalent to 'evil', *kakon*; cf. 474c)? We can see why some pleasures, e.g. the pleasures of excessive eating, are harmful, because they frustrate our other ends, and some others are beneficial because they promote our other ends e.g. if we come to enjoy taking healthy exercise. But are there not other pleasures?

(1) Are there not intrinsically bad pleasures, e.g. in wanton cruelty, which may not harm our other ends (cf. Ar. *EN* 1176a10-24)?

(2) Are there not intrinsically good pleasures, e.g. in being kind or generous, which are to be chosen for themselves apart from our other ends (cf. *EN* 1104b3-8)?

(3) These pleasures are intrinsically good or bad because of their objects what we take the pleasure in. But are there not other pleasures whose objects make them neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad, but which are good just because they are pleasures, apart from any other end they promote (cf. R. 357b)?

Here we should remember the general scope of 'harmful' and 'beneficial'; see 474cd. If they include what contributes to our good or harm by being good or evil in itself, why should we agree with Socrates that a craft is needed to choose between good and evil pleasures? We can see why something like craft-knowledge is needed to know the causal consequences of certain pleasures for our other interests. But what kind of craft tells us how to choose types (1)-(3) of pleasures above, when these pleasures are not judged by their causal consequences? A craft is a recognizably rational procedure with definite criteria of rightness and wrongness partly because it assumes some agreed conception of its product; the product is the right product and property produced if it has the right causal characteristics (e.g. if a hammer is good for knocking nails into wood or if a series of movements causes the right tune to be played on a violin). But if pleasures are to be considered good or bad without reference to their causal consequences, how do we know which ones are good and bad, and how do we determine the craft which is to produce them? Perhaps Socrates speaks of harmful and beneficial pleasures because these seem to be the easiest ones for a craft to select; he does not consider the difficulties raised by other good pleasures for his conception of virtue as a craft. See 500e-501c, n.

Pleasures and distresses are also called 'worthy' (*chreston*\*) and

'base' (*poneron* \*); see 464d7-e1, 470e8. Perhaps Socrates uses Callicles' political language here.

'choose and do ... pleasures and distresses'. Perhaps 'do', *prakteon*, means 'achieve' (cf. Cope, 'try to bring about'); or perhaps 'pleasures' and 'distresses' are the actions which are sources of pleasure and distress; cf. 496e.

499e-500a Socrates claims that he and Polus agreed that we 'should', *dein*, do everything for the sake of the good. In fact what they agreed at 467c-468c was that we always *do* pursue what we believe to be good. Perhaps the agreement on that alleged psychological fact does not make the practical advice here superfluous. If what we really want is the good, then we have good reason to see if what we decide to pursue is good; we will do what we can to reach correct beliefs about the goodness of things.

But another view of this advice is possible. If the pleasures advocated by Callicles are the result of pursuing good-independent appetites, Socrates' advice to follow our desire for the good is not idle. But then the admission of such pleasures and appetites conflicts with the Socratic Paradox.

We might take Socrates' advice, then, either of two ways:

- (1) We should make sure, as far as we can, to choose what is really good, not just what seems good to us (no conflict with the Socratic Paradox).
- (2) We should choose what seems good to us over what seems merely pleasant to us (conflict with the Socratic Paradox).

As usual, it is not clear whether Socrates means to recognize good-independent desires; see 491d, 493a. But perhaps 500a2-5 suggests (2) rather than (1).

The words 'we must do', *prakteon*, 'we must choose', *haireteon*, are a further source of ambiguity. These *-teon* endings usually indicate that something should be done rather than that it always is; see C. C. W. Taylor, 190, Goodwin, 368, Kühner-Blass, ii.290; but cf. Ar. *MM* 1208b37-1209a3. The use of 'should', *dein*, in the context suggests that this is their sense (cf. 490c 1-2).

500a Callicles agrees that if there is a difference between good and bad pleasures, we must look for a craftsman, a *technikos*, to choose between them. This is not out of character for Callicles. He also believed that his way of life was not just his personal preference, but the just and objectively right order of nature and society.

500ab How has the argument with Callicles supported Socrates' previous distinction, recalled here, between knacks concerned with

pleasure and crafts concerned with the good?

(1) Callicles supported Polus' and Gorgias' claim (see 491e-492a) that rhetoric is a good for the rhetor, by arguing that it lets him maximize satisfaction of his most demanding desires. If Socrates has shown that this satisfaction does not promote the agent's good, he has shown that the power to satisfy these desires is not an unconditional good.

(2) If rhetoric only promotes the pleasure of its audience, their indiscriminate desire-satisfaction, Socrates' argument shows why that will not be good for them. This result supports Socrates' previous charge, 463a-e, that rhetoric is 'flattery', not really good for the person flattered.

But how does any of this show that rhetoric is not a craft? The argument allows us to say that it is a craft which needs to be strictly controlled by someone with knowledge of the good; the non-identity of pleasure and good rules out the claim that rhetoric is a craft aiming at the good, but not the claim that it is a craft aiming at pleasure without the good. Socrates still assumes that any genuine craft must aim at the good; and that assumption still needs defence.

500b 'contrary to what you think'. See 487e, 495ab, Intr. § 2.

500c 'what way we ought to live'. See 456c, 472c.

500cd Socrates assumes that Callicles' advocacy of unrestrained desire and pleasure is somehow needed to justify the praise of activity over contemplation, and that the collapse of Callicles' case vindicates the contemplative life; cf. 484c. But what does Socrates advocate? 'A life (*bios*; see 494d) in philosophy' suggests a way of life devoted as little as possible to public life (cf. *Tht.* 173c-174b). But Socrates contrasts his preferred way of life with 'conducting politics the way you conduct it now'; perhaps other conceivable forms of public and political life might be more acceptable; see 473e, 515c, 521d.

500e-501a Socrates repeats his attack on 'knacks' in 465a, again claiming that they lack a *logos* (cf. 454de) and that they are concerned with the pleasant rather than the good. What is the relation between these two charges?

Socrates perhaps believes that a craft has some objective standard of what makes a good product, and can explain how each step in production contributes to that product. If the standard is objective, it does not depend on a particular person's whims or desires. (It may

depend on desires; e.g. what makes a good bed depends on people's desire to sleep in reasonable comfort, but whether or not a bed is good from this point of view is a matter of objective fact; it does not depend on whether a particular person likes it.) Now someone who tries to produce pleasure has no objective standard of correctness for his product he depends entirely on whether his customer likes it. Clothes-making is a craft, since there are objective standards for good clothes (comfortable, durable, fitting well, etc.); but fashion-designing, on Socrates' view, is no craft, since it only tries to please the customer.

Why can pleasure-producing knacks give no account? Might a pastry-cook or a fashion-designer not be able to say what reliably pleases his customers and how he produces it? But he could not say what features of his product make it the right one, apart from its effects on the customers. This is why someone with a knack has only habit, experience, and memory (see 462c).

But do Socrates' criteria for a craft challenge his claim that there can be a craft that chooses good and beneficial pleasures (cf. 500a)? There is a craft concerned with bed-making because there is an agreed conception of what a bed should do, and the craftsman finds the procedure for making the product matching our agreed conception. Medical goods are the concern of a craft relying on an agreed conception of health. The craft concerned with goods and pleasures should show us how to choose the good-producing pleasures, according to our agreed conception of the good and of happiness. But have we an agreed conception of happiness? Socrates has not yet found one; and without it how is the craft that produces it to be identified? (Cf. perhaps *M.* 91a-92a, Irwin, 141 f.) On Socrates' analogy between virtue and crafts see Bambrough (1) (an attack). Gibbs (a defence); cf. 505ab, 507ac, 521d.

501a Socrates does not deny that a successful craftsman needs experience of previous efforts at bed-making to make a bed successfully. But a craftsman's knowledge cannot be simply the product of experience; he must know how a bed *ought* to be, because he knows the function of a bed, which determines the right way to make a bed, whether or not anyone has ever made it that way. A pleasure-producer has no conception of the right end for him to aim at apart from what has given pleasure in the past. *Phd.* 96b rejects the reduction of knowledge to experience for reasons similar to those given here, the *Phd.*, however, unlike the *G.*, uses this rejection in an argument for separated Forms.

'making practically no distinctions'; i.e., probably, no distinctions between good and bad pleasures.

'by which (i.e. by what usually happens) it provides its pleasures'. The cook relies on his memory of what has usually been found pleasant by this sort of diner in these circumstances to decide what dishes to provide he has no rational ground for thinking one dish better than another. We may not agree with Socrates that cookery is in this position; enthusiasts may say that even if people begin to prefer cheeseburgers to *coq au vin*, *coq au vin* is still a better dish, and someone who can cook it is a better cook. Fashion-designing or car-styling would be a better example for Socrates. The sad fate of the Ford Edsel illustrates the hazards of flattery.

501d-502a Socrates does not attack all kinds of music, but only flute-playing, professional public lyre-playing, and dithyrambs. Flute-music was attacked by Pythagoreans (Iamblichus, *VP* 111) for bad effects on the character, and by Aristotle, *Pol.* 1341a21-4. The others may be criticized because of the over-elaboration resulting from increased professionalism; cf. *Ar. Pol.* 1341a6-21. Nor does Socrates tell us to give up all kinds of music; he says only that we should not think it produces anything more than pleasure for us. (Or does he mean that we should not choose the pleasures of music because they are not beneficial, even though they may be harmless? See 499de.)

The claim that music produces only pleasure would probably surprise many Athenians; contrast Protagoras at *Pr.* 326ab, and Plato's later view of its educational functions at *R.* 399d, 401d-402a. This later view depends on the recognition of rational and non-rational parts of the soul; but in our present passage the non-rational part is not recognized (contrast 491d. 493a), and so no educational use is found for music.

502b How controversial would Plato's view of tragedy be for his readers? Would they be as unconcerned as we would be over a parallel claim about television soap-operas, or as outraged as some would be over a parallel claim about 'serious' journalism or literature? Explicit evidence that Athenian tragedians were regarded as moral teachers is scanty; Aristoph. *Ran.* 1055 is often discounted (see Dodds, Lloyd-Jones, 145-7, Snell (1), 113-16). But Protagoras insists on the educational value of poets (not mentioning tragedians specifically) at *Pr.* 326ab. In *R.* ii Plato includes the views expressed by poets among the views of justice and happiness he rejects; and in *R.* x he argues elaborately that poets are not moral authorities. There is no reason to think that he is wrong in supposing that the poets would be taken seriously. Many tragedies present conflicts, where the poet presents a strong case on each side; there is no

reason to deny that these conflicts were expected to provoke serious moral reflection.

Socrates has two reasons for refusing to take tragedians seriously:

- (1) They lack the moral craft they need for discussion of moral questions.
- (2) We might concede this, and reply that still they are experts in the craft of writing tragedies. Socrates believes there is no such craft, since tragedy-writing provides no norms for a good play, beyond the pleasure of the audience.

'if something is without pleasure, but beneficial ...' Here the tragedian is said to ignore what *benefits* his audience; previously artists were said to ignore what *improves* the audience. As usual (cf. 464c) Socrates seems to identify the two criticisms. On the poets cf. *Ap.* 22bc, *Ion* 532d-534a. *R.* 595a ff., esp. 602c-606d, attacks tragedy because it appeals to the pleasures and emotions of an inferior part of the soul. The *G.* is silent on this point for the reason mentioned on 501d-502a; cf. 465a.

502cd 'addressed to a large mob of the people'. Tragedy, unlike other forms of rhetoric, is not addressed to the parts of the free adult male population who are present in the Assembly or the courts, but to all citizens and non-citizens in Athens, who, Socrates assumes, would come to a dramatic performance. See Pickard-Cambridge. 263-5.

On tragedy and rhetoric cf. *Isoc.* 15.46. The comparison is apt if Socrates and Isocrates are thinking especially of the formal 'contest'. *agon* in a tragedy, between two points of view expounded in set speeches. The similarity between speeches in plays and other products of rhetoric is especially clear in Euripides; see esp. Solmsen, chs. 1-2.

502e Socrates contrasts speeches intended to please their audience with speeches intended to improve them, not with speeches intended to benefit them. Fourth-century rhetors draw a similar contrast; cf. *Demosth.* 3.3, 3.24, 13.21 f., *Isoc.* 8.3-5, 75, 126, 15.233 f. But they normally contrast the 'good old days' of Athenian power and wealth under plain-speaking, honest leaders like Pericles and Themistocles with later decadence; cf. also *Thuc.* 2.65.8. Plato attacks this conservative-democratic account of the 'great days' of the democracy; for him flattery, responsiveness to public opinion, was not a later corruption of democracy, but an essential property of it throughout its history. See 517c.

'despising the common interest for the sake of their own private interest'. Socrates combines two charges:

(1) Rhetors try to please their audience, not to improve them.

(2) They are out for their own interest, not for the common interest. Does (2) follow from (1)? Perhaps Socrates means that if I were concerned at all for the benefit of my audience, I would realize that it is not achieved by flattery; and so if I flatter them, I must be manipulating them for my own benefit, not for theirs this was the boast of Gorgias and Polus at 452e, 466bc.

A Calliclean might reply that he is capable of altruism; he will seek maximum desire-satisfaction for his audience as well as for himself. Socrates might fairly reply that a Calliclean must value the desire-satisfaction of someone with more demanding desires and larger resources more highly than he values the satisfaction of others; and he can obtain these resources for himself by using other people in his interest.

But why can Socrates' favoured politician not face the same difficulty? He is concerned with his own good above all; and why should he not achieve it by manipulating others? Socrates assumes that the wise individual will aim at his own good, and correspondingly the wise politician will aim at the common good. But the 'correspondingly' is not justified. Socrates' comparison with the craftsman makes it look easy; just as the function of the craftsman, in so far as he is a craftsman, is to make a bed, the function of the politician, as such, is to seek the common good; the description of the craft contains its own goal. But it does not follow that any actual politician behaves the way a politician 'as such' would behave, if he is better off doing something else than fulfilling the goal of a politician. See 504a, R. 345b-347a.

503a Politics and the good of the soul; see 464b, 513d ff. When Socrates mentions some generally admired politicians, Callicles does not express admiration for them, or advocate imitation of them he would presumably advocate different actions (see 492ab). See 515c ff.

503c 'proved himself a good man' (*andra agathon gegonota*; cf. 515d). This phrase is standardly used for someone's proof of being *agathos* in battle, especially by a brave death; cf. Thuc. 1.86.1, 2.35.1, 3.54.3, Adkins (3), 168, 170. Here it is applied to proof of *arete* \* in the successful conduct of public business (easily understood from some of the contexts in Thucydides). Socrates replies that someone may have shown himself a 'good man' to this extent, in public life, without having aimed at the public good, and so without having been a good man in the ways which matter most. See 470e, 516e-517a.

'lately died'. Pericles (see 455e) died in 429, suggesting a dramatic date for this remark irreconcilable with other chronological evidence in this dialogue; cf. 470d, 473e. Thucydides says that Athenian politics began to degenerate after Pericles, 2.65.10-11. The dramatic dating here removes the post-Periclean 'decline' from the argument, and concentrates Plato's attack on the 'respectable' politicians; see 502e.

503de The craftsman keeps his eye on his own intended product, and works so that the material acquires the right 'form' (or 'character', *eidos*) and 'structure' (*taxis*). From having a clear conception of the product the craftsman can work systematically to produce the objectively correct result. The vocabulary used here, and especially the reference to a 'form' and to 'looking to' (*apoblepein*; cf. 475a) some standard, appears also in statements of Plato's later theory of separated Forms; see *R.* 596b. But in the *G.* and in *Cra.* 389a-c, it need not refer to separated Forms. The link between the appeal to a form here and in later dialogues is the importance of normative knowledge not based purely on observation and memory; see 501a. On the development of the Theory of Forms see Ross, ch. 2, White, ch. 1.

Socrates treats painters as craftsmen because they follow a systematic method and aim at some correct result (supposedly, an exact likeness of the original). In *R.* x Plato decides that since they aim at the production of illusions, not of objectively correct results, they do not count as real craftsmen, 596b-598c. They just try to make their customers believe that it is like a bed, rather than showing what a bed really is, when they paint a bed. Apparently Plato has not considered this objection to painters when he writes the *G.*

Here the craft-analogy is applied to virtue with a new twist; cf. 466a. Previously the virtuous man has been regarded as the craftsman or producer of his own virtuous actions, who can also make someone else virtuous by teaching him the same craft-knowledge. But here the politician and the citizens are supposed to be related as shepherd and sheep or as carpenter and wood; a shepherd does not make his sheep into shepherds, and it is no longer obvious why the virtuous man with moral knowledge should teach the citizens the same knowledge. In *R.* iv Plato insists more clearly that the virtue of the other citizens is not the virtue of the rulers, since it does not include knowledge. (Hall discusses these questions.)

'Structure (or 'arrangement', *taxis*) ... order (*kosmos*)'. The apparent assumption that these two terms are equivalent helps the argument at 504a-d, 506de. '*Kosmos*' may be intended to suggest

that the order is elegant and attractive hence the use of the term for 'adornment' (cf. 'cosmetic'); see 523e, Vlastos (10). 3-5.

503e 'Work' (*ergon*) might include either process (working) or thing produced (as in 'work of art') or both; cf. 452a.

504a7 'worthy' (*chreston* \*; see 464d7-e1, 499e)...'wretched' (*mochtheron*\*, instead of *poneron*\*, which is contrasted with *chreston*\* elsewhere in the dialogue). *Chreston*\* was previously applied to healthy conditions; its equally regular use for good and bad characters makes Socrates' claim look easy when he says that good and bad character is a matter of health and sickness.

504a-d The good order produced in the body by a medical craftsman is health and strength. Socrates revives the analogy used at 477bc, and seeks a parallel for the soul. He assumes that good order is 'law' (*nomos*) in the soul, expressed in justice and temperance. It is common to associate order, *kosmos*, or orderliness, *kosmiotes*\*, with *sophrosune*\*, and hence with moderation in pressing my desires on others, and hence with justice; cf. Gorgias B 6, Thuc. 1.84.3, Phocylides, fr. 11 (Diehl), Aristoph. *Plut.* 89, 563-5, Lysias, 21.19, 26.3, North, 94 f. But Socrates is surely not entitled to take all this for granted. See 499b, 506e-507a.

504c Socrates understood 'healthy' as 'productive of health'; but 'justice' and '*nomos*' seem to be the names of conditions which make people just and lawful. Perhaps 'makes' is logical rather than causal here. But Socrates does not seem to observe a distinction between the use of the abstract noun for the state of the person, and the use of the adjective for the actions tending to produce the state; for this distinction see *R.* 443e-444a. See 478e, 509b, 522b.

504d '... that rhetor, the craftsman, the good one'. Socrates seems to concede the possibility of the kind of rhetor he has been seeking (503ab), who is concerned with the improvement and benefit of the citizens apart from their pleasure. However, someone becomes a 'true rhetor' only in so far as he abandons rhetorical techniques, and simply prescribes what is needed whether or not it is palatable he does not use rhetorical methods for different ends. On the different views of *R.* x and the *Phdr.*, relying on the division of the soul, see 465a, 501d-502a.

504de The programme for the 'true rhetor' or 'true politician' sounds like a first sketch for the regime described in the *R.*:

- (1) The politician is a craftsman who is expert in moral and political questions, with the authority accorded to an expert.
- (2) Socrates does not say that the regime will be undemocratic, or that the ruler will have absolute power. But he does not argue for democratic supervision of the ruler.
- (3) The ruler tries to improve people's souls, guided by his conception of the virtues; cf. *R.* 500d.
- (4) The ruler is assumed to be trustworthy; his power will not corrupt him, because he has knowledge. The Socratic Paradox shows why the ruler will always do what he thinks good for him. But why should he think that improving or benefiting other people is always good for him? This is a hard question both in the *G.* and in the *R.*

Even though this sounds like a sketch of the *R.*, it may not all be executed there. For there Plato does not think the ruler's virtue and knowledge is simply a craft (see Irwin, 201), and does not suppose that his methods will be purely cognitive. The education described in *R.* ii-iii has no place in the *G.*; see 501d-502a.

504e 'that they acquire the rest of virtue, *arete* \*, and get rid of vice, *kakia*'. On the scope of virtue see 477a-e, 479b, 492e. What does it include here? Socrates seems to conflate (a) a virtue from the point of view of other people's expectations e.g. the justice and temperance produced in the citizens for the benefit of the state; (b) virtues measured by the agent's own interests and expectations. Callicles was concerned with (b); and in this sense Socrates has surely not yet proved that justice is a virtue. On the equivocal use of 'virtue' in *R.* 335b-d see Irwin, 179.

505ab By relying on the analogy of justice and health, Socrates avoids questions about political authority. He assumes that there is some craft-knowledge parallel to the doctor's knowledge about the body, and that the psychic physician should have power and authority to prescribe treatment for others. The suggestion that a healthy man can be allowed to do what he wants would have surprising results for Socrates' claims about political authority; it would apparently make the expert's control only temporary. But see Plato's answer. *R.* 590e-591a.

The craftsman's knowledge is not of what a bed should be like, but of how to make something matching his true conception of what a bed should be like. The user, someone who sleeps on beds, must tell him what a bed should be like. Must the politician not rely on the desires and tastes of his customers, as the doctor relies on his patients' admitted desire to be healthy? In that case the politician seems to rely on the views of the many, though not in the way the

rhetor relies on them; see 500e-501a, Bambrough (1), 189-99. Plato tries to confine the knowledge which controls the craftsman to the *expert* user, e.g. the expert rider who knows what a bridle should be; *R.* 601c-e, *Cra.* 390bc. But does this remove the difficulty? There is an expert user of bridles because they are used in a further craft, horsemanship; but there is no expert sleeper and no craft of sleepmanship. Now is the political craft guided by a superior craft? If not, how can there be an expert user of it, or an expert customer? Here is one reason why Plato might come to deny in the *R.*, that political knowledge is just a craft; see 504de.

The argument of this whole passage, together with the earlier discussion of punishment, develops political doctrines which are entirely reasonable inferences from the position of the Socratic Dialogues, whether or not the historical Socrates made the inferences himself. There is no reason to believe that Plato is imposing his own anti-liberal views on Socrates' essentially liberal position; see 488e, 490a.

But do Socratic and Platonic moral doctrines really require these political conclusions? Supporters and opponents alike often suppose that the following argument is valid:

- (1) There are experts about what is right and wrong in ethics and politics.
- (2) They can be recognized.
- (3) They can be relied on to use their knowledge for the common good, not for their own interest.
- (4) Therefore they should be given political power.

Many liberal writers seek to avoid (4) by rejecting some of (1)-(3). An especially popular target is (1). See Popper. i.62-7. 235 f. But in fact a further premiss is needed:

- (5) The only ground for general participation in government is the lack of recognized and trustworthy experts.

Socrates surely believes (5); see 455b-d, *Pr.* 319a-320c. The extension of expert authority from the particular crafts to political questions assumes that political questions are sufficiently similar to those dealt with by the other crafts. Socrates sometimes assumes that freedom should be allowed only to someone with the knowledge to use it for his own benefit (*Lys.* 210ab, where, as often, freedom is combined with rule over others; see 452d above). If he makes the same assumption about political freedom, he is justified in accepting (5), and hence (4). But is the assumption justified?

505a2-3 'wretchedness... wretchedly'. See 486b3, n.

505b Socrates explicitly claims, as he assumes all along, that

improving is benefiting, that it is good for me to have a good soul. This is reasonable if 'good soul' and 'virtuous soul' are explained as 'soul equipped for living well and happily'. But if virtue is measured by the agent's happiness, why is justice a virtue?

'restrain it from its appetites'; i.e. restrain it from getting the objects of its appetites, as in 'restraining it from what it has an appetite for', just below.

505bc 'tempering it' (*kolazein*). Socrates argues for the value of *kolazein* (correction or punishment; see 476a) by saying that it is needed to prevent *akolasia* (intemperance, licence, lack of control). He returns to Callicles' previous defence of *akolasia* (492e) as *arete* \*, against Socrates' earlier argument for punishment. Socrates has now argued more carefully than he argued against Polus that a wise man will prefer temperance over intemperance, and so he has given a better reason for valuing 'tempering' or punishment (*kolazein*) but only if punishment is really the best way to make someone more temperate.

What is implied in the talk of ordering and restraining desires? The two views in this dialogue about good-independent desires (see 491d) suggest two different answers:

- (1) The unhealthy soul has a faulty conception of its good, and needs to be restrained because otherwise its desires all good-dependent will mislead it.
- (2) Its strong good-independent desires make it incontinent, so that it needs control.

Socrates talks about denying satisfaction of the 'appetites', ambiguously as usual (cf. 491d, 505a). The reference to order and disorder suggests (2) more readily than (1), since a soul liable to incontinence would be more obviously disordered than a merely misguided soul would be. And if I am to control myself, (2) is required; (1) leaves no room for self-control. Socrates seems to imply that an individual is supposed to control his own desires in the way that a doctor is supposed to control his patient's desires, which suggests (2).

Socrates' previous argument against the value of rhetoric assumed the truth of the Socratic Paradox. The defence of temperance and continence assumes the falsity of the Paradox. The conclusions of these two main lines of argument in the dialogue are never satisfactorily reconciled.

505c Callicles' reluctance to take Socrates' painful medicine is explained by his misguided desires, which need restraint; cf. 458d, n., 475d, 513c.

505c10 The contrast between a 'story' or 'tale', *muthos*, and a rational argument or discussion, *logos*, is introduced casually here, to be developed at 523a.

505d-506a Socrates rejects the insinuation that the elenctic form is really only a show, and that continuous speeches would do as well. Since he has no knowledge about these questions, he must show that his views will win the assent of an interlocutor who sincerely examines his own beliefs and faces the consequences. See 487e, 508e, *Ch.* 166d. Perhaps the interlocutor's role shrinks from now on in the dialogue, not because of Plato's preference for systematic exposition (the *elenchos* does not prevent that), but because he realizes that he has not worked out adequate grounds for all his claims; cf. 507b.

506cd Socrates begins with the over-simplified account of the relation between the presence of a good and a person's being good, which he used against Calicles at 497de. Here he also claims that the presence of goods produces 'goodness' (excellence, virtue; *arete* \*; see 457c) in whatever it is present in an equally implausible claim. The parallel with 'When pleasure is present, we have pleasure (enjoyment)' should surely be 'When good is present, we are well off (i.e. it is good for us).' In 'We choose pleasure for the sake of the good', 'the good' might be intrinsic or instrumental good both were involved at 499c-500a. It is equally unclear whether a virtue is supposed to be an instrumental or an intrinsic good. In any case, though, why should the presence of just any instrumental or intrinsic good make me virtuous? Socrates seems to assume, and should say more clearly, that a virtue is good for the agent; and he has to prove that justice is a virtue in this way. See 504e.

506de This passage illustrates the general functional use of '*arete*\*' and '*agathos*'; cf. 457c, 459d, *R.* 335bc, 353bc, 601d, *HMi.* 373d-375d. The connection between goodness and structure, *taxis*, is clear for artefacts, where a good product must have its materials organized in a certain structure. Similarly, a good race-horse or carthorse has its strength and capacities organized to serve some function, not simply left to its momentary desires. Socrates claims that a good soul needs the same kind of organization. At 504de he argued that organization and order were needed to make something good good for other people's purposes. Here he needs to claim that some order is good for the agent's purposes. Can he show that the two orders will be the same?

506e-507a Socrates now infers that the kind of order and organization which makes a soul a good one is temperance. First he moves from 'structure', *taxis*, to 'order' *kosmos*; cf. 503e. It is generally assumed that someone who is 'orderly', *kosmios*, is thereby temperate, *sophron* \* cf. 494a, 504b, *Ch.* 159b; and if 'order' is understood this way, the move from 'structure' to 'order' seems more controversial. Socrates could defend himself as follows:

- (1) The relevant goal is the agent's happiness or faring well.
- (2) Following the analogy of the crafts, a good man well equipped for living well has his desires organized so as to secure his happiness.
- (3) To secure happiness a man must have his desires organized so as to achieve his over-all goals.
- (4) If he restrains none of his desires, he will not achieve his happiness (see argument with Callicles).
- (5) Therefore restraint of desires for the sake of over-all goals is part of good organization of desires.
- (6) This restraint is temperance.
- (7) Therefore temperance is worth while.

This argument can reasonably be derived from the discussion with Callicles earlier.

507ab Socrates now continues the argument:

- (8) A temperate man will do what is fitting.
- (9) If he does what is fitting, he will do what is just towards men and pious towards the gods.

If (8) is to follow from (1)-(7), 'fitting' should mean 'fitting for the agent's happiness'; but (9) seems to need 'fitting for other people' (in the case of justice), i.e. in their interest. The gap between (8) and (9) might be filled by the conventional assumption that a temperate man will do what is fitting for a good man to do, and will therefore also act justly (cf. 506de, and Xen. *Hell.* 3.14.6, on 'fitting'). But Socrates is not entitled to this assumption in arguing against Callicles; this was not included in (6).

To defend his position against Callicles Socrates must defend one of these claims:

- (a) Justice is conventional justice, and that is in the agent's interest.
- (b) Real justice is not conventional justice, but it is in the agent's interest.
- (c) Conventional justice is worth while for the agent even though it is not in his interest.

Socrates never accepts (c); see 457d, 482cd. In this dialogue he does not decide between (a) and (b). On similar questions about *R.* iv see Sachs, Vlastos (5), Kraut, Irwin, 208-17.

In the argument with Polus justice seemed to be the primary

virtue, unclearly associated with courage, temperance, and wisdom; see 477b, de. Temperance became prominent only when Callicles argued from the foolishness of temperance to the foolishness of conventional justice. Now Socrates seems to have identified justice and temperance, and to have made temperance the primary virtue. The very same condition of soul produces both just and temperate actions; and it is best called 'temperance' rather than 'justice' because it is above all the order in the soul which promotes the agent's prudent plans just actions follow from this order, according to Socrates. The recognition of non-rational desires (contrary to the Socratic Paradox; cf. W. H. Thompson (1), viii f.) has made temperance the basic virtue.

507a 'senseless, *aphron* \*, and intemperate, *akolastos*'. *Sophron*\* has a very wide range; see 491e. And so its opposite can be conceived both as being generally 'unsound' or 'senseless' (*aphron*\*), and as the particular manifestation of it in lack of self-control, *akolasia*; cf. *Pr.* 332ab. The two terms also suggest the cognitive and the affective aspects of temperance and Socrates is not clear on their relation; see 507b.

Socrates has also failed to distinguish:

- (a) developing unrestrained good-independent desires on principle, thinking it best on the whole;
- (b) acting on powerful good-independent desires, thinking it better not to.

His failure is not surprising when he does not clearly recognize good-independent desires. On the *R.* see Irwin,200; cf. *At. EN* 1102b25-8.

507a9 'acting temperately' (*sophronein*\*). *Sophronein*\* is closely associated with being *sophron*\* (e.g. *R.* 431e4, 8); it sometimes seems to imply that someone exercises his virtue (cf. *Ch.* 164c5-6). It does not follow that simply doing temperate actions is sufficient for *sophronein*\*; but Socrates seems to be unclear about this (see next note).

507b 'someone who does just and pious things must be just and pious'. This seems to imply that virtuous action is sufficient for being virtuous. But Socrates normally insists that knowledge is necessary for virtue (cf. *Ap.* 29e-30a, Irwin, 90-2) and at 460bc he treated virtue as a kind of craft-knowledge. If virtue requires knowledge, someone who does the right actions because he has the right beliefs still lacks virtue because he lacks knowledge. Socrates himself should be in this position, since he distinguished

knowledge and craft from belief at 465a, and insists that he lacks knowledge, 508e-509a. Perhaps he believes that someone without knowledge will not do *all* the right actions because he will not be flexible or reliable enough in unfamiliar or dangerous situations. But he is at least careless; the question is faced at *M.* 97a-99e, *Phd.* 68b-69c, *R.* 358e-359b.

'endure, *karterein*, where he should'. Socrates accepts endurance as a part of courage. At *La.* 192c-194d he seems to deny this: see Irwin, 87-9, but contrast Santas (4), 195, O'Brien, 113, 117. His denial is reasonable if he thinks knowledge is sufficient for virtue; someone with knowledge will not need endurance as well, since he will have no non-rational desires or fears to endure or resist. The *Pr.* is also silent about endurance, and 359c-360b shows why it is not needed, since neither the brave man nor the coward has any conflicting desires. See 522e. Socrates has also accepted order as a part of temperance, 506de, though at *Ch.* 159b-160b and later in the *Ch.* he seems to reject it, for the same reasons that justify rejection of endurance as part of courage.

In both cases the *G.* is nearer to common conceptions of the virtues than to the general Socratic conception of virtue as knowledge, because the *G.* makes claims inconsistent with the Socratic Paradox. If some desires are good-independent, knowledge of the good will not infallibly control them; this is why courage and temperance need endurance and order as well as knowledge. But we have seen that the *G.* does not explicitly reject the Socratic Paradox; and so Plato does not explain why the Socratic accounts of the virtues are altered. He explains more clearly at *R.* 429b-431c.

Here Socrates finally answers Callicles' claims about courage. 497d-498c suggested that courage is needed for a well-planned life. But this courage has to be more than Callicles allowed, mere resolution in the execution of desires (491b, 495d). If it is wise to control some of my desires for the sake of my prudential plans, the right kind of endurance will pursue these plans without distraction by non-rational desires.

Socrates now stops asking and answering his own questions, and turns to monologue; see 505d-506a.

507c 'must be a completely good man'. Socrates relies on some common conception of the cardinal virtues which belong to a good man; cf. 477b. Here, but not in 477b, they are derived from psychic order. That was not mentioned in 477b, before the argument with Callicles, since only that argument showed why psychic order was needed, by a theory of desire incompatible with the Socratic Paradox assumed in the argument with Polus.

'the good man must do whatever he does well, *eu*, and finely, *kalos* \*; and the man who does well must be fortunate, *makarios*, and happy, *eudaimon*\*, and the bad man who does badly must be wretched.' Socrates is often alleged to equivocate on *eu pratein*, meaning

(a) 'fare well', i.e. be happy and flourish;

(b) 'act well', i.e. do what is morally good.

See 478a. Socrates clearly relies on (a); but where does he rely on (b)? 'Virtue', 'good man', 'good action', 'doing what he does well', in this argument are relative to the agent's happiness; (b) is not needed. (On 'finely' see 474cd.)

But the argument still raises questions:

(1) Even if 'doing what he does well' is 'doing what is required for happiness', how is it sufficient for happiness? A good craftsman might be making a statue in just the right way when, by no fault of his, a hurricane destroys the statue. Can the same not happen to a virtuous man? Will one of the external hazards mentioned in *R.* 360e-361d, *Ar. EN* 1100b28-1101a21, not deprive him of happiness? Socrates must insist that the final good is infallibly secured by virtuous action he did not go this far at 470e; but cf. perhaps *Ap.* 41cd. But if he says this, it is harder to show that virtue is only a craft. For a craft is instrumentally valuable for the sake of some product distinct from its exercise. We would expect the same to be true for virtue and its product, happiness (cf. 460b, 470e, 500e-501a). Socrates says nothing incompatible with this here. Virtue might be an instrumental means to happiness and still secure it infallibly; repeated flexing of my muscles is a means to strengthening them, but may still infallibly make them stronger. But if virtue is really an infallible means to happiness, the possible content of happiness is severely restricted; apparently it must consist in some psychic state or in some pattern of action, or in both. A hedonist conception of the good would provide a plausible psychic state. But perhaps Socrates has in mind his suggestion at 494a; since the virtuous man's actions will be guided by rational order, his desires will not be very demanding, and he will not be ruined by bad luck frustrating his desires, since an orderly person's desires will easily be satisfied from other sources, and the harm he can suffer from the world is comparatively unimportant (see 508de). Plato does not develop this conception of the relation between virtue and happiness in the *G.* or anywhere else. In the *R.* he maintains that justice is good in itself and to be chosen for itself (358a) as a part of happiness. The *G.* never says this, though in such passages as the present one we can see why it is a natural next move for Plato. For a different view see Vlastos (17).

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(2) Socrates has not shown that a 'good' and 'virtuous' man on his view, someone with an orderly soul promoting his own happiness, has the recognized virtues, producing just actions. He need not claim that the conventional views of just actions are entirely correct; but he must show that his just person will benefit rather than harm others, so that he will even be willing to suffer injustice from others rather than do injustice. Could Socrates show this? He might reasonably claim that many reasons for doing injustice will not attract the Socratically just person who has no extravagant Calliclean desires, and so has no reason to satisfy these desires at other people's expense (see n. on 499b). In that case Socrates might claim to have shown why justice is less unattractive than Callicles made it look. But surely this argument is still an inadequate defence of justice. Socrates claims that what is worth while and virtuous for a man is simply what regulates his non-rational desires for the sake of his over-all goals. Such a general description seems to cover many ways of life; even if it includes the virtuous (including just) way of life, it apparently includes others too. How does temperance result in the life of a good citizen or a Socratic philosopher rather than in the life of a single-minded and well-organized miser or ambitious politician or pleasure-seeker? On this issue in the *R.* see Irwin, 230-9.

Here Socrates has been offering information about the virtues with some confidence. Does he contradict the profession of ignorance in earlier dialogues? Two answers might be offered:

(1) This is part of the dogmatic, didactic tone of the *G.*, replacing Socratic scepticism with Platonic preaching, continued in the *Phd.* and *R.* See Intr. § 9.

(2) If Socrates normally means to profess ignorance of the right kind of definition of the virtues, he need not disclaim all positive beliefs about them; for his beliefs may not constitute acceptable definitions by the criteria of 451d; see 475a, 489e. And so his remarks here need not violate the disclaimer of knowledge, since they refer to the final good, *eudaimonia*, without defining it in undisputed terms. See Irwin, 89. But is the requirement for an adequate definition reasonable? Socrates has not shown how his, or any plausible, account of the virtues might meet it.

507d Socrates urges us to avoid intemperance (or licence; *akolasia*), so that we do not need to be tempered (or corrected; *kolazein*). He assumes (cf. 476e) that the kind of correction normally administered by courts of justice really reduces the intemperance in a man's soul.

507e An intemperate man cannot have friendship, *philia*, with men

or gods, since he can have no community (association, sharing; *koinonia* \*; 487c) with others. (*Koinonia*\* and *philia*; *EN* viii.9; virtue as a precondition of *philia* and *koinonia*\*; Thuc. 3.10.1). Socrates says that if *A* is to be a friend to *B* (i. e. *B* is the object of *A*'s friendship), there must be some community between *A* and *B*; but if *B* is incapable of community, there can be no community with *A*; and therefore *A* cannot be a friend to *B*. *B* is incapable of community if he is intemperate; for community requires acceptance of some common interests; and Socrates assumes an intemperate man will always pursue the filling of his own appetites on the occasions when the common interest would require their restraint. Socrates' assumption rests on the generally disorderly character of the intemperate man's good-independent appetites.

Socrates assumes that inability to form any co-operative relations (*philia* includes all of these, not just the ones founded on affection) makes life undesirable. Calicles himself has implicitly accepted this. He has assumed that a superior man will help his friends (482b6, 483b4, 492c), and he himself regards people as his friends (487b,d,e). If Socrates is right, the way of life advocated by Calicles prevents the kinds of attachments which Calicles himself, like any other reasonable person, wants and values. Cf. 510cd.

This argument deserves more attention. Does Socrates' conception of virtue give any better results? His virtuous man will restrain himself, but for the sake of his own interest; will his self-restraint also benefit others as friendship requires? Perhaps Socrates will argue that a virtuous man who sees that friendship is in his interest will already have self-restraint, and can easily extend it to do what friendship requires, while an intemperate man who has allowed his appetites to go free can no longer control them even if he sees that he would be better off by being more temperate.

This raises difficulties:

- (1) It seems to rely on the falsity of the Socratic Paradox (last sentence of previous paragraph).
- (2) If someone decides to do just actions to secure reciprocity and friendship from others, is he a just man? Would he not be better off if he could make people believe he is just, and so benefit both from their friendship and from his unjust action at their expense? This question is discussed at length in *R.* ii.
- (3) Socrates has argued that intemperance prevents *B* from being the object of *A*'s friendship because *A* cannot count on *B* to care about their common interest; lack of the benefits of *A*'s friendship is clearly a harm to *B*. But does *B*'s intemperance make *B* incapable of adopting a friend's attitude to *A*? If so, is that a serious harm to *B*? Socrates should, but does not, discuss these questions.

507e-508a Socrates appeals to cosmological theory presenting justice and order as parts of a larger world order guided by justice, recalling his previous comments on order and temperance (503de); see esp. Heraclitus, DK 22 B 114, *Lys.* 214b, 215c-216a, *Symp.* 186b-188e, Ar. *EN* 1155b1-9. On Socrates' interest in the Presocratics see not only Aristoph. *Clouds* but also *Phd.* 96a ff. Some find evidence here of Plato's interest in Pythagoreanism; but the previous passages suggest that the interest may be no more Platonic than Socratic, and no more in Pythagoreanism than in Presocratic theory in general. See Vlastos (10), ch. 1, (1), Guthrie (1), i.205-12.

508a Socrates mentions 'geometrical equality' without explanation. It normally refers to some proportional arrangement, as opposed to numerical (or 'arithmetical') equality, and in later dialogues Plato contrasts this conception of equality or fairness giving more to the more deserving, however desert is determined with the democratic belief in numerical equality. See *R.* 558c, 561bc, *Laws* 757bc. Socrates may intend this here, or he may be criticizing Callicles for failing to see the importance of order, system, and proportion in general. See 465a for Socrates' interest in geometry. See further Vlastos, (4), 195n., Morrison.

The appeal to equality is supposed to answer Callicles' earlier advocacy of *pleonexia*, taking more for myself than is 'equal' or 'fair' (*ison*; see 483e, At. *EN* 1129a32-b1). But is it really an answer? Callicles advocated *pleonexia* against egalitarians who claimed that everyone should have an equal share. Until Socrates explains the relation between 'geometrical equality' and equality or inequality of shares, it is not clear whether he really shows that the behaviour recommended by Callicles is undesirable; why should 'geometrical equality' not include greater shares for the superior man? Socrates might reasonably insist that justice does not always require pure numerical equality it depends on what someone deserves or what is owed to him or what is 'his own' (see *R.* 331e-335e, 433e). But how is this decided? The mere reference to geometrical equality leaves many unanswered questions.

508b Has Socrates really vindicated his case against Callicles, Polus, and Gorgias? He has argued plausibly against Callicles' view that it must be better for a superior man to seize power and indulge himself against justice. Callicles defended this policy by advocating general indulgence, which has been found to be undesirable. But in answering Callicles has Socrates proved against Polus that it is better for me to do the conventionally just actions discussed earlier? See 507a-c.

508c The initial claim against Gorgias is supposed to be proved because Socrates has argued that the proper use of rhetoric requires justice and knowledge of justice for me to know when I will be better off using my rhetorical skills; contrary to Gorgias and Polus, their use will not always be good for me, since power, as they understand it, is not always good for me.

508d 'The dishonoured' (*atimoi* \*); those without protected civil rights. See 486a-c.

508de Socrates reinforces his previous reply to Polus' claim that rhetoric confers power, repeated in Callicles' claim that a rhetor-politician can defend himself better than Socrates can. Callicles has suggested that there is something shameful and unmanly in being unable to protect oneself and one's family and friends; cf. *Cri.* 45c-46a and Socrates' reply, 48b-d. In reply Socrates insists that a just and well-ordered soul is the most important thing, no matter what happens (cf. 470e, 507c); since it is supremely important for his happiness, the harm other people can do him is comparatively unimportant. See Vlastos (13).

Socrates might mean different things here:

- (1) Since a just soul is supremely important, it is never worth while to defend myself by unjust means.
- (2) Since a just soul is supremely important, a just man will never harm his soul by acting unjustly; since it is unjust to harm anyone else, a just man will never harm anyone else (*Cri.* 47c-49c).
- (3) A just man who is struck or beaten will never retaliate.
- (4) Since a just soul is supremely important, it is never worth while to do anything to protect myself physically or to pursue any of my other aims.

Here (4) prescribes extreme quietism and absorption in my own psychic health; (3) prescribes only a form of limited quietism, pacifism in the face of injustice. Socrates clearly believes (3), and (3) follows from (2), if striking, beating, etc. count as harming. But Socrates sometimes understands 'harming' differently, as making someone worse, especially making him more unjust (*R.* 335b-d); and on this view why should the kind of physical violence involved in retaliation harm its victim? On this view of 'harm' (3) does not follow from (2). But then the ground for retaliation also seems to be removed by the Socratic or Platonic account of harm; the aggressor has apparently not harmed me, if he has not made me more unjust. But Socrates has not justified any such view of harm. Even if being made more unjust is the *worst* form of harm for me, other supposed harms may still be harmful; Socrates has not shown why it is not just

to use just means in self-defence to avoid these other harms. Nor does he claim here that 'ordinary' harms are not real harms, only that they are less important than the psychic harm caused by injustice. But this claim allows ordinary harms to be important enough to be worth avoiding; and in that case the self-defence provided by rhetoric may still be worth having, for all Socrates has said (cf. 481b).

How do Socrates' previous arguments demonstrate the *supreme* value of having a just soul? He has argued against Calicles that any rationally self-interested man has reason to value the prudence and psychic order needed for him to pursue his goals systematically. This may be worth while irrespective of my particular aims in life; but why is it still worth while even if none of these particular aims is fulfilled? And why should we always choose justice over everything else? We need *some* psychic justice to fulfil any rational aims; but if the benefits of unjust action are great enough, would it not be reasonable to risk weakening our psychic justice for these benefits?

Has Socrates proved that doing injustice, correctly understood, is worse than suffering injustice, correctly understood? He never defines them; but his arguments and examples suggest that someone does injustice to me to the extent that he harms me. Now he has argued that the very worst form of harm for a man is to have an unjust soul; the worst injustice I could do to someone, then, would be to make his soul worse and more unjust. If I could do this, then surely I would harm him no less than if he made his own soul unjust? Socrates does not adjust his use of 'do injustice' and 'suffer injustice' to his conception of a person's good and harm. If he did adjust them, he would have to say that what are commonly thought to be the most serious injustices are not really the most serious.

508e-509a Socrates' comments on the status of his conclusions sound inconsistent:

- (1) His position has been secured with steel and adamant arguments (indicating stability; cf. 527b).
- (2) He does not know how these things are.

We might say (with Dodds) that (1) is dogmatic and Platonic, and (2) is a concession to Socratic modesty. But the inconsistency is not clear. In (2) Socrates means only that he cannot adequately justify the belief he has defended (knowledge and justification; 454e, 465a, 500e-501a, 524ab, 527ab, *M.* 97e-98a). But in (1) he claims justifiably that the argument with Calicles confirms especially strongly Socrates' initial beliefs (cf. 487e). If we properly understand (1) and (2), they are not only consistent, but even explain each other; Socrates claims stable beliefs supported by elenctic

argument (cf. *Cri.* 46bc) without knowledge. See 472ab, Irwin 40, 62, Vlastos (6).

509b Socrates assumes he has proved that doing injustice, i.e. doing unjust actions, harms us. But he has proved at most that *being* unjust, having a disordered soul, harms us. Unjust action will harm us only if it makes our souls unjust; and still (cf. 478e, 504c) Socrates has not proved this. He needs to prove at least one of these:

- (1) A just man will see no benefit to him in unjust action.
- (2) For some other reason a just man will be incapable of unjust action.
- (3) Every single unjust action automatically makes the agent's soul unjust.

509bc Self-defence; cf. 483b, 522c-e, 526e. Self-defence is good for me if I can defend what it is good for me to keep; and Socrates' challenges Callicles' view of what is worth keeping. An element of traditional *arete* \* is examined and eventually found to require the Socratic, at first sight quite untraditional, virtues.

509de Socrates returns to wanting (*boulesis*\*) and the power to get what one wants (cf. 466d ff.); someone who sees that injustice is bad for him will avoid it only if he has the power and the knowledge. Socrates still assumes that someone will avoid injustice if all these conditions are satisfied; he still relies on the Socratic Paradox.

509e Socrates claims that Polus and he agreed that no one wants to do injustice or does injustice involuntarily (see 480a). But 467c-468e did not prove this. Socrates must mean that since they have found that injustice is bad for the agent, only people who do not know this will do injustice. Their action is not involuntary under the description 'unjust', which someone may correctly apply to his action, but under the description 'harmful to the agent', which no one could apply to his own action and still want to do it according to the Socratic Paradox.

510a 'Political system', *politeia*; the particular constitution, democratic, oligarchic or tyrannical or dynastic.

510b 'Uneducated'; see 470e.

510b-d Polus and Callicles argued that any self-respecting man would want to protect himself against suffering injustice. Socrates replies that this is not always the best defence of self-respect; for it

requires someone to bend his character and his preferences to become a friend to the tyrant (or, as Socrates says later, to the regime), so that *he* no longer decides the sort of person he will be. On tyrants and flatterers cf. 466b-d, Hdt. 3.80.4-5.

510c Friendship apparently requires some similarity of character cf. At. *EN* 1157a10-12, 1162a9-15. Here as in 507e Socrates considers how someone must be to be the object of friendship. The Greek is ambiguous and difficult at c1-3; 'a friend to him with all his mind' involves the active sense of 'friend', *philos*, i.e. the tyrant will not be friendly to a better man. But 'he won't be a friend either' seems to require the passive sense, i.e. the worse man will not be befriended by the tyrant. But the general point of the passage is concerned with how someone must be for the tyrant to be friendly towards him.

How is this passage consistent with the claim in 507e that an intemperate man is incapable of friendship, of being befriended by anyone? If Socrates relied on that claim he could argue:

- (1) To be a tyrant's friend, i.e. befriended by a tyrant, I must be like the tyrant.
- (2) The tyrant is intemperate.
- (3) Therefore to be a tyrant's friend I must be intemperate.
- (4) All intemperate men are incapable of being befriended (507e).
- (5) Therefore to be a tyrant's friend I must be incapable of being befriended.

It is odd that Socrates does not press these consequences of his arguments about intemperance. Some parallel consequences about injustice are examined at *R.* 351c-352a.

'The man will have great power.' Socrates speaks of power as Polus and Callicles speak, though strictly he denies that this is real power; cf. 468d. 'On the account you people offer' in 510e may suggest this reservation.

510d 'In this city'; i.e. in a city ruled by a tyrant. The general maxim being a friend to the political system is applied to Athens at 513a.

511a1 'wretched'; see 486b3, n.

511b Callicles finds it deplorable (cf. 522d) that a fine and good man. *kalos kagathos*, should be destroyed by a base, *poneros* \*, man (see 470e, 526b). He does not think that mere superior power implies justice (see 489c, 490a), but recognizes an ideal type of person who can justly demand more than others get. But the

difference between his conception of the 'fine and good' man and Socrates' conception emerges in what follows.

511b-513c This long speech picks up the questions raised in Callicles' earlier denunciation of the philosophical life (484cd). Callicles attacked Socrates for his unmanly existence, offensive to the self-respect of anyone who values himself highly. Socrates now reverses the charge, and suggests, by appeal to Callicles' own values, that the mean-spirited life is the one praised by Callicles. The speech attacks Callicles at several points.

1. Most important, it appeals at 512e to his sense of honour his belief that it is better for a man to distinguish himself in action than simply to prolong his life (cf. 483e-484a, Ar. *EN* 1169a23, Homer, *Il.* 18.98-126, *Ap.* 28b-29b, *Cri.* 48b, Adkins (3), 260 f.). Rhetoric turns out to be a device for preserving life, like many other crafts or knacks which Callicles would not take seriously. We may think that Socrates is not being fair to rhetoric; was it not defended as a way to secure personal power, to achieve the rhetor's goals, not merely a means to self-preservation? But Socrates has replied that the power to indulge desires is not an unqualified good; the only other unqualified good a rhetor might claim to secure is self-preservation, and now Socrates tries to show what is wrong with that. He intends to fix on a conflict in Callicles' beliefs between his defence of self-development against small-minded conventional scruples, and his praise of rhetoric and conventional success, which turns out to rest on small-minded conventional values. Callicles, the self-proclaimed critic of petty-bourgeois values, is more absorbed in them than he realizes; see 463a-c.

2. Socrates appeals to Callicles' social prejudice against mere manual workers and craftsmen, who turn out to be doing something no less worth while than the rhetor praised by Callicles. Plato, like Aristotle, thoroughly agrees with this prejudice (cf. 450b. *R.* 495d, At. *Pol.* 1328b34-1329a2, 1337b4-21, *Ecclesiasticus* 38.24-34, cited by Barker (1), lxxiv), which was shared by many upper-class Greeks (cf. Hasebroek, 38-43, 174). Here Socrates does not suggest that it is wrong to despise manual workers, but that it is wrong not to despise rhetors, who do nothing more valuable. As in the *R.* (e.g. 550e-552e) Plato rejects the pretensions of the traditional upper classes, not because he rejects political inequality, but because he wants it to rest on a really sound basis, superior moral and political knowledge.

511d4 'dressed up' (*eschematismene* \*); or 'putting on airs'. The reference to dress may recall the 'impersonating' or 'dressing up'

mentioned in 464c (and cf. 465b). The use of the same term for an elaborate, figurative rhetorical style makes it suitable for the contrast drawn in this passage.

511e-512a Socrates agrees with Callicles' claim at 483b, and then disagrees with Callicles, insisting that those with disordered souls are incapable of the self-defence that matters. See 505a, 522c-e, *La.* 195d, *R.* 406d-407c.

512a Socrates' conviction of the superior value of the soul need not reflect any particular metaphysical theory; cf. 464e, 465a. He assumes, as in *Cri.* 47e, *Pr.* 313a, *Ch.* 156e, that a man's benefit or harm depends more on his soul his knowledge and character than on his body, since a vicious man will not benefit from his other advantages, and a virtuous man will not be ruined by other misfortunes. This is a controversial moral claim, but involves no metaphysical theory of the kind found in the *Phd.*

512cd Callicles would say he was one of the 'better', *beltiones* (cf. 488bc), people, and so too good for a marriage alliance with a mere tradesman. Socrates replies that Callicles' defence of rhetoric makes a virtue or excellence, *arete* \* out of the mere capacity to preserve life for myself and others, so that the tradesman should be just as 'good' as Callicles. Callicles Socrates implies has no coherent conception of virtue to justify his claim to superiority.

513a Socrates returns to the general principle of 510a, that protection against suffering injustice requires me to be an ally of the political system in force, and so to become like it. He does not say (as Dodds suggests) that the Athenian demos is a tyrant; but he does insist that Callicles' relation to it will be no less humiliating and self-destructive than the relation of the tyrant's friend to the tyrant has been found to be.

513a-c Again Socrates aims at Callicles' own defence of himself. Like other aristocrats in a democracy, Callicles no doubt argued (see 481d, *Thuc.* 6.89) that he simply used the democratic constitution for his own advantage. Socrates replies that it is not so easy; to 'use' democracy he has to adopt some of the values he claims to despise a compromise that someone like Callicles ought to reject. Plato rejects the widespread view that the people are primarily led and guided by dominant individuals (e.g. Pericles, as portrayed in *Thuc.* 2.65); he argues that most of the influence comes from the people themselves. That is why rhetors and sophists

are primarily their servants, not their leaders; cf. *R.* 492b-493d.

513c Though Callicles is still not entirely convinced, Socrates does not suggest (contrary to Dodds) that he is unreachable by rational argument. Though Socrates has previously suggested that Callicles' desires may be disordered (505c), and mentions here the misguided 'love' (*eros* \*; see 481d) that prevents him from being convinced, he still insists that rational persuasion can make Callicles re-direct his desires. He assumes here (cf. *M.* 85c, *Phil.* 24d, explaining the 'often' here) that repeated examination will convince Callicles, when he sees that there are no tricks, and that Socrates' position really follows from Callicles' own basic convictions, as revealed in the *elenchos*. The *R.* could be regarded as a 'thorough consideration' of the issues, designed to produce firmer conviction.

As usual Socrates suggests that the science opposed to the pseudo-science concerned with pleasure will be concerned with (a) improving the citizens, and (b) benefiting them. He connects (a) and (b) by suggesting that if people lack the appropriate virtues nothing else will benefit them; cf. *Ap.* 30ab, 36e, *Eud.* 280b-282e.

513d3 'approaches'; cf. 463a.

514a 'The city's public business', *politika pragmata*; to do with the *polis*.

Conditions for a craft; see 447c. This illustrates the Socratic tendency noticed at 490de.

515b 'Competitive'; cf. 457d, 461bc, 482c-e, 495ab, 499b. Socrates again rebuts the repeated charge that his dialectic aims only at catching out the interlocutor no doubt an understandably common view of the *elenchos*, often rejected in the *G.*

515c Socrates revives the question (503c) about whether Pericles and the rest were good citizens, *agathoi politai*. But then he asks an apparently quite different question, whether they were good at political affairs, *ta politika*, or good politicians, *politikoi* (see 473e). But for Socrates all these questions require the same answer:

- (1) A good man has all the virtues, including justice.
- (2) Justice is the virtue of a good citizen.
- (3) Therefore a good man is a good citizen.
- (4) A virtuous man can make others virtuous.
- (5) Therefore a virtuous man can make others good citizens.
- (6) A man is a good politician if and only if he makes others good citizens.

(7) Therefore a good man will be a good politician.

We might reject (4). But Socrates' view that virtue is knowledge allows him to reply; a good man needs only to explain the rational basis of virtue, why it is good for people, and they will at once (by the Socratic Paradox) want to become virtuous.

When Callicles says that these four men were good citizens, he need not agree that they were good men, the kind of men he admires (503a only conceded that they were *said* to be good men). Callicles shows no democratic tendencies; cf. 483c, 503a, 515e, 517a.

515d We might object: 'A good politician will try to improve the citizens, but it may not be his fault if he fails; they may be fickle and refractory.' Socrates will reply that they are only ignorant, and need to be shown only that virtue is in their interest. But why might not some cognitive deficiency make someone fail to grasp the argument showing this? Socrates does not say. Plato does not use this argument in dialogues later than the *G.*, perhaps because it relies on the Socratic Paradox which he rejects.

We might also object that the Athenians rebelled against Pericles because they correctly believed he was in the wrong. But this reply would concede Socrates' claim that Pericles was not virtuous.

515e No good evidence supports these charges (for which cf. Aristoph. *Ach.* 595-619. *Vesp.* 100-12. *Eq.* 797-800) about political pay (for jury-service, and perhaps for service in the army, navy, and the Council); see Jones, 49f. Conservative critics probably objected to political pay because it made democracy work; poorer citizens, who stood to lose most by unpaid public service, would be more likely to serve on juries when they were paid (see esp. Ar. *Pol.* 1293a1-10, 1297a36-8, 1298b17-19).

Callicles replies that the people with torn ears i.e. oligarchic, pro-Spartan, boxing enthusiasts (cf. *Pr.* 342b) make these charges. Socrates himself does not openly endorse the charges either (for his association with pro-Spartans cf. Aristoph. *Av.* 1281).

515e-516a Pericles was tried for embezzlement ('theft'), perhaps in 430 ('at the end of his life'); see Thuc. 2.65.3, Gomme (1), ad loc. Socrates does not mention that the Athenians soon restored Pericles to office. He assumes that Pericles was not guilty of the charge; if he was, the attack would not be a sign of the Athenians' wildness, but perhaps of their concern for justice.

516b 'gratify'; cf. 462d. Callicles tries to evade the consequence of his own admissions.

Socrates argues from a 'keeper' or 'someone in charge', *epimeletes* \*, of animals to a keeper of men. An animal keeper is normally expected to make his animals tame; but is it a politician's business to make citizens tame? Socrates should not simply assume that it is; and so he appeals to Homer, in 516c.

516c Relying on Homer (*Od.* 6.120) Socrates argues:

- (1) The just are 'tame' or 'gentle' (*hemeroi*\*).
- (2) The Athenians became wilder, less gentle.
- (3) The Athenians became less just.

This is invalid. Socrates assumes that if x becomes wilder it becomes less just; but (1) only allows us to say that x is not yet just; becoming wilder might be a stage in becoming more just. But even (1) is implausible; we might argue that dogs, e.g., who rebel against a bad master are not necessarily worse dogs; the rebellion might be a sign of desirable high spirits; cf. *R.* 376ab.

'he would have wanted least of all'; because of the Socratic Paradox. Cf. *Ap.* 25c-26a, 522e below.

516d Socrates concludes that Pericles was not 'good at politics' (or 'in political affairs' *agathos ta politika*), which (see 515c) shows why he was not a good citizen or a good man.

'what you were agreeing'; cf. 466e. Socrates forces Callicles to accept the consequences of the *elenchos*.

516de Cimon was ostracized in 461 after the failure of his pro-Spartan policy. A similar question of policy probably underlay Themistocles' ostracism and later exile. See Ehrenberg (1), 193-9. *Thuc.* 1.135. Miltiades was fined for his failure to capture Paros. Our knowledge is too slight to test Socrates' story; but it is not obvious that the Athenians were unfair to him; see *Hdt.* 6.132-6, Ehrenberg, 142 f. No other evidence suggests that the Athenians came as near to inflicting the death penalty as Socrates suggests.

Socrates' version of these incidents conceals the serious questions of policy sometimes at stake and the solid grounds for measures taken against these politicians. His story is a perversion of the historical conditions, as far as we know them.

'work'; see 452a. Here it means 'working of a craft'.

516e 'thrown out'. The verb *ekpiptein*, 'fall out', used here is also the passive form of *ekballein*, 'expel' or 'exile'. Socrates plays on the two uses.

516e-517a None of these politicians practised the 'true rhetoric',

the Socratic political craft (see 504de), or the flattering kind. Presumably Socrates thinks they were unsuccessful flatterers, since they did not always manage to ingratiate themselves with the people. But then he calls them 'servants' of the people (517b) who gave them what they wanted just as he previously described flatterers such as cooks and fashion-designers. 'Flattery' for Socrates includes two elements:

(1) My efforts to make you pleased with me by praising you the normal conception of flattery.

(2) My efforts to please you by always giving you what you fancy the extended conception of flattery or pandering which mostly concerns Socrates.

One way to success in (1) is normally (2). But (2) may not always work, unless your getting what you want results in your being pleased with me. If you are ungrateful enough, or I am inept enough, I may please you without gaining any favour from you. Socrates seems to want to say that the politicians tried (2) but were not successful in (1).

*M.* 93a seems to disavow this unqualified attack on Athenian politicians. But *M.* 100a suggests that the disagreement with the *G.* may not be great. See A. E. Taylor, 142, Friedlander, ii. 360. The *R.*, e.g. 488a-e, is not friendly to democratic politicians either.

517a 'works'; their exploits, or the visible results of them, or both; cf. 452a.

517b 'had an appetite for'; or perhaps just 'desired'; cf. 491d.

517b Socrates' authoritarian views are clear when he says it is the politician's or (equivalently; see 515c) the good citizen's task to 'force change' (or 'force in a new direction', *metabibazein*; cf. Ar. *EE* 1216b30) in people's desires, with or without their consent. Socrates might appeal to the authoritative knowledge of the politician, which the citizens can expect to be used in their interest (cf. 502e). The appeal to an analogy between keeping animals and ruling citizens is dangerous; see *R.* 341c ff., 343bc, 345b-347a. Socrates must assume that the politician produces 'virtue' or 'excellence' in the citizens, qualities promoting a citizen's own good; see 504a-d. It must be in the politician's own interest to do this (on normal Socratic views about motivation); but Socrates has not shown why it is.

517c Socrates says they have returned to the old question, about the distinction between flattery and a real craft. However, he now

calls one side of the division not 'flattery', but 'serving', *diakonike* \*, perhaps for the reason suggested at 516e-517a. He strains his thesis when he assimilates ships (Themistocles), walls, and dockyards (Pericles) to bread and circuses, gratifying the *epithumiai* (see 491d) of the people. Socrates rejects Gorgias' claim at 455d that these public works were the result of good advice by politicians. But the people were not clamouring for these pieces of 'flattery'; the politicians needed considerable foresight to see the need, and considerable skill and leadership to persuade an unwilling people to accept their advice. Socrates omits to mention that Themistocles' naval proposal had to compete against a proposal to distribute the necessary money among the people (Thuc. 1.90.3, Hdt. 7.144.1-2, Ehrenberg (1), 146). He may reply that these projects did not aim at the real welfare and moral improvement of the citizens, but at national defence or expansion which eventually satisfied their other desires. But it is a gross over-simplification typical of Socrates' political comments to suggest that this is just humouring popular whims.

However, Socrates is right on one point. Contrary to Thuc. 2.65.7-10, he insists that Pericles, like his successors, was guided by popular demands he sought to give people what they wanted, in the long run, and took his aims and political values from their desires, not from a view of what would make them better and so benefit them. Socrates rightly insists that Pericles and his successors shared one characteristically democratic assumption, that the political leader should try to give people what they, or some dominant group of them, want; see 502e. We may not agree with Socrates' view that it is clearly wrong to aim only at satisfying people's wants in this way; see Barry, 38-43.

517d 'bodies have appetites for' (literally, 'come into appetite for'). The body is regarded as the owner of desires concerned especially with the satisfaction of its needs; cf. *Phd.* 66c. But the *G.*, unlike the *Phd.*, has no systematic distinction between the motives belonging to the soul and the body; cf. 464d.

517d-518a Earlier Socrates contrasted

(a) types of flattery which were no genuine crafts, because they were irrational, 464c-465a;

(b) genuine crafts.

Here he contrasts

(c) the 'serving' pursuits;

(d) the crafts medicine and gymnastics which by right rule over them.

Now (c) includes some mere 'knacks', as previously defined, but also

some pursuits, e.g. weaving and shoemaking, which seem to satisfy the previous criteria for being crafts. They are subordinate to medicine and gymnastics, which 'rule' in so far as they prescribe the proper use of the other crafts and their products. The term 'serving' is ambiguous between

- (1) 'serving the whims of the audience', and so an irrational knack;
- (2) 'serving the aims of the superordinate science'.

But (1) and (2) seem to exclude each other; for must the pursuits used by a superordinate craft not be crafts themselves? Surely the doctor's craft is served, not by the pastry-cook's pseudo-craft, but by the pharmacist's genuine craft? Admittedly, Socratic criteria for crafts tend to be restrictive: if a craft must have a true conception of the end it aims at (503e), perhaps only a superordinate craft, and perhaps only the highest craft of all, counts as a craft. On subordinate and superordinate crafts see *Ch.* 173d-174c, *Eud.* 289a-290d. If the right distinctions were drawn, Socrates could still attack the democratic politicians for their ignorance of the superordinate and supremely important craft. But he has combined this objection with the different objection that they practice a mere knack and not a real craft. He has been misled by the apparent chance of a neatly symmetrical return to an early theme of the *G*.

517e8 'worthy and base'; see 464d7-e1, 499e, 504a7.

518d 'since they had it without the healthy'; either (a) the people who filled them up did not care about their health, or (b) they did not care about their own health when they were Filled up, or both. Socrates' main point is (a), the normal feature of the flattering pseudo-craft. But the reference of the 'inexperience' of the people suggests (b); and because of the Socratic Paradox (b) must be true if someone is to suffer because of (a). However, Socrates does not think (b) is curable; people must be freed from (a) by being handed over to someone who knows what is best for them and can be relied on to give it to them; cf. 517b.

518e 'festering'; cf. 480b. The medical metaphor previously applied to the individual soul is now applied to the state.

519a The projects of former politicians have caused some kind of sickness, presumably moral degeneracy, reaching its crisis in some disaster to the city; talk of the loss of ships and walls presumably refers to the Athenian defeat of 404; see Bury-Meiggs, 314-18. Socrates does not trouble to show how Athenian moral sickness caused the defeat, or how moral health might have avoided it.

Perhaps he means that injustice caused the internal dissension that helped the Spartans win the war; but, like many others who talk vaguely of the effects of moral degeneracy, Socrates does not make his diagnosis very clear, or support it with the evidence it needs.

Conservative rhetoric, rejected by Socrates, suggested that everything was all right in the good old days, before the deplorable demagogues following Pericles. Later politicians also idealize the past; cf. Dem. 1.16, 3.21-9, Isoc. 8.75-8, 15.306-8. On old and new political leaders cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 813-18, 1322-34. See 517c.

519b-d The objections to politicians' and sophists' complaints assume the truth of Socrates' view that knowledge is sufficient for virtue; he assumes that anyone who understands the sophists' instructions will be virtuous, if the sophists really have knowledge of virtue, and are thereby virtuous.

519d 'less reasonable (*alogoteron* \*, i.e. with less *logos*) than this argument (*logos*'); on the uses of *logos* see 449de.

'because of the injustice they don't have'; justice and injustice are states of souls causing actions, and Socrates assumes, as at 460b, that justice in the soul is inconsistent with anything causing unjust actions. But see 478e.

519de Socrates' long speeches; see 464bc, 465e-466a, 505e, 507b, Intr. § 9. 'Mob orator'; see 482c.

519e-520b Callicles' education (or 'culture', *paideia*; see 487b, 470e) is the normal Athenian gentleman's; and his contempt for the sophists is shared by other Athenian gentlemen; *La.* 197d, *M.* 91e. Socrates asks why Callicles despises the sophists, and still values rhetorical training, which would regularly be offered, among other things, by sophists. On sophists and rhetors see 465bc. Contrary to the view sometimes expressed, that Callicles represents, and is intended by Plato to represent, some clearly and typically sophistic position, Plato is careful to dissociate him from the sophists; see 465a, 482e.

Why can the rhetor not protest against unjust treatment? Surely he does not normally claim to make the citizens just, and so need not be surprised at their injustice; only Socrates' ideal rhetors and politicians will claim to make people just.

520e 'how to be as good as possible and how best to govern one's own house or the city'. Socrates alludes to the sophist's claim to teach the skills of government, a claim rather uneasily combined

with the claim to make the pupil virtuous and just, a good citizen as well as an able ruler; *Pr.* 318e, *M.* 73a, 91a. As Socrates implies, the sophists did not satisfactorily explain the relation between these different apparently virtues or excellences; see Adkins (1). The *G.* has tried to show why they are not really different virtues; 515c.

521c 'approach', *homilein*; cf. *proshomilein*, 463a.

'speaking freely'; cf. 461e, 487a. Callicles, like Polus, has found this harder than he supposed, when the *elenchos* forces him to re-examine his position.

521ab Socrates now clearly identifies 'serving' with 'flattery' (see 517c-518b, 521d). Callicles is embarrassed, as at 494de, when he has to face the consequences of his own position, which contradict his own ideals. 'Calling a Mysian a Mysian' is presenting something in the worst possible light. His embarrassment is reasonable, in the light of his own convictions. For Callicles seemed to advocate independence, self-development, integrity, emancipation from petty conventional scruples, courage in fulfilling projects without fear of other people's resentment. But now it turns out that to pursue these designs he advocates the rhetoric and demagoguery which contradicts all his professions, making him conform to the wishes and tastes of the many for the sake of his personal safety. Here, as in 511b-513e, Socrates appeals to what was attractive in Callicles' own position, to expose its inconsistency with the way of life he follows. For Socrates' defence cf. *Cri.* 48b-d, *Phd.* 62e-69e (relying on psycho-physical dualism not found in the *Cri.* or *G.* in these arguments).

521c 'badly', *kakos* \*; i.e. in ways bad for the agent, i.e. harmfully, as in the argument with Polus.

521cd It is natural to see an allusion here to Socrates' trial (see, e.g., Ryle (3), 163-5). But Callicles does not seem to be thinking of exactly what happened to Socrates. He thinks of some ordinary sycophant making trouble for Socrates and his accusers were rather different.

521d 'undertake the real political craft'. Socrates does not say that he *has* this craft, but that he 'undertakes' (or 'attempts', *epicheirein*) it, looking for its principles; and so this remark need not conflict with his previous disavowal of knowledge. Socrates is never clear about how this ideal of a moral and political craft is to be realized; for he offers no clear account of happiness showing how it requires

justice; and without such a clear account of its goal, in 'undisputed' terms (cf. 451d), the political craft cannot begin. See 500e, 505ab.

'the only one among people now'. This is a violent paradox, since 'practising politics' is what the professional politicians are supposed to do, and Socrates dissociates himself from them (473e, 500c, *Ap.* 31d-32a). The previous argument has shown that really 'practising politics' requires us to improve people's souls, and to know what a good condition of the soul would be; and that is what Socrates now claims to do (*Ap.* 29d-30b, 36bc). Though the connection between the claims here and in the *R.* is clear, we have no reason to say that the *G.* is being any more Platonic than Socratic.

521d 'these subtle things'. Socrates throws back Callicles' quotation at 486c. Here the phrase refers not, as earlier, to the useless subtleties of the philosopher, but to the mean-spirited subtleties of the rhetor.

521e Cf. 456b, 464de, 478ab. The doctor and the politician; 505ab. Public opinion; *R.* 492a-496e.

521e-522a The charges parody those against Socrates (*Ap.* 23d, on ruining the young; *M.* 94e-95a). Socrates' leaving people 'confused' (or 'at a loss', *aporein*) is the normal result of the *elenchos*, *M.* 30a, *Th.* 149a; cf. *Ap.* 23d). ('*Aporein*' is also a medical term for severe debilitation; *R.* 556d, Hippoc. *Epid.* 5.42). The religious charge mentioned at *Ap.* 23d is not mentioned here. It does not fit into the context; nor does it fit so easily into Socrates' case, that the Athenians simply failed to see how good he was for them.

522b Plato treats the 'justice-just' relation as parallel to the 'health-healthy' relation; cf. 478e, 504c, 509b, *R.* 443e.

522c 'as you rhetors say'. Socrates imagines himself addressing the court in the court-orators' style. Perhaps he means to challenge their claim to be real judges; cf. *Ap.* 40a, 41a.

522d Self-defence; 473e-474b, 486a-c, *Cri.* 45c-46a.

'I would deplore it'. Socrates corrects Callicles' claim at 511b of what is deplorable and a proper object of shame for someone not failure to protect oneself physically against others, but failure to have the right state of character and act on it.

522e Callicles himself agrees that a brave man should not fear death.

He was the advocate of bravery and resolution, 491b. But in fact, Socrates argues, the rhetoric valued by Calicles is simply a device for staying alive by sacrificing my self-respect in pandering to others. Cf. 512d-513a.

Socrates adds his own twist to traditional rejections of fear of death. Someone who fears death is not only cowardly, but also 'unreasoning' (or 'irrational', *alogistos*), since he has not reasoned and understood the greater harm he suffers by being unjust. Socrates relies on the Socratic Paradox; see 516c, 477c, Vlastos (6), 15.

So far Socrates' defence of justice has been concerned with this life alone; he has argued that a man is better off if he develops the best state of character in himself and detaches his values from the pursuit of worldly success, whatever may or may not happen after death; cf. *Ap.* 40c-41c, *Cri.* 54bc (where he shows his belief in immortality). Here he goes further than the *Cri.* went.

'full of many injustices' (*adikema* \*). *Adikema*\* was previously used for unjust *actions*; when Socrates says that the soul is full of them, he presumably means that it is full of their effects on it, and that they have made it in more unjust. Cf. 469b, 478e, 524d.

'the ultimate (*eschaton*) evil'. Socrates perhaps plays on '*eschaton*', meaning both 'temporally last' and 'most serious'.

523a Socrates rejects the term '*muthos*' or 'mere tale' for his story, and insists that it is a 'rational account', *logos*; cf. 449de, 505c. He probably means that (a) it is true; cf. 524ab, 527ab; and (b) it is rationally defensible; 527ab.

Some general questions can be raised about the myths in Platonic dialogues (the *G.* is probably the earliest; cf. *M.* 81a-d, *Phd.* 107c-115d, *R.* 614b-621d, *Phdr.* 246a-250c, *Pol.* 268d-274e):

- (1) How far does Socrates alter traditional material, and how much does he invent for his purpose?
- (2) What is the epistemological status of the myth? How much does Plato believe, and why?
- (3) What is its role in the argument? Does the main argument of the dialogue depend at all on the truth of the myth, or the other way round?

On (1) see Dodds, Guthrie (1), iv. 305, (2), 168 ff. The other questions are considered below.

523a 'There was this rule, (*nomos*)'. Socrates replies to Calicles' attack on *nomos* as merely the result of weak people's conspiring against nature; the *nomos* endorsing justice and rejecting injustice is both eternal and natural, recognized by the gods.

523c The procedure of the unreformed court reflects the procedure of the contemporary Athenian courts; 471e, 475e-476a.

When Zeus says that people are judged 'with clothes on', he includes people's bodies with wealth and families as 'clothes' or 'coverings', suggesting that someone's body is as external to his real self as these other appendages are. We might say this independently of any metaphysical theory of the soul as a non-bodily entity, if we mean that someone's physical strength and social status recognized goods and components of *arete* \* (451e) do not reveal his real character.

523d For criticism of the senses cf. *Phd.* 65a-67b. Here, however, no contrast with non-sensible Forms is involved, as in the *Phd.* The senses are liable to be too much impressed by external and superficial features irrelevant to a correct moral judgement on character; cf. *I Samuel* 16.7.

Plato elsewhere speaks of 'nakedness' and 'purification' as ways of gaining clear knowledge; *Alc.* 132a, *Symp.* 211a,e, 216de.

Zeus does not explain why people must not know the day of their death (cf. Aesch. *PV* 248 ff.). Perhaps he thinks of the attitude mentioned in *R.* 330d-331b (cf. 364b-365a).

523e 'when he has died without warning (*exaiphnes*\*)', or 'immediately when he has died'. The first translation may be supported by the previous remark about depriving men of foreknowledge of their death. 'Bereft ...' should refer to 'the soul'; but the adjectives are masculine accusative (*psuche*\* is feminine), as though they had been preceded by 'the man'. On soul and man see 524b.

'adornment', *kosmos*; see 503de.

524a5 'make a further judgement' (*epidiakrinein*, a probable emendation in *La.* 184d1). This is not a judgement 'on appeal' (Dodds) in the ordinary sense, since Socrates does not suggest that the defendant is allowed to appeal (contrast *Laws* 767a). Minos intervenes only when the other two are at a loss. It is not clear whether each of the other two judges consults the other one before resorting to Minos; the Greek dual form in 'are at a loss' might suggest this.

524ab Socrates says that he 'believes' or 'trusts in' (*pisteuein*) the story; he avoids any claim to knowledge cf. 454c-e, 508e-509a. With the 'consequences', *sumbainonta*, of the story cf. the consequences of agreements reached by the *elenchos*, 479c, 494b, 508b.

524b On death as separation of body and soul cf. *Phd.* 64c. Socrates asserts that after death the soul and the body stay much the same as they were in life. The major difference in the body is that it is dead; that is why Socrates ascribes Life only to the man (the compound of body and soul), and sometimes calls the separated body a 'corpse' (*nekros*; but he is not consistent; e.g. in 524c *soma* \* refers to the dead body, and elsewhere to the living body). But Socrates clearly does not think that it is a dead soul which survives the separation of body and soul; though he always distinguishes the corpse from the person, he speaks indifferently of the soul and of the person after death (e.g. 526b). In that case the soul and the body surely cannot remain 'much the same' after death in the same way. Socrates might reply that the body is never strictly alive, but just acts differently when it is joined to the soul, the only real source of life.

524e The Persian king; 470e.

525a 'false oaths and injustice (*adikia*)'. False oaths are clearly actions. It is not clear whether 'injustice' covers unjust actions (see 524d, 478e) or the unjust state of character resulting from them or most probably both.

Socrates claims that the conditions which Callicles praised as virtues at 429c are treated as vices, and 'dishonoured' (cf. 486c, 508c, 527a) in the afterlife. 'Disproportion' reflects lack of measure and proportion (508a), and hence lack of order (*kosmos*; 503de) in the soul.

525b1 'Vengeance' may be an over-translation of *timoria*\*; it is a frequent term for punishment. But it is often associated with taking revenge. Perhaps this is why Plato avoided the term in 475d ff.; *diken*\* *didonai*, 'pay justice', and especially *kolazein* (see 476a) suited his therapeutic view of punishment much better than the retributive associations of *timorein*\* would have suited it. *Timorein*\* was used only at 472d8, e6. *Tisis*, 'retribution' or 'compensation', 523b3, reflects the same view of punishment, which Socrates has not recognized so far in the dialogue. On *timorein*\* and *kolazein* see Ar. *Rhet.* 1369b12-14, Cope (2), 233 f., *Pr.* 324ab, C. C. W. Taylor ad loc.

525b6 'are at fault with curable faults (*hamartemata*\*)'; or perhaps 'commit curable errors'. But what is curable seems to be the condition of the soul cause or effect or both of the faulty action; cf. 479a. 525d is less clear.

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Though he has referred to punishment after death as 'retribution' (*tisis*; 523b), here Socrates insists again (cf. 478a) that the proper purpose of punishment is curative. But now he adds that some people are incurable, and therefore fit only to be examples to deter others (cf. *Pr.* 324b). He does not concede that punishment in this life can be justified by its deterrent effect on others. He seems to assume:

- (1) We can justifiably treat someone as incurable only after his death.
- (2) Only incurables can justifiably be used for deterrence.

He needs (1) to justify his earlier claim that it is always good for me to be punished. If I knew I was an incurable, or that I would be treated as one, I would surely have good reason to think that punishment harmed me, and to avoid it. But how is (2) justified? Our selection of a criminal, as opposed to others, for this deterrent use, must apparently be justified, if at all, by something *he* has done, his past crimes. Does that not reflect a retributive attitude? Even if the punishment itself is inflicted for forward-looking reasons, the selection of candidates for punishment seems to reflect retributive views. If Socrates rejects all retributive views, he has no right to (2). He has no reason in principle to deny that non-criminals should be coerced for their own good and the benefit of others. This result fits easily into the political theory of the *R.*

Socrates also seems to assume:

- (3) If I am incurable, anything can justifiably be done to me for deterrent purposes.

Incurables do not cease to have interests; and so why should these interests not be considered, as they are for curables? If they are incurable, they might be better off dead (cf. *R.* 406d-407e); but surely they are harmed if they are tormented after death without regard for their interests? Socrates might argue that they have chosen to act unjustly and become unjust, and therefore deserve all they get. But then he must appeal to retributive views. *R.* 617de also suggests that the legitimacy of inflicting harm on people depends on their past choices. Perhaps Socrates and Plato cannot afford to dispense with retributive views of punishment as completely as they suppose.

'their benefit comes through pain and suffering'. As before, Socrates assumes, without justification, that conventional methods of punishment achieve the goals he advocates for punishment.

525c 'the examples are made from them' is perhaps meant to suggest that the men themselves no longer exist, and their souls have simply been used as material for examples (cf. *Ar. Phys.* 190625-7).

But the suggestion is not maintained in the sequel.

As usual (see 522b) Socrates supposes, not that an unjust action, *adikema* \*, is evidence of an unjust state of soul, but that it creates the unjust state. He does not explain why especially unjust actions make me especially unjust; might I not do something extremely unjust under extreme provocation, and then reform after extreme remorse? If Socrates replies that only an extremely unjust man could bring himself to do an extremely unjust action, he treats the action as the effect rather than the cause of the state. No doubt actions are both effects and causes of states of character; but Socrates' view, that the quality of the action directly causes the quality of the resulting state of character, is grossly over-simplified.

The incurables are examples, not to those on earth, but only to the dead. Perhaps the dead are to return to earth (as in *R.* x; see Dodds). But perhaps they can still influence the effects of punishment on them by their attitude to it, and contemplation of the incurables may make them more co-operative. No theory of reincarnation need be assumed.

525d Socrates returns to Archelaus, Polus' candidate for happiness, and the democratic politicians and rhetors who suffer with the absolute rulers, kings, and tyrants. Socrates adds to his previous claim that freedom to do what we like is no real power if we are ignorant of our own good (452e, 466bc). Here he adds that the ruler's 'liberty' (*exousia*; 461e, 525a) and opportunities actually damage his interests, because they allow him to commit worse injustice. Plato does not think that power necessarily corrupts; it creates temptations, but they are resistible. Later, however, he is exacting about the kind of character needed to resist the temptations, and rather pessimistic (more than in the *R.*) at *Laws* 691cd. On 'faults' see 525b.

Dodds suggests that the temptations of power are an unfair handicap to someone who holds power, and that this apparent unfairness needs to be remedied by a pre-natal choice of life, as in *R.* 617d-620d. But Plato might deny any unfairness; these positions offer greater dangers, but also greater opportunities (e.g. to practise the political craft) than others.

526a Socrates agrees with Callicles that only weakness prevents many from acting unjustly, and that they would be unjust if they could avoid punishment; cf. 483bc, *R.* 359c-360d.

Socrates allows that men have arisen and will arise who are 'fine and good in this virtue, justly managing what has been entrusted to them'. Here again Socrates insists that the Free and good man (see

470e) must be just. The phrase following 'fine and good' may restrict it, meaning that these men have been fine and good to a certain extent, and in a limited way; if virtue requires knowledge, and none of these men had knowledge, none should be virtuous either.

Socrates does not admit that Aristeides was any more than a flatterer, or that he knew what was really best for the state. He admits only that Aristeides acted justly to a certain extent. However he did suggest earlier (502e) that other political leaders were out for their own interests; and he seems to deny this for Aristeides.

526b 'some base character' (*poneros* \*). 'Base' is the normal opposite to 'fine and good', and so is used for the 'base' or 'low' political class (cf. the Roman term '*improbus*'). Socrates rebuts this political use of the terms 'fine and good' and 'base', insisting that anyone is base if he is unjust. See 511b, 470e.

526c The philosopher's ideal of 'not interfering' (*apragmosune*\*) is defended against the political activist's ideal, described by its opponents as 'interfering' or 'doing many things' (*polupragmosune*\*); cf. 485d. On these attitudes cf. Thuc. 2.63.2, 64.4, 6.18.6, Ehrenberg (2), 46-62, Adkins (6). 'Not interfering' is associated with 'doing one's own' (i.e. one's own work) and justice, *R.* 433ab (see Vlastos (5), 117-23); on 'doing one's own' and temperance see *Ch.* 161b-162b.

Plato advocates withdrawal at *R.* 493de, *Th.* 173c-e; Socrates apparently takes a different view at *Ap.* 31c. But the difference is not so clear on closer study; Socrates insists that he does not go in for public office (*Ap.* 31d, 36bc; cf. *G.* 473e), but sticks to private life, exhorting Athenians to be virtuous. Since these activities are consistent with our present passage, Socrates' advocacy of non-interference here need be no more Platonic than Socratic.

526d Socrates quotes Homer's line about Minos judging disputes *among* the dead (i.e. disputes arising after they have died), and applies this to Minos' judgement on people's previous lives. We do not know if this alteration is Platonic or earlier.

'I am persuaded'. Socrates claims conviction and persuasion, not knowledge, about what he has extracted from the myth.

526e 'in reply to your call'; see 486a-c, echoed by Socrates, returning to the question about self-defence (509bc).

'more than all the contests here'. Socrates speaks in the terms of Polus and Callicles again (cf. Adkins (3), 30-8). They think that

happiness and being well off is the result of success in struggles for power and status. Socrates' contest is essentially different from others, since praise and success does not depend on competition with others, but entirely on the agent himself.

Plato takes a rather unattractively malicious pleasure in depicting the incompetence of the unjust and unphilosophical man (often identified) facing the life after death; cf. *Tht.* 174a-176a. Socrates throws back Callicles' taunts at 486a-d.

527a 'dishonour'; see 525a.

527ab Socrates suggests:

- (1) We have a reason for believing the myth.
- (2) We cannot find anything better or truer.
- (3) We cannot show that we should live any other way than Socrates' way.
- (4) That way of life is also most advantageous in the afterlife.

But what is the logical connection here? Surely (2) by itself is no defence of (1). But apparently (3) is meant to support (1); the myth rests on the independent moral argument of the dialogue. But does that help? If it is supposed to assure us that the world reflects our moral views, we need some other reason to believe it than the fact that it is a moral tale constructed out of our moral views.

Platonic answers to these questions can be constructed from, e.g., *Eu.* 10c-11b, *R.* 377c-383e. Plato thinks the traditional stories include some truth about the gods; but to find that truth we must apply our moral views, reached by non-theological argument, and reject any conception of the gods inconsistent with those views. In the *G.* we have settled our moral beliefs on non-religious grounds. The religious beliefs are not simply constructions from moral beliefs; they are independent traditions. But just as the *elenchos* seek the most coherent selection from our moral beliefs, we also seek to make our moral and our religious beliefs coherent. And since we have better warrant Socrates assumes for our moral beliefs, we should select those religious traditions which fit our moral beliefs. This policy is not foolproof; but Socrates claims that it is the most reasonable option in the present state of our knowledge.

We might doubt his claim that the myth coheres with our moral beliefs. Socrates has argued that the wise man will not care about worldly power, success, etc., but only about the good condition of his soul which makes him immune to all these external aids or handicaps. If we have accepted this, why should we expect the gods to provide us with all these 'unimportant' extras, when they matter so little? Perhaps Socrates will reply that they matter, but not as

much as being just matters. But it is doubtful whether he has shown this; see 508c-e. It was not clear whether justice and psychic order was to be valued for its own sake or for some further benefit; and it was not clear why some collection of other goods could not outweigh the benefits of being just. And so it is not clear whether the religious appeal is needed to show that justice is the supreme benefit. *R.* 360e-361d, 612a-614a faces these questions more clearly.

527b Socrates claims that his position can be maintained without self-contradiction (508e-509a), so that his beliefs are stable, unlike other people's (cf. *Cri.* 46b-d, *Eu.* 11 b-e).

'a man must practice not seeming good, but being good'. See Aesch. *Sep.* 592, Plutarch, *Arist.* 3.5 (on Aristeides), *R.* 361b. If psychic justice is an instrumental good, the question arises whether its results could be secured by apparent justice as well as by real justice. This question is not raised in the *G.*, but in the *R.*

527c 'be convinced by me'; cf. 513c.

527d On 'fine and good' see 526ab. Most people would expect the free and good man to be able to defend himself against attack. But Socrates suggests that this will not matter to a really fine and good man; insults and apparent dishonour will not matter in comparison with what Socrates counts as virtue.

527e 'that is how uneducated we are'. Questions about education, *paideia*, have arisen periodically. Socrates insisted on justice and *paideia* as necessary conditions for happiness at 470e. Callicles claimed at 485a to value philosophy as a part of *paideia*, implying that it was fit only for a young man; Socrates remarked that most Athenians would think Callicles was adequately educated, 487b. Now Socrates concludes that someone who cannot reach reasoned and defensible convictions about these questions has no claim to real *paideia* at all, so that philosophical study for an adult is not as foolish as Callicles supposed.

Sidgwick (1), 404 f., presents one verdict on the main ethical argument of the *G.*: '... in the earlier age of ethical thought which Greek philosophy represents, men sometimes judged an act to be 'good' *for the agent*, even while recognizing that its consequences would be on the whole painful to him, as (e.g.) a heroic exchange of a life full of happiness for a painful death at the call of duty. I attribute this partly to a confusion of thought between what it is reasonable for an individual to desire when he considers his own existence

alone, and what he must recognize as reasonable to be desired when he takes the point of view of a larger whole; partly, again, to a faith deeply rooted in the moral consciousness of mankind, that there cannot be really and ultimately any conflict between the two kinds of reasonableness. We may illustrate this double explanation by a reference to some of Plato's Dialogues, such as the *Gorgias*, where the ethical argument has a singularly mixed effect on the mind. Partly, it seems to us more or less dexterous sophistry, playing on a confusion of thought latent in the common notion of good; partly a noble and stirring expression of a profound moral faith.'

We can now perhaps see how far this verdict is justified (see esp. 507c, n.). Socrates has offered arguments, better than dexterous sophistry, to show that Polus' and Callicles' reasons for rejecting justice are unsatisfactory, because they conflict with central beliefs of the interlocutors themselves about the kind of life which is worth while for a rational agent. Socrates has argued plausibly that one obvious reason for rejecting justice the conflict between justice and a life of Calliclean pleasures turns out not to be an objection to justice. He has shown that, contrary to first appearances, the control and restraint of desire demanded by justice *need* not be bad for the agent, since some restraint and temperance is needed for any rationally satisfactory life at all (see 499ab, n.). At the same time that argument falls short of a complete vindication of justice (see 507c, n., 508de, n.).

We may draw different conclusions:

- (1) The kind of 'moral faith' displayed in the concluding myth is necessary to vindicate Socrates' claims about justice.
- (2) The assumption underlying Socrates' faith is misguided. He always assumes that justice must benefit the agent, and that if it does not, he has no reason to be just (see 468b, n.). This is a basic error about the justification of morality, and Socrates' failure to vindicate morality shows that his assumption is wrong.
- (3) Socrates' assumption is reasonable, and the final resort to faith is not needed to vindicate justice, because we can find a better argument to show that someone is always better off by being just than by being unjust.

Plato's own view of the *G.* is (3), reflected in the argument of the *R.* The *R.* defends the *G.*'s basic claim that someone is always better off being just. Plato thinks that this defence requires the rejection of some of the *G.*'s central claims in ethics and theory of action (see 468ab, 479b, 491d, 493a, 507c, Intr. § 13). The argument of the *G.* should be studied both for its own sake and as a first attempt at the task attempted again in the *R.*

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