


Critical Notes
on Plato's *Politeia*

BY

S.R. SLINGS (†)

EDITED BY

GERARD BOTER &
JAN VAN OPHUIJSEN



CRITICAL NOTES
ON PLATO'S *POLITEIA*

MNEMOSYNE

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S.R. SLINGS (†)

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BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON
2005

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Slings, S. R.

Critical notes on Plato's *Politeia* / by S.R. Slings / edited by Gerard Boter and Jan van Ophuijsen.

p. cm. — (Mnemosyne, bibliotheca classica Batava. Supplementum,
ISSN 0169-8958 ; 267)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 90-04-14172-3 (acid-free paper)

1. Plato. Republic—Criticism, Textual. 2. Transmission of texts—Greece. I. Boter, Gerard. II. Ophuijsen, J. M. van, 1953- III. Title. IV. Series.

PA4279.R7S57 2005

321'.07—dc22

2005047100

ISSN 0169-8958

ISBN 90 04 14172 3

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

*Dedicated to the members of
the Amsterdam Hellenist Club*

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PREFACE

In 1977, Siem Slings initiated the project ‘Text edition of Plato’s eighth tetralogy’; in March 2003 the new Oxford Classical Text of the *Republic* appeared. In the meantime Slings supervised two doctoral dissertations concerned with the project;¹ he reworked his own doctoral dissertation on the *Clitophon* into a book;² finally, he wrote a series of articles on the text of the *Republic*, published in *Mnemosyne* between 1988 and 2003.

In the autumn of 1998, an incurable cancer of the prostate revealed itself. Slings realized that he would sooner or later succumb to this disease, which made him speed up his work on the text of the *Republic*. It was a great satisfaction to him and to all around him that he managed to finish the edition and that he could hold the fruit of his 25-year long labours in his hands. On 20 May 2003 the publication of his edition was celebrated in what was called a ‘Siemosium’ at the Free University, Amsterdam. After this joyful occasion Slings’s condition deteriorated rapidly. In July his doctors informed him that nothing more could be done to stop the disease. In the first weeks of the new academic year he had to give up teaching. In December he was still able to preside over the Ph.D. thesis defence of his pupil and friend Toon van Wolferen. After this occasion, his last public appearance, he had another six weeks to live, growing weaker by the day. He died in the morning of Sunday, 18 January 2004, at the age of 58.

In the OCT Slings announced the publication of a book on the text of the *Republic*, consisting of the articles he had published in *Mnemosyne* in the course of preparing his edition. Foreseeing that he would not live to complete this task, he asked us to finish it after his death.

The first and most obvious part of our task was to bring the text into accordance with the new edition. This regards the line numbers, which

¹ G.J. Boter, *The Textual Tradition of Plato’s Republic*, Ph.D. diss., Free University, Amsterdam 1986 (Leiden 1989); G. Jonkers, *The Manuscript Tradition of Plato’s Timaeus and Critias*, Ph.D. diss., Free University, Amsterdam 1989.

² *A Commentary on the Platonic Clitophon*, Ph.D. diss., Free University, Amsterdam 1981; *Plato: Clitophon*, Cambridge 1999.

in many places differ from those in Burnet's edition. In a number of places the text of the lemmata had to be changed to accord with the new edition.

More importantly, it appeared that in a number of cases Slings had decided to print a reading he had rejected in his notes. In such cases we have decided to leave the text of the note as it stands; the discrepancy between note and edition has been indicated between square brackets. In a few cases Slings opted for a reading he had not discussed in his articles; in such cases we have composed a note ourselves (again, between square brackets), trying to reconstruct the considerations that led Slings to adopt a given reading; the most conspicuous case in point is Slings's conjecture <Καί> πῶς; at 485a9.

Slings's articles appeared over a period of fifteen years, during which he regularly changed his habits with regard to editorial practice. For instance, 'pp. 116–117' could be written as '116f.', '116 f.', '116–117', etcetera. We have aimed at conformity in such matters, but it is more than likely that a number of deviations have escaped our notice. In referring to books and articles we have followed the Harvard convention throughout.

Slings discussed the text of all his articles on the *Republic* with the members of the Amsterdam Hellenist Club, to which he refers in the articles a number of times. It was his wish that this book should be dedicated to the members of this Club, of which he had been an inspiring member for more than thirty years.

We trust that this book will be a useful companion to the OCT edition of the *Republic*. At the same time, it is a monument to a great scholar.

Gerard Boter
Jan van Ophuijsen

BOOK ONE

327c10 οὐκοῦν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ἔτι ἔλλείπεται τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς ...;

ἐλλείπεται ADF: γο ἔν λείπεται A³

Against Adam's excellent defence of ἔν λείπεται (λείπεσθαι said of a third alternative, cf. *Grg.* 510c7: a better man can be no friend to the tyrant, nor can a worse one. λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος, to wit, the ὁμοίητης) may be brought forward *Phlb.* 18d4–6 τὸ δ' αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου ... ἐλλείπεται—μῶν ὃ Φίλιβη τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὐτῶν ἔστιν; where the quotation preceded by τό is exactly parallel to our passage.

The slightly abnormal use of ἔτι ('isn't there still the possibility left out by you?') may have caused the correction to ἔν λείπεται (so Jowett–Campbell), but it is equally possible that a non-assimilative spelling (ἐνλείπεται) was misunderstood.

It must further be noted that the authority of A³ in the *Politeia* is uncertain: apart from some scholia and repetitions of phrases in the margin (with σώζοντες possibly as a variant for διασώζοντες at 329a1), the only other variant which we owe to this hand in the *Politeia* is 329e3 σου] σε (*falso*). In the *Nomoi*, A³ is very busy recording variants and supplying lacunas: there he had an ancient MS at his disposal. His behaviour in the *Politeia* suggests the contrary. Therefore, despite the 'γο', ἔν λείπεται may very well be a conjecture made by A³. Cf. Boter (1989: 85) and my data on A³ in the *Clitophon*, *Mnemos.* 40 (1987), 36–37.

329e7 καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται.

μέντοι γε ὅσον ADF Arethas: μέντοι ὅσον γε Procl. *In Alc.* 12.10 (p. 5 Westerink): μέντοι ὅσον Scor.γ.1.13 Stob. (IV 50a,31 = IV 1035,5 Hense)

μέντοι γε is juxtaposed in Plato here and *Cra.* 424c9–10 φωνήεντα μὲν οὐ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογα; as a variant for μέντοι *Phdr.* 230d5 (cf. De Vries *ad loc.*); *Phd.* 61c9. Cf. also *Sis.* 388a5; *Alc.II* 139e9. *Prt.* 312d8 the reading οὐ μέντοι γε ἱκανῶς γε (B: οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε TW) is a conflation of the TW reading with οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς; similarly *Euthphr.* 12c4 οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε BDTW Stob. *MC*: οὐ μέντοι γε ἵνα C: οὐ μέντοι γε ἵνα γε

V, Stob. S. The juxtaposition is rare throughout classical Greek (Deniston [1954: 405]), but there is no good reason for doubting it (statistics in Blomqvist [1969: 30]).

Here, μέντοι γε may have been used to avoid ὅσον γε, which commonly means ‘only inasmuch as’ (cf. however below, on 331b5, for another explanation). At *Cra. loc.cit.* the particles were probably juxtaposed for euphonic reasons, to avoid ἀφθογγά γε. There is no good reason for assuming γε to be interpolated: in Hellenistic prose μέντοι ... γε almost disappears and μέντοι becomes the norm, yet οὐ μέντοι γε is rare. The Atticists revive οὐ μέντοι ... γε (Blomqvist [1969: 29; 32]). I would rather assume that the rareness of μέντοι γε in Plato brought about the variants μέντοι and μέντοι ... γε (the latter had been conjectured by H. Hofer, *De particulis platonis capita selecta* [Bonnae 1882], 39; Blaydes ad Ar. *Thesm.* 709; Hartman [1914: 221]. Hartman [1914: 11] ascribes the conjecture to Cobet in *Mnemos.* 1884. I haven’t found it there or in any of Cobet’s works, though there is a general rejection of μέντοι γε in *Mnemos.* 11 [1883], 138 in a note on Hdt. 2.93,2 and 98,2. But Hartman’s wording seems to refer to a more specific treatment.).

Other authors borrow this dictum, but usually rephrased in such a manner that it loses its value for the text of Plato (e.g. Choric. 157,24 Foerster–Richtsteig λέγει μὲν τι ... οὐ μὴν ὅσον περ οἴεται). Arethas is fond of it; six times out of seven he gives a καί before or (once) after ὅσον, which must be his idea of elegant Greek, and should not be used for Plato. The fact that he has μέντοι γε καὶ ὅσον three times (*Scr.min.* 1.117,10; 335,2–3; 2.57,28 Westerink) as opposed to one μέντοι καὶ ὅσον (1.292,17), indicates that his text was identical to that of ADF.

330c5–6 ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι **τὰ χρήματα** σπουδάξουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, **καὶ κατὰ** τὴν χρεῖαν ἤπερ οἱ ἄλλοι.

τὰ χρήματα F Stob. (IV 31d,118 = V 775,4 Hense): περὶ τὰ χρήματα AD || καὶ κατὰ AD Stob.: καὶ οὐ κατὰ F

Both σπουδάξω τι and σπουδάξω περὶ τι are found in Plato. Contrast *Phd.* 114c3–4 τὰς ... περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν (sc. ἡδονὰς) ἐσπούδασε and 64d2–3 ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας. But the construction with the simple accusative (cf. *Sph.* 251c3; 259c2–3) is definitely *lectio difficilior*: it is far easier to explain how περὶ was inserted than how it was omitted.

If the preposition is left out, as I think it should be, there is a slight ambiguity: τὰ χρήματα may also be taken as internal accusative

with *χορηματισάμενοι* (cf. X. *Cyr.* III 3,5). This is not a valid counter-argument: in fact, it is probable that *τὰ χρήματα*, given its position between *χορηματισάμενοι* and *σπουδάξουσιν*, should be taken *ἀπὸ κοινού* with both.

The negative in F was conjectured independently by the 16th-century humanist H. Wolf (cf. *Philol.* 10 [1855], 347), and endorsed by J.C. Vollgraff (*Mnemos.* 44 [1916], 4; his statement that it is in Stobaeus is false). It may be attractive at first sight, but it leaves *τε* unexplained. Besides, the entire sentence is meant to explain (cf. *γάρ* c3) the statement *οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆι ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάξονται αὐτά*.

I see absolutely no reason for Vollgraff's omission of the article in his proposal *〈οὐ〉 κατὰ χρεῖαν*; it may be sheer carelessness.

330e5 ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστός γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ εἴ τινα τι **ἠδίκηκεν**.

ἠδίκηκεν AF Stob. (IV 31d,118 = V 775,20 Hense): *ἠδίκησεν* Asl D Iustin. (*Coh.Gr.* 26 = 59,19 Marcovich)

The perfect has a very close parallel in *Phd.* 113d7–8 *καθαιρόμενοι τῶν ... ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας* (cf. *supra* d8–e1) *ἀπολύονται εἴ τις τι ἠδίκηκεν* (where C Stob. read *ἠδίκησεν*); cf. *Men.* 92b5. I have not found a comparable unambiguously attested use of the aorist in Plato. ‘Le parfait ... insiste souvent sur la responsabilité de l’agent’ (P. Chantraine, *Histoire du parfait grec* [Paris 1927], 177, quoting *Lys.* 30,24 *τίς ἐλάττω τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθὰ πεποιήκεν ἢ πλείω ἠδίκηκεν*);

Choric. 100,9–10 F-R. *οὐδὲν εἰσήμει δεινὸν οὐδὲ λογισμὸς ἔστρεφεν αὐτῆι τὴν ψυχὴν* (cf. 330e1–2), *μή τινα λελύπηκεν* shows that he is alluding to a text with the perfect, not the aorist.

331b5 ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρεῖας πολλάς, ἀλλὰ **γε** ἐν ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἄν εἰς τοῦτο ... πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

γε ἐν ADF: *ἐν γε* Stob. (IV 31d,118 = V 776,17 Hense): *γε* secl. Stallbaum

The combination *ἀλλὰ γε* is found five times in (some of) the MSS of Plato. At 543c4, *Phd.* 86e4 and *Hp.Ma.* 287b4, *ἀλλ’ ἄγε* is demonstrably better. The remaining two instances are the present passage and *Phdr.* 262a2 (*ἀλλὰ γε* δὴ BD Hermias: *ἀλλὰ* δὴ TW: *ἀλλὰ* μὴν Galen). Juxtaposition of *ἀλλὰ γε* is rare, not only in classical Greek (where its occurrence has been doubted altogether; cf. Denniston [1954: 23]), but also in later times (contrary to what is suggested by R.A. Neil, *comm.*

on Ar. *Eq.* [Cambridge 1901], Appendix I, 193). No examples are recorded in Preisigke–Kiessling, only two in the New Testament, two in Polybius (II 33,9 and II 39,9; XII 10,4 γε is Casaubonus' correction), none in Epictetus and Plotinus. From the Atticists no instances are recorded in W. Schmid's *Atticismus* [Stuttgart 1887–1897]—very many of ἀλλά ... γε—, whereas Arr. *Cyn.* 15,1 is textually uncertain. Neil mentions Pausanias without giving any further information. [ἀλλά γε is found in Paus. VI 17,9.]

However, in classical Greek there are some instances of ἀλλά γε that merit closer investigation. Arist. *EE* 1216b20 οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε stands on its own; *Oec.* 1343b25 γε is not in the MSS; Archestr. 177,2 *SH* Wilamowitz' τι for γε is certainly right. But there is no good reason to doubt Gorg. *Pal.* 10 and 14, both times answering a hypothetical objection beginning with ἀλλά.

Now, when we are confronted with a rare phenomenon established certainly for only one classical author, would we accept it at only one place in another author for whom it is not unanimously attested? (*Phdr.* 262a2 ἀλλά γε δὴ is absolutely unique and almost certainly wrong, cf. Denniston [1954: 242].) In principle, no. But there are two considerations which may lead one to accept ἀλλά γε here.

First, since ἀλλά γε is also uncommon in later Greek, there is no convincing case for γε being interpolated (if we follow Stallbaum, who incidentally in the second edition of his commentary recanted his seclusion of γε and adopted Stobaeus' ἀλλά ἔν γε) or transposed (Stobaeus' reading is *lectio facilior*). Secondly, it may not be a coincidence that the author for whom ἀλλά γε is attested unambiguously is a Sicilian, whereas the present speaker comes from Syracuse (this may also account for 329e7 μέντοι γε: Adam defends both μέντοι γε and ἀλλά γε on the ground that Cephalus was not an Athenian—he did not know about the passages from Gorgias, but his intuition may be right). Cf. Olymp. *In Grg.* 37,3–5 Westerink φαιμὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ὁ λέγων, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνου προφέρει τὰς λέξεις [sc. χειροῦργημα, κύρωσις] ἐγχωρίους οὔσας· Λεοντῖνος γὰρ ἦν; Dodds on *Grg.* 450b9.

Though neither of these arguments is incontrovertible, together they give sufficient support for retaining the MSS reading.

For what it's worth, I note that Plato nowhere has a particle separating two forms of εἷς: *Phlb.* 63c1–2 ἔν ἀνθ' ἐνός; *Lg.* 705b4–5 ἀνθ' ἐνός ἔν, cf. 738e5; *Sph.* 229b9 ἔν ἐφ' ἐνί, cf. *Lg.* 758b7; *La.* 182b2 ὑπό γε ἐνός εἷς. But cf. the doubtful *Epin.* 976e1–2 μία γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν πρὸς μίαν.

332c4–5 διανοεῖτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς φαίνεται ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη δίκαιον, τὸ προσή-
κον ἐκάστω ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον. — ἀλλὰ τί οἶε
ἔφη. — **πρὸς** Διὸς ἦν δ' ἐγὼ εἰ κτέ

post c3 ὀφειλόμενον et post c4 ἔφη alterum interlocutorem indicat prA, signo : usus; postea post ὀφειλόμενον signi : dimidium erasum ut · fiat, signum post ἔφη totum erasum; obelus quoque in margine positus, qui alterum interlocutorem indicet (erat unus tantum) postea erasus: post ὀφειλόμενον punctum solum, post ἔφη nullum signum praebent DF: ἔφη tantum Polemarcho attrib. Madvig || c5 πρὸς D: ὃ πρὸς A Fpc: ὦ πρὸς Fac

τί οἶε is used at the beginning of a speech or answer at *Smp.* 207a6; *Prt.* 341c6 (about Simonides, as here); *Hp.Ma.* 296a6; 304a4. Except in the *Smp.* passage it is always preceded by ἀλλά. It is never a self-contained answer except at *Hp.Ma.* 296a6. Most importantly, it is never used as a tag-question as Madvig takes it to be here, and besides, ὘φη as a self-contained answer ('He said Yes') is quite rare in reported dialogues, as opposed to Συνέφη, and it is certainly not a good answer to ἀλλὰ τί οἶε;. Consequently, ἀλλὰ τί οἶε must have been spoken by Polemarchus. The division of the words between the speakers as found in A before correction, and in most modern editions, is quite correct.

At the beginning of a speech or answer, πρὸς Διὸς is found *Ly.* 209d5; *Euthd.* 294b11; *R.* 602c1. People do say ὦ πρὸς Διὸς in Plato (about a dozen times, as against nearly three dozen of simple πρὸς Διὸς), but never at this position. Therefore I am inclined to think that D is correct in omitting it. It may have arisen from anticipation of ὦ Σιμωνίδη later in the line.

333e6–7 ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας;

φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὗτος ADF: φυλάξασθαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν, οὗτος Laur.80.19pc || ἐμποιήσας Schneider: ἐμποιῆσαι ADF: καὶ ἐμποιῆσαι D²

See the notes of Stallbaum, Schneider, Tucker and Adam (and his App. II, 1,62–63). μὴ παθεῖν (cf. Boter [1989: 211]) and καὶ ἐμποιῆσαι are clearly conjectures. Of the other remedies only Schneider's ἐμποιήσας and λαθῶν, considered, and rejected, by Tucker (cf. Apelt [1903: 340–341]; Prandtl [1904: 5]; Vretska [1953: 76–77]) are at all probable.

I prefer ἐμποιήσας for the following reasons. (1) Corruption of ἐμποιήσας to ἐμποιῆσαι is easy, given the word order, which could almost automatically lead to φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν being taken together—of course the MSS punctuation is no valid argument; corruption of λαθῶν

το λαθεῖν is less easily accounted for. (2) λαθών as a circumstantial participle, instead of λανθάνω with a supplementary participle, is definitely the rarer construction in Attic prose. In Plato's authentic works, it is only found *Prt.* 321e1, that is to say in Protagoras' myth with its numerous poeticisms and Ionicisms.

It has been argued, especially by Tucker and Vretska, that with λαθών the emphasis falls on ἐμποῦῃσαι, as it should. I am not quite certain that it should: one might equally argue that the emphasis falls on λαθεῖν, as this facilitates the transition πατάξι – λαθεῖν – ἐμποῦῃσας – κλέψαι; and given the word order, the notion of secretiveness is stressed anyway, whether λαθεῖν or λαθών is read. I cannot agree with Vretska that λαθών is 'der gleichsam unbemerkt eingeführte neue Begriff' (77).

335a8–9 κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακῶς, νῦν πρὸς τοῦτ' ὅδε λέγειν, τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν;

λέγειν F: λέγειν ὅτι ἔστιν δίκαιον AD

The words ὅτι ἔστιν δίκαιον have never been doubted, although Schneider and Chambry duly record their omission in F¹. It is possible, but no more than that, that they were omitted by sheer accident in F's exemplar: from A.C. Clark (1918: 415), one gets the impression that lacunas of 12 to 17 letters are relatively frequent in F, but since Clark's data are based on Burnet and Schneider, they are practically worthless outside the *Politeia*—those reported from *Hp.Ma.* may be due to the well-known injury of F's exemplar, which is irrelevant to the *Politeia*. It is far more likely, however, that they were interpolated in AD in order to ease the construction.

Though there are in F a fair amount of arbitrary changes made with this aim (cf. 332e3 ἐν τίνι πράξει] ἐν τῷ τί πράττειν F; 344c3 ἡδίκηκότα] πεποιηκότα F; Boter [1989: 106; 109–110]), interpolation (except of small words) is more typical of A and D than of F.

Therefore, I have little doubt that ὅτι ἔστιν δίκαιον should be removed. To my mind, the sentence gains with their deletion. Compare, in a similar context, 334e10.

337a3 καὶ ὅς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάχασέ τε μάλα σαορδάνιον κτέ

ἀνεκάχασε re vera A: ἀνεκάχασε DF: ἀνεκάχασε Phot. (*Lex.* a 1829)

At *Euthd.* 300d3, the only other passage to contain a form of *κακ/γγά-ζω*, B has *ἀνακακχάσας*, T *ἀνακακχάσας*, W not *ἀνακακχάσας* as reported in the Budé edition, but, judging from a microfilm, unambiguously *ἀνακακχάσας*. I suspect that *-καγγ-* is a late form, perhaps the result of contamination with epic *καγγαλάω*, and that the original form *καχάζω* (*(*καχάζω*, ‘to say *χὰ χὰ*’) underwent expressive gemination, a normal phenomenon in this type of word, to *κακχάζω*, which the combined testimony of A here and BTW in *Euthd.* suggests is what Plato wrote.

337a6–7 καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ ἦδη τε καὶ τούτοις προύλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλήσεις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσεις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο εἴ τις τί σ’ ἐρωτᾷ.

ἐθέλήσεις AD: ἐθελήσεις F (et Scor.y.1.13) || ποιήσεις ADF: secl. Cobet (1873: 526–527) || ἀποκρινοῖο Laur.80.19pc: ἀποκρίνοιο AF: ἀποκρίναιο D || ἐρωτᾷ AD: ἐροῖτο F: ἐροτο F²: ἐρωτῶι Goodwin (1912: §690)

In a6, ἐθέλήσεις may very well be right; for the switch from indicative to optative in indirect discourse, cf. K.-G. II 366; Goodwin (1912: §670). However, F’s numerous confusions of *ει*, *η* and *οι* do not encourage adopting its reading here.

Cobet’s seclusion of ποιήσεις (cf. Van Herwerden [1883: 333]; J.L.V. Hartman [1896: 25]; J.J. Hartman [1898: 113]), for which he quotes Theophr. *Char.* 25,2 καὶ πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ μάχεσθαι, is more convincing than most of his deletions; interpolations facilitating the construction of a sentence (cf. the previous note) are indeed found occasionally in all MSS (e.g. 539c3). The expression πάντα ποιεῖν, adduced by Adam to defend the text, does not seem to me relevant. But in the expressions οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ, τί ἄλλο ἢ, which Cobet cites as parallels, we do indeed find elliptical and non-elliptical constructions side by side (cf. K.-G. II 285). Thus, there is no general rule by which to justify the deletion here, and therefore I dismiss Cobet’s proposal.

In choosing between ἐρωτᾷ and ἐροῖτο (the latter had been conjectured by Richards [1893: 14 = 1911: 87; neither he nor Burnet could have known that this is the reading of F]), we must ask ourselves whether the sentence would be good Greek in direct speech: πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσει ἢ ἀποκρινεῖται εἴ τις τι αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷ. I have seen no parallels for such a construction: if the *εἰ* clause contains a present indicative and the main clause a future indicative, the *εἰ* clause never refers to the future (e.g. Hdt. VII 15,3 εἰ ὦν θεός ἐστιν ὁ ἐπιπέμπων ... ἐπιστήσε-

ται καὶ σοὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὄνειρον). I cannot make head or tail of Adam's suggestion that the indicative is used because 'εἰ is not genuinely conditional, but temporal, and temporal clauses are liable to such changes, which make for liveliness.'

So much for the exigencies of grammar. On the other side of the balance we may note that (a) 'the indicative may perhaps be allowed in loose conversational style' (Adam); (b) the change from ἔροιο to ἐρωτᾷ in some ancient MSS is harder to explain than *vice versa*; (c) F has a tendency to regularize the moods, cf. 466a1–6, where in indirect speech F has optatives throughout, A only from α5 εἶμεν onwards, while D sits on the fence, as usual (but cf. here on ἐθελήσεις for an opposite case).

The aspectual difference between ἐρωτᾷ and ἔροιο does not help to reach a decision: in general (iterative) clauses of this type, both present and aorist subjunctive or optative aorist forms are found. Cf. *Grg.* 447d7–8 ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τις σε ἐρωτᾷ; *Men.* 70b7 ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἂν τις τι ἔρηται. Hence Goodwin's conjecture ἐρωτῶι is superfluous.

On balance, I prefer ἐρωτᾷ, mainly because I think it is more likely that Plato made a minor grammatical error (in what is, after all, a complicated *oratio obliqua* structure) than that a later copyist changed a regular form deliberately into an irregular one.

There is a third possibility, namely that Plato wrote ἂν ... ἐρωτᾷ, after which ἂν was corrupted to εἰ, and ἐρωτᾷ later corrected to ἔροιο in one of the ancestors of F. But corruption of ἂν to εἰ is a very dubious hypothesis.

340e3 ἐπιλιπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός.

ἐπιλιπούσης AD Stob. (II 38,8 = II 163,14 Wachsmuth); ἐπιλειπούσης F

Theoretically, one expects the present and imperfect tenses to be used for the process of failing, and the aorist when the end of the process has been reached (τὰ χρήματά με ἐπέλειπεν 'I was running out of money'; τὰ χρήματά με ἐπέλιπεν 'I have/had run out of money'). In the two passages in Plato where there are no variants in the primary witnesses, this distinction is not altogether confirmed: *R.* 574d1 Τί δ', ὅταν δὴ τὰ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ἐπιλείπημι τὸν τοιοῦτον, πολὺ δὲ ἤδη συνειλεγμένον ἐν αὐτῶι ἦι τὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν σμήνος; οὐ πρόωτον μὲν οἰκίας τινὸς ἐφάπεται τοίχου κτέ (ἐπιλείπη(ι) AF: ἐπιλείπει D) the most logical interpretation is that the young tyrannical man has already squandered his parents' resources, though 'begin to fail' (Cornford) is not entirely

impossible. *Plt.* 274d4 ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θεῶν ... τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐπέλιπεν ἀνθρώπους fits the theory (*Phlb.* 52d10; *Prt.* 310e1; 334e6 the verb is used in a different construction). Since there are three passages where the primary MSS are divided (*h.l.*, 568e2, 573e3), a glance at the usage outside Plato may be useful.

An examination of all occurrences in *Hdt.*, *Th.*, *Lys.*, *D.* (14 occurrences in all: discounting *D.* 20,23; *prooem.* 55,1 where the verb has a slightly different meaning) shows the following results: when only the interpretation as a more or less gradual process is possible, the present is used (only *D.* 14,30 *bis*); conversely, when it is clear that completion is intended, the aorist is usual, but the present can be used for special reasons (*Lys.* 30,19, where there is an emphasis on the process leading to exhaustion, cf. ἀναλίσκεσθαι).

In all three passages in Plato where there are variants, the context indicates that the exhaustion is now complete; in none is there any special reason for concentrating on the process, but only at our place is such a concentration definitely excluded (and I do not find it plausible for 568e2).

There is no sign of a conscious preference for either the present or the aorist in our MSS. At our place as at 573e3, prA D have the aorist, A²F the present; at 568e2 F has the aorist, AD the present.

If we were to follow A (or prA) everywhere, we would have to accept the aorist here and at 573e3, and the present at 568e1. However, if we accept the aorist at 573e3, I feel we should read it *a fortiori* at 568e2. Therefore, I submit that the aorist should be read at all three places.

Allan notes 'ἐπιλειπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης and ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός convey the same notion. For this reason it is desirable to read ἐπιλειπούσης.' I am not sure that I understand this, but if the implication is that ἐπιλειπούσης ἐπιστήμης is a state, not a process (or rather, event), the argument is contradicted by the use of ἐπιλείπω everywhere else.

341e6–7 τούτοι οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζη τὰ ξυμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τούτο παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη

ἐπὶ τούτο F: ἐπὶ τούτω(ι) AD

The accusative is regular in final expressions after παρασκευάζω, cf. 422d7 ἐπὶ τούτο παρεσκευασμένος; *Grig.* 509e1; 510a3. No similar use of ἐπὶ τούτοι is found. For the same reason τούτο (AD) is to be preferred to τούτω(ι) (F Stob.) at 353a5.

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 187.]

344ε1 ἡ σμικρὸν οἶει ἐπιχειρεῖν προᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ βίου διαγωγὴν, ἣ ἂν διαγόμενος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην ζώην ζώη;

ἀλλ' οὐ AD: ὄλου F

Adam (1902: 217) claims that ἀλλ' οὐ is 'simpler, livelier, and in every way better than ὄλου'. There is a close parallel in form and content: *La.* 185a3 ἡ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴεσθε νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν ... ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος ὃ τῶν ὑμετέρων μέγιστον ὄν τυγχάνει;

Against this, W.L. Lorimer (CR 45 [1931], 213) wishes to read ὄλου with Burnet, but puts a comma after προᾶγμα as well as after διαγωγὴν, comparing *Cri.* 45c5–6 οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν προᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἔξδὸν σωθῆναι.

As an ancillary argument, Lorimer adduces a number of translations in which words like 'entire' creep up even if ἀλλ' οὐ not ὄλου is translated (e.g. Shorey: 'and not the entire conduct of life'). These are, I think, due to the fact that it is hard to bring out in a translation that βίου διαγωγὴν (whether or not with ὄλου added) is a foil for the really important words ἣ ἂν διαγόμενος κτέ. In fact, it might be argued that ὄλην would perhaps be more appropriate than ὄλου.

Another, less trifling argument against ὄλου could be the absence of the article; though the construction is occasionally found in Plato (e.g. *R.* 577ε1 περὶ ὄλης ... ψυχῆς; cf. Gildersleeve [1911: 303]), it seems rather poetic or at any rate high-flown language to use here.

But in this case palaeographical considerations appear to swing the balance. It is not easy to see how ὄλου could have been corrupted to ἀλλ' οὐ, whereas it is rather easy to explain the other way round: if αλλου was misunderstood as ἄλλου, which makes no sense, ὄλου would be an easy correction.

345c4 τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ὄλου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ **ποιαίνειν** οἶει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα καθ' ὅσον ποιμὴν ἔστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα ἀλλ', ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινα καὶ μέλλοντα ἐσιτίασθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἣ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα.

ποιαίνειν A Eus. (*PE* XII 44,2 = Π 134,1 Mras) et legit Gal.: ποιμαίνειν A¹ i.m. D: παχύνει F

Most commentators retain ποιμαίνειν, on the assumption that a shepherd *qua* shepherd cannot be considered by Thrasymachus to fatten his sheep ('how Thrasymachus errs is explained in οὐ πρὸς τὸ κτλ' Adam).

But Socrates' point is a double one: not only has Thrasymachus lost sight of τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα (as in fact he has, cf. 343b1–4), but also his description of the ruler *qua* ruler (cf. 343b5) seeking only his own interest, leads to the assumption that the shepherd *qua* shepherd fattens his sheep (instead of preserving their good shape by a normal quantity of food), because it is in his own interest to do so. Note παχύνειν at 343b2.

ποιμαίνειν may be a corruption of παίειν, but I rather think it is a conscious correction made by someone who had problems with παίειν similar to those of modern commentators. It is just possible that the first explanation in Hsch. π 2237 παίειν· σιτεύει λιπαίνει derives from a commentary on this passage (rather like Tucker's explanation 'the art of the ποιμήν, which might be expressed by ποιμαίνειν, is at least equally expressed by παίειν τὰ πρόβατα').

F's παχύνει is either a simple misreading of a gloss παχύνειν (written as παχυνεῖ) or the remnant of a longer note (cf. Boter [1989: 106]); in either case it is παίειν not ποιμαίνειν which is explained. Cobet (Mnemos. 9 [1881], 356) saw that in Gal. *Plac. Hipp. Pl.* IX 5,8 (= Π 564,35–566,1 De Lacy) διαφέρονται δὲ καθ' ὅσον ὁ μὲν χρηματιστής, ὁ δὲ καταδύσεται (cf. c5–d1), κατασκευάζουσιν αὐτὰ πίονα, the last three words prove that Galen read παίειν.

346b4 οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἐάν τις κυβερῶν ὑγίης γίγνηται διὰ τὸ **ξιμφέρειν** αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἔνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτῆν ἰατρικὴν;

ξιμφέρειν F: ξιμφέρον AD

With the exception of Allan, commentators have gone remarkably astray in explaining this passage. The only way of keeping ξιμφέρον is given by Burnet: "The construction surely is διὰ τὸ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ "thanks to his being at sea", ξιμφέρον αὐτῷ "when it is good for him to be so" (accusative absolute)" (CR 18 [1904], 204; cf. Burnet [1905: 296 and n. 5]). But first, the word order is clumsy, because any Greek reader would connect διὰ τὸ with ξιμφέρον rather than with πλεῖν. Secondly, ξιμφέρον αὐτῷ as an absolute accusative wrongly suggests that becoming healthy is the reason for being at sea (Burnet's 'when' only obscures the point further: are there moments for a captain when it is not useful for him to be at sea?).

Consequently, even though ξιμφέρον may be considered *lectio difficilior*, it is illogical and should not be accepted. As in the entire passage τὸ

ξυμφέρων is a highly frequent phrase, it is not hard to account for the corruption of the original ξυμφέρειν (so rightly Tucker).

347a3-4 ὦν δὴ ἔνεκα ὡς ἔοικε μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν

ὦν F Eus. (PE XII 9,3 = II 98,16 Mras): ὦι A: οὔ D || δεῖν AD: δεῖ F Eus.

ὦν is obviously right, οὔ a correction of ὦι (perhaps a misreading of ὦ). δεῖν is at any rate *lectio difficilior*: the infinitive, however, is not to be explained as indicating that Socrates' previous words (cf. 345e5–6) are being repeated—which they are not—, but rather as a type of anacoluthon familiar after ὥσπερ ἔλεγον and the like, where the sentence proceeds in the accusative and infinitive. Cf. *Phlb.* 20d7–8 τόδε γε μὴν ὡς οἴμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν; Reinhard (1920: 11–12; 24); K.-G. II 581. Reinhard points out that F normally replaces the infinitive by the indicative in such cases, e.g. *R.* 485a4–5 ὁ τοῖνυν ... ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν (δεῖν AD, δεῖ F, wrongly adopted by Burnet). T, to which she ascribes the same tendency, reads δεῖν at our place.

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 187.]

347d6 ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γινώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἔλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν.

τὸ secl. Richards (1893: 15 = 1911: 87)

In Plato, αἰρέομαι is nowhere else followed by τό + infinitive (there are some twenty instances of the simple infinitive), and the construction may well be unique in classical Greek.

However, this does not seem to me a good reason for deleting it. In the first place, one gets the impression that in the fifth and fourth centuries, τό + infinitive and the single infinitive are more or less interchangeable; cf. K.-G. II 44–45. Secondly, Plato may very well have written the article here to prevent construing ὁ γινώσκων (used absolutely) with ὠφελεῖσθαι ('to learn', cf. 619a5).

348b6 ('If we conduct the discussion this way, ..., if we do it that way ...')—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.—ποτέρωσ οὖν σοι ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ἀρέσκε;—οὕτως, ἔφη.

ποτέρωσ F: ὀποτέρωσ AD

F's reading is unobjectionable: *ὁποτέρως* looks, however, more idiomatic: 'Whichever you want'. Jowett–Campbell (II 214) compare *Euthd.* 271a6 (Τίς ἤν ... ὧι χθές ... διελέγου; ...)—*ὁπότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς*, ὃ Κρίτων; where few scholars would not accept Hermann's correction *πότερον*; In *Plt.* 261e4 ('Are we going to call this ἀγελαιοτροφία or κοινοτροφική?')—*ὁπότερον ἂν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ξυμβαίημι*, the main clause (*ὀνομάσομεν*) is easily supplied from the preceding *ὀνομάζομεν*. Neither of them is a good parallel. Even in comedy, the phrase *ὄτι βούλει* as an answer (absent from Plato) always depends on a predicate (e.g. *Ar. Lys.* 98 ἐπερήσομαι τι μικρόν;—*ὄτι βούλει γε σύ*).

But the really suspicious part of the AD reading is οὖν: in Plato, after indefinite relatives, οὖν is restricted to 'elliptical' use (Denniston [1954: 422]). In other words, whereas we might find Γοργίας περὶ ὅτου οὖν (or ὅτου οὖν) λέγει we will never find Γοργίας περὶ ὅτου οὖν βούλει λέγει.

We must therefore conclude that *ὁποτέρως* is a corruption, probably due to the later Greek habit of using forms of *ὅστις* etc. in direct questions (cf. *Euthd. l.c.*; *Lys.* 212c4 *πότερος* Hirschig *ὁπότερος* BT).

349b7 ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἔχειν; οὐδαμῶς ...—τί δέ; τῆς δικαίας πράξεως;—οὐδὲ <ταύ>της [δικαίας], ἔφη.

ταύτης scripsi: τῆς δικαίας ADF Stob. (III 9,58 = III 382,5 Hense): τῆς δικαίας πράξεως Stallbaum: τῆς πράξεως τῆς δικαίας Adam: τῆς Wilamowitz

Wilamowitz is certainly right in rejecting οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας (1919: 377, 'Er konnte sagen "auch als keine gerechte Handlung", allenfalls "auch als keine Handlung", aber nicht "auch (nicht) als eine gerechte", denn dann lag der Unterschied in dem Adjektiv'). Stallbaum's conjecture (inspired by Ficino's translation *Neque iusta etiam actione*) does not explain the error; Adam's does, but is very unelegant. Wilamowitz himself must have been somnolent: I do not see how οὐδὲ τῆς ἔφη is at all possible (the article can be used as a pronoun with οὔτε/οὔτε but not with οὐδέ).

Read οὐδὲ ταύτης, ἔφη. The first syllable of forms of οὔτος is occasionally dropped, thus yielding an article. The ancient scribes, who had better Greek than Wilamowitz, felt that a noun or adjective was called for, and came up with the senseless *δικαίας*. Had they interpolated *πράξεως* instead, nobody would have taken offence.

A similar process happened *Cra.* 385c10 καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγου λέγεται; 'That part of a true statement is also pronounced' (meaning *ὄνομα* as the smallest part of a *λόγος*). The true text is pre-

served by C (Tubingensis). In an ancestor of BW, τοῦτο was corrupted to τὸ, which of course needed a noun, and ὄνομα was easily found: BW read τὸ ὄνομα and T the conflation τοῦτο ὄνομα.

Other cases of corruption from demonstrative pronoun to article are: *Grg.* 492c1 τοῦτο Hoenebeek Hissink τοῦ BTWF; *Epin.* 981a8 τοῦτό γε O² Kpc *recte* τοῦτό τε AO τότε Π^o (O⁴ i.m., the famous ‘book of the patriarch’); *R.* 340b7 τοῦτο AD *recte* τοῦ F; *Ti.* 60d5 ταῦτα FCY-family *recte* τὰ A.

Another solution is given by Vasmanolis (1964: 184): οὐδὲ τῆσδε, μὰ Δία. I cannot take μὰ Δία seriously, but τῆσδε deserves consideration (-δε may have fallen out, and δικαίας supplied). It is, however, far less idiomatic than ταύτης.

349c7–9 τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἄδικος; ἄρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως;—πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔφη ...—οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλείστον αὐτὸς λάβη;

ἀδίκου ADF: ἀδίκου γε Stob. (III 9,58 = III 382,13 Hense) || καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται—λάβη om. Stob. || ὡς ἀπάντων AD: ὅς ἂν πάντων F || πλείστον αὐτὸς AD: αὐτὸς πλείστον F

Though οὐκοῦν ... γε is not abnormal in Plato (cf. 353e7; 456c12; *Smp.* 200d8; *Prm.* 141a8–9), the fondness for γε of later ancient MSS and secondary witnesses should count as an argument against adopting it here.

The clause omitted by Stobaeus contains a syntactic *unicum* that makes it rather suspect. Plato avoids the use of ὡς with the subjunctive as a final conjunction (whether in adverbial or object clauses). Indeed the only certain instance of this construction is *Io* 537b4 (ὡς ἄν) in a quotation from Homer. *Phlb.* 55c7 and *Lg.* 779b7 the MSS have ἔως. The credentials of final ὡς with the optative are slightly better (*Ti.* 92a4, without ἄν; *Phd.* 82e6 and *Smp.* 187d5 with ἄν). Plato is not the only Attic author to shun this usage, cf. H.A. Short ap. Gildersleeve, *AJP* 4 (1883), 419 n. 2 (no certain example in the orators apart from Antiphon).

The reading of F is hardly an improvement. It could be interpreted as ‘he will compete (in order to find out) who ...’, but αὐτὸς is slightly awkward, and to my mind, a Greek would have preferred λήψεται to ἄν ... λάβη in such a case. Combining AD’s ὡς with F’s ἄν does not contribute to better Attic syntax either.

On the other hand, though the clause could be missed, it is far from being an obvious, or even plausible, interpolation—indeed it is hard to see why anybody should have wanted to interpolate it at all. Integrating a previously conceded point into a second question which thereby covers two points is standard Platonic procedure (ἀπάντων or πάντων refers both to the ἄδικος ἄνθρωπος and πρᾶξις of this question and to the δίκαιος and δικαία πρᾶξις of the last one). Besides, in this and the following excerpts Stobaeus leaves out clauses that are not vital to the argument (e.g. III 9,60 = III 385,3 Hense om. 351b2 καὶ—δουλωσαμένην, b4 καὶ—b7 σκοπῶ). Therefore, it would be unwise to use Stobaeus' omission of the entire clause to get rid of a syntactic anomaly.

How, then, do we proceed with the anomaly? One way out would be to write ⟨ξ⟩ως ἄν πάντων. But this presupposes a double corruption: ἔως to ὡς and, in AD, ἄν to ἄ-; surely, it is better to explain F's ὅς ἄν as originating from AD ὡς ἄ-: the initial error was απαντων to ανπαντων, after which the unfamiliar ὡς ἄν was corrected to ὅς ἄν.

Perhaps ὡς can be retained if one realizes that its choice (over ὅπως, cf. X. *HG* VII 2,14) may have been motivated by the superlative πλεῖστον: in the instances of final ὡς (+ ἄν) *c. opt.* in Plato, either a comparative or a superlative is present (cf. Gildersleeve, *l.c.*, on *Ti.* 92a4). This consideration may also justify Apelt's change of ἔως to ὡς, *Phlb. l.c.*; *Lg. l.c.* ἔως is probably correct (though the word order is not: perhaps ἔως μὲν ἄν ἤμ?).

351b2 πόλιν φαιῆς ἄν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως †καὶ καταδεδουλώσθαι†, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆι ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην.

Cobet (1873: 257) brackets καὶ καταδεδουλώσθαι with the following comment: 'Grammaticus aliquis in margine explicuit quid esset ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην. Recte ille quidem, sed non erat id Platoni obtrudendum'. I cannot accept the MSS text, but I am not sure that his remedy is correct.

1. The scholiasts normally explain the construction ἔχω *c. part.aor.* with aorist, not perfect, forms, e.g. Schol. E. *Med.* 33 (ἀτιμάσας ἔχει) Ἄτικῶς, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἠτίμασε. Cf. further Schol. S. *Ant.* 1068; *OC* 1141; E. *Hipp.* 932; *Or.* 451; *Tro.* 1123; *Ar. Av.* 852 (Rutherford). Only twice have I found a perfect: Schol. E. *Hipp.* 932, which goes on to compare Hes. *Op.* 42 (κρούψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι κτέ) ... ἀντὶ τοῦ κερύφασι (cf. W.J. Aerts,

Periphrastica [Amsterdam 1965], 129–130); *S. Ant.* 31–32 in a paraphrasis of κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν the Schol. gives κηκηρυχέναι. The replacement of a *verbum simplex* by a compound is of course standard scholiast practice, but at the same time it is also Platonic, cf. *Mx.* 240a2 δεδουλωμένοι—α4 καταδεδουλωμένη.

2. If Cobet wants to imply that ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην is a periphrastic construction, he is wrong, as is shown cogently by Aerts 157, who compares *Grg.* 456a8 (ἡ ῥητορικὴ) ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' ἑαυτῆι ἔχει; *Hdt.* I 28 τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ὑπ' ἑαυτῶι εἶχε καταστρεψάμενος: the expression ὑφ' ἑαυτῶι ἔχειν (ποιεῖσθαι) prevents us from taking ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην as a paraphrasis of δεδουλώσθαι (though cf. *Epist.* 334c6–7 μὴ δουλοῦσθαι Σικελίαν ὑπ' ἀνθρώποις δεσπότηας). In reality, δουλωσαμένην is to be regarded as a participle of circumstance (note the word order at all three places) and πολλάς is object both of ἔχειν and δουλωσαμένην.

Indeed, there are only three instances of periphrastic ἔχω with aorist participle in Plato (Aerts 156–158). An examination of these instances shows that Plato uses the construction only when he has no other option: at *Lg.* 793b8 περικαλύψαντα ἔχει and *Cra.* 404c1 ἐρασθεὶς ἔχειν there was no corresponding perfect form (κεκάλυφα, ἤρασμαι) in Plato's time, as Aerts points out. *Phdr.* 257c1–2 πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω Plato probably could not have used the perfect τεθαύμακα because, like most fourth-century writers, he uses the latter only as a so-called intensive perfect; in other words, τεθαύμακα always denotes a state in the present and does not combine easily, if at all, with πάλαι. I may refer to my analysis of the perfect of state verbs in Demosthenes in *Ophelos: Zes studies voor D.M. Schenkeveld* (Amsterdam 1988), 72–76, esp. 75–76.

Returning now to our textual problem, we must conclude that Cobet's explanation of καταδεδουλώσθαι as an explanatory gloss (later adapted to the context by means of καί, as often) is not without its problems. Yet what sense can be elicited from καί καταδεδουλώσθαι? After ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως the words must mean 'and has (already) enslaved them'. This is odd in itself, and besides, it makes no sense when the text continues 'and it also holds many (cities) in subjection, having enslaved them'. The words πολλάς δὲ καί indicate that something new is added to the preceding and that the addition is valid for many cities—if καί καταδεδουλώσθαι is retained, the addition is not new and the fact has already been stated for all cities.

Most editors have countered Cobet's deletion with the hypothesis that καί καταδεδουλώσθαι refers to the city's succeeding in enslaving

others. But as the lasting point of this success is already covered by ὑφ' ἑαυτῆι ἔχειν the point would be valid only if Plato had written καὶ καταδουλώσασθαι. In fact, in a discussion of this problem with the members of the Amsterdam Hellenist Club, two of them (Professor C.J. Ruijgh and Professor A. Rijksbaron) independently suggested correcting the text to καὶ κατα[δε]δουλώ(σα)σθαι (σασθαι becoming σθαι by haplography and the reduplication inserted afterwards to correct the nonsensical καταδουλωσθαι). This yields a smooth text: the unjust city endeavours to enslave others unjustly and succeeds in doing so. Still, I have several objections.

1. After φαίης ἄν an aorist infinitive would normally refer to a past action, whereas here the context requires a simultaneous one: with καταδεδουλώσθαι the clause would probably mean 'the city is trying to enslave others and did enslave them', which is out of the question.

2. The notion of success is superfluous at this stage of the argument (though it becomes important from 351c8 onwards). What Socrates suggests in this sentence amounts to the following:

(a) Let us assume the existence of an unjust city (πόλιν ... εἶναι).

(b) Such a city would try to enslave other cities unjustly (καὶ ἄλλας ... ἀδίκως).

(c) In addition, such a city would keep many other cities in servitude, which it had enslaved in the past (πολλὰς δὲ καὶ (!) ... δουλωσαμένην).

The addition of 'and would be successful at it' (καὶ καταδεδουλώσθαι) in (b) brings in a notion which has nothing to do with the city's being unjust. In fact, Socrates' point further on is that success depends on the city's being just, not unjust (cf. b7–9; c6–d2).

Thus, there are grave objections to the transmitted text but also to the two corrections discussed here. If I were forced to make a decision, I would follow Cobet, but it seems more prudent to use the obelos.

[In his edition, Slings prints καὶ καταδεδουλώσθαι without daggers; in the apparatus he mentions Cobet's deletion of the words, with the comment *fortasse recte.*]

It may be noted in passing that the parallels quoted by Aerts disprove F's ὑφ' ἑαυτῆιν.

351c1–2 εἰ μὲν ἔφη ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες †ἔχει ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία†, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετ' ἀδικίας.

ἔχει ADF Stob. (III 9,60 = III 385,7 Hense): ἐστιν Marc.187: secl. Tucker || σοφία ADF: σοφίαν Stob.

I cannot think of a satisfactory reading in this place. The transmitted reading cannot be right. Commentators compare various explanatory asyndeta (cf. 337e2), but here there is no asyndeton since μετὰ δικαιοσύνης is the apodosis. Burnet makes ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία a parenthesis, a practice of which he is far too fond in general, and which is clearly a remedy of despair here: if anything, it strengthens the suspicion.

Of the variants, ἔστιν, the reading of Marc.187 (presumably a correction made *currente calamo* by Bessarion) does not explain ἔχει. σοφίαν is a further corruption or a desperate attempt to make at least some sense.

The remedies that have been proposed can be found in Adam and Tucker. Perhaps the most obvious one is Hartman's deletion of ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία (1896: 41), but this cannot be right: Socrates had said that justice is ἀρετή as well as σοφία (cf. 350d4); but ἀρετή only confounds the issue here. Thrasymachus says in fact: it is wise and therefore, in your view, just for cities to be imperialistic—in my view it is wise and therefore unjust, since injustice is εὐβουλία (348d2). Therefore, σοφία is in fact very much needed here (the same argument goes for Tucker's deletion of σοφία alone). Baiter's ἔχει <εἰ>, endorsed by Stallbaum and J.B. Mayor (CR 10 [1896], 111) is puerile; Adam's statement that in A ἡ is written over an erasure is more than dubious, and anyway the erasure is certainly not 'large enough to have contained εἰ ἡ'.

The only conjecture which is at all acceptable is Tucker's deletion of ἔχει. However, it is not easy to see how it came to be interpolated, as the clause is clear enough without any verb. Besides, the entire sentence would become too nominal for my (subjective) taste. [In his edition, Slings accepts Tucker's deletion of ἔχει. See *Additional Notes*, p. 187.]

In the next line, Stobaeus' omission of ἔλεγον looks attractive until one realizes that, if it is adopted, the logical supplement is ἄρατι ἔλεγον, whereas in fact the two verbs refer to two different statements (cf. above).

353d7 τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαίμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι;—οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ.

ἐκείνης ADF Stob. (III 9,60 = III 389,12 Hense); ἐκείνου Par.1810²pc Mon.237²pc Laur.80.7

Commentators (especially Schneider and Adam) appear unduly embarrassed by ἐκείνης; even Burnet calls it ‘illogical’ (1905: 296, n. 5). Madvig (1871: 416) went so far as to delete it altogether, which leaves ἴδια strangely unspecified.

His paraphrasis shows what has gone wrong: ‘cui [rel.] ea tribuamus et (cuius) propria dicamus’. But in the Greek, the clause is only formally a relative clause: if it were a genuine one, we should have had αὐτοῦ (or τούτου) for ἐκείνης. But in fact ἔσθ’ ὅτι αἰσθητὴ ἢ ψυχῆι equals ἄρ’ οὐ μόνη τῆι ψυχῆι, just as ἔσθ’ ὅστις (in questions) equals ἄρ’ οὐδεὶς (cf. Thrasy-machus’ answer). See K.-G. II 403. Hence, changes like καὶ φαίμεν ἢ φαμεν (Richards [1911: 88]; φαμέν is in fact read by prA F and two of the three MSS of Stob.) and καὶ (οὐ) φαίμεν (Vasmanolis [1964: 188]; Renehan [1976: 126]; cf. dg where AD omit οὐ as against F Stob.) are superfluous.

BOOK TWO

358e3 και ὁ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε οἷόν τ' ἐ(στί) και ὄθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.

οἷόν τ' ἐ(στί) Blass: οἷόν τε F: τί ὄν τε A: τί οἷόν τε D Schol.

The D reading is quite clearly a contamination of those of A and F, though the contamination is an old one (it is paraphrased by the Schol.—in A, not D—: τίς ἢ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν δικαιοσύνη και ποῖον και ὄθεν γίνεται). Consequently, both it and improvements on it (τί οἷονται και ὄθεν γεγονέαι δικαιοσύνην Laur.80.19pc, cf. c1–2) should be discarded.

A offers construable Greek ('being what and whence, justice has arisen') but that is all that can be said for it. ὄθεν (sc. ὄν) and γέγονε are more or less tautologous, and the word order is clumsy: Plato's readers would naturally take ὄθεν directly with γέγονε, the more so because a few lines earlier Glauco had said και πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασιν και ὄθεν γεγονέαι (c1–2). Had Plato wanted to say what A makes him say, I think he would have preferred τί τε και ὄθεν ὄν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.

Two considerations (not very important ones in themselves) strengthen suspicion. (a) Why is τε postponed? There are parallels in Plato, cf. Denniston (1954: 517), but τί τε ὄν would have been normal (this was felt by Bessarion, who emends—in the margin of Marc.187—τί τε ὄν τυγχάνει). (b) Why is τί coupled with a relative, not an interrogative, adverb?

Besides, A's reading can be explained as a corruption of that of F (οἷόν τε with τι written above the line as an explanation or variant, see below). In itself, this is no argument, as it is just as easy to explain F's text as a corruption of τιοντε, given c1–2 οἷον ... και ὄθεν.

For these reasons, even though A's text is *lectio difficilior*, it cannot be accepted. It might be thought that τί ὄν is attractive in itself, but the only way to retain it is by writing τί ὄν ὄθεν γέγονε: however, the presence of τε και in ADF bars that way.

Consequently, of the three primary MSS, F gives the most original text. But is it authentic? Glauco is going to expound two things: what justice is and where it comes from (c1–2 οἷον εἶναί φασιν και ὄθεν γεγο-

vévαι; 359a4–5 καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιουσύνης; b6–7 ἢ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις ... καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε). Therefore we expect οἶόν τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὄθεν γέγονε here (this correction was proposed by F. Blass—for his identification, cf. JAW 145B [1909], 21 – LZB 1898, 296). Stallbaum and Jowett–Campbell invite us to supply ἐστὶ (mentally, that is) after οἶόν τε, but I doubt if that is possible in this particular context, given γέγονε. And the run of the entire passage tells against taking οἶόν with γέγονε directly.

It would be a bit rash to print οἶόν τ' ἐ(στὶ) in the text, the more so since we cannot exclude the possibility that οἶόν was imported from c1 by a harmonizing scribe (on the other hand, τί ἐστὶ, proposed by Campbell, would suggest the announcement of a definition, which is not what Glauco wants), but it is certainly the most likely conjecture (for others, cf. Adam ad loc.; Ritter [1913: 48]; Boter [1989: 212]).

If it is original, we might suppose that οιοντεστι was corrupted to οιοντετι, in which τι was understood as τί, and written above the line (A) or omitted (F). But the explanation is not very convincing: a putative οιοντετι could always be taken as οἶόν τέ τι. It is more plausible that A's τί was an explanatory gloss of οἶόν, inserted, as Professor Rijksbaron suggests, to prevent readers from interpreting οἶόν τε as 'it is possible'.

[In the end, Slings decided to print οἶόν τ' ἐ(στὶ) in his edition. See *Additional Notes*, p. 187.]

359d1 εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἶαν ποτέ φασιν δύναμιν †τῶι Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνω† γενέσθαι.

τῶι ... προγόνω(ι) ADF Procl. (*in R.* Π 111,4 Kroll): τῶ Γύγη τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνω Prag.Radn.VI.Fa.1pc Laur.85,7pc

See Adam's Appendix I (I 126–127) for the conjectures, of which the reading of Prag.Radn.VI.Fa.1pc and Laur.85,7pc is the earliest. The following have been proposed since then (Wilamowitz' Γύγηι τῶι Κροῖσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνωι, Π 377, had already been suggested by his black sheep Jowett and Campbell, a fact he did not think worth mentioning): (a) προγόνωι ὀργάνωι E. Wüst, *Beiträge zur Textkritik und Exegese der platonischen Politeia* (Dillingen 1902), 10–12—a proposal that will not convince anyone but has, I think, at least the merit of showing where exactly the problem lies. (b) Γύγηι τῶι τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνωι K.I. Logothetis, *Platon* 18 (1966), 5–6 = Κριτικά καὶ ἐρμηνευτικά εἰς Ἑλληνας συγγραφεῖς (Athens 1970), 38–39—mentioned by Adam as one that had

already been proposed, but perhaps this is a mistaken reference to Stallbaum's alternative τῷ Γύγῃ, τῷ τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ.

The passage is often treated from a historical point of view; see the literature collected in W. Fauth, *RhM* 113 (1970), 1–42. As I have little more to contribute than a trial balloon, I refrain from discussing all the ins and outs of the problem. I start from the following facts and observations.

(1) The ring is almost always called 'Gyges' ring', already in the self-quotation 612b3. For other places see Boter (1989: 297); add Luc. *Bis Acc.* 21 = Π 103,30 Macleod; Philostr. *Her.* 8,3 = 8,26–9,3 de Lannoy; *VA* III 8 = I 89,32 Kayser; Anon. *in Rh.* (*CAG* 21,2) 256,6 Rabe; Greg. Naz. *PG* 35,21; 628; Lib. *Ep.* 432,5 = X 422,16–17 Foerster; *Or.* 56,10 = IV 136,10–11; Socr. *Ep.* 14,2; Tzetz. *Hist.* I 140–169. The A scholium (ση. τὴν κατὰ Γύγην τὸν Λυδὸν ἱστορίαν καὶ τὸν δακτύλιον) leaves out the ancestor, and so does one of the few scholia in F (not yet published): περὶ τῆς τοῦ Γύγου σφενδόνης.

The single exception (Procl. *l.c.* τῷ κατὰ τὸν Γύγου πρόγονον διγηγήματι) serves only to prove that the ADF text existed already in late Antiquity.

(2) It might be maintained that 'Gyges' ring' is shorthand for 'Gyges' ancestor's ring'. However, other elements of the story (the murder of the king in cooperation with the queen) are elsewhere told of Gyges himself, not of his great-grandfather of the same name (Nic. Dam. *FGH* 90F44,11). This strengthens the suspicion that something is wrong. Besides, I am reluctant to assume that Plato was really interested in the niceties of Lydian genealogy (so rightly H. Herter, *Kleine Schriften* [München 1975], 555 n. 102).

(3) τοῦ Λυδοῦ cannot here refer to Croesus, even if Croesus is meant by ὁ Λυδός in Hdt. (I 141,4 etc.). In this context, τοῦ Λυδοῦ would mean 'the present king of Lydia', which is nonsense. In [D.] 7,6 (pronounced 343/2 BCE) ὁ Μακεδών is Philip, in 17,10 (pronounced 336/5 BCE) it is Alexander. It is not as though ὁ Λυδός ever refers to Croesus as being the Lydian κατ' ἐξοχίην, in the way Homer is ὁ ποιητής.

(4) It cannot be a coincidence that the Lydian word transcribed as γύγῃς actually meant 'grandfather, forefather' (references in Fauth, 28–29 and n. 237–239). That this was known to the Greeks appears from Hsch. γ 972 Latte γύγα: πάπποι (Perger's self-evident correction of the *vox nihili* πάμποι given by the cod.).

Therefore I submit that τῷ προγόνῳ is a gloss on the original text Γύγῃ τῷ Λυδῷ. After its intrusion, the original dative was changed to

the genitive. τῶι and προγόνωι were already secluded by Ast, but he left the genitive intact, and so could not account for the intrusion.

As I said, this proposal is a trial balloon.

361e3–362a2 ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, **δεδήσεται**, **ἐκκαυθήσεται** τῶφθαλμῶ ...

δεδήσεται AD Epict. (bis) Eus.(ab): δεθήσεται F Clem.(a) Thdt. Mart. Apollon. || ἐκκαυθήσεται ADF Mart. Apollon.: ἐκκοπήσεται Laur.8o.19pc Par.1642 Clem.(a) Eus.(a) Thdt.: ἐκκοφθήσεται Caes.D.28.4 Laur.CS.42: ἐξορυχθήσεται Clem.(b): *effodiantur oculi* Cic.

This passage is quoted by various ancient authors; it is worth examining some of the quotations somewhat closer, for the light they shed on the transmission of Plato's text in antiquity.

In the *Martyrium Apollonii* 40 (100,21–23 Musurillo) the quotation starts from ὁ δίκαιος. The text follows F where it deviates from AD (δεθήσεται, πάντα τὰ κακὰ); the middle futures μαστιγώσεται and στρεβλώσεται are replaced by the Κοινή forms in -θήσεται (cf. below).

Clem. *Strom.* V 14,108,3 = II 398,21–23 Stählin (henceforth 'Clem.(a)') quotes οὕτω—ἀνασκινδυλευθήσεται, inserting δὲ after οὕτω (not necessitated by his manner of quoting: the quotation is introduced ὁ Πλάτων μονονουχί προφητεύων τὴν σωτήριον οἰκονομίαν ἐν τῶι δευτέρῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὧδέ φησιν). Apart from ἐκκοπήσεται for ἐκκαυθήσεται, his text deviates from Burnet's in that he reads μαστιγώθησεται and δεθήσεται.

In a very lengthy passage transcribed in its entirety from Clem. *Strom.* V 14, Eus. *PE XIII* 13,35 = II 211,12–13 Mras ('Eus.(b)') gives the same passage as Clem.(a), including the spurious δὲ. στρεβλώσεται is omitted here, and with Burnet Eus.(b) reads μαστιγώσεται (ADF: μαστιγώθησεται Clem.(a) *Mart. Apollon.*) and δεδήσεται (AD: δεθήσεται F Clem.(a) *Mart. Apollon.*).

It may be thought that Eus.(b) checked this quotation against a Plato MS but this hypothesis cannot account for the omission of στρεβλώσεται and the retention of Clem.(a)'s δὲ. Elsewhere, *PE XII* 10,4 = II 99,11–15 Mras ('Eus.(a)'), he quotes 361e1–362a3 without δὲ; this time he reads στρεβλώσεται and again offers μαστιγώσεται and δεδήσεται. It is clear that Eus.(a) comes from Plato directly, or at any rate not via Clem.(a) and that Eus.(b) was not brought in line with either Plato or Eus.(a).

We cannot entirely discard the possibility that Eus.(b) gives a better text of Clem.(a) than the single cod. of Clem.(a), in other words that Clem.(a) originally had μαστιγώσεται and δεδήσεται and that the

readings *μαστιγωθήσεται* and *δεθήσεται* are due to subsequent corruption in the transmission of Clem.(a). It is true that *δεθήσεται* is also found in Thdt. *Affect.* VIII 50 = II 328,9–12 Canivet, which probably derives from Clem.(a) as well: (so E. des Places, *Studi in onore di A. Calderini e R. Paribeni*, I [Milano 1956], 331): Clem.(a) and the quotation in Thdt. coincide; Thdt. does not derive from Eus.(a) or (b). Thdt. changes *μαστιγώ(θή)σεται* to *αἰκισθήσεται* and introduces (with *Mart. Apollon.*) *στρεβλωθήσεται* for *στρεβλώσεται* (ADF Clem.(a) Eus.(a): om. Eus.(b)). But of course *δεθήσεται* may have been corrupted from *δεδήσεται* in the cod. of Clem.(a) and those of Thdt. independently.

(P. Canivet, *Histoire d'une entreprise apologétique au V^e siècle* (Paris n.d. [1957]), 229–230, claims that Clem.(a), Eus.(b) and Thdt. all quote Plato directly from memory. This is out of the question for Eus.(b), which as I said occurs within a long quotation from Clem., and his hypothesis is further weakened by the common variant *ἐκκοπήσεται* (cf. below). It cannot be excluded altogether that Thdt. quotes (not Plato but) Clem.(a) from memory.)

There is also another explanation for the agreement of Eus.(b) with ADF against Clem.(a): Eus.(b) when transcribing Clem.(a) took umbrage at the forms *μαστιγωθήσεται* and *δεθήσεται*, because his Atticist training had conditioned him to expect *μαστιγώσεται* (common Atticist teaching) and *δεδήσεται* (cf. Moeris 114 Pierson–Koch *δεδήσεται* Ἄττικῶς, *δεθήσεται* Ἑλληνικῶς; Philemon gramm. 300 Osann *δεδήσεται*, οὐ δεσμοθήσεται; Thom. Mag. 87,3 Ritschl *δεδήσομαι*, οὐ δεθήσομαι).

If this second hypothesis is right, there is no reason why scribes copying Plato MSS could not have adopted the same policy. AD read *δεδήσεται*, F *δεθήσεται*—can we be very sure that F's reading is a vulgarization rather than the original text, improved upon by ancestors of AD, just as Eus.(b) may have done? Here two passages from Epict. become relevant, both of them confluences of our passage with *Phd.* 67e₄–5 (οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκουν μελετώσι): II 1,38 ἄλλοι μελέτωσαν δίκας ... σὺ (sc. μελέτα) ἀποθνήσκουν, σὺ δεδέσθαι, σὺ στρεβλοῦσθαι, σὺ ἐξορίζεσθαι (I thank Dr Boter for drawing my attention to this place); IV 1,172 οὐχ ὡς Πλάτων λέγει μελετήσεις οὐχὶ ἀποθνήσκουν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ στρεβλοῦσθαι καὶ φεύγειν καὶ δεδέσθαι (δέρεσθαι cod. but Schenkl's correction is put beyond doubt by the parallel from Epict. himself). Since Epict. was certainly no Atticist, we may take it that the Plato text from which he adapted his *mot* had *δεδήσεται*. If, therefore, the AD text is an Atticist correction, it must be a very old one, which makes it more likely that it is original. (Epict.' *ἐξορίζεσθαι* and *φεύγειν* may

be free inventions, just as Cic. *Rep.* III 17,27, in a free paraphrase to be discussed below, adds *exterminetur* to the punishments borrowed from Plato).

The Atticist predilection for reduplicated future medio-passive forms has some basis in historical fact. But as regards δεδήσομαι vs. δεθήσομαι Moeris, Philemon and Thomas are wrong. Attic has both forms, the former always clearly a future perfect, cf. X. *Cyr.* IV 3,18 συμπεφυκῶς δεδήσομαι (sc. τῶι ἵππῳ) ὥσπερ οἱ ἵπποκένταυροι.

Here it is hard to decide whether the context requires 'he will be put in jail' or 'he will be kept prisoner'. In any case, for a Greek it goes without saying that being in prison means being subjected to bodily harm (compare for instance Ant. 5,8)—therefore this verb, like the others, refers to a form of corporeal punishment. It might be thought that for any real harm to be inflicted a longer stretch of time is necessary and therefore a state, not an event, predicate is needed. This is indeed how I should explain the future perfect if it were certain that it is what Plato wrote, but the point is not a strong one.

If when all is said and done I disagree with the claim of H. Wolf (cf. *Philologus* 10 [1855], 348), Van Herwerden (1883: 337) and J.L.V. Hartman (1896: 51) that δεθήσεται is called for, it is less because I feel δεδήσεται is intrinsically better than because it is backed up by Epict. and because F on the whole has less compunction in changing verb tenses than A and D have. (For the sake of completeness it may be mentioned that δεθήσεται is also read by Vind.1 and Bonon.3630, the oldest subgroup of copies of D, cf. Boter [1989: 216–217]).

There are various alternatives for ἐκκαυθήσεται, the unanimous reading of ADF, which seems to be backed up by the self-quotation at 613d9–e1 καὶ ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι (cf. 361e1) ἀληθῆ λέγων, εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται. But in the latter passage the words εἶτα ... ἐκκαυθήσονται disrupt the sentence, so much so that Ast's deletion of them has met with more or less general approval (Hermann, Stallbaum, Adam, Wilamowitz [1919: 342], Chambry). [In his edition, Slings too places εἶτα ... ἐκκαυθήσονται between brackets.]

There is a parallel passage: *Grig.* 473c1–2 (ἐὰν) στρεβλώται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, where no variants are recorded for ἐκκάηται.

Apart from *Mart. Apollon.*, the indirect tradition (Clem.(a), Eus.(ab), Thdt.) is unanimous in reading ἐκκοπήσεται for ἐκκαυθήσεται. Besides, it looks as if this is what Cicero read in his text (*Rep.* III 17,27 *effodiantur oculi*) but cf. below. It may seem remarkable that in a paraphrase Clem.

agrees with Cic. (*Strom.* IV 7,52,1 = II 272,11–12 Stählin; ‘Clem.(b)’ *κᾶν στρεβλῶται ὁ δίκαιος κᾶν ἔξορύττηται τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ*) but I think the coincidence between Clem.(b) and Cic. is a fortuitous one, for the following reason.

In Greek *ἐκκόπτεσθαι ὀφθαλμόν* is used when a person loses an eye through any cause, whether accidentally or by design: in a fight (D. 24,140), in battle (D. 18,67), because it is picked out by a bird (Ar. *Ach.* 92; *Av.* 1613) or through deliberate blinding (Aeschin. 1,172; cf. D. 24,140). When a person is blinded as an act of punishment this is more properly called *ἔξορύττω* (Hdt. VIII 116,2; cf. A. *Eum.* 186). A similar distinction seems to obtain between *excutere* and *effodere* in Latin. Therefore, if Cic. uses *effodere* and Clem.(b) *ἔξορύττω*, this does not prove that there ever existed a variant *ἔξορυχθήσεται* in Platonic MSS: both authors independently opt for the more precise term.

ἐκκοπήσεται is read by Laur.80.19pc (*i.m.*) and Par.1642, and was obviously a variant in their common source. This may be (a) a remnant of a lost primary source, (b) a reading adopted from a MS of Clem., Eus. or Thdt., (c) a correction of *ἐκκοφθήσεται* (the reading of Caes.D.28.4 and Laur.CS.42); it should be noted that whereas *κοφθήσομαι* is not found in Attic at all, *κοπήσομαι* is attested Lys. 3,34. Cf. Boter (1989: 205; 228).

Ast (in his comm. on *Grg. l.c.*) wanted to combine the ADF reading with that of the indirect tradition, proposing *ἐκκαυθήσεται καὶ ἐκκοπήσεται*, a proposal that has been refuted adequately by Schneider in his note at our place. A better conjecture is offered by Van Herwerden *l.c.* who reads *καυθήσεται, ἐκκοπήσεται* on the strength of Cicero’s *effodiantur oculi ... uinciatur* (cf. *δεθήσεται*), *uratur* (applauded, for once, by Wilamowitz *l.c.*; at 613e2 Van Herwerden suspects [*ἐκ*]καυθήσονται). A parallel from Libanius (*Decl.* 21,29 = VI 334,15–16 Foerster *μαστιγώσει, στρεβλώσει, σιδήρωι καὶ πυρὶ δαπανήσει τὸ σῶμα*), not noticed so far, may be thought to support the conjecture, but it is at least as probable that the words *σιδήρωι ... τὸ σῶμα* paraphrase the MSS reading *ἐκκαυθήσεται*—or they may be Lib.’ own invention.

A closer examination of the passage from Cicero disproves Van Herwerden’s hypothesis. The relevant passage runs as follows: (*si*) *bonus ille uir uexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique auferantur* (perhaps inspired by *Grg. l.c.* *ἐκτέμνηται?*), *effodiantur oculi, damnetur, uinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, egeat ...* The coupling of *uinciatur* (from Plato) and *uratur* comes natural to a Roman, cf. Sen. *Ep.* 37,1 *illius turpissimi auctoramenti uerba ... ‘uri, uinciri, ferroque necari’* (cf. 71,23; 24,3). After two barbaric punishments

(*manus auferantur, effodiantur oculi*) Cic. gives, introduced by *dammetur*, a series of punishments to which a person in his own world may be liable.

Besides, Cicero's *uratur* refers to torture by applying red-hot iron. It may be that *κάω* is the Greek word for that, but I have not found a parallel. Besides Grg. *l.c.* there is another one for *ἐκκάω ὀφθαλμούς*: Hdt. VII 18,1.

To sum up: it cannot be denied that Cic. paraphrases our passage, but the only thing which can be said about the text he paraphrases is that it had *ἐκκοπήσεται*. This conclusion is sufficient refutation of Canivet's claim that Clem., Eus. and Thdt. consciously replaced *ἐκκαυθήσεται* by *ἐκκοπήσεται* (*o.c.*, 229; cf. 159).

I find the choice between *ἐκκοπήσεται* and *ἐκκαυθήσεται* a hard one to make. *ἐκκοπήσεται* is attested earlier (Cic.) than *ἐκκαυθήσεται*, but that may very well be a coincidence. I opt for the latter because two arguments in conjunction seem to me to make a stronger case than can be made for *ἐκκοπήσεται*. First, I know of no parallel case in *R.* where a conscious distortion of the text is to be found in all three primary MSS (see Boter [1989: 65–66] for a list of their common errors). Secondly, *ἐκκαυθήσεται* can be paralleled from Plato's own works, *ἐκκοπήσεται* cannot.

365b4–7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα, δικαίω μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ, ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανερός· ἀδίκωι δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασαμένοι θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται.

μὲν γὰρ AD: γὰρ δὴ F || δικαίω(ι) μὲν AF: δικαίω D || μὴ καὶ F: καὶ μὴ AD || ὄφελος AD: τὸ ὄφελος F || παρασκευασαμένω(ι) ADF: παρασκευασαμένω(ι) Caes.D.28.4 Laur.CS.42 Par.1810

The construction of the first half of this sentence is disputed. Some scholars take τὰ ... λεγόμενα as subject of φασιν. Quite apart from the matter of concord (353c1 is quoted as a parallel), 'the things that are being said say that ...' is hardly a felicitous expression. But Schneider's explanation of the sentence ('*quae quidem vulgo dicuntur, talia sunt, ut iusto mihi commodi quicquam fore negetur*') cannot stand either: it entails an ellipsis for which it would be hard to find a parallel.

In fact, we have to do with what is sometimes called a 'theme construction', a more or less loosely connected first constituent of a sentence in which its topic is stated. 'As for what people say, ...' For this reason I print a comma after λεγόμενα. [In his edition, however, Slings does not print a comma.] In Plato both the nominative and the

accusative can be used for this construction (normally, but not quite correctly called ‘anacoluthon’; it often *entails* anacoluthon): *La.* 190d7–8 τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν ὃ Λάχης εἶπεῖν, ἀνδρεία τί ποτ’ ἐστίν (no prolepsis, which would have required ἀνδρείαν); *R.* 565d9–e1 ὡς ἄρα ὁ γενεσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγγνου ... ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτωι λύκωι γενέσθαι; *Ti.* 37e1–3 ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας ... τότε ... τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται. An example without anacoluthon: *R.* 365a4–7 ταῦτα πάντα ... τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν; cf. Jowett–Campbell, II 241; L. Reinhard (1920: 166–179).

μέν γὰρ should be preferred to F’s γὰρ δὴ (1) because μέν *solitarium* is very much suited to the context: it is often found ‘with words denoting opinion ..., implicitly contrasted with certainty’ (Denniston [1954: 382]); (2) because μέν *solitarium* is *lectio difficilior* (or alternatively because F also has μέν after ὄφελος, so it may have been removed here on purpose, for euphonic reasons).

μέν is also found after δικαίωι and after ὄφελος. In themselves, those two are unobjectionable (for ὄφελος μέν οὐδέν ... πόνους δέ, cf. Denniston [1954: 168]) but three μέν’s in barely one line and a half is a little too much. I suppose it had been omitted and inserted in the wrong place (in a predecessor of either A or F; D omits both), but it is hard to decide which one is authentic. Since F is generally unreliable as far as particles are concerned, I follow the text of A, but the true answer, I guess, is *non liquet*.

ἐάν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ had been conjectured by Dobree (*Adversaria*, I [Berlin 1874], 134–135) and by Boeckh (*Gesammelte kleine Schriften*, IV [Leipzig 1874], 61–64), and was, I think rightly, adopted by Burnet from F. See, in addition to the various commentaries, Adam (1902: 217); Burnet (1905: 101).

I find the interpretation of ἐάν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ (‘if, in addition, I am thought not to be just’) slightly artificial, if perhaps not untenable. Besides, an ordinary Greek reader would interpret these words as ‘even if I am not thought to be just’, which makes no sense. The reading of F prevents the ambiguity.

In the Platonic corpus εἰ (ἐάν) καὶ μὴ always means ‘even if not’ (*Ap.* 38c4; *Plt.* 264c6–7; *R.* 337c3; *Lg.* 663d6; 718d5; 737a3; 829d3) with the exception of *Sis.* 391c8 where we probably have to do with responsive καὶ/καί. For ‘unless in addition’ Plato uses εἰ (ἐάν) μὴ καὶ at *Euthd.* 289a1; *R.* 591c8–9; cf. *Alc. II* 141b2; *Eryx.* 406a5.

Burnet preferred παρεσκευασμένοι to παρασκευασαμένοι, but the former has only the authority of some secondary MSS. The transitive

middle perfect of this verb is possible (*R.* 416b6; *Mx.* 234c6) but rare, and there is no overriding need for the perfect here (but cf. 361b1). Brandwood (*s.v.* παρασχευάζειν) lists a number of places where the MSS are divided between aorist and perfect (the present instance has been overlooked; as a whole his selection of variant readings is unreliable).

365d4–6 ἔξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὥστε πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκεν μὴ διδόναι

ὥστε F: ὡς AD

If Brandwood's inventory of ὡς + infinitive in a consecutive sense is to be trusted, this use is found very rarely before the *Nomoi*: only *Prt.* 330e6; *R.* 477a6; *Ptm.* 152c3; *Ti.* 56b7. In all four cases ὡς introduces a complementary clause (preceded by οὕτως), not a free one as here (e.g. *R.* 477a6 εἰ δὲ δὴ τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι). Therefore F is right.

This is a classic example of how the slogans of textual criticism may lead to error. Before Brandwood, it was not possible to check the use of ὡς and ὥστε with the infinitive in Plato. Burnet does not even mention ὥστε in his apparatus (which for F is derived from that of Schneider, who does) and neither Chambry nor Schneider pay any attention to it (Adam remarks on the rarity of ὡς *c. inf.*, but does not mention the variant reading) doubtless on the ground that *lectio difficilior potior* and more in particular because of F's unreliability with regard to particles. But a reading can be so difficult that it becomes hard to swallow, and even an unreliable witness may tell the truth once in a while.

[In spite of his spirited defence of ὥστε, however, Slings prints ὡς in his edition.]

366b4–5 Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην [ἄν] πρὸς μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἰροίμεθ' ἄν, ...

πρὸς scripsi: ἄν πρὸς AD: ἀντὶ τῆς F

F's ἀντὶ is of course a gloss on πρὸς, its article weakens the sense. Cf. Tucker ad loc.: “in preference to an injustice of the amplest kind” (τελεωπάτης 361A). Not strictly identical with πρὸς τῆς μεγίστης?—Tucker does not mention the reading of F. But one wonders if ἀντὶ did not also leave its trace in the AD text, to wit as ἄν. A hypothetical ἀν-

τι πρὸ could easily be mistaken for ἄν πρὸ (ΤΙ/ΠΙ). Of course the opposite reasoning applies equally well: an authentic ἄν after δικαιοσύνην may have been ousted (as well as πρὸ) by the gloss ἀντι in F (so Boter [1989: 106]). But the duplication of ἄν deserves further investigation.

The following observations are based on an exhaustive examination of occurrences of ἄν in the *Politeia*—I have not thought it worth examining the entire Platonic corpus (but cf. Dodds ad *Grg.* 486a1–3 who rightly explains the ‘exceptionally heavy recurrence of ἄν’ as due to Plato’s quoting Euripides’ *Antiope* in that sentence).

ἄν is fairly often duplicated when a sentence contains two (rarely more) coordinated predicates (past indicatives, optatives, infinitives). In addition, duplication can occur with two coordinated subjects or complements (367d3–6 ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀποδεχοίμην ἄν ... σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν; cf. 330a2–3; 445d9–e2), with a predicative participle when followed by a predicate with ἄν (598c3 γράψας ἄν τέκτονα ... ἔξαπατῶι ἄν; cf. 516a2; 569b9–c1), when a subordinate clause intervenes (351c7–9 δοκεῖς ἄν ἢ πόλιν ἢ ..., ὅσα κοινῆι ἐπί τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πράξει ἄν τι δύνασθαι; cf. 368d2–5; 420c5–d1; 455a5–6) and finally in two cases of οὐκ ἄν ... οὐδὲ ἄν (526c2 οὐκ ἄν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἄν εὔροις; 589e2–3 οὐκ ἄν αὐτῶι ἐλυσιτέλει οὐδ’ ἄν πάμπολυ ἔτι τούτοι λαμβάνειν).

It is clear that the duplication of ἄν in our place goes far beyond what Plato allows himself elsewhere in the *Politeia*, and it cannot be a coincidence that precisely here there is a serious suspicion of one of the two being due to corruption of the text. We should not hesitate to delete it.

It may be objected that this remedy seems to be at odds with Wackernagel’s Law. It is not. Plato frequently uses ἄν at the end of a longer clause, before a syntactic incision (almost invariably preceded by the predicate). Some examples from *R.*: 350b1; 367a8; 387d9; 392a8; 394e5; 402d9; 410d9 etc.

368d1 ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, **δοκεῖ** μοι ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ

δοκεῖ ADF: δοκῶ Gal. (*Plac. Hipp. Pl.* IX 2,8 = II 546 de Lacy)

Hartman (1896: 59) accepts Gal.’s reading, adding ‘modo corrigatur ποιήσεσθαι pro ποιήσασθαι’ (ποιήσασθαι is read by ADF Gal.). Burnet prints δοκῶ but retains ποιήσασθαι. All other editors give δοκεῖ.

Hartman's correction deserves more attention than it has received. At the four places in Plato where *δοκῶ μοι* means 'I intend to' (not counting this one), it is followed twice by a future infinitive (*πείσεσθαι* *Thl.* 183d10–e1; *κατακείσεσθαι* *Phdr.* 230e2–3) that cannot possibly be a corruption of an aorist infinitive; once by an aorist infinitive (*Euthd.* 288c5 *ύφηγήσασθαι* MSS, *ύφηγήσεσθαι* Heindorf); *Prt.* 340a1 *παρακαλεῖν* may be present or future. The near-synonymous verb *διανοέομαι* may be followed by a present, aorist or future infinitive.

However, the tense of the infinitive hinges on the choice between *δοκῶ* and *δοκεῖ*. Gal.'s reading might be considered *lectio difficilior*, but there can be little doubt that it is wrong. From c8 onwards Socrates carefully stresses that the investigation is going to be carried out jointly (c9 *έπιχειροῦμεν*; 369a2 *ζητήσωμεν, έπισκεψώμεθα*; a6 *θεασαίμεθα*; b1 *ζητοῦμεν* etc.; contrast the singulars in 368b3–c4). And the emphatic (*ήμεῖς*) first person plural of the *έπειδή* clause does not harmonize with a first person singular in the main clause. (The subject of *ποιήσασθαι* is either left unspecified or to be supplied from *ήμεῖς*).

371e5 οἱ δὴ ... κέκληνται ὡς ἐγῶμαι μισθωτοί: ἦ γάρ;—Ναί. [πάνυ μὲν οὔν.]—Πλήρωμα δὴ κτέ

It may be instructive to reproduce the punctuation of the primary witnesses.

- A κέκληνται ὡς ἐγ'ῶι
 _μαι, μισθωτοί: ἦ γάρ: πάνυ
 _μὲν οὔν: πλήρωμα
- D .κέκληνται ὡς ἐγῶ'μαι μισθωτοί. ἦ γάρ: πᾶ
 νυ μὲν οὔν: πλήρωμα
- F .κέκληνται ὡς ἐγ' ῶμαι
 μισθωτοί. ἦ γάρ, ναί: πάνυ μὲν οὔν. πλήρωμα

The change of speaker indicated after *μισθωτοί* in A is of course an error (it is replaced by a high point in A's indirect copy T). Both in A and in D a comma was added underneath the double point after *γάρ*; in A the comma was added by A², i.e. the scribe correcting himself, and touched up, like almost all commas under *dicola*, by A⁵; in D the comma is by a later hand (cf. Boter [1989: 85; 91]). F has a short vertical stroke over the comma after *γάρ*, probably an acute accent meant to correct the original grave (F normally writes a grave accent before a comma, an acute one before heavier punctuations).

F is very careless in indicating change of speaker: normally a simple low point is used, the double point and point + comma are much rarer.

It seems obvious that ναί is a variant of πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Variants in answer formulas are surprisingly rare in Plato. Wilamowitz (1919: 341–342) mentions *Th.* 181d4 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν MSS (ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ om. Stob.) and *R.* 515d8 πολὺ γ' ἔφη ADF (πάντως δήπου Iambl.). Add *R.* 484b12 ὀρθῶς AD δῆλον F; 333c3 φαίνεται ADF ναί Scor.y.1.13. At 335d5 F omits ναί (the sort of error that leads to such variants).

I think Ναί should be preferred for two reasons. First, it is more easily omitted than πάνυ μὲν οὖν because it is shorter. Secondly, πάνυ μὲν οὖν is found already at b11 and d8—this could explain why this particular formula was used to fill the gap (alternatively, the error may be due not to omission but to perseveration). For what it is worth I mention that πάνυ μὲν οὖν is found to answer ἦ γάρ; (e.g. *R.* 369c5), but ναί is far more frequent (in the *Politeia* and later dialogues ναί and πάνυ μὲν οὖν do not differ much in frequency generally; cf. H. von Arnim, SAWW 169,3 [1912], 26–27).

373d1 οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρεΐαι ἐσόμεθα ...;

χρεΐα F: χρεΐαις AD

The Greek for ‘to be in need of something’ is ἐν χρεΐαι τινὸς εἶναι, cf. 566e8; *Phd.* 87c2; Isoc. 10,55; D. 13,1; 19,193; Arist. *Pol.* 1258a16; 1313b29. I have not found a parallel for the plural in this expression. (Adam’s reference to 369d1 μεγίστη τῶν χρεῶν is of course no defence, much less Jowett–Campbell’s reference to rare plurals of other words). Cobet was therefore fully justified (1873: 528) in postulating the singular (cf. Hartman [1896: 64]).

Many of Cobet’s best corrections have not survived into modern apparatuses because they were confirmed by newly-found evidence. (In this case of course he could have found the singular attested for F and a number of its descendants in Schneider, but it does not appear he ever consulted that edition, and anyway he was not the kind of scholar to be greatly interested in MS support for his corrections).

AD’s final -ς is explained by Cobet and Hartman as due to dittography (the first ἐ- of ἐσόμεθα being mistaken for a sigma). The explanation is perhaps not entirely satisfactory but I have no better one, and anyway the case for the singular is so much stronger that we should not worry too much about it.

377b2 οὐκοῦν οἴσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέωι καὶ ἀπαλωὶ ὀτωιοῦν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται **τύπος** ὃν ἂν τις βούληται ἐνσημῆνασθαι ἐκάστωι.

τύπος ADF Stob. (II 31,110n = II 233,23 Wachsmuth): τύπον Stob. (II 31,110v = II 226,13 Wachsmuth)

τύπον was conjectured by Richards (1893: 15 = 1911: 95; against his arguments I. Bywater, *JPh* 31 [1910], 199–200) and accepted by Hartman (1896:68) and Adam, who defends it in his commentary on the grounds that (a) ‘the subject of πλάττεται and ἐνδύεται should be the same’ (if this were Isocrates, perhaps so), and (b) ‘it is more natural and correct to say that an object which “is being moulded” “puts on” a τύπος than to say that the τύπος sinks into it’.

But his paraphrase ‘the youth’ (I rather think, with Richards, that νέωι ... ὀτωιοῦν is neuter) ‘puts on whatever impression ... the educator desires to stamp him with’ mixes two metaphors (moulding wax and making an impression in wax) that should be kept apart. And while it is true to say that ‘the τύπος sinks into it’ is incorrect, I don’t think that this is at all what the Greek actually says (Hartman rightly points out that ἔρωσ ἐνδύεται, cf. *Th.* 169c1, and εὔνοια ἐνδύεται, cf. *Lg.* 642b5–6, are no good parallels because ‘τύπος non ut ἔρωσ vel εὔνοια ... res “agens” est’).

I take it that ἐνδύω τύπον means ‘to make an impression’ (with a signet-ring in wax or clay). Cf. *Th.* 191d6–7 ἀποτυποῦσθαι ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους (compare ἐνσημῆνασθαι at our place); *Plu.* 3f. Thus, πλάττεται and ἐνδύεται τύπος are two distinct but closely related metaphors, the first one that of ‘moulding’ a shape in wax or clay (cf. c3; *Lg.* 798e2), the second of imprinting it. Both verbs are passive.

382e11 καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπαταῖ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, **ὔπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ**.

ὔπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ prA Eus. (*PE* XII 3,34 and *PE* XIII 3,46 = II 173,24 and 176,19 Mras): οὔθ’ ὔπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ A²DF (before the correction in A, there was a high point after πομπάς, which was written, naturally, with an acute accent; in the process of or perhaps after the correction the high point was erased but the accent was never changed): οὔθ’ ὔπαρ οὔθ’ ὄναρ Mon.237pc: οὐδ’ ὔπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ Stephanus (*Thesaurus* s.v. ὔπαρ)

οὔθ’ ὔπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ was read by Bekker and Stallbaum and preferred to οὔτε/οὐδέ by K.-G. II 280, but this was before Adam had published

the prA reading. Therefore Denniston misses the point when he says ‘I am quite inclined to defend, with Burnet against Kühner, ... οὐθ’ ὑπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ (though the shortness of interval makes the irregularity harsher)’ (1954: 193). But the only readings that deserve serious consideration are ὑπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ and οὐθ’ ὑπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ—the other two are unnecessary conjectures.

One serious argument against οὐθ’ ὑπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ was advanced by Adam: the phrase is not on a par with οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας κτέ but is a specification of οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς. Another one is the harshness of οὔτε/οὐδέ separated by only one word, as pointed out by Denniston.

On the other hand, single οὐδέ to convey ‘neither A nor B’ actually has a preference for short phrases or single words in the ‘A’ and ‘B’ slots, as can be seen from Denniston’s collection of examples (1954: 194); cf. K.-G. II 291. No instance from Plato is quoted, but there are one or two parallels in the orators and one in Aristotle. It is quite easy to see how οὐθ’ could have crept in: its omission is less easy to account for (a scribe who decided that five times οὔτε was enough?).

383a7 Πολλὰ ἄρα Ὀμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες ἄλλα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα κτέ

ἄλλα AD: ἀλλά F: om. Eus. (*PE* XIII 3,35 = II 174,1 Mras)

Burnet wrongly reports F’s reading as ἀλλά: there is a trace of a grave accent over the second alpha, though it could easily escape detection. Remarkably enough, F also has a comma after ἀλλά which suits ἄλλα better (there is in fact a comma after ἄλλα in A and a low point in D), but the comma may have been written by a later hand.

Denniston says about this passage that it is ‘noteworthy in that the protasis is expressed participially’ (1954: 12; all other examples of apodotic ἀλλά have a preceding εἰ clause).

Since the accents in Plato MSS are due to ancient or Byzantine scribes interpreting the text, the editor has to choose for himself: where different accents give a different meaning it is incorrect procedure to take the relative trustworthiness of witnesses into consideration (as one ought to do in cases like 371d7, where A has πλάνητας against DF πλανήτας).

Here the choice is between an unparalleled use of apodotic ἀλλά and a rather nice hyperbaton. I do not see room for hesitation.

BOOK THREE

387c3 οὐκοῦν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, Κωκυτοὺς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἑνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ †ὥς οἶεται† πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

ὥς οἶεται ADF: ὡς οἶόν τε Laur.80.19pc: secl. M. Hertz, NJPhP 105 (1872), 851–852; cf. Hartman (1896: 77); Apelt (1903: 343); Ritter (1913: 53). Apart from those mentioned by Adam, the following corrections have been proposed: ὡς ὄντα Apelt, BPhW 15 (1895), 967–968 (cf. 386b4): ὡς οἶδια Th. Gomperz, SAWW 134 (1895), 15 (cf. Phot. *Lex.* II 4 Naber): ὡς οἰοτέα Th. Gomperz, *Hellenika* (Leipzig 1912), I 316–317 (= προβάτια, Sophr. fr. 122): πῶς οἶει C. Bonner, CPh 3 (1908), 446–447 (cf. *Smp.* 216d6): ὡς οἰοτέα R.G. Bury, CR 21 (1906), 14.

The majority of scholars tend to reject the words ὥς οἶεται as a marginal remark ('that's what *he* thinks'), made by a Christian (or perhaps Epicurean?) reader. But I doubt that ὥς οἶεται is the natural form such a remark would take; at 571d2 ὥς οἶεται, ejected on similar grounds by Apelt (1903: 343) is clearly authentic. Besides, Socrates cannot seriously mean that these terrible words make *all* those who hear them shiver: compare the reserve expressed 388d2–3 (with regard to dirges and laments, which presuppose that death is a terrible thing) εἰ γὰρ ᾧ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῖν οἱ νέοι σπουδῆι ἀκούοιεν καὶ μὴ καταγελῶιεν ὡς ἀναξίως λεγομένων, and of course Cephalus' statement that myths about the underworld are laughed at by all except those who think they are close to death (330d4–e2; cf. also *Grg.* 527a5 on the description of the judgement and punishment of the souls μῦθος ... ὥσπερ γρασός). What probably lurks behind ὥς οἶεται is a qualification of πάντας. If I did not have to account for the transmitted text, I would propose ὡς εἰπεῖν, an idiom whose primary function is to mark exaggerations as such, and of which Ast notes (*Lexicon Platonicum* [Lipsiae 1835–1838], s.v. εἶπον) that it is used especially with πᾶς (cf. from this book 404c3 πανταχοῦ ... ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν). But this has no paleographical probability at all.

There is one parallel I have to adduce here, for the first time, I think: *Lg.* 967a1–4 οἱ μὲν γὰρ (sc. οἱ πολλοί) διανοοῦνται τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισμένους ἀστρονομίαι τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις ἀθέους γίγνεσθαι, καθεωρακότας ὡς οἶονται [O. Apelt,

Die Ansichten der griechischen Philosophen über den Anfang der Cultur, Eisenach 1901 (Gymn.-Progr.), 21: ὡς οἶόν τε A] γινόμενα ἀνάγκαις πράγματ' ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίας βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν πέρι τελουμένων.

In our place ὡς οἶονται is mentioned as an intermediate stage of corruption by those scholars who read ὡς οἶόν τε (which has been refuted adequately by Adam), but it has never been considered seriously. It would require Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητάς (b1–2) to be understood as subject (it will hardly do to retain οἶεται and supply only Homer as subject). This implies that the hearers' shuddering is the effect intended by the poets when they use these words: I have no problems with the assumption, which may also underlie Socrates' following words καὶ ἴσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι, though throughout the discussion Socrates concentrates on the actual, not the intended effect of poetry.

Another problem is of course that it will not do to start emending the text from the 14th-century correction ὡς οἶόν τε (which is the transmitted text in the parallel from *Lg.*), and I do not quite see how a perfectly reasonable plural could have been corrupted to a puzzling singular in all three primary MSS (even the vicinity of ποιεῖ hardly accounts for the corruption).

388e5 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φιλογέλωτάς γε δεῖ εἶναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅταν τις ἐφιῆι ἰσχυρῶι γέλωτι, ἰσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ἐφιῆ Vat.229: ἔφη D: ἔφην A: ἐφίη F Stob. (III 1,53 = III 21,3 Hense): post ἰσχυρῶι add. κατέχοιτο A³: post γέλωτι add. ἄλλω(ι) Caes.D.28.4¹sl Laur.CS.42¹sl: χοῆται Laur.85.7pc: pro ἐφιῆι leg. φλέγηι Apost. (XIII 41b = *Paroem.* II 584,23).

Plato wrote either ἐφῆι or ἐφιῆι. The former variant was written without iota and misunderstood as ἔφη in D and further corrupted to ἔφην in A. The trivialness of the first half of the process is illustrated by 547d3 εφηι P9: εφη P9pc, ἔφη AD *recte*. The corruption led to the interpolation of various predicates, none of which have the slightest claim to authenticity: ἐφιῆμι with the dative meaning 'to give in to', though a rare idiom, has one good parallel in Plato: *Ti.* 59d2–3 ταῦτηι (sc. τῆι παιδιᾷ) δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν ἐφέντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν πέρι τὰ ἐξῆς εἰκότα δίμμεν τῆιδε; cf. E. fr. 564,3 N² ἔδρασαν πάντ' ἐφέντες ἠδονῆι.

Boter (1989: 182) categorically ascribes the reading ἐφῆι to Vat.229pc (with some reservation on p. 76). Judging from the same microfilm, I am inclined to think that the reading was always in Vat.229. Par.1810, the exemplar of Vat.229 (possibly its direct exemplar), has ἔφη. As Vat.229pc is the same hand as Vat.229 (if ἐφῆι was introduced into

Vat.229 as a correction, it was certainly done by the scribe who wrote the body of the text), the question is of little importance.

To my mind the aorist is better than the present. In this context, 'to give in' is used typically for an event, not a state or process. Therefore, one expects the aorist to be used unless the author wishes to concentrate on the process that precedes the event (cf. Eng. 'he was giving in gradually'), for which there is no reason in this context, or unless the readers are expected to take the predicate as referring to a series of events. This may be how Schneider takes the subjunctive present, though his paraphrase (repeated by Adam) is ambiguous: 'quum quis vehementi se risui dat, in eo statu est, qui vehementem mutationem seu conversionem in contrarium requirere et efficere solet'. But the universal statement contained in the main clause is something entirely unconnected with the habitualness or otherwise of the subordinate clause. I do not see why there is no violent reaction if a person yields to violent laughter only once, which is why I think no good case can be made for ἐφιῆι.

This analysis is backed up by the use of the aorist in the two parallels quoted above, to which may be added *Prt.* 338a4–6 μήτ' αῦ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων, though it is not certain that ἐφέντα is intransitive there (two lines above, the verb is used transitively: ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, 338a3, which could be a good argument for taking πάντα κάλων with ἐφέντα, were it not for the absence of a coordinator). The synonym ἐνδίδωμι is, in this meaning at any rate, always used in the aorist in Plato.

I think these considerations are stronger than any argument based on transmission and explanation of the error. True enough, εφηι could easily have been corrupted to εφη (especially since the two final syllables were both pronounced *i* in the imperial age), and it is harder to find a good explanation for the opposite process (was εφη misread as εφη? Or do we here have a deliberate correction of εφη to εφηι, made in order to prevent taking εφη as 'he said'? Such a correction is not unthinkable, especially in F). But since both readings are possible, syntax and meaning have to sway the balance in this case.

[In his edition, Slings prints ἐφιῆι. See *Additional Notes*, p. 188.]

389a3–6

Οὐκοῦν Ὀμήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν
 ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνώητο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν,
 ὡς ἴδον Ἥφαιστον διὰ δώματα ποιπνύοντα
 οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

Before Hermann editors generally printed a full stop after ποιπνύοντα. Hermann objected to the asyndeton (rightly) and deleted ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν (wrongly, I think). He was followed by Hartman (1896: 79) and by Naber (1908: 36). Van Herwerden's deletion of περὶ θεῶν (1883: 340) has nothing to do with our problem.

Adam's way of defending the transmitted text is untenable: he prints a high point after θεῶν and does not punctuate after ποιπνύοντα. Thus the two lines from Homer are object of ἀποδεκτέον. But a quotation in itself cannot have the function of subject or object within the sentence: this requires for it to be preceded by τό as in 390b₄–5 ἢ τὸ Λιμῶνι δ' οἴκιστον κτέ (depending on a8 ποιεῖν or b3 δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι, cf. next note) or to be announced by τὰ τοιάδε (389e₁₂–13) or τὰ τοιαῦτα (386c₅–8). The latter construction is the one used in our place; the punctuation before ἄσβεστος is incorrect. [In his edition, however, Slings prints a raised period after θεῶν.]

Deleting, with Hermann, at least ἀποδεξόμεθα (I would keep περὶ θεῶν at any rate) may seem attractive in that it removes a stylistical problem; it is easy to see how ἀποδεξόμεθα came to be inserted. For the sequence οὐδέ ... οὐ see K.-G. II 204; add (with Hermann, praef. vii) R. 609e₁–3; Cra. 398e₆–7; D. 21,129. Yet the transmitted text is defensible—sufficiently so to be retained. The words as quoted constitute one sentence, not two. The problem is that this sentence has two, almost identical, predicates. Consequently, the sentence is anacoluthic: the quotation causes a change in construction by which the predicate is repeated in a different form. This is an anacoluthon of the type called 'Palindromie' by Reinhard, who treats the phenomenon extensively (1920: 151–166). Such a repetition of the predicate is repeatedly triggered off by a form of οὗτος or τοιοῦτος, cf. *Phd.* 86b₆–c₁ τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ... κρᾶσιν εἶναι ... τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν. Cf. Reinhard's examples on p. 158 and *Grg.* 456cd as quoted p. 155. Of the phenomenon in general I add some examples from the *Politeia*: 339e₁–6 οἷου τοίνυν ... ὠμολογήσθαι σοι. ὅταν ..., ἄρα τότε ... οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ξυμβαίνειν κτέ [in his edition, Slings prints a raised period after ὠμολογήσθαι σοι.]; 372b₁–6 θρέφονται δὲ

... σκευαζόμενοι, ... παραβαλλόμενοι ... κατακλινέντες ... εὐωχήσονται; 337a8–b4 εὖ οὖν ἠδιδραθα ὅτι εἶ τινα ἔροιο ..., καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῷ “Ὅπως μοι κτέ”, δῆλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι κτέ.

The anacoluthon, more precisely the switch from the first person plural to the impersonal verbal adjective, facilitates the dialectical trick present in κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, for which cf. Jowett–Campbell *ad loc.*

Hermann also wished to read οὐκουν (οὐκοῦν ADF): see des Places (1929: 184 n.1) for arguments against a similar change at *Euthd.* 298a8. For οὐκοῦν ... οὐ (here οὐκοῦν ... οὐδέ ... οὐ) suggesting a negative answer, cf. Denniston (1954: 435).

390b6–c1 ἢ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων [ὥς] μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς (ὄσα) ἐβουλεύσατο, τούτων πάντων ῥαιδίως ἐπιλαθόμενον διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν κτέ

ὥς μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο ADF Eus. (*PE* XIII 14.9 = II 231,1–2 Mras); μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ὄσα ἐβουλεύσατο Wilamowitz (1919: 378); ὄσα μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ἐβουλεύσατο Van Herwerden (1883: 341); cf. Hartman (1896: 81); Richards (1893: 251 = 1911: 96; CR 15 [1901], 387). For other conjectures, cf. Hartman, *l.c.* || ἐπιλαθόμενον Eus. Pr. (u.v.): ἐπιλανθόμενος F: ἐπιλανθανόμενον AD

The transmitted text is accepted not only by most editors but also by Denniston, who quotes this place as an instance of ‘postponement of ὥς and of the relative’ (*Greek Prose Style* [Oxford 1952], 50). His only other example of ‘postponement’ of two subordinators is entirely different: *Lg.* 905c4–6 ταῦτα εἶ μὲν σε πείθει ..., περὶ θεῶν ὥς οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι λέγεις—here there are two separate, relatively mild cases of hyperbaton (ταῦτα; περὶ θεῶν) that happen to occur in the same sentence. In our place, both ὥς (if at all tenable) and ἃ should have come directly after Δία (the construction depends on a8 ποιεῖν, or less probably on b3–4 δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι ... ἀκούειν νέωι).

In discussions of the textual problem, it has not yet been pointed out that καθευδόντων ... ἀνθρώπων and μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς belong together, or speaking more precisely that καθευδόντων ... ἀνθρώπων qualifies μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς, which in its turn qualifies ἐβουλεύσατο: Zeus alone is awake while the others sleep (the reference is to *Il.* B 1ff.). Therefore I find it impossible to accept ὥς in this place: if it is authentic at all, it goes with ἐπιλαθόμενον and should not come between the two participles. (Van Herwerden’s ὄσα for ὥς is unacceptable for the same reason). But apart from that, ὥς must be rejected *per se*: there is no good parallel for ποιεῖν Δία ὥς ἐπιλαθόμενον (383a3 ὥς μῆτε αὐτοὺς γόητας

ὄντας is absolute accusative, *pace* Adam), cf. LSJ, *s.v.* ποιέω A I 4 b; and if Δία ... ἐπιλαθόμενον depends on δοκεῖ ... ἀκούειν, I see no way of accounting for ὡς at all.

Wilamowitz' correction gives the best explanation of ὡς (Hermann's καὶ for ὡς would be more likely in minuscules than in majuscules, and the corruption is older than Eusebius). The position of (ὄσ)α is a bit of a problem, as we shall see, but if we were to read ἡ Δία (ᾧ) καθευδόντων κτέ both ὡς and the replacement of ᾧ would have to be accounted for.

Denniston (*o.c.*, 48–50) gives examples of what he calls 'postponement' of subordinators (it is better to speak of anticipation or left-dislocation of part of a subordinate clause, a focus construction not to be confused with prolepsis, which is a theme construction). His examples of 'postponed' relatives are all from the *Nomoi*, but cf. *R.* 399c2–4 δυστυχοῦντων, εὐτυχοῦντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων αἵτινες φθόγγους μιμήσονται κάλλιστα; 425b10–c1 ἐκ τῆς παιδείας ὅποι ἂν τις ὀρμήσῃ; c11–d1 ἕκαστοι ἃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβάλλουσιν; *Ap.* 19d6–7 περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσι; *Phdr.* 238a4 ἐκπρεπῆς ἢ ἂν τύχη γενομένη; perhaps *R.* 363a7 ἀγαθὰ, τοῖς ὁσίοις ἃ φασὶ θεοὺς διδόναι (τοῖς ὁσίοις may just as well be a modifier of ἀγαθὰ); *K.-G.* II 598. Our place is rather unique in that there is anticipation of a complex predicative participle construction; among Denniston's examples, the closest parallel is *Lg.* 925c3–4 ἅπαις δὲ ἀρρένων τε καὶ θηλειῶν τὸ παράπαν ὃς ἂν μὴ διαθέμενος τελευτᾷ. But with other subordinators the phenomenon is more common, cf. close by 388e8–389a1 ἀνθρώπους ἀξίους λόγου κρατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος ἂν τις ποιῆι.

ἐπιλαθόμενον is decidedly better than the present participle. It is true that the present stem is used with ῥαϊδίως to refer to a process which is easily completed (e.g. *Ly.* 212a2–3 ταχὺ καὶ ῥαϊδίως κτᾶσθαι; *Phd.* 63a7 ῥαϊδίως ἀπαλλάττοντο αὐτῶν; *R.* 455b5–6 ὁ μὲν ῥαϊδίως τι μανθάνει, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς—contrast *Plt.* 285d10 ῥαϊδίως καταμαθεῖν, but ῥαϊδίως here means not so much 'easily' as 'rashly, lightheartedly' (cf. *Ap.* 24c6 ῥαϊδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους; *Men.* 94e3 ῥαϊδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους; *R.* 377b4–5 ἄρ' οὖν ῥαϊδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ... μύθους). Besides, though 'to forget' may be a process elsewhere (instructive 413b4–6 κλαπέντας μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλανθανομένους, ὅτι τῶν μὲν χρόνος τῶν δὲ λόγος ἐξαιρούμενος λανθάνει), here the verb describes a sudden event. F's nominative is of course due to perseveration of ἐγρηγορός. Proclus' paraphrase (*in R.* I 132,19–20 Kroll) ὅτι διὰ τὸν πρὸς τὴν Ἥραν ἔρωτα τῶν μὲν δεδογμένων ἐπελάθετο πάντων is additional support for the aorist.

392b9 οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ὁμολογήῃς ὀρθῶς με λέγειν, φήσω σε ὁμολογημέναι ἅ πάλαι ἐζητοῦμεν.

In his commentary, Stallbaum drew attention to Ficinus' translation 'quae iam diu quaerimus', adding: 'Num legit ζητοῦμεν?' The note cannot possibly be read as an endorsement of ζητοῦμεν, which was first put in the text by Hermann (who refers to Ficinus, not to Stallbaum, in his praef., vii; in his review of Stallbaum's commentary [1849: 182; published originally in 1831] Hermann had already given the answer 'Gewiss!' to Stallbaum's tentative question). Hermann was followed by all subsequent editors, even such staunch pillars of conservatism as Jowett–Campbell and Shorey. The state of affairs is correctly, if somewhat loosely, described by Hartman (1896: 82): 'Hermann praecunte Stallbaumio ... correxit'. This was misunderstood by Adam, who ascribes the correction to Stallbaum (both in his edition and in his commentary), and the error was perpetuated by Burnet and Chambry.

Stallbaum's suspicion that Ficinus read ζητοῦμεν is not borne out by the extant MSS, all of which read ἐζητοῦμεν. 'quaerimus' is not necessarily a conscious correction by Ficinus: he may have used the present to avoid the cumbersome pluperfect subjunctive that would have been necessary in indirect speech.

But I do not see why the ADF reading should not be followed here. Certainly the fact that elsewhere in Plato we find πάλαι ζητοῦμεν (*Euthd.* 289e1; *Men.* 93b6; *R.* 420c1; *Phlb.* 18d7; *Epin.* 989a1; *Cra.* 424a6 the MSS are divided, though the primary ones all seem to read ἐζητοῦμεν) is not an argument, because this context differs from all others in that the relative clause depends on a perfect infinitive. 'If you admit I'm right, I'll say to you: "you have now admitted the point we tried [not: we try] to establish all along"'. As soon as Adeimantos gives in, the investigation is over and done with, which is exactly why Socrates says ὁμολογημέναι not ὁμολογεῖν, and after ὁμολογημέναι, ζητοῦμεν is illogical: if Adeimantos' admission is treated as a thing of the past, then so is, *a fortiori*, the investigation which was ended by the admission. (Since Greek has no *consecutio temporum* the fact that the indirect speech depends on the future φήσω has no influence on the tense of the subordinate clause).

394e5 ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἂν ὥστ' εἶναι που ἐλλόγιμος.

The text (which is also in Stob. II 31,110^r = II 224,11–12 Wachsmuth) is sound but has not been explained satisfactorily. The ὥστε clause is a complement of ἀποτυγχάνοι (unparalleled, I think, for this verb, but cf. a similar construction of its virtual antonym διαπράττωμαι at *Grg.* 478e7—contrast the simple infinitive a couple of lines below, 479a7. See K.-G. II 11–12). At the same time this verb is also construed with a nominal complement, to wit πάντων. Such a combination of nominal and clausal complements is commonplace in Plato, cf. e.g. *Euthd.* 272b5–6 οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ἦς; See the material collected by Riddell (1877: §229).

Attempts to tamper with the text have rightly been rejected by the editors. This goes for Ast's πάντως instead of πάντων, approved by Stallbaum but not put in his text; πάντων is certain because πολλῶν—ἀποτυγχάνοι ἄν is a reminiscence of *Margites* fr. 3, overlooked by editors of this poem. And Van Herwerden's deletion of ὥστ'—ἐλλόγιμος (1883: 342), endorsed by Hartman (1896: 83–84) hardly needs refutation.

A similar combination of nominal and embedded complements is found 416a5–6 ἐπιχειρῆσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν, where Madvig's remark 'Graecum non est κακουργεῖν τι' (1871: 419) is entirely beside the point. See Dodds on *Grg.* 513e5–7; Riddell (1877: §180). The construction is closely related to the left-dislocations discussed above, ad 390b6–c1 (p. 42).

395a3 σχολῆι ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μιμῆσεται καὶ ἔσται μιμητικός, ἐπεὶ που οὐδὲ [τὰ] **δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα** δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμωιδίαν καὶ τραγωιδίαν ποιοῦντες.

τὰ delevi: δύο secl. Hartman (1896: 84)

The words I have printed in bold type can only mean 'the (well-known) pair of μιμήματα which people think are closely akin'. The implication that there is only one such pair does not fit in with a7 οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαψωιδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα, and is refuted by the following οἷον ('for example'; Chambry tries to dodge the question by translating 'je veux dire', but this use of οἷον, while quite normal in Aristotle—cf. H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* [Berolini 1870], 502a7–23—is not found in Plato or any other author before Aristotle; it developed, I think, out of cases like *Phd.* 71a12–13 ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων ... δύο γενέσεις, but in such cases a preceding form of τοιόσδε is never absent before Aristotle).

It might be maintained that tragedy and comedy look more alike than any other pair of types of imitation. But this does not solve the problem of οἶον and would have required ἐγγύτατα rather than ἐγγύς (cf. Shorey: ‘the two forms of imitation that appear most closely akin’).

Hartman seems to be the only one to have realized the problem. His solution is possible (δύο may have been interpolated because of the dual in α5–6 ἢ οὐ μιμήματα ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεϊς;), but has the disadvantage of making the ἐπεὶ clause more or less superfluous. (Hartman’s claim that if δύο were genuine, Plato would have written τὸ δοκοῦντε is refuted by places like *Chrm.* 157e2–3 ποῖται δύο οἰκίαι συνελθούσαι).

The reasoning is as follows. (1) No man can successfully have more than one profession (394e3–6); (2) no man can successfully practise more than one type of imitation (394e8–9); therefore much less (σχολῆι ἄρα) (3) can any man successfully have a serious occupation and practise more than one type of imitation (395a1–2), since (4) not even the [?two] closely related types of imitation can be practised successfully by one man. If in (4) ‘two’ is suppressed, (4) covers the same ground as (2); if ‘two’ is kept, (4) is a much more specific statement than (2).

Therefore I suggest that not δύο but τὰ is spurious. It is left untranslated by e.g. Jowett (‘for even when two pieces of imitation are nearly allied, ...’) and Apelt (‘da nicht einmal für zwei nahe miteinander verwandt scheinende Formen der Nachahmung ...’). Since anarthrous attributive participles are relatively rare in Greek, τὰ could have crept in easily. For those who prefer more spectacular explanations: τὰ may have come from α5 where μιμήματα and μιμήματε are ancient variants (cf. Adam *ad loc.*; with Adam, I prefer the plural but Hartman’s μιμήματ’ [1914: 237] may equally be right): τὰ may have been written above the line or in the margin as a correction or variant of μιμήματε and inserted in the wrong place.

Only after the above had been written did I find a passage in Proclus which seems to confirm my conjecture: *in R.* I 51,27–52,3 Kroll πῶς ἂν αὐτὸς συνάιδῃ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, ἐν Συμποσίῳ μὲν ἀναγκάζων τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι τέχνης κωμωιδίαν καὶ τραγωιδίαν ποιεῖν, ἐν Πολιτείᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ταύτας γειτνιώσας ἀλλήλαις (οὐ) τῆς αὐτῆς ἕξω εἶναι λέγων ἀποτελεῖν διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο πεφυκέναι κεκερατισμένην (cf. b5). In fact Plato says nothing of the kind here, indeed what Proclus makes him say would destroy the argument. But if he read οὐδὲ δοκοῦντα, as I claim Plato wrote, he could have taken the words together and interpreted them as ‘not even looking closely alike’. If his text was identical to that of ADF, his error seems a very bizarre one.

396ε3 οὐκοῦν διηγῆσει χρήσεται οἴαι ἡμεῖς ὀλίγον πρότερον διήλθομεν
κτέ

The state of affairs in A is representative of a good many number of cases very loosely described by Boter as follows (1989: 84): ‘often a iota suprascriptum has been added; sometimes a iota adscriptum is replaced by a iota suprascriptum; in such cases only the lower part of the original iota is erased’.

What has happened is this. Already while copying the body of the text, the scribe of A distinguished carefully between the ‘long diphthong’ αι, written α ι, and the ‘short diphthong’ αι, written αι. As far as I know, this observation is a new one; its explanation is A’s habit of trying to make sense of a majuscule exemplar while copying it, even though the diacritics were entered later. As such, the distinction between $\bar{\alpha}$ and $\check{\alpha}$ must be compared with what I have pointed out in the note on 371ε5 (see above, p. 32) on word division in prA (noticeably less marked in the *Politeia* than in the ninth tetralogy, but the fact, equally unnoticed, that wherever there is a difference in colour between the ink of the body of the text and that of the diacritics, word-initial tremas on iota and upsilon are always in the colour of the text, not the diacritics, points the same way).

Here the original text was οαι not οα ι, in other words, when copying his exemplar the scribe took this form momentarily for a nominative plural. When subsequently he checked what he had written against his exemplar and added the diacritics, the scribe realized he had made a mistake. Therefore he erased the lower half of the original iota (which Boter is obviously wrong in calling ‘iota adscriptum’), leaving only an alpha; a superscript iota, a rough breathing and an acute accent were added. Precisely the same thing happened at 405b3 ἀπορίαι. In other cases he saw his mistake straight away, with the result that the only thing now to be seen is a tiny erasure. A more complicated case is 406c2, where he had written αγνοια ι, thought better of it, erased the iota (mistakenly supposing that a nominative was necessary) and wrote the omicron of the following οὐδὲ over the erasure; the word after that was originally written απειρια. When putting in the diacritics he saw that the two words were datives after all and added superscript iotas to both.

D, which has a similar distinction between αι and α ι, though maintained far less consistently (its tendency to write α η ω for the ‘long diphthongs’ is far greater than in A), surprisingly reads οἴαι ι at 396ε3.

397a2 οὐκοῦν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος αὖ, ὅσοι ἂν φαυλότερος ἦι, πάντα τε μᾶλλον **διηγῆσεται** καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μμεισθαι σπουδῆι τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν.

διηγῆσεται ADF: μμῆσεται Laur.8o.19pc: μμῆσεται ἢ διηγῆσεται Madvig (1871: 418): διὰ μμῆσεως (or μμῆσει) διηγῆσεται Hartman (1914: 237)

διηγῆσεται is, to my mind at least, not just defensible but obviously better than the other readings. Everything essential has been said by Prandtl (1904: 16). Prandtl also adequately refutes Adam's correction τῆς ἀπλῆς (ἄλλης ADF) διηγήσεως at 396e6) and by J.G. van Pesch in *Sertum Nabericum* (Lugduni Batavorum 1908), 309–310. Yet a short note is in order, seeing that since Schneider adopted μμῆσεται, no editor has printed the ADF reading except Burnet.

διήγησις is either 'narration' generically or specifically 'narration without direct speech' (as 397b2 below; also called ἀπλῆ διήγησις). Here διήγησις is the generic word. It seems Plato is making two points at the same time: (1) the less decent the man, the more he will be inclined to treat indecent subjects (πάντα μᾶλλον διηγῆσεται): by implication, the decent man will avoid such subjects (this had not been said before); (2) the less decent the man, the more he will indulge in representing everything in direct speech (ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μμεισθαι)—this is the main point of the entire discussion.

Secondly, all conjectures result in tautology: πάντα τε μᾶλλον μμῆσεται (etc.) ~ ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μμεισθαι. Of course the words σπουδῆι (cf. 396d4; e1) τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν in the latter clause contain new and salient information, but surely there was no need for Plato to be as repetitive as Byzantine and modern correctors want him to be in order to impart that information.

399b2 Οὐκ οἶδα ἔφην ἐγὼ τὰς ἀρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν ἀρμονίαν, ἣ ἔν τε πολεμικῆι πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαιῶι ἐργασίᾳ προεπόντως ἂν μμῆσαιτο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσωιδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς τραύματα ἢ εἰς θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἰς τινα ἄλλην ξυμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις **παρατεταγμένως** καὶ καρτεροῦντως ἀμυνομένου τὴν τύχην.

The indirect tradition seems to point at (παρα)τεταγμένους as a variant of παρατεταγμένως: Iambl. *VP* 32,220 (119,6–8 Deubner) the MS has παρατεταγμένους καὶ καρτεροῦντως ἡμύνετο τὴν τύχην, which is perfectly acceptable Greek and should not be harmonized with the Plato

text; Them. 309a (II 111,7–8 Downey–Norman) οὕτω τεταγμένον και καρτερῶς ἀμυνομένου την τύχην (τεταγμένου ABΣΖ: παρατεταγμένως D perhaps through contamination with Plato MSS, a phenomenon not unknown in the codd. of Them.); Pr. *in R.* I 55,19–22 Kroll ἐκείνην ... ἄρμονίαν, ἥτις ἂν ἀπεργάζεται τον παιδευόμενον ἐν πάσαις πράξεσιν ... τεταγμένον; with the preverb I 61,6–7 παρατεταγμένον πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀναγκαίας και ἀκουσίους πράξεις.

Yet the ADF reading is superior. The brave man defends himself against ill luck in a combative spirit (παρατεταγμένως) and with perseverance (καρτερούντως): together the adverbs constitute a sufficient condition for an exemplary self-defence. The θρηνώδεις ἄρμονίαι (398e1) and the μαλακαί τε και ξυμποτικαί τῶν ἄρμονιῶν (eg) have been excluded—the two modifiers given here are the opposites of these qualities (παρατεταγμένως versus θρηνώδης, καρτερούντως as against μαλακός). And there are also two adverbs in the following sentence, which as a whole is closely parallel to ours: b8–c1 σωφρόνως τε και μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις (!) πρόπτοντά τε και τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. (Also, if instead of παρατεταγμένως we read the participle, the tense seems all wrong to me—however, since Themistius, Iamblichus and Proclus had no problems with the perfect, it would be unwise to press this point).

Syntactically speaking the two adverbs could just as well have been participles. But it is easy to see that had Plato written παρατεταγμένου και καρτεροῦντος ἀμυνομένου, the precise coupling of the words would have been unclear (παρατεταγμένου could have gone either with καρτεροῦντος or with ἀμυνομένου).

The meaning ‘steadily’ given to παρατεταγμένως by LSJ is not entirely correct. Cf. *Prt.* 333e2–4 και μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε και ἀγωνιᾶν και παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι (‘bereit, streitlustig ... und kampfbereit [in Fechterstellung] sein’, Nestle *ad loc.*). When παρατάττομαι is used metaphorically there is always an association of grimness or hostility (‘animus repugnandi certus et obstinatus’, Schneider): Aesch. 3,35 οὕτω τοίνυν περιφανῶς παράνομα γεγραφώς (sc. Ctesiphon), παραταχθεὶς μετὰ Δημοσθένους ἐποίησε τέχνας τοῖς νόμοις; D. *Ep.* 3,12.

399b4 ἐν εἰρηνηκῆι τε και μὴ βιαίωι ἀλλ’ ἐν ἐκουσίωι πράξει ὄντος

Jowett–Campbell and Burnet print ἐκουσίᾳ without comment, presumably because of the closely parallel passage 603c6 μιμείται ... βιαίους ἢ ἐκουσίας πράξεις. In our place, all other editors and all MSS give ἐκου-

οίω(ι), which is supported by c2 ἐκούσιον (sc. ἁρμονίαν). Since a substantial number of derived adjectives in -ιος are of two endings, there is no reason to change the transmitted text. If Burnet has not elsewhere changed the ending of the MSS without due warning, there is in Plato's authentic works one more example of ἐκουσία as against seven of feminine ἐκούσιος; see Brandwood, s.v.

401e4–5 ἘΑρ' οὖν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ὦ Γλαύκων τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσημοσύνην καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῆι, εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὃ ἐκεῖ τραφεῖς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίωνν τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ †καὶ χαίρων καὶ† καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλὸς τε κάγαθος, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νεὸς ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὃ οὕτω τραφεῖς;

χαίρων καὶ transp. post δὴ M. Vermehren, *Platonische Studien* (Leipzig 1870), 94; καὶ χαίρων om. Mon.237, transp. post δυσχεραίωνν Bywater, *JPh* 31 (1910), 201, cf. Wilamowitz (1919: 378); χαίρων καταδεχόμενος Laur.80.7 Ambr.300 Stallbaum

Throughout the discussion of harmony and rhythm Socrates expresses his thoughts in lengthy, well-balanced and remarkably regular sentences. This sentence, as opposed to the previous one 401b1–d3 is, in addition, a very concise one. When Adam says that ‘the MS reading, though less pointed and pregnant [than Vermehren’s transposition], is in itself satisfactory enough’ he shows a lack in stylistic feeling. It would be hard in any linguistic register to accept the coordination χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος, let alone in this one.

Both transpositions are wrong. Education in μουσική achieves its aim without the young person being aware of it (cf. 401c8 λανθάνη) like a breeze that brings healthy air (c7–8). Only when confronted with ugly things does the young person develop a judgement (an aesthetic, not yet a rational one, cf. 402a2–4): if educated in μουσική, he will perceive these things most sharply for what they are (ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο) and will rightly take offence at them (ὀρθῶς δυσχεραίωνν). The addition of χαίρων spoils the thought, whether before or after δυσχεραίωνν. (It goes too far to say, as J.M. Edmonds does PCPhS 91–93 [1912], 21, that ‘the clause τὰ μὲν ... κάγαθος is parenthetical and simply a foil’).

The deletion of *καὶ* after *χαίρων* is a good remedy. The reading should be added to Boter's list of passages where Laur.80.7 and Ambr.300 have good corrections (1989: 235–237). (The omission of *καὶ χαίρων* in Mon.237 may be a simple error; the words are in its exemplar Laur.80.19). A solution along the same line would be to delete the *καὶ* before *χαίρων*, as Dr N. van der Ben points out to me (personal communication; he is content with the transmitted text himself). In theory, it is even possible to retain this *καὶ* by making it an adverb ('he would actually be glad to praise beautiful things'), but I find this very strained at best.

I wonder if it is not better to change *χαίρων* to *χαίροι*. This would create a parallel with the young man's reaction to ugly things (*τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοὶ καὶ χαίροι*: *τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἄν ... καὶ μισοῖ*). This coupling of *ἐπαινεῖν* and *χαίρειν* can be supported by many parallels. I choose two, both from analyses of aesthetic pleasure: *R.* 605d3–4 *χαίρομεν ... ἐπαινοῦμεν* and *ε5 χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν*; *Lg.* 655d7–e3 (from a discussion of musical education which is closely related to ours) *οἷς μὲν ἄν πρὸς τρόπου τὰ ῥηθέντα ἢ μελωδιηθέντα ἢ καὶ ὀπωσοῦν χορευθέντα ... τούτους μὲν καὶ τούτοις χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ προσαγορεύειν καλὰ ἀναγκαῖον*; see also 656b2–3 *μισῆι ... ψέγηι*.

[In his edition, Slings does print *καὶ χαίροι καὶ*. See *Additional Notes*, pp. 188–189.]

403b7 τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὕτως ὁμιλεῖν πρὸς ὃν τις σπουδάζοι ὅπως μηδέποτε δόξει μακρότερα τούτων ξυγγίνεσθαι

ὁμιλεῖν ADF: ὁμιλεῖ F || σπουδάζοι ADF¹pc: σπουδάζει Fac

The indicative *σπουδάζει* was adopted from a number of secondary MSS (Laur.80.7, Ambr.300, Par.1642, Vind.1; not Matr.4573) by Ast and recommended by Richards (1893: 251 = 1911: 97–98) and Hartman (1896: 92). As it now appears to be the original reading of F it should be taken more seriously than it has been hitherto; besides, the explanations of the optative given by the commentators are wrong or uninformative.

The optative, if correct, is the one that marks events in some types of subordinate clauses as capable of repetition. After a non-past main verb it is used quite frequently in poetry, but seldom in prose. The most extensive list of occurrences is given by Stahl (1907: 308–309). Stahl omits to observe what was pointed out by Goodwin (1912: §502 and 555), that the main verb is usually, and almost always in prose, an

expression of necessity, possibility or propriety. Cf. *R.* 332a4–5 ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ’ ὅπως οἰοῦν τότε ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ; *Chrm.* 164b1; 171e7 and my note (1988: 412). Here ὀμιλεῖν, which depends on b4 νομοθετήσεις, is the equivalent of a deontic expression.

The indicative is *lectio facilior*, and it is one more instance of F’s tendency to regularize the moods (if it is not a simple error as in 401e4 ἐπαινεῖ for ἐπαινοῖ). See notes on 337a6–7 (above, pp. 7–8) and on 347a3–4 (above, p. 12). The change may have been facilitated by the preceding ὀμιλεῖ.

For another group of optatives after non-past main verbs, cf. 410c2 and Adam *ad loc.*; K.-G. II 382–383.

411a5–b2 οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικῆι παρέχηι καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὄτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης ... ἀρμονίας, ... ὅταν δ’ ἐπιχέων μὴ ἀνῆι ἀλλὰ κηλήι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει

καταυλεῖν ADF Demetr. (*Eloc.* 51): καταντλεῖν Ph. Gu. van Heusde, *Specimen criticum in Platonem* (Lugduni Batavorum 1803), 127 || ἐπιχέων C. Morgenstern (*Symbolae criticae ad Platonis politiam ab Astio denuo editam* [Index lect. Dorpat 1816]): καταχέων Demetr.: ἐπέχων ADF

The strongest argument against van Heusde’s elegant conjecture has been missed by the commentators. Demetrius quotes the passage as an example of a more vivid expression following a less vivid one (πολὺ γὰρ τὸ δεύτερον ἐναργέστερον τοῦ προτέρου), whereas καταντλεῖν is actually a more colourful word than καταχεῖν.

It will hardly do to defend καταντλεῖν by supposing that it was corrupted to καταυλεῖν already before Demetrius (so Cobet, *Collectanea critica* [Lugduni Batavorum 1878], 236). For such a supposition to be at all tenable, the correction has to be far superior to the supposed corruption, which is obviously not the case here.

I agree whole-heartedly with Wilamowitz’ outburst (1919: 379) ‘Was ist das für eine Kritik, die hier καταχέων verschmäht und wohl gar oben auswirft’ (the latter half of the quotation is directed against Cobet, who had deleted a6 καὶ καταχεῖν [1873: 528–529; cf. *Collectanea critica*, *l.c.*]). But we could have done with arguments in addition to outburst.

Though often translated intransitively (e.g. by Jowett and Shorey), τήκει and λείβει are of course transitives, the soul being object. If so, the soul must be supplied with κηλήι as well. Once this is realized, it is hard not to see the parallel καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν ~ -χέων ... κηλήι. (Hartman [1896: 97] perceived the identity of κηλεῖν and καταυλεῖν, but

he was too much under the spell of Cobet to draw the conclusion). But the parallel in thought must be translated at least partly into a parallel in expression, which is why -χέων at any rate is indispensable and ἐπέχων impossible. Even if it were possible to interpret ἐπέχων as taking up παρέχη (so Stallbaum and Schneider, but cf. below), the parallel would not be adequately expressed, and besides the sequence of thought would be odd: ‘when he does not stop submitting his soul (ears?) to music but entrances it’, a strange contrast between music implied as agent in ἐπέχων and the activity of the man himself as expressed by κηλήι.

Another argument against ἐπέχων is its meaning. The parallel *Thet.* 165ε1 ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείεις is irrelevant, for ‘when he doesn’t stop persevering’ requires a complement indicating the action persevered in. Nor can one supply τὴν ψυχὴν with ἐπέχων: this would mean ‘being intent upon, hoping to acquire’: *Lg.* 926b2 ἐπὶ μείζοσι γάμοις τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπέχων; *Ar. Lys.* 490 (used absolutely) ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπέχοντες. (I am confident that at 399b6 Bessarion was right to change ἐπέχοντα to ὑπέχοντα).

The choice, then, is between Demetrius’ reading καταχέων and the conjecture ἐπιχέων. Wilamowitz explains the corruption in ADF as due to misreading of δεκχέων (= δὲ καταχέων), which, he claims, ‘steht dem δεπεχων nicht ferner als δεπιχεων’. This may be true, but it presupposes that ADF were derived from a codex written in minuscules (the notorious archetypus with variants of wretched memory). In favour of ἐπιχέων it may be argued that Demetrius quotes from memory (he has a number of variants which admit of no other explanation); since he cites only α5 ὅταν ... α6 ὅτων and β1 ὅταν ... β2 λείβει with only one line of comment in between (he also quotes phrases from α6–β1, but in a different context), he may easily have written καταχέων for ἐπιχέων under the influence of καταχεῖν. Besides, ἐπιχέων may have the nuance of ‘pouring on top of, in addition to’, which is rather apt here.

411ε1 Μισόλογος δὴ οἶμαι ὁ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται καὶ ἄμουσος, καὶ πειθοῖ μὲν διὰ λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτι χρῆται, βίαι δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι ὥσπερ θηρίον πρὸς πάντα διαπράττεται

See Adam’s note for various conjectures, to which add πρὸς] πως Hermann (1849: 184); διαπράττεται] διὸ παράγεται or διὸ ταράττεται Apelt, *WKPh* 20 (1903), 343; διαπικραίνεται Naber (1908: 439). Variants in later MSS include διαταραττ written over διαπράττεται by F⁵, inter-

preted as διαταράττει by F's copy Laur.85.7, and διατάττεται Laur.80.7 (not in Ambr.300).

No change is necessary. διαπράττομαι can be used of 'operating' in a certain way, with πρὸς one might almost translate 'to behave'; cf. (with Adam) *Cra.* 395b3–4 καὶ ἃ πρὸς τὸν Θυέστην ὡς ὠμὰ διεπράττετο (sc. Ἄτρεϋς). But Adam is wrong to assume that πάντα is masculine—one would have expected the plural. ὥσπερ θηρίον determines the rest of the sentence and πάντα is neuter plural. Cf. 410b5–8 πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῆς φύσεως βλέπων κάκεινο ἐγείρων πονήσει ... οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀθληταὶ ῥώμης ἔνεκα σιτία καὶ πόνους μεταχειρίζονται (*Gal. Thras.* III 83,1 Helmreich; μεταχειριεῖται ADF; see Adam *ad loc.*); *Grq.* 521e6–522a3 ὧ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὄδε εἴργασται ἀνήρ ... καὶ ... ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πάματα διδοῦς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἠνώχουν ὑμᾶς; Reinhard (1920: 49–51).

412d5–6 καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ὧ ξυμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῶι, καὶ [**ὅταν μάλιστα**] ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος **οἷοιτο** ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῶι εὖ πράττειν, μηδέ, τοῦναντίον

καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα AD: ὅταν μάλιστα F: καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα Π4 (u.v.) Stob. (IV 1,157 = IV 107,1–2 Hense); καὶ Hermann || οἷοιτο A Stob.: οἷοιτο ἃ F: οἷον τὸ D: οἷόν τε Par.1810 Scor.γ.1.13: οἷηται Par.1810pc Laur.80.19pc (not Par.1642)

With some hesitation I follow, with most scholars, Hermann's seclusion of ὅταν μάλιστα, explained as a dittography of d4 (τοῦτ)ό γ' ἂν μάλιστα by Baiter. ὅταν is clearly impossible: even if οἷοιτο is corrected to οἷηται, the introduction of a point in time ('whenever') is entirely irrelevant. ὅτι is explained by Adam as accusative of respect, which seems to be ruled out by the fact that it has the same referent as ἐκείνου, from which it would depend if it were correct (I have to confess that I fail to understand Adam's paraphrase); therefore the correction of Stob.' text to ὅτι ἂν (in which ἂν is supposed to be taken with ξυμβαίνειν) cannot be accepted (Hense takes this to be the original text of Stob.). Jowett–Campbell take ὅτι as modifying μάλιστα ('as much as possible', or as they paraphrase, 'as far as is conceivable', so also Apelt: 'im stärksten Masse'), but this combination cannot belong with εὖ πράττοντος and is too far away from ξυμβαίνειν.

There is some room for doubt as to the authenticity of μάλιστα. It could be argued that since the sentence begins with 'people most love that thing which ...', a second 'most' is in order (and it could not very

well come in the clause $\tilde{\omega}$ ι ξυμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῶι since one thing cannot be more identical than another). But I think Plato is equivocating on purpose. Socrates' preceding question δ_2 κῆδοιτο δὲ γ' ἄν τις μάλιστα τούτου ὃ τυγχάνοι φιλῶν can be read both as 'people care most about the thing they love' and as '... whatever they love'. In the present sentence the possibility that people may consider their own interest dependent on the interest of more than one thing (and therefore love more than one thing) is deliberately neglected, because the guardians should care *only* for the city's well-being. Socrates can make the point only through ambiguity, and the addition of a second μάλιστα in this sentence spoils the effect.

As for syntax, Jowett–Campbell explain ἐκείνου μὲν κτέ as the equivalent of οὗ μὲν κτέ, citing the rule that a second relative pronoun, when it differs in case from the first, is normally replaced by a demonstrative pronoun (e.g. 395d5–6 ὧν φαμεν κῆδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι; cf. Adam *ad loc.* and *ad* 357b8; Jowett–Campbell, II 238–239; exceptions to the rule as formulated here often involve prepositions preceding the second relative, so also 396c3 οὗ ἂν ἔχοιτο ἄει καὶ ἐν ᾧ διηγοῖτο). But only αὐτός and οὗτος, not ἐκεῖνος, are so used (cf. my remark on 353d7 [above, p. 19]). Therefore I assume an anacoluthon after ἑαυτῶι, the rest of the sentence being coordinated not with the relative clause ᾧ ... ἑαυτῶι, as it logically should be, but with the main clause. If so, ἄν should be mentally supplied with οἴοιτο.

It would seem that this interpretation underlies F's original reading οἴοιτο ᾧ (Chambry's apparatus is wrong): as a relative after οἴοιτο cannot be construed, ᾧ is best explained as due to a misreading of *αν* (perhaps written *α*).

It seems likely that Π₄ shared Stob.' reading. The editor of *POxy.* 2751, A.H. Soliman el-Mosallamy, prefers [ὃ|τι] to [ὃ|ταν] for reasons of space, but does not take into account the possible omission of καὶ before ὅτι/ὅταν. In other words, whereas the lacuna seems to favour [...καὶ ὃ|τι μάλ]ιστα over [...καὶ ὃ|ταν μάλ]ιστα, the question still needs to be answered whether it could have contained F's reading ὅταν μάλιστα. I think not: (1) the lacuna seems definitely too long (but cf. below), (2) even if (1) is disregarded, the cut-off rules, observed everywhere else in Π₄, in themselves appear to preclude [...ὄτ|αν μάλ]ιστα. There is a lacuna after πρῶττοντος in Π₄, the next line starts with ξυμβαίνειν. It seems impossible to decide which of the transmitted readings in between was that of Π₄, the more so since the right-hand sides of the lines in the columns of this papyrus end very irregularly.

413d6 οὐκοῦν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ καὶ τρίτου εἶδους τοῦ τῆς γοητείας ἀμύλλαν ποιτέον

τοῦ τῆς Stob. (IV 1,157 = IV 108,20 Hense): τούτοις AF: τούτους D

It is perhaps not entirely impossible that τρίτου εἶδους ... γοητείας ἀμύλλα can mean 'a trial of a third sort, with regard to enchantments' (Jowett–Campbell), but most of Plato's readers would have taken the words as 'a trial of a third sort of enchantment'; this ambiguity would be the more disturbing here since Socrates is expressing himself in metaphors throughout (b₄ τραγικῶς ἦν δ' ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω λέγειν). This argument reinforces Adam's mistrust of τούτοις, which as he rightly says 'should rather be αὐτοῖς'.

414e1–2 ἐπειδὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἐξειργασμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οὔσα ἀνήκεν, καὶ νῦν δὴ ὡς περὶ μητρὸς καὶ τροφῆς τῆς χώρας ἐν ἧι εἰσι βουλευέσθαι τε καὶ ἀμύνειν αὐτούς, ἕάν τις ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴη, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι.

καὶ ADF: del. Vind.89pc, secl. Ast: ὡς Hermann || δὴ ADF: δεῖ Laur.80.19pc

A correspondence καὶ ἡ γῆ ... καὶ νῦν (Jowett–Campbell, Adam, Boter [1989: 217] and others) would connect two predicates between which there is a transition from narrative to directive text; although I cannot disprove the possibility, it seems too artificial to be acceptable. A similar objection obtains against Prandtl's interpretation (1904: 18–19): he takes καὶ as the coordinator and makes the main clause start with καὶ νῦν, quoting *Lg.* 685c6–8 καθάπερ νῦν τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα φοβούμεθα ἡμεῖς, καὶ τότε ἐκείνην τὴν συσταθεῖσαν σύνταξιν ἐδέδισαν οἱ τότε (where καὶ is clearly 'also')—moreover, his paraphrase of our place 'cum olim patria tamquam matre usi simus, matris nunc quoque honores ei tribuimus' shows that he is not very clear about the value of ἐπειδὴ: if it is causal, the pluperfect ἐξειργασμένοι ἦσαν should have been a perfect, and one sorely misses a τότε here. The various apodotic uses of καὶ discussed in Denniston (1954: 309) do not provide a good parallel.

I see only one possibility to retain καὶ (but I am less than enthusiastic about it): to take it as stressing the following ἡ γῆ. 'When they were fully completed, it was actually the earth, being their mother, who made them see the light.' The basic tenor of the 'noble lie' is that the guardians and the other citizens are γηγενεῖς (e6), so ἡ γῆ could do with a little extra emphasis. See Denniston (1954: 320) for parallels (there are

none in which, as here, καί opens an apodosis). Yet when all is said and done I am not sure that καί is not better dispensed with.

All editors accept δεῖ, but I am convinced that this is an unnecessary change; besides, although one primary witness frequently has δῆ for δεῖ and vice versa (392c2; 398e4; 401e4; 404a9; 410a9; c7 from this book alone), I know of no instance in the *Politeia* where all three at once are wrong.

From d4 onwards, the sentence depends on πείθειν ... ὥς; this goes for καὶ ἢ γῆ ... ἀνῆκεν as well. Since there is (on any reading) something of a disruption of the easy flow of thought with καὶ ἢ γῆ κτέ, one should not be surprised that precisely here, where the narrative switches to a statement of direction, the construction changes from πείθειν ὥς ('to convince them that such and such is the case') to πείθειν plus infinitive ('to persuade them to do this or that'). For a roughly comparable case of καὶ νῦν δῆ at the turning-point of an anacoluthon cf. *Clit.* 410d4.

BOOK FOUR

420a1 ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς φραΐη ἄν ὥσπερ ἐπίκουροι μισθωτοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται καθῆσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρουροῦντες

ἄλλο ἢ AD: ἀλλ' ἢ F

There are, in Plato, about ten instances of a form of οὐδεὶς followed immediately by ἀλλ' ἢ, cf. K.-G. II 284–285 with Anm. 4; Denniston (1954: 25; 27). About half of these concern the phrase οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ, 'simply, just' ('doing nothing but'), qualifying a verb. Cf. *Men.* 84c10–11 σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅτι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος; 76b7; *Phd.* 76a6; *Tht.* 167e2; *Lg.* 722c9. οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ is three times used in the same way: *Euthd.* 277e1 τούτῳ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χορεύετον περὶ σέ; *Tht.* 195e1; *Men.* 80a1. Ours is the only passage where the MSS are divided.

I don't see why Plato could not have used two versions of the same expression; the assumption would require changing the text in three passages. Therefore I follow AD: even though F's reading might seem to be the *lectio difficilior*, it is unwise to adopt it, because F is notoriously unreliable in its transmission of particles.

Of course, ἀλλ' ἢ itself probably originated as a misunderstanding of elided ἄλλο ἢ, so one might ask if ἀλλ' ἢ in Plato shouldn't be corrected to ἄλλ' ἢ everywhere. But outside this phrase elided ἄλλο is quite rare in the corpus: about ten instances in Burnet's text—it could have been elided, but isn't, in 220 cases including 39 ones of ἄλλο ἢ. Therefore it is likely that the misunderstanding belongs to an older period of Greek. See Denniston (1954: 26–27; 581).

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 189.]

420e6 ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ξυστίδας ἀμφίεσαντες καὶ χρυσὸν περιθέντες πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐργάζεσθαι κελεύειν τὴν γῆν, καὶ τοὺς κεραμέας κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐχουμένους, τὸν τροχὸν παραθεμένους, ὅσον ἂν ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοιοῦτοι τρόποι **μακαρίους ποιεῖν**, ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἢ πόλις εὐδαιμονῆι.

The words I have printed in bold type are in AD, not in F. It is not easy to account for their omission, as there is no homoioteleuton or similar cause, and while omission of one word is common in F (Boter [1989: 106]; above 419a7 θεοῖς), omission of two substantial words is rare. It is tempting to regard them as an interpolation, since rounding off a long sentence with a loose ‘and all others likewise’ is typical of Plato’s style (below, 421c1–2). But the word for ‘likewise’ in such phrases is properly ὡσαύτως, and phrases like τοιοῦτοι τρόποι (*Mx.* 240b5; *Phd.* 73c6 etc.) and (a correction which is palaeographically easy) τῶι αὐτῶι τρόποι (below, 441d4–5), and related ones, always qualify a verb in the immediate vicinity, except once: *Euthd.* 290c9–d1 καὶ οἳ γε στρατηγοὶ ἔφη οὕτω τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. This, however, is no support for the F reading here, as τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον points forward as well as backward (as does οὕτω) and is explained in the following sentence.

Therefore we have to accept the authenticity of μακαρίους ποιεῖν, even though the omission in F remains a bit of a problem. Dr. Boter suggests to me that one of F’s ancestors may have been a text written in columns of some 15 letters and that μακαρίους ποιεῖν filled exactly one line, which was omitted through telescoping. For Plato, such a text would have been unusual (cf. E.G. Turner–P.J. Parsons, *Greek Manuscripts of the Ancient World* [London 1987²], 7; 106—the papyrus there has 15 letters to the line as a minimum, and μακαρίους ποιεῖν would, given its three iotas, be below average), but not unthinkable. The suggestion bears no relation to another, no doubt later, ancestor, first reconstructed by A.C. Clark (1918: 414–417; cf. Boter [1989: 99–100]), with about 35 letters to the line.

425a10 καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ ἄρα εἶπον δοκοῦντα εἶναι νόμιμα ἐξευρίσκουσιν οὗτοι, ἃ οἱ πρότερον ἀπώλλυσαν πάντα.—**Ποῖα;**

ποῖα ADF Stob. (IV 1, 97 = IV 38, 12 Hense): τὰ ποῖα Hartman (1896: 108).

As Hartman points out, τὰ could easily have fallen out after πάντα. Yet in follow-up questions both formulae are found in the *Politeia*, five times each (τὰ ποῖα 427b5; 460e3; 507a10; 548e3; 577c3; ποῖα in this passage; 442e3; 523b8; 527c4; 530d3). In addition, we once find ποῖα ... ταῦτα (396c5), twice τὰ ποῖα ... ταῦτα (421d1; e10). In all of these passages the transmission is unanimous.

On closer scrutiny, the expressions prove not entirely interchangeable. τὰ ποῖα is typically used when the partner had suggested a topic, for example by using a cataphoric pronoun (548e1–3 ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ

τάδε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον πεφυκέναι.—τὰ ποῖα; 421c10—d1 τοὺς ἄλλους αὖ δημιουργοὺς σκόπει εἰ τάδε διαφθείρει ὥστε καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι.—τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα;) or by other means (507a6—b1 ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε.—Διομολογησάμενός γ' ἔφην ἐγὼ καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τὰ τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμ-προσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα.—τὰ ποῖα; ἢ δ' ὅς; 427b1—5 τί οὖν ἔφη ἔτι ἂν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῆς νομοθεσίας εἴη;—καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἡμῖν μὲν οὐδέν, τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τὰ τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρῶτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων.—τὰ ποῖα; ἢ δ' ὅς;). See K.-G. I 625—626; one might say the article is used because the other interlocutor has made the entity referred to by ποῖα definite. When the article is omitted, the speaker asks for additional information more by his own initiative (527c3—4 καὶ γὰρ τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ οὐ μικρά.—ποῖα; ἢ δ' ὅς; 442e1—3 τὰ φορτικά αὐτῷ προσφέροντες.—ποῖα δή;). The distinction holds good outside the *Politeia* as well, and applies also to the more frequent pair ποῖον; / τὸ ποῖον; It may be interesting for stylometrists to notice that the only pre-*Politeia* dialogues in which the idiom is used at all, with or without the article, whether in singular or plural, are *Phaedo* and *Cratylus*.

In our passage the context seems to me to favour ποῖα; without the article, as transmitted.

427a1 ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ὥσπερ ὕδραν τέμνουσιν.—καὶ μὴν ἔφη οὐκ ἄλλο **τί γε** ποιοῦσιν.

τι γε A: τι σε D: γέ τι F

In the only other passage in Plato where a form of ἄλλος is followed by both γε and a form of τις, the order is γέ τις (*Tht.* 182d6). Yet although γέ τις is many times more frequent than the reverse, the reverse does occur in a number of places. At *Phlb.* 38e1 καὶ μὲν τις γ' αὐτῷ παρῆι, the order is necessary because the sequence μὲν γε is avoided in Greek; so also *Phd.* 81d6; *Tht.* 167a6; *Lg.* 781c2. But there is no similar explanation for *Lj.* 214e2 καίτοι δυσχεραίνω τί γε ἐν αὐτῷ, which is very similar to our sentence in that it opens with an 'adversative' particle, followed by a short chunk of new information ('Focus'), set off by γε from a constituent containing information that is entirely predictable and is only put in the text for the sake of coherence (cf. my note on *Ap.* 40c5, in De Strycker—Slings [1994: 384], for sentences ending with predictable constituents). By contrast, at *Tht.* 182d6, cited above (καὶ τις μηχανή, ὃ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἶπερ κτέ), τῶν τοιούτων can hardly be said to be predictable, hence the more usual order.

Therefore, τί γε is shielded by a parallel passage, and it is also *lectio difficilior*, which is the more important here as F, as I said above, is not to be trusted in the matter of particles.

Another possibility is to regard γε as an interpolation, made by a scribe who felt that καὶ μὴν should be followed by γε, as it normally is in Plato. If so, the interpolation, written above the line, found its way into the text in different places in AD and F. Indeed, γε is often omitted after καὶ μὴν in short answers (e.g. *Phd.* 84d4; *Cra.* 408e4 etc.). But it is found there all the same at *Phlb.* 44a11; *Smp.* 201c1; *La.* 181a7. And the difference in order is just as easily accounted for by F's tendency to regularise it.

428b5 σοφή μὲν τῷ ὄντι δοκεῖ μοι ἢ πόλις εἶναι ἢν διήλθομεν· εὐβουλος γάρ, οὐχί;

Laur. 80.19pc corrects to ἢ οὐχί, about which Boter remarks (1989: 209) 'at the end of the sentence, οὐχί alone is not very frequent'. As a tag question, οὐχί is in fact more frequent than ἢ οὐχί (though of course far less frequent than ἢ οὐ), and the idioms are entirely different. οὐχί is used to ask for summary confirmation of a point virtually taken for granted. This is always indicated by a particle in the question or statement preceding it, normally γάρ, as here (so *Men.* 83c3; 87e2; 88a1); δὴ (*Th.* 169d8) and πού (*Prm.* 148a3) once each. Although these particles can also be used in questions or statements followed by ἢ οὐχί, there is a difference in that ἢ οὐχί brings up points that are sometimes far from self-evident and have to be made at some length (see e.g. *Grg.* 496c6–d2 Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὠμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγεσ πότερον ἢδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.—Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἢδὺ λέγω.—Μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὐν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρὸν, ἢ οὐχί;—Φημί.). The difference is like 'For the city is wise, right?' versus 'For the city is wise, or isn't it?'

In this passage, the city's εὐβουλία is a new point, but Socrates and Adeimantos had agreed less than a page before that the city was clearly σοφή (427e9–11), and the two qualities are closely associated; cf. below b12–13 σοφή καὶ εὐβουλος, c3 βουλευομένη ... σοφή; 348d2–4; e2, where Socrates infers from Thrasymachus' qualification of injustice as εὐβουλία that the unjust are both φρόνιμοι/σοφοί and ἀγαθοί.

Besides, the choice is not so much between οὐχί and ἢ οὐχί (very probably a conjecture) but between οὐχί and no tag question, in fact no indication that this is a question, at all. This latter alternative is

not impossible, since *ναί* regularly answers statements that are more or less self-evident, but if so, we would have to assume that *οὐχί* was interpolated, and it is too rare an idiom to be interpolated.

428c3 οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην, **βουλευομένη** ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις.

βουλευομένη ADF: βουλευομένη Heindorf (on *Phd.* 64d)

Adam argues—wrongly, I think—that Heindorf’s correction should be adopted because we have to mentally supply *βουλευομένην* at c5 (τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ sc. ἐπιστήμην) and, I may add, c8 (τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς γῆς). On the other hand, Jowett–Campbell do seem to have a point when they argue (on d1–2 below) that it is the city throughout, not the ἐπιστήμη, which is εὐβουλος (and σοφὴ—see previous note); cf. b8, b12–13, d9.

In addition, reading the accusative here entails, as all commentators point out, reading the nominative at d1: (is there an ἐπιστήμη) ἢ οὐκ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλευέται, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὅλης. I feel that the phrasing and word order in d2 ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὅλης, ‘for the whole city itself’, are curious: I would rather have expected ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ ὅλης τῆς πόλεως (cf. *Ap.* 36c8 μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως [ἐπιμελεῖσθαι] πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως). Indeed, the few times when forms of ὅλος and αὐτὸν are juxtaposed in Plato, ὅλος comes first (*Prm.* 150a4; *Phlb.* 15b6; *R.* 491c7). This suggests ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς (not αὐτῆς) ὅλης in d2 and if the suggestion is correct, ἦ not ἢ in d1. If so, c3 would be the only time when deliberation is attributed to knowledge, not to the city. (Adam’s argument that with the nominative at c3 we will have to change the transmitted reading to ἦ at d1—ἦ A, not over an erasure despite Campbell’s claims to the contrary: ἦ D: ἦ F: ἦ Laur.CS.42 [probably a conjecture]—can hardly be taken seriously: ἦ is an interpretation rather than a correction of the transmitted text. As I have tried to show, ἦ is indeed necessary.)

And finally, even if this argument is ignored, it is slightly bizarre that at d2 there is an ἐπιστήμη which is said to deliberate (βουλευέται) about the best behaviour of a city towards itself and toward other cities, all the more so when at d8–9 it is said that because of that ἐπιστήμη the city is εὐβουλος and τῶι ὄντι σοφὴ.

In any case, an explanation must be sought that accounts for the phrasing τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην here (c2) and the similar ones at c5 and c8 quoted above. These cannot possibly be

simple variants of τὴν τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην (cf. b12 τὴν τῶν τεκτόνων ἐπιστήμην), because while one may perhaps accept τὴν περὶ τὰ ξύλινα σκευή ἐπιστήμην as a periphrasis of the genitive of the object (cf. *Phlb.* 55d1–2 τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης), I know no parallel for τὴν περὶ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην (almost all examples adduced for ‘περὶ *c. gen.* instead of the simple genitive’, for example by England [1921: *Index* s.v. περὶ], admit of a different explanation), and surely one must draw the line at τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην as a mere syntactic variant of τὴν τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην.

Schneider’s solution ‘dubium esse non [protest], quin Socrates τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην eam intellexerit, quae ὑπὲρ τ. ξ. σ. βουλεύεται, participium autem ad nomen civitatis accommodans, quia civitati τὸ βουλεύεσθαι non minus conveniebat, quam scientiae, ante ἐπιστήμην omiserit βουλευομένην’ belongs to the golden days of yore when you could solve any textual problem by mentally supplying anything you wanted.

I prefer to believe that we have to do with the telescoping of two ideas: διὰ τὴν τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην, and βουλευομένη ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὡς κτέ (the subject of ἔχοι is of course σκευή). Such a form of telescoping is normal with local prepositions (cf. expressions of the type οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἔφυγον, *K.-G.* I 546–547), but it is also found with περὶ, e.g. *Phd.* 58a1 οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε (genitive instead of accusative influenced by ἐπύθεσθε, cf. Burnet *ad loc.*), and therefore a similar use with ὑπὲρ should not bother us. The fact that the simple genitive in b12 τὴν τῶν τεκτόνων ἐπιστήμην is a genitive of the subject, whereas here τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν would be a genitive of the object, may have contributed to the construction.

429c7–9 σωτηρίαν ἔγωγ’ εἶπον λέγω τινὰ εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.—ποῖαν δὴ σωτηρίαν;—τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγυνοίας περὶ τῶν δεινῶν ἃ τέ ἐστι καὶ οἷα διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τε λύπαις ὄντα διασώζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡδύνασι κτέ

γεγυνοίας Laur.80.19pc: γεγυνοίαν ADF Stob. (IV 1, 98 = IV 39, 4 Hense) || αὐτὴν ADF Stob.: αὐτῆς Adam (edition): αὖ τὴν H. Jackson, *JPh* 4 (1872), 148: αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν secl. Hermann (praef., x) || τὸ ADF Stob.: τῷ Laur.80.19 (or Laur.80.19pc, it is hard to tell from my microfilm); διὰ τὸ Hartman (1896: 112)

I have nothing to add to previous treatments of the transmitted γεγυνοίαν, which is rightly changed by all modern editors, except that Theo Sm.’s words τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τῶν ἐκ παιδείας αὐτῷ ἐγγενομένων ἐν τε

λύπαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς κτέ (13, 2 Hiller) might be thought to favour γενουσίας slightly more than the accusative. (Alcinous' definition of ἀνδρεία as δόγματος ἐννόμου σωτηρία δεινοῦ τε καὶ μὴ δεινοῦ [*Intr.* 182, 37 (59 Whittaker)], cited by Boter [1989: 315], does not belong here but is borrowed from 433c7–8.) But the correction is so self-evident that it hardly needs this support.

The various changes proposed for αὐτήν and τὸ all try to make grammatical sense of the sentence, whose meaning is clear enough: 'when I said that this opinion was σωτηρία διὰ παντός I meant that the brave man preserves it in pains and pleasures ...' Only Schneider, Jowett–Campbell and Shorey retain the MSS text; none of them explain it at all satisfactorily. I think the text may indeed be retained as follows.

Despite the word order, there is no problem in ἔλεγον being used with a double accusative ('I called'), to wit αὐτήν and διὰ παντός ... σωτηρίαν respectively: the hyperbaton διὰ παντός ... σωτηρίαν is logical because διὰ παντός is the important topical information: the whole sentence explains why Socrates said διὰ παντός. (I do not think it is correct to say that the hyperbaton in itself gives emphasis to διὰ παντός, but an overall discussion of the pragmatic function of hyperbata would be out of place here.) The substantivized infinitive is more difficult.

Not infrequently, an infinitive preceded by the article functions as an explanation; the most famous example in Plato is *Smp.* 204a4–6 αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν. There the infinitive is an apposition to the adverbial αὐτὸ τοῦτο (K.-G. I 311); this is not really more abnormal than X. *Hell.* II 3, 56 ἐκεῖνο δὲ κρινῶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαστόν, τὸ κτέ (cf. K.-G. II 43). But we also find cases where there is nothing in the sentence proper to which the infinitive could be an apposition; examples, not all of them relevant, are collected by Stahl (1907: 674 [1]), who cites from Plato *Lg.* 805a4–7 φημί ... πάντων ἀνοητότατα τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν τόποις γίνεσθαι τὸ μὴ πάσῃ ῥώμῃ πάντας ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπιτηδεύειν ἀνδρὸς γυναιξὶ ταῦτά. (*Ap.* 35e is different in that preposed infinitives are better explained as Theme constructions; cf. above, pp. 28–29.) In other words, the infinitive is an explanatory apposition to the whole clause (for clause appositions in general, cf. K.-G. I 284–285). 'I called it permanent conservation because the brave man ...'

The three passages from Plato mutually support each other. The syntactic structure of the *Lg.* one and our one is identical, and so is the

information structure of all three: all start with words carrying a certain amount of emphasis followed by more or less given or predictable ones, and both present their most salient information in the infinitive (for that reason no comma should be printed after ἀμαθία in the passage from *Smp.*).

Of the conjectures, Jackson's and Hermann's have been dealt with by Adam; Hartman's is possible, but three times διὰ in thirteen words (διὰ παντός ... διασώιξεσθαι) is not very euphonic; τῶ(ι), the reading of Laur.80.19, is better. Adam's ἀντῆς, which was accepted by Burnet and Chambry, has the advantage of syntactic simplicity (two accusative phrases governed by ἔλεγον; 'by preserving it perpetually I meant preserving it throughout when one is in pains and in pleasures'), but I think it cannot stand: it would rather require τὴν διὰ παντός ... σωτηρίαν ἀντῆς.

429e1-2 καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν τοῦτοι τῶι τρόπῳ βαφῆι, δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται †τὸ βαφέν†

τὸ βαφέν ADF Stob. Theo Sm. (see previous note); secl. van Herwerden (1883: 345)

This is one of the very few excisions made by a scholar of Cobet's school which cannot be dismissed out of hand, although it has been in fact so dismissed by editors and commentators. I cannot make sense of Jowett-Campbell's explanation 'And whatever is dyed in this manner, that which is dyed becomes of a fast colour', but it certainly indicates the problem more eloquently than I could. There are several ways of construing the sentence, but none of them is at all plausible.

First, τὸ βαφέν may be taken as antecedent of the relative clause, placed in Tail position. A Tail is the opposite of a Theme (cf. above): it is placed outside the clause proper, to wit after it, and normally contains an elaboration of it or a comment on it. If so, the meaning is 'And whatever is dyed in this manner becomes of a fast colour, viz. that which is dyed'. I think no argument is needed to discard this possibility, if it deserves the name.

Secondly, ὁ ἂν may be regarded as equivalent to ἔάν τι (so Schneider and Adam). This seems a neat solution, until one takes a closer look at the phenomenon of 'conditional relative clauses' in general (cf. K.-G. II 441-442).

There is a group of substantive ('autonomous') relative clauses which do not fit in the main clause syntactically and/or semantically, e.g. Ξ 81 βέλτερον ὃς φεύγων προφύγη κακὸν ἢ ἐ ἀλώηι. As a rule, the main

clause contains an evaluating statement; almost invariably, the relative clause follows the main clause. The only example in Plato that I know of is *R.* 402d1–4 ὅτου ἄν ξυμπίπτῃ ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόητα ..., τοῦτ' ἄν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι. Our passage does not fall into this category if only because the relative clause is not autonomous—it is actually repeated in the main clause.

Besides, there is a smaller group of relative clauses which one might, without doing too much damage to the context, translate by 'if someone/something', but which are simple relative clauses all the same: they have either an antecedent or a syntactic slot in the main clause. Instances from Plato are collected by Bluck in his note on *Men.* 89e1–2, e.g. *Men.* 80d5–6 καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις ... τοῦτο δὲ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; *Ly.* 214d1–3 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀνόμοιον εἶη καὶ διάφορον, σχολῇ γέ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὅμοιον ἢ φίλον γένοιτ' ἄν. Our passage does not come under this heading as there is no slot in the main clause, and if τὸ βαφέν is taken as antecedent we are back at the first possibility.

Thirdly, τὸ βαφέν may be taken as the passive form not of a regular object of βάπτω but of an internal accusative, referring to the colour or the dye with which an object has been dyed (cf. *Ar. Ach.* 112 ἴνα μὴ σε βάπτω βάμμα Σαρδιανικόν)—indeed it is rather the dye or the colour than the garment which is δευσοποιός here. But there seems to be no parallel for this usage, and, if the dye is meant, it is not clear why Plato should not have used βαφή if he wanted to make this clear—he uses the word shortly afterwards (430a3); if the colour, τὸ βαφέν could conceivably be an accusative of respect (it will hardly do to take it as shorthand for τὸ βαφέν χρῶμα), but such an interpretation is too desperate a remedy to be acceptable.

If we assume, with Van Herwerden, that τὸ βαφέν is an interpolation, we must first ask whether there could have been sufficient reasons for interpolating it. In fact there are. Ancient interpreters and lexicographers distinguished between δευσοποιός 'dyer' (the original meaning, given the form and accent of the compound), 'fast dye' and 'fastly dyed garment' (*Schol. ad loc.*; *Harp.* 55, 6–12 Bekker; *Moeris* 194, 18 *Pier-son*; *Tim. Lex.* 64 *Ruhnck.* = 400 *Hermann*; *Hsch.* δ 735 *Latte*; *Suid.* δ 290–291 and *Phot. Lex.* δ 220–222 with further references by *Adler* and *Theodoridis*). τὸ βαφέν does not crop up in the various explanations, but cf. *Hsch. loc. cit.* τὸ γνησίως βεβαμμένον.

However, the fact that τὸ βαφέν is already found in the paraphrasis given by *Theo Sm.* (first half 2nd century CE; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄν τοῦτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῇ, ὁμοῦ τι τὸ βαφέν καὶ ἡ φύσις) should make us pause

before accepting Van Herwerden's proposal. I know of no parallel for an explanatory gloss found so early.

There is an alternative remedy, namely to dispense only with the article: δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται βαφέν would mean 'it becomes of a fast colour after (because) it has been dyed'. (For those who like their explanations of errors to be palaeographical: the article may have arisen through correction of a dittography γίγνεταιταιβαφεν.) Against this is the fact that circumstantial participles that follow the main verb are normally elaborations or explanations of it. For the relationship between the position of participles and their function in structuring the text, cf. C.M.J. Sicking, *Lampas* 27 (1994), 11–16. Even though I cannot exclude the possibility entirely, I think it is definitely unlikely.

On balance, the best policy seems to me to obelise τὸ βαφέν, rather than to accept Van Herwerden's solution: the early date of the interpolation and the alternative of deleting only τὸ cast some doubt on the deletion.

[In the end, Slings did delete τὸ βαφέν in his edition; see note on 566e6 (p. 152, and *Additional Notes*, p. 190).]

432c2 φανερόν γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ταύτηι πη ἔστιν ὄρα οὖν καὶ προθυμοῦ κατιδεῖν, ἐάν πως πρότερος ἐμοῦ ἴδῃς, καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις.

φράσεις A: φράσις D: φράσις F

The aorist subjunctive, which is preferred by most modern editors, would mean: 'do your best to catch sight of it, in case perchance you see it before I do and (in case) you point it out to me'. The 'elliptic' conditional is slightly inconsistent with the preceding imperative in any case, but up to ἴδῃς this is the kind of inconsistency that is found all the time in spoken language; however, 'in case you point it out to me' seems to me too inconsistent to be acceptable.

Older editors and commentators, Stallbaum for one, explained the future as the equivalent of the imperative (so also Gildersleeve [1900: I 116]; cf. K.-G. I 176, 6; Stahl [1907: 359–360]). I prefer to think there is a slight anacoluthon here: after the conditional the sentence goes on as if ὄρα ... καὶ προθυμοῦ had been followed by ὅπως. If so, καί is here not a connective but a focus ('adverbial') particle. 'Do your best to catch sight of it, in case perchance you see it before I do; be sure to point it out to me as well'.

Maybe καί has fallen out before ἐάν, a possibility considered by J.L.V. Hartman (1914: 245). If so, the sentence is entirely regular and the

future will indeed have the value of a directive. This is better than to print a high point after *κατιδεῖν*: I see no justification for the asyndeton. But there is no need to tamper with the text.

[In his note on 573d1 (see below, p. 155), Slings points out that the phrase *καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις* is proverbial.]

432d8–e2 *πάλαι ὧ μακάριε φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶμεν ἄρ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡμεν καταγελαστοτάτοι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχοντες ζητοῦσιν ἐνίοτε ὃ ἔχουσιν, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀπεβλέπομεν, πόρρω δέ ποι ἀπεσποκοῦμεν, ἦι δὴ καὶ ἐλάνθανεν ἴσως ἡμᾶς.*

Editors print a high point either after *καταγελαστοτάτοι* (this is the road taken by Reinhard, 39) or after *ἔχουσιν*, in either case creating a puzzling asyndeton. I prefer to think this is a sentence with two main-clause predicates: after the *ὥσπερ* clause the sentence goes on (with *καὶ* as focus particle) as if no main clause had preceded. Cf. the remarks in my note on 389a3–6 (above, pp. 40–41); note on *Ap.* 32b5 in De Strycker–Slings (1994: 344–345).

433b7 *δοκεῖ μοι ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν < * * ὦν > ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι κτέ*

lacunam indicavi: τῶν vel τῶν prA: ὦν A¹ F⁵: τῶν D: τῶν F^{ac} Stob. *SM* (IV 1,100 = IV 43,17 Hense): τῶν πολιτῶν Stob. *A*

The quasi-unanimity of the transmission in favour of the *lectio difficilior* τῶν should make us think twice before accepting the relative, which in A may very well be a conjecture (F⁵ has no authority). But a relative cannot be dispensed with, and it should be in the genitive, as is shown by the apposition (*σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως*) that follows it (cf. my note on *Ap.* 41a3–4). Although no antecedent is necessary, τῶν suggests to me that there was one. The introductory passage 427e12–428a11 offers one; cf. especially a5–7 *εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν [which is actually the case in the context of our passage] αὐτῷ ἂν τοῦτοι ἐγνωρίστο τὸ ζητούμενον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν*—see also e12 *τὸ ὑπόλοιπον*. The passage is also echoed a couple of lines below, 433c1–2 *καίτοι ἔφαμεν δικαιοσύνην ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειφθέν ἐκείνων, εἰ τὰ τρία εὔρομεν*. Therefore perhaps τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν <τριῶν ὦν> ἐσκέμμεθα. The omission is easily accounted for.

If this conjecture is right, ὑπόλοιπος is used in a slightly eccentric

way. It would have to mean ‘the remaining item of the three’, in other words, ‘the one item of the three which we have not yet discussed’, and this is contradicted both by the context (all three virtues have been discussed) and by the perfect ἐσκέμμεθα. But no matter what you read, even the A¹ correction, you are saddled with this problem in any case. The sense is obviously ‘that which is left over now that we have discussed these three items’. There is an exact parallel at *Ti.* 41d5 τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα: not ‘that which was left over of the former [mixture]’ but ‘that which was left over after the former [mixture] had been used up’; cf. Taylor’s note. The genitive after ὑπολειφθέν at 433c1 quoted above has to be interpreted in the same way.

The reading τῶν ὄν found in Laur.85.7 and its descendants is a conflation of F^a and F⁵; Laur.85.7 was copied from F after this had been corrected by F⁵ (Boter [1989: 191]). [See *Additional Notes*, p. 190.] Hartman (1896: 116–117) argues for their authenticity, quoting 442c5 τῶι δὲ ἦρχεν and referring to Stallbaum’s note on *Phd.* 75b (cf. K.-G. I 583–584, where the passages are so selected as to suggest, falsely, that this idiom is mainly used ‘zur Bezeichnung philosophischer Begriffe’; *Cra.* 435a6–7 τῆι ἦι φῆις οὐ σκληρότητι should be added). But substantivizing a relative clause is a device that Plato uses only when the alternative, the substantivized participle, is not available, as clearly in the *Cra.* passage; at 442c4 τῶι δὲ ἦρχεν is used because the imperfect, which cannot be expressed by τοῦ ἀρχοντος alone, is vital in its context.

433e4 ἄρα τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἐν τῆι πόλει τὰς δίκας προστάξεις δικάζεις;—τί μήν;—ἢ ἄλλου **τινὸς οὖν** μᾶλλον ἐφιέμενοι δικάσουσιν ἢ τοῦτου κτέ

τινὸς οὖν ADF: τινὸς οὐ Stob. (cf. previous note)

In this context, the genitive of ἄλλο τι is just as good as that of ἄλλο οἷον, adopted by Burnet and Chambry, while we certainly need connective οὖν here (‘coming to the point’, cf. my note on *Ap.* 40e2). For ἢ ... οὖν in Plato, cf. Denniston (1954: 285).

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 190.]

434b1 ἔπειτα ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ πλήθει ἢ ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλοι **τῶι** τοιούτῳ

All editions spell ἄλλοι τῶι—wrongly, cf. my note on *Ap.* 33d6. ἄλλος requires the article when it is followed by an attributive adjective, participle or, as here, pronominal adjective. It is not significant that

all three primary MSS have τῶ(ι)—the accent is cancelled by D², but it is nice to see that they are right.

436a1 γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ τις οἰηθεῖη τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θράκιαν τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ περὶ τὸν παρ’ ἡμῶν μάλιστα’ ἂν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον τὸ περὶ τούς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τούς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν οὐχ ἥμισα.

τὸ ADF Stob. (I 47,10 = I 306, 14 Wachsmuth): ὁ Marc.187pc (= Bessarion; cf. Boter [1989: 143–145; 231–234]) Laur.85.7pc: seclusi

The relative, almost certainly a conjecture, is what Plato would have written if he were anyone but Plato. But it is quite in keeping with his style that in the last item of an enumeration there is a change of construction through which a less embedded syntactic form is preferred to a more embedded one (‘Sejunktion’, Reinhard [1920: 65–88; esp. 74–79]). Instead of saying ‘or the love for money which one might say exists ...’ Socrates may very well have ended this long sentence with something like ‘or one might say that love for money exists ...’

This would entail deleting the article after φιλοχρήματον. To delete εἶναι (a2) instead is not an option: while λέγω with a single accusative of the person or thing one talks about is quite common, this construction is unparalleled for φημί.

The transmitted text is printed by Burnet—alone among editors—but I do not see how it can be construed so as to make sense (‘one might say that love for money in Phoenicia and Egypt exists not least’). The telescoping of prepositional phrases discussed above on 428c3 (see p. 62) does not work here: it would result in τὸ περὶ τῶν τε Φοινίκων καὶ τῶν κτέ (without εἶναι). Besides, when an article is repeated after a noun it normally precedes an attribute which is supplied for the sake of coherence, but which does not contain entirely new and salient information, as it would do here.

But it is not easy to see why the article was inserted in the course of the transmission. Simple dittography (τῶτο) is surely too simplistic an explanation. And if a scribe felt the need for an attribute after τὸ φιλοχρήματον, to insert a relative pronoun as at 435e6 would certainly have been a more logical remedy. Hence the most prudent course is to obelise the article, not to delete it.

[In his edition, Slings deletes τὸ; see *Additional Notes*, p. 190.]

437b1-4 Ἔρ' οὖν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων;

This sentence, which is quoted twice by Galen (*Plac. Hp. Pl.* V 7, 13 [I 338, 25–28 De Lacy]; VI 1, 25 [II 366, 14–16 De Lacy]) is unanimously transmitted without ἄν. Can we in fact dispense with it? Schneider thought so, and referred to his note on 428d3, where he explained the absence of ἄν as a consequence of the complex syntactic structure of the clause: βουλεύεται ... ὄντινα τρόπον αὐτῆ τε πρὸς αὐτήν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ ('factum nonnunquam videtur interpositis inter relativum compluribus verbis, ut relativo nondum addita ne optativo quidem adderetur', comparing *Phdr.* 239b8).

This is an interesting idea: it would be the opposite of 'double ἄν', which in prose is caused by a similar complexity. I know of one sentence in Plato which is quite similar in structure to ours, where ἄν is likewise absent: *Chrm.* 168e9–169a1 ἀκοῆ δ' αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ἔτι γε κίνησις αὐτῆ ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν καὶ θερμοῦτης κάειν καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἀπιστίαν παράσχοι, ἴσως δέ τισιν οὐ (ἀπιστίαν <ἄν> παράσχοι Heindorf). In both cases the sentence starts with a string of nouns or substantivized infinitives with other constituents depending on them, vaguely governed by a preceding predicate (ἀπιστεῖται at *Chrm.* 168e4; ἐναντίον here); the clause proper starts with πάντα (αὖ) τὰ τοιαῦτα, which summarizes the string and starts off a syntactic structure of its own, in which the mood is a rather unexpected potential optative. As in both cases the opening part of the sentence is a sort of syntactic no man's land, it seems indeed quite possible that after πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα it proceeds as if there had already been an ἄν.

It is not a valid objection to point to the next sentence, once again similar in structure but containing an ἄν: b6–8 διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὄλωσ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἄν θείης τὰ εἶδη τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα; Precisely because our sentence had ended as if it contained ἄν, this one, which continues its structure, does contain it.

This passage and the one from *Chrm.* support each other so strongly that I think it would be unwise to supply ἄν. Those who feel a need for it must in any case not put it between ἔρ' and οὖν (so Burnet), but within the clause proper, after ἐναντίων (Baier), ἀλλήλοις (Stallbaum) or even θείης (Ast).

On the whole, Plato MSS are very reliable as to the presence or

absence of ἄν. With the optative, Burnet prints an ἄν not given in any part of the tradition (MSS and secondary witnesses) twelve times in the whole corpus; if we exclude our passage, the one from *Chrm.* and the two to be discussed in the next note, the net total is eight. There is besides a suspiciously high number (ten) of ἄν's supplied with an infinitive after verbs of thinking. That, however, is an issue which I leave for another occasion.

439b5–6 οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτήν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερον ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἶη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πεινῆν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαμεν τό γε αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τάναντία πράττει.

In the second sentence, the particle ἄν is omitted also by Stobaeus I 49, 30 (I 360, 22–24 Wachsmuth) and by cod. *L* of Galen *Plac. Hp. Pl. V* 7, 37 (I 344, 24–25 De Lacy), while codex *H* reads πράττειν. Several proposals have been made to insert it (instead of δὴ, a conjecture ascribed to Schanz by Adam [commentary], which I have been unable to trace; after ἅμα Campbell) or to dispose of the problem (πράττει Ast). But I don't see why ἄν cannot carry over from the previous optative into the γὰρ clause (so also Goodwin [1912: §226]). I know no parallels from Plato (for omission after other connective particles cf. Riddell [1877: §67]), but cf. (with K.-G. I 249) X. *An.* IV 6, 13; Lys. 14, 21. The most famous example is Ar. *Eq.* 1057 ἄλλ' οὐκ ἄν μαχέσαιτο· χέσαιτο γὰρ εἰ μαχέσαιτο, which for obvious reasons cannot count as a reliable parallel. I disagree with Adam that 'the instances cited in support ... are very much easier than this'; cf. especially *R.* 382d7–11 πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιωὼν ἄν ψεύδοιτο;—γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν εἶη ἔφη.—ποιητῆς ἄρα μὲν ψευδῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι.—οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.—ἀλλὰ δεδιῶς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; (ἄν ψεύδοιτο F Eus., rightly rejected by Burnet); 352e6–353a2 ἔσθ' ὅτι ἄν ἄλλω ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς;—οὐ δῆτα.—τί δέ; ἀκούσας ἄλλω ἢ ὠσίν;—οὐδαμῶς.—οὐκοῦν δικαίως [ἄν ADF Stob.: secl. Adam] ταῦτα τούτων φαμέν ἔργα εἶναι;—πάνυ γε.—τί δέ; μαχαίρα ἀμπέλου κλημα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς; (μαχαίρα ἄν F Stob., wrongly adopted by Burnet; the ἄν two lines earlier is a misplaced interpolation in or gloss on e8 or a1).

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 191. For θηρίον Slings decided to print θηρίου in his edition; see *Additional Notes*, p. 191.]

439e5 ἀλλ' ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ποτε ἀκούσας **τι** πιστεύω **τοῦτο**, ὡς ἄρα κτέ

τι (οὐ) Campbell, alii alia || τοῦτο Gal. (*Plac. Hp. Pl.* V 7, 46 = I 346, 29 De Lacy) Stob. (I 49, 30 = I 361, 19 Wachsmuth): τοῦτω(ι) ADF

The MSS text is explained by Adam as ‘having once heard something I trust this’, with **τι** as referent of **τοῦτωι**. This seems to me impossible, because οὗτος is too strong a pronoun to refer to an entity introduced in the same clause by means of **τις**; a form of αὐτό would have been better. If we do not want to change the transmitted text the best way is to combine **τι** and **τοῦτωι/τοῦτο** into a single phrase: ‘something, namely this’ (cf. my note on *Ap.* 41c9; add *Smp.* 175b2; *R.* 577c8) and to construe it ἀπό κοινοῦ with both ἀκούσας and πιστεύω, roughly along the lines of *Grg.* 524a8–b1 ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὺς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι.

The only way to do this is to read the accusative **τοῦτο** of the indirect tradition. For πιστεύω with a neuter accusative pronoun cf. *Phdr.* 243e2.

440d7–8 καλῶς γὰρ ἦν δ' ἐγὼ νοεῖς ὁ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἀλλ' †εἰ† πρὸς τοῦτωι καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμηί.—τὸ ποῖον;

εἰ ADF: ἦ Ast || τοῦτω(ι) καὶ τόδε AD: τοῦτο F

Ast’s correction has been adopted by all editors except Schneider and Stallbaum (in the second edition of his commentary, 1858), but it does not fit Denniston’s description of questions introduced by ἀλλ' ἦ (27): ‘an objection in interrogative form, giving lively expression to a feeling of surprise or incredulity’. Denniston gives all (three) instances in Plato; *Euthd.* 299a2–5 is not a question. In all three places ἀλλ' ἦ begins an answer.

An alternative solution, which has not been suggested, though it should have been, is to print a dash, not a period or a question mark after ἐνθυμηί, thus making Glauco break into Socrates’ sentence (‘But if you also consider this—What?’). It can hardly be a serious objection that there will turn out to be no main clause: that is what is liable to happen when people interrupt each other. Dashes are in fact solutions very much favoured by Burnet, but they are rarely indispensable: in my view, the only certain examples in the *Politeia* are 522b4 and 549c5; at 567e3 I read ἐθελήσειέν πως τοὺς δούλους, not ἐθελήσειεν—πῶς;—τοὺς δούλους; in the other eight places where Burnet prints dashes (402b3; 410d2; 439a2; 460b8; 551c4; 558d6; 562b2; 578b2) I prefer a period. Besides, the tense and mood are wrong: the indicative of the present in a futural conditional sentence is very rare, and, like the

future indicative, would have a warning or threatening tone which is entirely out of place here (cf. my note on *Ap.* 41a2). I would expect Socrates to have used the optative before he was interrupted, if indeed he was.

An alternative is to regard εἰ as introducing an indirect question, depending on a verb (e.g. θαυμάζω) that never comes because Socrates is interrupted. But the order interrogative clause—main clause is rare, and the main clause would be so short that there is no point in Socrates being interrupted. Complete omission of a main clause is out of the question here, cf. K.-G. II 534 Anm. 14: in all passages quoted there a main verb is easily understood from the preceding context. I have also toyed with the idea that εἰ is an intrusive gloss replacing ἄρα, but so far from needing clarification, ἄρα is often used to explain other particles, cf. Schol. *Phdr.* 262a9; *Io* 530a5; *R.* 454a11; *Sis.* 387d5; Hsch. η 1; μ 2057.

Both solutions, besides, fail to explain a minute detail of the transmission of the *Politeia*. All three primary MSS read ἐνθυμη(ι) here, whereas the indicative is invariably spelled with -ει in prA (corrected systematically by A⁴), and almost always so by D; F normally spells -η in the first three books, but switches to -ει in the fourth. Even though most modern editors prefer -η in the indicative, we should not close our eyes to the fact that what is transmitted is a subjunctive. We may choose to ascribe the subjunctive to scribal error, but that would entail accepting two (very similar) errors in one short clause. It seems better to try to accommodate one of the two transmitted readings.

There is a variation of the second solution proposed before that might work. Elliptic εἰ clauses are sometimes used for polite proposals (not strictly confined to poets, as K.-G. claim, I 226). Stein ad Hdt. VII 5, 2 ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ μὲν νῦν ταῦτα πρήσσοις τάπερ ἐν χερσὶ ἔχεις (ἀλλ' εἰ as here) further quotes Hdt. VII 160, 2; 235, 1; X. *Smp.* 2, 2 (which should be explained differently); cf. Stahl (1907: 423–424). The idiom seems to require an optative in prose, and while corruption of an optative to a subjunctive is not rare (above 436d8 ἀποδεχοίμεθα Laur.80.19pc Gal. *recte*: ἀποδεχώμεθα prA DF: ἀποδεχώμεθα Arc), a longer ending as in ἐνθυμοῖο is not likely to have been corrupted to a shorter one such as ἐνθυμηι.

Besides, a similar elliptic clause with the subjunctive is found at *Grig.* 447b7 οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἦκειν οἴκαδε παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει. Therefore one might consider ἔάν here. A scribe who took προθυμηι for an indicative would consequently change ἔάν to εἰ. But I realise that the explanation is not strong, because a scribe

remembering ἔαν would not normally take προθυμῆι for an indicative. I know of no parallel for such a corruption.

441b4 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὁ ἄνω **που ἐκεῖ** εἵπομεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου μαρτυρήσει κτῆ

που ἐκεῖ ADF Stob. (I 49, 31 = I 362, 16 Wachsmuth): πούς· καὶ Gal. cod. *L* (*Plac. Hp. Pl.* V 7, 76 = I 354, 34 De Lacy): που Gal. cod. *H* || ἐκεῖ εἵπομεν] εἵπομεν ἐκεῖνο Bywater *JPh* 31 (1910), 203

Schneider noted, without drawing any conclusion, that ἐκεῖ is omitted in the Aldine edition of Galen. Subsequently, Hartman based his deletion of the word on its absence there. This was contradicted by Adam, who noted that the word is there in Kühn's edition (V 500). Burnet again notes 'ἐκεῖ om. Galenus', which was taken over by Chambery. Apparently, none of the last four scholars took the trouble to check the text against I. Müller's 1874 edition of Galen's *Plac. Hp. Pl.* (I 484, 15), where the reading of cod. *L* is given (instead of *H* Müller cites three copies of it).

In any case, it is not true that Galen omits ἐκεῖ: the reading of *L* shows that the word was in Galen's text (ε > c with subsequent correction of the remaining κει).

The phrase ἄνω που ἐκεῖ does in fact sound pleonastic. One might compare 434d6–7 εἰ ἐν μείζονί τι τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην πρότερον ἐκεῖ ἐπιχειρήσαμεν θεάσασθαι, where ἐν μείζονί τι τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην may be regarded as situated outside the clause proper, as a Theme or Theme-like constituent, so that it can be referred to anaphorically by means of ἐκεῖ (Burnet needlessly prints <ῆ> ἐκεῖ). Here, however, such an analysis seems unlikely, because ἄνω που can hardly be extra-clausular.

Renihan (1976: 122) defends the collocation by pointing at phrases like αὐτοῦ ἐνθάδε etc., but in all his parallels a form of the stem αὐτ- is used, and therefore they are obviously different. He might, however, have quoted *Grg.* 508e6 ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις, which seems even more pleonastic than our passage. I have no explanation for the juxtaposition of ἄνω and ἐκεῖ, but we have to accept it anyway.

443a1 ... εἰ δέοι ἡμᾶς ἀνομολογεῖσθαι περὶ τε ... καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνηι ὁμοίως πεφυκότος τε καὶ τεθραμμένου ἀνδρός, εἰ δοκεῖ ἂν παρακαταθήκην χρυσίου ἢ ἀργυρίου δεξάμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀποστερηῆσαι, τίν' ἂν οἶε οἰηθῆναι **τοῦτο αὐτὸν** δοῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὅσοι μὴ τοιοῦτοι;

τοῦτο αὐτὸν Stob. (III 9, 61 = III 393, 13 Hense): τοῦτον αὐτὸν ADF: τοῦτον αὐτὸ Schneider: τοῦτ' ἄν αὐτὸν Hartman (1896: 127)

Schneider's conjecture, which was accepted by Burnet and Chambry, seems to me to give too much emphasis to the agent and too little to the action. The agent had been introduced extensively by means of the participial phrase τοῦ ... ἀνδρός, picked up by ὁ τοιοῦτος, so τοῦτον seems too strong here. It may be objected that μάλλον ἢ ὅσοι μὴ τοιοῦτοι requires a strong contrast, but the focus is on the likelihood rather than on the persons themselves. This is brought out with his customary clarity by Shorey: '... who do you suppose would think that he would be *more likely so to act* than men of a different kind?' (my italics). The action is all new in terms of information structure, and it is especially this type of information that is referred to anaphorically by means of a form of οὔτος.

There is little to choose between the Stobaeus reading and Hartman's conjecture. Assimilation of pronominal neuter -ο to a neighbouring -ον is so common that Hartman's proposal cannot be said to be more plausible palaeographically. And the ἄν is not necessary: it is carried over from the infinitive ἀποστερεῖσθαι (cf. note on 439b5–6, p. 71). As τοῦτο αὐτὸν has the slight advantage of being the transmitted text, it should be retained.

443a6 καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὀπωσιοῦν ἄπιστος ἢ κατὰ ὄρκους ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ὁμολογίας.—πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ὀπωσιοῦν AD: ὅπως τί γε οὖν F^a: ὅπως τι οὖν ἄν F³: ὀπωσισγεοῦν Stob. (III 9, 61 = III 393, 17 Hense): ὀπωσιοῦν γ' ἄν Burnet

γε as found in F and Stob. is a barbarism as it stands and a solecism if transposed; it should not have been adopted by Burnet. Once again, F's gifts are to be feared if they are particles. Quite logically, γε is never found with forms of ὀπισσοῦν in Plato, not to mention forms of it modified by οὐδέ. F³'s ἄν (proposed independently by Hartman [1896: 127], who could not have known that it is in F) is one of the few good conjectures made by that hand (cf. Boter [1989: 101–102])—ἄν is not in Par.1810, the source of many corrections of F³): at first sight the ἄν in Glauco's answer seems to require it. But again, there is no problem in mentally supplying ἄν ... εἴη from Socrates' preceding question (a4)—in the answer, of course, ἄν is necessary.

This is as good a place as any to state that Burnet, who did not have

at his disposal the sophisticated means which we can use today—LSJ, Denniston, the TLG material—should be admired all the more for his uncanny feeling for Platonic Greek. It is easy to improve on him by using state-of-the-art tools, and his treatment of textual evidence was rather more cavalier than is considered permissible today—or even in his own day—but of all modern critics of Plato he is easily the greatest.

443b4 ἔτι **τι** οὖν ἕτερον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν κτέ

τι om. Stob. (III 9,61 = III 393,23 Hense)

There is a problem in the MSS concerning the change of speakers and the accent on **τι**, which I leave out of account, because it is irrelevant to our problem. Hermann notes (p. x) ‘**τι** post ἔτι ex dittographia ortum ... circumscripti ... sive addi placuisset, commodiore tamen loco ponendum erat’.

It is certainly true that indefinite pronouns normally follow connective particles in the post-initial position in the clause. However, there are three examples of **τι οὖν** in Plato, including this one, and it cannot be a coincidence that all three are found within thirty pages (Stephanus) of each other. The other two places are 455c5 οἷσθ’ ἄ τι οὖν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετώμενον; 472e2 ἥτιόν τι οὖν οἶε ἡμᾶς εἶ λέγειν τούτου ἕνεκα.

I submit that we here have to do with the familiar phenomenon of a rare idiom which, once used, remains stored in the author’s mind and pops up a number of times. The classic collection of examples is in Denniston’s preface (1954: lxii–lxiii and n. 3).

443c9–10 τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτον **μέν** **τι** ἦν ὡς ἔοικεν ἢ δικαιοσύνη, **ἀλλ’ οὐ** περὶ τὴν ἕξω προᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός κτέ

μέν ADF: om. Stob. (III 9,61 = III 394,12 Hense) || ἀλλ’ οὐ ADF: ἄλλο τι vel ἀλλ’ ὅτι Stob.: ἀλλ’ οὐ [τι] Hense

Burnet follows Stob. (as he tends to do in this part of the *Politeia*) in omitting **μέν**, apparently without realising that it changes the sense. Without **μέν** the sentence becomes eliminative (‘her dress is red, not green’), where the part after **ἀλλ’ οὐ** is an opinion already stated but now rejected. This is out of the question. (The sentence after the first **ἀλλὰ** is, of course, eliminative, but that is beside the point.) What Socrates means is that while it is true that justice is like τὰ αὐτοῦ προᾶττειν, there is an important qualification, namely that it is not about

external behaviour. What we need is a qualifying clause ('her dress is red, but it's a soft red'), which alone can explain the double *ἀλλά* in *ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν ἕξω προᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός*. *μέν* is absolutely vital to the sense. Normally, it would have been followed by *οὐ μέντοι* (*μέν/ἀλλά* is rare in prose)—presumably *ἀλλ' οὐ* was chosen because it is somewhat stronger.

[In his edition, Slings prints *ἀλλ' οὐ τι*; see *Additional Notes*, p. 192.]

BOOK FIVE

450a9 ἦν ὡς ἤδη διεληλυθὼς ἔγωγε ἔχαιρον, ἀγαπῶν εἴ τις **ἑάσοι** ταῦτα ἀποδεξάμενος ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη.

ἑάσοι AD: θεάσοι F (dittography of E or C): ἑάσει Scory.1.13 Par.1810 Bessarion (Marc.187pc)

Of the commentators, only Schneider expresses dissatisfaction with the future optative. Ast retained the future indicative of a number of secondary MSS and it was said to be the normal construction by C.F. Hermann in his review of Stallbaum's commentary (1849: 179–180, published originally in 1831)—in his edition, Hermann changed his mind and printed the optative.

It is not easy to account for the optative. In Plato, ἀγαπάω is usually construed with εἰ and the subjunctive (e.g. 330b6; 472c1); a number of times with εἰ and the present or aorist optative (e.g. *Prt.* 327d6, where the verb itself is in the [potential] optative—but it is in the indicative at *Lg.* 684c7). Parallels for εἰ and the future optative after this verb are not found in Plato, nor have I found any in other fourth-century prose writers. What is found occasionally (Hermann's 'fast ständige Construction' is highly exaggerated) is εἰ plus future indicative: *R.* 496e1; *Lys.* 12, 11; *Isae.* 4, 29; *Hyp. Eux.* 17. Perhaps the optative here may be accounted for as indicating reported speech, as implicit, one might argue, in ἔχαιρον, or perhaps better in ὡς ... διεληλυθὼς, but I am none too happy with the explanation. Obviously, the future optative is easier to account for when the predicate of a clause governing an εἰ clause is itself a verb of saying (*S. Ai.* 313 ἔπειτ' ἐμοὶ τὰ δειν' ἐπιπέλιησ' ἔπη, εἰ μὴ φανοίην πᾶν τὸ συντυχὸν πάθος; cf. *Ant.* 414 and Kamerbeek's note; *X. An.* I 4, 7). The only parallel for the future optative in an εἰ clause depending on a verb at all comparable in meaning to ἀγαπάω that I have found is *X. Hell.* V 4, 20 φοβούμενοι εἰ μηδένες ἄλλοι ἢ αὐτοὶ πολεμήσοιεν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις. Cf. Stahl (1907: 327; 381).

Given the wavering between mood terminations that were pronounced identically, found very often in one of the three primary MSS, not infrequently in two, and occasionally in all three (below δι δοκῆ] δοκεῖ ADF; note on 479a2, pp. 97–98), I think that the future indicative deserves serious consideration. It should be noted, however, that in the

first millennium CE -οι and -ει were not yet pronounced identically, and that changes from the indicative to the optative are rarer than the other way round. Hence I print the optative, but without much enthusiasm.

451a7 ἐλπίζω γὰρ οὖν ἔλαττον ἁμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονέα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπατεῶνα **καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι**.

So ADF unanimously. There is only one sensible way of understanding the words printed in bold type (as opposed to a number of possible ways of construing them), namely a deceiver ‘about valuable (*καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν*) and just institutions’. That *καλὸς κἀγαθός* can be used of things in Plato can be seen in Wankel’s indispensable repertory (1961: 101–106). Yet there are enough indications in the context that some of the genitives must be masculine: 450d9–e1 ἐν γὰρ φρονίμοις τε καὶ φίλοις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων εἰδόμενα λέγειν κτέ, and especially 451b3 ἀπατεῶνα ἡμῶν. But which adjectives are masculine and which neuter? To translate ‘of decent and just people about institutions’ (so Apelt [1903: 344]; Vretska [1953: 86–89]; Wankel [1961: 82 and n. 3]), thereby making them all masculine, brings in an irrelevant point and leaves out an essential one: why say that the objects of Socrates’ deceit are just and leave the institutions unqualified? On the other hand, one can concur with Wilamowitz’ remark that ‘*δίκαια*, das absolute Richtige, und *νόμιμα* als das richtig Geltende zweierlei sind, und so zusammengehören wie *ἀγαθά* und *καλά*’ (1919: 381). And above all, Socrates’ point is not that he would rather be guilty of involuntarily killing a man (any man, τινός) than of misleading him in legal matters (as Vretska rightly notes [1953: 87], Socrates had not proved to be above telling useful lies), but that he would sooner kill a perfect stranger than mislead decent people about these issues. Therefore *καλῶν*, *ἀγαθῶν* and *δικαίων* cannot all three qualify *νομίμων*: *καλῶν*, and consequently *ἀγαθῶν* as well, must be masculine (objective) genitives.

If so, the text is not sound and must be changed. Wilamowitz’ proposal [*καὶ*] *δικαίων* (*καὶ*) *νομίμων* is quite convincing. It presupposes that *καὶ* was displaced in the course of the transmission—a trivial phenomenon. (The objections are also met if *καὶ δικαίων* is deleted, but it is not easy to see how it came to be inserted.) It is not a valid objection that *πέρι* should come directly after *δικαίων* (Vretska [1953: 87]): as a matter of fact, A *καὶ* B *πέρι* is particularly frequent when A and B are substantivized adjectives, e.g. *Phdr.* 277d1–e1 *δικαίων καὶ*

ἀδίκων πέρι; 261b1; *Plt.* 309c5; *Phlb.* 24a8. In *R.*, δίκαιος and νόμιμος are also coupled at 359a4.

454b4 τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ὅτι οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τυγχάνειν πάνυ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἐριστικῶς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκομεν κτέ

τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν ADF Gal. (*Plac. Hp. Pl.* IX 3, 10 = II 554, 1 de Lacy): τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν Bessarion (Marc.187pc): τὸ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν Heller (1874: 31–32): τὸ τὴν ἄλλην Baier: τὸ τὴν μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν Hartman (1896: 136–137)

As far as I know, the only scholar who accepted the transmitted reading was Stallbaum in his edition (Lipsiae 1821–1825, not to be confused with his commentary; reported by Schneider *ad loc.*—I have been unable to check this). All others adopt a conjecture, nearly always Bessarion's (of course, most 19th-century scholars were not in a position to know that it was a conjecture). I am convinced that the transmitted text is right and that Bessarion's correction is impossible Greek.

The first thing to establish is the exact meaning of διώκομεν. Adam tells us that this cannot mean 'to attack' but must mean 'to pursue', 'to insist' (the two are far from synonymous). As a matter of fact, διώκω may well mean 'to attack' at *Tht.* 166e1 and might just possibly have that meaning at *Grg.* 483a7. However that may be, here the meaning must be identical to the one in a7 κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν 'their goal is the contradiction of statements at the purely verbal level' (Waterfield). Therefore, διώκομεν is here 'we are trying to establish' and τὸ ... τυγχάνειν is the thesis that Socrates and Glauco are in the process of establishing, a thesis which, as we must infer from a7, is the opposite of something that has been said, and moreover, the opposite of something that was said before 453a7–e5, because that is the passage which Socrates now regards as eristic wordplay.

The only possible candidate is the selection of men and women alike as guardians. This had been taken as a provisional starting-point (451e4–5) for the discussion 452a2–453a5; towards the end of this it still remained an open question, framed in terms of φύσις and ἔργα (453a1–2). The subsequent eristic passage 453a7–e5 leads to the conclusion that equal opportunity for men and women was a matter of different φύσεις doing the same ἔργον; besides, and this is, I think, crucial, Socrates and Glauco are now presented as actually subscribing to their former starting-point (453e3–5 τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτὰ φάμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν κατηγορεῖται;—κομιδῆι γε). In other words,

Socrates and Glauco had assumed that equal φύσεις should do equal ἔργα, and the eristic argument 453a7–e5 refutes this. That is to say, by means of the eristic argument Socrates and Glauco are establishing that equal φύσεις should not do equal ἔργα, and this is precisely what the transmitted text says here. That is the ἀντιλογία signalled immediately before (454b1–2): by unthinkingly using the words ‘same’ and ‘different’ (κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα a7, κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα b5–6) they end up contradicting themselves. If the text is changed here to mean ‘different φύσεις should do different ἔργα’ the passage becomes a repetition of 453e3–4, and an important point is lost: the eristic argument makes them betray the basic principle of τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, which in the city means that the same φύσεις do the same ἔργα (the principle is restated at 453b3–4 δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἓνα ἐν τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν).

As for Bessarion’s and Heller’s corrections, the following should be noted. τὸ here substantivizes a ὅτι clause whose Topic (the same φύσις) is placed before it (a kind of prolepsis, one might say). This strategy is known as a Theme construction; I have deployed this concept in my notes on *R.* 365b4–7 (see above, pp. 28–30) and 429c7–9 (see above, pp. 62–64), and discussed the phenomenon in *Slings* (1997b: 192–202). The construction is used here, first because the substantivized ὅτι clause is about the same φύσις, a concept which had last been operative (by implication) 453e2–5 and which therefore has to be reactivated; secondly because ‘the same φύσις’ is the key concept of this utterance of Socrates’, as well as the next two (up to 454d3); thirdly because the concept is crucial to the ἀντιλογία which Socrates had signalled, so the Theme construction improves the cohesion of the text.

However this may be, it can easily be seen that whereas it is logical to prepose τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν before the ὅτι clause, it is impossible to do so with μὴ (or οὐ) τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν. A negated quality cannot be a Theme. For those who prefer their textual criticism couched in more traditional terminology: in prolepsis a negative cannot be placed before the phrase that is taken out of the clause. Bessarion presumably meant ‘the unequal φύσις’. That, however, is better expressed by Baiter’s τὴν ἄλλην φύσιν (which has little palaeographical probability), or even by Hartman’s cumbersome τὴν μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν. However, I have already indicated why I think that ‘the unequal φύσις’ is weak and repetitious.

454d2 οἷον ἱατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα† τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγομεν ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

ιατρικόν A²DF Gal. (*Plac. Hp. Pl. IX* 3, 12 = II 554, 13 De Lacy): ιατρικῶν A¹:
ιατρὸν Cornarius || καὶ ιατρικὴν ADF Gal.: καὶ ιατρικὸν Laur.80.19pc: om. Vind.1
Bon.3639 Scor.y.1.13 || ὄντα ADF Gal.: ἔχοντα Cornarius: ὄντας C.F. Hermann:
secl. Burnet: τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα secl. Adam

I have no solution for this hopelessly corrupt passage, but I may make some observations that have not been made before.

ἐλέγομεν might seem to suggest that Socrates and Glauco actually said this, but ἢ οὐκ οἶει is against this, and there is no passage in the *Politeia* to which it can refer. The passage adduced by Adam, 350a1–3, is about an ιατρικός who does or does not consider himself superior to another ιατρικός—this is clearly irrelevant, and besides, it is from a discussion by Socrates and Thrasymachus. So the clause depending from ἐλέγομεν must be taken as an illustration of the procedure as described by Socrates immediately before: ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τείνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα (c9–d1). Now that remark can only point back to the statement of principle 453e3–4 τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτὰ φαμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι (cf. previous note). This statement is a reformulation of the hypothesis that men and women alike are fit to be guardians. This might be taken as an argument for reading a female doctor into this sentence, an interpretation that was almost unanimously rejected in the past but which is defended by Pomeroy. But the argument does not strike me as cogent. It should in any case be borne in mind that ιατρικός is not the same thing as ιατρός: the adjective means ‘being fit for an ιατρός’. Pomeroy’s epigraphical data about 4th-century female doctors (1978: 499–500) are irrelevant.

It is very unlikely that τὴν ψυχὴν is accusative of respect. The phrase frequently modifies an adjective in this way, but never an adjective ending in -ικός. While Plato speaks of an ιατρικὴ ψυχὴ (*Hp.Mi.* 375b5, 7) and the like (some eleven times in all, if Ammann’s repertory is complete), he does not say that someone is ιατρικός τὴν ψυχὴν. Instead, we find ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν (*Phdr.* 252e3) and νεανικοί ... τὰς διανοίας (*R.* 503c3), but above all the type φύσει ὀητορικὸς (*Phdr.* 269d4, 6 examples in Ammann). This tells heavily against the readings of Hermann and Burnet (‘a man and a woman who have a physician’s mind have the same nature’, Shorey), and therefore against introducing women capable of being doctors at this stage of the argument (they are mentioned later on, at 455e5)—unless one resorts to drastic rewriting, as G. Luck (ap. Pomeroy [1978: 498 n. 4]) οἷον ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα(ς) τὴν αὐτὴν (τὴν αὐτὴν) φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγο-

μεν. But corruption of ἔχοντας to ὄντα is highly unlikely (it is not relevant to argue, as Pomeroy does, that ἔχοντας is supported by ἔχειν); moreover, the sentence becomes superfluous (Socrates and Glauco had been speaking about φύσις all along, not about ψυχή) and the next one (d5) too condensed: ἰατρικὸν δέ γε καὶ τεκτονικὸν ἄλλην—ἄλλην what? ψυχὴν or φύσιν? (The same objection applies against Hermann's ὄντας, of which it is hard to see exactly how it is supposed to construe.)

Another argument against bringing in women here is the sentence structure at d7–9, where women are mentioned explicitly: οὐκοῦν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος, ἐάν μὲν πρὸς τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἄλλο ἐπιτιθέμενα διαφέρουν φαίνηται, τοῦτο δὴ φήσομεν ἑκατέρωι δεῖν ἀποδιδόναι, more in particular the double καὶ in the Theme construction καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος. It might seem that it is not possible to take this as corresponsive 'both ... and', since you cannot say in Greek any more than in English 'both the male and the female gender are different (from each other)' (one may use τε ... καὶ in such 'combinatory coordinations', but not καὶ ... καὶ). Therefore the first καὶ probably means 'also', and the second 'and'. If so, the contrast between male and female is brought in as (relatively) new information (see Slings [1997b: 195–198]). Attempts to avoid this by translating διαφέρουν as 'excelling' and καὶ ... καὶ as 'either ... or' (Adam, Waterfield) are doomed to failure on account of διαφέρειν in d10, which can only mean 'to differ'.

In all fairness, however, it should be pointed out that the argument proffered in the previous paragraph is not water-tight. Since καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος is a Theme, and therefore by implication not part of the ἐάν clause, it may be doubted what the subject of this clause really is. It cannot be 'both the male and the female sex' for the reason given above. But given the fact that καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος is a Theme and therefore not part of the ἐάν clause (because it has to be referred to by means of ἑκατέρωι in the governing clause), one might argue that the subject of the ἐάν clause is simply an unexpressed 'the male and female sexes'. If so, the double καὶ at d7–9 may after all mean 'both ... and'. If it does, those who wish to read females with an aptitude for medicine into 454d2 may have a case after all.

Here Platonic usage may help to reach a decision. In all occurrences in all the authentic works of οὐκοῦν καὶ ... καὶ the first καὶ means 'also' and the second 'and', with the exception of *Grig.* 497c8–d1 οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται, where the addition of ἅμα,

of course, makes all the difference. In other words, there is very good reason to assume that *καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος* means ‘also the male and the female sex’. Therefore there is no place in our sentence for a woman with an aptitude for medicine.

Given the general scarcity of expressions of the type *ψυχὴν πονηρὰν ἔχω* (cf. *Grig.* 523c5) in Plato (cf. further *Grig.* 486d2; *Hp.Mi.* 376b1, 4) it would be foolish to exclude that Plato wrote *ιατρικὴν (τὴν) ψυχὴν ἔχοντα* (for the article, cf. *Grig.* 486d2), as Cornarius proposed—*ἔχοντα* is not found in any MS (cf. Boter [1989: 212]) nor in Galen. The difference between *ιατρικὸν* and *ιατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα* (‘un homme doué pour la médecine et un homme qui a l’esprit médical’, Chambry) may seem to be nil, but since a woman with an aptitude for medicine has already been excluded, something like that must have been what Plato wrote. But as I said, the corruption is hard to explain.

Could we then, with Adam, change *ιατρικὴν* to *ιατρικὸν* and reject *τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα* as a relic of a marginal gloss? The fact that these words are already in Galen tells against this possibility: parallels for interpolation of an explanatory marginal annotation as early as the second century CE are rare and doubtful (cf. above, pp. 65–66 [but below, p. 190]).

The original reading in A, *ιατρικῶν*, might be taken as a conflation of *ιατρικὸν* of the other MSS and Galen and *ιατρικῶ*, ‘two people endowed for medicine’. If this is to make sense, however, one would have to delete *καὶ ιατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα*, so the same objection applies as to Adam’s proposal. Besides, parallels from classical Greek do not encourage reading the dual without the numeral *δύο*, cf. the material collected in Slings (1983: 500).

All in all, it seems fairly certain to me that Plato meant something akin to what Cornarius and Adam make him say, but neither solution is convincing, and the corruption may well lie much deeper.

456a1 *γυμναστική δ’ ἄρα οὐ, οὐδὲ πολεμική, ἣ δὲ ἀπόλεμος καὶ οὐ φιλογυμναστική;*

γυμναστική AF Gal. (*Pl. Hp. Pl.* IX 3, 20 = II 556, 14 De Lacy) Eus. (*PE* XII 31, 4 = II 127, 3 Mras – des Places): *καὶ γυμναστική* D || *οὐ οὐδὲ* ADF Gal.: *οὐδὲ* Eus.: *καὶ* Laur.80.19pc: *οὐ καὶ* Laur. 85.7pc || *οὐ alterum* AD Gal. Eus.: om. F

If the transmitted text printed above is accepted, it might be rendered as follows: ‘And isn’t it the case that some women may be good at sports or warfare, while others aren’t?’ So Waterfield, and at first sight the

Greek seems quite straightforward. But it is not. (1) Nowhere else in Plato is οὐ as a question particle (cf. *nomme*) placed at the end of the clause. (2) When a question is modified by οὐ, any connective particle it contains is positive, not negative (459a8–9 ἄρ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τινες καὶ [not οὐδὲ] γίνονται ἄριστοι;), hence we expect καὶ πολεμική. (This was formerly thought to be in Galen, but wrongly so.) The situation is of course different when two *nomme* questions are coordinated as at 470e8. (3) No parallel is cited in our handbooks for ἄρα in a question modified by οὐ. Given the fact that ἄρα indicates a low commitment on the side of the speaker with regard to the content (cf. Van Ophuijsen [1993: 83]), and οὐ as a question particle a high one, the two seem in fact impossible to combine. Hence, I sympathise with Boter, who declares the sentence 'undoubtedly corrupt' (1989: 212), and to a certain extent even with Hartman's *cri de coeur* 'quam si horridam dico, a vero non longe aberro' (1896: 138).

Yet it is hard to think of a remedy. The reading of Laur.80.19pc καὶ γυμναστική ἄρα καὶ πολεμική (cf. Laur.80.7 Par.1642: καὶ γυμναστική δ' ἄρα καὶ πολεμική) is satisfactory Greek, but does not explain the corruption. The fact that Eusebius omits οὐ might point to a corruption, but it could just as well be accounted for as haplography, and in any case it is entirely unconvincing to assume that the original text did not contain a negative at all.

Any attempt at a solution must therefore be based on the assumption that at least one negative is sound, and that it is to be taken as suggesting a positive answer. This seems incompatible with ἄρα, therefore we should probably write ἄρα (or ἄρ') before it. The connective between γυμναστική and πολεμική should be καί. As a matter of fact, D has καί, but in a place where it is not necessary. Therefore the best solution is probably γυμναστική δ' ἄρα οὐ καὶ πολεμική κτέ (this happens to be virtually the reading of Laur.85.7pc: Laur.85.7ac had F's reading γυμναστική δὲ ἄρα; οὐ· οὐδὲ πολεμική, Laur.85.7pc deletes οὐδὲ and writes καί above the line). If for some reason καί had fallen out (and had been reinstated in the wrong place in D), a superficial copyist may well have thought that οὐδέ was the proper missing connective. Adam objects that ἄρα is 'generally elided before οὐ', but there are numerous exceptions, cf. *Euthphr.* 7d2; 8a2; *Phd.* 67c5; *R.* 386a6 etc. (and editors sometimes elide the word without MS authority, as at 459a3 below: ἄρα A: ἄρα DF: ἄρ' Burnet).

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 192.]

457c6 Λέγε δὴ ἴδω, ἔφη.

This is the correct punctuation. We have here to do with an idiom which goes unrecognised in our handbooks: a clause containing an imperative or another directive speech act followed asyndetically by a clause containing an adhortative subjunctive; the latter has the practical value of a ἴνα or ὥστε clause. Cf. Z 340 ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἐπίμεινον ἄρηια τεύχεα δύω. I have discussed the idiom extensively in my note on E. *El.* 835–837 (Slings [1997a: 156–157]). This is the only example from classical prose known to me (there is another in Chariton), but no conjectures (λέγε) φέρε Cobet [1873: 530]; ἄγε Richards [1893: 351]; ὡς ἴδω Laur.80.19pc; (ἴν') ἴδω Richards [1911: 116] and Hartman [1914: 251]) are necessary.

457d9 Οὐκ οἶμαι ἦν δ' ἐγὼ περὶ γε τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἄν, ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι, κοινούς δὲ τοὺς παῖδας, εἶπερ οἷόν τε· ἀλλ' οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατόν ἢ μὴ **πλείστην** ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι.

πλείστην AD: πλείστην ἄν F

This case is entirely similar to 439b5–6, for which see above (p. 71). If ἄν can carry over into a γάρ clause, as it does there, there is no reason to assume that it cannot do so into an ἀλλά clause. Cf. 382d11 ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; (ἄν to be supplied from d6). There, too, F has a superfluous ἄν (not adopted by Burnet), presumably intended originally as an aid to construction. Even though an original ἄν stood a major chance of falling out before ἀμφι-, which in antiquity was often written ἀνφι-, F's particles are to be suspected on principle.

460c6 Εἶπερ μέλλοι ἔφη καθαρὸν τὸ γένος τῶν φυλάκων ἔσεσθαι.

μέλλοι ADF: μέλλει Scor.y.1.13 Phlp. (*Ael.* IX 3 = 321, 14 Rabe)

I would like to believe that after Socrates' chilling reference to infanticide Glaucō distances himself somewhat. In fact, as commentators have pointed out (cf. especially Adam's Appendix IV, I 357–360), Plato does go to some length to present the issue as euphemistically as possible. For the optative used in a similar cautionary answer to speculation about the future, cf. *Phdr.* 274a6–7 Παγκάλως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὃ Σώκρατες, εἶπερ οἷός τε τις εἶη; *Thet.* 162b5–6 Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἶπερ

μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; After a future indicative in the main clause, the optative in an εἰ clause normally indicates scepticism, but at times also suggests that realisation is not desirable. Cf. Wakker (1994: 176–179). It is wrong to say, as Adam does, that the optative can only stand (as an optative of indirect speech) if the reference is to a past statement, as for example 464b8–c3 ἔφαμεν γάρ που ... εἰ μέλλοιεν ὄντως φύλακες εἶναι. Nor is 459e1 εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποιμνίον ὅτι ἀκρότατον εἶναι an argument against the optative (so Schneider), if only because there the εἰ clause is found in a continuous statement of Socrates.

461c5 καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἤδη πάντα διακελευσάμενοι προθυμείσθαι μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα **μηδὲ ἔν**, ἐὰν γένηται, ἐὰν δέ κτέ

μηδὲ ἔν Cobet (1873: 528): μηδέ γ' ἔν prA: μηδὲν A² (ἐ γ punctis notata) DF Eus. (*PE* XIII 19, 18 = Π 250, 3 Mras – des Places) Philop. (*Aet.* IX 3 = 322, 4 Rabe)

Such is the influence of A that its reading before correction here, though manifestly impossible, was accepted by all editors except Stallbaum, Adam and Chambry—it was only to be expected that Burnet, whose predilection for γε is probably the only weak spot in his feeling for Platonic Greek, should have printed it. Adam is quite correct in saying that ‘we do not find γε thus interposed between οὐδέ (μηδέ) and εἰς’. In fact, he could have gone much further. The cluster οὐδέ (μηδέ) γε is found over fifty times in Plato, always connecting sentences, clauses or single phrases (*La.* 197d1 μηδέ γε εἴπη is ‘then don’t say it’). It does not do so here.

A study of Denniston (1954: 156–157), shows that οὐδέ, when used as a Focus particle, as here (‘not ... either’, ‘not even’), is never directly followed by γε in Greek. Four passages with οὐδέ γε are given by Denniston, including this one. The others are *S. El.* 1347 οὐχὶ ξυνήης;—οὐδέ γ' ἔς θυμὸν φέρω, where the uncertainty of the meaning of ἔς θυμὸν φέρω makes Jebb’s interpretation of οὐδέ as ‘not even’ quite gratuitous; ‘No, nor’ (Campbell) makes it a connective, with γε marking (as in δέ γε) an answer as parallel to and closely coherent with the previous speaker’s words, cf. *OC* 1743 οὐκ ἔχω.—μηδέ γε μάτευε. (Denniston’s analysis ‘it gives an air of liveliness, interest and intensity to the opening of an answer’ [1954: 130] is mere speculation.) *D.* 41, 11 γε is a conjecture for γάρ, but neither particle is possible in this context. *S. OC* 1702 the conjecture οὐδέ γ' is ignored by the two latest editors and by Kamerbeek in his commentary.

463a9 Ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις **αὐτὸ [τοῦνομα] τοῦτο**, ἄρχοντας.

αὐτὸ τοῦνομα τοῦτο AD: αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὺς F: αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῦνομα Stob. (IV 1, 104 = IV 48, 16 Hense)

‘τοῦνομα fort. secludendum’ says Burnet, and it may seem a splendid confirmation of this intuition that τοῦνομα is not in F. Burnet could have known it is not there, because Schneider states this in so many words, but he must have overlooked Schneider’s note, which anyone who has used Schneider knows is an easy thing to do.

Both idioms are in themselves possible. For the pronominal internal accusative with προσαγορεύειν, cf. a6–7 above τί ... τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγορεύει; 340e1; 428d8; 435a7 etc. ὄνομα as an internal accusative is rare: *Lg.* 896a4 τοῦνομα ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν, and once in the passive: *Lg.* 665a2 ἄρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο. These are the only instances I have been able to find of the internal accusative of the full noun; far more frequently we find the accusative of the person or thing addressed combined with the dative of ὄνομα: *Prt.* 355b6 ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δύο καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύομεν; *Cra.* 397d5–6; *Sph.* 232a6; 251a5–6 etc.

There is one more fact that may have aroused Burnet’s suspicion. In the *Politeia*, αὐτὸς οὗτος is hardly ever, if at all, accompanied by a noun. The only instance is 484d8–9 τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδὸν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν, where τῷ μεγίστῳ is probably an apposition. This and the strange position of τοῦνομα, between αὐτό and τοῦτο, makes it very hard to accept the noun.

I am therefore inclined to think Burnet was right. τοῦνομα can be explained as a gloss. F’s reading may, incidentally, preserve the same word: after all F sometimes offers truncated words. Thus at 460a2 F originally had ἄρ, and χουσι had to be written above the line by the first hand. Suppose τοῦνομα was written as τουν: this would naturally be changed to τοὺς. If so, F and Stobaeus have an unobjectionable word order, but the presence of a noun is still a stumbling-block: I suspect that their order is a trivialisation of the AD order, and that τοῦνομα was first inserted in the position where AD have it. The upshot of this is that Burnet’s idea may not be confirmed by MSS evidence, but it is nonetheless almost certainly right. [In his edition, Slings prints τοῦνομα within square brackets.]

463e7 Ἀληθέστατα, ἢ δ' ὄς.

ἀληθέστατα AD: ἀληθέστατα ἄν F: ἀληθέστατα αὐ̄ Stob. (IV 1, 104 = IV 49, 23 Hense)

In the *Politeia* αὐ̄ is never the last word of an utterance, except here, where the witnesses are divided; at *R.* 468a5 Burnet conjectures ποῖ̄ αὐ̄ for the transmitted ποῖαν (ποῖ̄ ἄν A: ποῖαν DF). In later works it is found twice in this position: *Sph.* 257a6; *Lg.* 859d1, but the utterances are much longer, and αὐ̄ contrasts two statements made in the same utterance. It is found before a strong punctuation at *R.* 561d6 ἐπὶ τοῦτ' αὐ̄, where Burnet prints a full stop but a comma would do just as well (similarly *Th.* 192a6), and in the phrase τί δ' αὐ̄;, a variant of τί δέ;, which is found about nine times in Plato.

These data do not encourage one to adopt Stob.'s reading here, even if F's ἄν is taken as a corruption of αὐ̄. But other explanations of ἄν are available (misreading of α plus a horizontal in the line above as $\bar{\alpha}$ = αν; dittography of the following Η). And since ἄν obviously makes no sense, αὐ̄ is just as well accounted for as an ancient conjecture.

465d3 πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπηλλάξονται, ζήσουσί τε τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου ὃν οἱ ὀλυμπιονῖζαι ζῶσι μακαριώτερον.

ἀπηλλάξονται Cobet (1858: 243); ἀπαλλάξονται ADF Stob. (IV 1, 104 = IV 52,21 Hense)

What the context requires is neither 'they will get rid of' (ἀπαλλάξονται) nor 'they will be set free from' (ἀπαλλαγῆσονται—unlike other authors, Plato maintains this distinction in the future tense) but 'they will be free from', which is what Cobet's conjecture means. The best, probably the only way of accounting for double τε connecting clauses is to assume that both clauses refer to future states. The future perfect is, besides, indirectly supported by the perfect optative ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἄν εἶεν at c2, although in itself this is not a sufficient reason for changing the text—it would be if the verb ἀπαλλάττομαι had occurred in an answer, but this is Socrates continuing his own exposé. What matters, however, is that the verb form should denote a future state, and for this, the future perfect is the only possible tense. By contrast, the simple future in Plato always refers to a future event, e.g. *Ap.* 39c6–7 νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε (sc. you have sentenced me to death) οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου; *R.* 496e1–3.

The future perfect of this verb is not found elsewhere in Plato, nor indeed in Ancient Greek. It occurs twice in the OCT of Demosthenes: 20,28 and 24,85, but there, too, we have to do with conjectures of Cobet's, who proposed the form also at Ar. *Ach.* 757 and Hsch. α 6147 (ἀπηλλάξει—ἀπηλλάξεις MS, paraphrased ἀπηλλαγμένος ἔσσι), where it is a certain correction. The last passage proves that the form was used, and it is of course predictable that wherever it was used, it was bound to be corrupted. Quite apart from the fact that the corruption involves only a vowel and still makes reasonably good sense, in post-classical Greek the future perfect led an extremely precarious life in general, especially the non-periphrastic variety (cf. B.G. Mandilaras, *The verb in the Greek non-literary papyri* [Athens 1973], 240). Some grammarians even thought it was a peculiar Attic variant of the simple future (cf. above, p. 25; to the references given there add R. Reitzenstein, *Geschichte der griechischen Etymologia* [Leipzig 1897], 393, 5, where δεθήσεται should be corrected to δεδήσεται). Small wonder that ἀπηλλάξομαι should have vanished entirely from our texts. I feel no hesitation in restoring it.

468a5 ἄρα ὀρθῶς μοι καταφαίνεται ἢ οὐ;—Λέγ' ἔφη **ποῖα**.

ποῖα Laur.85.7pc Bessarion (Marc.187pc): ποῖ ἄν A: ποῖαν D: ποῖαν F: ποῖα δὴ Richards (1893: 351): ποῖ αὐ Burnet

Cf. note on 463e7 (p. 90), and 445d3 Λέγε ἔφη τίνες. In Richards' conjecture, δὴ is too obvious to be true: it should have come after λέγε as at 457c6, cf. note (p. 87).

468c1 καὶ προστίθημί γε τῷ νόμῳ, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ ταύτης ὧσι τῆς **στρατιᾶς**, **μηδενὶ** ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὃν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν

στρατιᾶς AD: στρατείας F || μηδενὶ A: καὶ μηδενὶ DF

The expression ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς is found three times in Aristophanes, the short syllable guaranteed by metre (*V.* 345; 557; *Lys.* 100). ἐπὶ στρατείας is not in Aristophanes. For this reason I follow Burnet in printing ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς throughout in this passage (b4; c1; e5), whatever the MSS readings—at b4 it is actually a conjecture first proposed by van Herwerden (1883: 349).

I wonder why καὶ is so popular here: it is defended by Schneider and Jowett–Campbell and printed by Burnet. Yet Hartman had shown that it is clearly impossible: 'procul dubio alioquin Plato scripturus fuerat μηδ' ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ κτλ.' (149). Only once in Plato is καὶ before μηδεῖς

not the connective particle (*Lg.* 635a6 is hopelessly corrupt): *Lg.* 862a1–2 σκοπεῖσθε δὲ εἴτε τι λέγω ... εἴτε καὶ μηδὲν τὸ παρὰπαν, where καὶ goes with the second εἴτε ('or, what is also possible'), and μηδέ would be out of the question as an alternative. No similar excuse for καὶ can be found here—it clearly has to go.

469c5 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔφη μᾶλλον γοῦν ἄν οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τρέποιντο, ἑαυτῶν δ' ἀπέχοντο.

γοῦν ἄν scripsi: γ' ἄν οὖν ADF¹pc: γὰρ οὖν prF: τ' ἄν οὖν Eus. *QN*: μὲν οὖν Eus. *I* (*PE* XII 37,1 = II 130, 7 *Mras* – des Places)

γ' ἄν οὖν is an extremely rare cluster of particles. It is found three times in comedy, twice in Euripides, twice in Thucydides (in the same speech: I 76,4; 77,6). In Plato, it is a variant here and at *R.* 604d2 (Stob.: γοῦν ἄν ADF); it occurs also in the spurious (and probably quite late) *Eryxias* at 393c6. Otherwise it is not found before the imperial age.

There is, besides, the problem that both γε and οὖν are hard to account for here. γε might perhaps be defended as giving secondary focalisation to μᾶλλον, but οὖν, which would mark the preceding clause, that is to say, Glauco's agreement, as subsidiary to this statement, is entirely out of place. γὰρ οὖν is hardly better, and it is probably nothing more than an incidental slip of the scribe of F, corrected immediately. τ' ἄν οὖν must be a corruption of γ' ἄν οὖν, not the other way round, because τε ... οὖν is an impossible collocation.

I write γοῦν ἄν. γοῦν here gives not so much a 'part proof', its most typical value, as an extra ground for agreement. Cf. Shorey, translating γ' ἄν οὖν: 'By all means, he said; at any rate in that way they would be more likely to turn against the barbarians.' γοῦν ἄν is found some twelve times in Plato. The error can be explained as a simple transposition; besides, οὖν and ἄν are frequently confused even in majuscules, cf. (with Adam on 472d4) 450c4 οὖν DF: ἄν A: δὴ Baiter. Therefore they may have looked alike in the exemplar of a MS from which both ADF and Eus. derive, and they may have changed places in this MS itself.

470c6 Ἑλληνας μὲν ἄρα βαρβάροις καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλησι μαχομένους πολεμεῖν τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίους φύσει εἶναι, καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἔχθραν ταύτην κλητέον·

μαχομένους πολεμεῖν F: πολεμεῖν μαχομένους AD (Adam wrongly refers to a marginal note in A; the note is in fact found in Laur.59,1 [siglum a]).

Cf. De Strycker–Slings (1994: 256–257) on *Ap.* 18d6. Of the 10 instances of postponed τε recorded for Plato in Denniston (1954: 517), *R.* 478d5 does not apply (I don't see how else the thought could have been formulated), and *R.* 358e3 is textually uncertain (cf. above, pp. 21–22). The other eight fall into three categories (I have added some instances —on the whole rather unremarkable—from *R.*; I disregard cases where τε in its regular position would have caused an impossible cluster, like τε μὲν 452a2 or ὅσπερ τε 376d9): (1) A B τε καὶ A' B': *Cra.* 403e4 τέλος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης (note that τέλος σοφιστής is an expression that recurs in Plato: *Smp.* 208c1); *R.* 474a1; *Lg.* 673c4; 866a4. (2) A B τε καὶ B': *Ap.* *l.c.* σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν (the semantic parallelism between 'to defend' and 'to refute' overrules the syntactic one; no correction—ἐλέγχοντα Hirschig [1852: 3]—is at all plausible); *R.* 334b1–2; 465e2; 560d4.—I have not included cases where B, and therefore by implication B', is added as an afterthought, such as *R.* 427d1–3 τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει ἐν αὐτῇ, φῶς ποθεν πορισάμενος ἰκανόν, αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει; cf. 535e2. (3) A B τε καὶ A': *Lg.* 885d5 ταῦτα ἀκούοντές τε καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἔτετρα; 890b2 (but perhaps better classified under [2]); *R.* 391d3; 408b2. In three out of four cases of (1) the boundary between τε and καὶ coincides with a boundary between two clauses, as it does in all four cases of (2), but in none of the four cases of (3).

In our passage, the AD reading, endorsed by Adam and adopted by Burnet (the F reading is defended by Hirschig [1852: 3], and Hartman [1896: 151], would give a structure A B τε καὶ A', involving two different clauses. It would be the only instance in Plato of a postponed τε not immediately followed by καὶ. Besides, πολεμεῖν would be an intrusion into the participial clause which functions as background ['Theme'] to φήσομεν and the infinitive construction governed by it. True, such a thing is possible in choral lyric (I am thinking of passages like καίε τε δαιδαλέας ἐκ λάρνακος ὠκύμορον φίτρον ἐξαύσασα [B. 5, 140–142]), but until proof to the contrary has been provided, I refuse to believe it is in Plato.

For the same reason, I am inclined to think that Burnet is right in rejecting the postponement of τε at 472a6–7 εἰκότως ἄρα ὄκνον τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκη οὕτω παράδοξον λόγον λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν (λόγον λέγειν τε F: λέγειν λόγον τε AD). The F reading removes the postponed τε, the AD reading has the structure A B τε καὶ A' ((3) above), again across a clause boundary. I am inclined to assume that οὕτω παράδοξον λόγον is a Theme, and as such precedes the clause proper.

The AD reading would again involve intrusion of a word belonging to the clause proper (λέγειν) into the Theme. But of course it was inconsistent for Burnet to accept such an intrusion in our place and to reject it at 472a6–7.

Adam says that ‘it is hard to see why [μαχομένους and πολεμείν] should have become displaced.’ I agree, but in this case the data from parallel passages in Plato are strong enough to resist sacrificing the F reading to the principle *utrum in alterum*. He further claims that ‘by adopting the order in the text [of AD] Plato restricts μαχομένους to πολεμείν; otherwise the participle would naturally go with πολεμίους φύσει too.’ Once again, I agree, but I don’t see this is an argument: if μαχομένους precedes πολεμείν it qualifies both it and πολεμίους ... εἶναι—what on earth can be wrong with that?

It might also be objected that in both passages I reject the word order of AD in favour of that of F, although F is notoriously unreliable as far as word order is concerned (Boter [1989: 107]). True again, but if F’s word order harmonises with Plato’s use (as established on the basis of passages where the transmission is unanimous) and the AD order does not, I have no choice.

The analyses of the two passages as given above attempt to solve the problem from a purely syntactic and semantic point of view. In principle, they should also be approached from a pragmatic angle. I have attempted such an approach, but since it does not lead to a different result, I refrain from boring my readers with it.

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 192.]

471e3 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἤδη αὐτὸ πειρώμεθα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν ὡς κτέ

ἤδη αὐτὸ F: αὐτὸ ἤδη AD

F’s order is here *lectio difficilior*; it is supported by 532a1 οὗτος ἤδη αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος. At *Criti.* 108d7 τοῦτ’ οὖν αὐτ’ ἤδη δραστήον, ἤδη αὐτό would have caused a hiatus, which Plato in his late period takes pain to avoid.

472d4–6 Οἷε [ἄν] οὖν ἥτιόν τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι ὃς ἂν γράψας παράδειγμα οἷον ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἰκανῶς ἀποδοὺς μὴ ἔχη ἐπιδείξαι ὡς καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

οὖν scripsi: ἂν οὖν AD: οὖν ἂν F || ἐπιδείξαι DF: ἀποδείξαι A

There are two parallels for οἶε οὖν ἄν in Plato (*Men.* 84c4; *R.* 584d6), none for οἶε ἄν οὖν. The F reading is therefore superior, but I cannot convince myself that it is right. It is not so much the subjunctive in the relative clause which is suspect (if ἄν after οἶε were correct, one might have expected ὅς and the optative—but there are numerous examples of similar variations) as the fact that ἄν is entirely superfluous here, and that it is absent from the parallel question ε2 ἡττόν τι οὖν οἶε ἡμᾶς εὔ λέγειν τούτου ἔνεκα κτέ, as Hartman (1896: 153) rightly remarks. Richards' predictable remedy is δὴ οὖν (1892: 340; 1893: 352 = 1911: 121). But in questions, δὴ οὖν is only found after question words in Plato, and the same goes for οὖν δὴ (very rarely after a question particle as at *R.* 490a8). For confusion of ἄν and οὖν, cf. above, note on 469c5 (p. 92). I suppose that the original οὖν was misread as ἄν, and that the true reading was reintroduced through contamination, but in different places.

In itself, ἐπιδείξαι is just as good as ἀποδείξαι, as a glance at LSJ will show. Plato uses ἀποδείκνυμι at d2; e3 and e7 (which go closely together); 473b5. This might seem a good argument for ἀποδείξαι here, but Plato is as fond of variation as Pindar and Thucydides, only less notorious for it because he applies it more subtly, cf. De Strycker–Slings (1994) *Index* s.v. variation. Note ἐνδείξασθαι at 474b2; ἀποφαίνειν 473a6; δείξαι 473c3.

This may not be a decisive argument, but the presence of ἀποδοῦς immediately before ἀπο/ἐπιδείξαι must sway the balance. It is far more likely that the participle caused A or one of its predecessors to change ἐπιδείξαι inadvertently to ἀποδείξαι than to assume a spontaneous, unprovoked change from ἀποδείξαι to ἐπιδείξαι (there is no ἐπι in the vicinity). Besides, the frequent occurrence of ἀποδείκνυμι may have played a part, and certainly ἀποδείκνυμι, being the technical term for 'to prove', was better known than ἐπιδείκνυμι in the same sense.

477a10–11 Οὐκοῦν <ἐπει> ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ' ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξὺ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἴ τι τυγχάνει ὄν τοιοῦτον;

ἐπει ἐπὶ μὲν C.F. Hermann, xii (fortasse melius ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ μὲν): ἐπὶ μὲν ADF: εἰ ἐπὶ μὲν Laur.80.19pc || ἐπὶ τῷ(ι) μεταξὺ ADF: ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ F¹: ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ δὲ Bessarion: καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ Wilamowitz (1919: 381 [et mox μεταξύ τι ζητητέον])

The main objection both against the transmitted text and against some of the remedies proposed in the past is that οὐκοῦν seems to ask for

confirmation of two different points: (1) Didn't we agree that knowledge is about reality and ignorance about unreality (cf. 476e6–477a1)? (2) Shouldn't we try to find something intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, for this field between reality and unreality we have just postulated (477a6–8)?

οὐκοῦν is frequently used to introduce double questions, but when it is, the questions are parallel. The inconcinnity between ἦν and ζητητέον, to which Wilamowitz drew attention, seems to me to indicate that more has been lost than a single particle after ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι. Boter (1989: 209) has shown that the δὲ found in F is not inserted by the first hand, as Schneider asserted. But it makes no difference which hand supplied it, since it cannot stand anyway, as was pointed out already by Wilamowitz.

A better solution is Hermann's οὐκοῦν (ἐπει) ἐπὶ μὲν, an improvement on Laur.80.19pc's (εἰ). I agree, with Wilamowitz and Hartman (1896: 157) against Adam, that the cacophony is not really objectionable. (Hartman's own solution, οὐκοῦν (ἄν) ... ἦι [for ἦν], is clearly impossible, since this is not a statement about the future, as the subjunctive would imply: we would have to translate 'if it turns out that knowledge is about reality ...', which predicts an examination that never takes place—in fact it will continue to be taken for granted that knowledge is about reality: 477b11–12; 478a4–5; c3, note ἀπέδομεν.) Usually, when Socrates starts a question by οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ (ἐπειδή, ἐπεὶπερ), he takes the content of the ἐπεὶ clause for granted, and he can often do so because it restates a conclusion reached earlier. The main clause sometimes contains a deontic expression which announces a new investigation, as here (*Plt.* 261a2–4 οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή ... τοῦτο αὐτὸ πάλιν αὖ διαιεῖν ἀναγκαῖον; *R.* 502c9–10 οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή τοῦτο μόνος τέλος ἔσχεν, τὰ ἐπίλοιπα δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον—I have found nothing similar in sentences that start with οὐκοῦν εἰ); once in the ἐπεὶ clause a past tense is used to indicate previous agreement: *Sph.* 264a8 οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶπερ λόγος ἀληθῆς ἦν καὶ ψευδῆς κτέ—once again, this is not found in εἰ clauses that are preceded by οὐκοῦν. Hermann's conjecture, perhaps better amended to ἐπειδή (not for the sake of euphony but because -δή adds a hint of interaction that is rather desirable in this distorted version of the conclusion as it actually was reached), is therefore a very probable correction.

I have toyed with a more drastic solution, namely to assume a lacuna after μὴ ὄντι, containing Glauco's answer and an introductory formula, e.g. ἀγνωσία δ' ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι;—(Ναί.—Τί δέ;) ἐπὶ

τῶι μεταξὺ τούτῳι κτέ. But the main problem is that Socrates would then expressly ask for confirmation of a point that was agreed upon only a couple of lines before. I therefore have adopted Hermann's conjecture.

Wilamowitz takes offence at the word order in μεταξὺ τι καὶ ζητητέον ('Da gehört es [= καί] doch nicht hin'). There is no accounting for taste, but I think the clause is much flatter without καί, and the early position of μεταξὺ τι creates a nice effect. Wilamowitz' position seems to be supported by Denniston (1954: 327 'That καί can follow the word it emphasizes seems doubtful', D.'s italics), but I wonder if καί should be taken to emphasise μεταξὺ τι. In its meanings 'also, even', καί is a Focus particle, and the proper place for it is before the Focus. Now μεταξὺ τι is probably Topic rather than Focus: it is in any case inferrable information, as the word μεταξὺ has already been used several times, while ζητητέον is new and unpredictable information, and therefore better qualifies as Focus than μεταξὺ τι does. Cf. *Io* 541a5–6 οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅστις ἀγαθὸς στρατηγὸς τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥαψωιδὸς ἐστίν, where we have to translate '... is also a good rhapsode', but ἀγαθὸς is given and ῥαψωιδὸς new, and the Focus particle modifies the new constituent.

479a2 καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστός ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ιδέαν τινα αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἠγείται ἀεὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει

ἠγείται A¹: ἠγῆται DF et fortasse prA: ἠγηται Par.1810, fortasse recte

The cases where the primary MSS offer an indicative where the subjunctive is required or the other way round are legion (cf. above, note on 450a9; to give just one more example, 462b1–2 ὃ ἂν ... ποιεῖ ADF twice, both times joined in error by Stobaeus–Burnet's report is incorrect). But in this particular case ηγηται may well be what Plato wrote, namely as a perfect indicative.

Usually, the difference between ἠγοῦμαι and ἠγῆμαι is that the latter refers to a firm, permanent conviction. The perfect is only found three times in Plato (of course there may be instances where it was corrupted to the present, and there certainly are instances where Burnet prefers the present over the perfect where it is attested as a variant reading, as *Clit.* 407c3). Twice, it denotes a firm conviction in such a way that the reader is bound to take it as ironical: *Ti.* 19e2–4 τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος αὖ πολλῶν μὲν λόγων καὶ καλῶν ἄλλων μάλ' ἔμπειρον

ἤγημαι, φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή πως κτέ; *Hp.Mi.* 374d6 βελτίω ἄρα ἤγησαι τῶν
σαντοῦ τὰ ἐκουσίως πονηρὰ ἐργαζόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀκουσίως; cf. *Clit. l.c.*
(γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν) ἃ δὴ παιδείαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι
τελέαν ἤγησθε (AD, ἠγεῖσθε F Them.). That suits the present context
very well.

BOOK SIX

484b5 φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἄλλ' ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ **παντοίως** ἴσχυουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι

(παν)τοίως A i.m. (not a scholium): πάντως ADF

There are idioms in Greek where a form of πᾶς is roughly synonymous with one of παντοῖος. But there is a difference in the case of ἔχω plus adverb. Cf. *R.* 559d7–8 παντοδαπὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἐχούσας. πάντως ἔχειν seems to be ‘to be true at all times’, cf. *La.* 199b6–7 ἢ δὲ γ' αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι (id. c1; c7), explained by 198d2–5 οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος ..., ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων ..., ἄλλη δὲ ὅπῃ κάλλιστα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μήπω γεγονός, ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτὴ. Apart from these passages, πάντως ἔχω does not occur in Plato. Therefore, even though παντοίως is relatively weakly attested and might be regarded as *lectio facilior*, I follow Stallbaum, Burnet, Shorey and Chambry as against the majority of 19th-century editors in adopting it.

Note the use of ἴσχω rather than ἔχω with the adverb. The former is the inchoative of the latter (‘to get’ as against ‘to have’), and this may add an extra point, on a par with the switch from singular to plural: the philosophers can grasp the unchanging, the others wander around among many things that constantly acquire new, varying natures.

485a5 ὁ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον **δεῖν** καταμαθεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν ὁμολογήσειν καὶ ὅτι κτέ

δεῖν AD: δεῖ F

A ὁ clause containing a form of λέγω is particularly liable to lead into an anacoluthon, cf. *Phdr.* 272d3–7 παντάπασι γάρ, ὁ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἵπομεν τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δεοὶ δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῆ τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι; K.-G. II 581; Jowett–Campbell, II 237; Reinhard (1920: 10–14; our passage quoted 11); Slings (1997b:

204–205). Likewise with MSS divided between δεῖ and δεῖν: *Phlb.* 54d4–6 οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ μινύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ' ἠντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖν (B, δεῖ TW–W's reading taken from microfilm); *R.* 347a3–4 ὦν δὴ ἔνεκα ὡς ἔοικε μισθὸν δεῖν (AD, δεῖ F Eus.) ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἀρχεῖν, with my note (above, p. 12).

492c1 ὅταν εἶπον ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν πολλῶι θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, **πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς** αἶ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ᾧσιν ἐπηχοῦντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου.

Hartman (1896: 395), took offence at πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς. He claims that αὐτοῖς would have to be taken as 'ipsis' not 'iis' ('and, in addition to these people themselves', not '... to these people'), and has a slight preference for correcting the text. He suggests either deleting αὐτοῖς or changing it to αἶ; in either case πρὸς would become adverbial.

There are two separate problems involved here, Plato's adverbial use of πρὸς and the possibility of placing πρὸς αὐτοῖς (meaning 'iis') at the beginning of a clause.

As for the former, Plato has a strong preference for using adverbial πρὸς in the phrase πρὸς γε καί, or more rarely καί ... γε πρὸς. But πρὸς δέ is found twice: in Protagoras' myth with its many Ionicisms and archaisms (*Prt.* 321d7 πρὸς δέ καὶ αἶ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν), and once in the *Nomoi* (778e6–8 τεῖχος ... ὁ πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς ὑγίειαν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐδαμῶς συμφέρει, πρὸς δέ τινα μαλθακὴν ἔξιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἐνοικούντων εἶωθε ποιεῖν). Since the *Nomoi* has so many unusual idioms that it cannot be taken as a safe guide to Platonic usage, the case for adverbial πρὸς here could be a good deal stronger than it is, and that in itself is a good reason to reject Hartman's proposed corrections.

(For what it's worth, I mention that at 494e3, D has another instance of adverbial δὲ πρὸς, where AF have the undoubtedly correct δ' ἔπος.)

But Hartman, a modest scholar, not to be confused with his namesake, the pretentious Leiden Latinist J.J. Hartman, has a very good point about the position of αὐτοῖς. Indeed, Attic prose authors tend to avoid the collocation Preposition + δέ + a form of anaphoric αὐτόν ('eum' not 'ipsum') altogether. There are no instances in Lysias,

Isocrates and Demosthenes, and only a handful in Thucydides (III 22, 3 μετὰ δὲ αὐτόν; IV 56, 2 ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν; VI 77, 2 πρὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ).

Yet it so happens that there are two parallels in Plato, both of which involve, as does the present passage, πρὸς with the dative: *Ti.* 65c3–6 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τὰ πολλά, διὰ συγκρίσεών τε τινων καὶ διακρίσεων γίγνεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ αὐταῖς κεχρησθαι μᾶλλον τι τῶν ἄλλων τραχύτησί τε καὶ λειότησιν; *Ig.* 778c5–7 καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὄλην ἐν κύκλωι πρὸς τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς τῶν τόπων, εὐεργείας τε καὶ καθαρότητος χάριν· πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἰκίσεις τε ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων κτέ.

It cannot be a coincidence that Plato deviates from the Attic rule in the case of πρὸς with the dative. Both parallels are from his late period, but we have to accept them as good evidence, rather than change the text on the basis of evidence that is, at any rate, not better.

494d11 ἐὰν δ' οὖν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τῶν λόγων [εἰς]αισθάνηται τέ πηι καὶ κάμπτηται καὶ ἔλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους ...;

ε1 αισθάνηται Laur.85.7pc: εἰς αισθάνηται AD: εἰς αισθάνηται F (not εισαισθάνηται, as reported by Schneider)

Scholars have always felt uneasy about the AD reading εἰς αισθάνηται. For quite some time now Socrates has been talking about someone gifted for philosophy, but forced away from it by his friends: b4 ὁ τοιοῦτος; c4 τὸν τοιοῦτον; d5 τῷ δὴ οὕτω διατιθεμένωι. For him now to disregard this longstanding Discourse Topic and introduce a new one ('one person') is illogical. Besides, εἰς by itself is odd Greek: one would have expected something like εἷς τις τοιοῦτος (cf. Shorey's translation 'one such youth').

The corrections proposed by modern scholars and those made already by Byzantine scribes, need not detain us. The former can be consulted in Adam (commentary, Richards' τις for εἰς should be added [1911: 126]), the latter in Schneider. Burnet, with characteristic lack of mistrust of F, seized upon the opportunity of finding a way out of the problem by adopting its alleged reading. Apparently he did not stop to consider what the word εισαισθάνομαι means, or indeed if such a word exists.

It looks as if it doesn't. It is not mentioned in Liddell–Scott or in any other dictionary that I have consulted. Nor is it easy to see the need for such a word. True, εἰσοράω 'to look at' and εἰσακούω 'to give ear to' do exist, because these verbs denote a conscious activity of the subject. But

for εἰσαισθάνομαι there seems to be no *raison d'être*. Waterfield's 'to pay attention' would make it synonymous with εἰσακοῦσαι in the preceding sentence. I assume that αἰσθάνομαι is here used absolutely, as *R.* 360d5, and that the clause means 'if in whatever way he becomes aware [that he has no νοῦς and needs to have it]'.

It so happens that, as I said, a form of εἰσακούω has been used a couple of lines above (d8), and I feel certain that the preverb persevered in the mind of the scribe of the common ancestor of ADE, and caused him to add it here. But it has to go, and interpreting it as εἶς only makes things worse.

αἰσθάνηται is read by Laur.85.7pc; the scribe had first tried to make sense of F's reading by giving εἶς αἰσθάνηται [sic], but either he or a later hand deleted εἶς by means of two dots under the beginning and end of the word.

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 193.]

496a8 ἄρ' οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως [**ἄξιον**] ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον;

ἀληθινῆς Ast: ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς A: ἄξιον ὡς ἀληθινῆς D: ἀληθινῆς ὡς ἄξιον F: ἀξίως ἀληθινῆς Campbell

The varying position of ὡς in D and F suggests that it originated as a reading written above the line, and we have to examine the possibility that it was a correction of ἄξιον to ἀξίως, in anticipation of Campbell's conjecture (another explanation would be dittography of the -ως of φρονήσεως). The point of the adverb would seem to be 'in a manner worthy of philosophy'. But I doubt if the adverb is felicitous as a qualifier of φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον: 'having to do in a worthy manner with true insight' is not a formulation that inspires confidence, although it might perhaps be maintained that it balances προσήκοντα. In his review of Jowett–Campbell (*AJPh* 16 [1895], 230), Shorey finds fault with the cacophony of φρονήσεως ἀξίως—of which I leave it to the reader to decide whether it is an argument or not.

In any case, the readings of D and F are no strong evidence against the likelihood that ἄξιον is a gloss. Such approving remarks, the equivalents of the ubiquitous ὠραῖον of medieval MSS, are indeed found, and once they had intruded, may have been liable to correction.

For parallels cf. below ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα at 504e3 and the note; Cobet (1873: 480; 1876: 163) adduces several more in the form ἄξιον (*Lib. Or.* 30, 42 = III 110, 11 Foerster; *Decl.* 46, 23 = VII 563, 15 Foerster;

Iambl. *VP* 23, 21 Deubner–Klein). All three are not equally convincing, but the instance from Iamblichus certainly is.

Wilamowitz (1919: 342) takes ἄξιον not as a ‘lobende Randnotiz’ but as an ancient variant of ἐχόμενον. This kind of explanation is a hobby horse of his, and in this instance it is unclear how such a variant could come into being (a deliberate change of ἐχόμενον to parallel the preceding ὁμιλωσι μὴ κατ’ ἄξιαν?). Even as an explanatory gloss on ἐχόμενον (which is not what Wilamowitz means by ‘variant’) ἄξιον hardly makes sense.

496c3 τὸ δ’ ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαμόνιον σημεῖον.

οὐκ AD: οὐδ’ F

Plato never qualifies a form of ἄξιος with the Focus particle οὐδέ but always uses the simple negative, and it is another testimony to Burnet’s impressive feeling for Platonic Greek that he did not adopt F’s reading here, although at first sight it looks less flat than AD’s οὐκ, and despite his general predilection for F’s readings.

496d7 οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς

φερομένου ADF Phot. ζ 9 (II 240 Theodoridis) Suid. ζ 13 (II 499–500 Adler) *Et.Gen.* B (139 Miller): φερομένων Wilamowitz

‘Überliefert φερομένου, aber der Wind wird nicht getrieben, sondern Staub und ζάλη ... vom Winde’ (Wilamowitz [1919: 381]). Fair enough, because if φερομένου were to go with πνεύματος (possible despite Wilamowitz’ apodictic denial, cf. *Ti.* 43c3 πνευμάτων ὑπὸ ἀέρος φερομένων), κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης would have no construction, unless one connects them, implausibly, with χειμῶνι as Jowett–Campbell do.

But the correction is not necessary. If an adjective qualifies two nouns of different genders, it may occasionally be congruent with the noun from which it is farthest removed. Cf. *K.-G.* I 80–81; Schw.-D. 605. If so, the noun in between has a secondary status, and this fits our passage. Since ζάλη is an alternative for κονιορτός (or forms a hendiadys with it), κονιορτός determines the gender of the adjective.

Themistius twice refers to this passage with the words ἐν ζάλη κονιορτοῦ (104c = I 158, 18–19 Downey–Norman and 308a = II 109, 11), but this should not be used as evidence that his text had a different

reading (coinciding with conjectures made by van Herwerden and Richards, cf. Adam ad loc.), since he also uses the phrase τὴν ζάλην ... καὶ τὸν κονιορτόν (326b = Π 143, 7).

497c5–7 οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔμελλον [sc. ἐρήσεσθαι], ἀλλ’ εἰ **ΑΥΤΗ** ἦν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἄλλη.—τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ **ΑΥΤΗ**

c5 αὐτή A: αὐτῆ D: αυτη F (on the microfilm there is an unclear trace over the alpha; it does not look like a breathing to me)—c7 αὐτή ADF

Van Herwerden (Mnemos. 35 [1907], 398) is surely right in postulating either αὐτή—αὐτῆ or αὐτη—αὐτη. Since the MSS authority in these matters is nil, we are left to our own devices. I think that if Plato had wanted his readers to understand that he meant ἢ αὐτή he would probably have written that, the more so since the reader will have been conditioned by c4 τίς αὐτη ἢ πολιτεία, where no alternative reading is possible. I therefore opt for αὐτη both times.

497d6 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ πάντων ῥᾶιστον διελθεῖν.

πάντων Bekker: πάντως ADF

‘οὐ πάντως ῥᾶιστον “not in every respect quite easy” (with the usual Greek litotes), is quite unobjectionable’ Adam, referring to Schneider, who has nothing better to offer than an instance of διαφερόντως with the superlative at *Ti.* 23c6. There remain, however, some objections, no matter how usual the Greek litotes may be felt to be. Twice in Plato’s works is πάντως preceded (whether directly or not) by the negative: *R.* 454c8 τότε οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν ἐπιθέμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν κτέ: ‘we did not then posit likeness and difference of nature in any and every sense, but were paying heed solely to the kind of diversity and homogeneity that’ etc. (Shorey); *Lg.* 841b4–5 τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχροῦν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ μὴ πάντως δοῦν. Neither is at all parallel to the supposed litotes.

Besides, the negative apart, πάντως never qualifies the superlative in Plato as straightforwardly as ADF would wish us to believe it does here. The closest instances are *Lg.* 832e8 πάντων πολεμιώτατον ... πάντως; 898a6 πάντως ὡς δύνατον οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν. The only true parallel is from the dubious *Epinomis*: 991c4 πάντως καλλίστη, where a later hand in O (Vat. gr. 1), variously identified as O² or O⁴, has πάντων, adopted by L.A. Post, *AJPh* 57 (1936), 179. Here, we will have to accept

Bekker's correction. 'But the change is slight and the phrase more idiomatic [than πάντως]', so rightly Campbell in Jowett–Campbell.

499b6 πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης **περιβάλλη**, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μὴ, πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι

περιβάλλη(ι) ADF: παραβάλλη Laur.59.1

The ADF reading is aptly defended by Schneider, who compares E. *Io* 829 τυραννίδ' αὐτῷ περιβαλεῖν ἔμελλε γῆς. Cf. also Hdt. I 129, 4 εἰ γὰρ δὴ δεῖν πάντως περιθεῖναι ἄλλωι τέωι τὴν βασιλιήην ... δικαιότερον εἶναι Μήδων τέωι περιβαλεῖν. We have to accept that for once Plato said 'to invest them with caring for a city' (dative and infinitive) instead of 'to invest them with the rule of a city' (dative and accusative), as in the two parallels. Cf. ἐπιτρέπω τι, which can have another complement either in the accusative or in the infinitive. The construction may also have been influenced by the familiar ἀνάγκη plus dative and infinitive.

Adam is certainly wrong in adopting (in his commentary) the variant παραβάλλη, of which I am not sure that it was a conjecture rather than a mistake (of the two compendia for παρὰ and περὶ); it makes much less sense. In Classical Greek, intransitive παραβάλλω ('to join', 'to meet') always has a personal subject, and ἡ ἀνάγκη does not qualify as such.

In his edition, Adam had conjectured ἀνάγκην τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλη—brilliant, but, as he says in his commentary, contradicted by c7–8 τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι. Besides, the identity of the τις who imposes on the philosophers the necessity to care for a city, and on a city the necessity to obey the philosophers (καὶ τῆι πόλει κατηγκῶι γενέσθαι, b6), and who moreover does so ἐκ τύχης, so that he cannot be a divine force, remains entirely in the dark.

501b3–4 ἔπειτα οἶμαι ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἐκατέρωσ' ἀποβλέποιεν, πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ **τὸ** ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις **ἐμποιοῖεν**, ξυμμιεγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον

b3 τὸ ADF Eus. (*PE* XII 19, 8 = II 110, 8 Mras-des Places): δ Bessarion (a correction in Marc.187, which originally had τὸ) || b4 ἐμποιοῖεν ADF Eus.: (ὥς) ἐμποιοῖεν Wilamowitz (1919: 382): (ἔως) ἐμποιοῖεν E.S. Thompson, PCPS 19–21 (1888), 20: ἐμποιοῖεν Apelt (1903: 346): fortasse <καὶ> ἐμποιοῖεν

Hierocles (*ap. Phot. Bibl.* 464b = VII 200–201 Henry) quotes the sentence literally up to and including αὖ (with ὡς instead of the second πρὸς); unfortunately, nothing can be deduced about his text of Plato from what follows: (καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖνο αὖ) ὁ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιεῖ, ὡς καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔφη, τὸ θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοεἰκελον (cf. b5–7). He seems to be consciously distorting what Plato says, because the godlike in man is here caused by an unidentified agency, not by the ‘legislative painters’ as in Plato. We cannot change Plato’s text to make Socrates say what Hierocles says: this would not only require changing ἐμποιοῖεν to ἐμποιοῖ, but also changing the plurals ξυμμειγνύντες καὶ κεραννύντες. Consequently, neither can his relative ὁ be used to support tampering with τό.

The article is indispensable. The ‘legislative painters’ look at two things: the naturally just etc., and human nature. The latter cannot be made clear by πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ alone, and is not nearly made sufficiently clear by Burnet’s weak conjecture πρὸς ἐκεῖν’ [= ἐκεῖνα] αὖ. Besides, the change to the relative would cause the two naturally related optatives ἀποβλέποιεν and ἐμποιοῖεν to be in different clauses, a main clause and a relative one.

Apelt’s change makes no sense: the painters cannot look at something they have already put in mankind in order to mix it with the naturally just etc. and thus produce something (the ἀνδρείκελον) which they want to put into mankind.

I share the feeling of many scholars that something is missing before ἐμποιοῖεν, and I am inclined to believe it was a coordinating rather than a subordinating conjunction, preferably καί, since a subordinator would again unnaturally separate ἀποβλέποιεν and ἐμποιοῖεν.

There is, however, also a possibility that the text as it stands was written by Plato. He had written ἀπεργαζόμενοι and ἀποβλέποιεν, but ἀπεργαζόμενοι is a rather empty word. Now suppose the word had vanished from his memory but the fact that he had already used a participle had stayed there. This participle would then naturally be ἀποβλέποντες. And if he thought he had written that, ἐμποιοῖεν could follow without a connecting particle. (The hypothesis also assumes that Plato was a bit unclear about whether or not he had already written ἄν. Cf. above, pp. 70–71 [below, p. 191].)

On this hypothesis, the resulting anacoluthon is closely related to the familiar type of two-predicate sentence, for which cf. Reinhard (1920: 151–166); above, p. 40; De Strycker–Slings (1994: 344–345).

502a2 βούλει οὖν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ μὴ ἦττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ παντάπασι πρᾶους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεισθαι, ἵνα εἰ μὴ τι **ἀλλὰ** αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν;

ἀλλὰ Ast: ἄλλο ADF

Since both Adam's and Jowett–Campbell's commentaries ignore Ast's conjecture, which was, I think, rightly adopted by Burnet and Chambry, it is perhaps useful to point to the parallel passages 509c5 καὶ μηδ' ἄλλως γ' ἔφη παύσει, εἰ μὴ τι ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιὼν (ἀλλὰ the reconstructed reading of D: ἄλλα AF); *Men.* 86e2 εἰ μὴ τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον (no variant readings recorded), where cf. Bluck's note; Denniston (1954: 12–13). Here, 'for shame, if for no other reason'.

504c6 τούτου δέ γε ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τοῦ παθήματος ἦκιστα **προσδεῖται** φύλακι πόλεώς τε καὶ νόμων

προσδεῖται ADF: προσδεῖ Par.1810pc (cf. Boter [1989: 224])

LSJ have a separate section on impersonal *προσδεῖται* (s.v. *προσδέω* Π 2), but none of the four examples given there can stand up to closer scrutiny. [Pl.] *Demod.* 384b2 the subject is probably the *τις* of the following *εἰ* clause; X. *Ages.* 1, 5 it is certainly the preceding substantivized infinitive *τὸ ... ἀξιωθῆναι*, which cannot be otherwise construed; [Pl.] *Alc.* 2 138b6 it is certainly the person praying (cf. the following *ὅπως μὴ λήσεται αὐτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά*); *IG* 2² 380, 11 (Attica, late 4th century, *ὅπως ἂν ... τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀγορανομίῳ ἐπισκευασθῆ ὅσων προσδεῖται ἅπαντα*) it is probably *ἅπαντα*: if so, that would be the only instance of *προσδέομαι* meaning 'to be necessary in addition' rather than 'to have additional need of'. None of this suffices to corroborate the ADF reading, and the correction might seem to impose itself. (Before Burnet, scholars generally thought that D actually has *προσδεῖ*, although they could have found the truth in the much-neglected commentary of Schneider.) One might think that Platonic usage can best be learned from 507c10 and d5 *προσδεῖ*; but compare d8 *προσδεῖται*.

However, there is room for doubt. *δεῖται* used for impersonal *δεῖ* is reported by LSJ, s.v. *δεῖ* III, for *Men.* 79c2 *δεῖται* (BW, *δεῖ* τι F, *δεῖ* T) *οὖν σοι πάλιν ἔξ ἀρχῆς ... τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως*, defended by Bluck *ad loc.* (and by E.S. Thompson [1901: 308]). Bluck refers to *R.* 340a5, where I think Socrates is the subject. But Bluck has a very strong

case indeed for the *Meno* passage, where δέῖται is proved to be correct by 79c6 ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι (no variants) τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως and 79e1 πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι (no variants) ἐρωτήσεως. In none of the three passages from the *Meno* is a subject at all plausible.

If Plato can use impersonal δέῖται instead of δεῖ, I don't see why he cannot also have written προσδέεται here. I leave it to other scholars to detect a difference between the impersonal active and the impersonal middle/passive. But given these data, it would be unwise to follow Par.1810's conjecture.

504e3 ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίους πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινόμενους ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιῶν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας;—καὶ μάλα ἔφη. [ἀξιον τὸ διανόημα].

ἀξιον τὸ διανόημα ADF: non vertit Ficinus, secl. Ast (not Schleiermacher)

Cf. above, note on 496a8 (pp. 102–103). It should be pointed out, and perhaps should have been pointed out long ago, that when a Platonic interlocutor introduces an answer with καὶ μάλα, or gives καὶ μάλα as a self-contained answer, he reacts to one element of the question (whether real or rhetorical). Cf. *Euthd.* 298d8–9 εἰπέ γάρ μοι, ἔστι σοι κύνων;—καὶ μάλα πονηρός. In this case, since Socrates had asked a leading question starting with ἢ οὐ γελοῖον, Glauco's καὶ μάλα indicates that his answer is 'it would indeed be ridiculous'. The transmitted answer καὶ μάλα ἀξιον τὸ διανόημα is entirely out of keeping with Platonic usage.

Ficinus showed a keen feeling for Platonic idiom when he did not translate the interpolated words, and Ast was doubtless right in deleting them.

507e3–515d7 Due to the loss of two leaves in D, its readings have to be reconstructed from its copies Scorialensis γ.1.13 (Sc), Parisinus gr. 1810 (Par) and Scorialensis Ψ.1.1 (Ψ). Of these, Sc is slightly more reliable than the other two, because it was copied from D before any of the later correcting hands in D changed the readings. I give a collation of these three witnesses, from which incidental errors in Par and Ψ have been omitted. One source of later corrections in D is W, itself a descendant of Sc. But in this passage, W nowhere agrees with Par Ψ against Sc.

As a general rule, agreement between Sc and either Par or Ψ restores the original reading of the lost part of D, which, following Burnet, I will call 'D'. When Par Ψ agree against Sc, D cannot be reconstructed. Agreement of Par Ψ is nearly always agreement with AF as well, and therefore when they agree either Sc copied *prD* faithfully and a later hand in D corrected the reading, or Par Ψ give the reading of D and Sc made a mistake when copying D. The question which, is hardly ever important. There are traces of contamination in Ψ (515b5 νομίζειν; c5 εἰ *habet*). Boter (1989: 175–176) shows that an ancestor of Ψ was contaminated from Neapol. gr. 233 (III B 9); this MS has, however, νομίζειν ὀνομάζειν at 515b5 and does give εἰ at c5, but after τοιάδε. The best explanation is that an ancestor of Ψ was also contaminated from a member of the F family.

507e5 καὶ τοῦ Sc Ψ Par

508b6 ταμειουμένην Sc Ψ: ταμειουμένη Par

b13 ἐαυτῷ ἀνάλογον Sc: ἀνάλογον ἐαυτῷ Ψ Par

c5 ἐπέχοι Sc Par: ἐπέχη Ψ Parpc

c6 ὧν] ὡς Sc Ψ Par

c9 καταλάμπη Sc: καταλάμπει Ψ Par. The Sc reading may be that of D, given the fact that Apc reads the subjunctive as well.

d8 μεταβάλον Sc Par: μεταβάλλον Ψ

509a2 καὶ οὕτω καὶ Sc: καὶ ὄντα καὶ Ψ: οὕτω καὶ Par. Ψ tries to make sense of the reading of Sc, which is therefore that of D.

a6 εἰ – a8 λέγεις om. Sc: hab. Ψ Par

c5 ἀλλὰ Sc Ψ Par

c6 εἰ Sc: ἦ Ψ: ἦι Par

c6 ἀπολείπεις Sc: ἀπολείπεις Ψ Par

d3 οὐρανοῦ] ὄρανοῦ Sc: οὐρανοῦ Ψ Parpc: ὄρατοῦ Parac. Cf. note *ad loc.*

510a5 τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο Ψ Par: τοῦτο θεῖω Sc

a6 καὶ σκευαστὸν Sc Ψ Par

b4 μμηθεῖσιν] τμηθεῖσιν Sc Ψ Par

b5 ζητεῖν om. Sc: hab. Ψ Par

b7 ὑποθέσεων Sc: ὑποθέσεως Ψ Par

b7 τῶν περὶ Parpc: ὧν περὶ Par (et F): ὧνπερ Sc Ψ (et A)

b8 ποιουμένην Sc et fortasse Parac: ποιουμένη Ψ Par

c7 ἀξιούμεν Sc: ἀξιούσι Ψ Par

d1 φανερόν Sc: φανερόν Ψ Par

d5 ὀρωμένοις Sc Ψ Par: εἰρημένοις Par i.m.

- ε1 μὲν Ψ Par: μὲν οὖν Sc
 511a1 δὲ Ψ Par (and F): τε Sc (also A, and therefore probably *D*). I prefer
 τε το δέ.
 a4 νοητοῦ Sc Ψ Par
 a9 τετμημένοις Sc Ψ Par
 a10–b1 ταῖς ταύταις Sc: ταύταις Ψ: ταῖς ταύτης Par. Again, Ψ corrects
 Sc, which therefore represents *D*.
 b7 καταβαίνοι Sc: καταβαίνῃ Ψ Par
 c3 οὐ Par s.l.: οὖν Sc Ψ Par
 d3–4 καὶ τῶν Sc Ψ: καὶ τὴν τῶν Par. The *D* reading is, I think, better
 than the alternative with the article (AF and Par).
 d4 οὐ νοῦν Ψpc (incertum quid antea) Par: οὖν Sc
 e3 μετέχειν Sc Ψ Par
 514a2 ἴδε Sc Par Ψ
 a4 παρὰ πᾶν] παράπαν Sc Ψ (and F): παρ' ἅπαν Par (and A Porph.).
 Since we must reconstruct ΠΑΡΑΠΑΝ for the archetype, we have to
 take it as παρὰ πᾶν (Iambl.); if Plato wanted his readers to under-
 stand that he meant ἅπαν not πᾶν, he would, I think, have written
 ΠΑΡΑΑΠΑΝ, of which there is no trace in the transmission.
 b1 εἰς τε τὸ] εἰς τὸ Sc Ψ: καὶ εἰς τὸ Par, an easy correction.
 b5 παρ' ἣν ἰδέ] παρ' ἣ ἦν ἰδεῖν Sc Par: παρῆ ἰδεῖν Ψ, a further corrup-
 tion.
 b7 δεικνύουσιν Sc Ψ: δεικνῦσιν [sic] Par (δείκνυσιν F)
 b7 ὁρῶ Par Ψ: ὁρθῶς Sc, an incidental error.
 515a4 ἔφη Par Ψ: om. Sc, ditto.
 a5 ὁμοίους Sc: ὁμοῦς Par: ὁμοῦς [sic] Ψpc (perhaps ὁμοίους Ψac)
 a5 μὲν om. Sc Par Ψ; πρῶτον μὲν is not answered by an ἔπειτα or the
 like, hence μὲν is *lectio difficilior*.
 b4 ταῦτα Sc Par Ψ
 b5 ἡγῆ Sc Par: ἡγοῖο Ψ
 b5 ὄντα] παρόντα Sc Par Ψ
 b5 νομίζεν Ψ (with F): νομίζεν ὀνομάζειν Sc Par (with A), and no doubt
D.
 c5 εἰ Ψ (with Apc and F): om. Sc Par (with prA), ditto.
 c5 ξυμβαίνοι Par Ψac (u.v.): ξυμβαίνει Sc Ψpc (u.v.)
 d3 τι om. Sc Par Ψ
 d4 ὀρθότερον Par Ψ: ὀρθότερα Sc

508e3 αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὔσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἠγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἠγήσει

γιγνωσκομένης ADF: γιγνωσκομένην Laur.80.19

'The meaning is clear ... The position and case of γιγνωσκομένης are difficult.' So Shorey in his inimitable pithy manner. Although there are many things concerning the Idea of the Good about which I would not venture to make a statement, I think both the position and the case of γιγνωσκομένης can be accounted for.

αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὔσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ('the Idea of the Good) being the cause [or perhaps better: source] of knowledge and truth' is a participial clause that refers to a state of affairs with regard to which the clause will be relevant. Such a constituent is known as a Theme, and I have shown in my note on 365b4–7 (above, pp. 28–30) that theme constructions, which often involve participles in Plato, can be put in the nominative or the accusative regardless of the syntactic function their referents are going to have in the clause proper (e.g. ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἐνὸς ἐγκατατετημημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι, *R.* 565d9–e1). Cf. 510e1–3 αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσί τε καὶ γράφουσιν ... τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι. I have discussed the phenomenon more extensively, but again with focus on Plato, in *Slings* (1997b: 193–202).

Hence I do not see a problem in the fact that the Idea of the Good is referred to in the accusative in the Theme participle, and in the genitive in the clause proper. As for the question why the genitive is used, the answer is that ὡς plus genitive absolute is a perfectly normal construction to use after an imperative of a verb of thinking: *R.* 327c14 ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε; *K.-G.* II 93–95. The accusative in Laur.80.19, proposed independently by Ph.W. van Heusde, *Initia philosophiae platonicae* II 3 (Traiecti ad Rhenum 1831), 46, and adopted by Adam (who in his commentary at II 83–84 discusses many more conjectures) is therefore superfluous.

The fact that αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὔσαν καὶ ἀληθείας is a Theme also accounts for the position of μὲν, which is basically Shorey's second point. In fact, the position of μὲν is entirely regular: 'Given that the Idea of the Good is the source of knowledge and truth, you must on the one hand be convinced that it can be known, on the other hand, beautiful as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing that it is different from and even more beautiful than these you will hit the

nail on the head.’ Note the semantic parallelism of *διανοοῦ* in the *μέν* clause and *ἡγούμενος ... ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει* in the *δέ* clause. The only irregularity is the fact that in the latter, the Idea of the Good, which had its correct (female) gender in the theme construction and in the *μέν* clause, turns neuter (*ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτό*) in the *δέ* clause. But that can be explained by the fact that one line before, *γνώσις* and *ἀλήθεια* are also referred to in the neuter: *οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, not οὐσῶν*. Hence *τούτων* at e5 is no doubt neuter, which explains the neuter in *ἄλλο κτέ*.

509d3 νόησον τοίνυν ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ ὡσπερ λέγομεν δύο αὐτῶ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ’ αὖ **OPATO**, ἵνα μὴ **OPANO** εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα.

OPATO scripsi: ὄρατοῦ ADF || OPANO scripsi Wilamowitz (ὄρανοῦ) secutus: ὄρανοῦ
D: οὐρανοῦ F: οὐρανὸν A

ὄρανοῦ is read by *Scor.γ.1.13*; *Par* has *ὄρατοῦ*, corrected to *οὐρανοῦ*, which is also the reading of *Scor.ψ.1.1*. It seems a fair inference that *Par*’s original reading was a correction of *ὄρανοῦ*, which must therefore be inferred for *D*.

Wilamowitz (1919: 338) pointed out that the pun works better on the assumption that Plato did not yet write *ou* for long closed /o/ (‘false diphthong’), but used the simple omicron; he gives a number of parallels, including *Cra.* 396c1 *οὐρανία, ὀρώσα τὰ ἄνω* (i.e. **OPANIA**). The *D* reading gives a splendid confirmation of his intuition: it shows that there was at least one majuscule MS in later antiquity that read **OPANO(Y)** not **OYPANO(Y)**.

The best way to make the pun clear is by printing the two words in capitals and without diacritics.

509d6 The scholium mentioned by Adam in his note (easily accessible in Hermann’s edition, VI 350–351) is a Byzantine extract, not found in *A* but first in *Marc.184* (cf. *Boter* [1989: 57]). The scholium was written by Johannes Rhosos, the scribe of *Marc.184*, but it was presumably commissioned by Bessarion, for whom Rhosos copied *Marc.184*. It is a paraphrasis of *Iambl. Comm.Math.* 32, 13–37, 19 *Festa*, headed *Σχόλιον ἐκ τῶν Ἀρχύτου καὶ Βροντίνου [sic] καὶ Ἰαμβλίχου ἐπιτηθέν*. In this passage, Iamblichus quotes Brotinus and Pseudo-Archytas. The scholium’s words *εἶτε καὶ εἰς ἄνισα, ὡς ἐν τῶν τισὶν ἀντιγράφων τοῦ Πλάτωνος εὔρηται* should therefore not be regarded as evidence for a

variant reading ἴσα in ancient MSS of Plato, as has been thought. Ps.-Archyt., in a paraphrase of the passage about the divided line in Plato, does read ἴσα.

The ‘Grammaticus ap. Voilloison.’ quoted by Stallbaum, and also referred to by Adam, is in fact none other than Pseudo-Archytas as quoted by Iamblichus. The words quoted by Stallbaum are 36, 14–17 Festa. The relevant part of Villoison’s *Anecdota graeca* contains the *editio princeps* of *Comm.Math.*

510b9–c1 ταῦτ’ ἔφη ἃ λέγεις οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἔμαθον.—ἀλλ’ αὐθις, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· ῥᾶιον γάρ κτ᾽

ἐγώ (ἐρῶ) Cobet (1873: 531)

The text printed above is transmitted unanimously by the primary manuscripts, but it cannot be accepted.

If ἀλλ’ αὐθις is the ellipse with the colloquial effect which Adam claims it is, we should find it more often. There are no parallels in Plato, nor in Aristophanes and Menander.

Cobet’s correction does not sound right to Adam, who claims that Plato would have placed it after αὐθις. But given Plato’s fondness for the parenthetic position of ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, I would think that ἀλλ’ αὐθις (ἐρῶ) ἦν δ’ ἐγώ is no more likely to be what Plato wrote than ἀλλ’ αὐθις ἦν δ’ ἐγώ (ἐρῶ).

However, I think the corruption lies somewhat deeper. If one compares *R.* 429c4 οὐ πάνυ ἔφη ἔμαθον ὃ εἶπες, ἀλλ’ αὐθις εἰπέ it is tempting to give ἀλλ’ αὐθις here to Glauco (cf. also 508c3 ἔτι διελθέ μοι). If so, the end of Glauco’s and the beginning of Socrates’ words have fallen out. By way of example I propose ἀλλ’ αὐθις (εἰπέ.—ἀλλ’ ἐρῶ) ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.

[In his edition, Slings prints ... ἀλλ’ αὐθις (<*- *->) ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.]

511d2¹ ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλούμενων [mathematics], αἷς αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοαὶ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσεων αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ

¹ I would like to give special thanks to Mr M.F. Burnyeat, who did me the honour of reacting *in extenso* to an earlier draft of this note. From his reaction I have shamelessly borrowed some arguments. I am sorry that I failed to convince him.

τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελεθόντες σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι, [καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς].

καίτοι—ἀρχῆς secl. Bolling (1902: 319–321)

The καίτοι clause does not necessarily clash with Plato's doctrine, especially when read in connection with 533b5–c6: Socrates' words ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσει χρώμεναι ταύτας [the hypotheses] ἀκινήτους ἔωσι, μὴ δυνάμενοι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν (533c2–3) do suggest that the status of mathematics as not a true ἐπιστήμη could be elevated to dialectic proper. Socrates is not too sanguine about the possibility, as appears from the next sentence: ὧι γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδεν συμπλέκεται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; (533c3–6). But it may be maintained that no matter what mathematicians may or may not do, the basic concepts of their science are νοητά anyway. It may even be maintained that, if mathematicians were to relate their concepts to an ἀρχή, they would cease to be mathematicians and become dialecticians. In other words, it is not clear that Plato actually has a quarrel with mathematics as it is practised, and the disputed clause should not necessarily be read as criticism.

But the clause can be read as an uncalled-for defence of mathematics, in other words an interpolation, and it should be stated that the καίτοι clause is very suspect, and may be too suspect to be accepted. In his commentary, Adam said that 'the clause could easily be spared, and may be spurious' (II, 87). Bolling studied καίτοι with the participle and decidedly wished to delete the clause here. Wilamowitz condemned it peremptorily, with a not entirely fair remark against Adam: '... duldet sogar Adam ein Satzglied ..., das sich auch von selbst aussondert, obwohl das hellenistische καίτοι für καίπερ ein unverkennbares Stigma ist' (1919: 345 n.1).

First, of course, there is the fact that καίτοι modifying a participle is hardly ever used by classical authors, cf. Bolling's study and its summary in Denniston (1954: 559). Plato uses καίπερ some twenty times in all, three times in the *Politeia*. It is not a good solution to emend καίτοι to καίπερ or καὶ ταῦτα—if these idioms were corrupted to καίτοι in the course of the transmission, we should expect more cases of them. In Plato, καίτοι never is a variant of καίπερ. If you cannot accept καίτοι you cannot accept the καίτοι clause.

However, the alleged instances of καίτοι with the participle deserve to be scrutinised before we can use the fact that it is used with a participle here as an argument for deletion. Participles that follow the

predicate can modify various levels of the sentence: the predicate, but also the speech act (for levels of the sentence cf. Wakker [1994: 17–20]). An example of the latter is E. *El.* 569 οὐκ εὔφρονῶ γὰρ σὸν κασίγνητον βλέπων; ‘How can you say I’m out of my mind when I’m actually looking at your brother?’, not ‘Am I out of my mind because I’m looking at your brother?’, which would be the required translation if the participle modified the content of the speech act rather than the speech act itself. Cf. Slings (1997a: 151).

Now it so happens that in two of the four instances from the classical period discussed by Bolling, including our place, καίτοι accompanies a participle modifying a speech act: Ar. *Eccl.* 158–159 ἀνήρ ὢν τῷ θεῷ κατώμοσας, καίτοι τά γ’ ἄλλ’ εἰποῦσα δεξιότατα, ‘you’ve sworn by the two goddesses, and you a man too, so you must be out of your mind (cf. 156 ποῦ τὸν νοῦν ἔχεις;), and that despite the fact [καίτοι] that apart from that your speech was very clever’. If the καίτοι participle modified the predicate, the meaning would have been ‘you swore by the goddesses, and you did so disregarding the fact that the rest of your speech was very clever’, which is manifest nonsense. Similarly Lys. 31,34 ἱκανά μοι νομίζω εἰρησθαι, καίτοι πολλά γε παραλιπών, ‘I hereby declare my speech to be at an end, and this despite the fact that I have skipped many arguments’. (For ‘and this despite the fact’ as the semantic value that distinguishes καίτοι from other adversative particles, cf. my contribution to A. Rijksbaron [ed.], *New Approaches to Greek Particles* [Amsterdam 1997], 122–125.) A borderline case is D. 19,221, overlooked by Bolling and Denniston and first mentioned by Blomqvist (1969: 41): καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ’ ἀκήκο’ αὐτὸν λέγειν, καίτοι μηδενός γ’ ὄντος Αἰσχίνῃ δεινοῦ μηδ’ ἀδικήματος, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Here two statements made by Aeschines are found to be in conflict with each other (perhaps the καὶ γὰρ clause is an embedded sequence and καίτοι contrasts μηδενός κτέ with Aeschines’ words quoted literally before καὶ γὰρ—if so, the participle definitely modifies the speech act, since it is Aeschines’ speech act).

Now originally καίτοι only modified independent sentences following the sentence with which an adversative relation was indicated by καίτοι, and extension of this use to post-predicate illocutionary modifiers as a first stage of a development that in the Hellenistic period—but as Blomqvist shows, relatively late in the Hellenistic period—led to καίτοι replacing καίτερος as the adversative participle particle altogether seems a natural scenario—more logical than Denniston’s extension of καίτοι in parenthesis, which is quite rare anyway. I am therefore prepared to

accept these three instances as textually sound (and not with gratuitous quasi-explanations that ‘either Praxagora is praising ... in sub-standard language ... or her syntax reveals her sex’, so Bolling, *Language* 11 [1935], 261–262). Blomqvist has dealt with the instances cited by Deniston from Aristotle, and shown that in the two from his authentic works (*Met.* 369a20; *HA* 541a10), καίτοι is textually suspect (1969: 41–42).

Of the remaining instances, I agree with Bolling that Simonides *PMG* 542, 12–13 καίτοι ... εἰρημένον is probably a parenthesis, and that leaves us with our passage. Here the explanation given above for the instances from Aristophanes and Lysias doesn’t work, since the genitive absolute does modify the predicate, not the illocution: ‘although the mathematical concepts are intelligible when combined with an ἀρχή, the mathematicians seem to you not to acquire νοῦς about them’. For the sake of completeness I note that in Plato, there are three or four instances of illocutionary participles modified by καίπερ, the clearest case being *R.* 459a7–8 πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων, καίπερ ὄντων γενναίων, ἃρ’ οὐκ εἰσὶ τινες καὶ γίνονται ἄριστοι; (‘I submit this leading question to you, even though I realise that all are noble’). Cf. further *Plt.* 297d7; *Prt.* 315e6 and perhaps *Plt.* 302b7.

Therefore those who wish to defend the καίτοι clause will inevitably be guilty of special pleading. It could perhaps be argued that the καίτοι clause contrasts Socrates’ view of the status of mathematical concepts with the procedure followed by mathematicians, and that the difference between them is akin to the difference between two speech acts. It is not, it might be said, Glauco’s case that the mathematicians are aware of the fact that their concepts are intelligible in combination with an ἀρχή, hence καίτοι had to be used rather than καίπερ. But this overlooks the fact that the main clause already states Socrates’ view of the mathematicians. And in any case, while it is true that some adversative clauses are qua content further removed from the main clause than others, if καίπερ was not an option (but I do not see why it was not), Plato had the alternative of writing καὶ ταῦτα. Cf. 404c1–2 οὔτε ἰχθύσις αὐτοὺς ἐσιπᾶι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ ὄντας; 420a3; 429e4–5; 543d1.

Therefore, even if καίτοι is perhaps not the tell-tale sign of inauthenticity that Wilamowitz thought it is, it is very suspect indeed. I cannot find a defence for it that satisfies me.

There are more grammatical problems, but they are less insurmountable. One may wonder why the genitive absolute is used. The objects

of mathematics have been referred to twice in the neuter accusative plural in this sentence, c8 αὐτά and immediately preceding the clause d2 περί αὐτά. So why not νοητά ὄντα? It would have been a different matter if the mathematical concepts had been referred to in the dative, cf. 586d8–e1 ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθείαι ἐπομένον; 590d3–5 ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὄν παντί ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ κτέ. Cf. Adam ad loc.; K.-G. II 110–111. In Plato an accusative is only replaced by a genitive absolute at the beginning of a new clause: 538d6–8 ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ... ἔρηται ... καὶ ἀποκριναμένου ὃ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἤκουεν ἐξελέγχει ὁ λόγος, which in ScO.γ.1.13 is corrected to ἀποκρινάμενον, perhaps rightly. Clearly the genitives in our passage are much harder to explain. But here the explanation may well be that Plato wanted to preclude a reading implying that the mathematicians willingly ignore the possibility that their concepts are intelligible in combination with an ἀρχή.

In its context, the clause seems to have to mean 'even though they are intelligible, when related to a starting-point' (Waterfield), in other words, the status of the mathematic objects is contingent upon their being or not being related to an ἀρχή. Wouldn't this require νοητῶν ἄν ὄντων? Adam may have seen this when he proposed his interpretation 'although they are intelligibles with a first principle', and identifies the ἀρχή with the hypotheses (cf. 511c6–7 αἷς αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί). But it seems to me out of the question that ἀρχή here refers to something different from two lines above (c8–d1 διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων). It is true that the hypotheses are called ἀρχή later on by Socrates (533c3–4). But that, it might be argued, is all the more reason for us to expect ἄν in our passage, and to reject Adam's interpretation.

Yet this objection may be countered by the observation that the potentiality of the mathematical objects being understood by νοῦς is already in the Greek because νοητόν means 'capable of being understood'—that is to say, the fact that a verbal adjective in -τός is by definition potential may account for the absence of ἄν. In other words, the mathematical concepts are timelessly νοητά, whether or not anybody actually takes the trouble to understand them.

Adam's interpretation also gives another meaning to μετά than is done traditionally. 'They are νοητά and have an ἀρχή' is an interpretation which the Greek yields without too many problems. But since his interpretation cannot be accepted we have to account for μετά in a different way. (The fact that the phrase μετ' ἀρχῆς does not

occur elsewhere in Plato means nothing, of course.) It does seem definitely possible to explain the preposition here as ‘in combination with’. Cf. *Cri.* 46b1–2 ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη.

And finally, I cannot suppress the feeling that the clause is altogether too compact, and the point it makes too important to be hidden in a participial clause. Why, if Plato wanted to make the point, did he not write something like *καίτοι νοητά ἐσσι, καὶ νοῦν ἴσχειν δύνανται περὶ αὐτὰ οἱ θεώμενοι, εἰ μετὰ ἀρχῆς σκοποῖεν αὐτά?* The clause is compact, even harsh Greek, and when this fact is combined with the use of *καίτοι* the suspicion that it is an interpolation becomes a strong one, since interpolations often exhibit condensed syntax.

The point that these words make has not been made before. Mathematical objects come under a *νοητόν* ... εἶδος (511a4), one *τιμήμα* τοῦ *νοητοῦ* (b2), so they are intelligibles in the wider sense of the term. Here Glauco uses *νοητόν* in the stricter sense, and gives a condition on which mathematical objects will actually be understood in the stricter sense. This is out of character, since the whole speech gives a resume of things that Socrates had said earlier. We should expect Socrates to make the point, not Glauco. True, *νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτά* is at the least a new phrase and can be considered a new thought, but Socrates had said (510c6–7) *οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι διδόναι*. The distinction between *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* was prepared for by Socrates’ distinction of two sections within the *νοητόν* and by his use of *διανοοῦμενοι* at 510d6. And besides, is the disputed clause not at variance with what Socrates had said about the mathematical method, 511a4–7, *ὑποθέσει δ’ ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν?* Perhaps not entirely, but Socrates had certainly not indicated that it is possible to start from mathematical concepts and end with the Forms, and the suggestion is definitely that it is impossible.

If the *καίτοι* clause is an interpolation, who interpolated it? The most likely candidate is someone who wanted Plato to be more positive about mathematics than he actually is. One may think of a meso- or neo-Platonic mathematician who took offence at Socrates’ apparent criticism of mathematics. That such people did exist appears from a passage in Proclus’ commentary on book I of Euclid: *καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐν Πολιτείαι τὴν μαθηματικὴν ταύτην γνῶσιν τοῦ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἀπελαύνειν χοροῦ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς αὐτῆς (I. αὐτῆς) ὡς ἀγνοοῦσαν διελέγειν, καὶ τὸ ὧι ἀρχὴ μὲν ὁ μὴ εἶδεν [οἶδεν ADF and*

other ancient authors], τελευτή δὲ καὶ μέσα ἐξ ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν [cf. 533c3–4], ἐπὶ τούτοις προσθήσουσι [critics of mathematics], καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα παρὰ τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄνειδι κατὰ τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης ἀπέρομπται (29, 17–24 Friedlein).

Proclus does not betray an awareness of the disputed clause (any more than any other ancient source), and it might be argued that had he known it, he would have appealed to it to mitigate Socrates' criticism. But I do not think that an argument from silence—which of course is very shaky at the best of times—holds water in this instance. Proclus knows Plato's fourfold division and gives a synopsis of the passage of the divided line (10, 21–11, 9), in the course of which he says that the objects of δῖα νοητά (11, 5 ἡ δῖα νοητά τὰς τῶν νοητῶν εἰκόνας θεωρεῖ), an echo of *R.* 510b4, e3 and 511a7, with the important difference that in Plato, the images studied by mathematics are mental images of mathematical figures as drawn by mathematicians. Proclus thus corrects Plato: the parallelism between νοητά and διανοητά on the one hand and αἰσθητά and δοξαστά on the other becomes closer, because διανοητά and δοξαστά are images of νοητά and αἰσθητά respectively—in Plato, only the δοξαστά are images of the αἰσθητά. Thereby, Proclus has cut off the possibility that mathematicians acquire νοῦς about their objects, a possibility left open by Plato. So even if Proclus knew the καίτοι clause, he had no use for it.

It should be the first principle for the editor of a philosophical text that his edition should be hermeneutically neutral, and affect the philosophy presented in the text as little as possible. But this principle cannot always be applied, and in this case it would be cowardly to dodge the issue by printing a cross next to καίτοι. The upshot of this lengthy note is that as an editor, I have no choice but to delete the entire clause. The thought is perhaps not at variance with other tenets presented here, but the way in which it is presented is suspicious. There is no evidence from ancient sources one way or another. But the language (apart from καίτοι especially the condensed expression of the whole) clearly betrays an interpolator.

BOOK SEVEN

514b1 ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς ἀρχένας, ὥστε μένειν τε **αὐτοῦ** εἷς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὄρᾶν

αὐτοῦ R.B. Hirschig, *Aristophanis Vespae cum scholiis et lectionibus codicum [...] denuo excerptis* (Lugduni Batavorum 1847), 139: αὐτοῦς ADF Iambl. (*Protr.* 106, 6 des Places; 78, 7 Pistelli)

The transmitted αὐτοῦς is atypical of the language of the *Politeia*: of the ca. 50 instances of ὥστε with the infinitive in this dialogue, the subject of the infinitive is expressed only twice when it is identical to that of the preceding (normally also governing) clause: 362c4–6 (τὸν ἄδικον) ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον **αὐτόν** εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον, where without αὐτόν the contrast with τὸν δίκαιον would suffer (and an undesirable generic reading would become possible); 611b1–3 τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχὴν ὥστε πολλῆς ποικιλίας καὶ ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ διαφορᾶς γέμειν **αὐτὸ** πρὸς αὐτό, in an idiom common with reflexives. No similar explanation of αὐτοῦς can be given here, so while grammatically unimpeachable, it is stylistically suspect.

By contrast, Hirschig's correction yields an expression typical of Plato, and more in particular of the *Politeia*: in four out of the six instances of adverbial αὐτοῦ it accompanies a form of μένω (327c9; 371c8; 519d4; 621c7). In other works the tendency is less marked, but the sum total of αὐτοῦ μένω in Plato is still eight, on a total of twenty instances of αὐτοῦ.

It is easy to see how in majuscule script αὐτου became αὐτους before εἰς. The alternative αὐτόθι will not do: in Plato, αὐτοῦ is always 'on the spot', whereas αὐτόθι is a non-Focal anaphoric adverb referring to a place already mentioned. There is no instance of μένω αὐτόθι in Plato. And explaining a corruption of αὐτοθι to αὐτους is much harder than in R.B. Hirschig's conjecture.

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 193.]

516d4–e1 δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτόν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ' ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου **ἂν πεπονθέναι** καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι ἑπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλωι, ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρωι καὶ **ὄτιοῦν [ἂν] πεπονθέναι** μᾶλλον ἢ κείνά τε

δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν;—οὕτως ἔφη ἔγωγε οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον **πεπονθένει** **ἂν** δέξασθαι ἢ ζῆν ἐκείνως.

οἰοῦν πεπονθένει scripsi: οἰοῦν ἂν πεπονθένει AD Iambl. (*Protr.* 108,25 des Places; 81,4 Pistelli): ὅτι ἂν πεπονθένει F

πεπονθένει preceded or followed by ἂν three times in a row, although transmitted unanimously by ADF and Iamblichus (*Protr.* 108, 21–28 des Places; 81 Pistelli), is not easy to accept, and it is rather surprising that we have to wait until Naber (*Mnemos.* 16 [1888], 100) for the first proposed deletion.

Naber wished to delete the first ἂν πεπονθένει; J.L.V. Hartman (*Mnemos.* 46 [1918], 303–304) and Wilamowitz (1919: 384) the second; D. Tarrant (*CR* 57 [1941], 7–8) both—though in case this was thought too drastic she was prepared to settle for deleting the second. Finally, Adam (*CR* 4 [1890], 356–357) strangely enough proposed deleting the first πεπονθένει while keeping the ἂν that goes with it. This suggestion is repeated in Adam’s edition, but withdrawn, like so many of his conjectures, in his commentary.

Tarrant gives a useful overview of expressions of the type τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, from which it appears that it can be used both in apposition and as an integral part of the construction—here Adam’s commentary gives the closest parallel: *Smp.* 198c2–3 ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἐπεπόνθη: ἐφοβοῦμην μή μοι τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφαλὴν κτέ (λ 633–635). These words refute Adam’s original claim that ‘τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου must mean “what Homer has experienced.”’ Besides, I don’t see how deletion of the first ἂν πεπονθένει yields acceptable Platonic Greek, as in its appositive use the expression either precedes or, less often, follows the quotation immediately. There is no parallel in Plato for a putative ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι ‘ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα κτέ.’ The first instance of the phrase is therefore sound.

Nobody has proposed to tamper with the third, although Tarrant remarks that πεπονθένει is not essential (but answers in Plato tend to be full of non-essential material), and I see no reason not to accept it.

Matters are different with the second. Here Richards (1892: 341) was the first to see that ἂν is impossible, changed it to δὴ as was his habit, and left it at that. An infinitive plus ἂν cannot be used as complement of βούλομαι. Wilamowitz strangely misses the point when he says ‘was hier stünde, müsste ja von βούλεσθαι abhängen, was das Perfektum nicht gestattet.’ βούλομαι is occasionally followed by a perfect infinitive, e.g. *Phd.* 62c2–3. But the infinitive as complement of

βούλομαι is a ‘dynamic’ one, not a ‘declarative’ one, which alone can be accompanied by ἄν, as in the first instance where it depends on δοκεῖς ἄν—an inconspicuous instance of double ἄν, for which cf. my note on 366b₄–5 (above, pp. 30–31) and De Strycker–Slings on *Ap.* 41a₇ (1994: 390–391). (In the reply ἄν goes with δέξασθαι.) Cf. H. Kurzová, *Zur syntaktischen Struktur des griechischen: Infinitiv und Nebensatz* (Prag 1968), 24; 57, on the fundamental distinction between these two uses of the infinitive.

I do not understand how Adam can say in his commentary that ‘ἄν πεπονθέναι depends in both cases directly on δοκεῖς.’ The Homeric tag used here has the construction βούλομαι ... ἦ, which it is natural to assume Plato replaced by βούλεσθαι ... μᾶλλον ἦ. Socrates does not ask if the man would have endured and would still be enduring anything rather than accepting these opinions and this life, but if the man would *wish* to have endured etc. It is immaterial whether μᾶλλον ἦ κατέ is made to depend on βούλεσθαι, as seems natural, or on the second πεπονθέναι. But the second πεπονθέναι must depend on βούλεσθαι and be on a par with θητευέμεν.

I must confess to a mistrust of the zeugma that ensues when ἄν πεπονθέναι is omitted altogether. βούλεσθαι would then have to govern first an infinitive (θητευέμεν) and then ὄτιοῦν. Tarrant brings out the point in her nominalising translation: ‘most radically wish for “servitude, upon earth, with a portionless man” and for anything whatsoever.’ Hartman says that ‘Plato scripturus fuerat ... πάσχειν s. παθεῖν;’ I feel that an infinitive of πάσχω is indispensable, and since we already have one, and we have seen that a perfect infinitive after βούλομαι is possible, why not keep it? From σφόδρα βούλεσθαι on, I would translate: ‘and strongly prefer to live on earth while being a labourer for someone else, someone without property, and to have endured, and still endure, anything.’ Plato may have written the perfect because it was still in his mind.

In any case, the perfect infinitive is protected from deletion or change by Glauco’s answer, which literally means: ‘Yes, I think he would accept to have endured anything rather than living that way.’ Since πᾶν in the answer corresponds to ὄτιοῦν, πεπονθέναι in the answer must correspond to the πεπονθέναι that follows ὄτιοῦν in the question. As we have already seen, ἄν is not similarly protected, because in the answer it goes with δέξασθαι not with πεπονθέναι.

The remedy is clear: delete the second ἄν and leave the rest as it is. Its insertion may be accounted for as due to assimilation to

the other two instances of ἄν accompanying πεπονθέναι. But there is another explanation. Even in majuscule writing, ἄν and οὔν tend to get confused (cf. my note on 469c5 [above, p. 92]). The ἄν may therefore be due to dittography of the last syllable of ὅτιοῦν, the word immediately preceding. In this respect it is interesting to note that whereas AD Iambl. read ὅτιοῦν ἄν, F has ὅτι ἄν here, presumably a relic from a less advanced stage of the corruption.

For those who might be tempted by Richards' remedy it may be useful to know that δῆ follows a form of ὄστισοῦν once only in Plato (*Lg.* 789d4).

516e4–5 εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβάς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θάκον καθίζοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ σκοτόους ἄν[α] πλέως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς ...;

ἄν πλέως Stallbaum: ἀνάπλεως ADF Iambl. (*Protr.* 109,1 des Places; 81,8 Pistelli): ⟨ἄν⟩ ἀνάπλεως Baier

I can do nothing better than quote Cobet (1862: 173): 'πλέως et ἀνάπλεως quid differant colliges ex Ruhnkenii annotatione ad Tim. v. Ἀνάπλεως pag. 31, qui docuit ἀνάπλεως et ἀναπίπλημι *polluendi* et *foetandi* potestatem habere. [Cf. *Phd.* 83d10; *Tht.* 196e1; *Smp.* 211e2; in all these passages there is an opposition with καθαρός.] Itaque Plato ταραχῆς πλέως dixit et λήθης πλέως de Rep. p. 391c[3] et 486c[7] ... Eodem igitur modo ὀφθαλμούς dixit esse σκοτόους πλέως, non ἀνάπλεως.'

517a4–6 καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιτο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουαι ἄν;

ἀποκτείνουαι ἄν depends on a verb of thinking that is not expressed in the sentence. Such verbs are found in 516c5 and d2; from e4 on the questions were asked in the optative with ἄν. I have discussed the anacoluthon extensively in *Slings* (1997b: 206–208), and dealt with a possible parallel, *Smp.* 211b7–d1, at 208–210. Another parallel of a double anacoluthon caused by return to the more embedded structure is *R.* 549c7–e1, where the plaintive mother is first brought in in a genitive and participle within a ὅταν clause of which the son is the subject (c7 ὅταν ... τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούη ἀχθομένης); next the genitive and participle becomes a genitive absolute (d1 ὁρώσης); then the mother becomes subject of the second subjunctive in the ὅταν clause (d5 αἰσθάνηται); finally with d6 ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης the mother is again in the genitive and participle construction, the son having to be mentally sup-

plied as subject and ἀκούημι as the predicate (the whole speech consists of one ὅταν clause given in reply to the question πῆι δὴ ἔφη γίγνεται; c6). There, all attempts to tamper with the text have failed, and I have no doubt that it is sound, as it is in our passage. I shall not waste space on attempts to restore the optative.

Another solution deserves to be mentioned briefly. Drachmann (1926: 110) proposed to delete ἀποκτείνειν as a gloss on ἀποκτεινύναι (this is the correct spelling; AD Iambl. have ἀποκτιννύναι, F ἀποκτεινύναι [sic]) and to print a comma after λαβεῖν. This was adopted by Des Places in his edition of Iambl. *Protr.* (109, 10; but Des Places does not print the comma, so his text is clearly impossible Greek). I find the resulting function of καί ‘actually’ too artificial.

But there is the alternative of keeping the anacoluthon and deleting καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, which would then be a gloss (ἀποκτείνειν) being further integrated into the syntax by means of καί—a well-known phenomenon. I raise this possibility because the tense of ἀποκτείνειν worries me, as it did Drachmann, especially given its coupling with the aorist λαβεῖν. After verbs denoting ability Plato uses the aorist infinitive ἀποκτείνειν four times (*Ap.* 29d3; *R.* 566b2—note ἐκβάλλειν ἢ ἀποκτείνειν; 610e6; *Lg.* 876e7). The present infinitive (ἀποκτείνειν or ἀποκτεινύναι) is also used four times, but three times in clearly generic contexts (*Plt.* 301d3; *Prt.* 325b1; *R.* 360c2). Only once is there a good parallel: *Crī.* 48a11 οἳοί τε εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτεινύναι, and I would have been glad to have more confirmation, even though obviously Drachmann’s claim ‘es müsste notwendig heissen ἀποκτείνειν’ seems too bold a statement. Prof. Ruijgh suggests to me that Plato may have written ἀποκτείνειν, changed in the transmission to ἀποκτεινύναι under the influence of ἀποκτεινύναι. Possible, but this leaves the *Crī.* passage unexplained. Did Plato wish to avoid the cacophony in ἀποκτείνειν ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν?

The present tense in ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν is a different matter, whether one takes it as iterative-generic, as Drachmann does, or as ‘conative’, as I would prefer myself. And in any case, as Drachmann aptly remarks, ‘[e]s ist wohl überhaupt klar, dass man durch eine Änderung von ἀποκτεινύναι den Ast abschneidet, auf dem man selbst sitzt.’

518d10 αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσι ἐγγύς τι **τείνειν** τῶν τοῦ σώματος

d10 τείνειν Plot. VI 8, 6, 24: εἶναι ADF Iambl. (*Protr.* 110, 20 des Places; 83,1 Pistelli)

τείνειν was a conjecture proposed by Campbell (as a note in the text volume, not in the commentary volume); Adam's τεῖναι, which he tells us in his commentary he once thought of, but which I have not been able to locate in print, is a mere variation on it, designed so as to account better for the corruption, but I find the aorist harder to understand than the present. Campbell's conjecture was duly mentioned by Burnet in his apparatus, but of course it would have been very unwise to print it.

Since it now proves to be a reading of Plotinus, it deserves more serious consideration. Here is Plotinus' text: ταῦτα γὰρ ἔοικέ φησιν ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ σώματος ἔθεισι καὶ ἀσκήσει [cf. 518d11] κατορθωθέντα. The text of Plato's scholiast on this passage might be considered to support εἶναι, but I doubt that it is evidence either way: ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἄλλα τρεῖς ἀρεταὶ ἐγγύς εἰσι σώματος· ἔθεισι γὰρ καὶ ἀσκήσει προσγίγονται· ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰδίου (Greene [1938: 247]).

The two expressions are both Platonic and more or less synonymous, but ἐγγύς τείνω is far more idiomatic. Cf. *Phd.* 65a6–7 ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν ('has ... one foot in the grave,' Hackforth; cf. Burnet's note); *R.* 548d8–9 οἶμαι μὲν ... ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτουὶ τείνειν ἔνεκά γε φιλονικίας.

It should be noted—and this is a decisive consideration—that in both parallels the collocation ἐγγύς τι is used, which Plato uses in just two other places: *Phd.* 80b9–10 τὸ παράπαν ... ἢ ἐγγύς τι; *Grg.* 520a6–7 ταῦτόν ... ἢ ἐγγύς τι. In other words, Plato uses only ἐγγύς εἶναι, not ἐγγύς τι εἶναι. There is no motivation for τι to follow ἐγγύς here, unless Plotinus' τείνειν is accepted. The expression ἐγγύς τείνω does not occur elsewhere in Plotinus' works, so we can exclude the possibility that he rephrased the wording, as in fact he frequently does when referring to or quoting from Plato. The text of ADF Iambl. looks like an innocent trivialisation of the expression, rather than a visual error—the latter would work better with ἐγγύς τείνειν than with ἐγγύς τι τείνειν.

One might object that Plotinus may have had the passage from *Phd.* in mind when he quoted this one, or the passage from *R.* 548d8–9, or both, but elsewhere he does not refer to either of these passages, which aren't the sort of ones that Neo-Platonists would have at their fingers' tips.

It is also true that Plotinus is rarely a reliable witness to the text of Plato. The famous phrase at 589a7–b1, ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος, is quoted twice by him, I 1,10,15 and V 1,10,10, but he never seems to get the

adverb right: ἔνδον at I 1,10,15; εἶσω at V 1,10,10, expressly announced as a quotation from Plato.

But neither of these two objections does explain the data about ἐγγύς τι in Plato. Therefore I confidently restore τείνειν to the text of Plato, and do so as a tribute to Campbell, whose feeling for Platonic Greek was too often eclipsed by Jowett's longwindedness and sterile conservatism.

In his review of Jowett–Campbell, Shorey (AJPh 16 [1895], 230) writes about Campbell's correction that it is 'clever and would commend itself but for a lingering doubt whether the phrase had not a half-humorous suggestion in Plato's usage.' An excellent observation, and now that it has become certain that Plato used the phrase, we may appreciate its semi-humour the more—it is on a par with αἱ ... ἄλλα ἀρεταὶ καλούμενα ψυχῆς, which refers to the four cardinal virtues that were discussed so earnestly in book IV.

526d6–7 ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ εἶπον πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα **καὶ** βραχὺ τι ἂν ἐξαρκῶι γεωμετρίας τε καὶ **λογισμοῦ** μόριον

καὶ F: om. AD || λογισμοῦ F and a later hand in D: λογισμῶν A: λογισμὸν D

In the sense of 'small' Plato, I think, always modifies βραχύς by καί: *Ti.* 48c1 ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ βραχὺ φρονούντος; 64b3; *Criti.* 107c5; *Lg.* 907c5; 927c4. I have (briefly) examined all occurrences of βραχύς in Plato, and have not found any counter-examples. F's particles are not to be trusted as a general rule, as I have often had occasion to note. But each case must be tested on its own merits, and here καί seems indispensable.

'Arithmetic' is normally λογισμοί in Plato, but there are enough cases where the singular is used in this meaning. In the present passage; 522c6–7 ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν; 524b4, where the subject is first introduced. Cf. further *Hp.Ma.* 367a9; c5; *R.* 340d5; *Phdr.* 274c8 ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὐρεῖν. Since both D and F read the singular, which it may be maintained is *lectio difficilior*, it is best to adopt F's reading.

528a1 σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγει· ἢ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἔνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιῆι τοὺς λόγους

ἢ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους Cobet (1862: 177): ἢ οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους AD: ἢ πρὸς οὐδετέρους F

The AD reading cannot stand. It is all very well to speak of the emphatic double negative as Jowett–Campbell do, but a double neg-

ative does not occur in questions beginning with ἦ οὐ in Plato. The choice is then between the F reading and Cobet's conjecture—the other conjectures are listed by Adam; none is worth considering.

Since this is not a choice between two MSS readings, the principle *lectio difficilior potior* does not apply. The real question to ask is which reading better accounts for the variants in AD and F. Cobet's does. οὐδέ 'not at all', for which cf. my note on *Clit.* 409e2, is rare (even though this instance falls into the class described by Denniston [1954: 196]), so it was bound to be replaced by οὐ. If the ousted original reading was entered above the line and misinterpreted to yield οὐδετέρους, this accounts for the AD reading. The F reading would then be a trivialisation of the latter.

If Plato simply wrote ἦ πρὸς οὐδετέρους with F, it is not impossible to explain the οὐ in AD (for example through mental anticipation), but the supposition seems less likely to me. Therefore I accept Cobet's conjecture, even though somewhat reluctantly, because it goes against the grain to print a conjecture when a perfectly good MS reading is available. But I feel supported by the fact that Burnet, who here had the same facts at his disposal as I, except that he could not be certain that the double negative is un-Platonic, arrived at the same decision.

528a6 ἄναγε τοίνυν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ εἰς τοῦπίσω· νῦν [δὴ] γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἐξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῆι γεωμετρίας.

νῦν δὴ ADF: δὴ seclusi

The cluster νυνδὴ (nearly always written νῦν δὴ in the MSS) is never the first word of a sentence in Plato except here and *Sph.* 263c4 Νυνδὴ γοῦν ταύτηι συνωμολογήσαμεν (no variants reported). It certainly behaves as a postpositive, cf. *Ly.* 218e3 ὁ κάμων νυνδὴ ἔφαμεν τοῦ ἱατροῦ φίλος, where its position is obviously dictated by Wackernagel's Law (parenthetic ἔφαμεν does not constitute a separate clause, cf. my note on *Clit.* 407a5).

To print νῦν δὴ and to translate 'now', not 'just now' is not an option. νῦν δὴ almost always refers to the present or the immediate future. There is no (other) instance of νῦν δὴ γὰρ in Plato. And above all, δὴ γὰρ for γὰρ δὴ is suspect in any Greek author after Homer. Besides, I do not see any use for δὴ, which marks statements as self-evident, in this passage, where Socrates has to explain to Glauco for a full page what was wrong with putting astronomy before stereometry.

Therefore I submit that the text should be changed here and in the *Sph.* The only possible correction in both places is to delete δή.

For νῦν with the aorist, referring to the immediate past, cf. e.g. *R.* 341c4 νῦν γοῦν ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδέν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα; 592a9 ἐν ἧι νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει.

529d6 ἢ σὺ οἶει;—οὐδαμῶς γε ἔφη.

οὐδαμῶς γε F: οὐδαμῶς AD

Although an unmodified οὐδαμῶς is of course the standard in Plato, there are six instances where the MSS give οὐδαμῶς γε unanimously: *Prm.* 144a3–4; *Grig.* 462e3; *Lg.* 789a8 and a psychological cluster in book 6 of the *Politeia*: 485d2; 499a3; 506c4. (For psychological clusters, cf. my remark on 443b4 [above, p. 76].) The parallel *R.* 499a2–3 is particularly significant: ἢ οἶει;—οὐδαμῶς γε.

I suppose that in both passages οὐδαμῶς is treated as an extra constituent to an implied οὐκ οἶομαι: this would account for the addition of γε, one of whose functions is marking the addition of a constituent to a clause that is already complete, cf. my remarks on *Phd.* 58d1 (Slings [1996: 101]), and on *E.* *El.* 739–741 (Slings [1997a: 155]).

However that may be, since the questions in 499a and here are strictly parallel, so should the answers be. Therefore I gladly accept, with Burnet against all other editors, F's γε.

I criticised Burnet's 'predilection for γε', adding that it is 'probably the only weak spot in his feeling for Platonic Greek,' in my note on 461c5 (above, p. 88). Cf. note on 443a6 (above, pp. 75–76). I extended the criticism to the editors of vol. I of the new OCT (Slings [1998: 100]). I stand by what I wrote. But it is a pleasure to acknowledge that in this case, Burnet was obviously right. In this case he showed his 'uncanny feeling for Platonic Greek' (the note on 443a6 mentioned above) to a magisterial degree.

532a7 οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῶι διαλέγεσθαι †ἐπιχειροῦν ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὄρημα, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῆ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῶι γίγνεται τῶι τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τότε ἐπὶ τῶι τοῦ ὄρατοῦ.

'It is better to follow the MSS. without attempting to get over the asyndeton which is not without parallel in Plato—the clause ἄνευ ... ἀποστῆ being explanatory of οὕτω ἐπιχειροῦν.' Thus, predictably, Jowett—

Campbell, who fail to give a parallel for asyndeton, explanatory or otherwise, within a subordinate clause. The passage is also listed, under 'Apposition', Π 221. The difference with the other instances cited there jumps to the eye: one would need a forward-pointing pronoun or adverb in the same subordinate clause. οὕτω cannot count as such, since it connects the whole sentence with the previous one.

Among the various conjectures is Ast's ὄρμᾶν, which earned an undeserved popularity because it was thought to be supported by Clem.Al. *Strom.* V 11, 74, 2 (Π 375, 25–376, 2 Stählin).

I shall quote Clement in full in order to show that the putative support is not there. δυνατὸν δὲ κἂν τῶι διαλέγεσθαι τὸ καταμαντεύεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῆ τις ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὄρμᾶν καὶ μὴ ἀποστατεῖν τῶν ὄντων πρὶν κτέ. (It may be mentioned in passing that Ast's conjecture created a possible idiom [*pace* Stallbaum], which I discussed in the note on 394e5 [above, pp. 43–44]: a nominal complement is combined with a clausal one. Cf. 416a6 ἐπιχειρῆσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν. In this passage both the nominal complement τῶι διαλέγεσθαι and the clausal complement ὄρμᾶν would have to depend on ἐπιχειρῆ.)

It is easy to see that Clement's phrasing does not support Ast's infinitive. Clement detaches τῶι διαλέγεσθαι from ἐπιχειρῆ altogether, so he has no option but to use the infinitives ὄρμᾶν and ἀποστατεῖν. If anything, his wording shows that his text read ὄρμᾶι as our MSS do, and that he took both ὄρμᾶι and ἀποστῆι as subjunctives. If you change ὄρμᾶι with Ast, you are logically committed to changing ἀποστῆι as well. Clement also disproves Stephanus' καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἀποστῆι, which makes ὄρμᾶι an indicative.

We are then left with the possibility of inserting ἂν before ἄνευ (Baiter, but why an ἂν clause within a ὅταν clause? No one seems to have thought of a simple καὶ instead) or of changing ἐπιχειρῆ to ἐπιχειρῶν (mentioned in Jowett–Campbell, but neither Adam nor I have been able to trace it; it is probably an unattributed guess by Campbell himself). The second is better than the first, but I agree with Adam that it is too drastic. Clement may not after all provide evidence for ὄρμᾶν, but he does provide evidence for ἐπιχειρῆ.

I cannot solve the puzzle. ἐπιχειρῆ (καὶ) is perhaps the least unlikely, but it would put ἐπιχειρῆ, ὄρμᾶι and ἀποστῆι on the same level, whereas in fact the latter pair elaborates on ἐπιχειρῆ. Perhaps ἐπιχειρῆ ἄνευ (τε)? In some majuscule scripts TE could easily be omitted before the initial Π of πασῶν. But τε connecting clauses, which is rare in

Plato in any case (Denniston [1954: 499]), is more typically used for afterthoughts than for explanations.

535a10 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοῖνον ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἷον [δεῖν] ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι

δεῖν ADF: secl. Richards (1894: 195 = 1911: 135)

'Apparently superfluous δεῖν is adequately attested for Plato,' as R. Renehan rightly says (1976: 127). And in principle this is a better approach than Adam's specious defence of the auxiliary, which would lead to a translation like: 'you must suppose *that it must be those natures* that we must look for' (the emphasised words are Adam's translation). The sentence simply becomes too directive to be stylistically acceptable.

Is pleonastic δεῖν, then, stylistically acceptable? Renehan seems to think so, for he quotes a passage from *Ep.* 7 as a parallel for δεῖν with the verbal adjective (1976: 129). He does not, however, quote it in full. It goes: ὁμῶς ἔρρηψε δεῖν, εἴ ποτέ τις τὰ διανοηθέντα περὶ νόμων τε καὶ πολιτείας ἀποτελεῖν ἐγχειρήσοι, καὶ νῦν πειρατέον εἶναι (328b8–c2). The difference is obvious: the intervening εἰ clause occasions the pleonasm, which, moreover, is prepared for by πορευτέον καὶ ὑπακουστέον earlier in the sentence. More to the point is another passage from the same letter: 352a3–4 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔδοξε μοι ῥηθῆναι δεῖν. In our passage, however, δεῖν and ἐκλεκτέας sit cheek by jowl, and there is certainly no parallel in Plato for that (even if *Ep.* 7 is considered Platonic). An impossible combination, and δεῖν clearly has to go, as presumably it also has to at *Ep.* 7 352a4.

Richards' alternative proposal, to read ἀεὶ for δεῖν, is unconvincing: what is the point of the adverb? No doubt δεῖν is due to a scribe for whom ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι was a relatively uncommon phrase, and who therefore while copying contaminated it in his mind with δεῖν ἐκλέγειν.

538a5 τοῦτον ἔχεις μαντεύσασθαι πῶς ἂν διατεθεῖη πρὸς τε τοὺς κόλακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποβαλλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε τῷ χρόνῳ κτέ

ὑποβαλλομένους DF: ὑποβαλομένους A

Given the fact that double and single λ are constantly interchanged, the DF reading may well be a fortuitous agreement in error, and certainly the aorist in A, which is the most reliable witness for the *Politeia* that we have, may seem better.

Yet the present participle is *lectio difficilior* and can be defended quite well. A substantivized present participle may refer to a single action in the past if this action is presented as characteristic of the Agent, which it certainly is in this passage, since the only role of the ὑποβαλλόμενοι is to be there for the argument. Cf. De Strycker–Slings (1994: 393) on *Ap.* 41b8 ἄγοντα.

538b7 αἰσθόμενον τοίνυν τὸ ὄν μαντεύομαι αὖ περὶ μὲν τούτους ἀνεῖναι
 ἄν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάσειν κτέ

αἰσθόμενον Asl: αἰσθόμενος ADF || ἄν τὸ ADF: ἄν (αὐτὸν) τὸ Reinhard (1920: 183)

Schneider, Stallbaum, Adam and Reinhard defend the anacoluthon involved in the ADF reading—strangely enough, Jowett–Campbell ignore the textual problem and print the accusative without giving a hint that it is only read by A². (K.F. Hermann conjectured the accusative without knowing that it was a variant in A.) And at first sight the case for a pendent nominative might seem strong enough, given the countless parallels collected for Plato by Riddell (1877: 223–224); Jowett–Campbell II 241; Reinhard (1920: 180–185). I have discussed the phenomenon from a pragmatic perspective in CP 87 (1992), 96–100, and again in Slings (1997b: 192–203).

But there is a problem, noticed only by Reinhard. Take αἰσθόμενος as a Theme construction (cf. above, pp. 28–30) and you are bound to put its referent in its proper case in the main clause. Cf. ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετημημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ **τούτοι** λύκῳ γενέσθαι (*R.* 565d9–e1). And although Reinhard’s proposal is palaeographically speaking not very difficult, the fact that it should have to be made in the first place makes one slightly suspicious.

And there is something even more suspect. Change of person is very often the cause of a pendent nominative (CP, *l.c.*, 98), but if so, the nominative should refer to the first person here, not to the third, as in fact it does. There is one exception, which deserves to be quoted in full (it is also quoted by Reinhard [1920: 181–182]): νῦν οὖν, ᾧ παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν ἔργοι, ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας οἰδίας, ἄν μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ γε ἦ καὶ βελτίω τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν φαίνεται λεγόμενα, δώσομεν **ὑμῖν** χορὸν (*Lg.* 817d4–7).

Strictly speaking, there is a switch between a nominative and a dative here, not one between a nominative and an accusative, but let that pass. It can still be shown that this is the proverbial exception that proves the

rule. One of the most important factors that are responsible for the pendent nominative is the so-called empathy hierarchy:

1st, 2nd person > 3rd person human > 3rd person other animate > 3rd person non-animate > 3rd person abstract.

It has been shown for many languages that the higher an item is in this hierarchy, the greater are its chances to be in the nominative, or be Agent or Topic (cf. CP, *Lc.*, 98). And it has also been shown that the position of the first and second persons in this hierarchy may vary from one language to the next, and even from one language user to the next. Therefore, the sole reliable exception in Plato's works involves a first and a second person, not a first and a third person as in our passage, where the putative pendent nominative refers to a third person, whereas the main verb of the sentence, which follows quite soon after the participle (much sooner than in the *Lg.* passage), is in the first person.

I therefore refuse to accept the nominative, whatever its credentials may be. And vice versa, the correction in A (a minuscule ν above the line, without the $-\varsigma$ being deleted) may well be a conjecture without any authority. But it seems to me right all the same.

540c7 καὶ τὰς ἀρχούσας γε ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ὃ Γλαύκων· μηδὲν γάρ τι οἴου με περὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἢ εἰρηκα ἦ καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν

ἦ καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν scripsi: ἦ περὶ καὶ γυναικῶν F: ἦ περὶ γυναικῶν AD

καὶ is impossible where it stands in F, but if καὶ and περὶ were to change places, the result is a relatively rare but idiomatic construction which, I feel, the female rulers are entitled to. For the idiom cf. *R.* 524e3 ὅστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν ἦ καὶ τοῦναντίον φαίνεσθαι; *Phd.* 75c11; *Chrm.* 161b1; *Ti.* 49b4; *Lg.* 951b6.

In this scenario the two words changed places and were no longer understandable. This explains the omission of καὶ in AD.

BOOK EIGHT

543b8 ἀλλὰ μνημονεύω ἔφη ὅτι γε οὐδὲν οὐδένα ὠϊόμεθα δεῖν κεκτῆσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀθλητάς τε πολέμου καὶ φύλακας [...] αὐτῶν τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι AF: ὡς νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι D: ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄνθρωποι Adam (1890: 357)

At 419a5 and 470e9 (οἱ) ἄλλοι is used to mark the contrast between (one class in) the ideal state and the real world. Since b5 διωμολογησάμεθα, b7 ὠϊόμεθα and b8 ἀθλητάς ... πολέμου refer us back to the former passage (419a5) and to 416d4–417a5 (cf. especially 416d9 ἀθληταὶ πολέμου) which immediately precedes it, rather than to 470e9, it seems logical to assume that the contrast is between the guardians and real-life soldiers. For νῦν ‘in practice’, cf. *Phd.* 94c9; *Phdr.* 247e1; W.J. Verdenius, *Mnemos.* 11 (1958), 228. Deleting νῦν (so M. Wallies [1922: 43–44]) solves nothing.

Perhaps, however, Plato meant ‘the other citizens in the ideal state and the whole of mankind at present’; such a conflation would not be beyond him. Anyway, there is no need for Adam’s conjecture (adopted neither in his edition nor in his commentary); one may wonder why Plato did not use the more idiomatic οἱ νῦν ἄνθρωποι.

D’s ὡς is inferior to ὧν. It makes the clause ambiguous (do or don’t ‘the others now’ have private property?); it leaves, as ὧν does not, the possessions unspecified, whereas in 416d4ff. they are indeed specified at length; it is easier to explain corruption of ὧν to ὡς than vice versa.

543c4 ὀρθῶς ἔφην λέγεις. ἀλλ’ ἄγ’, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ’ ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθῶμεν πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα.

ἀλλ’ ἄγε D Thom.Mag.: ἀλλά γ’ AF

Thom.Mag. (*Ecl.* 390, 10 Ritschl) quotes this passage for ἄγε as one of the παρακελευσματικά ἐπιρρήματα. But that proves nothing more than that his Plato had the same diacritics as D. ἀλλά γε is possible in principle (cf. note on 331b5 [above, pp. 3–4]).

ἄγε, often followed by δῆ, is idiomatic with commands or exhortations related to the progress of the conversation, cf. *Sph.* 235a10;

Phlb. 39e8; *Phdr.* 237a7; *Lg.* 893b1. It invariably opens a sentence. Preceded by *ἀλλά*, followed by an adhortative subjunctive *Phd.* 116d7 (in a different context). Very similar to our passage is *Phlb.* 33a3 *ἄγε δὴ τοῖνυν ... ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνήσθαι*.

When *ἄγε* is preceded by *ἀλλά*, MSS tend to waver between *ἀλλά γε* and *ἀλλ' ἄγε* (*Phd.* 86e4 *ἀλλ' ἄγε* D: *ἀλλά γε* BCTWVPV) or to prefer the former (*Hp.Ma.* 287b4 *ἀλλ' ἄγ'* Par.gr.1811: *ἀλλά γ'* TWPF: *ἀλλά* Stallbaum because of the following *φέρει ... περιῶμαι*). It can hardly be true, as Adam claims with characteristic *ad hoc* argumentation, that *ἀλλ' ἄγε* is too vigorous in our place: the collocation tends to be formulaic, as can be seen from *Hp.Ma.* loc.cit.

544a6 ἵνα πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδόντες καὶ ἀνομολογησάμενοι τὸν ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα ἐπισκεψάμεθα εἰ ὁ ἄριστος εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ὁ κάκιστος ἀθλιώτατος ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοι.

ἀνομολογησάμενοι F: ὀμολογησάμενοι AD

The construction with the simple accusative of the person or thing agreed upon is found with *ὀμολογέω* (*R.* 598a1) and with *ἀνομολογέομαι* (*Lg.* 737c4; the active of the compound does not seem to exist). The transitive middle of *ὀμολογέω* is rare in Plato (*R.* 436c9, where Galen reads *διομολογησόμεθα*; *Cra.* 439b6) as in all fourth-century prose, but unimpeachable (cf. *X. Smp.* 4, 56).

However, *ἀνομολογέομαι* becomes a rare word after Plato. In papyri it is not found after the Ptolemaic period and most post-classical authors avoid it. Photius (α 2030 Theodoridis) explains *ἀνομολογήσασθαι* by *διομολογήσασθαι*, and likewise the Scholiast on *R.* 348b3 (*ἀνομολογούμενοι*) ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀμολογοῦντες. Therefore it is definitely unlikely that the compound was interpolated here.

545e1 ἢ βούλει ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος εὐχόμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσηγλούσας [...] ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν;

φῶμεν ADF (Π8 deficit): θῶμεν Adam

‘I once suggested *θῶμεν*’ says Adam in his commentary. I am unable to trace the publication where the suggestion was made (it is not in his edition). It was repeated by S.A. Naber (1909: 4–5).

There is some evidence for MS corruption of *θῶμεν* to *φῶμεν*. Cf.

Dodds on *Grg.* 481c1, the only instance in Plato, I think, where a change to θῶμεν is necessary. However, φημί is as acceptable as τίθημι when an imaginary speaker is introduced. Cf. *Lg.* 741a6 τὸν ... λόγον ἡμῖν φῶμεν παραινεῖν λέγοντα, where T.J. Saunders, *Notes on the Laws of Plato*, BICS Suppl. 28 (London 1972), 29–30 needlessly conjectures θῶμεν.

Proclus' remarkable distortion διὸ καὶ τὸς σαφῶς εἶπεν ὑψηλολογούμενος ἐρεῖν (*In Remp.* II 7, 26–27 Kroll) may point to φῶμεν rather than θῶμεν (that his text was the same as ours at e3 appears from *In Ti.* III 200, 5–6 Diehl τὰς Μούσας ὑψηλολογουμένας; cf. *In Eucl.* 8, 15 Friedlein).

546a2 γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν (ADF, partly Π8) is often misquoted in the Neo-Platonists. Proclus' πᾶν (τὸ) γενητὸν φθαρόν (*in Remp.* II 9, 27; II, 5 etc. Kroll; *in Ti.* I 293, 18 Diehl; ap. Phlp. *aetern.* 589, 8–9; 590, 6–7 Rabe) is Aristotelian terminology (*Cael.* 279b5 etc.), as Procl. indicates himself (*in Remp.* II 9, 26; *in Ti.* I 295, 28; ap. Phlp. 589, 7). When (τῷ) γενομένῳ is used, it almost invariably follows παντί: Procl. *in Ti.* I 287, 26; 296, 4–5; ap. Phlp. 120, 6; cf. *in Remp.* II 10, 15; Olymp. *in Alc.* 2, 8–9 Westerink (p. 1); Phlp. *opif.* 221, 13 Reichardt.

In addition, ἐξ ἀνάγκης is added to the quote Procl. *in Ti.* I 287, 27; Olymp. and Phlp. *opif.* as cited, as well as by Averroes (p. 219 Rosenthal: 'of necessity'), although it is not very likely that the words were in the Greek original of the text used by Averroes, which has been identified with Galen's *Epitome* of the *Politeia*.

We are obviously dealing with an 'oral variant', more precisely a popularised Platonist school quote. Proclus' actual text of Plato can be seen in the slightly fuller quotation ap. Phlp. *aetern.* 589, 10–11 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν. (As far as I can see Procl. always uses the aorist participle: *in Remp.* II 10, 16 should not have been corrected to the present, as it paraphrases *Ti.* 28e2–3. Simplicius' present participle [*in Cael.* 300, 18–19 Heiberg] must be a trivial error [cf. below on 549b6, p. 139]. Π8 may have had either; it cannot have had παντὶ γενομένῳ or γινομένῳ.)

547a5 ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσις

γενεᾶς ADF Plot. V 1, 7, 27: γενεῆς Procl. *in Remp.* II 79, 29 Kroll

The Homeric line alluded to is Z 211 = Y 241 ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὐχομαι εἶναι (hence εἶναι in Plato should be spaced). Plotinus, who elsewhere alludes to the invocation of the Muses (III 7,

11, 7–9), is no doubt dependent on Plato (if confirmation is needed: cf. H.R. Schwyzer, *Entretiens Hardt* 5 [1957], 314; M. Atkinson, *Plotinus: Ennead VI* [Oxford 1983], 175). He is not adverse to epic forms himself (cf. I 4, 7, 31–32 πάρ τοι ἔστιν ὁδός [= Θ 43]; IV 7, 8, 36 ψύχεος [= ι 555]; II 9, 9, 22 ἠϊδίως).

On the other hand, Proclus definitely tends to bring in epic forms even when he is quoting Plato, when the latter avoids them: *in Remp.* I 221, 16–17 οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός φησιν (sc. Socrates, subject of the two preceding sentences) οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης, where the allusion is to 544d6–7 ἢ οἶε ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίνεσθαι, harmonised by Procl. with τ 163.

J. Labarbe, *L’Homère de Platon* (Liège 1949), 324–325, claims that because Plato left ταύτης without the article it requires in Attic, he must have written γενεῆς; cf. *Sph.* 268d3 ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος. But do Attic forms necessarily entail Attic syntax? In a number of cases epic and Attic forms sit cheek by jowl: 389d2 δημιουργοὶ ἔασι ADF Stob., where the Attic form is rightly retained by Labarbe, 188, against Burnet; 612b4 τὴν Ἄιδος κυνῆν (ADF Luc. Liban. Damasc.: κυνέην Greg.Naz. Stob. Schol.: κυνέαν Olymp.). Cf. also *Phdr.* 236d2 ξύνες ὅ σοι λέγω (MSS) as against τοι at *Men.* 76d3.

Incidentally, Labarbe’s point that the article requires an Attic form of the noun, although not valid, reinforces my claim that Plotinus alludes to this passage, not directly to Homer. It is unlikely that two authors quoting Homer in a more or less Attic form should have come up independently with ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς rather than ταύτης τοι τῆς γενεᾶς. Labarbe does not mention Plotinus, and while he does cite Proclus he seems unaware of the latter’s quoting habits. There is no good reason not to follow ADF.

547b6 ἄτε οὐ πενομένω ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντε πλουσιῶ τὰς ψυχὰς, ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρετήν ... ἠγέτην·

To Adam’s arguments (commentary *ad loc.* and 1890: 357) for taking τὰς ψυχὰς as an accusative of respect with πλουσιῶ should be added what seems decisive to me, that if τὰς ψυχὰς were intended as object we should have expected it five lines earlier, with εἰλκήτην, rather than with ἠγέτην. At least one ancient reader agreed, as is shown by the high point after ψυχὰς in Π8.

549a1 καὶ δούλοις μὲν ἄν τις ἄγριος εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος.

μὲν ἄν τις scripsi: μὲν τιων prA D: μὲν τις Apr: μάντις ἄν F: μὲν τις ἄν Laur.85.7pc

It is not likely that τιων of AD is a corruption of τις ἄν: it is rather to be explained as a perseveration of δούλοις. The F reading μάντις ἄν seems to me more than a trivial slip. I suppose that ἄν was omitted (as indeed it is in AD) and added above the line in various places in ancient MSS: over μὲν (where it was mistaken for a correction of μὲν τις to μάντις) and between τις and ἄγριος. F's reading is a contamination of the two corrections.

In Plato, μὲν ἄν τις is the preferred order: *Cra.* 396b3; *Th.* 195e5; *Plt.* 281d2; *Prm.* 138b2; *Mx.* 241a3; *R.* 375d10. Only at *Plt.* 261d4–5 do we find μὲν τις ἄν, presumably because μὲν is there part of a ὁ μὲν/ὁ δέ complex.

Since Laur.85.7pc offers a correction of the F reading it has no authority, and we should follow normal Platonic usage. In a short clause like this, it is highly unlikely that we can dispense with ἄν altogether (for this possibility, cf. my note on 437b1–4 [above, pp. 70–71]).

549b6 λόγου ἦν δ' ἐγὼ μουσικῆι κεκραμένου ὃς μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σω-
τῆρ ἀρετῆς διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι.

Themistius copies the relative clause 7c (I 11, 15–16 Downey), giving ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι γιγνόμενος for ἐγγενόμενος of ADF. ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι is no doubt a conscious explanatory variation, and this also accounts for the omission of ἐγ-, but his text of Plato may have had ἐγγιγνόμενος.

There is no difference in context: both in Plato and in Themistius the relative clause contains a general statement (cf. the generic τῷ ἔχοντι). Both readings can be defended: ἐγγενόμενος is presumably to be interpreted as reinforcing the anteriority to διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ; ἐγγιγνόμενος stresses the generic character of the clause (cf. 501b5–7 ὁ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοεικέλον). Corruption (via ἐγγινόμενος) is equally likely either way, cf. 546a2 (and the note above), where Simplicius reads γι(γ)νομένωι for ADF γενομένωι.

Given the fact that Themistius has a marked tendency to introduce minor changes into his quotations and reminiscences (cf. H. Schenkl, *WS* 21 [1899], 114–115), it is safer to follow the MSS.

550a1–2 **κἄν** ἐξίων ἕτερα τοιαῦτα **ἀκούη** καὶ ὁρᾷ [...], τότε δὴ ὁ νέος κτέ

κἄν scripsi: καὶ ADF || ἀκούη AD: ἀκούει F

In Plato, τότε δὴ is almost exclusively an apodotic idiom, and there is no good parallel for its opening a new sentence. Burnet and the editors of the new OCT print a high point before it at *Thl.* 193d1, but the preceding ὅταν clause (b9–d1) is so long that it is more natural to suppose that the main clause preceding it has been lost sight of, in other words, that we here have to do with the anacoluthon in which a subordinate clause is subordinated to two main clauses: one preceding and one following it. I have discussed this type in my notes on 389a3–6 (above, pp. 39–41); 432d8–e2 (above, p. 67). (Alternatively it is possible to consider 193b9 λείπεται—τῶιδε a separate sentence.) At *Phdr.* 241a2 there is no good reason to assume that a new sentence begins.

Consequently we must here postulate, as Schneider suspected, a dependent clause to precede τότε δὴ. And it follows almost automatically that in a2 the subjunctive of AD is correct. Schneider thought that no change was necessary as ἐάν can be carried over from 549e4; he compares 540e4–541a4. There, however, ὅταν is supplied from 540d3 because only the question Πῶς; ἔφη intervenes—to all practical intents and purposes there is one long ὅταν clause stretching from 540d3 to 541a4. Here, such a carry-over of ἐάν is impossible because of the intervening main clause διακελεύονται at 549e5, itself followed by another subordinate clause, which in its turn contains an ἐπειδάν clause.

Therefore, if ἐάν cannot be supplied, it must be inserted. For κἄν corrupted to καὶ cf. 545d3 κἄν AD Π8 *recte*: καὶ F. I propose a similar remedy at 553c2 (see below, pp. 143–144).

551d9 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, τὸ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν κτέ

A has been gravely misreported here. A marginal γ' (= third flaw of oligarchy) was misread by Adam as καὶ and taken by him and Burnet for a variant of ἀλλὰ. Where DF have οὐδὲ τόδε, A had **δε (at the beginning of the line): Apc added οὐδὲ at the right-hand side of the previous line and wrote τό over the erasure. It is a logical inference that prA had ουδε, corrected to οὐδὲ τόδε. Chambry's report is absolutely wrong and Burnet's attribution of οὐδὲ τόδε to 'rec. a' is mistaken: the correction was clearly made by the scribe himself. A's exemplar may

have had οὐδέ (if so, the correction was derived from another MS), or οὐδὲ τόδε (if so, the omission of τόδε was an error of A itself), but in either case we have to do with a simple error. To read ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε καλόν (Bekker and Schneider) is to misinterpret A.

Next, A originally had εἶ|ναιπόλεμον. Arc erased ναι, added ναι to the right of εἶ, and wrote ἴσωσπ over the erasure. Once again, this is a correction due to the original scribe. Here a simple error is out of the question because DF, too, read εἶναι πόλεμον. ἴσως must have been added in A from another source. (Burnet wrongly attributed the erasure to M, through misunderstanding of Jowett–Campbell.)

A possible explanation of ἴσως may be found in the fact that A originally had ἀδυνατος; perhaps one of its ancestors had the same reading and someone wrote ἴσως ἀδυνάτους in its margin. But this explanation does not account for the place of ἴσως, and the correction of ἀδυνατος to ἀδυνάτους in A seems to have been made straight-away.

In any case, ἴσως has far weaker MS authority than has been assumed hitherto. I do not understand that to Adam it seemed ‘exactly the right word in the right place’—or rather, given Adam’s propensity to retain dubious readings by proclaiming them to be exactly right, I understand it all too well. If the clause needs a qualifier, ‘probably’ is better than ‘perhaps’, and I can think of a better place than immediately before πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν, where it is rather ambiguous. I have little doubt that ἴσως is a remnant of a marginal note. Hence conjectures like Badham’s σῶς—which I have been unable to trace—or Richards’ ἰσχυρῶς (1894: 292 = 1911: 138) do not offer the proper remedy.

It should be added that Averroes’ paraphrasis does not have the equivalent of ἴσως (p. 224 Rosenthal: ‘they are unable to ⟨wage⟩ war at all’; the Hebrew text does have an adverb, translated ‘at all’ by Rosenthal: it cannot mean ‘perhaps’).¹ As Averroes’ text is beyond doubt a translation of Galen’s epitome, it may be inferred that ἴσως was not in that epitome. Not that this means much, of course: it is precisely the word an epitomiser would leave out. I cannot think of a Greek equivalent of ‘at all’ that could even plausibly have been replaced by ἴσως.

¹ I would like to thank my former colleague Ms Dr T.A.M. Smidt van Gelder – Fontaine, who kindly answered my queries on this issue as well as those about 566e6, cf. below.

552b3–11 The MSS mark a change of speaker after b3 ἔφη, b6 πένητες, b7 ὀρθῶς and of course b11 ἀναλωτής. Schneider, followed by Adam, attributes b3–6 to Adeimantus, b7–11 to Socrates. He argues that b4–6 seem to cast doubt on what has already been proved by Socrates, and is therefore unlikely to have been spoken by him; Adeimantus may have qualified his assent with these words, as he certainly does 554b2–3.

The arrangement is possible but the argument unconvincing. It is quite normal for Socrates to buttress up a point already conceded by his partner with an *ex parte* proof (e.g. 335d3–7). If Plato wanted his readers to understand that b4–6 are spoken by Adeimantus, he would have indicated this, as he does at 554b2.

552e1–4 μὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα ἔφην ἐγὼ καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐπιμελείαι βίαι κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί;—οἰόμεθα μὲν οὖν ἔφη.

e1 οἰόμεθα ADF: οἰόμεθα Arc || e2 ἐπιμελείαι (ADF) suspectum || e4 οἰόμεθα ADF: οἰόμεθα A⁵(u.v.)

At e1 οἰόμεθα is an old correction in A, made by the hand of the scribe. Its two major descendants Laur.CS.42 (γ) and Caes.D.28.4 (M) have the subjunctive (γM do not take over readings introduced by A⁴ or A⁵, cf. Boter [1989: 85]). At e4, however, οἰόμεθα seems to have been introduced by a later hand. Here γ seems to read οἰόμεθα as a correction of an original οἰόμεθα; M now reads οἰόμεθα with an omikron above the line, but likewise an original ó seems to have been corrected. It looks as if the second οἰόμεθα is a correction made independently in AγM in order to make the answer harmonise with the question. In other words, whereas there is good MSS authority for οἰόμεθα—οἰόμεθα and some for οἰόμεθα—οἰόμεθα, there is none for οἰόμεθα—οἰόμεθα as read by Stallbaum and Adam.

Now I can think of no explanation of οἰόμεθα in the question that does not also require the subjunctive in the answer ('are we to suppose that not'—the familiar οὐκ οἶομαι, surprisingly absent from LSJ, 'are we perhaps to suppose', 'are we forbidden to suppose', cf. 337b6). Chambry prints οἰόμεθα—οἰόμεθα but his translation does not make clear how he justifies this. Therefore the indicative is probably right in the question.

The discussion of this problem in commentaries is flawed by the ineradicable notion that μὴ in questions equals Latin *num*. The value of

μή is much more subtle than this: it is used in anxious or quasi-anxious questions ('it is not, I hope, the case that', often fading to 'perhaps'). Cf. J. & A.M. Adam on *Prt.* 312a7; Denniston (1954: 47–48; what is said there about ἄρα μή goes for single μή as well, as no doubt Denniston was fully aware, but had no cause to say). Here the value is not 'we do not, then, suppose, do we' (Adam) but rather 'could it be, then, that perhaps we are assuming'.

Although I cannot quite convince myself that at e2 ἐπιμελείαι βίαι is what Plato wrote, it can certainly be defended, and it deserves a better defence than it has got. The emendations (*diligentia ac vi* Ficinus, hence ἐπιμελείαι καὶ βίαι H. Wolf, cf. *Philologus* 10 [1855] 348; ἐπιμελείαι secl. J.J. Hartman [1898: 51]; ἐπιεικεῖ βίαι Naber [1909: 6], cf. 554c12–d1 ἐπιεικεῖ ... βίαι) are not impressive, but most explanations of the transmitted text are wrong.

ἐπιμελείαι may mean 'deliberately' elsewhere (Adam), but this is not suitable here. 554c1–2 κατεχομένας βίαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας, adduced by Stallbaum and Hartman, proves that in our place ἐπιμελείαι is a dative of instrument and βίαι one of manner, cf. (with Jowett–Campbell) 359c5–6 νόμοι δὲ βίαι (AF: καὶ βίαι D) παράγεται. Contrast 344a7–8 κατὰ συμκρόν ... καὶ λάθρα καὶ βίαι ἀφαιρεῖται, where three expressions of manner are coordinated and an asyndeton is impossible.

Yet the explanation may be too specious. 'By means of wakefulness they forcibly repress' is not a felicitous expression, and the juxtaposition of the two datives, no matter how dissimilar their functions, is, to my mind, a little clumsy. At 359c5–6 νόμοι δὲ βίαι there is at least an intervening particle.

I may be permitted another conjecture, although it is not good enough to be put in the text. When one considers the frequency of words ending in -αι in this six-word clause, the suspicion that one -αι is adventitious arises. Since the adjective ἐπιμελής is relatively rare but well-attested for Plato (less than ten occurrences, discounting adverbs), one may suspect that Plato wrote ἐπιμελεῖ. If he did, the word was bound to be corrupted in this context. But elsewhere, he uses ἐπιμελής only of gods, meaning 'caring for' (*Smp.* 197d7, *Lg.* 900c9 etc.), and in the expression ἐπιμελές ἐστι (*Lg.* 763e2; 824a9; cf. *Smp.* 172c5). When all is said and done, I retain the transmitted text, though not without misgivings.

553c2–4 ἰδὼν δὲ γε ὃ φίλε ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα, δείσας οἴμαι εὐθύς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ

ψυχῆι φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκείνο, **κἄν** ταπεινωθεῖς ὑπὸ πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα **ξυλλέγεται**, ἄρ' οὐκ οἶει τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκείνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίξειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας παραζωννύντα;

κἄν scripsi: καὶ ADF || ξυλλέγεται ADF: ξυλλέγεται Scor.y.1.13

The indicative in Scor.y.1.13, adopted by all editors, may just possibly be an ancient reading (Boter [1989: 218–219]), but there is a more than even chance that it is a correction. If so, one may wonder if it is right. I submit that κἄν should be written at c2, the subjunctive retained at c4, and a comma printed after it. This would make the metaphors ἐπι κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου and εἰς ... τὸν θρόνον ἐκείνον ... ἐγκαθίξειν more closely parallel than they are in the received text, since they are no longer separated from each other by another indicative (ξυλλέγεται). (The asyndeton that ensues if ξυλλέγεται plus full stop is printed can be paralleled from 562d8.) The choice of the present, not the aorist, subjunctive is natural enough given κατὰ σμικρὸν.

For κἄν corrupted to καὶ cf. above, note on 550a1–2 (p. 140). Naturally, there are cases enough in which a subjunctive replaces an indicative in our tradition, e.g. 553a3 γίγνεται A *recte*: γίγνηται DF. But if good sense can be made of a subjunctive unanimously transmitted at the cost of changing only one letter elsewhere, it would be a very timid critic indeed who would cling not even to the *paradosis* but to the vulgate.

554b6–7 οὐ δοκῶ ἔφη οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἠγεμόνα τοῦ χοροῦ **ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτί(μα) μάλιστα**.—**Eῦ** ⟨**⟩ ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τότε δὲ σκοπεῖ.

ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτί(μα) μάλιστα. Eῦ Schneider: post Eῦ lacunam statui, vocibus ⟨γε⟩ vel ⟨λέγεις⟩ vel. simil. supplendam: ἐστήσατο: καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα εῦ ADF

Nothing at all can be made of καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα εῦ as an answer, so with all subsequent editors I gladly take over Schneider's brilliant correction and redistribution of the words over the interlocutors. I feel slightly embarrassed that I have to be so pedantic as to point out that this cannot be the definitive solution.

Eῦ as a self-contained answer is contrary to Platonic usage. *Prt.* 309b3–5 cannot justify it: καὶ πῶς πρὸς σέ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;—Eῦ comes closest, but there Eῦ is an answer to a question asking for a modal qualifier, whereas in our place it is not prepared for in any way.

Therefore I assume that one or more words have been lost after it. Cf. Richards (1911: 139) ‘εὖ is not at all appropriate; also we should expect εὖ γε’ (Richards goes on to propose εἶεν, which is, as he says, ‘quite in place’. But his explanation of the corruption ‘ἦν may be responsible for the loss of εν’ is hardly satisfactory.)

556a4 καὶ οὐτε ἐκείνηι ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἐθέλουσιν ἀποσβεννύναι [...] οὐτε τῆιδε κτέ

καὶ οὐτε F: οὐτε γ’ A: καὶ οὐτε γε D

D’s text looks perfectly acceptable: when Socrates opens a new statement or question with καὶ (after his interlocutor’s assent), another particle (γε, δὴ, ἄρα) is normally added. But it would be very curious, given the nature of our transmission, if of an original καὶ οὐτε γε only D had preserved the whole and A and F only parts of it. D’s reading is almost certainly a contamination of those of A and F, and we have to choose between these two.

A’s reading can comfortably be ruled out because there is no parallel for the collocation οὐτε γε in Plato (and this is of course an additional argument against the D reading as well). Richards may have felt this when he proposed οὐτε γάρ (1894: 293; not in *Platonica* [1911]), but γάρ cannot be right. Socrates does not make the point that because the rich are unwilling to take legal measures, they increase the idle poor: they do so because of their greed, and in addition they refuse to take measures.

For καὶ opening an answer without another particle, cf. 560a4 (559e9 is textually uncertain; 567a5 γε [AD] is obviously right against F’s τε). See *Ly.* 216d7 for καὶ οὐτε similarly opening a statement after an interlocutor’s assent.

[See *Additional Notes*, p. 193.]

558a4–8 τί δέ; ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὐπω εἶδες ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἦπτον αὐτῶν μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφομένων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὐτε φροντίζοντος οὐτε ὀρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἦρως;

The smallest problem in this difficult sentence is the shift from plural (ἀνθρώπων through ἀναστρεφομένων) to the singular (περινοστεῖ). The examples adduced by Reinhard (1920: 141–149; cf. Jowett–Campbell II 245) are ample ground for retaining περινοστεῖ, which may be attested

in Hsch. π 1772 Schmidt. Corrections like <ὁ ἄνθρωπος> περινοστεῖ (R.G. Bury, PCPS 1, 1951, 3), περινοστοῦσιν (H. van Herwerden, *Mnemos.* 19 [1891], 337), περινοστεῖν (K. Vretska, WS 71 [1958], 50–51), let alone that of rewriting the entire sentence in the singular or plural (Richards [1894: 293 = 1911: 140–142]) can be dismissed.

Likewise to be dismissed is Wilamowitz' way out of the problem by making ἦ οὐ πῶ εἶδες ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πολιτεία a separate question followed by a question-mark (1919: 385). As Vretska rightly notes, Adeimantus' answer καὶ πολλούς γ' does not fit an εἶδες contained in what is in fact a parenthetical question.

I refer to Adam for proof that in the genitive absolute ἀνθρώπων ... φυγῆς, ἀνθρώπων is subject not the complement. Burnet's deletion of ἀνθρώπων makes no sense to me.

Now, if ἀνθρώπων is the subject of the genitive absolute, it follows that αὐτῶν μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφόμενων cannot be a genitive absolute as well, because, among other things, αὐτῶν would be superfluous on that assumption. Hence Schneider's αὐτοῦ (endorsed by W. Teuffel, NJPhP 113 [1876], 113; Wilamowitz *loc.cit.*), for which see my note on 514b1 (above, p. 121). But let us first see where this thread leads us. If αὐτῶν μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφόμενων is not a genitive absolute, it must be complement of εἶδες, singular though the genitive is. One may cite X. *Mem.* I 1, 11 οὐδεὶς ... Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβές ... οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν, but of course the presence of ἤκουσεν makes the genitive more palatable (although the order εἶδεν ... ἤκουσεν should make us pause before dismissing its support altogether).

But I wonder if the explanation that the words are in the genitive through attraction to the preceding genitive absolute can hold water. If it can, the rest of the sentence is perfectly regular. The καὶ that precedes ὥς, bracketed by H. Weil (RPh 8 [1884], 171–172) connects the genitive complement of εἶδες with a second one, consisting of a ὥς clause, which itself contains a lengthy genitive absolute, so a second genitive complement of εἶδες would have been stylistically impossible and the use of ὥς imperative. 'Or haven't you ever seen in such a state, after men were condemned to death or banishment, that they (αὐτῶν) stay there none the less and go about in their midst, and that without anybody caring or noticing such a man walks around like a ghost?'

This is an account that satisfies me; discussing alternatives such as Schneider's αὐτοῦ (which may be right), Weil's deletion of καί, or taking ὥς as modifying οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὀρώντος οὐδενός, would not bring us substantially further.

[In his edition, Slings accepts Weil's seclusion of καί; we have no indication as to what made him change his mind.]

558b5 ἡ δὲ ξυγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ' ὅπως οἰοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν ὠικίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μὴ τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι οὐποτ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὧν εὐθύς παίζει ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύει τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς **καταπατήσασα πάντα ταῦτα** οὐδὲν φροντίζει ἐξ ὁποίων ἂν τις ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικά ἰὼν πράττη, ἀλλὰ τιμᾷ, ἐὰν φῆι μόνον εὖνους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει;

καταπατήσασα πάντα ταῦτα scripsi, Mon.237² secutus (-σασ' ἄπ-): καταπατήσας ἅπαντ' αὐτὰ Ar (av- ex -a facto): καταπατήσας ἅπαντα ταῦτα D: καταπατήσας ταῦτα πάντα F

The D reading seems to be correct but for the word division. The subject of φροντίζει can only be democracy, not a promising young man (cf. ἐξ ὁποίων ἂν τις ἐπιτηδευμάτων). As this subject is only expressed indirectly by αὐτῆς at the beginning of this long sentence, the presence of τις (in the clause εἰ μὴ τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι) may easily have led to the interpretation of καταπατήσασ(α) as a male participle. The same interpretation must underlie F's reading.

It looks as if A's source had *απαντατα*, which was corrected by A *currente calamo*. If so, the reading of the source is more likely to be a corruption of ταῦτα than of αὐτὰ. αὐτὰ would be preferable still if it referred to τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, but it does not. With τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα the education of the guardians is meant; πάντα ταῦτα or ἅπαντ' αὐτὰ takes up ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύοντες.

The corrector of Mon.237 may have hit the mark, but if ἅπαντα is right, would Plato not rather have used *scriptio plena* to avoid misunderstanding? Cf. on 514a4 (above, p. 110).

559b4 ἡ μὲν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφοτέρω ἀναγκαῖα, ἧι τε ὠφέλιμος ἧι τε **παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή**.

To the corrections listed in Adam's Appendix III to Book VIII (II 314–315; πεινῶντα was read by H. Wolf, cf. Philol. 10 [1855], 348) the following can be added: παῦσαι ζῶντ' ἀδύνατον M. Wallies, BPhW 42 (1922), 44; παῦσαι ζῶντ' or ζῶντι ἀδύνατος A.J. Egelie, *Observationes criticae in Platonem* (diss. University of Amsterdam, Kerkrade-Heerlen 1902), 66–68; παῦσαι ζῶντι ἀδύνατα A. Prandtl (1904: 28–30); παύσασθαι ζῶντος

ἀδυνατέι Wilamowitz (1919: 385–386; but in Classical Greek ἀδυνατέω has only persons as subject); παῦσαι [ζῶντα] <οὐ> δυνάτη A. von Bamberg, *Philol.* 23 (1865), 352–353. Athenaeus 511f reads παῦσαι ζῶντας δυνάτη; πεινῶντας for ζῶντας is a conjecture of Musurus’ in the Aldine of Ath.

None of these is even tolerably convincing, and we have to accept the transmitted text, which means ‘and in that it is capable of putting an end to man’s life’ (if not fulfilled).

559d8 ὅταν νέος, τεθραμμένος ὡς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδευτός τε καὶ φειδωλῶς, γεύσεται **κηφήν ὄν** μέλιτος κτέ

κηφήν ὄν Naber (1909: 7): κηφήνων ADF

The ‘honey of the drones’ is perplexing, not just because it is biologically incorrect but because the entire imagery was brought in because the drones live off the honey collected by others (564e9–10). To interpret κηφήνων μέλιτος as ‘honey taken by the drones’, even if this were possible in itself, makes no good sense. The young man has been brought up ἀπαιδευτός τε καὶ φειδωλῶς, and it is the taste of honey itself that causes his change (unless we are to assume that stolen honey is sweeter, but that would be a very obscure point indeed).

Commentators are slightly baffled; Vretska (*Gymnasium* 63 [1956], 418–419) speaks of the ‘Unbekümmertheit um die realen Unmöglichkeiten, die Platon dem Leser zumutet.’ The democracy passage is of course notorious for that, but Naber’s correction does more than remove an entomological absurdity. Socrates is here speaking not of all young men but of those who are filled with unnecessary desires (cf. c8–11). κηφήν ὄν makes the distinction in this sentence.

559e1 ἐνταῦθά που οἶου εἶναι ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς <πολιτείας> ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς δημοκρατικὴν.

<πολιτείας> post μεταβολῆς scripsi, quod Adam post e2 ἑαυτῷ inseruerat

A lacuna is far more likely than corruption of ὀλιγαρχίας and δημοκρατίαν to -ικῆς ... -ικὴν (cf. Adam). Jowett–Campbell’s suggestion μεταβολῆς <ἐξ> ὀλιγαρχικῆς is not enough, because we still need a noun. A. Busse’s <ἐκ ψυχῆς> (*WKPh* 36 [1919], 214) is too pleonastic given τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ; so is, to a lesser extent, van Herwerden’s <ἐξεως> (*Mnemos.* 35 [1907], 598).

Adam's alternative suggestion that πολιτείας has fallen out (1890: 357) has much to recommend itself, but when placed after ἐαυτῶι the word order is unacceptable because of the predicative position and function of ὀλιγαρχικῆς. It should be put either before or after ὀλιγαρχικῆς, and I agree with Burnet that before it is better, in order to prevent ambiguity.

The expression ⟨πολιτείας⟩ ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἐαυτῶι equals ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἐν ἐαυτῶι. Cf. 551a12 πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς (ADF Stob.: ὀλιγαρχικῆς secl. Naber [1909: 6]); *Lg.* 756e9–10 μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, and for πολιτεία ... ἐν ἐαυτῶι *R.* 590e3–591a1 ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν; 574e1–2 δημοκρατούμενος ἐν ἐαυτῶι; 550b5–6; 553c6; 579c5.

560a4 καὶ **τοτὲ** μὲν οἶμαι τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε τῶι ὀλιγαρχικῶι ...—...—αὐθις δὲ οἶμαι κτέ

τοτὲ scripsi: ποτὲ ADF

No classical Attic author uses ποτὲ μὲν (whether answered by ποτὲ [τοτὲ] δέ or by an equivalent of it, as here), except Xenophon and Aristotle, who are certainly classical authors, although neither may count as Attic ones. (The concept of 'Classical Attic' is dubious in the extreme in any case.) There is at any rate no parallel in Plato, who does not use ποτὲ δέ either. Hence we have to change to τοτὲ μὲν (cf. 380d4; 561c7; 605c2), presupposing a fairly easy corruption. Cf. *Men.* 88b3, where F reads τότε μὲν, BTW ποτὲ μὲν according to Bluck, who does not give information about τοτὲ δέ (BWF read τότε δέ; on the Free University microfilm of F I read τότε μὲν [sic], but I cannot make out whether the grave accent on τότε is original); *Thi.* 170c4, where the new OCT records τότε μὲν ... τότε δέ for W (with superscribed π in both cases), ποτὲ twice for BD, and πόττε twice for T. Brandwood records more than one hundred instances of ποτέ in the authentic works.

560d6 καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἠλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἕξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὔσαν **πείθοντες** ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

ὡς om. D || πείθοντες ADF: τιθέντες R.G. Bury, CR 20 (1906), 14

Bury argues that πείθοντες is out of place because the young man's soul is already dominated by the ἀλαζόνες λόγοι of c8–9 (cf. b6 κατέλαβον; c3 κατέσχον; d2 κρατούσι). His second argument, that the personal object of πείθοντες should have been expressed, is very weak indeed.

But his change is no improvement. ὡς ... οὔσαν τιθέντες would mean 'regarding as', which fits ὀνομάζοντες and καλοῦντες less well than πείθοντες does. (The meaning 'calling' requires the middle and a different construction, cf. *Cra.* 402b2; *Tht.* 157c1). Running out of synonyms after ὀνομάζοντες and καλοῦντες (and needing one more to match ὠθοῦσιν ... ἐκβάλλουσι ... ὑπερορίζουσι), Plato used πείθοντες 'passing them off as', which is close enough.

For ὡς ... οὔσαν as complement of πείθοντες, cf. *Phdr.* 245a6–7 πεισθεις ὡς ἄρα ... ἰκανὸς ποιητῆς ἐσόμενος. Jowett–Campbell's complicated explanation is perfectly superfluous. D's omission of ὡς yields dubious syntax. *Th.* IV 17, 1, quoted by LSJ πείθω A I 1, is no real support for πείθω with accusative and participle.

561a3 ἄρ' οὐχ οὔτω πως ἦν δ' ἐγὼ νέος ὢν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου εἰς τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν;

εἰς DF: om. A

Schneider's spirited defence of the A reading has persuaded most editors to adopt it, but I do not think his arguments hold water. If a (non-internal) accusative after μεταβάλλω does not simply denote the person or thing affected by a change, we always have to do with the sense 'to change and adopt (acquire) something' (cf. K.-G. II 563). Cf. *Tht.* 181c6–7 ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ (similarly *Ti.* 58c2; *Lg.* 760e1; 904d7); *Phdr.* 241a2–3 μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ... καὶ προστάτην; *R.* 424c3–4 εἶδος γὰρ καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν εὐλαβητέον; *Cra.* 405d6–7.

Genuine intransitive μεταβάλλω always requires a prepositional phrase. Strict logic would require μεταβάλλει ἐκ ... τρεφομένου εἰς ... ἐλευθερωθέντα here, but cf. 620a7–8 κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἴρεσιν; *Ep.* δ 353e4–5.

563d5 ἐννοεῖς ὡς ἀπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, ὥστε κἂν ὀτιοῦν δουλείας **τις προσφέρηται**, ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι;

τις secl. E. Berti, RFIC 101 (1973), 301–302; τισί Adam (edition); προσφέρει W.H. Thompson (*The Gorgias of Plato* [London 1871], 70; JPh 5 [1874], 217)

Berti's deletion of τις is based on Cicero's translation (*Rep.* I 43, 67 *ut si minima uis adhibeatur imperii, irascantur et perferre nequeant*). However, Cicero has no scruples in using a passive form where Plato has the active or at any rate, as here, transitive form. Cf. 562d6 τοὺς ... τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηγόους προπηλακίζει—*eos qui pareant principibus agitari ab eo populo*. His testimony is therefore to be used with great caution.

The problem is whether or not Plato can be credited with middle προσφέρομαι in the sense of προσφέρω. This is the only passage in his works, or indeed in fourth-century Greek, where this usage is found. Plato's general treatment of compound verbs suggests that this is not unthinkable. Cf. my note on *Clit.* 408d1; *Phlb.* 57a5 προηνεγκάμεθα and possibly *Smp.* 190a6 περιφερόμενον (cf. Brandwood s.v. περιφέρειν). I see no overriding reason to change the text.

566e6 ὅταν δέ γε οἶμαι πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγήη, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρη, καὶ ἡσυχία ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμουσ τινὰς ἀεὶ κινεῖ, ἴν' ἐν χρεῖαι ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ἦι.

πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς del. Lloyd-Jones, ap. M. Amit, CR 19 (1969), 4–6, cf. 6 n.1

Lloyd-Jones's deletion of πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς as a gloss on πολέμουσ τινὰς (e8) yields easier syntax and gets rid of a problem of interpretation, but it is not altogether satisfactory. ἐκείνων (e7) rather emphatically refers to a group of people who 'are no longer troublesome'. If this group is not defined in the context, I do not see why Plato should not have written αὐτῶν.

Besides, if the phrase is deleted, τοῖς μὲν/τοὺς δέ would create the impression that the tyrant has either appeased or destroyed the entire population; the words would seem to neglect the majority that had supported him. Also, the contrast between this statement and the previous question (d8–e4) would be almost insurmountable: after the tyrant's initial benevolence he would all of a sudden prove to have killed a substantial part of the population—not his initial opponents, since these were already destroyed earlier (cf. a1; c7).

These objections can be met if a specific group has been mentioned in the context. Therefore, πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς is a necessary addition, and there can be no doubt that the tyrant's exiled enemies are meant, cf. P. Shorey, CR 19 (1905), 438–439. It is absurd to say, as Amit does, that the phrase is an 'unlikely elliptical expression'. The tyrant's enemies are mentioned 566a3 and a9, and implied a12–b2, c1–5 and d1. Their exile is referred to at 565e7 ἀνδρηλατήη, as well as in the quo-

tation of the oracle. As Adam remarks, the ἀναδασμός γῆς is facilitated by their having fled the city. In short, the meaning of τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς is no problem. Shorey rightly points out that οἱ ἔξω regularly refers to a party in exile; to his references add S. *OC* 444.

Syntactically speaking, the problem is of course the use of πρὸς. We might have preferred a Theme construction in the accusative (cf. notes on 365b4–7 [above, pp. 28–30] and on 538b7 [above, pp. 132–133]), as 592a1–3 τιμάς ... τῶν μὲν ... ἄς δ' ἄν κτέ, but the juxtaposition of τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς and τοῖς μὲν would have been very harsh. The addition of πρὸς, ‘in dealing with’, circumvents the problem, though the phrase πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς does become rather loosely connected with the rest of the sentence. Calling it an anacoluthon, as Amit does, is going much too far.

It may be useful to add that the disputed phrase is found in Averroes’ commentary (‘When he has made peace with the external enemies’, p. 235 Rosenthal), and was therefore in Galen’s epitome of the *Politeia*. Explanatory interpolations found as early as the second century CE are not, perhaps, to be excluded entirely, but they are very rare. (A possible case in point is 429e1 [for which see my note on p. 66]. I am now inclined to delete τὸ βαφέν, even though it is already in Theophrastus.)

567a2 οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες γιγνώμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζονται εἶναι καὶ ἦττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσι;

τῷ Arist.: τῷ vel τῷ Apc (certe -ω): τὸ prA DF

In A, -ο has been changed to -ω by the first scribe. Whether or not the same hand changed the grave into a circumflex is doubtful (Laur.CS.42 [γ] and Caes.D.28.4 [M] have τῷ, but that could easily be a copyist’s correction); no iota is added.

Schneider and Adam refer to Arist. *Pol.* 1313a18–21 καὶ τὸ πένητας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους τυραννικόν, ὅπως ἢ τε φυλακὴ τρέφεται καὶ πρὸς τῷ καθ’ ἡμέραν ὄντες ἀσχοιοὶ ὧσιν ἐπιβουλεύειν. They do not indicate, but must have realised, that Aristotle is actually paraphrasing Plato (cf. πένητες γιγνώμενοι; πρὸς τῷ καθ’ ἡμέραν ... εἶναι; ἐπιβουλεύωσι). His words may be used, if prudently, to restore Plato’s text.

εἶναι πρὸς τινι ‘to be engaged in, busy with something’ is common. The accusative does not seem to be used in this sense. βοῶδι γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἰᾶσθαι is ‘to arrive at, get round to’. The idioms may be related, but the difference in case is essential.

567e3 τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἄν ἐθελήσειέν **πως** τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν δορυφόρων ποιήσασθαι;

πως Bessarion (Marc.187pc): πῶς cum signis alterius interlocutoris ADF: fortasse omnino secludendum

A has double points before and after πῶς and a paragraphos in the margin (the scribe later added a comma underneath the first double point, to mark it as a question). D likewise has a double point before and after πῶς. In F there is a high point before πῶς and a double point after it.

All three primary witnesses therefore indicate a change of speaker after ἐθελήσειεν and after πῶς. But it is impossible to accept their authority. Nowhere else in Plato does a speaker interrupt another's question with a simple πῶς (there is no true interruption at 540e3). Besides, πῶς is a very clumsy question to ask here. If an interruption is intended, τί or τὸ ποῖον is what one would expect. And since Socrates has hardly started his question, why interrupt him at all?

The obvious remedy is reading ἐθελήσειέν πως and giving the whole sequence e3–5 to Socrates, as Bessarion did. But the obvious is not always right. πως is not very attractive: its position in the sentence is slightly irregular, though not impossible, cf. 466c1–2 πλέον εἶναι πως ἡμῖν παντός. Can it mean 'in some way or other' (which it doesn't do all that often in Plato: normally πως qualifies adverbs: ἄλλως πως, μόγως πως, ὅδε πως, or conjunctions: εἴ πως)? It does not express doubt as it does in dubious or paradoxical statements (466c1–2 as quoted above; 479a8; 603e9). To the best of my knowledge, Plato does not elsewhere use πως in questions containing the optative plus ἄν.

Of course πως may be corrupt, but I cannot think of a correction that even begins to convince me: ἴσως, πού, ποτε are all at variance with Plato's *usus* in questions with the potential optative. Perhaps πως can be accounted for as a misplaced ancient variant or correction of τίς, which is not without its problems either (τί Laur.80.19pc: τοὺς Aldina)? If so, it is definitely unlikely: if a question starts with πῶς δέ, a negative is invariably the next word in Plato.

Therefore, I reluctantly print πως, because I cannot entirely exclude that it is what Plato wrote. I would greatly prefer to delete it altogether, but I don't see how it came to be interpolated.

Note on correcting hands in D

Autopsy of D has convinced me that in book 8, and in some earlier books as well, there is another hand not recognised by Boter (1989: 92–94), writing in an ink of the same hue as D¹, but much diluted, with a very thin pen, to be called here ‘D^x’; D^x adds some accents in a very haphazard and thoughtless way [e.g. 552e10, where D¹ had already correctly written τῶσαῦτα, D^x adds a grave on the first syllable, thus changing the word to τὸσαῦτα]; D^x must be dated between D¹ and D², as can be seen from 552c3, where D¹ had written κήφηνα, D^x added a silly grave on the second eta, which was changed by D² to a circumflex; at 557c2 the correct reading ἐγγίγνοιτο is due to D^x [prD ἐγγίγνοιτο]; at 579b2, D originally had the correct reading φροῦρούμενος; D^x changed the first syllable φρου- to φροῦ-, thus absurdly reading φροῦρούμενος; D² covers the ρ and the υ of D¹ with its characteristic dark brown ink, thus reading φροῦμενος; D^x is not, I think, active in books I–IV, but my search has not been extensive; it was probably D^x who added an extra acute on ἀπό τε [so D¹] at 451b9 ἂ τότε, thus reading ἄ ποτε [sic], where D² changed the breathing to a rough one: ἄ ποτε; at 486b11 D¹ had wrongly written δίαια, which a later hand changes to δικαία (Boter thinks it was D³, but the colour of the ink does not match his description ‘a pale, bluish ink’ [93], nor is it D² or D⁴, so it is presumably D^x).

BOOK NINE

571c2 λέγεις δὲ τίνας ἔφη ταύτας;

δὲ DF: δὲ καὶ A: δὴ Stob. (III 1, 57 = III 22, 10 Hense)

The A reading seems to me a contamination of two different expressions: λέγεις δὲ ὃ ἔξενε τίνας τούτους χορούς κτέ (*Lg.* 664d5; cf. *Clit.* 409a1; *R.* 550c10) and καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους ὃ Σώκρατες; (*Men.* 91b6). I can think of no good reason why Plato could not himself be guilty of such a contamination, not found elsewhere in his works, except that the function of καὶ becomes strange at best. It will have to be the non-additive focus particle, traditionally translated ‘actually’ (Denniston [1954: 316–323]), but that is not used before interrogatives, if Denniston’s inventory can be trusted: καὶ preceding an interrogative is always the connective particle (Denniston [1954: 309–311]). So I prefer to dismiss δὲ καὶ as a scribal error. Dover in Denniston (1954: 585 [Addenda]) wishes to read τίνας δὲ καὶ λέγεις κτέ, but that is rewriting rather than editing.

Both δέ and δὴ are possible. Λέγεις δέ asks for additional information or interpretation, Λέγεις δὴ (the rarer idiom, found only *Phlb.* 48d6; *Hp.Mi.* 371a1 with δὲ δὴ a variant reading [F, as against TW, cf. Vancamp (1996: 120)]) marks the question as an inference (*Phlb.* l.c.) or asks for a clarification *Hp.Mi.* l.c. (‘You are a liar, Hippias.’—οὐδαμῶς ὃ Σώκρατες; λέγεις δὴ τί καὶ πρὸς τί;). On the whole, δέ seems to fit Platonic usage better here.

573d1 τὸ τῶν παιζόντων ἔφη τοῦτο, σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς.

The scholion quotes the proverb (twice) as σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς (Greene [1938: 237]), and so, without τοῦτο, is it used *Phlb.* 25b7, with φράσεις instead of ἐρεῖς. Cf. also 432c2, where I overlooked the proverbial saying in my note (see above, pp. 66–67).

Therefore τοῦτο goes with τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, and a comma should be printed after it, which no edition does. Cf. *Smp.* 221b2 τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο; *Grg.* 508d1–2 τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. If anything, Plato’s fondness of parenthetical ἔφη favours my reading of the passage.

573d3 οἶμαι γὰρ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔορται γίνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κῶμοι καὶ **θαλία** καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα

θαλία DF Didymus (Miller, *Mélanges*, 401): θαλια prA: θάλεια Arc

Adam rightly points out that θάλεια is an adjective, although he wrongly attributes this doctrine to Schneider, who in fact denies it. It is in fact in Eustathius: Θαλία δὲ ὡς καρδία παροξυτόνως αὐτὴ ἢ εὐωχία ... Θάλεια μέντοι προπαροξυτόνως εὐωχίας ἐπίθητον καὶ Μούσης δὲ καὶ Νηρηΐδος ὄνομα (II 683 van der Valk). LSJ follow suit, except that s.v. θάλεια they have the following entry: 'II. as subst., = θαλία 1 in pl., Pl. R. 573d (nisi hoc legendum)'.

I find it very strange that Burnet, who could have known from Adam that θαλια is in D and from Schneider that it is in F, prints what he took as the text of A without comment. Chambry prints θαλια and gives it as F's reading in the apparatus (he does not recognise D as an independent witness). Boter (in his collation of ADF, not in his book) was the first to see that the scribe of A originally had θαλια, and that only when he put in the diacritics he changed it to θάλεια.

Since it is very well possible that the scribe of A changed the spelling of the word without authority, it is foolish to cling to θάλεια simply because A is the oldest MS. And even if the scribe did have authority, that would only mean that the two words were confused in late antiquity, which we already knew, e.g. from Hesychius.

575c3 καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πρὸς τύραννον πονηρία τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐδ' **ἔκταρ** βάλλει.

ἔκταρ A in textu et bis in scholio, D in textu et bis in scholio: ἔκταρ F in textu (u.v.) et in scholio quod textui irrepsit, A⁵ in scholio: ἔκταρ A semel in scholio, D semel in scholio

I refrain from giving the readings of the indirect tradition (cf. Boter [1989: 350]), because the editions are rarely trustworthy enough. Thus, in his edition of the scholia Greene prints (under the heading **ἔκταρ** taken over from Burnet) three times ἔκταρ although the facsimile of A, the only source for this scholium, clearly has ἔκταρ the first two times and almost certainly ἔκταρ the third time. And this despite the fact that the scholium derives the word ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰκνεῖσθαι. Similarly, Latte gives ἔκταρ twice in the text of Hsch. ι 504, where the same derivation is given, but since his apparatus, for reasons best known to him, dispenses

with diacritics altogether, one has to turn to the edition of Schmid to find that the MS has no diacritic at all the second time and spells ἴκταρ (presumably) the first time.

The F scholium (incorporated into the text by an absent-minded scribe) was edited by Boter (1989: 106). The D scholium is one of the very few of the first hand in D, not to be confused with the numerous scholia written by D² and taken over from W. It runs as follows: ἴκταρ· ἐγγύς(·) ἔστι δὲ παρουσία τὸ οὐδ' ἴκταρ βάλλεις ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ οὐδ' ἴκταρ ἦκεις: (I apologise for reporting this scholium from a microfilm: I stupidly mislaid the notes I took in Venice). The scholium of A⁵ runs: ἴκταρ, ση(μαίνει) τὸ ἐγγύς(·)

What Plato wrote is, of course, ΙΚΤΑΡ. How he may have pronounced it is anybody's guess. Of course the rough breathing in A and Hsch. was probably influenced by the etymology, but the rough breathing in D cannot be similarly explained.

Etymologists tell us that the word comes from the stem also found in Lat. *ici*, *ictus*. If this is correct (the τ is hard to account for), the smooth breathing is original. But I see no reason why popular etymology may not have associated the word with *ικνεῖσθαι* long before the Greek etymological lexica did, cf. especially the proverb οὐδ' ἴκταρ ἦκεις as reported in the A and D scholia. If so, the rough breathing may in fact be quite old.

It is my policy in these matters, as it was Burnet's, to follow A unless this is manifestly impossible. That is not the case here.

576c3 τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ.

τοῖς—δοκεῖ om. F Ficin., secl. Stark (1962: 287) || πολλὰ καὶ AD: καὶ πολλὰ Scoryl.13: πολλὰ Par.1810 (Adam wrongly attributes a reading πολλὰ δοκεῖ to Schol., who in fact has no lemma at all): ἄλλα Van Herwerden (1884: 330)

The position of καὶ has tempted two intelligent Byzantine scribes to correct the transmission, but the AD text is sound. It might be translated as: 'As for the many, many are their opinions as well'. I take τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς as Theme, from which πολλὰ is derived as Topic, followed in its turn by the Focus δοκεῖ, properly preceded by the focus particle καὶ. Cf. 477a10–11 ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξύ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον and my note (above, pp. 95–97).

The writing bears too much the stamp of Plato's Greek for its omission in F to count for much, even though Glauco's answer ignores the remark (cf. Adam ad loc.).

576d3 τί οὖν ἀρετῆι τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς βασιλευομένην, οἶαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν;

γρ ἀρετῆι Amg: ἄρα ἢ DF: ἄρα ἢ A: ἄρ' ἀρετῆι Ruijgh, *haud spernenda lectio*

It has to be pointed out that A not only wrote his marginal variant, but also indicated in the text that it is a variant for ἄρα ἢ, by putting a dot above, and slightly to the left of the ἄ of ἄρα and another above, and slightly to the right of ἢ. Disregarding the variation ἄρα/ἄρα, the only two transmitted readings are therefore τί οὖν ἀρετῆι τυραννουμένη πόλις and τί οὖν ἄρα ἢ τυραννουμένη πόλις. There is no authority for τί οὖν ἀρετῆι ἢ τυραννουμένη πόλις, which given πρὸς βασιλευομένην is illogical in any case.

Is ἀρετῆι indispensable for the meaning? It is easily supplied from ἀρετῆι καὶ εὐδαιμονία in the preceding question, c9–d1. Yet the structure of the argument leaves little doubt that it cannot be missed: c9 ἀρετῆι καὶ εὐδαιμονία; d3 ἀρετῆι; d7 εὐδαιμονίας. And it is of course conceivable that ἀρετῆι was corrupted to ἀρα, although it is certainly not the easiest of corruptions.

But the transmitted οὖν ἄρα deserves more serious attention that it has received so far. The last discussion of it is Schneider's, whose negative verdict on the collocation οὖν ἄρα ('Sed hoc ipsum ἄρα, quum ironiae hic locus non sit, post οὖν molestissime et prorsus insolito modo abundat') has influenced all editors after him. The in-depth study of E. des Places (1929) on οὖν and ἄρα does not help us: he seems not to have noticed that the collocation is attested here.

The collocation is likewise condemned by Van der Ben (1985: 32 n. 5). In my review of this book (1988: 411), I somewhat halfheartedly defended the collocation. In the light of recent studies of these particles, especially J.M. van Ophuijsen (1993: 67–164), I now withdraw what reservations I once had against the collocation. The two particles each do their job in the two passages in Plato where they are unanimously transmitted (*Tht.* 149b10 and *Chrm.* 160e13): οὖν indicates that the speaker is coming to the point, and ἄρα that he presents the statement as an inevitable conclusion (sometimes ironically, in that he presents as inevitable an opinion which he clearly does not share, but it is manifestly wrong to condemn ἄρα here because it is not ironical, as Schneider does). At the beginning of a sentence οὖν is always a connecting particle, whereas ἄρα is connective, if at all, only as a side-effect.

But how well does the particle cluster work in our sentence? In Plato, ἄρα in questions introduced by τίς, ποῖος and the like presents the

question as inevitable: 'It is evident that I have to ask this, whether you and I like it or not'. Cf. Van Ophuijsen (1993: 83–84) on the low degree of personal commitment present in ἄρα. Cf. *Ly.* 209d6 (If your father thinks you will manage his affairs better than he, he will leave them to you.—Yes.—And his neighbour too.—Yes.—And so will the Athenians.—Yes.—) Πρὸς Διὸς ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τί ἄρα ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς; *Euthd.* 279b4 (What ἀγαθά are there? Surely wealth?—Yes.—Health, beauty, a good physical condition?—Yes.—And nobility, power, honour.—Yes.—) Τί οὖν ἔφην ἔτι ἡμῖν λείπεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τί ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ σώφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον; πότερον πρὸς Διὸς ὦ Κλεινία ἡγεῖ σύ, ἐὰν ταῦτα τιθῶμεν ὡς ἀγαθά, ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς θήσειν, ἢ μή; (Socrates pretends to be less than enthusiastic about the status of the virtues as ἀγαθά: b7–8 ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τις ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσειεν).

In both these instances ἄρα is used in a question that is the climax of a series. But it can also be used at the beginning of a series of questions, a series that it is impossible not to ask, as *Euthd.* 279a5 (Clearly we can only fare well if we have many ἀγαθά.—Yes.—) Φέρε δὴ, ἀγαθά δὲ ποῖα ἄρα τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει ἡμῖν ὄντα; In our passage the situation is comparable, although the question is not technically the first in a series, but d6 οὐκ ἐρήσομαι amounts to a question. It is the logical question to ask given the context: (The tyrannical man is like tyranny, the democratic man like democracy, etc.?—Yes.—So the relation of one type of city to another is the same as that of one type of man to another?—Yes.—) τί οὖν ἄρα τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς βασιλευομένην οἶαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν; An instructive parallel is *Lg.* 944d5: (The law should be that whoever willingly abandons or throws away his weapons is to be put on trial.) ζημία δὴ τῷ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμυντηρίων ὄπλων εἰς τοῦναντίον ἀφέντι δύναμιν τίς ἄρα γίγνοιτ' ἂν πρόσφορος; Note the contrast with δὴ, which according to Van Ophuijsen indicates a high degree of commitment both in speaker and in addressee: of course you and I agree (δὴ) that punishment should be the next Discourse Topic, and inevitably (ἄρα) the question must be asked which punishment fits the crime.

The use of ἄρα here fits Platonic usage. Since it is transmitted in all three MSS, one might think of the scenario that in the common ancestor of ADF an original αραρετη (ἄρ' ἀρετῆ), as suggested by Prof. C.J. Ruijgh (personal communication), was corrupted to αρετη, and that afterwards αρα was written above the line (in *scriptio plena*), thereby eventually ousting αρετη (without the final iota) but for the η, which was then wrongly mistaken for the article. This interpretation of

the data—it is not, technically speaking, a conjecture—deserves serious consideration, even though I don't have the nerve to print it.

578e5 ἐν ποίωι ἄν τινη καὶ ὀπόσῳι φόβῳι οἶει γενέσθαι αὐτόν ...;

ὀπόσῳι ADF: ἐν πόσῳi SCOR.Y.1.13

Adam may have a point in saying, in his note on 348b6, that the inconcinnity between ποίωι and ὀπόσῳι may have been caused by 'the proximity of οἶει', for which he compares *Grg.* 522a6 (ὀ)πόσον τι οἶει ἄν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; (ὀ)πόσον BTWP: πόσον F, adopted by Burnet and Dodds). Yet it should be borne in mind that most 19th-century editors of Plato believed that there was no real difference between τίς and ὄστις, πόσος and ὀπόσος etc. We now know that Plato distinguished very carefully between the two series of forms. For example, at 348b6 ὀποτέρως can no longer stand (cf. my note, above, pp. 12–13). All other arguments in Adam's note can safely be disregarded.

It may be hard to swallow the variation ποίωι ... ὀπόσῳι in what are, after all, two direct questions. Yet I feel that the transmitted readings here and in the *Grg.* support each other mutually: here, ὀπόσῳι is unanimously transmitted by the three primary witnesses; in *Grg.* by the best ones. And although we may associate variation more with Thucydides than with Plato, Plato applies it at least as often as Thucydides, only less conspicuously so. Cf. the index of De Strycker–Slings (1994), s.v. *variation*.

579d10–11 ἔστιν ἄρα τῆι ἀληθείαι, κἄν εἰ μή τῳι δοκεῖ, ὁ τῳι ὄντι τύραννος τῳι ὄντι δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας καὶ κόλαξ τῶν πονηροτάτων κτέ

δοκεῖ Prag.VI.F.a.1 (= Lobc.): δοκῆι ADF Stob. (IV 8, 34 = IV 319, 27 Hense) || τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας (et Stob.) varie temptatum

It is strange that nobody seems to have thought of saving the subjunctive by deleting εἰ. But in any case, it is shielded by the parallel *R.* 473a2 κἄν εἰ μή τῳι δοκεῖ (ADF: δοκῆι Stob.), so the correction of Prag.VI.F.a.1 (cf. Boter [1989: 240]) is certain.

Various attempts have been made to regularize τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας, but the words are sound. The paradoxical point that Socrates wants to make is that the tyrant in the true sense of the word is a slave in the true sense of the word, namely a flatterer. Hence δοῦλος

τάς μεγίστας θωπείας, the latter word explained by και δουλείας (cf. vice versa *Euthd.* 302b6–7 ἄπορον τινα στροφήν ἔφευγόν τε και ἔστρεφόμεν; *R.* 410b5–6 αὐτὰ μὴν τὰ γυμνάσια και τοὺς πόνους ... πονήσει) and και κόλαξ is added as the solution to the riddle.

Lobc. writes δουλείας και θωπείας, and this was endorsed by Richards (1911: 146), but the words και κόλαξ are stylistically very weak after θωπείας ('a slave to the utmost flattery and slavery and a flatterer'). Adam's transposition of και κόλαξ to follow δοῦλος (in his 1897 edition, withdrawn in his commentary) is better, but leaves τῶν πονηροτάτων out in the cold: since τάς μεγίστας ... δουλείας already qualifies δοῦλος, and μεγίστας qualifies δουλείας, it is at the least strange to have τῶν πονηροτάτων as an objective genitive qualifying δουλείας (which should have been in the singular as at 569c1 δουλείας ἐλευθέρων) but not, apparently, τάς μεγίστας. And in any case, if Plato wanted both δοῦλος and κόλαξ to have a corresponding accusative, why didn't he give one separately to each, as he does 405c1–2 πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεισθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους διεξιθῶν ἀποστραφῆναι λυγίζόμενος? In other words, the reading that strict logic requires is δοῦλος τάς μεγίστας δουλείας και κόλαξ τῶν πονηροτάτων τάς μεγίστας θωπείας (or τάς μεγίστας θωπείας τῶν πονηροτάτων). Not only is it impossible to explain the transmission from such a reading, it now becomes clear why Plato chose the order he did: by postposing κόλαξ, he was able to give it extra emphasis through the following τῶν πονηροτάτων.

By writing τῆς μεγίστης, Ast wanted to get rid of the internal accusative altogether. Indeed, this may well be the only instance in classical Greek of a substantive noun qualified by an internal accusative, an idiom more common for adjectives, cf. *R.* 490d3 κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν; *Ap.* 22e3–4 μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν; K.-G. I 307. Stallbaum's longwinded appeal to the latter instances hides the problem.

But I doubt that the solution yields good Greek. While you can be a slave of some other person, or of money, I have not seen a parallel for δοῦλος qualified by the genitive of an abstract noun denoting a state. Besides, it may not be a coincidence that the only substantive to have an internal accusative at all is δοῦλος, which is frequently used as an adjective (as its antonym ἐλεύθερος often is a substantive): from this book alone, cf. 577d10 ἢ ... δούλη και τυραννουμένη πόλις; 587c1 δούλαις τισὶ δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς. Indeed, it might even be argued that the word is an adjective here, though it makes no difference to the meaning.

The text is sound, and Plato must be allowed this syntactic *hapax* in a sentence that states emphatically what Socrates has been trying to prove ever since he was challenged by Glauco and Adimantus in Book II, that the most unjust man leads the unhappiest life. Another striking feature is the double superlative in *πλείστων ἐπιδεέστατος* (e2), and so is the rather unusual variation of nouns, adjectives and participles in *οὐδ' ... ἀποπιμπλάς ... ἀλλά ... ἐπιδεέστατος καὶ πένης ... φαίνεται ... καὶ ... γέμων, ... πλήρης* (e1–5).

583c10 ἄρ' οὖν μνημονεύεις ἣν δ' ἐγὼ τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν;

οὖν F Schol. Bob. Cic. *Red.Pop.* 4: οὐ AD

With characteristic ingenuity in defending A's every reading, Adam claims that οὓ is much more lively, and compares 373e3 for the asyndeton. But there in fact F has δῆ, rightly adopted by Burnet and Chambers, although the latter reads οὐ in our passage.

I don't think particular liveliness is called for when Socrates asks Glauco if he remembers a familiar statement, a statement certainly not prepared in the preceding questions. And besides, as this is basically a new point, after it has been established that peace of mind is intermediate between pleasure and pain, a transitional particle is called for.

Yet the unexpected support from the Bobbio Scholia to Cicero is welcome. These Scholia have been preserved in a MS from the 6th century, so they are the oldest witness by far. Cf. Hildebrandt (1907: 60); Stangl (1912: 111).

F's particles are to be distrusted, but sometimes they are just right.

585a8 ⟨***⟩ ὥδε γοῦν εἶπον ἐννόει·

lacunam ante ὥδε statui: γ' οὖν A (ut semper) D (quamquam plerumque γοῦν scribens): γοῦν F (ut semper): δ' οὖν Wilamowitz (1919: 267 n. 2)

No matter whether one believes in a separate γ' οὖν as opposed to γοῦν, it has to be pointed out that this is the only instance in Plato where γ' οὖν or γοῦν accompanies the imperative, except *Lg.* 952c1–2 καὶ ἐάντε μηδὲν χείρων μηδέ τι βελτίων ἦκειν δόξει, χάριν γοῦν τῆς σφόδρα προθυμίας αἰνεῖσθω, where γοῦν is simply the focus particle as ἐπειρώτα τίνα δεύτερον μετ' ἐκείνον ἴδοι, δοκέων πάγχυ δευτερεία γῶν οἴεσθαι (*Hdt.* I 31), which has nothing to do with our problem.

There is, however, a passage where γοῦν occurs side by side with an adhortative subjunctive: *Lg.* 629a3–4 καί μοι τῶι λόγῳ συνακολουθήσατε. προστησόμεθα γοῦν Τύρταιον κτέ. This is treated extensively by Denniston (1954: 457), who arrives at the conclusion that the οὔν ingredient of γοῦν is more to the point than the γε one. ‘At any rate, let us take Tyrtaeus, and ask *him*’ (D.’s emphasis). I see little difference from the normal connective use of γοῦν here, except (but that hardly counts as an objection) that it is not ‘part-proof’.

Can we attribute the same meaning to γοῦν here? Glauco had said ‘I wouldn’t find it odd, in fact I would find it a lot more odd if it weren’t the case’. For Socrates to get back with: ‘Look at it, at any rate, from this angle’ is, to my mind, entirely illogical. Glauco had in fact rounded off one stage in the argument (the analogy between coming up to the middle from the bottom with the coming up from pain to quiet), Socrates opens another one, introducing the concept of κένωσις, which will prove pivotal for the final stage of the argument.

Denniston requires γ’ οὔν and explains it as connective οὔν plus emphatic γε (1954: 449). But this will hardly do, because γε cannot reinforce ὃδε, which is the most focal word of the clause, whereas γε (as opposed to γοῦν) hardly ever is a true focus particle modifying the primary Focus of the clause.

At first sight, then, there are two solutions. Either follow Wilamowitz’ δ’ οὔν or make do with simple οὔν. Both are suitable for marking the major transition in the argument that we find at this place. With οὔν, I would have expected, given ὃδε, an announcement in the previous speech or speeches that a new (part of the) examination is going to take place (‘Do it this way, then’). δ’ οὔν looks much more promising, because it would cut Glauco short, which he needs from time to time. ‘However that may be [whether you would find this odd or the contrary], look at it this way’.

There is, however, a serious problem with Wilamowitz’ correction. With the imperative and the adhortative subjunctive, δ’ οὔν is not elsewhere used at the very beginning of a speech; *Plt.* 264b7–8 ταῦτ’ ἔστω. πάλιν δ’ οὔν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν κοινοτροφικὴν πειρώμεθα διαιεῖν comes closest. When a speech opens with an imperative or adhortative subjunctive plus ὃδε, Plato uses asyndeton (ὃδε ἴδωμεν, *Prm.* 158b8; *Ly.* 218d6), ἀλλά (ἀλλ’ ὃδε σκόπει, *Crī.* 50a6; *Plt.* 306a12; *R.* 507c10; 582a3), δὴ (ὃδε δὴ σκόπει, *Crī.* 392c2; *Thē.* 192d3; 204d4; *Sph.* 255e8; *Phdr.* 260a; *Men.* 90c9; *R.* 349c11; 603c5), τοίνυν (ὃδε τοίνυν ἐπιχειροῦμεν *R.* 436b6; 564c7) and once ἄρα (ὃδε ἄρα λεκτέον *Prm.* 160d3). None of these has the slightest

chance of being corrupted to γοῦν; the putative corruption of δ' οὖν to γοῦν is likewise problematic.

For these reasons, I am inclined to assume a lacuna before ᾧδε and retain γοῦν. If so, we would have a case similar to *Lg.* 629a3–4 discussed above.

586ε1 εἶπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκάστωι, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον.

τὸ ADF: ὁ Ast

The Theme construction immediately followed by a form of οὗτος is rather unusual. Schneider gives parallels from *Lg.*, 657c5–6 τὸν πλείστον καὶ μάλιστα χαίρειν ποιοῦντα, τοῦτον μάλιστα τιμᾶσθα; 729a4–6 ἢ γὰρ τῶν νέων ἀκολάκευτος οὐσία, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων μὴ ἐνδεής, αὕτη πασῶν μουσικωτάτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη. In both cases, especially the second, the Theme is rather longer than the one presupposed here.

Stallbaum gives closer parallels: *Chrm.* 163c7–8 τὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πρώτοντα, τοῦτον σάφρονα καλεῖν; *Tht.* 172b5–6 τὸ κοινῆι δόξαν, τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθές τότε ὅταν κτέ, where it is possible, though to my mind not preferable, to construe τὸ κοινῆι δόξαν τοῦτο as one constituent.

What our passage has in common with the ones from *Chrm.*, *Tht.*, and *Lg.* 657e is that the Theme construction comes at or near the end of a long speech. It may not be too speculative to suppose that the reader's attention has been strained so much that a chunking device, which is what a Theme construction basically is, becomes necessary. Cf. my note on 508e3 (above, pp. 111–112).

589a2 τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπον λιμοκτονεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀσθενῆ, ὥστε ἔλκεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκείνων **πότερον** ἄγῃ

πότερον Stob. (III 9, 62 = III 399, 2 Hense): δπότερον ADF Eus. (*PE* XII 46, 5 = II 136, 2 Mras-des Places) Iambl. (*Protr.* 31, 24 Pistelli = 62, 22 des Places): πρότερον Copt

The sense requires 'wherever either of the others brings him', not 'wherever no matter which of the other two brings him'. The latter is what δπότερος means (cf. Slings [1999: 265; 299] for indefinite relative forms used in the sense of *quicumque* without a δῆ or οὖν following), but we need indefinite πότερος, an idiom very often misunderstood by scribes, who sometimes give forms of δπότερος as a variant (*Phlb.* 21a1; 22d4), though more often of πρότερος (Copt here; *Phlb.* 20e5; *Chrm.* 171b11; *La.* 181d7; *Lg.* 914d1).

The idiom is unknown even to classical scholars, as witness the fact that Hense, even though the only Stob. MS (S) to give this extract has *πότερον*, prints the reading of the Plato MSS, as all editors of Stob. since Gesner had done before him.

There is one passage in the *Politeia* where *ὀπότερος* might be a corruption of *πότερος*, but is not necessarily so: 509a3–4 ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρω ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὀπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν. 'To regard whichever of the two as good' is not, perhaps, too strong. In our passage it definitely is, so despite its relatively weak attestation I print *πότερον*, which quite probably was the ultimate reading of Copt as well.

590d3 οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ὤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὄν παντὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι κτέ

ὄν ADF: om. Stob. (III 9, 62 = III 401, 17 Hense)

Stobaeus' reading deserves serious consideration; it will not do to supply ⟨ὄν⟩ from the Plato MSS in the Stob. text, as Hense does. Adjectives are sometimes used instead of participles (whether predicative or in the absolute accusative) when they are modified by one of the so-called participle particles. Cf. K.-G. II 102; Goodwin (1912: 346); my note on E. *El.* 1292–1297 (Slings [1997a: 161–162]).

Examples from the *Politeia* include the following: 358c2–4 πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὡς ἀγαθόν; 551e2 καὶ ἅμα χρήματα μὴ ἐθέλειν εἰσφέρειν ἅτε φιλοχρημάτων (predicative); 449c3–5 καὶ λήσειν οἰηθῆναι [sc. δοκεῖς] εἰπὼν αὐτὸ φάυλως, ὡς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων παντὶ δηλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται; 586d7–8 τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήφονται, ὡς οἶόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν (accusative absolute). ὄν is added 358a6; 440a7 (predicative; add 480a4 ὡς τι ὄν, where ὄν could not be missed); 545b5 (accusative absolute).

In our passage we must ask ourselves whether the sentence without ὄν would have been so obscure that ὄν was inserted as an aid to construction. It was not, because after οἰόμενοι δεῖν it was always possible to take ὡς ἄμεινον as ὡς ἄμεινόν ἐστιν (as it has to be taken 358d1). Perhaps Plato wrote ὄν precisely in order to avoid this misunderstanding.

BOOK TEN

596b9–10 οὐ γὰρ που τήν γε ιδέαν αὐτήν δημιουργεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν.—**πῶς γάρ;**— **οὐδαμῶς.** ἀλλ’ ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς τὸν δημιουργόν.

οὐδαμῶς ADF: seclisit Stallbaum

For the record I give the speaker distribution in the MSS. AD have δημιουργῶν: πῶς γάρ: οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ’ and so attribute πῶς γάρ to Glauco. F has δημιουργῶν· πῶς γάρ: οὐδαμῶς: ἀλλ’ and thus gives οὐδαμῶς to Glauco, as all modern editions do.

As self-contained question-sentences, πῶς γάρ, πῶς γάρ ἄν and πῶς γάρ οὐ are never used as tag-questions in Plato, but always as answer-questions. Very occasionally they are preceded by another reply, always very short (*Phlb.* 31b1; *La.* 194c1; *Lg.* 895c10; 901a10; 907a1), but that does not affect their status as answer-questions. Therefore πῶς γάρ, if authentic at all, should be given to Glauco, not to Socrates.

Hence οὐδαμῶς either is to be deleted as an ancient gloss on πῶς γάρ or should be given to Socrates. Stallbaum, who in the first edition of his commentary had bracketed οὐδαμῶς, in the second (1858) withdrew this, after Schneider had referred to *Phlb.* 64b4–5—πῶς γάρ ἄν;—οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ’ εἴ τινος κτέ. Strangely enough Stallbaum printed the standard distribution, and this lack of consistency is probably the cause that all editors and commentators continue to give πῶς γάρ to Socrates. Wrongly so, as I hope this note has shown.

598e5–599a1 δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον μιμηταῖς τ(οι)ούτοις οὔτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται **τρίτῃ** ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος ... ἢ τι καὶ λέγουσιν καὶ τῷ ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασιν περὶ ὧν δοκοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν.

τοιούτοις Richards (1894: 393 = 1911: 148): τούτοις ADF Procl. (*in R.* I 203,20 Kroll) || τρίτῃ ADF: τρίτα Procl. (*in R.* I 203, 22), coniecerat van Herwerden (1884: 332)

In response to Richards’ conjecture, Adam tells us that ‘μιμηταῖς is of course predicative, and that is why τούτοις has no article.’ It will not do to dismiss Richards as a schoolboy who made an elementary blunder: what Adam should have shown is that we require predicative μιμηταῖς here.

It should be noted first that the clause is virtually a repetition of d3–4 καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἐντυχὸν γόητί τι καὶ μιμητῆι ἔξηπατήθη, where it is out of the question that γόητί τι καὶ μιμητῆι is anything but a complement. We should therefore expect μιμηταῖς to have the same syntactic function here.

But there is more at stake. In Adam's interpretation, which is of course the only one that the MSS reading admits of, Socrates is pre-determining the outcome of the examination that is going to take place. Take μιμηταῖς as predicative and you set up a distinction between representationalists and good poets who know a thing or two; take it as a complement and among the representationalists you distinguish between the deceivers and those who know what they are talking about.

Now obviously it is the second reading which corresponds to the problem that has been raised by Socrates. That certainly is a point in favour of Richards' conjecture, although Plato's Socrates is not above rigging the cards when it suits him. But at 599b3–4 it is clear that even the putative good poets are representationalists: ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε οἶμαι ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῆι ἀληθείαι τούτων πέρι ἄπερ καὶ μιμεῖται κτέ. This must sway the balance.

As for τριτὰ versus τρίτα, I agree with Adam that the former is *lectio difficilior*, and his explanation of it as internal accusative (= τριτὴν ἀποχὴν, or as Jowett–Campbell explain, τριτὰ διαστήματα; but wouldn't that rather have to be τρία διαστήματα?) holds water: 'three times removed from'. A form of τριττός had been used at 597b4; forms of τρίτος at 597e3; e7.

602c1–3 πρὸς Διὸς ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμῆσθαι τοῦτο [οὐ] περὶ τρίτον μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας. ἦ γάρ;—ναί.

δὲ δὴ AF: δὲ D || οὐ ADF: seclusi || μὲν τι AD: μέντοι F || ἦ γάρ; ναί om. F

δὴ frequently accompanies πρὸς Διὸς and δὲ δὴ does so at *Euthphr.* 4e4–5 οὐ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διὸς ὧ Εὐθύφρων οὕτωσι ἀκριβῶς οἶε ἐπίστασθαι κτέ. I am therefore inclined to accept it here, despite the presence of another δὲ δὴ in the next question (c4).

There are two problems with the rest of the sentence. First, ἦ γάρ indicates that it cannot be a tag question, as Plato does not use it after questions (most editors print a question mark, not a full stop, after ἀληθείας), much less after questions modified by οὐ. (We might trust F blindly and omit ἦ γάρ, but we would then be logically committed to going without an answer as well.) Secondly, solitary μὲν in questions is

rare in Plato (the examples given by Denniston [1954: 367] may well be the only ones in Plato) and such questions ask for preliminary factual information. That does not go well with a question modified by οὐ, and of course Socrates is here asking for confirmation of a point on which he and Glauco had long before agreed.

Adam may have a point when he writes that ‘μέν of course balances δέ in πρὸς δὲ κτλ.’ (the reference is to c₄, in the next question; similarly, but less sweepingly Jowett–Campbell: ‘Before taking the next step he resumes what has preceded with μέν’), but although parallels for such a split of μέν ... δέ in consecutive questions may perhaps be found, they are suspect at best, e.g. 380e3 (ὑπὸ μέν ἄλλου)—381a3 (ψυχὴν δέ), where I would prefer to take μέν as implicitly announcing an ὑπὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ, which never surfaces, rather than believe that it is answered by ψυχὴν δέ. On the other hand, in consecutive statements, or in a pair in which the first clause is a statement and the second a question, such a split is perfectly normal.

μέντοι in οὐ questions (Denniston [1954: 403]) would be excellent without ἢ γάρ. οὐ ... μέντοι is relatively frequent in the last two books of the *Politeia*: 581a9; 584a1–2; 597a1.

Schneider reports μέντοι for F, Adam mentions it, and Stallbaum prints it. But Burnet must have overlooked this, because I feel sure that he would at any rate have reported it, and quite possibly printed it. With his characteristic flexibility in defending A’s every reading, Adam writes: ‘μέντοι ... is not so good’. This time he happens to be right, since, as we saw, the sentence is not a question.

Both problems are solved at once by deleting οὐ. I cannot give a satisfactory explanation of its insertion. Did some ancient reader perhaps write ου over the ending of τοῦτο, thereby changing ‘this representing’ into ‘his (τούτου) representing’? Possible, but hardly more than that.

602d4 ἡ σκιαγραφία ... γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει, καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται μηχαναί

ἄλλαι DF: αἱ ἄλλαι A

There seems to be nothing wrong with αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται (‘the numerous other similar tricks’), except that to the best of my knowledge this is not how Plato writes; I have searched intensively, but found no parallel. Unless proof to the contrary has been supplied, I refuse to believe that the article is sound. Even ἄλλαι is superfluous, cf. 370d5

τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοὶ τινες πολλοί. But it would be a little too drastic to remove it.

605a3 ὁ δὴ μμητικὸς ποιητὴς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκε **τε** καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν **πέπηγεν**

τε prA et A² s.l.: γε ApC in ras., DF

There are three problems here: the unparalleled construction of *πέπηγεν*, the postposition of *τε*, and (related to this) the fact that the negative modifies the second clause as well as the first (so that one should have expected *οὐδέ* rather than *τε καί*).

All three are solved by assuming that the second clause is an afterthought, added by means of *τε καί* as *Phd.* 117c3 ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί *τε καὶ* γένοιτο ταύτη; *R.* 427d1–3 τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει ἐν αὐτῇ, φῶς ποθεν πορισάμενος ἰκανόν, αὐτὸς *τε καὶ* τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει (cf. note on 470c6 [above, pp. 92–94]; Denniston [1954: 520]). I know of no parallel for such a second clause modified by the negative of the first one, but the irregularity is understandable, and of the remedies that have been proposed, Stephanus' αὐτοῦ <οὐ> τούτῳ (cf. Madvig [1871: 433]; Wallies [1922: 45]), while certainly not 'unpleasing' (Adam), would make the two clauses more closely parallel than they already are, and therefore, perhaps too closely parallel for Plato's style. Burnet notes in his apparatus that he would like to delete *πέφυκε* 'tanquam ad *πέπηγεν* adscriptum'. The fact that Proclus already read *πέφυκε*, as Burnet noted (*in Remp.* I 201,28 οὐ πρὸς τὸ λογιστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς *πέφυκεν*), says little, but the ensuing zeugma of *πέπηγεν* (governing first πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον and then ἀρέσκειν), plus the fact that with ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ a new subject suddenly turns up in the middle of the sentence, make the cure worse than the illness.

I suppose that Plato felt the need for a more specific clause than οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς *πέφυκε*, and added one. In the second clause, he needed *πέφυκε* plus infinitive, but since he already had used the verb he had to look for a synonym. A good candidate was *πέπηγε*, which occasionally does roughly the same job as *πέφυκε* ('to have grown together and therefore to be in a certain state' as opposed to simply 'to have grown and therefore to be in a certain state'): *Ti.* 58d8–e2 τὸ δὲ ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ ὁμαλῶν στασιμώτερον μὲν ἐκείνου καὶ βαρὺ πεπηγὸς ὑπὸ ὁμαλότητός ἐστιν, 'the kind consisting of large and uniform particles is by origin more stable than the other and heavy because of its uniformity' (if *πεπηγός* is taken as a circumstantial participle, the

position of ἔστιν cannot be accounted for). 77c3–5 shows how this use developed: διὸ δὴ ζῆι μὲν ἔστιν τε οὐχ ἔτερον ζώιου, μόνιμον δὲ καὶ κατεροριζωμένον πέπηγεν διὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως ἔστερησθαι. Here πέπηγεν probably has its literal meaning ‘it is stuck’, but since the predicative μόνιμον δὲ καὶ κατεροριζωμένον expresses the same idea it is in effect little more than a copula.

I would therefore assume that in our place πέπηγεν governs the infinitive (‘to be inclined, accustomed to’) in the same way as πέφυκε does elsewhere. There is a plausible parallel for another synonym of πέφυκε adopting this construction only once: S. *OC* 184–187 τόλμα ξείνος ἐπὶ ξένας, ὃ τλάμων, ὅτι καὶ πόλις τέτροφεν ἄφιλον ἀποστρυγεῖν καὶ τὸ φίλον σέβεσθαι. Here I would take the infinitives (at any rate ἀποστρυγεῖν) as complements both of τόλμα and of τέτροφεν: ‘being a stranger in a foreign land, you must bring yourself to loathe what the city has grown to loathe as hateful, and to respect what is dear to the city’.

Conjectures are unconvincing. Valckenaer wished to transpose πέφυκε and πέπηγεν but it is hard to see why they should have changed places. Of the others, given by Adam, the less said the better.

γε is clearly impossible: it gives a degree of focality to a function word that cannot carry it. I wonder if it is not an ancient conjecture, made to get rid of τε, rather than a simple uncial error. Campbell’s report on the state of affairs in A is wrong: there is definitely a tau (marked with a dot above it) above the gamma.

605c2 καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίαι ἐκάστου τῆι ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῶι ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν μεγάλα ἡγουμένῳι τοτὲ δὲ σμικρὰ, εἶδῶλα **εἰδωλοποιοῦντα**, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα.

εἰδωλοποιοῦντα Mon.237²: εἰδωλοποιοῦντι ADF

The dative deserves serious consideration (it is accepted by Schneider and Jowett–Campbell) but throughout the passage the εἶδῶλα are the products of the μιμηταί, not of the minds of those exposed to them (599a8 bis; d4; 600e5; 601b9) and an appeal to 574e3 is not sufficient to protect the dative, which is easily explained as due to perseveration of the datives διαγιγνώσκοντι and ἡγουμένῳι. Schneider’s further claim (likewise endorsed by Jowett–Campbell) that ἀφεστῶτα is neuter, modifying εἶδῶλα, is far from being an objection, and it may actually well be

right: both the imitator and the products of the representation are said to be far from the truth: 597e7; 599d3; 600e5; 603a10 (imitator); 599a1; 602c2 (products).

606c2–3 ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου; ὅτι, ⟨ἄν ἄ⟩
 ἄν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμωιδικῆι ἢ καὶ ἰδία
 ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῆις καὶ μὴ μισῆις ὡς πονηρά, ταῦτόν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν
 τοῖς ἐλέοις;

⟨ἄν ἄ⟩ ἄν Ruijgh: ἄν ADF: ἄν Schneider: ⟨ἄν οἷς⟩ ἄν Wallies (1922: 45): ⟨ἄν ὅτι⟩ ἄν
 ego olim

I start from two basic assumptions. First, ὅτι is the conjunction, not the pronoun, because the expression ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος is never followed by an explanatory asyndeton in Plato, and a ὅτι clause is normal (*Smp.* 187d4; *Grig.* 509a4; *R.* 330a4; 394e8; a ὡς clause *Phlb.* 40e2; *Lg.* 890b8; an accusative and infinitive *R.* 476a6; *Ti.* 47c5). Therefore it should not be tampered with. It is besides shielded by ὅτι at d3, with which ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος has to be understood. Second, ἄν, as transmitted, is impossible because when placed directly after ὅτι it cannot modify the optative αἰσχύνοιο.

On the basis of these assumptions, it is clear that ἄν must be changed, but also that it will not do to change δέ to δῆ in addition to whatever one may wish to change ἄν to. Adam rightly remarks that δέ is necessary to mark the contrast between αὐτὸς and ἐν μιμήσει—and besides, two independent corruptions (and independent they must be) are unlikely to have occurred so close to each other.

On these criteria, we must reject all conjectures listed in Appendix III of Adam's commentary, to which should be added Wallies' ⟨ἄν οἷς⟩ ἄν, plus an idea I had long ago of changing ὅτι ἄν to ὅτι ἄν ⟨ὅτι ἄν⟩, cf. *Phdr.* 258a5 καὶ ὄς ⟨καὶ ὄς⟩ εἶπεν'. Only Schneider's ἄν for ἄν meets the requirements.

It therefore becomes inevitable to accept δέ as an apodotic particle, although I must confess I am not quite comfortable with the idea, because in Plato, apodotic δέ after a relative clause is quite rare (Denniston [1954: 178]). We can, I feel, neither dispense with the particle nor explain it otherwise.

What might seem to be needed is not so much a relative, as in Schneider's ἄν, as an indefinite pronoun: 'the same argument, that if you were ashamed of making some jests yourself but are very pleased to see them on the comic stage, you do the same thing as in the case

of feelings of pity.’ A relative clause can sometimes be used instead of an εἰ clause with an indefinite pronoun (βέλτερον ὃς φεύγων προφύγη κακὸν ἢ ἐ ἀλώη, Ξ 81), and although in most prose instances cited K.-G. II 441–442 the relative clause follows the main clause, and instances in Plato are rare (I have found only *R.* 402d1, which precedes the main clause; cf. my note on 429e1–2 [above, pp. 64–66]), Schneider’s conjecture is preferable to correcting ἄν to εἴ τι, which has no probability, palaeographically or otherwise, and which is harder to reconcile with the subjunctives that follow δέ than ἄν is.

The problem with ἄν is, however, that it is never transmitted in Plato MSS; where it is printed by Burnet (five times) it is always a conjecture (cf. Brandwood, s.v. ἄν). It seems to follow from this that Plato avoided crasis in ἄ ἄν, which occurs 54 times in the corpus, and that ἄ ἄν is what we should read (rather than my former conjecture ⟨ὄτι ἄν⟩, which as a singular fits the context less well: the reference in ... ἄν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν is to actions for which you would feel ashamed, rather than to a singular indefinite action).

There are two oppositions in this passage. First, a semantic one between αὐτός (*in propria persona*) and ἐν μιμήσει ... κωμωδικῆ ἢ καὶ ἰδία ἀκούων, as stressed by Adam. Second, a syntactic one between the optative αἰσχύνοιο and the subjunctives χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς. It should be evident that the subjunctives cannot stand in the same subordinate clause as αἰσχύνοιο, which they do in Schneider’s correction. As for the first, it is so marked that I feel obliged to accept apodotic δέ: ‘what you would be ashamed to do yourself’ as opposed to ‘what you enjoy and don’t feel repelled by in a comic or private representation’.

Consequently, I accept the conjecture ⟨ἄν ἄ⟩ ἄν, suggested by Professor C.J. Ruijgh during a session of the Amsterdam Hellenist Club.

607c6 εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἢ μίμησις, ὡς χοῆ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένη, ἄσμενοι ἄν **καταδεχοίμεθα**

καταδεχοίμεθα ADF: δεχοίμεθα Arc (dots over κατα-)

καταδέχομαι can be used of admitting exiles back again, cf. LSJ, s.v., 2, and that is clearly meant here, as is shown by d4 οὐκοῦν δικαία ἐστὶν οὕτω κατιέναι. The correction in A is perhaps due to misgivings over the fact that Socrates had hitherto used παραδέχομαι (595a5; 605b1; 607a5). Anyway, δεχοίμεθα is not an acceptable reading: in the *Politeia*, the simplex verb is not used with a personal object.

608e6 ἄρ' οὖν ὡσπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖ;—τὸ ποῖον;—τὸ μὲν ἀπολλῦον καὶ διαφθεῖρον πᾶν τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ σῶιζον καὶ ὠφελοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν.—**ἔγωγε τοῦτό γ' ἔφη.**

ἔγωγε τοῦτό γ' ἔφη ApC: ἔγωγ' ἔφη prA DF

The ApC reading has to be accepted. It is clearly *lectio difficilior*, highly unlikely to be an ancient conjecture. As an answer, it is unique in Plato, which explains why τοῦτό γ' was omitted in ancient MSS. But uniqueness is not a good ground for rejection. For the double γε cf. *La.* 195d3 οἶμαι ἔγωγε τοῦτό γε. And ἔγωγε plus a single constituent in an answer is common enough, cf. especially 526a6 τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὅτι κτέ; see further 439a3; 522d9; 544e3; 573a3; 577d9; 578e8.

610a4 ὀρθότατ' [ἄν] ἔφη λέγεις.

ἄν ADF: secludendum vel αῖ legendum put. Stephanus

In the *Politeia*, Socrates' interlocutors do not use αῖ in short answers, except in the formula οὐκ (οὐδ') αῖ τοῦτό γε (426e2; 531e5), and in a number of highly dubious cases discussed in the note on 463e7 (above, p. 90). The first of Stephanus' proposals ('vel ὀρθότατα absque ἄν, vel ὀρθότατ' αῖ, legendum videtur') is therefore right.

610b1–2 ἢ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν, ἢ ἕως ἄν ἦι ἀνέλεγκτα, **μήτε** φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυροτοῦ **μηδ' αῖ** ὑπ' ἄλλης νόσου **μηδ' αῖ** ὑπὸ σφαγῆς ... ἔνεκα τούτων **μηδὲν** μᾶλλον ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι

μήτε A: μή ποτε DF || μηδ' αῖ AD: μηδ' F

I prefer μήτε to μή ποτε because the latter had already occurred at a6 (μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν κτέ) so that the DF reading can be explained as an error of perseveration, and because it alone can explain the curious double μηδ' αῖ, which is unique in Plato. When οὔτε is followed by οὐδέ, Plato always reinforces the latter with another particle (cf. Denniston [1954: 193]; note on *Clit.* 407b3 in Slings [1999: 277–279]), normally αῖ. With ὑπὸ σφαγῆς an entirely different cause of death is mentioned, hence again μηδ' αῖ. If μή ποτε were the original reading, Plato would probably not have added αῖ to the first μηδέ.

For the sake of completeness, I report that at a6 A originally had μήτε, πο being added above the line. But I don't see how this can be used as an argument either way.

διοε3 οὕτω πόρρω που ὡς ἔοικεν ἐσκήνηται τοῦ θανάσιμος εἶναι

ὡς ἔοικεν ADF: om. Π11

In his edition of Π11 (*POxy.* xliv, p. 46; cf. Haslam [1991: 344]), M.W. Haslam suggests that ὡς ἔοικεν is an intrusive gloss on που. I can confirm that the particle που is used nowhere else in Plato in a clause that contains parenthetical ὡς ἔοικε, but that is not meant as support for Haslam's proposal. It is certain that που is here the local adverb, not the particle. πόρρω που is good Platonic idiom, cf. *Euthphr.* 4b1; *Phd.* 96e6; *R.* 499c9; 598b6. The case is clinched by the similar πόρρω ποι, *R.* 432e1–2; 554e6.

Of course it still cannot be excluded that someone in antiquity mistook που for the particle and glossed it by ὡς ἔοικεν. But it is equally possible that this went the other way round: an ancestor of Π11, taking offence at the putative pleonasm που ὡς ἔοικεν, may have deleted the latter. And finally, there is what I consider to be the likeliest possibility by far: the absence of ὡς ἔοικεν from Π11 was a trivial mistake and nothing more.

διοε9 ὁπότε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἰκανὴ ἦ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν, σχολῆι τό γε ἐπ' ἄλλου δλέθρῳι τεταγνέ-
νον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται.—**σχολῆι** ἔφη,
ὡς γε τὸ εἰκός.

σχολῆ [sic] F: σχολῆι γ' AD

σχολῆι as a reply to a question that also contained σχολῆι can be paralleled from *Sph.* 233b8 σχολῆι μέντ' ἄν;¹ *Lg.* 668c9 σχολῆι πῶς δ' οὐ; But if I understand anything at all about how the particle works, γ' cannot be paralleled. In replies, its function is to indicate that the reply is made in such a way that it adds a new constituent (a word or a phrase) to a question that did not contain that constituent. In other words, one may reply with πάνυ γε ('very much so') to a question that does not itself contain the word πάνυ, or with πολύ γε—only when the question contains a comparative ('far') or a superlative ('by far'), but never when the question itself already contains πολύ qualifying the comparative or superlative. Cf. the next note. To print a reply σχολῆι γε in answer to

¹ Most editors write μεντ' ἄν, but I fail to see why a paroxytone word, even a paroxytone postpositive, should lose its proper accent because its second syllable suffers *crasis*.

a question that already has the word σχολῆι is to misunderstand the particle γε completely. F here for once rightly omits a particle.

611c4 ἀλλ' οἷόν ἐστιν καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἱκανῶς λογισμῶι διαθε(α)τέον, καὶ **πολύ** κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὐρήσει καὶ ἐναργέστερον δικαιουσύναν τε καὶ ἀδικίας διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν.

πολύ Arc: πολλὸν prA: πολὺ γε F: πολλὸν γε D

In Slings (1998: 100) I noted that πολὺ γε is found outside answers only *Ap.* 36d8 and this passage. In the former place γε is perfectly satisfactory: οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον ... πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρωτανειῶι σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳι ἢ συνορίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν. A constituent is added to a clause that is already complete in itself, and it is one of the main functions of γε to mark this.

In our passage, there is far less need for it, since what is added is a whole clause.

Since πολὺ γε in answers is found about fifty times in the corpus, it is easy to see why it came to be inserted, as it also was at *Euthphr.* 15b9.

612e8–621d5 The words 612e7 ἔστι ταῦτα are the last ones of the verso of a folium in D. The remaining leaves have been cut out and are now lost. As in the comparable lacuna 507e3–515d7 (cf. above, pp. 108–110) the readings of D have to be reconstructed from MSS that go back to it as it was before it was mutilated.

These MSS are: (1) Θ (Vaticanus gr. 226, ca. 1300), W (Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 7, s. xiv in this part), T (Marcianus gr. app. cl. IV.1, s. xv in this part). ΘWT go back to Sc (Scorialensis γ.1.13, s. xiii–xiv), which at present is itself lost after 607d6. Θ follows Sc before Sc was corrected, although it may incorporate or reflect superscript readings that were in Sc from the start; the others derive from Sc after it was corrected, in all likelihood by the scribe himself. Sc was copied from D before any later hands corrected D. (2) Par (Parisinus gr. 1810, s. xiv). Par goes back to D as corrected by D² and D³; D² itself derives a substantial part of its readings from W. A case in point is 616a3, where I suppose that D originally had τε, as preserved in Θ; subsequently this was extended in Sc to τε ταῦτα ὑπομένοεν, as found in WT; D², I claim, took ταῦτα ὑπομένοεν over from W, hence we find it in the margin in Par. Cf. the various discussions of these MSS in Boter (1989: 92–93; 155–158; 160–164; 170–173; 176–179; 217–225 [and 220 for 616a4]). Durham C.IV.2

(s.xv), which also derives from Sc, has only part of the first page of book X; Laurentianus Acquisti e doni 37 (s.xvi), which has the same pedigree, contains excerpts only, none of them pertaining to our passage; Ψ (Scorialensis Ψ.I.I, written 1462), a gemellus of Par, stops after 599c7 *μεγίστων*.

It stands to reason that wherever Sc can be reconstructed from ΘWT and agrees with Par, its readings are those of D as reconstructed, called ‘D’, but a warning is in order, as the copyist of Sc was a very intelligent scribe, who made many corrections *currente calamo* (as well as introducing many more afterwards, cf. below). Where Sc as reconstructed is opposed to Par, D cannot be reconstructed unless Par agrees with W against ΘT or with T against ΘW. Sc can always be reconstructed, although Θ is more reliable than WT; moreover, it should be kept in mind that Sc had (and still has in the parts where it is extant) many superscript variants written at the time when the text itself was copied.

Incidental errors found only in one of the four MSS ΘWT Par are not reported, although I have been on the liberal side in applying this principle to Θ.

612e8 γε] τὲ ΘWT Par and AF, γε being a variant written above the line in A

613a5 πενή ΘWT Par and F; -α written over an erasure in A, but I do not think prA had -η

a6 τι ΘT Par: om. W, and F—no doubt a fortuitous agreement

b3 τούτων WT Par: τούτων Θ

b5 τοιαῦτ’ ἄττ’ ἄν] τοιαῦτά τ’ ἄν Θ, and presumably D, because the reading of F (τοιαῦτ’ ἄτταν [sic]) is rather similar: τοιαῦτ’ ἄν W (and A, in both cases no doubt independent corrections of a difficult transmission): τά τ’ ἄν T: τοιαῦτ’ [sic] ἄττ’ ἄν Par

c3–4 εἰς τέλος WT Par: εἰς τὸ τέλος Θ

c7 παρὰ WT Par Θsl: περὶ Θ

d1 περὶ WT Par Θsl: παρὰ Θ

d3 γαμοῦσι ΘW Par: ταμοῦσι T (a salutary reminder that ‘majuscule errors’ can also be made in a minuscule transmission)

d7 καταγέλαστοι WT Par: καταστέγαστοί prΘ

e2 ἐκεῖνα Par (and AF): om. ΘWT and, I think, D

e3 εἰ hab. ΘWT Par, F (omitted by prA, but inserted by the first hand in A)

614a7 ἐκάτερος T Parpc: ἐκάτερον ΘW, AF, and presumably D, cf. Boter (1989: 239)

- a7 ἀπειλήφι] ἀπειληφός ἤ ΘW: ἀπειληφός. ἤ T: ἀπειληφός Par; *D* no doubt had the ΘW reading, a trivial error for ἀπειληφός ἤ, which has a good claim to being original
- b3 ἦρός ΘWT: ἦρωος Par, cf. Boter (1989: 224)
- b8 οὗ prΘ (circumfl. postea eras.), Par: οἱ οὗ WT, no doubt preserving a correction in Sc (οἱ Euseb. Theodoret.); cf. Boter (1989: 218)
- c6 περιάψαντας T Par: περιάψαντες et ας s.l. Θ: περιάψαντα W
- d1 αὐτὸν WT Par: αὐτῶν et ὄν s.l. Θ
- d2 διακελεύοντό οἱ Par: διακελεύειν τέ οἱ ΘWT and no doubt *D*
- d5 αὐτοῦ δικασθεῖεν ΘWT Par
- d6 κατὰ—έτέρω (A Stob. Procl.) om. ΘWT: κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον Par, F; the omission may be the reading of *D* or of Sc
- e2 ἀσμένως ΘWT Par, F
- e3 κατασηνᾶσθαι, fortasse *ā ex o facto* Θ: κατασηνᾶσθαι et εἰ s.l. W: κατασηνᾶσθαι Par: κατα σηνάς τε T
- e4 γνώριμαι Par, A: γνώριμοι ΘWT, F, and no doubt *D*; as -οι is *lectio difficilior*, I have adopted it
- 615a2 γλιετή ΘWT Par
- b2 εἶ Parpc: οἶ ΘWT and perhaps prPar, F, hence no doubt *D*
- b2 πολλοῖς Par⁵mg (cf. Boter [1989: 239]), Stob.: πολλῶν ΘWT Par (πολλοὶ AF); πολλῶν is a perfectly possible reading, but πολλοῖς is slightly better, and it is easier to account for (πολλοῖς being corrupted to πολλῶν through assimilation with θανάτων—it is hard to see how πολλῶν got corrupted to πολλοῖς)
- b6 εἶεν Par: ἦεν prΘ WT, hence *D*, a meaningless variant ταῦτά] ταύτην ΘT Par, *D*: idem et ου s.l. W
- c2 ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας Par, AF Stob.: εὐσεβείας τε καὶ ἀσεβείας ΘWT, Procl., and very probably *D*
- c2 αὐτόχειρας ΘWT Par with all other witnesses
- c3 διηγείτο WT Par: διηγοῖτο Θ, a trivial corruption, whether in *D* or not
- c4 δὴ WT Par: δεῖ et ἦ s.l. Θ
- c4 ὑπὸ έτέρου Par: ὑπὸ τοῦ έτέρου ΘWT, probably *D* but an inferior reading
- c7 τε Par, AF Stob.: om. ΘWT and probably *D* (and Iustin.)
- d3 ἄν ἤξει T Par: ἄν ἤξοι ΘW, which may just possibly represent *D*, cf. Boter (1989: 222)
- 616a3 παριοῦσι ΘT Par: παροῦσι W, F—a trivial error
- a3 τε: Θ: τε ταῦτα ὑπομένοιεν WT: γε Par et ταῦτα ὑπομένοιεν i.m.; no doubt Θ is most faithful to *D*, which is identical with AF and Iustin.,

and virtually identical with Stob. (τι instead of τε), but the passage is more than a little suspect—ὕπομνοιεν cannot be read, as in Platonic Greek it does not mean ‘to suffer’

a7 ἀσμενέστατον ΘWT Par

a7 σιγήσαντος WT: σιγήσαντο prΘ, a fecit et ος s.l.: σιγήσαντα Par, -a fortasse ex -ος facto; σιγήσαντος is correct, and it is probably what *D* had

b5 τεταμένον WT Par: τεταγμένον Θ

b6 καὶ WT Par: om. prΘ

b7 προσελθόντας WT, and probably *D*: προσελθόντος Θ: προελθόντας Par, Theo Smyrn.

c2 εἶναι—c3 ὑποζώματα] εἶτα ΘWT: εἶ τὰ Par et ἦ i.m.; a line omitted in *D*

c3 συνέχων ΘWT prPar, hence *D*: συνέχοντα Parpc

d3 ἐν Par: om. ΘWT, and presumably *D*

e5 ἔκτου WT Par: om. Θ

e7 πέμπτου] δευτέρου ΘWT Par (et πέμπτου s.l.), hence δευτέρου *D*

δ17αι παραπλήσια Θ Par: παραπλησίως WT, probably a correction of Scpc, not adopted by *D*²

a4 τὸν ἔκτον WT Par: τὸ ἔκτον prΘ

a4 δὲ δὴ] δὴ Θ, and by the looks of it *D*: ἦ [sic] W: δεῖ T: δὲ δεῖ Par

a7 αὐτῶν Par: αὐτὸν prΘ WT, hence *D*, a trivial error

a7 τούτων Par: τούτων prΘ WT, hence *D*, an error of perseveration

b1 καὶ om. ΘWT Par

b2 τὸν τρίτον ΘWT Par, A: τὸ τρίτον F: τρίτον Theo Simpl. *recte*

b7 ἕνα τόνον] ἀνά τόνον ΘWT Par, ἀνατόνον F

c5 τὰ ὄντα—c6 τῆι om. ΘWT Par

d4 λαχέσεως T Par: λάχεως ΘW

d6 λαχέσεως T Par: λάχεως ΘW

e7 εἰ δὲ] ε δε Θ: ε δε [sic] W: ἦ δὲ Tpc (incertum quid antea habuerit): ἦδε Parpc (incertum quid antea habuerit)

δ18αι εἶναι] ὅτι ΘWT Par

a1 ὀπαιστὸς ΘWT Par

a1 εἴληγεν Apc (incertum quid antea habuerit) F: ἦλεγγε ΘW Par: εἴληγε T, cf. note

b2 εὐδοκίμων ΘWT Par

b6 ὑγίαις Θ: ὑγείαις W(u.v.) T Par

b6 μέσον ΘWT Par

c4 διαγινώσκοντα Par: διαγινώσκειν καὶ ΘWT, hence no doubt *D*

c5 αἰεὶ Par: om. ΘWT, and probably *D*

- c7 εἰδέναι] καὶ εἰδέναι ΘWT Par
d3 τοιαῦτα WT Par: om. Θ
d5 αὐτῶν Θ Par: αὐτὸν et ὦν s.l. W: αὐτοῦ T; it looks as if *D* and prSc had αὐτῶν, and that Scpc corrected it without making it quite clear what he meant (which Scpc often does)
e3 ἔασει Par, AF: ἔασειν ΘWT, and no doubt *D*
619a2 ἰέναι WT Par: ἔναι [sic] Θ
a3 καὶ² Par: τε καὶ ΘWT, and probably *D*, a perfectly possible reading
b3 ξὺν νῶ ΘW, Arc and, I take it, *D*: ξυνῶ T, F: σὺν τῶ Par
c7 τῶν ΘWT: τὸν Par (et prF), et τῶν i.m., a pure coincidence
d1 ἐν Par: om. ΘWT, and presumably *D*, but not a reading worth consideration
d2 τοιοῦτος Θ Par: οιοῦτος [sic] W: οὔτος [sic] T
e1 φιλοσοφεῖ ΘWT Par
e2 ἐν om. ΘWT Par, F
620a1 ἔλεινῃ AF ΘWT Par
b1 εἰκοστήν] τῷ εἰκόσι· τὴν Θ, and probably *D*: ὡς τὸ εἰκόσι· τὴν WT: εἰκόσι· τὴν Par, et ὡς τὸ i.m.
b4 ἐχθρὰν ΘWT Par, Euseb.
c5 ζητεῖν suo loco hab. Par: post πολὺν hab. ΘWT, *D*
c6 μόλις ΘWT Par
e6 δὲ Par: om. ΘWT, and no doubt *D*
621a6 τῆ WT: τῆ et ἰ s.l. Θ: τῆ Parpc, incertum quid antea habuerit
a7 ποιῖν WT Par: ποιεῖν et ἰ s.l. Θ, perhaps a trivial error of *D*, immediately corrected by Sc
a7 τοῦς—b1 μέτρου om. ΘWT Par
b5 ποιῖν WT Par: ποιεῖν et ἰ s.l. Θ, cf. ad a7
b6 οὐκ] οὐδὲ ΘWT, *D* (not an unattractive reading): οὐδὲν Par
b7 ἰδεῖν] ἦδη ΘWT: ἴδοι Par
b8 οὔτος ΘWT Par
b8 καὶ] ἀλλ' ΘWT Par, AF (cf. note)
c6 καὶ ἡμῖν Par: ἡμῖν ΘWT, probably *D*
d2 χιλιετῆ ΘWT Par
d3 πράττοντες Par (-μεν in A is written in an erasure): πράττομεν ΘWT, Arc: πράττομεν F, cf. Boter (1989: 225).

618a1 τῶι δὲ ἀνελομένῳ δηλον εἶναι ὁπόστος εἴληγεν.

εἴληγεν Arc (incertum quid antea habuerit) F: ἤλεγχε D

A has been incompletely reported by Bekker, who gives only what he took to be the reading of prA, to wit εἰλήχει, and misreported by Adam, who says ‘εἰλήχει A¹: εἴληγεν A²’. It is in itself possible that A first wrote εἰληγεν, thought better of it and for reasons best known to him deleted -ειν when deletion of (the second) -ει- would have been sufficient, wrote an ε over a wide erasure and continued with the final ν before going on to the next word. In the facsimile, the original -ειν is clearly visible. But facsimiles can be deceptive, as I have learned the hard way. In fact, the MS itself clearly has erasures on either side of the ε, but I am not satisfied that the ε itself was written in an erasure. And the scenario works only on the assumption that the scribe did not use his usual ligature for ει, because neither rasura is big enough to find a place for it. There is no trace of an acute accent above the -η-. In short, I do not know what A’s original reading was, but I can exclude the pluperfect with confidence.

In any case, we here have to do with an incidental mistake, immediately corrected (given the absence of traces of other accents), presumably against the exemplar, and therefore of limited value for the constitution of the text. Unfortunately, all 19th-century editors, believing that -ειν was acceptable as a third person singular pluperfect ending, adopted it, and all 20th-century editors relied on Adam enough to cling to the pluperfect (even Chambry, who, unlike Burnet, saw A itself).

Now the ὁπόστος clause is an indirect question and therefore the rules of indirect speech should be applied. Perhaps a pluperfect is not entirely out of the question (cf. K.-G. II 539, Stahl [1907: 559]), but the main rules require a perfect, and a perfect is given by the only two witnesses whose reading is certain. D’s ἤλεγχε is no evidence either way, as the corruption necessitated changing the ending in any case, nor is Proclus’ paraphrase εὐθύς γινώσκει πόστος ἔλαχε, in *Remp.* II 280, 24–25, helpful in this respect.

618c4–7 τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον **χρηστὸν** καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἰρεῖσθαι, ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα **[καὶ]** **ξυντιθέμενα** ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου πῶς ἔχει, **εἰδέναι** τί κάλλος πενίαι ἢ πλούτῳ κραθὲν καὶ μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἕξεως κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται

χρηστόν Stob. (III 1,24 = III 11,6 Hense): καὶ χρηστόν ADF || ξυντιθέμενα scripsi: καὶ ξυντιθέμενα ADF: καὶ ante c5 ἀναλογιζόμενον transpos. K.F. Hermann || εἰδένα AF: καὶ εἰδένα D

Three different problems in this segment of a far longer sentence. The choice between *χρηστόν* and *καὶ χρηστόν* is easy. The meaning is ‘distinguishing the good life from the bad’. We have therefore to do with a combinatory coordination, in which corresponsive *καὶ* cannot be used. Cf. note on 454d2 (above, pp. 82–85). Sometimes one has to go to Stobaeus for the correct reading; in this book *βοῶδι ἰατρικῆ* (also Plutarch; *ἰατρικὴν* ADF); 615b2 *πολλοῖς* (*πολλοὶ* ADF).

Not much more difficult is the question of the *καὶ* which ADF give before *ξυντιθέμενα*. This would have to mean ‘all the things mentioned, put together and separated just now’. This will not do, since the reference is clearly, as Jowett–Campbell say, to the *βίων παραδείγματα* (a1–b6). These were mentioned, by Er as reported by Socrates, but not put together or separated. It is much better to take *ξυντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα* as circumstantial participles modifying *πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ ὀηθέντα*: ‘taking into account all the things of which we have spoken and estimating the effect on the goodness of life of their conjunction or their severance’ (Shorey). This involves removing *καὶ*. K.F. Hermann wanted to put it before *ἀναλογιζόμενον*, but as we shall presently see that will not do: it is better to remove it altogether.

The construction of *εἰδένα* is a far more difficult matter. Burnet tries to save the AF reading by printing a high point after *αἰρεῖσθαι*, thereby making *εἰδένα* loosely dependent on an unexpressed ‘one has to’ (cf. c3 *δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα*; d5 *δυνατὸν εἶναι*). This is not especially attractive in itself, nor is the asyndeton, but the decisive argument was given by Schneider: *ἀναλογιζόμενον* belongs closely with *αἰρεῖσθαι* (cf. d5–6 *συλλογισάμενον αἰρεῖσθαι*), therefore it should be taken as modifying it.

Should we then accept *D*’s *καὶ εἰδένα*, as most editors do? First a caution is in order. The status of *D*, the reconstructed reading of the lost part of D, is less certain than that of the preserved D, because the reconstruction is based on the MSS Scor.y.1.13 and Par.1810, both of whom we know are given to conjectures, and sometimes make good ones.

But whatever may be the truth of this, there is also the possibility that *καὶ εἰδένα* is an ancient conjecture. The question then becomes how necessary the conjecture is.

One may think of the anacoluthon known as ‘two-predicate sentence’, which I have discussed in the note on 389a3–6 (above, pp. 39–

41); cf. note on 501b3–4 (above, pp. 105–106); De Strycker–Slings (1994: 344–345) on *Ap.* 32b5; Slings (1997b: 210–212). But in most cases, the second predicate is a repetition or a variation of the first. Here, however, αἰρεῖσθαι refers to an ulterior event, for which εἰδέναι is a necessary condition.

Yet the solution given by *D* is hardly better. It requires us to construe δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα ... αἰρεῖσθαι ... καὶ εἰδέναι. The object of εἰδέναι, however, is an exemplification of the participial clause ἀναλογιζόμενον, which as we saw belongs with the infinitive αἰρεῖσθαι: συντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις is worked out by κάλλος πενίαι ἢ πλούτῳ κραθέν. Therefore they should be on a par syntactically. This parallel status is not achieved by καὶ εἰδέναι, but nor is it by εἰδέναι alone. The logical consequence of this was drawn by Wallies (1922: 46–47): delete εἰδέναι altogether. This may seem bold, but the sentence is really better without it, and τί κάλλος κατέ following directly on πῶς ἔχει sounds authentic.

Yet I feel it would be irresponsible to follow Wallies: the possibility of a two-predicate sentence, however slight, remains. Therefore my text contains εἰδέναι and my apparatus an endorsement of Wallies' conjecture.

619c2 καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαίμαργίας οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς ἀνασκηψάμενον ἐλέσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν εἰμαρμένην παιδῶν αὐτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακά.

ἀλλ' αὐτὸν *AD*: ἀλλὰ ταυτὸν *F*

Plato never places anaphoric αὐτὸν (no matter what its case is) directly after ἀλλά, except here and *Grg.* 463c2. It cannot be a coincidence that in both cases the pronoun is object of λανθάνω. I have no explanation, but no choice either.

621b6–7 ἀλλ' ἐξαιφνης ἀναβλέψας **ιδεῖν ἤδη** ἔωθεν αὐτὸν **κείμενον** ἐπὶ τῆι πυρῶϊ.

ιδεῖν ἤδη scripsi: ιδεῖν *Apc*: ἦδη *prA DF*: εἶδεν post αὐτὸν *Procl.*, libere reddens: ἴδου *Par* || ἦδη κείμενον *revera Apc*: κείμενον *DF Procl.*

Scholars exhibit a remarkable reluctance to accept ἤδη, but as it fits the sense and is in all three primary MSS it deserves at least serious consideration (Bekker, who by his negative report suggested that ἤδη was not in *A*, is the culprit here, but Adam and Jowett–Campbell, who correct the report, do not print it either). Proclus gives more a paraphrase than

a text, so nothing can be deduced from it: *in Remp.* II 345,1–2 Kroll ἀναβλέψας δὲ ἔωθεν ἑαυτὸν εἶδεν ἐπὶ τῆι πυρᾷ κείμενον δωδεκαταῖον (cf. 614b6). If he was capable of writing ἐπὶ τῆι πυρᾷ κείμενον instead of κείμενον ἐπὶ τῆι πυρᾷ, he may also have left out ἦδη.

Inspection of A shows that it originally read ἦδη between ἀναβλέψας and ἔωθεν, later corrected to ἰδεῖν. The erasure reported by Jowett–Campbell is only a partial one. The δ is original and the ν is squeezed in. After ἰδεῖν had been restored, the corrector (who it should be remembered was the same person as the scribe) wrote ἦδη at the end of the line.

How did the corruption originate? Of course ἦδη and ἰδεῖν sounded very much alike in pronunciation, but I wonder if that is enough to account for a putative corruption of ἰδεῖν to ἦδη—the accents are different. If the text of Apc is followed, matters become even worse: we have to explain why a similar-sounding ἦδη ousted an ἰδεῖν which was several words away and took its place.

The only likely scenario that I can think of is the following. Plato wrote ἦδη ἰδεῖν or ἰδεῖν ἦδη, and since the pronunciation of the words was similar, one of them ousted the other. The unlucky victim was the verb. The corrector of A, seeing that a verb meaning ‘to see’ was missing, supplied one by conjecture and did so by correcting ἦδη, which he then removed to the place where it was most convenient for him to put it.

It may be objected that ἰδεῖν placed before ἔωθεν makes no good sense: Er may have opened his eyes early in the morning, but can it logically be said that having opened his eyes he saw himself early in the morning? This is what Proclus must have felt when he placed εἶδεν after ἑαυτόν. But the objection does not hold water. ἔωθεν may well modify the complex ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν. And if we place ἰδεῖν after αὐτόν, there is no way of accounting for the corruption. Yet if ἔωθεν modifies both the participle and the infinitive, I think ἦδη should come after ἰδεῖν, not before it. For the order ἦδη ἔωθεν, cf. ἦδη τότε *R.* 417b5; *Lg.* 778b7.

621b8 καὶ οὕτως ὃ Γλαύκων μῦθος ἐσώθη **ἀλλ’** οὐκ ἀπώλετο

Another series of misreports with grave consequences. Bekker’s negative report suggests that A reads καί. Neither Adam nor Jowett–Campbell corrects this, and Burnet had to rely on them. Chambry rightly attributes ἀλλ’ to A but goes on to inform us, wrongly, that F has καί. The result is that all editions print καί, for which there is no author-

ity whatsoever. As Boter (1989: 244) points out, *καί* first appears in the Aldina, and is not in any MS. Proclus likewise reads *ἀλλ'*: τὸν μῦθον συμπερανάμενος σεσῶσθαί φησιν *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπολωλέναι* (*in Remph.* II 354, 10–11 Kroll). If Denniston is correct when he says ‘strictly speaking, *ἀλλ' οὐ* expresses the incompatibility of two ideas, *καὶ οὐ* merely adds a negative idea to a positive’ (1954: 2), *ἀλλ' οὐ* is more suitable than *καὶ οὐ*. True, he goes on to say that the distinction is not always observed, but we are not dealing with two variants here, but with a unanimously transmitted reading and a 16th-century mistake or perhaps correction. It is about time that in this magnificent sentence the correct particle should be restored.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

341e6–7 Despite the use of ἐπὶ τούτῳ at d8 I still believe the accusative to be better, although I find it difficult to account for the difference. But ἐπὶ τούτῳ at d8 is the probable cause of the corruption of ἐπὶ τοῦτο to ἐπὶ τούτῳ at e7. In ἐπ' αὐτοῖς at 342a4 ἐπί is simply 'in addition to', which requires the dative.

347a3–4 ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα ὡς ἔοικε μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν: cf. note on 485a5 (pp. 99–100).

351c1 In my edition, I have accepted Tucker's deletion of ἔχει, although I still cannot account for its intrusion. Was b8 ἔξει perhaps inserted here by mistake, and if so, was its tense changed? Not a very good explanation, I am afraid.

Anyway, we will have to accept the fact that sometimes a single word is transmitted unanimously which makes nonsense of the sentence as it stands, and which, if removed, gives an impeccable reading. A case in point is 569a3, where ADF give ἀλλ' ἵνα ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθῆι κτέ. The editors are unanimous in accepting the reading of Laur.80.19pc, ἀπό, but Plato does not say ἐλευθερώω ἀπό [although this construction is found *Ep. β*, 355e7–356a1; but, of course, this letter may be spurious], while he uses ἐλευθερώω with the simple genitive in four places, so ὑπὸ must be an interpolation that changes the construction and the meaning (it is not shielded by the hopelessly corrupt 575a5–6 τὸν δ' ἐνδόθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα). One looks in vain for a motive for its interpolation.

I withdraw the remark about the nominal character of the sentence, which in hindsight looks like special pleading.

358e3 It may be more than a little rash to print οἷόν τ' ἐ(στι), but I have decided to print it. On balance, it seems more likely to me that Plato was consistent in repeating οἷον from c1 οἷον εἶναί φασιν καὶ ὄθεν γεγόνενα than that a scribe imported it from there.

372e7–8 εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσιν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει.

It is unnecessary to print a high point after θεωρήσωμεν and thus to create an asyndeton. We have here to do with the common idiom βούλει σκοπῶμεν, except that it is here used in a conditional clause rather than in a direct question. Cf. K.-G. I 223.

One may of course deny this possibility (cf. Richards [1893: 15]; J.B. Mayor, CR 10 [1896], 111), but denial without arguments is not helpful. It should be pointed out that many idioms otherwise restricted to questions are sometimes found in conditional clauses, e.g. δεῖ or χρῆ meaning 'it is allowed'.

388e5 I have changed my mind over this. Quite often universal statements made in the main clause cause the present stem to be used in the subordinate clause, in passages in which one would have expected the aorist in the subordinate clause. At *Ti.* 59d2 the present participle would have been impossible, so no argument can be made of that. *Prt.* 338a5 and E. fr. 564, 3 N² ἐφέροντα (-ες) are coincident participles, which in Greek almost always have the same tense as the predicates they modify; in both cases these are in the aorist.

389d9–e2 σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ **τοιαῦτα** μέγιστα, ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἔδωδάς ἡδονῶν;

τοιαῦτα scripsi: τοιάδε AF Stob.LM (III 5, 1 = III 258,12 Hense): τοιαῦτα δὲ D Stob.A

τοιαῦτα δὲ is clearly a contamination of two variants: τοιάδε as given by AF and two codd. of Stob. and τοιαῦτα. I prefer the latter, because ὅδε etc. points forward to something said in the next sentence: for a pronoun announcing something in the same sentence οὗτος is used.

401e4 We can, I think, get a little further. χαίρων καταδεχόμενος appealed to me because I took it to mean something like 'bid a hearty welcome to', on the analogy of ἴθι χαίρων 'go with my best wishes' (not found in Plato). This was muddled thinking, because there χαίρων is said of the addressee of the greeting χαῖρε, whereas here it would be used of the person greeting. There may be parallels for that, e.g. χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων (E. fr. 449, 4; cf. θρηνεῖν in line 2), but this would still require χαίρων to mean something like 'saying goodbye', whereas we need it here in the meaning 'saying hello'.

Anyway, there are no parallels in Plato for *χαίρων* being used in either of these situations. This makes the case for *χαίρων καταδεχόμενος* weaker, and the case for *καὶ χαίροι*, which is already strong in itself because it can be paralleled from Plato, proportionally stronger.

Between the participles *δυσχεραίνων* and *καταδεχόμενος*, *χαίροι* ran a high risk of being turned into a participle itself. But then so did *ἐπαινοῖ*, which was left intact. The explanation might lie in the fact that copyists naturally copy colon by colon, and that there is a natural colon-end after *ἐπαινοῖ*, so the next bit to be copied was *καὶ χαίροι καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν*, where the optative ran a high risk of being assimilated to the participle.

420a1 Burnet prints ἄλλ' ἦ at 573a3, where ADF have ἄλλ' ἦ.

425d2–6 καὶ εἴ που τελῶν τινες ἢ πράξεις ἢ θέσεις ἀναγκαῖοί εἰσιν ἢ κατ' ἀγορᾶς ἢ λιμένας καὶ τὸ **πάμπαν** ἀγορανομικὰ ἅπτα ἢ ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἐλλμμενικὰ ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τούτων τολμήσομέν τι νομοθετεῖν;

καὶ F: ἦ καὶ AD || **πάμπαν** ADF: παράπαν Caes.D.28.4 Laur.CS.42

I find it slightly more logical that ἦ has persevered in AD than that it has dropped out in F, although even essential words do sometimes drop out in F.

Adam adopts *παράπαν* because, according to him, *τὸ παράπαν* means 'in general', 'generally'. He goes on to state that *τὸ πάμπαν* is never so used. I find no difference in meaning between the two expressions, which roughly correspond to the English *at all*. I do not necessarily agree with Adam's implicit claim that sentences containing a negative plus a form of *πάμπαν* do not support its adoption here: in such respects *εἰ* clauses tend to behave like negative clauses. But there is strong enough support at *Pl.* 270e8–9 *τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη μαραινόμενα κομιδῆι τὸ πάμπαν ἐξηφανίζετο*.

πάμπαν is found only eight times in Plato, *παράπαν* over one hundred and fifty. Perhaps we have to reckon with the possibility that *παράπαν* is sometimes corrupted from *πάμπαν*.

427a5 ἐν τῆι μὲν ὅτι ἀνωφελῆ καὶ πλέον οὐδέν, ἐν δὲ τῆι ὅτι κτέ

One might expect ἐν μὲν τῆι, but Gildersleeve (1911: 218) provides a parallel: 453a2–3 *εἰς τὰ μὲν ... εἰς δὲ τὰ*.

429e1 It might be argued that because Theo Sm. clearly takes τὸ βαφέν to mean ‘the dye’ (ὁμοῦ τι τὸ βαφέν καὶ ἡ φύσις), we must take it in just the same way, and so there is no problem with the text at all. The argument would be wrong because Theo’s φύσις is a corruption of πλύσις as read in the next clause in ADF. In other words, Theo had to make sense of a corrupt text as best he could, which he did by ignoring δευσοποιόν (it must have been in his text since it turns up in his paraphrase three lines later) and taking τὸ βαφέν as ‘the dye’. Therefore his text cannot help us to solve the problem.

The argument that in the *Politeia* no other explanatory gloss is found as old as the 2nd century CE is perhaps not as strong as I thought it was. Obviously, Theo’s text was even more corrupt than that of ADF. If in the latter the corruption can be healed by removing two words whose insertion is easily accounted for, that is what an editor should do.

There is, besides, the following to consider. The relative clause is in the singular, but its antecedent shifts to the plural in the next main clause (καὶ ἡ πλύσις οὐτ’ ἄνευ ὀυμμάτων οὐτε μετὰ ὀυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἄνθος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι). This is commonplace in Plato, but the shift becomes harder if in the first main clause the antecedent is referred to in so many words, whether as τὸ βαφέν or as simply βαφέν. Therefore I have decided to follow van Herwerden in his deletion.

433b7 F⁵’s ὄν is marked as an addition to the original τῶν (i.e. τῶν ὄν), not as a correction of it.

433e4 This note has become superfluous. Examination of F itself has shown what I should have noticed on the microfilm, that F originally had ἄλλου τινὸς οὖν like AD. A later hand, probably F⁵, added οὐ before τινὸς *extra lineam*, deleted the diacritics above τινὸς οὖν, and added a circumflex over ουν. There is therefore no authority whatsoever for ἄλλου οὐτινοσοῦν.

436a1 I now feel confident that Plato wrote ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον περὶ κτέ, despite the fact that there is no satisfactory explanation for the repeated article.

439b3–5 οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτήν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερον ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ **θηρίου** ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν;

θηρίου ADF Gal. (*Plac.Hipp.Pl.* V 7,36–40 = I 344,23 De Lacy): θηρίον Stob. (I 49,30 = I 360,22 Wachsmuth)

I have to thank Mr. Hendrik Lorenz (Oxford) for bringing this point to my attention. Nearly all editions read the accusative, and all translators that I have seen, as far as this can be inferred from their wording, take '(wild) animal' as object.

There is something in the thirsty man's soul which drives it to drinking (αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος is neuter, and depends on ἕτερον). Such an irrational force may well be compared to a wild beast, the more so because it has just been opposed to another part in man's soul that restrains the soul from drinking. If so, the genitive is correct.

I have been slow to realise what Mr. Lorenz points out to me, that the ἐπιθυμητικόν, as defined presently, is compared to a wild animal later on in the *Politeia*, 588b10–d6. Note θηρίου at 588c7. In the *Timaeus*, Plato will use the same simile: 70d4 ὡς θρόμμα ἄγριον.

The accusative seems to me far less apposite. True, you can drive a wild animal to drinking, and it is reasonable enough to say that the thirsty part of the soul leads the whole soul to drink. But to compare the soul in its entirety to a wild animal in the very sentence in which a restraining part within it is first introduced does not seem very fortunate.

439b5–6 To the examples of ἄν carried over from a previous clause or sentence the following rather less spectacular passage may be added: 558c1–3 ταῦτά τε δὴ ἔφην ἔχει ἄν καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη (A; εἴη ἄν DF) ὡς ἔοικεν ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἀναρχος καὶ ποικίλη κτέ.

440d7–8 I am now inclined to assume that a speaker is more often interrupted than I suggested in this note. There is a tell-tale τε at 522b3 which is never followed by a καὶ because of the interruption, but AD's τε is to be preferred because Glauco's slightly hurtful interruption οὐχοῦν ὀρθῶς would be in character, and I don't quite see the point of γε. It is probably best to print dashes in these two places.

I have arrived at the conclusion that the εἰ clause is elliptical, and contains an indicative.

[In his edition, Slings prints a full stop after ἐνθυμη; in the apparatus, he notes that εἰ may be a corruption of ἐάν.]

443c10 τὸ δέ γε ἀληθὲς τοιοῦτον μὲν τι ἦν ὡς ἔοικεν ἢ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὐ τι περὶ τὴν ἕξω προᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ

ἀλλ' οὐ τι Hense: ἀλλ' οὐ ADF: ἀλλ' ὅτι Stob.

I have now decided to print what I presented as a conjecture earlier; it was reconstructed as Stob.' reading by Hense, who prints οὐ [τι]. τι can easily have dropped out before the following πῖ in several MSS. The reverse process is less easy to reconstruct: dittography of πῖ, πῖ then reinterpreted or misread as τι, disappearance of upsilon through haplography with following tau? Hardly worth considering.

453a2 cf. additional note on 427a5 (p. 189).

456a1 In A's οὐδὲ, the delta is written in an erasure; I cannot make out the original reading.

470c6 I should also have consulted Denniston's p. 520, where three additional instances from *R.* of unusual postponement of τε are given. 550a6 falls under (2), as does 465e1 mentioned above. For 605a3 see above (pp. 170–171).

[485a9] It was only when correcting the second page proofs that Slings realized that the transmitted reading, Πῶς;, does not make sense. Of course, single πῶς is common enough (in the *Politeia* alone there are more than 25 instances); but it is used invariably by the interlocutor to invite Socrates to give a further explanation (see 392a11, 430e3, 436b8, 451d3, 454b3, 466e3, 477b14 etc.). Here, however, Socrates explains to Glauco what he intends to show in what follows. In doing so, he refers to a point settled before (485a4–5), namely that they should first inquire into the nature of the philosophers; he goes on to state that this will lead to the conclusion that the philosophers will have to be appointed as rulers of the state (a5–8). Glauco's reaction does not ask for further explanation on this point, as single Πῶς always does; it expresses consent with the procedure proposed by Socrates. This is clearly shown by the way in which Socrates starts his exposition in a10. Therefore Glauco's answer in a9 must mean something like 'of course', just as his answer Πάνυ μὲν οὖν does in a3. Two solutions offer

themselves: read either <Καί> πῶς; or Πῶς <γάρ>; Slings has decided in favour of <Καί> πῶς;, because this formula is slightly more frequent than Πῶς γάρ; (nine occurrences in the *Politeia* as against six), and because the phrase occurs three times in the vicinity of our place (484c3, 485c11, 486c9).]

494d11 Autopsy of F reveals an additional smooth breathing not noticed before: εἰς αἰσθάνηται. Therefore Burnet based his acceptance of a suspect compound on incomplete evidence.

508a3 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφη πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι

The rule in Plato is that πολλοῦ γε δεῖ is used at the very beginning of an utterance, especially after a question. Within the sentence, γε is not used in this idiom except here and *Gr.* 517a7 ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ κτέ, where no variant is recorded by Dodds. Since ἀλλὰ μὴν in Plato is more often than not followed by γε, just as ἀλλὰ μέντοι is (cf. Denniston [1954: 119; 410–412]; Blomqvist [1969: 65]; my note [Slings (1999: 268–269)] on *Clit.* 407a1), it seems best to accept it.

511d2 A possible parallel for the absolute genitive is 436d8–e1 ὡς οὐ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἑαυτῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα τότε μενόντων τε καὶ φερομένων, where for obvious reasons the text is also suspect.

514b1 One might think that the word order ὥστε μένειν τε αὐτούς favours the interpretation of αὐτούς as *ipsos* rather than as *eos*. Not so: *Phd.* 111a3 ὥστε αὐτήν (*eam*, with Topic shift) ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν; but *Lg.* 687a7 ὥστε αὐτούς (*ipsos*) τε ἐλευθέρους εἶναι. At *Cra.* 412d7 ὥστε αὐτὸ (*id*) μηδὲν στέγειν, αὐτὸ is object.

In our passage it may very well be maintained that ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς ἀγκύνας supports the reading αὐτοῦ in the ὥστε clause ὥστε μένειν τε αὐτοῦ εἰς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὄραν: the prisoners' legs are tied down so that they won't be able to move freely in the cave but will be forced to remain on the same spot, and their necks are tied down so that they will only be able to look at what is in front of them.

556a4 The cluster οὔτε γε is not found in the corpus except here. I see no option but to follow F, thin ice though he is where particles are concerned.

LIST OF MANUSCRIPTS

A full discussion of the textual tradition of the *Republic* can be found in Boter 1989. Boter recognizes three primary MSS: Parisinus gr. 1807 (A), Venetus Marcianus gr. 185 (coll. 576) (D) and Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 39 (F). In the text of this book these three MSS are indicated with their sigla.

All the other MSS depend directly or indirectly on one of these three MSS. Many of these secondary MSS contain interesting readings, which are most probably the result of conjectural emendation (for a discussion of these secondary MSS see Boter [1989: 201–241]). Slings often discusses such readings; the MSS in which they are found are indicated with their abbreviated names, not with sigla (in the list below, the sigla are added between brackets).

There are eleven papyri containing fragments of the *Republic*. Those used by Slings are listed here; for a full list see Boter (1989: 252–257).

Primary manuscripts

- A Parisinus graecus 1807, s. ix. For later hands, see Boter (1989: 81–86). Both A¹ and A² are identical with the scribe; A² indicates the readings he added after the whole text had been written, as can be seen from the different colour of the ink.
- D Venetus Marcianus graecus 185 (numero di collocazione 576), s. xii. For later hands, see Boter (1989: 92–94); see also Slings's note at the end of book eight (above, p. 154). In the passages where D itself is absent (507e3–515d7 and 612e8–621d5), its reading is reconstructed from its derivatives; these readings are indicated by means of the siglum *D*; see above, pp. 108–110 and 176–180.
- F Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 39, s. xiii–xiv. For later hands, see Boter (1989: 101–104).

Secondary manuscripts

- Bononiensis 3630, s. xiii–xiv (Bon). A gemellus of Vind.phil.gr. 89, deriving from D^{ac}.
- Caesenas D 28,4 (Malatestianus), s. xv (M). A gemellus of Laur.CS.42 (see below), deriving from A.
- Laurentianus 80.7, s. xv (α). A heavily contaminated MS, deriving indirectly from Laur.CS.42 (see below).
- Laurentianus 80.19, s. xiv–xv (β). An indirect copy of Parisinus gr. 1810 (see below), corrected (sometimes from its exemplar) by a highly intelligent scribe (see Boter [1989: 203–214]).
- Laurentianus 85.7, s. xv (x). A copy of F.

- Laurentianus Conventi Soppressi 42, s. xii–xiii (γ). A gemellus of Caes.D.28.4 (see above), deriving from A.
- Monacensis graecus 237, s. xv (q). A copy of Laur.80.19 (see above).
- Parisinus graecus 1642, s. xiv (K). A gemellus of Laur.80.19 (see above) in books I–III.
- Parisinus graecus 1810, s. xiv (Par). Derives from D as corrected by D² and D³.
- Pragensis Radnice VI.F.a.1 (Lobc[ovicianus]), s. xiv–xv. Derives from Scor. γ.1.13 (see below).
- Scorialensis γ.1.13, s. xiii–xiv (Sc). Derives from Ven.Marc.App.Cl. IV,1 up to 389d7, from D^{ac} from 389d7 on.
- Scorialensis Ψ.1.1, dated 1462 (Ψ). Derives from D as corrected by D² and D³.
- Vaticanus graecus 229, s. xiv. An indirect copy of Parisinus gr. 1810 (see above).
- Venetus Marcianus gr. 184 (coll. 326), ca. 1450 (E); written by Johannes Rhosus for Bessarion. A direct copy of Marc.187.
- Venetus Marcianus gr. 187 (coll. 742), ca. 1450 (N). An indirect copy of Venetus Marcianus App. Cl. IV,1 (T) in books I–II; an indirect copy of Laur.85.9 (which derives from A) in books III–X. Written for, and heavily corrected by, Bessarion.
- Venetus Marcianus App. Cl. IV,1 (coll. 542), ca. 950 (up to 389d7), s. xv (the remainder) (T). A, indirect copy of A until 389d7; an indirect copy of D^{ac} after 389d7.
- Vindobonensis phil. gr. 1, s. xvi (V). An indirect copy of Laur.85.9, which derives from A.
- Vindobonensis phil. gr. 89, ca. 1500 (Vind). A gemellus of Bonon.3630, deriving from D^{ac}.
- Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 7, s. xiv (the part containing R.) (W). An indirect copy of D.

Papyri

- Π4 *POxy.* 2751, late second or early third century. Contains fragments from 412c–414b.
- Π8 *POxy.* 3326, second century. Contains fragments from 545c1–546a3.
- Π9 *POxy.* 1808, second century. Contains fragments from 546b–547d; some corrections in a later hand.
- Π11 *POxy.* 3157, second century. Contains fragments from 610c7–611a7, 611c5–d2, 611e1–612c7 and 613a1–7.

Translation

- Copt Coptic translation of 588b1–589b3, ed. J. Brashler (Nag Hammadi Codex VI 5) in D. Parrott (ed.), *Nag Hammadi Codices V 2–5 and VI with Papyrus Berlinensis 8502, 1 and 4* (Leiden 1979), 325–339.

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CORRIGENDA TO THE
OXFORD TEXT OF THE *REPUBLIC*

334e2 in apparatus: *pro* Apr F *lege* A prF

361e5 in apparatus: *pro* cf. 613e2 *lege* cf. 613e1

429c8 in apparatus: *pro* αὐ̃ τῆς Jackson *lege* αὐ̃ τὴν Jackson

435e6 in textu: *pro* ὁ̃ *lege* ὁ̃

469c5 in textu: *pro* μᾶλλον̃ *lege* μᾶλλον

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