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AQUINAS'S PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON THE *ETHICS*

A Historical Perspective

By

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for

Kay and Margaret

“Inconveniens autem forte et hoc solitarium facere beatum.”
NE.IX.9.1169b16-17 (trans. lincoliensis)

“Quia igitur felix habet ea quae sunt naturaliter bona homini,
conveniens est quod habeat cum quibus convivat.”
SLE.IX.10.66-68

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EDITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Albertus Magnus: All citations, unless otherwise indicated, are from the *Opera omnia* (Münster: Aschendorff).

E.g.: *Super Ethica*.I.8.p38,51-57 refers to book I, lesson 8, page 38, lines 51-57

Aquinas: Works that have appeared in the Leonine edition - *Opera omnia* (Rome: Leonine Comm.) - are cited according to that edition; for editions of his other works, see Bibliography, below, page 275.

Citations from the commentary on the *Ethics* (i.e., *SLE*), as well as from the *De unitate intellectus* and the *De aeternitate mundi*, include references to the paragraph numbers of the Spiazzi editions (Rome: Marietti). Citations from the commentary on the *De anima* (*SLDA*) includes references to the Pirota edition (Rome: Marietti). These references are intended as an aid to the reader not having access to the Leonine editions and do not signify that either the wording or the meaning of the manual editions is identical to that of the Leonine.

E.g.: *SLE*.X.9.1-20.S2065 refers to book X, chapter 9, lines 1-20 of the Leonine edition of the *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, and to paragraph 2065 of the Spiazzi edition.

Aristotle: Only medieval Latin versions of Aristotle are cited. The *versio lincolniensis*, translated by Robert Grosseteste, was the version used by Aquinas in the larger part of *Pars secunda* of the *Summa theologiae* and in both the *SLE* and the *Tabula libri Ethicorum*, as well as by Albert in the *Super Ethica*. Nearly identical copies of this translation are included in the critical editions of the commentaries on the *Ethics* by Aquinas and Albert.

E.g.: *NE*.I.7.1098a20-21; *SLE*, p. 38; *Super Ethica*, p. 36,79-80 refers to Grosseteste's translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book I, chapter 7, lines 1098a20-21 as found on page 38 of the *SLE* and on page 36, lines 79-80 of the *Super Ethica*. - When Averroes's version of this same text of the *NE* is referred to, as “*In I Ethic.fol.8rE*,” reference is to book I, the front side of folio 8, paragraph E.

Other Latin versions of Aristotle's works are cited according to the editions found in *Aristoteles Latimus*.

Averroes: Crawford's edition of the commentary on the *De anima* (Cambridge: Med. Acad. Amer, 1953) is cited.

E.g.: *Com. Mag. De anima*. III.36.p486,200-202 which refers to book III, chapter 36, page 486, lines 200-202.

Averroes's commentaries on the *Ethics* and on the *Metaphysics* known to the Latin world of the 13th century are cited according to: *Aristotelis Stagiritae Libri* (Venice: Juncta, 1562); Vol 3: *Moralem totam Philosophiam complectentes cum Averrois Cordubensis in Moralia Nicomachia expositione*; and Vol. 8: *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIII. Cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis*.

E.g.: *In I Ethic.* 7.fol.8vH-I refers to the commentary on the *Ethics*, book I, chapter 7, the back or reverse side of folio 8, paragraphs H and I.

INTRODUCTION

To call Thomas Aquinas's *Sententia libri Ethicorum* (i.e., "*SLE*") a philosophical commentary is to maintain a position at odds with much of today's received wisdom. For Joseph Owens and R.-A. Gauthier, Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries are theological works.¹ According to Mark Jordan, Aquinas "chose not to write philosophy,"² and the *Sententia* on the *Ethics* is only a preparation for the "full" and "Christian" commentary known as the *Pars secunda* of the *Summa theologiae*.³ This recalls Gauthier's statement that the *SLE* is "une oeuvre manquée et de nuls secours," since there Aquinas is said to have hidden the problems whose real discussion is in the *Pars secunda* of the *Summa theologiae*.⁴ Then, there is the dilemma proposed by Denis Bradley: if human actions are studied in the light of their orientation toward the sole ultimate end Aquinas recognized as proper to human nature, namely, the vision of God in an afterlife, then that study of morality is theological; but if human actions are examined insofar as they are directed to some other ultimate goal, that study is not a

1. Joseph Owens: "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," in *St. Thomas Aquinas. 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies* (Toronto: Pont. Inst. Med. Stud., 1974) V. 1, pp. 213-38. R.-A. Gauthier: *Introduction. Somme contre les gentiles* (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1993) pp. 150, 180. "St. Thomas et l'Éthique à Nicomaque," in Th. Aquinas: *Opera omnia* (Rome: Leonine Comm., 1971) T. 48, pp. xxiv-xxv.

2. Mark D. Jordan: "Theology and philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas* (ed. N. Kretzmann & E. Stump) (Cambridge: Camb. Univ. Press, 1993) p. 233.

3. Mark Jordan: "Aquinas Reading Aristotle's Ethics," in *Ad litteram. Authoritative Texts and their Medieval Readers* (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 244-45. On p. 236, Jordan asserts that the *SLE* is Aquinas's attempt to extract what is essential to Aristotle's moral teaching. - An argument that Jordan's "historicist reading" of the *SLE* cannot explain differences between the commentary and the *Ethics* is had in John Jenkins, C.S.C.: "Exposition of the Text: Aquinas's Aristotelian Commentaries," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, 5 (1996), pp. 39-62.

4. R.-A. Gauthier & J. Y. Jolif: *Aristote. L'Éthique A Nicomaque. Introduction, Traduction, et Commentaire*, (Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires/Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1970) 2nd ed., T. I, P. I, p. 131.

Thomist philosophy.⁵ Accordingly, for Bradley, the *SLE* is Aquinas's reading of the *Ethics* in the light of his theological beliefs.⁶ Much earlier than any of the above, Harry Jaffa found Aquinas's interpretation of the *Ethics* to be based on the attribution to Aristotle of "six principles of Christian ethics."⁷ Appearing almost as a disciple of Jaffa, Dimitrios Papadis concluded that Aquinas's commentary generally offers a correct view of Aristotle's doctrine, although on occasion Aristotle's teaching receives a further development that is Christian and theological.⁸ Nor ought we overlook the recent and very important study of Aquinas and his work by J.-P. Torrell; in regard to Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries, Torrell cites with approval Owens, Jaffa, and Gauthier, concluding with the last-named that we best appreciate those commentaries if we recall that they were undertaken "in an apostolic perspective" ordered to fulfilling as well as possible Aquinas's profession as a theologian.⁹ However, notwithstanding the authority enjoyed by these authors, each rests his interpretation on a basis that can be faulted.

Before pursuing that criticism further, I note the existence of another side to the discussion, albeit one seldom accorded the attention merited. Hermann Kleber, for instance, following the renowned medieval historian, Martin Grabmann, proposes that Aquinas's goal in the Aristotelian commentaries is the discovery and expression of the *intentio Aristotelis*.¹⁰ Yet alongside this

5. Denis J. M. Bradley: *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science* (Wash., D.C.: Cath. U. of Amer. Press, 1997) pp. 514-34; especially pp. 528-30.

6. *Ibid.*, p. xi. E.g., p. xii: "The theological conception of *synderesis* is the basis upon which Aquinas attempts to stabilize the foundations of Aristotelian practical wisdom."

7. Harry V. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism. A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1952) pp. 186-88.

8. Dimitrios Papadis: *Die Rezeption der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles bei Thomas von Aquin. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung* (Frankfurt: R. G. Fischer, 1980), p. 176. E.g., the claim in *SLE*.X.12.146-59.S2123 that God creates all things through his wisdom.

9. J.-P. Torrell: *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Fribourg Suisse/Paris: Éditions Universitaires/Éditions du Cerf, 1993) pp. 348-50.

10. Hermann Kleber: *Glück als Lebensziel. Untersuchungen zur Philosophie des Glücks bei Thomas von Aquin* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1988), p. 64. Cf. Martin Grabmann: "Die Aristoteleskommentare des heiligen Thomas von Aquin," in *Mittelalterliches*

fundamental aspect of his Aristotelian commentaries, Aquinas works in the light of "the truth of reality" (*veritas rei*). Thus, Kleber finds that Aquinas offers in commenting on the *Ethics* philosophical foundations for Aristotle's moral doctrines.¹¹ Referring explicitly to Jaffa's "six principles of Christian ethics," Kleber briefly disputes the thesis that these are introduced as Christian rather than as philosophical principles; he proposes that they were regarded by Aquinas as in one way or another necessarily a part of the understanding of Aristotle's intent in the *Ethics*, thus part of discovering the *intentio Aristotelis*, while keeping in mind the *veritas rei*.¹² Finally, while remarking some differences between the *Ethics* and "the problem of happiness" functioning as the organizing element of Aquinas's *SLE*, Kleber finds Aquinas to be proposing a moral philosophy.¹³

A particular virtue of Kleber's relatively brief study of Aquinas's commentary (approximately 80 pages) is his demonstration of the interdependence of the organization Aquinas finds in the *Ethics* and the search for the *intentio Aristotelis*. In this regard, a distinction is drawn between an insight of theology and an insight motivated by the knowledge of revelation. According to Kleber, the latter type of insight functions as Aquinas sees in the *Ethics* a theory of the imperfect happiness possible in this life. In sum, Kleber regards the content Aquinas proposes as the moral philosophy the latter believed to be expressed in the *Ethics*.¹⁴

Slightly earlier than Kleber, Léon Elders offered a brief summary of the *SLE* in which he stressed Aquinas's effort to explain Aristotle's text "*secundum intentionem Philosophi*." Elders acknowledged the omission in his study of questions concerning the date of composition, the Latin translations of the *Ethics*, and earlier commentaries Aquinas might have used.¹⁵ Solely from the study of

Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik (München, 1926) B. I, p. 283.

11. Kleber: *Glück als Lebensziel*, pp. 64-65.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-72.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 72; 130-31.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

15. Léon Elders: "St. Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics," in *Autour de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Recueil d'études sur sa pensée philosophique et théologique*, T. I: *Les commentaires sur les oeuvres d'Aristote. La métaphysique de l'être* (Paris/Brugge: Fac-éditions/Tabor, 1987) p. 77.

Aquinas's commentary, he concluded that the reader of the *SLE* finds, not the morality of 4th century B.C. Athens, but a universal ethics for people of all ages and cultures. Notwithstanding, in opposition to Owens and Jaffa, Elders insisted that Aquinas's commentary does not transform Aristotle's moral system by the introduction of theological doctrines. Instead, "Aristotle's ethics based upon experience and prudence is prolonged into a moral philosophy based upon the fundamental inclinations of human nature and the first principles of the practical intellect."¹⁶ Elsewhere, Elders has challenged Gauthier's assertion that the *SLE* does not address "real" problems of morality.¹⁷

Anyone conversant with the tradition represented by the insistence in Kleber and Elders that Aquinas searches for the *intentio Aristotelis* has ample reason for not regarding as conclusive the characterization of Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries and, in particular, of the *SLE*, as theological.¹⁸

Earlier, it was remarked that the latter proposal as found in Owens, Jaffa, Gauthier, etc. rests on bases less firm than are needed to substantiate that view. Additionally, Kleber, because of the scope of his study, has only taken into account the organizational principle used by Aquinas in commenting on his Latin version of the *Ethics*, while Elders, as noted, has restricted his examination solely to the *SLE* text itself. Hence, there are numerous aspects of Aquinas's commentary which have been passed over in silence. For example, unasked is the question of when and why Aquinas came to attribute to Aristotle the doctrines whose presence in the commentary has led so many to the conclusion that the

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-16. In "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et Aristote," *Revue thomiste*, 88.3 (1988), p. 364, Elders assigns five goals to Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries: (1) to clarify the structure of each work; (2) to propose the march of ideas; (3) to reject interpretations untrue to Aristotle; (4) to note agreement or disagreement of Aristotle's doctrine and faith; and (5) to construct a philosophy for use by university professors and theologians.

17. Léon Elders: "Nature et moralité," in *Autour de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Recueil d'études sur sa pensée philosophique et théologique*, T. II: *L'agir moral. Approches théologique* (Paris/Brugge: Fac/Tabor, 1987), pp. 23-45.

18. Don Adams, while not asking whether the *SLE* is philosophy or theology, also insists that Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of happiness in this life is "textually well motivated, and guilty of no interpretive crimes." Cf. "Aquinas on Aristotle on Happiness," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, 1 (1991), pp. 98-99. Roger Guindon finds the *SLE* to be a "minute examination" of the immediate causes of the happiness open to human agents through the most perfect use of their natural faculties. Cf. *Béatitude et Théologie morale chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Ottawa: Ottawa Univ. Pr., 1956) p. 174.

work is theological.¹⁹ As well, the relation of Aquinas's *Sententia* to its predecessors has not entered into the evidence weighed.²⁰ Third, the emphasis on Aquinas's theological vocation has downplayed, when not implicitly denied, his contribution to the philosophical life of the 13th century. Aquinas did not write only as a theologian, but contributed to and provoked several philosophical controversies, and his reputation among his contemporaries depended in part on certain philosophical positions he advocated.²¹ As well, despite Gauthier's decisive dating of the *SLE* as posterior to the *Prima secundae* of the *Summa theologiae*, the commentary has been constantly interpreted as preparatory to the "moral part" of the *Summa*!²² However, if we take seriously Gauthier's dating, we ought to ask why Aquinas undertook a commentary on the *Ethics* in preparation for the *Secunda secundae*. After all, the latter had already been promised as a detailed spelling out of what had previously been proposed in

19. Owens and Jaffa conclude that the *Ethics-Commentary* is theological because (1) several doctrines attributed to Aristotle are not found in the *Ethics* by those who use our contemporary exegetical procedures, and (2) these doctrines are identical to doctrines of Christian faith. For the doctrines, see Owens: "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," pp. 229-31; Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, p. 187. Torrell offers a very mild criticism of this procedure: *Initiation*, p. 349.

20. Kleber is an exception, although even he has only two references to Albert the Great's *Super Ethica* and one to the *Greek Commentaries* translated by Grosseteste. Cf. *Glück als Lebensziel*, pp. 78, note 117; 102.

21. Bradley's acceptance of Owens's view of Aquinas as a Christian philosopher has a bearing on the former's proposal that Aquinas could never offer a teleological moral philosophy based on a doctrine of an end known to reason unaided by faith. On "Christian philosophy" as an accident in the mind of the philosopher where it is conditioned by the philosopher's faith, see Bradley: *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, pp. 30-31. - Jordan attributes to Aquinas the "view that no Christian should be satisfied to speak only as a philosopher." See his "Theology and philosophy," p. 233. This judgment ignores the countless passages where Aquinas engages in philosophical reasoning, and is based on (1) Aquinas's comments on the term "philosophy," and (2) Aquinas's "conversion of philosophy into theology" through the use of the concepts of virtue and causality in the *Summa theologiae*. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 236ff.

22. R.-A. Gauthier: "La date du Commentaire de s. Thomas sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque," *Recherche de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 18 (1951), pp. 66-105. "Praefatio" in Th. Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, (Rome: Leonine Comm., 1969) T. 47,1, p. 178*. "St. Thomas et l'Éthique," p. xxiv. Even Gauthier ignores his own dating of the *SLE* by referring to the commentary as a preparation for the *Pars secunda*: *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.

general terms in the *Prima secundae*.²³ In this regard, one notes the evidence in the *Prima secundae* pointing to the confidence which, prior to writing the *SLE*, Aquinas placed in his understanding of the *Ethics*. That is, the *Prima secundae* contains 600 references to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.²⁴ Finally, there is the relatively unstudied *Tabula libri Ethicorum* constructed by Aquinas in dependence on both the *Ethics* and the *Super Ethica* of Albert the Great. What does this work have to tell us regarding the relative chronology of the *Secunda secundae* and the *SLE*?²⁵ It is such historical aspects of the milieu surrounding the composition of Aquinas's commentary on the *Ethics* that will be examined in the present study. On that basis, Aquinas's *SLE* will be proposed as philosophical in nature.

In this spirit, Chapters 1-2 will consider the place of the *SLE* in the series of known commentaries on the *Ethics* written at Paris between the chartering of the Faculty of Arts in 1215 and the completion of Aquinas's commentary in the early 1270s. From that examination, Aquinas's commentary will be seen as intended to propose the correct interpretation of the *Ethics* that had eluded earlier commentators.

Chapter 3 will consider aspects of philosophy at the University of Paris both prior to and during Aquinas's tenure as Master of Theology. As well, Aquinas's involvement in philosophical debate and some responses to that involvement are noted. On the basis of this historical data, it will be suggested that the desire on the part of Aquinas to propose a viable moral philosophy by commenting on the *Ethics* would have been in no sense atypical.

The so-called "principles of Christian ethics" seen by some as foundational for Aquinas's *SLE* are the subject of Chapter 4. Through an

23. Cf. *Ia-IIae*.6.intro.

24. Jordan speaks of the *Sententia libri Ethicorum* as "a halfway point exegetically" between the use of citations of the *Ethics* in the *Sentence-Commentary* and the *Pars secunda*. No explanation is offered of the difficulties consequent on dating this "halfway house" in between the first and second halves of what he calls the "full reading of the *Ethics*," namely, the *Pars secunda*. Cf. "Aquinas Reading Aristotle's *Ethics*," p. 235. Torrell, after recalling favorably Gauthier's dating of Aquinas's *Sententia*, characterizes the latter as "une lecture personnelle...pour s'astreindre à bien pénétrer le texte d'Aristote afin de se préparer à la rédaction de la partie morale de la *Somme de Théologie*." Again, no recognition of any problem is apparent. Cf. *Initiation*, pp. 331-34.

25. According to Torrell, the *Tabula* is "riche d'enseignements pour une meilleure connaissance" of Aquinas, as well as "un indice éloquent" that in the interval between the first and the second parts of the *Summa theologiae* (1268-1271) Aquinas continued to plan for the latter part. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 334, 337.

examination of Aquinas's use of the same principles in works prior to the commentary, quite clear will be Aquinas's conviction that these principles are both philosophical and proper to Aristotle. Accordingly, the *SLE* is proposed as a work presenting the moral philosophy Aquinas regarded as correct.

Since many see the *SLE* as a preparation for the moral part of the *Summa theologiae*, Chapter 5 will turn to the dating to assign the former work. Through comparisons of Albert's *Super Ethica*, the *Tabula libri Ethicorum*, the *Secunda secundae*, and the *SLE*, the conclusion will be drawn that the completion of the latter work is best regarded as posterior to the *Secunda secundae*. Aquinas's desire to propose by the *SLE* his vision of correct moral philosophy will thus be more comprehensible.

As a conclusion, Chapter 6 will offer a brief overview of the doctrine of Aquinas's commentary. While considering the principal doctrines of the commentary in the order in which they are elaborated by Aquinas, the reader is enabled to see the *SLE*'s structure and to perceive the points at which the historical context is relevant for correct interpretation of Aquinas's meaning and intent.

A word of caution is perhaps needed. To claim that one of Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries is philosophical in nature, is not to regard the commentary as a type of *summa philosophiae* in some particular branch of philosophy.²⁶ Far from that, all that is asserted is that in the commentary in question Aquinas expressed as much of moral philosophy as he thought either possible or necessary in explaining Aristotle's text.²⁷

26. Jordan appears to disagree; cf. "Thomas Aquinas' Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries," in *Philosophy and the God of Abraham. Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, O.P.* (ed. R. James Long) (Toronto: Pont. Inst. Med. Stud., 1991) pp.111-12.

27. A new voice in the discussion of the nature of Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries is Jenkins: "Exposition of the Text." While Jenkins appears to avoid taking a stand on the question of whether the commentaries are philosophical or theological works (cf. *Ibid.*, p. 41, note 6), he too attempts to discover Aquinas's intention by examining only the latter's words and the Aristotelian text being commented on.

AQUINAS'S *SLE* AND ITS 13TH CENTURY PREDECESSORS

Studies of the *SLE* have almost universally omitted any consideration of it as a work intended to replace earlier interpretations of the *Ethics*. It is that aspect of Aquinas's interpretation that is examined in both this and the subsequent chapter. What will appear may not initially seem significant, namely, Aquinas's conviction that he is proposing the correct interpretation of Aristotle's *Ethics* and doing so by exposing its unity as a study of the problem of human happiness. However, if the *SLE* were intended, as is so often claimed, as a theological transformation of Aristotle's philosophical text, would Aquinas have been so intent on exposing the correct meaning of the *Ethics*?

For present purposes, the development in the interpretation of Aristotle's *Ethics* during the 13th century is profitably viewed as comprising three stages. On Stage 1, the human end discussed by Aristotle was understood as the happiness achieved through union with God or with a reality caused by God.¹ In contrast, the most significant characteristic of Stage 2 is the conception of the properly human end discussed in *Ethics*. I as the happiness attainable in this life through the activity of the moral virtues. Finally, in Stage 3, represented only by Aquinas's commentary, a new unity is found in the *Ethics*; from Book I to Book X, the unitary problem of human happiness is seen to govern the various discussions, with the result that the general description of happiness in Book I looks forward to its more detailed explanation in Book X as contemplative

1. For the texts of these commentaries, I depend especially on the study of Georg Wieland: *Ethica-Scientia practica. Die Anfänge der philosophischen Ethik in 13. Jahrhundert* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981). Wieland examines these commentaries for their doctrines on ethics as a philosophical discipline, on happiness as human perfection, and on virtue as the path to that perfection. The commentaries of Kilwardby and Albert the Great, placed in the present study on Stage 2, are examined in part and very briefly by Wieland, and Aquinas's *SLE* is introduced into the discussion of happiness as perfection. - For other studies of the Stage 1 works, see note 5 below.

happiness.² These characterizations reflect only the most evident aspects of the differences that appeared in the interpretations of the *Ethics* as the 13th century progressed. Especially in moving from the second to the third stage one encounters additional signs of difference. An outstanding instance here is the attitude toward the virtue of prudence, regarded in Stage 2 as the outstanding virtue, while in Stage 3 it cedes that honor to the virtue of wisdom. Other differences are undoubtedly rooted in a better understanding of Aristotle's thought deriving from the accumulated weight of years of interpretation. Here, for example, one notes differences in the understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of continence.

The anonymous commentaries comprising Stage 1 are all pre-1240, some based on either the *Ethica nova* or *vetus*, some on the combination of both. In Stage 2 are found the commentary by Kilwardby, the so-called "*Greek Commentaries*" translated by Grosseteste, the Latin translation of Averroes's commentary, and the *Super Ethica* of Albert the Great. Stage 3 is witnessed by Aquinas's *SLE*.³

STAGE 1 COMMENTARIES

When the 13th century began, only Books II-III of the *Ethics* were available in the Latin world.⁴ This *Ethica vetus* was supplemented by the *Ethica nova* between 1217 and 1220. Book I of the *nova*, combined with Books II-III of the *vetus*, became by the 1240s a basic text in the Parisian Faculty of Arts. Four extant pre-1240 commentaries by Arts Masters indicate the content of the teaching

2. Wieland: *Ibid.*, pp. 207-12 proposes this difference between Aquinas and his predecessors. Kleber, in his study of Aquinas's thought on happiness as the human goal, devotes a significant portion to the problem of happiness as the organizational principle of the *SLE*. Cf. *Glück als Lebensziel*, pp. 72-89.

3. A wide variety of Latin spellings is found in the texts to be considered. For ease of reading, where the spelling of a word employs "u" rather than the modern "v", the latter spelling is used. In citations from Aquinas's *Sentence-Commentary*, the initial letter of the word following a period has been capitalized.

4. Latin translations of the *Ethics* have been edited in *Aristoteles Latinus* Leiden/(Bruxelles: Brill/Desclée de Brouwer, 1972) V. 26.1-3.

students would encounter at Paris.⁵ In these anonymous commentaries, happiness is regarded as a union with an external reality, either God or something caused by God, rather than as something pertaining to human activity.

According to the Avranches commentary,⁶ life can be considered in a threefold way: corporeal life, conserved by health "until the end laid down for it by the creator"; a first type of spiritual life, according to which the soul lives "through knowledge of things"; and a second form of spiritual life, in which the soul lives "by participation in happiness or virtue."⁷

The awareness of intellectual virtue implied in the reference to the first type of spiritual life depends on the commentator's knowledge of the end of Book I and the initial section of Book II of the *Ethics*, for the discussion of intellectual virtue in Book VI had not at this time been translated. Hence, it is not too surprising that a non-Aristotelian notion is introduced in connection with the discussion of intellectual virtue: "Intellectual virtue is virtue by which the soul is joined to the superior essence by which it is naturally apt to be perfected."⁸ The

5. A listing of these commentaries is had in: Th. Aquinas: *Opera omnia* (Rome: Leonine Comm., 1969) T. 47, p. 236*. In addition to Wieland's *Ethica* mentioned in note 1 above, these commentaries are discussed in: O. Lottin: "Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des Arts de Paris aux approches de 1250," *Psychologie et morale aux XIIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Gembloux: Duculot, 1957) T. I, pp. 505-34. A. J. Celano: "The 'finis hominis' in the thirteenth century commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 55 (1986) pp. 23-53; "The Understanding of the Concept of *Felicitas* in the Pre-1250 Commentaries on the *Ethica Nicomachea*," *Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale*, 12 (1986) pp. 29-53. The section concerning the *Ethica nova* of the *Commentarium in Ethicam novam et veterem* (ms. Paris B.N. lat. 3804A, fol. 140ra-143vb; 152ra-59vb; 241ra-47vb) has been edited by R.-A. Gauthier: "Le cours sur l'*Ethica nova* d'un maître ès arts de Paris (1235-40)," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 42 (1975) pp. 71-141.

6. *Commentarium in Ethicam veterem* (ms. Avranches Bibliothéque municipale 232, fol. 90r-125v).

7. Wieland: *Ethica*, pp. 143-44, with note 59: Fol. 90r: "vita enim aut est in corpore (?) per animam et sic hominis, et huius in complementum sanitas conservata usque ad terminum qui sibi positus est ab opifice. Vita vero spiritualis est duplex: una qua vivit anima per scientiam rerum, et alia qua vivit participatione felicitatis vel virtutis."

8. *Ibid.*, p. 145, with note 66. The following, more extensive extract is found in Lottin: "Psychologie et morale," p. 526, note 2: Fol. 91r-v: "Virtus intellectualis est virtus secundum quam coniungitur anima superiori essentie a qua nata est perfici. Coniungitur autem superiori essentie per intellectum tantum contemplatione et affectu animi. Virtus

cognition resulting from this union of the soul and the higher reality leads inevitably to the love of the supreme good now known.⁹ Notwithstanding this identification of human happiness with knowledge achieved through an intellectual union with the supreme good, the Avranches commentator asserts that he speaks as a philosopher.¹⁰

From the Parisian commentary edited by Gauthier we hear that happiness is achieved by knowing and loving the first being.¹¹ However, this union is not achieved by the virtuous activity of the human agent, since he is not “the sufficient cause of uniting the supreme good” to himself.¹² Nor ought happiness be identified with virtue, for virtue only disposes the soul to happiness.¹³

An erroneous translation of Aristotle in the *Ethica nova* may help explain the conception of happiness in this Parisian commentary. Although the manuscript copy of the commentary ends abruptly at I.4.1095a15 of Aristotle’s text,¹⁴ lines I.10.1101a20-21 of the *nova* read “*Beatos autem homines ut*

intellectualis inchoatur a contemplatione et perficitur in affectu. Est enim in contemplatione summi boni cum dilectione eiusdem...”

9. Wieland: *Ethica*, p. 145, with note 69: Fol. 91v: “doctrina enim, qua instruimur ad cognoscendum summum bonum in his quae fiunt ab ipso, et cum homo cognoscat summum bonum, non potest retrahi quin diligat.” Cf. also the extract noted by Lottin in the preceding note.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-46, with note 71: Fol. 98r: “felicitas autem sicut ponunt philosophi, est in cognitione summi boni.”

11. Gauthier: “Le cours,” p. 107: “Item obicitur...felicitas non est in operando... Ad hoc dicendum est quod felicitas est vita anime. Iterum, felices operantur, scilicet in aspiciendo primum et cognoscendo; unde cognoscere primum et diligere sunt opera alicuius cum habet felicitatem. Et hoc modo intelligit auctor cum dicit quod ipsi dicebant quod vita et operatio sunt idem felicitati.”

12. *Ibid.*, p. 107: “Aliter potest dicit quod...errabant in hoc quod dicebant quod nos sumus principium sufficiens uniendi illud summum bonum nobis.”

13. *Ibid.*, p. 118: “Quamvis enim felicitas sit actus perfectus secundum virtutes, non ideo <sequitur> quod virtus et felicitas sint simul, immo virtus est, sicut iam dictum est, disponens ad felicitatem.”

14. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

angelos.”¹⁵ This expression comes at the conclusion of Aristotle’s discussion of the possibility of obtaining happiness in this life. The *nova*’s “men blessed as angels” points to a different conception of happiness than does the corrected wording of later translations: “*Beatos autem ut homines*” - “blessed as men.”

A second Parisian commentary offers an interpretation compatible with the above.¹⁶ Regarding Aristotle’s definition of happiness, the commentator asserts that “happiness is nothing other than the highest perfection.”¹⁷ Further, perfection consists in the pleasure arising from the actuation of potency,¹⁸ and the work and the suffering inseparable from human activity outlaw happiness in this life.¹⁹ After all, happiness implies the liberation of the intellect from all potency, something possible only through a connection with a perfect intellect in an after life.²⁰

In the fourth of the pre-1240 commentaries, a work incorrectly attributed to John Peckham, we find the continuation of the doctrine of happiness as a union with something external.²¹ However, now we find a greater emphasis on human

15. *Ethica nova* (ed. R.-A. Gauthier) in *Aristoteles Latinus* (Leiden/Bruxelles: Brill/Desclée de Brouwer, 1972) V. 26.1-3, fasc. 2, p. 88.

16. *Commentarium in Ethicam novam* (ms. Napoli Naz. III G 8, fol. 4ra-9vb).

17. Wieland: *Ethica*, p. 156.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 156, with note 117: Fol. 6va: “Felicitas nihil aliud est quam ultima perfectio; perfectio autem non est nisi in delectatione coniunctionis potencie cum suo actu.”

19. *Ibid.*, p. 157, with note 120: Fol. 4va: “Omnia hec vivunt cum labore et pena; quare...secundum hanc vitam non erit felicitas.”

20. *Ibid.*, p. 156-57, with note 118: Fol. 6va: “Cum intellectus intellectum sit in rationali et in intelligentiis, perfectius sit in intelligentiis quam in rationali, quia in ipsis non differt intellectus et actio et sua essentia, in rationali sit solum intellectus potentia; oportet ergo, quod illius intellectus impressio in rationali sit ab ipsa intelligentia. Quare oportet, quod necessaria sit impressio unius substantiae in alteram. Et ex hoc patet, quod felicitas nihil aliud est nisi continuatio hominis cum illis intellectibus, quae necessario erit, si possibilis est liberatio intellectus hominis ab omni potentia.” Wieland suggests this doctrine of a connection of the human intellect with the separated intellect is the result of Avicenna’s influence rather than that of Averroes. Cf. *Ibid.*

21. *Commentarium in Ethicam novam et veterem* (mss. Firenze Naz. Conv. Soppr. G 4 853, fol. 1ra-77va; Oxford Bodl. Lat. Misc. C. 71, fol. 2ra-52rb; Praha Univ. III. F. 10, fol. 12ra-3va).

activity and so, a more obvious Aristotelian color to the commentary's doctrine. The commentator explains that moral philosophy knows nothing of theological categories of good, but considers only what is good by nature, that is, happiness and virtue. Yet in studying happiness and virtue, the goal is not to know them as things naturally good, but instead to understand them in their acquisition.²² In accord with this distinction between happiness and virtue as things good by nature and as things to be acquired, the Pseudo-Peckham explains that human activity does not cause happiness in its substantial reality, but only causes the individual person's union with or acquisition of happiness.²³ This notion that activity causes the acquisition of happiness leads to a further distinction, that between moral science as speculative knowledge and moral science as lived out in human activity. Happiness is the subject of moral science considered as speculative knowledge to be acquired; in contrast, happiness is the goal of those seeking to put their moral knowledge into practice. As the commentator remarks, putting his point differently: happiness itself differs from love, that is, from the act of happiness.²⁴

However, even though happiness is the goal of activity in accord with moral science, human activity is not the total cause of happiness.²⁵ Instead, the first cause or God is the source of caused happiness, which is had as a perfection

22. Wieland: *Ethica*, p. 161-62, with note 144: Fol. 2vb: "ad horum evidentiam sciendum, quod moralis philosophia considerat bonum quod est natura bonum, ut felicitatem et virtutem, sed non ut sunt bonum natura, sed ex assuetudine."

23. *Ibid.*, p. 162-63, with note 145: Fol. 2vb: "licet quoad suam substantiam non causetur (=felicitas) ab opere nostro, tamen quoad suum actum vel suam unionem ad nos causatur a nostro opere." Cf. Lottin: "Psychologie et morale," p. 521, note 1: Fol. 1ra: "Bonum duplex est: divinum, id est a Deo collatum, ut felicitas...et humanum, id est ab homine per rectas operationes cum delectatione et tristitia et cum perseverantia in hiis acquisitum, quod est virtus. Non enim sic ponit philosophus virtutem in nobis a divina providentia, sicut ponit felicitatem; licet forte secundum theologum et secundum veritatem, virtus non sit a nobis, sed a prima causa, secundum illud: Deus operatur in nobis velle et perficere."

24. Wieland: *Ethica*, p. 163, with note 147: Fol. 2vb: "loqui est de morali scientia ut est speculans, et sic subiectum eius est felicitas; vel in quantum est operans, et sic est finis; vel aliter: differt felicitas et affectio vel actus felicitatis."

25. *Ibid.*, p. 163-64, with note 149: Fol. 2vb: "virtus non est meritum quod sit tota causa felicitatis."

of the soul.²⁶ Even granting this last point, caused happiness ought not be our principal goal. It is true that by a natural love human beings love the first cause in the sense of naturally desiring to be made happy and to be conserved in existence by that cause. However, if the love that results from deliberation is correct, we will love the uncaused happiness, or God, more than ourselves and thus, more than our own happiness and our continuance in being.²⁷

In regard to the question of whether happiness, that is, caused happiness, is specifically the same as natural human life, the Pseudo-Peckham responds negatively in asserting that happiness is not given the soul, but the soul disposed by good actions. Accordingly, the goal of good actions is the medium by which we are joined to the uncreated good, the source of our caused happiness.²⁸ As for the identity of the good actions, they are those of the contemplative life rather than of the active.²⁹ Notwithstanding, we must not forget that caused happiness comes immediately from the first cause according to the person's merits.³⁰

A guide for students in the Parisian Faculty of Arts, dating from the 1240s, the "Barcelona" guide, also offers as Aristotle's a doctrine of happiness as a caused good.³¹ The anonymous author of the guide responds affirmatively

26. *Ibid.*, p. 166, with note 157: Fol. 14vb: "sciendum, quod felicitas causata operatur ad primum cuius est effectus...et operatur ad animam quam perfecit." Cf. also the text from Lottin in note 23 above.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 167, with note 166: Fol. 15ra: "dicendum quod duplex est amor hominis: naturalis et deliberativus. Et naturali amore forte diligimus primam causam, ut nos felicitaret et ut conservet nostrum esse, sed non amore deliberativo. Et qui amore deliberativo magis diligeret suum esse vel conservationem suam quam ipsum primum, peccaret. (Sic) ergo patet quod simpliciter loquendo magis est finis felicitas incausata, plus etiam per amorem deliberativum unitur creatura rationalis primae causae quam sibi ipsi. Et loquor de creatura rationali recte appetente et ordinante."

28. *Ibid.*, p. 168-69, with note 168: Fol. 16rb: "anima enim per se non est cui confertur felicitas, sed anima disposita per bonas operationes"; and with note 170: Fol. 4vb: "finis optimus operationum est medium coniungens nos quodammodo bono increato."

29. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 171, with note 182: Fol. 20vb: "felicitas est a prima causa immediate...et hoc secundum merita, quae in diversis diversa sunt et successive in eodem fiunt et aguntur."

31. The guide is contained in Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Ripoll 109. The guide was initially studied by M. Grabmann: "Eine für Examina zwecke abgefasste

to the question of whether the happiness discussed in the *Ethics* is a caused happiness, resting his answer on Aristotle's understanding of happiness as one "perfect good among particular or human goods": since the first good or God is not a particular good and is uncaused, the good intended by Aristotle in speaking of happiness has to be a caused good, for that happiness is particular or human.³²

In these early interpretations of Aristotle, the human agent's end is proposed as union with a reality external to the agent and to his activity. Subsequent commentaries offer a more correct interpretation, although not one Aquinas will regard as genuinely Aristotelian in all its aspects.

STAGE 2 COMMENTARIES

In the commentary of Robert Kilwardby, Master of Arts at Paris (c.

Quaestionensammlung der Pariser Artistenfakultät aus der ersten Hälfte des XIII. Jahrhunderts," in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik* (München: Hueber, 1936), B. II, pp. 183-97; "Das Studium der aristotelischen Ethik an der Artistenfakultät der Universität Paris in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts," *Ibid.* (München: Hueber, 1956) B. III, pp. 128-41. Also see: Claude Lafleur: "Les 'Guide de l'étudiant' de la Faculté des arts de l'Université de Paris au XIIIe siècle" in *Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages* (ed. M. J. F. M. Hoenen, J. H. J. Schneider, & G. Wieland) (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 137-99. A "provisional" edition of the guide was prepared by Claude Lafleur for participants in a colloquium whose papers and discussion are found in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Autour du "Guide de l'étudiant" du ms. Ripoll 109* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997). Among the papers in this collection is a description of the Ripoll 109 guide's contents: Claude Lafleur: "Les texts 'didascalique' ('introductions à la philosophie' et 'guides de l'étudiant') de la Faculté des arts de Paris au XIIIe siècle," pp. 345-72; and of its teachings on the *Ethics*: Georg Wieland: "L'émergence de l'éthique philosophique aux XIIIe siècle, avec une attention spéciale pour le 'Guide de l'étudiant' parisien," pp. 167-80. A critical edition of the guide is to appear in *Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis* (Turnhout: Brepols).

32. Grabmann: "Eine für Examinazwecke," p. 195: Fol. 136ra: "Quaeritur, utrum felicitas, de qua hic agitur, sit causata et videtur quod non. Probat enim hic auctor, quod illa est bonum perfectum. Sed nihil est tale nisi primum. Ergo hec felicitas est ut primum. Ergo est incausata. Ad hoc dicimus, quod felicitas dicitur esse bonum perfectum inter bona particularia vel humana. Et sic intelligit hic Aristoteles. Primum autem non est particularia in sui essentia, cum sit simplicissimum. Propter hoc illud quod dicitur hic intelligitur de felicitate causata." Cf. Grabmann: "Das Studium," pp. 137-38. See also, Wieland: *Ethica*, p. 184; "L'émergence," p. 176.

1237-45), Aristotle's doctrines appear freed from the misconceptions of the commentaries considered above.³³ According to Kilwardby, happiness is truly a human good, as is virtue, although the goodness of the latter is less as befits a reality ordered to the supreme human good.³⁴ As a human good, happiness can be achieved by the human agent's habitual actions.³⁵

Against this background, happiness is defined as "the continuing action of the practical, rational soul in regard to activities both zealous and most perfect"; alternately, happiness is activity "continuing in regard to the highest and most enjoyable perfections of the soul."³⁶

Kilwardby claims that those interpreters are wrong who see Aristotle as holding that happiness is incomplete in this life. Kilwardby's reasoning is straightforward: only those agents simply happy are truly good; but Aristotle finds some living agents to be truly good; therefore,...³⁷

The type of activity Kilwardby sees envisioned by Aristotle is action according to those moral virtues required for a good life in civil society. As

33. Kilwardby's commentary is to be dated as pre-1245 because of the absence of any use of, or reference to, Grosseteste's translation of the *Ethics*. Cf. R.-A. Gauthier: "Introduction," in R.-A. Gauthier & J.-Y. Jolif: *L'Éthique A Nicomaque*, pp. 114; 116-17.

34. Wieland: *Ethica*, p. 173, with note 190: Fol. 285rb: "bonum autem humanum dupliciter est: scilicet bonum summum sive felicitas, et bonum inferius ordinatum ad summum bonum, scilicet virtus."

35. *Ibid.*, p. 173, with note 191: Fol. 287rb: "(felicitas) quae adepta est per consuetudinem bonorum operum"; Fol. 289va: "(felicitas) ipsa est finis omnium operationum"; and with note 192: Fol. 289va: "et notandum quod dicit illud bonum (=felicitas) est bonum operabile, tamquam velit quod homo posset consequi illud per suas operationes."

36. P. Osmund Lewry: "Robert Kilwardby's Commentary on the 'Ethica nova' and 'vetus'," in *L'homme et son univers au moyen âge*, Actes du septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale, 30 août-4 septembre 1982, ed. C. Wenin, Vol. 2 (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1986), p. 805: Fol. 292ra: "Diffinicionem quamdam felicitatis significat ex precedentibus posse haberi, que forte talis erit; actus anime rationalis practice consistens circa operationes studiosas et perfectissimas; vel sic, consistens circa perfecciones anime optimas et delectabilissimas, et in idem redit."

37. *Ibid.*: Fol. 293ra: "Et notandum diligenter quod vocat hic Aristoteles viventes vere bonos, quia si non est vere bonus nisi simpliciter felix, et secundum ipsum aliqui viventes sunt vere boni, secundum ipsum aliqui viventes sunt felices simpliciter: quod est contra eos qui dicunt Aristoteles viventem nolle felicitari nisi incomplete."

concerns the Christian view of happiness in the after life, that is said to be a topic foreign to the interests of the *Ethics* and one not discussed by Aristotle.³⁸ With Kilwardby's account, an end is put to the tradition of the earlier stage which had found in the *Ethics* a prefiguration of the Christian doctrine of happiness.

While his commentary represents Kilwardby's teaching at Paris, later in Oxford his *De ortu scientiarum* repeats the distinction between the happiness philosophers usually term *felicitas* and the *beatitudo* generally spoken of by Catholics. These differ as do Aristotle's happiness identified as completely virtuous activity and Augustine's notion of complete happiness as the beatific vision of God in an after-life.³⁹ Still later, in commenting on the *Sentences*, Kilwardby continues to remark that Aristotle's *Ethics*.I refers to happiness as had completely in virtuous activity.⁴⁰

On June 3, 1240, Herman the German completed his translation from the Arabic of both the *Ethics* and Averroes's commentary on that work.⁴¹ In agreement with the other commentators whose works comprise this second stage of interpretation, Averroes understands Aristotle to be interested only in the human happiness attainable in the present life. Accordingly, in Book I, when Aristotle searches for the ultimate end proper to the human agent, this search is seen as one for the end or good sought by those possessing "the art of guiding" civil or political society.⁴²

Then too, when Averroes searches for the act proper to the human agent, the act by which happiness is gained, the part of the soul "attributed" or "ascribed to" human beings is presented as related to the practical activity of moral living.

38. *Ibid.*: Fol. 293va: "Habemus ergo determinationem prime questionis, scilicet utrum vivens felicitabitur vel non. Et videtur Aristoteles determinasse iam quod sic. Et hoc dico de illa felicitate de qua locutus est in hoc libro, quam ipse semper et ubique vocat actum perfectum secundum virtutem. Unde forte non intendit de alia felicitate nisi que dicitur vita secundum iussus doctrine civilis; nec debuit forte doctrina civilis de alia felicitate perscrutari. Utrum enim post mortem felicitetur anima vel totus homo, forte non pertinet ad ipsam, nec hoc determinat Aristoteles." Also: Celano: "The understanding," p. 45, note 48; Wieland: *Ethica*, p. 175, with note 196; "L'émergence," pp. 176-77.

39. Lewry: "Robert Kilwardby's Commentary," p. 806.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 806-07.

41. *Aristoteles Latinus*. Pars Prior (Bruges/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1957) p. 68.

42. *In I. Ethic.* 7.fol.8vH-I: "Revertamur itaque ad id, in cuius via fuimus, scilicet ad loquendum de bono quaesito in arte guberandi civitates quid est."

This part of the soul, he explains, is itself further divided into two parts: the first or intelligent part, that is, the "apprehensive-commanding" part for it apprehends, deliberates, and judges regarding correct action; the second part of the human soul possesses the moral virtues and so, obeys and defers to the intelligent part.⁴³

In the above treatment of this "human" part of the soul, no mention is made of the speculative intellect. Later, in commenting on the apprehension of meanings, Averroes distinguishes between the cogitative or operative part of the soul, the "apprehensive-operative" part, and the speculative part.⁴⁴ Yet this speculative part of the soul is not a part of the human soul in any genuine sense of the term "part." When Averroes had referred in Book I to the part of the soul "attributed" to man, he meant just that, as is clear from his interpretation of Aristotle's *De anima*.

In his exposition of the latter work, Averroes explains that acts of speculative intellection (*intellecta speculativa*) are only the human understanding of what the separated, eternal material intellect understands. The crux of this doctrine is the connection of the separated, eternal material intellect, or the subject which understands intelligible meanings, with the human agent's phantasm or imagined form, a connection enabling the material intellect's understanding of the human agent's phantasm to be human speculative understanding.⁴⁵ Granted this

43. *Ibid.*, I.7.fol.9rF: "Remanet ergo ut sit totus actus proprius ei [scilicet, homini], in quo ipsi aliud non participat; si enim participaret, iam non esset ei actus proprius. Et de hac parte animae, quae ascribitur homini, apparet quod est duae partes, pars intelligens, idest apprehensiva imperans: et pars obediens intelligenti. Vult [Aristoteles] per obedientem et obsequentem, partem habentem virtutes morales, et partem intelligentem, iudicantem de recto." *Ibid.* fol.9vG: "...oportet ut sit actus hominis, sive malus sive bonus, vita quaedam. Et intendo per hanc vitam, actionem animae procedentem a deliberatione versus finem determinatum..."

44. *Ibid.*, VI.2.fol.81.vM - fol.82rA: "Et apprehensio, quae appropriatur entibus, quorum principia non sunt in nobis, nominatur scientia speculativa: et apprehensio, quae appropriatur entibus, quorum cause in nobis sunt, nominatur cognitiva operativa: intendo eam, in qua est cogitatio propter operationem, ...et utitur quidem homo cogitatione operativa in rebus, quas possibile est esse a voluntate. Cumque sic fit, cogitativa est una ex partibus anime rationalis que recipit rationem: et altera pars est speculativa..."

45. *Com. Mag. de anima*. III.36.p486,200-202: "...intellectus materialis non copulatur nobiscum per se et primo, sed non copulatur nobiscum nisi per suam copulationem cum formis ymaginalibus." *Ibid.*, p499,559-64: "Nos autem cum posuerimus intellectum materialem esse eternum et intellecta speculativa esse generabilia et corruptibilia..., et quod intellectus materialis intelligit utrunque, scilicet formas materiales et formas

doctrine, acts of speculative intellection actually "in" man are to be conceived as the activity of the eternal, separated agent intellect, which as a form is combined with the acts of speculative intellection as matter. That the agent intellect acts as a form in us is said to be visible if we remark that first, we perform our proper action through a form somehow in us, and second, that we act through an intellect making our sense images intelligible.⁴⁶ It is precisely this connection of the agent intellect with human acts of imagination or phantasms that enables the human agent to understand with the understanding had by the eternal, material intellect. Additionally, when all possible acts of speculative intellection actually occur, the connection of the agent intellect to the human agent is complete, a completion resulting in the assimilation of the latter to God because the agent is now in some way all being and all knowledge of being.⁴⁷

The doctrine at the root of this discussion of happiness is generally known as "the unicity of the intellect" for it proposes the existence of only one intellect which, eternal and distinct from human beings, functions as the source of each

abstractas, manifestum est quod subiectum intellectorum speculativorum et intellectus agentis secundum hunc modum est idem et unum, scilicet materialis."

46. *Ibid.*, p499,581 - p500,590: "...continget necessario ut intellectus qui est in nobis in actu sit compositus ex intellectis speculativis et intellectu agenti ita quod intellectus agens sit quasi forma intellectorum speculativorum et intellecta speculativa sint quasi materia. Et per hunc modum poterimus generare intellecta cum voluerimus. Quoniam, quia illud per quod agit aliquid suam propriam actionem est forma, nos autem agimus per intellectum agentem nostram actionem propriam, necesse est ut intellectus agens sit forma in nobis."

47. *Ibid.*, p500,599 - p501,619: "Et manifestum est quod, cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in potentia, quod ipse [idest, intellectus agens] erit copulatus nobiscum in potentia. Et cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, erit ipse tunc copulatus nobis in actu. Et cum quedam fuerint potentia et quedam actu, tunc erit ipse copulatus secundum partem et secundum partem non; et tunc dicimur moveri ad continuationem.

"Et manifestum est quod, cum iste motus complebitur, quod statim iste intellectus copulabitur nobiscum omnibus modis. Et tunc manifestum est quod proportio eius ad nos in illa dispositione est sicut proportio intellectus qui est in habitu ad nos. Et cum ita sit, necesse est ut homo intelligat per intellectum sibi proprium omnia entia, et ut agat actionem sibi propriam in omnibus entibus, sicut intelligit per intellectum qui est in habitu, quando fuerit continuatus cum formis ymaginabilibus, omnia entia intellectione propria.

"Homo igitur secundum hunc modum, ut dicit Themistius, assimilatur Deo in hoc quod est omnia entia quoque modo, et sciens ea quoque modo."

human person's intellectual understanding. Human intellection is possible through the connection of the eternal intellect with the individual's material imagination or phantasm. Today, some deny that Averroes ever taught this doctrine; the unicity of the intellect, it is claimed, is wholly the invention of 13th century theologians. Notwithstanding, Averroes's commentary on the *De anima* was available in Paris by 1225, and in 1252 Averroes was charged with having held the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect. In that year, Robert Kilwardby at Oxford and Bonaventure in Paris proclaimed the doctrine to be that of Averroes.⁴⁸

Two years earlier in Cologne, Albert the Great appeared to be unaware of this interpretation of Averroes. In his lectures on *De divinis nominibus*, Albert mentions an "erroneous" doctrine, which in his *Super Ethica* he had attributed to Averroes. According to Albert, Averroes's *De anima-Commentary* taught that the souls of individual persons do not continue to exist as distinct intellects after each person's death, but instead are merged into one intellect,⁴⁹ and thus attain happiness.⁵⁰ This latter doctrine is proposed in a question concerning "the connection of the intellect to the [separated] intelligences after death."⁵¹ Averroes's *Metaphysics-Commentary* is mentioned as one source for this doctrine. Further, Albert explains that in Averroes's conception, this "connection" is "according to essence"; that is, there will be one intellectual essence for all persons. While Albert regards this doctrine as heretical, he suggests we can agree with Averroes's notion of a connection with the separated intellect after death if we consider the connection to be "according to the object" known by each individual soul.⁵²

48. R.-A. Gauthier: "Introduction," in Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, T. 44, P. 1, pp. 222*.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. *221-22. Albert's text is: *Super Ethica*.I.13.p72,14-19; I.15.p79,78-80.

50. *Ibid.* VI.8.p453,17-18.

51. *Ibid.* p452,69-70.

52. *Ibid.* p452,80-83: "(2) Praeterea, Commentator in XI [i.e., "XII"] Metaphysicae dicit, quod haec est ultima prosperitas, quod anima nostra continuatur ad intelligentias agentes in animas nostras." *Ibid.* p453,24-31: "Praeterea, aut manet intellectus secundum essentiam aut secundum esse post mortem. Si secundum essentiam, cum omnium sit una essentia, scilicet natura intellectualitatis, tunc ex omnibus animabus non manet nisi una. Si secundum esse, ergo remanet etiam secundum potentias inferiores, et sic non continuatur cum intelligentia, sed distinguitur ab ipsa." *Ibid.* p453,63-70: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod Averroes multas haereses dicit; unde non oportet, quod sustineatur. Si tamen in hoc volumus eum sustinere, dicendum, quod prosperitas nostra erit in continuatione ad intelligentiam non secundum esse, sed

The text in Averroes's *Metaphysics-Commentary* which might have been in Albert's mind appears to refer to the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect. Averroes speaks of the connection of the human "generable and corruptible soul" with the separated intellect and contrasts the connection with that of the separated intellect and the first heaven. Because of the truth had in this contrast, Aristotle is said to have been correct in thinking "that the form of men, insofar as they are men, is only through their connection with the intellect, which was said in the *De anima* to be the agent principle that moves us."⁵³ However, the *Super Ethica* can be seen as indicating that Albert did not yet understand the text just mentioned as proposing the unicity of the intellect. Additionally, on more than one occasion, Albert implies that only Plato held the intellect to be distinct from the human soul.⁵⁴ In the 1260s however, Albert's *De anima-Commentary* explains Averroes's proposal of the doctrine now called "the unicity of the intellect."⁵⁵

Apart from their understanding of Averroes's doctrine of the intellect and of the human soul, it should have been clear to anyone reading Averroes in the 1240s that the *Ethics* was said to treat in Book I "properly" human happiness, that is, the happiness attainable through moral virtue. In addition to the texts already noted, there is another in which Averroes connects the happiness discussed in Book I with "action of the soul proceeding from deliberation regarding a determined end,"⁵⁶ and he explains that it is much better to use the art of governing cities or "the action of the soul according to the command of virtue" to

secundum obiectum, quando anima post mortem contemplabitur simplices quiditates sicut intelligentia."

53. In *XII Meta.* 38. fol. 321rE-F: "Iam igitur declaratum est quod coelum et naturalia continuantur cum primo, quod est intellectus, qui est in fine gaudii et voluptatis, sicut nostra dispositio in continuatione cum intellectu, qui est principium parvo tempore. Deinde dicit, Ista igitur dispositio in illo est semper, nobis vero est impossibile idest, sed continuatio coeli cum hoc principio semper est, nostra autem continuatio cum principio, quod est in nobis, impossibile est ut sit semper. Illud autem, quod continuatur de nobis, est generabile et corruptibile, in corpore vero coelesti est aeternum. Et ex hoc quidem apparet bene quod Aristoteles opinatur quod forma hominum, in eo quod sunt homines, non est nisi per continuationem eorum cum intellectu, quod declaratur in libro de Anima esse principium agens et movens nos."

54. Cf. *Super Ethica.* X. 11. p750, 1-5; p750, 45 - p751, 4; p751, 42-43; 13. p763, 15-17.

55. Cf. *De anima.* III, Tr. 2, c. 3, p181, 54-63; c. 7, p186, 59-72; p187, 18-45. Albert proposes four arguments against the unicity of the intellect in *Ibid.* p187, 46-91.

56. In *I Ethic.* 7. fol. 9vG-H.

attain happiness than to receive it by chance or good luck.⁵⁷ As regards the quality of human happiness, Averroes's reader would find that the latter's version of the *Ethics* did not agree with the *Ethica nova* or *vetus* in asserting that agents living happily throughout life were "blessed as angels." Instead the reader finds Averroes following his text of Aristotle in asserting that those who over a lifetime had been consistently happy were "blessed, only insofar as men, not otherwise."⁵⁸ - In this interpretation of "blessed as men" is had a first indication that a theological perspective is not a prerequisite for finding that Aristotle discusses a happiness that has its limitations, i.e., a "*beatitudo imperfecta*."

When Averroes discusses the happiness Book X associates with contemplation, one is hard pressed to find signs that the activity being described is effected by the connection of the separated agent intellect with the phantasms or sense imaginations of the human agent. Averroes remains very close to the language of Aristotle, speaking only of a happiness and an activity higher than the happiness and the activity associated with moral virtue. The intellect is spoken of as separated from the body, and its action is seen as divine.⁵⁹ But is this intellect only separated through its activity and so, still an essential part of the human agent's soul, or is it the separated eternal intellect? Is "divine" used in the strict sense, or is the divine aspect of intellectual activity only its resemblance to divine intellection? Nothing in Averroes's treatment at this point answers these questions. Only an awareness of his view of the unicity of the intellect as found in the *De anima* and his interpretation of the parts of the soul spoken of in *Ethics* I and VI point the reader to Averroes's meaning in his use of "separate" and "divine" in his chapters 6-8 of Book X.

Most likely in 1246-47 there appeared the *Greek Commentaries*, Robert Grosseteste's Latin translation of a compilation of the commentaries on the *Ethics* by various Greek authors; to this was joined Grosseteste's translation of the

57. *Ibid.* I.9. fol. 12rF - fol. 12vG.

58. *Ibid.* I.10. fol. 14vH-I: "Deinde, oportet autem ut adiungamus huic dicto quod sic vivat, et usque dum moriatur sic perseveret; occultum enim est nobis quid futurum sit de rebus; felicitatem ergo ponimus certissime finem modis omnibus et perfectam. Cum ita sit, tunc equidem nominamus ex vivis beatos illos, quibus existunt res, quarum fecimus mentionem in tempore suo praesenti, et existent in futuro; non nominamus autem eos beatos, nisi secundum quod homines tantum, non aliter."

59. *Ibid.* X.8. fol. 155rE; fol. 155vG; fol. 155vM - fol. 156rA.

Ethics itself.⁶⁰ In the commentary on Book I, its author, Eustratius, writes from his Christian perspective in noting that Aristotle's description of the good as "what all desire" is true of both "lower and higher" beings. Subsequently, he explains that the being closest to the good desired by all enjoys it immediately, and "this is God from whom and through whom and toward whom are all things."⁶¹ This outlook is Neo-platonist, with its notion of ethical growth understood as the passage of the soul through the stages of moderation of passions, mortification of passions, participation in the life of the intellect, and union with God. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Eustratius explains, deals primarily with the moderation of passions, that is, with life in political or civil society.⁶² The happiness described in Book I is thus the goal to be achieved through the moderation of passions. The agent who moves beyond that stage and mortifies or lives with the satisfaction of his passions, would then share in the life of the intellect and enjoy the appropriate beatitude.⁶³

In commenting on Aristotle's statement that "if there are many virtues, happiness will be according to the most perfect and best virtue" (*NE.I.7.1098a17*), Eustratius explains that the virtue meant is prudence, for by it the agent's activities are good.⁶⁴ The assumption at the base of this doctrine is a view of the life guided by moral virtues as the most properly human and as the life directed

60. *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (+1253)*, V. I: *Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous Scholia on Books II, III, and IV*, (edit. H. P. F. Mercken) (Leiden: Brill, 1973). V. III: *The Anonymous Commentator on Book VII, Aspasius on Book VIII, and Michael of Ephesus on Books IX and X* (edit. H. P. F. Mercken) (Leuven: University Press, 1991). Vol. II on Books V-VI has yet to appear. See V. I. pp. 38*-42* for the dating of the translation; pp. 3*-29* for the authors of the commentaries on the various books and the general characteristics of each commentary.

61. *Ibid.*, V. I, p. 8,96-100.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 12*-13*.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 6,33-47.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 118,78-85: "Quia felicitatem secundum virtutem animae operationem demonstravit, singulariter virtutem assumens (non una autem est, sed plures virtutes), propter hoc haec apposuit, optimae virtutum et ei quae secundum ipsam est operationi attribuens bene. Haec autem utique erit prudentia, quae rationabilis partis animae est virtus. Hoc autem est partium ipsius excellens, praestans quidem inferioribus et dirigens ea et cum ipsis convenientia, operans autem et per se ipsum propria et non decidens ab eo quod opportunum est."

toward the end "perfect and of itself sufficient" that is studied in *Ethics.I*. This life of moral virtue, or the civil life, is a mean between the extremes of the voluptuous life and the life of contemplation. Similar to what occurs in contemplation, reason in the civil or political life rises about the passions and any condition of submission to the body's desires; yet resembling the voluptuous life, the agent living the civil life satisfies the irrational appetites, but only by ruling over and guiding them.⁶⁵

Eustratius notes that man is by nature a political animal, both social and needing association with others in many diverse ways. Accordingly, he who is happy in the civil life performs many morally good external actions. In contrast, the agent leading the contemplative life lacks variety, has no need of assistance from a multitude of other persons; in sum, he lives a solitary life. Granted this, Eustratius asserts that one ought not wonder that Aristotle assigns as political happiness the life in the middle between the voluptuous life and the life of contemplation, nor that he divides the solitary life of contemplation from the multiform and varied civil life.⁶⁶ This political life and its happiness is the one appropriate to human nature, for this life consists in continuous change. Quite different is the life and beatitude proper to unchanging intellectual and divine nature. This is why Aristotle has said of those living the political life that they are

65. *Ibid.*, p. 105,14-20: "Et istae [i.e., vita voluptuosa et vita contemplativa] quidem extremae et ut contrariae ad invicem repugnantes, media autem harum moderativa passionum et civilis est, communicationem quamdam ad utrasque servans extremitates, ad hanc quidem ut rationem habens superiacentem servituti ex passionibus, ad illam autem tradens se in parte et irrationabilibus appetitibus, non ut meliori dominantur, sed ut et ipsi imperati a meliori operentur."

66. *Ibid.*, p. 105,23 - p. 106,45: "Politicum enim animal natura est homo et sociale et communicativum et operationes habens multas adiacentes sibi earum quae in communicatione, in quibus multis indiget conferentibus sibi et pecuniis et corporibus. Et qui secundum hanc vitam est felix consequenter habet ad perfectum secundum hominem honestorum et bonorum directionem exterius... Purgativa autem et contemplativa, recedens ab omni quod secundum hominem, et a perturbationibus quae sunt in medio extra factus et populorum et civitatis et familiarum ipsorum et communicationem cum hominibus abnegans et a propriae carnis recedens affectione et declinans ad intellectualius et divinius, sufficientem habet ad beatitudinem eam quae ex impassibilitate fit secundum intellectum operationem, et adhuc super intelligentiam unionem... Directa autem beatitudo simplex et sine varietate et sine indigentia multorum, ut in solitudine directionem habens. Nihil igitur novum si Aristoteles hic eam quae in medio et politicam felicitatem assignans dividit quidem ipsam quae est secundum solitudinem ab ea quae multiformis est et quam variam ostendit."

“blessed as men.”⁶⁷ However, this condition of being happy and “blessed as men” is a condition arrived at only with God’s help.⁶⁸ - This same *Greek Commentaries* contains Michael of Ephesus’s interpretation of Book X. There we find again the assertion that Book I proposes a doctrine of happiness proper solely to the life of moral virtue.⁶⁹

Judging by the attitude of Albert the Great, Grosseteste’s translation of the *Greek Commentaries*, as also of the complete text of the *Ethics*, replaced all previous commentaries and versions of the *Ethics*. Not only did Albert adopt Grosseteste’s translation of the *Ethics* as the basis for his Cologne lectures, subsequently published as the *Super Ethica*, but he refers to the compilation nearly 300 times, generally in terms such as the “the Commentator says” or “according to the Commentator.”⁷⁰

Granted the confidence Albert reposed in the “Commentator,” it is unsurprising to find Albert in accord with the view found in the *Greek Commentaries* in regard to the overall thrust of the *Ethics*. Agreeing with the Greek interpreters of Books I and X, Albert regards the discussion of happiness at the center of Book I as the study of civil happiness to be obtained through activity in accord with moral virtue.⁷¹ Against this background, Albert speaks of

67. *Ibid.*, p. 166,20-25: “*Beatos autem ait ut homines, id est secundum quod concordat humanae naturae, quibus in vita conversatio in continuo fluxu et transmutatione omnimoda existit, quia intellectualis et divinae naturae alia species beatitudinis, in statione esse habentis et neque unam sustinentis transmutationem.*”

68. After describing the onerous nature of the effort needed for the development of the moral virtues (*Ibid.*, p. 148,94-05), Eustratius continues: p. 148,05-08: “*Et sic simus utique felices et beati. Haec autem omnia nobis non utique unquam advenient, nisi Deum habeamus propitium et coadiutorem nobis in disciplinis et exercitationibus et operationibus et directionibus.*”

69. E.g., *Ibid.*, V. III, p. 408,59-63: “*...in primo quidem libro dixit de politica felicitate, secundum quam politicus felix adornat deteriora ratione, in hoc [i.e., in decimo] autem dicit de speculativa felicitate et eo qui secundum ipsum felice, qui est primus et essentialiter homo et verus homo, qui in nobis videlicet intellectus, et superveniens talis felix politico felici.*” Cf. also, p. 410,24 - p. 411,45. The implied notion of two “types” of person capable of different forms of happiness recurs frequently: e.g., p. 398,05 - p.399,27; p. 404,71-76.

70. For the complete list of references, see *Super Ethica*, pp. 817-18.

71. *Ibid.*I.15.p75,72 - p76,4: “*Dicendum, quod felicitas non est quaedam generalis beatitudo et ordinatio totius animae secundum omnes potentias, ...sed operatio secundum*

the human agent as ordered to civil happiness by a natural disposition which, when perfected, is “civility,” or the virtuous disposition toward creating happiness in political society.⁷²

The identification of the happiness discussed in Book I as civil happiness raises the question of whether such happiness can be perfect. Albert’s affirmative response rests on his understanding of the term “perfect.” In Book I’s discussion, it is not taken “simply,” as it would be if the intent were to discuss the perfect reality in the genus of beings, in which case “perfect” would refer to God. In the discussion of the most perfect in the genus of civil realities, civil happiness is rightly called “perfect” because that happiness comprehends within itself all the “noble” or valuable aspects of civil life, among which are especially the moral virtues.⁷³

In addition to being perfect, civil happiness is of itself sufficient, thus meeting Aristotle’s second characterization of happiness. Aristotle, Albert writes, “understands what is of itself sufficient as that by which an agent is sufficient not only to himself, if he lived a solitary life, but to those joined to himself by nature as are his parents, children, and wives, and [to those joined to himself] by love as

determinatam virtutem, scilicet prudentiam, et determinatam potentiam, scilicet rationem.” X.2.p714,27-31: “*...beatitudo civilis, de qua in primo loquebatur, non est sicut bonum separatum, sed sicut bonum, quod est in nobis, quod est suppositum electionis et non ratio eligibilitatis in omnibus...*” In X.10.p746,5-16 when the topic is the recapitulation by Aristotle of Book I’s doctrine on happiness, Albert writes: “*Et ut brevior sit tractatus, resumantur quaedam quae dicta sunt in primo de felicitate civili suppositis rationibus ibi positis. ...Primo ostendit, quod felicitas est in operatione et non tantum in habitu, tali ratione: Habitus optimi sine operatione possunt existere dormienti, qui vivit ad modum plantae, et infortunato; si igitur in habitu tantum sit felicitas contemplativa, inerit his qui dicti sunt; sed hoc non placet; ergo, sicut praedictum est de civili, oportet etiam, quod contemplativa sit in operatione.*” - Words are italicized in the *Super Ethica* to indicate the words of Aristotle on which Albert comments.

72. *Ibid.*I.3.p16,30-85. On the meaning of *civilitas* or “civility” and its use by Albert, see Lorenzo Minio-Paluello: “Tre Note alla ‘Monarchia’” in *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972) pp.277-98.

73. *Super Ethica*.I.7.p34,23-31: “*Dicendum, quod perfectum dicitur dupliciter, scilicet simpliciter, et sic solus deus est perfectus, quia sibi non deest aliqua nobilitas, quae sit in genere entis... Alio modo dicitur perfectum in genere, et sic civilis felicitas est perfectum bonum in ordine civilium et comprehendit in se omnes nobilitates illius generis, quia comprehendit omnes virtutes secundum habitum confirmatum.*” See also: IV.6.p246,10-17.

are his friends, and [to those joined to himself] by commitment as are his fellow citizens.⁷⁴

The intelligibility of Aristotle's limitation of the scope of Book I to civil happiness lies for Albert in the fact that the "proper work" of man is the governing of his life by practical reason, his best and most proper potency.⁷⁵ Since man only shares in the intellect, it is not introduced into the discussion of the activity by which man has his proper happiness. Even though civil happiness itself is seen as disposing the agent to contemplative happiness which enables him to live after the fashion of the separated substances, the happiness natural to man is that coming from life in society.⁷⁶

The gulf between pre-1240 commentaries and Albert concerning Aristotle's intent in Book I is apparent once again when Albert comments on the degree to which a human agent can correctly be styled happy in the present life. In commenting on Grosseteste's translation of *NE.I.10.1101a20-21* - "*Beatos autem ut homines*" - Albert proposes that Aristotle introduced this expression to prevent anyone from concluding that men could attain complete happiness in this life: "we say we can be blessed as men, [men] in whom there is necessarily some

74. *Ibid.*I.7.p34,62-67.

75. *Ibid.*I.8.p38,51-57: "Deinde cum dicit: *Quid utique*, ostendit, secundum quam potentiam sit felicitas operatio hominis. Et est ratio talis. Proprium opus hominis debet esse secundum id quod est proprium sibi et optimum in ipso...; sed proprium et optimum in homine est ratio operativa; ergo secundum hoc inest sibi opus suum, quod est felicitas."

76. *Ibid.*p39,15-17 & 77-87: "(6) Praeterea, intellectus est supra rationem, et ita etiam magis secundum intellectum [debet accipi felicitas], quem omittendo videtur peccare... Ad sextum dicendum, quod intellectus est in anima nostra participative, secundum quod attingit superiorem naturam substantiarum separatarum, sed secundum suam naturam rationalis est. Hic autem quaeritur civilis felicitas, quae est bonum vel opus hominis secundum suam naturam, quod ulterius ordinatur ad contemplativam felicitatem, de qua in decimo tractabit, quae est opus eius, secundum quod communicat cum superioribus substantiis sicut materiale et disponens ad ipsam. Et ideo intellectus hic relinquit." Wieland: *Ethica*, pp. 210-11 finds the basis of Albert's distinction between civic happiness as proper to man and contemplative happiness by which man resembles the separated substance to lie in the difference between reason (*Vernunft*) and intellect (*Verstand*). The irreducible difference between these two is itself seen as expressing the duality between, respectively, the formal principle and the spiritual substance of the soul.

defect, not [happy] as gods or angels."⁷⁷

This limitation of the scope of Aristotle's *Ethics* and its topics to our present life as known by reason is obvious again when Albert raises the question of whether philosophy can know the status of the souls of the dead. Responding, he asserts cautiously that philosophy cannot know whether souls continue to exist after death; but even if they are presumed to do so, nothing can be known respecting their existence except by faith.⁷⁸ In addition, when responding to an objection, Albert notes that the existence after death of many individual souls, rather than only one as Averroes claimed, cannot be demonstrated.⁷⁹

Similar to what is had in the other commentaries belonging to this second stage, prudence is regarded by Albert as the principal virtue at the source of civil happiness,⁸⁰ with its chief act seen not as deliberation, but rather as the act of choosing or of predetermining the end.⁸¹ For instance, it is for prudence to

77. *Super Ethica*.I.13.p69,39-42: "Et ne credatur, quod quis possit in vita esse omnino beatus, removet hoc dicens: hos dicimus esse *beatos ut homines*, in quibus necessario est aliquis defectus, non ut deos vel angelos."

78. *Ibid.*, p71,73-79: "Dicendum, quod hoc quod animae defunctorum remaneant post mortem, non potest per philosophiam sufficienter sciri. Et supposito, quod remaneant, de statu earum et qualiter se habeant ad ea quae circa nos fiunt, omnino nihil sciri per philosophiam potest, sed haec cognoscuntur altiori lumine infuso non naturali, quod est habitus fidei."

79. *Ibid.*, p72,14-19: "...et si intellectus non sit forma situialis, non potest demonstrari, quod remaneant plures animae distinctae, sed omnibus una, sicut ponit Commentator in libro De anima et hoc modo exponit auctoritatem Aristotelis inductam, licet sit contra fidem." The "Commentator" refers to Averroes: *Com. Mag. De anima*.III.5.p401,424 - p409,653. E.g., *Ibid.*p401,424 - p402,431: "Questio autem secunda, dicens quomodo intellectus materialis est unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum, non generabilis neque corruptibilis, et intellecta existentia in eo in actu (et est intellectus speculativus) numeratus per numerationem individuorum hominum, generabilis et corruptibilis per generationem et corruptionem individuorum, hec quidem questio valde est difficilis, et maximam habet ambiguitatem."

80. *Super Ethica*.I.11.p59,3-6: "...felicitas civilis est operatio prudentiae, secundum quam intrat in substantiam aliarum virtutum quae sunt in potentiis inferioribus, determinans eis medium." Also, see *Ibid.*IV.6.p246,14-15.

81. *Ibid.*VI.14.p479,16-17: "...consiliari enim non est actus principalis prudentis, sed magis eligere aut predeterminare finem." *Ibid.*, p484,36-39: "...prudentis est secundum veram rationem eligere illud quod eubulia praconsiliatum est, et praedeterminare finem."

determine or choose ends such as that of traveling to Rome.⁸²

There is yet a second sense in which prudence predetermines the end, for the moral virtues receive their correct intention or direction toward their end from prudence. As Albert argues, the nature-like tendency of a moral virtue toward an end is possible only if the end has been prescribed for it by something joined to it, and this is accomplished by prudence perfecting the order given by natural reason.⁸³

Even though the highest and best aspect of man is his operative or practical reason, Albert can yet see a unity in the *Ethics* in regard to its treatment of both civil and contemplative happiness. A practical science, he explains, is one not only leading to activity, but in addition one proposing a theory of activity. The civil science of the *Ethics* fulfills both these functions by proposing first, the end of the civil life and the moral virtues whose activity would lead to that end and second, the end of the contemplative life and the intellectual virtues whose activity is directed to it. Ethical science, more than other branches of philosophy, thus proposes the order of the entire soul.⁸⁴

82. *Ibid.*, 15.p486,65-75: "...actus enim prudentiae est praeordinare finem, et sic est suum, quod praecipiat, quod praeceptum est de finali opere; quod nisi fiat, numquam quaeretur via exsequendi praeceptum neque erit iudicium, qualiter ponetur in opere, sicut si aliquis habet praeceptum, quod vadat Romam, statim cogitat, qualiter debet exsequi, sed si esset praeceptum, quod eundem est et non quo, numquam posset exsequi. Et sic patet, cum finis semper prius sit in intentione et determinatione prudentiae, quod prudentia naturalia praecedit istos habitus [e.g., synesis quae est iudicans qualiter exsequendum sit in opus]."

83. *Ibid.*, 18.p510,24-34: "Quod autem [virtus moralis] indigeat [prudencia] ad intentionem rectam, probatio: Nihil enim tendit in alterum nisi sit sibi praestitutum vel ipse sibi praestituat, sicut etiam naturalibus omnibus praestitutus est finis a primo motore, cuius intentio est in omnibus agentibus naturalibus; sed virtus moralis tendit in suum finem sicut natura quaedam; ergo oportet, quod ab aliquo sibi praestituatur finis et coniuncto sibi, quod est ratio, in quo differt ab operatione naturali. Sed verum est, quod praestituto fine de se tendit in ipsum nec ad hoc aliquo indiget." Also, see: *Ibid.*, p509,28-50. On Albert's notion of prudence as perfective of reason, see pp. 50-54 below.

84. *Ibid.* VI.1.p391,19-30: "Est enim practicum, ut dicit Avicenna, dupliciter, scilicet quod est operativum simpliciter et quod est sciens rationem, per quam operatur. Sed specialiter haec scientia in utroque perfecit, quia includit in se finem utriusque, scilicet felicitatem civilem, quae est finis practicae, et felicitatem contemplativam, quae est finis contemplationis. Unde perfecit ad utrumque opus, et ad speculandum per virtutes intellectuales et ad opera, quae sunt civilis vitae per virtutes morales, et ideo ethica inter

When he arrives at Book X's discussion of happiness, Albert asserts that contemplation and contemplative happiness are had insofar as rational nature reaches the level of the superior separated substances in the sense that both have cognition of simple quiddities. By such cognition, the human agent far surpasses the ratiocinative knowledge had insofar as human intelligence concerns itself with realities in space and time.⁸⁵ In this context, Albert notes the objection according to which the human intellect is not prepared for contemplation; compared to the entities above it, the human intellect is like the eye of a bat in relation to the light of the sun.⁸⁶ In response to this pessimism, Albert distinguishes between philosophical and divine contemplation. While "theophanies descending from God" are required for the latter, by the habitus of wisdom the human intellect is prepared for philosophical contemplation.⁸⁷

Kilwardby, Averroes, Grosseteste's translation of the *Greek Commentaries*, Albert the Great - four sources of a new interpretation of the *Ethics*. The happiness Aristotle describes in Book I is, for these four, the result of activity by moral virtue. Additionally, for Averroes as for Eustratius, there is something super-human in contemplation and in its associated happiness. For the former, contemplation is understandably divine for the completed connection of the eternal agent intellect with the human agent's phantasm results in the latter's achievement of divine-like knowledge. In Eustratius's interpretation, while the intellect is part of the human soul and so, contemplation is indeed a human act, it is nonetheless an extreme condition for it involves the agent's separation from the civil life to which he is naturally suited. Although Albert's characterization of contemplation and its associated happiness is less radical, he too sees it as quite

alias partes philosophiae principaliter est ordo animae."

85. *Ibid.* X.11.p749,15-32: "Dicendum, quod omnis ratiocinativa cognitio est in quadam collatione, sive sit contingentium, ...sive sit scientifica, quae procedit etiam deducendo causam in causatum; et hoc accidit sibi ex hoc quod radius cognoscitivae virtutis obumbratur in ipsa ad continuum et tempus, dum quidditates rerum non accipit in sui simplicitate... Et ideo complementum rationalis naturae est, ubi pertingit ad simplices quidditates; in hoc enim coniungitur superioribus substantiis separatis, quarum talis est cognitio. Et ideo felicitas contemplativa ipsius est secundum intellectum, secundum quem pertingit ad huiusmodi operationem."

86. *Ibid.* p751,62-67.

87. *Ibid.* p752,15-21: "...intellectus, secundum quod est imperfectus, non est sufficiens ad contemplationem divinorum, sed secundum quod perficitur per habitum sapientiae, sic sufficiens est ad contemplationem philosophicam et, secundum quod perficitur per theophanias descendentes a deo, sic perficitur ad divinam contemplationem."

other than the properly human ratiocinative cognition involved in the greater part of the soul's activities.

STAGE 3, AQUINAS'S *SLE*

Before examining the *SLE*, it is useful to wonder why, given the existence of the four commentaries representing Stage 2, a busy theologian of the 1270s would set aside the time and effort needed to compose a commentary on the *Ethics*. Most certainly, his motivation would include the conviction that the existing commentaries were either incorrect or insufficient, if not both. But, in Aquinas's eyes, would their fault have been philosophical or theological, or both? As a prerequisite to an answer, let us recall that when he began the *SLE*, Aquinas had only recently completed his general treatment of morality in the *Prima secundae*. Evidently then, the most important topics of the *Ethics* (happiness as the ultimate goal of the individual person, the notion of virtue, the moral and intellectual virtues) as well as the order of their treatment had been taken up and adapted to theological needs in the *Prima secundae*. Is it then reasonable to think that Aquinas would have felt the need to produce subsequently another Christianized version of Aristotle's *Ethics* by composing the *SLE*?⁸⁸ Holding that question in abeyance for the moment, the very existence of the *SLE* leads to the expectation that in it Aquinas will correct what he regards as the incorrect philosophical interpretations of Stage 2 commentaries. While setting aside for now consideration of what Jaffa and others considered to be revealed doctrines proposed in the *SLE* and so, the latter's supposedly theological setting, let us note first, how Aquinas opposes his predecessors's understanding of the over-all order of the *Ethics*.

Aristotle's *Ethics* was never far from Aquinas's mind during the period extending from his first arrival in Paris in 1246 until his final departure from the city in 1272. Gauthier has argued that Aquinas attended lectures on the *Ethics* at the Faculty of Arts in 1246-48,⁸⁹ and it is generally accepted that in Cologne

88. As remarked above in the Introduction, Jordan refers to the *Pars secunda* as Aquinas's "full" and "Christian" commentary on the *Ethics*, and, along with others such as Gauthier, regards the *SLE* as preparatory to the moral part of the *Summa theologiae*. Cf. above, pp. XI, XV-XVI, and note 24 on p. XVI.

89. R.-A. Gauthier: "Saint Thomas et l'Éthique A Nicomaque," pp. xv-xvii. Jordan proposes that Aquinas's knowledge of the doctrines of the earlier Masters of Arts can just as easily be explained by positing Albert's *Super Ethica* as the intermediary by which their doctrines were passed to Aquinas. Cf. "Aquinas Reading Aristotle's *Ethics*,"

between 1248 and 1252 he drew up a *reportatio* of Albert's lectures on the *Ethics*, a *reportatio* apparently used by Albert in preparing the final version of the *Super Ethica*.⁹⁰ Then after returning to Paris, Aquinas referred to the *Ethics* in the *Sentence Commentary* (c. 1256) more than 300 times in his treatment of virtue (III, d. 23-36).⁹¹ In the *Summa contra gentiles* (1262-64), some 54 references are had, while the *Pars prima* of the *Summa theologiae* (1265-66) offers an additional 71.

Despite this extensive use of the *Ethics*, there is no reason to suppose that Aquinas restudied Aristotle's work of moral philosophy prior to his development of the *Tabula libri Ethicorum* in the early 1270s. It would appear that he had neither the time nor the occasion for examining Aristotle's text anew. Instead, he seems to have relied on the memory of his studies at the Faculty of Arts and under Albert at Cologne. The *Tabula*, however, provides evidence that Aquinas restudied both the *Ethics* and portions of Albert's commentary around 1270 and so, prior to the *SLE* and before all but the first six questions of the *Pars secunda*. The *Tabula*, which will be discussed in more detail below,⁹² is a listing in statement form of the principal ideas of the *Ethics* and depends heavily on the *Super Ethica* for the wording of most of its statements. While its contents suggest its immediate goal was to make accessible the principal ideas of the *Ethics*, Aquinas's ultimate reason for developing it is unknown. Its existence, however, testifies to the importance Aquinas attached both to the *Ethics* and to Albert's interpretation. The *SLE* itself also makes clear how important was Albert's commentary in Aquinas's eyes; revealing in more than 350 passages a dependence on the *Super Ethica*, the *SLE* may thus rest in part on the work Aquinas put into the *Tabula*, for the latter work could easily have served as the proximate conduit by which Albert's work was able to exert its influence on the *SLE*.⁹³

p. 245.

90. *Prolegomena*, p. v,27 - p. vi,10 in Albert's *Super Ethica*.

91. R. Guindon: *Béatitude et Théologie*, p. 213.

92. Cf. Chapter 5, pp. 196-98.

93. Cf. R.-A. Gauthier: "Praefatio," in Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, T. 47, P. 1. - That the *SLE*, although depending on the *Super Ethica* in over 350 passages, shows Aquinas most likely did not consult the latter work while composing the *SLE* except rarely and only in isolated passages, cf. pp. 235*, 255*-56*; that the commentaries on the *Ethica nova* and *vetus* served Aquinas as sources only because of their influence on the *Super Ethica* or because Aquinas remembered them from his first student days at Paris, cf. pp.

Yet despite Aquinas's reliance on the teachings of his masters, prior to the 1270s he had repeatedly proposed a view of the *Ethics* different from theirs. In the *Summa contra gentiles* (c. 1262-64), the *Q.D. de anima* (c. 1265-66), and the *Prima pars* (c. 1265-66), he explained that Aristotle's discovery in *Ethics*.I of happiness as activity according to perfect virtue led to the examination of all virtue; this in turn resulted in the doctrine of *Ethics*.X, namely, that wisdom is the perfect virtue whose activity is at the source of the agent's ultimate happiness.⁹⁴ This difference between Aquinas and earlier commentators, when added to the importance of the *Ethics* as shown by the number of citations of it in his works,⁹⁵ suggests at least one reason for Aquinas's decision to present his own full-fledged interpretation of Aristotle's *Ethics*, namely, to present Aristotle's response to the question of human happiness.

The calm surface of the *SLE* is unbroken except for two references to some unnamed philosophers who regarded human happiness as the result of a connection with a separated intellect.⁹⁶ Notwithstanding, Aquinas assuredly had Albert's *Super Ethica* in mind as he wrote, for alongside the hundreds of passages in which the *SLE* depends on the former work are other passages marking the difference between Aquinas and his former teacher. Whether Aquinas consulted Averroes's commentary during the composition of the *SLE* is less clear, although

236*-46*; and that Aquinas rarely read the *Greek Commentaries* but recalled Albert's teaching, cf. pp. 246*-54*.

94. E.g., referring to Averroes's doctrine of ultimate happiness as effected by the connection of the human agent to a separated agent intellect, Aquinas writes in *SCG*.III.44: "Patet autem quod nec Aristoteles, cuius sententiam sequi conantur praedicat philosophi, in tali continuatione ultimam felicitatem hominis opinatus est esse. Probat enim in I *Ethicorum* quod felicitas hominis est operatio ipsius secundum virtutem perfectam: unde necesse fuit quod de virtutibus determinaret, quas divisit in virtutes morales et intellectuales. Ostendit autem in X quod ultima felicitas hominis est in speculatione. Unde patet quod non est in actu alicuius virtutis moralis; nec prudentiae nec artis, quae tamen sunt intellectuales. Relinquitur ergo quod sit operatio secundum sapientiam, quae est praecipua inter tres residuas intellectuales... unde et in X *Ethicorum* sapientem iudicat esse felicem... Patet ergo quod opinio Aristotelis fuit quod ultima felicitas quam homo in vita ista acquirere potest, sit cognitio de rebus divinis qualis per scientias speculativas haberi potest." See also: *Q.D. de anima*, a. 16; *ST*.Ia.88.1.

95. In addition to the number of citations prior to his return to Paris, in the *Prima secundae* (1271) Aquinas referred to or cited the *Ethics* more than 600 times.

96. Cf. *SLE*.I.14.90-95.S170; X.13,137-41.S2135.

Aquinas's differences with the latter's interpretation are obvious when one sets the two commentaries side by side.

A first instance of Aquinas's opposition to his predecessors appears in his exposition of the passage in Book I where Aristotle begins to offer his own view of happiness. Both Averroes and Albert make it very clear at this point in their works that the topic is happiness as found in life in "civic" society. "We seek to know what is the good sought in the art of governing cities," is in effect the view of Averroes.⁹⁷ Although Albert does not begin his comment with such an obvious reference to "civic happiness" (*felicitas civilis*), he almost immediately implies that such is also his topic. Regarding the first condition of the human goal whose identity is being sought, namely, that this goal is the best, he notes the objection that none of the goals of any "civic discipline" can be "the end in civic life." To this, he first offers Eustratius's response: Aristotle searches for that happiness which comprises everything needed; accordingly, "health, without which one cannot be unhampered in civic activity" is included in happiness. However, Albert adds that a better response is to insist that even though health "is not the good and the best in civic life," it is yet the best in medical activity; since even the evil can use health, such a "best" is not the happiness sought.⁹⁸

Albert becomes more explicit later in the same *lectio* when he raises the question, "whether civic happiness is the perfect good," and answers in the affirmative. It was in this context that, as was remarked in the discussion of Stage 2, Albert distinguished between "perfect" as said of God and "perfect" as said of something in the genus of things pertaining to civic society, namely, to "perfect"

97. In I *Ethic*.7.fol.8vH-I: "Revertamur itaque ad id, in cuius via fuimus, scilicet ad loquendum de bono quaesito in arte gubernandi civitates quid est." Fol.9rA: "Deinde non intendo autem per dictum meum, quod bonum quaesitum est res sufficiens per se, quod sufficiat homini hoc bonum existenti solitario... immo equidem intendo ut vivat cum aliis, utputa filius, parentibus... Est enim natura civilis homo, idest non ei possibilis vita absque civium vicinitate..."

98. *Super Ethica*.I.7.p31,38-53: "Sed videtur, quod sanitas non sit finis alicuius disciplinae civilis, quia illud per quod aliquis iuvatur ad operandum secundum perversos mores, non videtur esset finis in civili vita; sed sanitas huiusmodi; ergo etc. Et similis est obiectio de omnibus aliis quae ponit. Et est obiectio Commentatoris.

Ad quod ipse respondet, quod Philosophus intendit de felicitate secundum maximum suum posse, secundum quod complectitur omnia quibus indiget organice; de quibus est sanitas, sine qua non potest est expeditus ad operationes civiles; et ideo ponitur aliquis finis... Vel melius dicendum, quod quamvis non sit bonum et optimum in civili vita, tamen est optimum in aliquo ordine, quia in operationes medicinae, et talibus optimis nihil prohibet aliquem mali uti..."

as predicated of "civic happiness."⁹⁹ Subsequently, Albert explains in what sense "civic happiness" is sufficient of itself,¹⁰⁰ and then he admits that "civic happiness" is made greater by the addition of external goods.¹⁰¹

In the chapter of the *SLE* paralleling the above comments of Averroes and Albert, Aquinas proposes that the happiness whose identity is being sought is "the ultimate end of man insofar as he is man," and this ultimate end is necessarily only one thing "because of the unity of human nature."¹⁰² Just as Averroes and Albert explain at this point in their commentaries how "civic happiness" is perfect and self-sufficient, so Aquinas proposes the sense in which the "one ultimate end of man insofar as he is man" is perfect and self-sufficient.¹⁰³

Subsequent to these discussions of happiness as perfect and self-sufficient, all three commentators follow Aristotle in looking further into happiness's definition by examining the human person's actions.¹⁰⁴ It is here that Averroes identifies the act proper to the human person as "the action of the soul proceeding from deliberation concerning a determined end."¹⁰⁵ In his parallel comment, Albert asserts that moral science is interested in the happiness associated with the activity proper to the human agent, namely, activity guided by

99. *Ibid.*I.7.p34,23-31. Cf. note 73 on page 19 above.

100. *Ibid.*p34,55-76.

101. *Ibid.*p35,54 - p36,16.

102. *SLE*.I.9.45-55.S106: "Si autem adhuc occurrant plura bona ad quae ordinentur diversi fines diversarum artium, oportebit quod inquisitio rationis nostrae transcendat ista plura quousque perveniat ad hoc ipsum, id est ad aliquod unum; necesse est enim unum esse ultimum finem hominis in quantum est homo propter unitatem humanae naturae...; et iste unus ultimus finis hominis dicitur humanum bonum quod est felicitas."

103. Averroes: *In I Ethic.*7.fol.8vL - fol.9rC. Albert: *Super Ethica.*I.7.p33,81 - p36,25. Aquinas: *SLE*.I.9.56-217.S107-17.

104. At this point, Averroes offers the distinction Aquinas uses in the *Prima secundae* to mark the distinction between an object or good sought and the act by which that object is attained. The terms *finis cuius* (the object sought) and *finis quo* (the agent's act by which the object is attained) are not found in Averroes's text here, although the distinction itself is made. Cf. Averroes: *In I Ethic.*7.fol.9rC-D.

105. *Ibid.*fol.9rF and fol.9vG. Cf. note 43 on page 11 above.

practical reason.¹⁰⁶ In commenting on the Aristotelian text that occasioned these interpretations, Aquinas proposes that "...happiness consists chiefly in the contemplative life rather than in the active, and in the act of reason or intellect [rather] than in the acts of the appetites ruled by reason."¹⁰⁷

Very shortly after the above comment, Aquinas speaks once more in a vein contrary to that of both Albert and Averroes: At issue is Aristotle's statement found almost immediately after he has defined happiness as activity according to virtue. Referring to what he has accomplished by the definition as well as to what is to follow, Aristotle notes that the good of man has been "circumscribed," since one must first speak "figuratively" and "later return to a description of the subject."¹⁰⁸ Concerning this text, Albert explains that by "circumscribed" Aristotle intends that happiness has been presented by an extrinsic determination; this procedure was chosen because one must speak of happiness first, "figuratively, that is, in general," and "later describe the subject more fully, which is what [Aristotle] will do by determining in detail the virtues comprehended by happiness."¹⁰⁹ In the context of his *lectio*, Albert implies that the detailed discussion of moral virtue in Books II-V will provide the more profound cognition of the civic happiness of interest in Book I.¹¹⁰ Earlier than Albert, and perhaps exerting an influence on his interpretation of the present Aristotelian passage, Averroes too explained that first, it was necessary to "circumscribe" happiness, that is, propose a "universal definition" and then

106. *Super Ethica.*I.8.p38,51-57. Cf. note 75 on page 20 above.

107. *SLE*.I.10.118-21.S126: "Ex quo potest accipi quod felicitas principaliter consistit in vita contemplativa quam in activa et in actu rationis vel intellectus quam in actu appetitus ratione regulati."

108. *NE*.I.7.1098a20-21: "Circumscribatur quidem igitur bonum ita. Oportet enim forte figuratiter dicere primum, deinde posterius rescribere." See *SLE*, p. 38. Albert's Latin version is identical; cf. *Super Ethica*, p36,79-80. Averroes: *In I Ethic.*fol.8rE: "Bonum igitur ipsum ita circumscriptum sit. Oportet enim fortasse prius figurare, deinde postea depingere."

109. *Super Ethica.*I.8.p42,39-45: "Et dicit: *circumscribatur*, quia differentiae sunt acceptae a posterioribus; unde non sunt intrinsecae, sed quasi circumstant ipsam. Et dicit, quod *oportet* ita *figuraliter*, id est in communi, *dicere prius et posterius rescribere*; quod faciet determinando in speciali de virtutibus, quas comprehendit felicitas."

110. E.g., *Ibid.*, p40,80-89; p41,53-66. In these passages, Albert argues that the "*opus hominis in quantum homo sit idem quod opus boni*," and that reason ordering activity by prudence is the most perfect work and so the source of happiness.

determine the parts of happiness.¹¹¹ By this further determination, Averroes, as later Albert, appears to refer to the discussions of the moral virtues whose activity is seen as happiness.¹¹² Aquinas too explains that the "circumscribing" of happiness signifies that a definition based on things external to happiness has been proposed. We have proceeded, he explains, "figuratively" or by examples; what is yet needed is a "fuller description," "which is why [Aristotle] will afterwards complete the treatise of happiness at the end of the book [of the *Ethics*]."¹¹³

Thus the over-all order Aquinas finds in the *Ethics* is this: Book I proposes a definition of happiness as the consequence of virtue, Books II-IX then discuss both the virtues and some of their consequences, and Book X completes the investigation of happiness by identifying it with contemplation through the virtue of wisdom. This perspective is restated either wholly or in part at several important stages in the *SLE*: toward the end of Book I where the parts of the soul are enumerated in preparation for the study of virtue (I.19.1-22); at the beginning of the study of virtue in Book II (II.1.1-13); in Book VI, when the study turns to intellectual virtues (VI.1.1-19 & 70-80); when Book X is introduced as the study of the end of virtue that is to be completed now that all the virtues have been examined (X.1.1-9); and in addressing contemplative happiness as the conclusion

111. *In I Ethic.*7.fol.9v1: "Dixit. Hoc est ergo bonum illud, cuius oportet nos determinare partes et modos, et forsitan oportebit nos primitus circumscribere ipsum, idest, definitione universali, deinde determinare post hoc, partes eius."

112. This "appearance" is based, not on any further statement by Averroes, but on his view of *Ethics.I* as defining the happiness to be found by a life of moral virtue.

113. *SLE.I*.11.7-20.S131: "Primo proponit quid sit factum et quid restet agendum. Et dicit quod ita sicut supra habitum est circumscribitur bonum finale hominis quod est felicitas. Et vocat circumscriptionem notificationem alicuius rei per aliqua communia quae ambiunt quidem ipsam rem, non tamen adhuc per ea in speciali declaratur natura illius rei. Quia, ut ipse subdit, oportet quod aliquid primo dicatur figurative, id est secundum quandam similitudinariam et extrinsecam quodam modo descriptionem, et deinde oportet ut manifestatis quibusdam aliis resumatur illud quod fuit prius figurative determinatum et sic iterato plenius describatur. Unde et ipse postmodum in fine libri de felicitate tractatum complebit." - Aquinas is incorrect in interpreting Aristotle in this passage as speaking of moral science, for the latter intended to describe the procedure of any practical science. Cf. Kleber: *Glück als Lebensziel*, pp. 81, 84. Yet as is clear, Aquinas was working within a tradition inherited especially from Albert, who also interprets this passage as speaking of the procedure of moral philosophy - another historical fact underlining the danger of concluding to Aquinas's intention without first examining the positions of his predecessors.

to which preceding discussions have been directed (X.9.1-20).¹¹⁴

It is in accord with his over-all view of Aristotle's procedure that Aquinas initiates the search for the specific difference which will distinguish virtue from all other habitus. "All virtue," he writes, "effects a good disposition in its subject and makes its subject's act good."¹¹⁵ To make clear the universality of this notion, Aquinas explains Aristotle's examples of the virtue of an eye and the virtue of a horse: just as the virtue or power of an eye results in both a good eye and good vision, so the virtue or power of a horse makes for a good horse and for actions of running and carrying a rider that are rightly seen as good.¹¹⁶ Proceeding on this basis, Aquinas discovers the specific difference of virtue and so, reaches the desired definition, namely, virtue is a habitus operating by choice, existing in a mean relative to the agent, a mean determined by reason in ways used by a wise man.¹¹⁷

Subsequent discussions of the principal moral virtues of courage, temperance, and justice, as well as subordinate virtues such as generosity or amiability proceed by focusing on the double good effected by virtue, namely, the good disposition of the agent and the good of the activity resulting from the virtue. About temperance, for instance, Aquinas examines its effect on its subject, the irrational appetite,¹¹⁸ as well as its effect on temperate action.¹¹⁹

When he turns to the investigation of the intellectual virtues, Aquinas continues to use as a guide the notion of the double good resulting from the presence of virtue. Thus, the study of these virtues focuses initially on the subjects that are perfected or "made good" by intellectual virtue. Here is found

114. In his study of the problem of happiness as the organizational principle of the *SLE*, Kleber remarks that the "consequences of virtue" treated in Books VII-IX, i.e., continence and friendship, do not fit as well under "the study of the problem of happiness" as they do under "the study of virtue." Cf. Kleber: *Glück als Lebensziel*, pp. 74, 77. Yet, this discrepancy pales in the light of the passages noted where Aquinas's statement of Aristotle's procedure manifests the former's attempt to disclose the *intentio Aristotelis*.

115. *SLE.II*.6.14-16.S307: "...omnis virtus subiectum cuius est facit bene se habere et opus eius reddit bene se habens..."

116. *Ibid.*, 16-22.S307.

117. *Ibid.*, 7.45-75.S322-323.

118. *Ibid.*, III.19.1-34.S595-597.

119. E.g.: *Ibid.*, 20.1-39.S613-615.

the distinction within the rational soul between the intellect and particular reason or the cogitative power.¹²⁰ Immediately following the explanation of these two subjects that can be perfected by intellectual virtue, Aquinas notes that Aristotle “begins here to treat those intellectual virtues by which both parts of the rational soul are perfected.” According to Aquinas, Aristotle’s first step is to remind the reader of the common condition of virtue, namely, that “the virtue of anything whatsoever is what makes its work good,” which is followed by the proposal to seek “in regard to each part of the rational soul, the good of its work.”¹²¹ The works envisioned are first, the cognition of truth and second, the acts by which an agent controls his activity.¹²² To examine the goodness virtue effects in these works is to investigate the truth sought in both speculative and practical uses of reason. Additionally, the agreement of appetite and reason must be considered in the search for the goodness of practical reason.¹²³ In accord with these projects, the virtues of art, science, prudence, wisdom, and intellectus are subsequently studied.¹²⁴

With the examination of the virtues and some of their consequences completed, Aquinas opens Book X with the explanation that the end of virtue will now be examined first, insofar as it is the end of an individual agent, and then, insofar as a life of virtue promotes the common good of political society.¹²⁵ After devoting the first eight chapters to the preparatory discussion of pleasure, Aquinas asserts in effect that now Aristotle has reached the point toward which the preceding parts of the *Ethics* had been directed, namely, the final discussion of the ultimate happiness proper to human agents.¹²⁶ Further, Aristotle’s desired conclusion is this: happiness consists in that speculative activity which occurs

120. *Ibid.*, VI.1.150-214.S1119-1123. With this doctrine, Aquinas again parts company with Averroes and Albert. Cf. “The two parts of the rational soul” below in Ch. 2, pp. 35-47.

121. *Ibid.*, 2.1-16.S1124.

122. *Ibid.*, 29-30 & 41-45.S1126

123. *Ibid.*, 93-108.S1130.

124. Science and art in VI.3; prudence in VI.4; intellectus and wisdom in VI.5-6; prudence and connected virtues in VI.7-9; problems concerning wisdom and prudence in VI.10-11.

125. *Ibid.*, X.1.1-9.S1953.

126. *Ibid.*, 9.1-20.S2065.

principally through the exercise of the virtue of wisdom. This doctrine “appears to be in agreement with what was proposed in Book I of happiness, and also in agreement with truth.”¹²⁷

Subsequent to having reached the above high point of the study of the moral life of the agent considered as a single individual, the *SLE* devotes its final three chapters to the need for an additional moral doctrine to be legislated by the proper authorities within society. These chapters thus prepare the way for Aristotle’s *Politics*.¹²⁸

At the very least, the above brief account of the three Stages in the interpretation of the *Ethics* requires that one conclude to Aquinas’s interest in offering what he saw as the correct account of Aristotle’s text understood as the response to the question of human happiness. But, on a deeper level, what reason could Aquinas have had for desiring that his readers understand the *Ethics* as a unified study of moral life centered on the ultimate goal of contemplative happiness? The *SLE* was not the result of lectures. Nor does it seem reasonable to regard it as a “personal” work in preparation for the composition of the moral part of the *Summa*, since the first half of that part preceded the composition of the *SLE*, and the remainder does little more than spell out in detail the general notions of the first half. Surely, the time and effort needed to produce the *SLE* as an explanation of the path to human happiness as proposed in Aristotle’s *Ethics* reveal an author convinced of the intrinsic value of knowledge of that path.

But does Aquinas’s explanation of that path represent in his mind the best that philosophy can offer? Or is that explanation actually a Christianized look at human moral activity? These questions will be put aside for the present, as we look in the following Chapter at further aspects of Aquinas’s attempt to counteract earlier interpretations of the *Ethics*.

127. *Ibid.*, 10.72-78.S2086.

128. *Ibid.*, 14.1-13.S2187 together with X.16.168-200.S2179-80.

AQUINAS AND HIS PREDECESSORS: SOME FURTHER DIFFERENCES

In the preceding Chapter, the principal opposition between the *SLE* and its predecessors was proposed. That opposition can be characterized variously. Speaking very generally, one might say that Aquinas disagreed with previous commentators on the unifying factor of the ten books of the *Ethics*. Or, if one prefers a less general description, one could explain that Aquinas insists by the *SLE* that the entirety of the *Ethics* is held together by the search for the answer to the question of human happiness. Thirdly, and now bringing in yet more detail, one can argue that, according to the *SLE*, in Book I is discovered a general description of the agent's final end, a description requiring the subsequent examination of the virtues and some of their consequences; then, in Book X, and on the basis of the preceding nine books, a final description of the happiness proper to the human agent in this life is offered. Yet however one phrases the opposition between Aquinas and the earlier commentators on the *Ethics*, it seems undeniable that the *SLE* was intended as an expression of a moral theory of great importance to Aquinas. In the present Chapter, less central differences between Aquinas and Albert, as well as one between Aquinas and Averroes, will be examined. Additional evidence is thus offered for the view of the *SLE* as a work in which Aquinas proposed a theory of morality which in his mind had not up to that time been adequately understood.

THE TWO PARTS OF THE RATIONAL SOUL

In opening *Ethics*.VI, Aristotle divides the rational part of the soul into the scientific and ratiocinative parts corresponding respectively to the cognition of necessary and contingent objects.¹ Aquinas explains that Aristotle proposes the

1. *NE*.VI.1.1139a5-15: "Nunc autem de rationem habente secundum eundem modum dividendum. Et supponatur duo rationem habentia, unum quidem quo speculamur talia entium quorum principia non contingunt aliter habere, unum autem quo contingentia. Ad ea enim quae genere altera, et animae particularum alterum genere ad utrumque aptum natum. Si quidem secundum similitudinem quandam et proprietatem cognitio

rational soul is divided into one part "by which we examine [*speculamur*] those beings, namely, necessary beings, whose principles cannot be other than they are," and into a second part "by which we examine [*speculamur*] contingent beings."² These parts are respectively the "scientific" and the "reasoning" parts.³ The basis of this division, notes Aquinas, is the principle that, for the cognition of generically diverse objects, generically diverse parts of the soul are a necessity.⁴ However, subsequent to this straightforward presentation of his interpretation of Aristotle's words, Aquinas takes 64 lines to explain why the doctrine given by Aristotle is to be understood as only a puzzle posed for our consideration.⁵ - Although Aquinas's presentation and solution of the puzzle have been characterized as a passage where he "repudiates" and "rejects" Aristotle's division of the soul,⁶ when attention is paid to Aquinas's words as well as to the interpretations of Averroes and Albert, we discover that Aquinas is only proposing the philosophical doctrines he regards as those of Aristotle. Before examining further Aquinas's interpretation, I note those of Averroes and Albert.

Averroes explains the two parts of the rational soul by referring to the two types of beings that are apprehended. A first part apprehends "beings whose

existit ipsis. Dicatur autem horum hoc quidem scientificum, hoc autem rationativum; consiliari enim et ratiocinari idem, nullus autem consiliatur de non contingentibus aliter habere; quare ratiocinativum est una quaedam pars rationem habentis." This is the Latin as found in *SLE*, p.331. Albert's Latin translation differs only in one word; cf. *Super Ethica*, p404,72-78. Averroes's version is identical in meaning, although not in wording; cf. *In VI Ethic.*, fol.81rE-F: "Nunc vero eodem modo rationis capax...(finishing with) ...animae partis, quod rationis est capax."

2. *SLE*.VI.1.107-12.S1115: "Supponatur ergo quod pars rationalis dividatur in duas: una quidem est per quam speculamur illa entia, scilicet necessaria, quorum principia non possunt aliter se habere, alia autem pars (est) per quam speculamur contingentia."

3. *Ibid.*137-42.S1118: "Et dicit quod praedictarum partium rationalis animae una quidem, quae speculatur necessaria, potest dici scientificum genus animae, quia scientia de necessariis est; alia autem pars potest dici rationativa, secundum quod ratiocinari et consiliari pro eodem sumitur;"

4. *Ibid.*114-16.S1116: "Ad obiecta quae differunt genere necesse est quod diversa genera partium animae adaptentur."

5. *Ibid.*150-51.S1119: "Videtur autem quod Philosophus hic determinat dubitationem habere."

6. Bradley: *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, pp. 195; 241.

principles are not in us," while a second part apprehends "beings whose causes are in us."⁷ Concerning the basis of this division, Averroes asserts that necessarily each part of the soul receiving cognition is proportionate to the cognition received. This foundation he finds in Aristotle's affirmation that parts of the soul are divided according to the differences of the genera of the objects known.⁸ Of the two parts of the soul at issue here, one is called the "speculative" part and is capable of the apprehension called "speculative science." The other, the "practical cognitive" or "cogitative" part, is that "in which there occurs thought for the purpose of activity."⁹

If one understands Averroes's *De anima-Commentary* to propose the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect, which is Aquinas's reading of that work at the time he wrote the *SLE*, then one realizes that Aquinas would have seen here in Averroes's account the latter's distinction between, on the one hand, the "speculative" part of the soul, namely, the one eternal, separate intellect through which each human person has intellection, and, on the other hand, the "cogitative" part of the soul, which, while the only rational aspect of the human soul, is a material cognitive power. Yet as noted earlier, when Albert commented on the Aristotelian passage in question, no reader of Averroes appears as yet to have found in the latter's exposition of the *De anima* the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect.¹⁰ Hence, if Albert had turned to Averroes's commentary on *Ethics*.VI.1 in the course of composing his own comment on the chapter - and his text provides

7. *In VI Ethic.*1.fol.81vL: "una quarum est pars rationalis, quae apprehendit entia, quorum causas impossibile est in nobis esse: et sunt illa, quae non est possibile esse nisi a causis suis naturalibus. Et secunda est illa, quae apprehendit entia, quarum [sic] causas possibile est esse in nobis: et ista sunt ea quorum causas possibile est esse preterquam naturales."

8. *Ibid.*fol.81vL-M: "Necesse quidem est ergo ut dividantur partes animae recipientis secundum divisionem generum, quae recipiuntur, et ut mutantur secundum illorum mutationem: eo quod necesse est ut dividatur receptivum divisione receptibilis, et diversetur eius diversitate..."

9. *Ibid.*fol.81vM-fol.82rA: "Et apprehensio, quae appropriatur entibus, quorum principia non sunt in nobis, nominatur scientia speculativa: et apprehensio, quae appropriatur entibus, quorum cause in nobis sunt, nominatur cognitiva operativa: intendo eam, in qua est cogitatio propter operationem... Et utitur quidem homo cogitatione operativa in rebus, quas possibile est esse a voluntate. Cumque sic sit, cogitativa est una ex partibus animae rationalis, quae recipit rationem: et altera pars est speculativa."

10. Cf. above, pp. 13-14.

no indication whether he did or did not - he would have found nothing terribly alarming, even though he would apparently have felt that much greater detail and precision is needed to make Aristotle's point.¹¹

"To provide a clear understanding (*ad evidentiam*) of what is said in [Aristotle's] text," Albert begins his interpretation by raising and discussing five questions, the first of which is "whether the division [of the soul], which [Aristotle] posits, is of a genus into species."¹² Albert's answer is definite: "All potencies of the [human] soul are found in one essence of the soul," and therefore they do not differ in species.¹³ If the potencies in question, i.e., the speculative and the ratiocinative, constituted specifically different souls, they would be distinct essential forms, which they are not; instead, both are accidental to the essence of the one soul.¹⁴ The potencies Aristotle speaks of here are only potential parts of the soul and so, "are always together, because never is there a scientific potency without a ratiocinative or vice versa."¹⁵

Question two proposes a crucial distinction in regard to "necessary things" (*necessaria*) as the object of scientific knowledge. If *necessaria* are understood as the essences of necessary things which are "accepted" or taken into the mind in a way divorced from time and space, then the intellection of *necessaria* is a non-discursive activity; in this case, intellection consists of one simple act. Only separated, non-material intellects can have this type of intellection, for they do not know things through some process of dealing with spatial and temporal realities. However, if *necessaria* are considered according to the being which they have in natural or mathematical realities where they are

11. While the *Super Ethica* cites Averroes slightly more than 50 times, only on three occasions is the reference to his *Ethics-Commentary*. Cf. the list of citations in *Super Ethica*, p. 798.

12. *Super Ethica*. VI.2.p398,62-68.

13. *Ibid*.p399,12-15: "Differentia specie non conveniunt uni secundum numerum; sed omnes potentiae animae inveniuntur in una essentia animae; ergo non sunt specie differentes."

14. *Ibid*.p399,16-21: "Praeteria, quod est essentialia uni, non potest esse accidentale alteri; sed huiusmodi potentiae animae sunt accidentia fluentia ab essentia animae; ergo cum species non constituentur nisi formis essentialibus, non erit divisio potentiarum sicut in species." Also, see *Ibid*.p399:22-25.

15. *Ibid*.p400,11-15: "Sed potentiae, de quibus hic loquitur Philosophus, semper sunt simul, quia numquam est scientificum sine ratiocinativo aut e converso. Et ideo non est divisio in haec, nisi sicut in partes potentiales."

obscured by space and time, then the *necessaria* are known through a process of reasoning. It is such a process, comprised of "comparing and thinking discursively and resolving the posterior into the prior," that we must carry out to gain our cognition of necessary things, i.e., to develop our sciences.¹⁶ Although here Albert does not explicitly make the connection, it is the scientific part of the human soul that, through a process of reasoning, knows those *necessaria* which are aspects of natural or mathematical realities.

In the third question, Albert intends to show that our power to know *necessaria* in natural and material realities is the same power by which we can know divine or non-material beings through the habitus of wisdom. He thus asks whether the division between a scientific and a ratiocinative part is sufficient: Is there not a power of sapience by which reason knows the divine beings?¹⁷ In response, Albert notes Avicenna's rule for determining a diversity of potency: wherever there exist diverse results that cannot be understood to have the same principles or causes, there must be diverse potencies to effect the results.¹⁸ For instance, the power of sense and the power of memory differ just as do the reception and the retention of a sensation.¹⁹ As for the reception by potencies oriented respectively to contingent and necessary beings, the former reception occurs through a "weak medium," i.e., through a sign external to the contingent being, while the reception of a necessary object of knowledge is through a medium that is either that being's cause or its immediate effect. Thus, cognition of

16. *Ibid*.p400,53-67: "Dicendum, quod necessaria, de quibus est scientia, possunt dupliciter considerari: aut quantum ad essentiam, secundum quod sunt accepta sine continuo et tempore, et sic in eis non est discursus, sed est eorum intellectus stans in uno. Aut secundum esse, quod habent in rebus naturalibus aut mathematicis, et sic ex commixtione continui et temporis obnubilantur, et oportet ea accipere per collectionem et discursum. Sed primo modo accipiuntur ab intelligentiis, quae non accipiunt cognitionem horum per imaginationem et sensum sicut nos, et ideo oportet, quod nos conferendo et ratiocinando et resolvendo posteriora in priora deveniamus in acceptionem necessariorum, quae est scientia."

17. *Ibid*.p401,12-17: "Tertio videtur, quod insufficienter dividit rationem, (1) quia sapientialia sunt in nobis, ad quae etiam perficimur nobilissimo habitu; sed non sunt nisi in ratione; ergo debuit ponere cum duobus, quae [Aristoteles] ponit, etiam sapientificum."

18. *Ibid*.p401,41-45: "Solutio: Avicenna docet sic invenire diversitatem potentiarum: Ubi cumque enim invenimus diversa opera, quae non possunt reduci in eadem principia, oportet, quod ad illa ordinentur diversae potentiae..."

19. *Ibid*.p401,48-53.

contingent realities is according to or close to (*iuxta*) the senses, and, in contrast, knowledge of necessary beings proceeds by a medium close to that involved in cognition had by pure intelligence.²⁰ Here, we have an echo of Albert's view of the intellect as a power in which the human agent only shares.²¹ Further, the medium by which we develop the sciences of mathematical and natural *necessaria* is the same type as that by which we attain wisdom regarding divine realities. In all these cases, we make a "collection" or an "assembly" (*collectio*) and employ "an immediate and essential medium," which results in our "fixed" or certain cognition of *necessaria*. As a consequence, no third power of the soul, one of sapience, is required.²² - Although no explanation is given of the "collection" and the "immediate and essential medium," the reader is surely expected to recall the doctrine of the preceding question. By "collection" or "assembly," Albert must be referring to the process by which we were said to develop science, namely, one of "comparing and thinking discursively and resolving the posterior into the prior."²³ As for the "immediate and essential medium," he intends quidditative knowledge.

Albert's fourth question deals with what both Averroes and Aquinas refer to as Aristotle's basic reason for distinguishing the two parts of the soul corresponding to necessary and contingent realities. To what we saw in Averroes and Aquinas, Albert offers no addition, but affirms only that where different genera of objects are had, different genera of potencies are needed.²⁴

Albert's final question adopts a new tact to conclude to Aristotle's division of the potencies respecting necessary and contingent realities. Here, he works with a parallel between the matter-form relation and that between a

20. *Ibid.*p401,53-60: "Et ideo, cum acceptio contingentium sit per medium debile, scilicet per signum, quod est quasi extrinsecum, et necessarium per medium, quod est causa vel effectus immediatus, erit alia potentia ad haec et illa cognoscenda, quarum una perficitur acceptione iuxta sensum et alia in propinquitate ad intelligentiam."

21. Cf. above, p. 20 with note 76.

22. *Ibid.*p401,60-65: "Sed idem principium in nobis est accipiendi scibilia et sapientialia quantum ad formam medii, quia omnia haec per collectionem accipimus et per medium immediatum et essentialia, quae facit fixam cognitionem, et ideo pertinent ad eandem partem animae."

23. In a later *lectio*, Albert asserts the following of *collectio*: *Ibid.*6.p429,65-68: "...quod collectio non dicit tantum aggregationem, sed simul cum hoc ordinem principiorum vel ad conclusionem vel ad opus..."

24. *Ibid.*p402,29-36.

cognitive potency and its object. Matter is proportioned to form, he begins, since the proper act of a form is in matter. This proportion does not arise from the substance of matter, for then all matter would be in proportion to the same form. Nor does the proportion depend on the form as completed or present in matter; if it did, a form would be present in matter logically prior to the existence of matter's proportion to the form. Accordingly, we must concede that the proportion of matter to form is indeterminate, since every form is drawn from the potency of matter.²⁵ The relation of a cognitive potency to its object is similar to this matter-form relation. Since every cognitive power is proportionate to its object, that proportion must consist in some sort of "beginning" of the object, a beginning that resembles an undetermined habitus. Through this beginning, or by means of this undetermined habitus, the potency resembles its knowable object just as the undetermined does what is determined. Accordingly, because necessary and contingent realities are received under different forms - here we need recall question three's distinction between cognition of contingent realities as close to sense and that of *necessaria* as close to the cognition had by pure intellects - it follows that these realities are known through different powers. To this doctrine, Albert adds in concluding, "Thus proceeds the argument of Aristotle."²⁶

By the discussion of these five questions, Albert intended "to provide a clear understanding of what is said in [Aristotle's] text." The doctrines he defended and explained can be summarized as follows. A pure intellect would understand a necessity through a simple act of intellection. Human reason only shares in the power that can gain cognition of the necessity of divine realities, as well as the necessities in natural and mathematical reality. But it can obtain this knowledge of necessities through a discursive process. Distinct from this power, called the "scientific" power, human reason has a "ratiocinative" power, whose object is attained by a procedure close to that used by the senses. While these

25. *Ibid.*p403,28-35: "Cum enim materia sit proportionata ad formam, quia proprius actus est in propria materia, talis proportio non ponitur esse ex substantia materiae, quia illa est eadem in omnibus, nec per formam completam, quia sic forma inesset, antequam insit, sed oportet, quod talis proportio indeterminata sit, quae est in materia, eo quod omnes formae extrahuntur de potentia materiae."

26. *Ibid.*p403,49-60: "Similiter etiam potentia acceptiva est proportionata ad suum cognoscibile, et ideo oportet, quod sit in ipsa quaedam inchoatio illius quasi indeterminatus quidam habitus, per quem similatur suo cognoscibili sicut indeterminatum determinato. Et ideo cum necessaria et contingentia sint diversarum formarum quantum ad modum acceptionis, eorum inchoationes non reducuntur in potentiam cognoscitivam unam, sed necessario ad duas... Et sic procedit ratio Aristotelis."

powers or potencies are distinct, they do not constitute separate souls, but rather are only potential parts of the human soul.

Given the importance of these doctrines, one might expect Albert to introduce them explicitly into his paraphrase of Aristotle's words, which follows immediately the conclusion of the fifth question. But that is not what we find. Instead, Albert offers only 56 lines, which amount to nothing more than a rewording of Aristotle's division of the rational soul into two parts; to the reader is left the task of applying the doctrines presented in the discussion of the five questions occupying the preceding 465 lines.

By a first power, Albert affirms, we examine (*speculamur*) necessary things, by another contingent things; this division is needed since, for each generically different object, there is numerically one part of the soul naturally fitted to that object; finally these powers are named, respectively, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative" parts of reason; the best explanation for seeing both as parts of reason is that the cognition had in each part completely results from discourse; and this discourse is necessitated by the fact that this cognition involves objects whose existence and whose meaning are mixed with both motion and quantity.²⁷

Since Albert's rewording of Aristotle's thought depends for its meaning on his discussion of the five questions, at the time of writing the *SLE* Aquinas would find implied a doctrine with which he cannot agree, namely, that there exist, even though "potential," two intellectual powers of the rational human soul, one enabling us to develop the natural, mathematical, and divine sciences, the other oriented to reasoning over practical affairs. Additionally, he would not think the Aristotelian passage actually meant this. Instead, Aquinas's reading of Aristotle's words - as outlined earlier - is substantially in agreement with that of Averroes: Aristotle's text proposes that one actual part of the rational soul, the scientific part, enables us to know necessary beings, the other, contingent beings. However, Aquinas, unlike Averroes, asserts that this is not genuine Aristotelian doctrine - if taken at face value - and accordingly, he claims that Aristotle did not intend to

27. *Ibid.* p404,24-27: "Sed nunc etiam dividendum est rationem habens per essentiam eodem modo in duo, uno quorum speculamur necessaria, quorum principia non possunt se habere aliter, et alio speculamur contingentia." p404,30-33: "...probat divisionem esse necessarium tali ratione: ad ea quae sunt altera genere, alterum de numero particularum animae est natum ad utrumque"; p404,41-49: "Primo proponit nomina et dicit, quod hoc quo cognoscimus necessaria, dicatur scientificum, et hoc quod speculamur contingentia, dicatur ratiocinativum, et remanet sibi nomen rationis, vel quia nihil perfectionis additur supra ipsum, vel melius, quia horum cognitio est tota in discursu quodam, quia sunt permixta motui et quantitati et secundum esse et secundum essentiam."

propose it as such. Aristotle is said to be offering a puzzle.²⁸ In solving the puzzle, Aquinas will agree with much of the doctrine Albert offered in his question, although not with the notion of the scientific and the ratiocinative as two potential intellectual parts of the soul. Additionally, Aquinas will be seen to prefer an open statement of the problem contained in Aristotle's words. Accordingly, Aquinas makes very evident that while we must not take Aristotle's words at face value, we also must not read them in Averroes's sense of the affirmation of one intellectual power oriented to necessary beings and one human, sensible power whose object is contingent reality.

In turning to the solution of Aristotle's puzzle, Aquinas follows the procedure he frequently adopts in his *Metaphysics-Commentary*, that is, he proposes what he understands to be Aristotle's unstated answer to the puzzle.²⁹ However, in the present case, Aquinas initially offers four reasons pointing to the conclusion that Aristotle was not asserting his own doctrine. To begin with, there is the teaching of *De anima*.III respecting the twofold division of the intellect into the agent intellect, or the ability to make any being actually intelligible, and the possible intellect, or the ability to have an intellection of any being whatsoever. This doctrine contradicts the thesis that one part or potency of the soul understands necessary beings and another contingents.³⁰

28. *SLE*.VI.1.150-51.S1119: "Videtur autem quod Philosophus hic determinat dubitationem habere." "Dubitatio" and "dubium" are equivalent to the Greek "aporie." - Much earlier than the *SLE*, in 1265-1266 the following apparently opposing view of Aristotle's doctrine is had in the *Q.D de anima*, q. un., a. 12: "Potentia enim ad actum dicitur correlative, unde secundum diversitatem actionum oportet esse diversitatem potentialium. Et inde est quod Philosophus in VI *Ethic*. dicit quod scientificum animae, quod est necessarium, et ratiocinativum quod est contingentium, sunt diversae potentiae; quia necessarium et contingens genere differunt." Yet, in his *De anima-Commentary* from the years 1267-1268 (*SLDA*.III.9.139-43.P828), Aquinas had remarked that Aristotle "distinguit autem consiliativum ab intellectivo sicut in VI *Ethicorum* distinguitur ratiocinativum, quod est contingentium, a scientifico, quod est necessarium, et ea ratione que ibi tangitur." This latter text seems justified by the context, i.e., an explanation that for Aristotle there are more potencies of the soul than certain ancient philosophers admitted.

29. *Metaphysics*.III contains numerous *apories* or *dubitationes* which Aquinas consistently solves by references to various Aristotelian doctrines. E.g.: *In Meta*.III.4.384-85; 5.392; 7.422.

30. *SLE*.VI.1.151-59.S1119: "Ipse enim in III *De anima* distinguit intellectum in duo, scilicet in agens et possibile, et dicit quod agens est quo est omnia facere, possibilis autem est quo est omnia fieri; sic ergo tam intellectus agens quam possibilis secundum

A second reason leading to the same conclusion is the fact that necessary and contingent, *qua* "true," differ only as the perfect and the imperfect. By this, Aquinas intends that only the level or degree of intelligibility differentiates necessary and contingent beings as objects of knowledge. Similarly, he notes, one would distinguish perfect and imperfect vision, namely, the sight of objects clearly illuminated as distinct from the sight of objects obscured by darkness. Both sorts of objects can be seen by one power of sight. Even more so then, the intellective potency, vastly superior to the power of sight, is capable of knowing both objects perfectly intelligible and objects possessing only imperfect intelligibility, i.e., both necessary objects and contingent objects.³¹

Third, the higher a potency, the more unified it is. When we compare the higher power of intellect to the lower power of sight, we conclude to the greater unity of the former. Following from the greater unity of a power is the greater universality of its objects. Accordingly, since the lower power of sight is capable of perceiving both heavenly, incorruptible bodies and earthly, corruptible bodies, even more so is the higher potency of intellect able to intellect both necessary and contingent beings.³²

Finally, there is the incorrect basis of the argument concluding that necessary and contingent beings are known only by different parts of the soul. That is, it is incorrect to maintain that diverse potencies of the soul are required for the cognition of generically diverse objects. If this were correct, then we could not see both plants and animals with the same visual power. The diversity which necessitates a distinction of powers lies in the formality of the object. For instance, even though there are ten distinct genera of beings, i.e., substance and the nine types of accident, the intellect can know substances and accidents from the viewpoint of quiddity. Consequently, one and the same intellectual potency

propriam rationem ad omnia se habet; esset ergo contra rationem utriusque intellectus, si alia pars animae esset quae intelligit necessaria et quae intelligit contingentia."

31. *Ibid.* VI.1.160-66.S1120: "Rursus, verum necessarium et verum contingens videntur se habere sicut perfectum et imperfectum in genere veri; eadem autem potentia animae cognoscimus perfecta et imperfecta in eodem genere, sicut visus lucida et tenebrosa; multo igitur magis eadem potentia intellectiva cognoscit necessaria et contingentia."

32. *Ibid.* 167-75.S1121: "Item, universaliter se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia quam sensus ad sensibilia, quanto enim aliqua virtus est altior tanto est magis unita; sensus autem visus percipit et incorruptibilia, scilicet caelestia corpora, et corruptibilia, scilicet inferiora, quibus proportionaliter respondere videntur necessarium et contingens; multo igitur magis eadem intellectiva potentia cognoscit necessaria et contingentia."

can know both necessary and contingent beings by intellecting their quiddities.³³

Subsequent to offering these four arguments to show that the division of the rational soul into two parts or potencies corresponding respectively to necessary and contingent beings could not be Aristotle's doctrine, but instead was the proposing of a puzzle, Aquinas explains the puzzle's solution. The crux of the solution is said to lie in our ability to know contingent beings in two ways. The first is the scientific way, which involves the cognition of contingent beings in terms of their universal meanings. Since such universal meanings are immutable, as are the meanings of necessary beings, one intellectual power can know both contingent and necessary beings, as happens in natural science.³⁴ The second way in which contingent beings can be known is precisely as particular realities. To attain this type of cognition, the intellect works through sensitive powers, in particular through an internal sense known as "particular reason" or "the cogitative power." The task of this sense is to collect or unify the various sense perceptions had by an individual concerning a particular object. When Aristotle speaks of this sort of cognition of contingent beings, he is said to have in mind the type of knowledge that feeds into our deliberation and subsequent activity in regard to particular realities. Aquinas proposes that if we keep in mind the two ways in which contingents can be known, i.e., from the perspective of their universal meanings and from the perspective of particular realities as objects of deliberation and activity, we can understand why Aristotle asserted that diverse parts of the rational soul are required. The universal meanings of contingent

33. *Ibid.* 176-89.S1122: "Videtur etiam et probatio quam induxit efficax non esse. Non enim quaelibet diversitas generis in obiectis requirit diversas potentias, alioquin non eadem potentia visiva videremus plantas et animalia, sed sola illa diversitas quae respicit formalem rationem obiecti, puta, si esset diversum genus coloris vel luminis, oporteret esse diversas potentias visivas. Obiectum autem intellectus proprium est quod quid est, quod est commune omnibus et substantiis et accidentibus, licet non eodem modo. Unde et eadem intellectiva potentia cognoscimus substantias et accidentia. Pari ergo ratione diversitas generis necessariorum et contingentium non requirit diversas potentias intellectivas."

34. *Ibid.* 190-203.S1123: "Haec autem dubitatio de facili solvitur si quis consideret quod contingentia dupliciter cognosci possunt: uno modo secundum rationes universales, alio modo secundum quod sunt in particulari. Universales quidem igitur rationes contingentium immutabiles sunt, et secundum hoc de his demonstrationes dantur et ad scientias demonstrativas pertinet eorum cognitio; non enim scientia naturalis est solum de rebus necessariis et incorruptibilibus, sed etiam de rebus corruptibilibus et contingentibus; unde patet quod contingentia sic considerata ad eandem partem animae intellectivae pertinent ad quam et necessaria, quam Philosophus vocat hic scientificum, et sic procedunt rationes inductae."

beings - and also of necessary beings - are known directly and solely by the intellectual power itself; the cognition of contingent beings as particulars concerning which we can deliberate and act requires an internal sense, the cogitative power. However, in both ways it is the one and only intellectual power that knows contingents, although in the second way it knows them through the intermediacy of a sense power of the rational soul.³⁵

Aquinas is not yet finished with this puzzle. In the subsequent chapter, he finds it implied in Aristotle's explanation of the work of the speculative and the practical parts of the soul. The good or correct work of the former part is said to be the attainment of absolute truth, i.e., truth considered of itself as divorced from practical activity; in contrast, the practical intellect achieves its correct or good work when it arrives at a true decision regarding practical activity which it does insofar as it agrees with right appetite.³⁶ By this doctrine of the speculative and practical parts of the soul, Aristotle is seen to refer to the scientific and ratiocinative parts mentioned a bit earlier, even though this division contradicts the doctrine of *De anima*.III.³⁷ Accordingly, Aquinas once again resolves the puzzle. As speculative, the intellect attains a universal consideration of its object; in its practical activity, the intellect begins with a universal consideration as with a principle from which it moves to its completion in a consideration of the particular or contingent activity to perform or to omit. Because of this practical working of the intellect, "Aristotle affirms in *De anima*.III that a universal meaning (*ratio*) does not move [a person to act] without the particular. It is in accord with this doctrine that the ratiocinative part of the soul is posited as a

35. *Ibid.*203-14.S1123: "Alio modo possunt accipi contingentia secundum quod sunt in particulari, et sic variabilia sunt nec cadit supra ea intellectus nisi mediantibus potentiis sensitivis; unde et inter partes animae sensitivas ponitur una potentia quae dicitur ratio particularis sive vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium; sic autem accipit hic Philosophus contingentia, ita enim cadunt sub consilio et operatione; et propter hoc ad diversas partes animae rationalis pertinere dicit necessaria et contingentia, sicut universalis, speculabilia et particularia operabilia."

36. *Ibid.*VI.2.93-127.S1130-31.

37. *Ibid.*128-34.S1132: "Videtur etiam hic esse dubium de hoc quod prosequitur de speculativo et practico intellectu quasi de duabus partibus supra positis, scilicet scientifico et ratiocinativo, cum tamen supra dixit esse diversas partes animae scientificum et ratiocinativum, quod de intellectu speculativo et practico ipse negat in III *De anima*."

diverse part from the scientific."³⁸

It was noted above that the presentation and solution of this puzzle have been seen as Aquinas's repudiation and rejection of the meaning of an Aristotelian text.³⁹ How differently would Aquinas's contemporaries have regarded this passage of the *SLE*? In the 1270s, Aquinas's interpretation of these passages from *Ethics*.VI.1 must have appeared quite evidently as an alternate reading to that of Albert, one both more concise and clearer in its explanation of Aristotle's procedure and doctrine. Additionally, a little reflection on Aquinas's position would have resulted in the realization that Aquinas's reading casts doubt on any support for the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect that Parisian Masters of Arts might find in Averroes's proposal that Aristotle divides here the rational soul into a scientific and a cogitative part.

HAPPINESS NOT A CONNECTION WITH A SEPARATED INTELLECT

We can only surmise that in the above passages Aquinas was thinking of Averroes's doctrine, and not exclusively concerned with Aristotle's thought in the passage before him and Albert's interpretation of it. Yet at least two other passages of the *SLE* testify that the unicity of the intellect was on Aquinas's mind as he wrote. Twice he criticizes Averroes's doctrine of happiness, although without mentioning his name. According to Averroes, contemplative happiness is had by a human agent when, through connection with the separated agent intellect, he comes to the complete knowledge of reality.⁴⁰ It is such a theory Aquinas has in mind when in Book I he asserts that, from Aristotle's doctrine safeguarding the connection between happiness and human causality, "it is clear that the happiness spoken of by the Philosopher does not consist in a connection

38. *Ibid.*134-39.S1132: "Dicendum est ergo quod intellectus practicus principium quidem habet in universali consideratione et secundum hoc est idem subiecto cum speculativo, sed terminatur eius consideratio in particulari operabili, unde Philosophus dicit in III *De anima* quod ratio universalis non movet sine particulari, et secundum hoc ratiocinativum ponitur diversa pars animae a scientifico."

39. Cf. p. 36 above with note 6.

40. *Com. Mag. De anima*.III.36.p500,599 - p501,619. Cf. note 47 on p. 12 above.

with the separated intellect according to which man understands everything.⁴¹ In Book X, Aquinas repeats this opposition to an unnamed interpreter. There, after expounding the doctrine that the agent given to intellectual contemplation will be beloved of God and solicitous both of his friends and good works, all characteristics of the wise, Aquinas adds: "From this it is clear that Aristotle posits the ultimate human happiness in the activity of wisdom discussed above in Book VI, not in a connection with the agent intellect, as some imagine."⁴² - Is there any reason to see in this passage something other than Aquinas's attempt to propose what he regards as Aristotle's doctrine?

SOME ASPECTS OF PRUDENCE

Approaching the end of his discussion of practical wisdom, i.e., prudence, Aristotle remarks that earlier thinkers had divined the truth of the doctrine that moral virtue is guided by prudence.⁴³ Yet "we must go somewhat beyond that position," he adds, "for not only is [moral] virtue a habitus according to right

41. *SLE*.I.14.90-95.S170: "Ex quo patet quod felicitas de qua Philosophus loquitur non consistit in illa continuatione ad intelligentiam separatam per quam homo intelligat omnia, ut quidam posuerunt: hoc enim non provenit multis, immo nulli in hac vita." - The doctrine safeguarding the connection of human causality and happiness is found in lines *Ibid.*59-90.S169-70.

42. *Ibid.*X.13.137-41.S2135: "Ex quo patet quod ultimam felicitatem humanam ponit Aristotiles in operatione sapientiae de qua supra in VI determinavit, non autem in continuatione ad intelligentiam agentem, ut quidam fingunt." - These criticisms of the unnamed interpreter(s) are the last in Aquinas' career-long reaction against the "connection" of the human agent and a separated intellect. The earlier accounts regularly name Averroes. Cf.: *II Sent.*, d.18, q.2, a.2; *De verit.*, q.18, a.5, ad8; *SCG*.III.44; *ST*.Ia.88.1; *Q.D. de anima*, a.16.- Wieland: *Ethica*, p. 157 and Celano: "The Understanding," p. 49 identify the unnamed interpreter(s) as those pre-1240 commentators who found the *Ethics* proposing that happiness comes through union with God. That Aquinas would be thinking of this interpretation of Aristotle seems scarcely credible given the above instances of this same criticism in Aquinas's work where Averroes is mentioned, as well as the fact that the appearance of Grosseteste's *Greek Commentaries*, the translation of Averroes' commentary, and the *Super Ethica* would have rendered attention to the earlier Parisian commentaries unnecessary.

43. *NE*.VI.13.1144b24-25.

reason, but [it is] also with right reason."⁴⁴

If we turn to the *SLE* and the *Super Ethica* to discover what Aristotle meant, we find a difference of opinion. According to Aquinas, if virtue were only "according to right reason," one could be morally virtuous without possessing prudence; that is, one could act on the instruction received from another agent who happens to be prudent. So it is that, in addition to being "according to reason," moral virtue must exist "with reason." Thus, neither moral virtue is had without prudence, nor prudence without moral virtue.⁴⁵ Yet Albert offers a more ample interpretation, while also appearing to read Aristotle differently: if moral virtue is only a habitus "according to reason," then the agent has need of prudence only for the acquisition of virtue; that is, the task of prudence would be complete in guiding the agent to form dispositions in the mean in regard to certain types of activity. But in fact, virtue is also with right reason or prudence insofar as the latter has the three-fold function required for virtuous activity: the determination of the end; the prescription of the choice; and the order or direction of activity leading towards the agent's end.⁴⁶

Prima facie, Aquinas appears to be reading Aristotle as simply asserting the necessary co-existence of prudence and moral virtue. In contrast, Albert raises the question of the function of prudence; besides having a role in the development of virtue, prudence or correct reason has the three-fold function integral to virtuous activity that was mentioned shortly above. Regardless of first appearances however, Aquinas's silence in regard to the function of right reason masks a definite turning away from Albert's doctrine. This becomes clear when one follows Aquinas's thought through a series of texts extending from the early

44. *Ibid.*1144b25-27; *SLE*, p. 374; *Super Ethica*, p. 511,83-85: "Oportet autem parum transcendere. Non enim solum qui secundum rectam rationem, sed qui cum recta ratione habitus virtus est..."

45. *SLE*.VI.11.107-13.S1284: "Non enim solum hoc habet virtus moralis quod sit secundum rationem rectam, quia sic posset aliquis esse virtuosus moraliter sine hoc quod haberet prudentiam, per hoc quod esset instructus per rationem alterius, sed oportet ulterius dicere quod virtus moralis est habitus cum ratione recta, quae quidem est prudentia." *Ibid.*120-24.S1285: "Sic igitur manifestum est ex dictis quod non est possibile aliquem hominem esse bonum principaliter, id est secundum virtutem moralem, sine prudentia neque etiam prudentem sine morali virtute."

46. *Super Ethica*.VI.18.p512,37-44: "dicit enim, quod non solum virtus moralis est habitus secundum rationem quasi accipens formam medii ab ipsa, sicut alii dicebant, quia sic non indigeret prudentia nisi quantum ad suum fieri, sed etiam est cum ratione recta quantum ad tria, scilicet ad determinationem finis et praepositionem electionis et ordinem earum quae sunt ad finem."

Sentence-Commentary to the *SLE*. An appreciation of these texts, however, requires a broader view of Albert's doctrine of virtue as both "according to" and "with" right reason or prudence. To that doctrine, I now turn.

In two questions preparing for the *Super Ethica's* comment on the Aristotelian text that was cited shortly above, Albert introduces his doctrine of the four tasks of prudence. As concerns the notion that prudence functions in the development of virtue, Albert begins from the "substance" of moral virtue, i.e., from what we conceive a moral virtue to be, namely, the correct ordering or directing of activities and passions so that a mean is had. Necessarily, something other than moral virtue itself causes this ordering; this cause is "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence (*ratio, quae quidem perficitur ad haec per prudentiam*)." Viewed in this fashion, moral virtue is seen to be distinct from reason, even though it is according to reason. A second way of considering virtue, however, is insofar as it reaches the end through its works. Here is revealed another ground of virtue's need of "reason, perfected for this purpose, by prudence." Insofar as moral virtue is a nature, not only tending toward an end, but arriving at the end through diverse activities, it presupposes prudential reason as the cause of this activity: "*et ad hoc iterum [ratio] perficitur prudentia*." In this sense moral virtue is with reason.⁴⁷

In this question, Albert has spoken of two ways in which moral virtue has a need of prudence: (1) "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence," effects moral virtue as a mean in activities and passions, and so, moral virtue is according to reason; and (2) "reason, perfected for this purpose, by prudence," makes virtue attain its end, and here moral virtue is with reason. But these are only two of the four functions enumerated by Albert in the text of the *Super*

47. *Ibid.* VI.18.p509,28-49: "Dicendum, quod virtus moralis potest dupliciter considerari: aut secundum substantiam aut secundum quod contingit finem per suum opus. Secundum substantiam est quidem medium in operationibus vel passionibus; ad hoc autem quod sit huiusmodi medium, oportet actiones et passiones esse ordinatas et rectas et ipsa media similiter. Cum autem nihil moveat se, oportet esse aliquid aliud quod faciat istam directionem, et haec est ratio, quae quidem perficitur ad haec per prudentiam, et ideo virtus moralis est secundum rationem. Similiter etiam natura non movet nisi ad unum, sed potentiae rationalis est agere opposita vel agere vel non agere. Virtus autem moralis est sicut quaedam natura tendens in suum finem; cum autem sit finis eius, ad quem devenitur per operationes humanas, in quibus est maxima diversitas, oportet, quod ad illa operetur ratio distinguens et ordinans ea, et ad hoc iterum perficitur prudentia. Et ideo, in quantum attingit et includit finem virtus moralis, oportet quod sit cum ratione..."

Ethica that above was contrasted with the *SLE's* comment.⁴⁸ The remaining two functions, also aspects of moral virtue when considered as "with reason," are examined in the second preparatory question Albert raises.

Albert begins here by remarking the two functions of prudence just noted. To these, he now adds a third and a fourth by noting two additional aspects of virtue presupposing the aid of prudence: (3) moral virtue makes the correct choice in desiring its proper good, and (4) it makes the correct intention by tending toward the end.⁴⁹ In regard to (3) the correct choice, "prudence, by which reason is perfected (*prudentia, qua perficitur ratio*)," effects the first aspect of choice by proposing one thing as preferable to another, while the moral virtue provides the desire of the preferable thing.⁵⁰ As for (4), the correct intention of the end, this occurs because prudential reason "predetermines (*praestituere*)" the correct end for the moral virtues.⁵¹

The discussion of these four functions of prudence constitutes Albert's preparation for his comment on Aristotle's statement that moral virtue is both according to and with reason. Virtue is "according to reason," because "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence," effects virtue as a mean in actions and passions. Yet, virtue is "with reason" on three grounds: because prudence directs the activities by which virtue's end is attained; because it posits one thing as preferable to another and thus, proposes the choice to be made; and because it insures the correct intention by predetermining the end.

This doctrine is not without its problems. First, there appear to be two different senses in which reason, perfected by prudence, predetermines the end of

48. Cf. note 46 above.

49. *Super Ethica*. VI.18.p510,5-12.

50. *Ibid.* p510,13-23: "Quod ad electionem ipsa [prudentia] indigeat [virtus moralis], probatio:... Cum autem sint ibi [i.e., in electione] duo, scilicet primo praeponere unum alteri et secundo optare illud, quae non sunt eiusdem potentiae, quia praeponere est potentiae distinguens, scilicet rationis, et optare appetitivae, quae non est distinctiva, videtur, quod virtus moralis, quae perficit electionem per hoc quod est optare, indiget ratione praeponente unum alteri et per consequens prudentia, qua perficitur ratio."

51. *Ibid.* p510,24-34: "Quod autem indigeat ad intentionem rectam, probatio: Nihil enim tendit in alterum nisi sit sibi praestitutum vel ipse sibi praestituat, sicut etiam naturalibus omnibus praestitutus est finis a primo motore, cuius intentio est in omnibus agentibus naturalibus; sed virtus moralis tendit in suum finem sicut natura quaedam; ergo oportet, quod ab aliquo sibi praestituatur finis et coniuncto sibi, quod est ratio, in quo differt ab operatione naturali. Sed verum est, quod praestituto fine de se tendit in ipsum nec ad hoc aliquo indiget."

moral virtue, although Albert has only used the term *praestituere* ("predetermine") insofar as he spoke of (4), virtue's intention of the end determined by prudential reason. In this latter case, Albert understands the prudential activity by which reason decides that such and such a type of virtuous activity (and so, of an end) is to be chosen in the agent's present situation. However, when this "predetermining the end" is contrasted with (1), the function of prudence in constituting virtue in its substance or as a mean, there appears by implication another meaning of "predetermining the end." That is, "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence," guides the agent so that he performs the actions by which virtues are acquired. In this sense, prudential reason appears to predetermine the ends of moral virtues by directing the acquisition of habitus directed toward determined ends.

The recognition of this more basic sense of "predetermining the end" has its own problem. If prudential reason guides in the acquisition of virtue, then is not prudence had prior to the acquisition of moral virtue? Here, in interpreting the doctrine that moral virtue is "with reason," was Albert leaving open the possibility that prudence can be had even when other virtues are not present? While Albert appears not to note the existence of this difficulty, three other doctrines of the *Super Ethica*, when taken together, provide a resolution.

First, there is Albert's notion that prudence can be had either imperfectly or perfectly. The latter form is had when all the moral virtues are possessed. This doctrine is also expressed by Albert in the context of commenting on Aristotle's assertion that "not only is [moral] virtue a habitus according to right reason, but [it is] also with right reason."⁵² In speaking of virtue as "with reason," Albert raises the objection that Aristotle's doctrine entails that prudence and moral virtue can only be had together.⁵³ In answering, Albert distinguishes between prudence as perfected and so, as inseparable from the totality of moral virtues, and, on the other hand, imperfect prudence. The latter can be had when, for instance, the agent is prudent in regard to situations requiring temperance, although he is without prudence as concerns another virtue, say courage.⁵⁴

A second doctrine of Albert needing to be brought forward concerns the seminal form in which virtues are first possessed. In commenting on *Ethics* II, Albert asks "whether someone without the habitus of justice can perform a just

52. *NE*.VI.13.1144b24-25.

53. *Super Ethica*.VI.18.p510,72-79.

54. *Ibid*.p511,9-22; 26-27. See also *Ibid*.I.8.p42,89 - p43,1.

act."⁵⁵ The response insists that virtues are originally in the soul "in formal and seminal potency." Accordingly, when an agent who lacks the form of justice first acts justly, this action arises from a seminal potency of justice, not from the complete and distinct habitus. In explanation, Albert compares the soul's seminal potency of justice to the generative potency in which a living being is virtually present.⁵⁶

A third doctrine that sheds light on the role of prudence in the development of virtue appears when Albert comments on Aristotle's assertion that prudence "is not a habitus with reason alone."⁵⁷ Concerning this, the *Super Ethica* states "that it [i.e., prudence] is not a habitus with reason alone, but it also has innate principles."⁵⁸ In a connected discussion, Albert examines the context of Aristotle's question of whether prudence can be forgotten. The presence in reason of innate principles, i.e., of the universal natural laws, is taken as the basis of Aristotle's negative answer: prudence can never be forgotten "because the universal laws are in our nature, in which laws prudence is substantially had, and these laws always remain." However, only through the "application to work" of the universal laws is prudence had in a perfect way. That is, through experience and guided by positive laws (e.g., those of Lesbia forbidding the presence of strangers on the city's walls) the agent's prudence gradually assumes the form where it is at any moment ready to be applied to particular activity.⁵⁹

55. *Ibid*.II.4.p105,38-39.

56. *Ibid*.p105,85 - p106,9: "Dicendum...quod virtutes sunt in ipsa anima naturaliter in potentia non pure materiali, sed quodammodo formali et seminali, sicut etiam formae in materia;... dicimus, quod primum agens opera iusta, quod est ratio, non disponitur iustitia existente in ipso secundum habitum completum et distinctum, sed in potentia seminali, et ab hoc non potest dici iusta, sicut nec semen potest dici animal ab anima, quae est in ipso non sicut forma eius, sed in virtute. Et quia in operatione iusta, quae est ad iustitiam, non est perfecta forma virtutis, nihil prohibet, quod procedat ab habente iustitiam imperfecte, sicut etiam semen procedit a virtute generativa, in quae est animal sicut in virtute seminali."

57. *NE*.VI.5.1140b28: "neque habitus cum ratione solum." Cf. *Super Ethica*, p442,73-74.

58. *Ibid*.VI.7.p444,23-24.

59. *Ibid*.p445,21-34: "Dicendum, quod prudentiae simpliciter et secundum totum non potest esse oblivio, sed bene potest esse, quod aliquis efficiatur minus habilis ad applicandum ad opus. Et huius ratio est, quia universalialia iuris sunt in nostra natura, in quibus substantialiter est prudentia, et ista semper manent; sed secundum applicationem

It follows from these doctrines that the virtue of prudence, every bit as much as any other virtue, exists originally in reason in a seminal manner. As a consequence, when the agent first begins to move in the direction of the acquisition of virtue, for example, when he performs his first act of justice, the correct rational activity behind the choice of the just action will be prudential activity arising from the seed of prudence in reason. In this way, Albert can assert that "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence," constitutes virtue as a mean. That is, as reason deliberates about possible actions, its correct reasoning arises from the seed of prudence within itself, that is, from the principles innate in reason. Consequently, as the agent gradually develops any given habitus of virtue, the imperfect prudence corresponding to that virtue is also gradually acquired. Then when all the virtues are possessed in perfect fashion, prudence too is itself had in a perfect form.

In the light of this doctrine, the more basic sense of "predetermining the end" of moral virtue can be understood. As noted, Albert never explicitly speaks of "predetermining the end" in this sense. Instead, he repeatedly refers to prudence's primary role as "predetermining" or "prescribing" or "pre-ordering" or "determining" or "establishing" the end to be sought in a particular situation facing the agent.⁶⁰

This present discussion of Albert began subsequent to a comparison of the *SLE* and the *Super Ethica* regarding Aristotle's assertion that "not only is [moral] virtue a habitus according to right reason, but [it is] also with right reason."⁶¹ The above more basic sense of "predetermining the end" enables us to understand Albert's doctrine of moral virtue as "according to reason": "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence," is needed for the acquisition of virtue. In regard to moral virtue as "with reason," the three roles of prudence are first, to "predetermine the end" to be pursued in a given situation; second, to prescribe choice; and third, to order the activity toward the end. In contrast with these doctrines, Aquinas's comment on Aristotle appears to be the simple

ad opus particulare oportet, quod perficiamur per experimentum et per alia iura scripta, quia ius illud universale est. Unde non potest applicari eodem modo ad omnia, sed oportet, quod habeatur aliquid simile regulae Lesbiae aedificationis, ...et quantum ad hoc generatur per experimentum et tempus..."

60. "Praedeterminare finem": *Ibid.* VI.14.p479,17; p484,39-40. "Preceptiva finis": *Ibid.* 15.p485,81. "Praeordinare finem": *Ibid.* p486,65. "Determinatio finis": *Ibid.* p486,73-75. "Constituere finem": *Ibid.* p488,10. "Praestituere finem": *Ibid.* 18.p510,31.

61. Cf. above, pp. 51-52.

assertion of the necessary co-existence of prudence and moral virtue. Yet as remarked, Aquinas's silence concerning the function of prudence masks a turning away from Albert's doctrine. To see how Aquinas gradually moved from a disciple of Albert to the commentator on *Ethics*.VI, I turn first to the former's *Sentence-Commentary*.

In Aquinas's *Sentence-Commentary*, echoes are had of Albert's expression, "predetermining the end" when the interrelations of prudence and moral virtue are under consideration. However, unlike Albert who uses interchangeably *praedeterminare*, *praeordinare*, *prescribere*, *determinare*, *constituere*, and *praestituere*, Aquinas employs only forms of *praestituere*. Yet much more significant in distinguishing Aquinas from his teacher is the clarity with which the new Bachelor of the Sentences employs *praestituere* when initially proposing his understanding of the roles of reason and prudence.

According to Aquinas's *Sentence-Commentary*, the end of human life is proposed as the good of reason. Yet the orientation of the moral virtues toward achieving the correct good as proposed by reason requires control of the agent's passions and activities. Reason, as the sole human faculty capable of cognition of the requisite end, is said to predetermine the end of human life (*praestitutio finis*). This determination of the end "precedes prudence, just as the intellectus of principles [precedes] science. In agreement with this conception, Aristotle said in *Ethics*.VI that 'prudence has as [its] principles the end of virtues'.⁶²

Given natural reason's determination of the end, that is, once the orientation of the moral virtues is established, prudence effects the mean in actions and passions. Thus, one can assert that "in some way, prudence predetermines (*praestituit*) the end for moral virtues." "And so, it is said in *Ethics*.II that 'the

62. *Sent.* III, d. 33, q. 2, a. 3co.: "...ad perfectionem virtutis moralis tria sunt necessaria. Primum est praestitutio finis; secundum autem est inclinatio ad finem praestitutum; tertium est electio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem proximus humanae vitae est bonum rationis in communi: ...et ideo est intentum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, ut passiones et operationes ad rectitudinem rationis reducantur. Rectitudo autem rationis naturalis est; unde hoc modo praestitutio finis ad naturalem rationem pertinet, et praecedat prudentiam, sicut intellectus principiorum scientiam; et ideo dicit philosophus, 6 *Ethic.*, quod 'prudencia habet principia finis virtutum'." - Rather than see Aquinas separating himself from Albert, Odon Lottin remarks that Aquinas proposes what Albert "left in the dark," namely, that prudence supposes the existence of moral virtue. Cf. "Les début du traité de la prudence au moyen âge," in *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Louvain/Gembloux: Mont César/Duculot, 1949) T. 3, P. 2,1, pp. 279-80.

mean of moral virtue is according to correct reason, which is prudence'.⁶³

In the above discussion, Aquinas distinguished with sufficient clarity the two diverse senses in which natural reason and prudence can be said to predetermine the end of moral virtues. Additionally, he distinguishes himself from Albert by his understanding of the cause predetermining the end of virtue, i.e., the cause behind the constitution of virtue. Whereas for Albert that cause was "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence," for Aquinas it is reason alone. However, only two articles subsequent, the latter writes of the predetermination of the end in a fashion more reminiscent of Albert. While Aquinas's doctrine in this later article is ultimately intelligible because of the earlier discussion of the different functions of reason and prudence in relation to the end, his presentation now is indicative of a mind in the early stages of grappling with a problem. The question raised is "whether the other cardinal virtues are reduced to prudence as to the more principal virtue or cause." The solution opens with an affirmative answer and then cites an authority providing some detail regarding the role of prudence as cause of the moral virtues. The discretion of prudence, we are told, is "the generator and both the custodian and the moderator of virtues." The subsequent explanation makes three points, which do not, as might initially be expected, correspond to the three characterizations of prudence's role just asserted (generator, custodian, and moderator). (1) Reason predetermines (*praestituere*) both the common and the proper ends for the other cardinal virtues. - At first glance, Aquinas appears to resemble Albert in proposing the expression, "by reason, which prudence perfects and makes correct, the end is predetermined." However, one must note that the clause, "which prudence perfects and makes correct," does not imply any role for prudence in predetermining the end as did Albert's "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence." All Aquinas intends is that reason naturally knows that the agent is to live according to what reason discovers to be good, and that such a life, when spelled out, will be found to encompass living temperately, courageously, and justly. - (2) Aquinas next turns to "correct reason," asserting in effect that it is called the "generator of virtues" insofar as it is at the source of the actions bringing about their development. - There seems no reason not to take "generator" strictly here, thereby seeing "correct reason," i.e., prudence, as the cause of the acquisition of virtue. (3) Prudence is "the custodian and moderator of virtues" insofar as it determines the correct "path" of each virtue by deliberation and

63. *Sent.* III, d. 33, q. 2, a. 3co. : "Sed hoc bonum rationis determinatur secundum quod constituitur medium in actionibus et passionibus per debitam commensurationem circumstantiarum, quod facit prudentia. 'Unde medium virtutis moralis,' ut in 2 *Ethic.* dicitur, 'est secundum rationem rectam, quae est prudentia'; et sic quodammodo prudentia praestituit finem virtutibus moralibus..."

choice.⁶⁴ Obviously, this discussion lacks the clarity and precision present earlier in the *Sentence-Commentary* when Aquinas distinguished two sense of "predetermining the end."

When Aquinas next discusses the activity of prudence and its relation to moral virtue, it is in the *De veritate* when his interest is in divine providence. We can speak of God's providential care only by analogy with the agent's providence regarding himself, he explains in the opening article. Here, where he focuses principally on the human virtue of prudence and its relation to virtuous activity, Aquinas's mastery of his subject is quite clear.

In any particular activity subject to prudence, Aquinas explains, two items are central, that is, the end and those things leading to the end. As is proposed in *Ethics*.VI, the prudent person is the one who deliberates well. Since deliberation does not concern the end, but only activities related to the end, prudence directs whatever leads to the end.⁶⁵ Continuing, Aquinas turns to the two ways in which the end of human activity "pre-exists in us." First, by natural intellectual cognition, the end of the human agent is known; as we read in *Ethics*.VI, we have by natural cognition the principles of both particular activity and scientific understanding. - As will be noted in Chapter 4, Aquinas eventually changes his mind regarding the presence in *Ethics*.VI of the doctrine of an

64. *Ibid.*, a. 5co. : "Respondeo dicendum, quod prudentia inter alias virtutes cardinales principalior est, et ad ipsum reducuntur omnes aliae quasi ad causam. Unde Antonius dicit, quod "discretio quae ad prudentiam pertinet, est genetrix et custos et moderatrix virtutum." Et hoc sic patet. "Virtus enim," ut dicit Tullius, "mouet in modum naturae, scilicet per quamdam inclinationem affectus." Omnis autem naturae inclinatio praeeigit aliquam cognitionem quae et finem praestituat, et in finem inclinet, et ea quibus ad finem pervenitur provideat: haec enim sine cognitione fieri non possunt... oportet quod per rationem, quam perficit prudentia, et rectam facit, praestituatur finis aliis virtutibus, non solum communis, sed etiam proximus, qui est attingere medium in propria natura. "Medium autem secundum rationem rectam determinatur," ut in 2 *Ethic.* dicitur. Secundo per rationem rectam est inclinatio earum in finem proprium, quae est intentio finis in virtutibus acquisitis, in quantum ex operibus ratione regulatis habitus virtutis praedictam inclinationem causans inducitur; et quantum ad hoc dicitur genetrix virtutum. Tertio per prudentiam rectificatur via unicuique virtuti, quae tendit in finem, in quantum per consilium et electionem segregantur utilia a nocivis respectu finis virtutis; et quantum ad hoc moderatrix et custos dicitur virtutum."

65. *De verit.* 5.1: "Sed in istis agibilibus duo quaedam consideranda occurrunt: scilicet finis, et id quod est ad finem. Prudentia praecise dirigit in his quae sunt ad finem; ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis prudens, quia bene est consiliativus, ut dicitur in VI *Ethic.* Consilium autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III *Ethic.*"

intellectus of practical principles.⁶⁶ - The end of human activity also “pre-exists in us” in our affections; the ends of all possible human activities are “in us” by the moral virtues through which we are inclined to live justly, courageously, and temperately. These sorts of actions constitute the proximate ends of activity.⁶⁷ After proposing the above ways in which the ends of human living pre-exist in us, Aquinas turns to the way we arrive at those activities through which the end is attained: under the direction of prudence, there occurs the deliberation by which we discover what is to be done, as well as the choice we are to make.⁶⁸

Thus far, Aquinas’s presentation of the doctrine of prudence in the *De veritate* has had three parts: (1) a statement of the two items central to activity, namely, the end and whatever is oriented to the end; (2) the two ways in which the end of human activity pre-exists in the agent; and (3) the assertion that by deliberation and choice prudence directs activities toward the end. The fourth and final point Aquinas now makes is an overview of the reasoning process constituting prudential activity as well as a statement of the prerequisites of that activity.

Since prudence has the task of properly ordering human action to its end, Aquinas explains, prudence carries through a reasoning process. The starting points or principles of this process are the ends which are given to prudence by an intellectus of the ends and by the inclination of moral virtues to their ends. Because of the need prudence has for its principles, the prudent person must be virtuous, as is asserted in *Ethics*.VI. Finally, because a higher power contains in some way everything found in subordinate powers, the directing power of prudence in some way includes both the cognition of the end and the willing of the end.⁶⁹

66. Cf. Ch. 4, pp. 191-92.

67. *De verit.*5.1: “Sed finis agibilium praeexistit in nobis dupliciter: scilicet per cognitionem naturalem de fine hominis; quae quidem naturalis cognitio ad intellectum pertinet, secundum Philosophum in VI *Ethic.*, qui est principium operabilium sicut et speculabilium; principia autem operabilium sunt fines, ut in eodem lib. dicitur. Alio modo quantum ad affectionem; et sic fines agibilium sunt in nobis per virtutes morales, per quas homo afficitur ad iuste vivendum vel fortiter vel temperate, quod est quasi finis proximus agibilium.”

68, *Ibid.*: “Similiter etiam ad ea quae sunt ad finem perficimur, et quantum ad cognitionem per consilium, et quantum ad appetitum per electionem; et in his per prudentiam dirigimur.”

69. *Ibid.*: “Patet ergo quod prudentia est aliqua ordinate ad finem disponere. Et quia ista dispositio eorum quae sunt ad finem, in finem per prudentiam, est per modum

Only in the final point made, does Aquinas fall somewhat short of the more precise conception of prudence he will express later. Since prudence uses the end as a principle in deliberating about things leading to the end, Aquinas can say quite meaningfully that the cognition of the end is “in some way included in prudence.” However, in asserting that “the will (*voluntas*), which is of the end, is somehow included in prudence,” Aquinas’s terminology is not as satisfying as it will be later when, in the *SLE*, he will explain that, for prudence to order effectively a choice, prudence is necessarily accompanied by the correct orientation of the human appetite.⁷⁰ Yet apart from its final proposal concerning prudence, the *De veritate* presents the role of prudence in a more mature form than did the *Sentence-Commentary* where it was not always clear in what sense prudence predetermines the end of virtue.

Given the clarity and relative simplicity of the presentation of the *De veritate*, it is surprising to find Aquinas, some 13 years later in the *Prima secundae*, asserting that “...prudence not only directs moral virtues in choosing those things leading toward the end, but also [directs the virtues] in predetermining (*praestituendo*) the end.” Of course, Aquinas continues by explaining that the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean proper to its matter, a mean determined by prudence.⁷¹ When one comes to this text of the *Summa* fresh from a reading of the *Sentence-Commentary*, one easily recognizes here in the *Prima secundae* the second and less proper sense of predetermining the end that was attributed to prudence in the earlier work, namely the prescription of a particular act as courageous or as temperate, etc. Nonetheless, not all readers of the *Summa* would necessarily understand the senses in which “predetermining the end” can be used. A confirmation of the confusion that may arise for the reader of the *Prima*

cuiusdam ratiocinationis, cuius principia sunt fines...; ideo ad hoc quod quis sit prudens, requiritur quod bene se habeat circa ipsos fines. Non enim potest esse recta ratio, nisi principia rationis salventur. Et ideo ad prudentiam requiruntur et intellectus finium, et virtutes morales, quibus affectus recte collocatur in fine; et propter hoc oportet omnem prudentem esse virtuosum, ut in VI *Ethic.* dicitur.

“In omnibus autem virtutibus et actibus animae ordinatis hoc est commune, quod virtus primi salvatur in omnibus sequentibus; et ideo in prudentia quodammodo includitur et voluntas, quae est de fine, et cognitio finis.”

70. *SLE*.VI.4.185-89.S1174.

71. *Ia-IIae*.66.3.ad 3: “...prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem. Est autem finis uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis attingere medium in propria materia: quod quidem medium determinatur secundum rectam rationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in II et VI *Ethic.*”

secundae is the fact that the author of an English translation of that work's questions on virtue felt the need to offer his readers an explanation of what Aquinas does and does not mean in attributing to prudence the function of predetermining the end.⁷²

As if he regretted this lapse of the *Prima secundae*, this return to the language of his youth, in the *Secunda secundae* Aquinas devotes an article to the question, "Whether prudence predetermines (*praestituit*) the end for moral virtues."⁷³ Now he answers with a clear "no." Adding to the interest of this apparent about face are the contrary uses of the same Aristotelian passage in these two parts of the *Summa*. The *Prima secundae*, in response to an objection, asserts that prudence functions by predetermining (*praestituendo*) the end of virtue. The objection had rested its case for the superiority of the moral virtues over prudence on these words from *Ethics*.VI: "Moral virtue makes correct the intention of the end; prudence, however, makes for the correct choice of those things leading to the end."⁷⁴ Aquinas's response to the objection is effectively this: because prudence predetermines the end in determining the mean for the virtue, prudence has an activity superior to that proper to the moral virtues.⁷⁵ Yet in the *Secunda secundae*, Aquinas offers in the *Sed contra* the same passage of Aristotle as the authority permitting the conclusion that prudence does not predetermine (*praestituere*) the end, but instead only directs activity toward the end.⁷⁶

An additional opposition between the articles from these two halves of the

72. Cf., St. Thomas Aquinas: *Treatise on the Virtues*, trans. John A. Oesterle, (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1984) p. 154, note 27: "Prudence does not prescribe the end of the moral virtues substantially and in general, for this is accomplished by what is called *synderesis*, the virtue by which we grasp the primary practical principles... Prudence directs the moral virtues in prescribing the end in regard to the manner of attaining the end and taking into account the particular circumstances by which the end is rightly achieved. For example, reason naturally dictates the end that one should live temperately, but it depends on prudence to find out how this is to be attained concretely in regard to the person concerned, the place, and the time."

73. *Ila-IIae*.47.6.

74. *Ia-IIae*.66.3.ob.3.

75. *Ibid.* ad 3. Cf. note 71 above.

76. *Ila-IIae*.47.6: "Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in VI *Ethic.*, quod virtus moralis intentionem finis facit rectam, prudentia autem quae ad hanc. Ergo ad prudentiam non pertinet praestituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed solum disponere de his quae sunt ad finem."

moral part of the *Summa* concerns the diverse ways in which Aquinas proposes that prudence is more noble than the moral virtues. In the *Prima secundae*, as noted, that superiority rests on the notion that "prudence not only directs moral virtues in choosing those things that lead to the end, but also by predetermining the end."⁷⁷ To the contrary, the objector in the *Secunda secundae* asserts that since prudence directs the activity of the moral virtues, it must also predetermine (*praestituit*) the end. In response, Aquinas notes the end is predetermined (*praestitutum*) by natural reason, while prudence aids the virtues to incline toward the end by directing them in activities that lead to the end. "Whence it remains that prudence is more noble than the moral virtues and [that it] moves them." Yet, "synderesis moves prudence, just as the intellectus of principles moves science."⁷⁸

As for the *corpus* of the article in the *Secunda secundae*, it reads as if it were a later, clearer, and more mature summary of the doctrine found in the initial article noted from the *Sentence-Commentary* where Aquinas discussed the functions of prudence and reason in regard to the moral virtues. Aquinas proposes now in the *Secunda secundae* that the end of moral virtues, that is, the human good, is existence according to reason. Such an existence requires that the ends of the virtues pre-exist in reason. Just as the intellectus of speculative principles permits scientific conclusions, so the ends of rational existence are naturally known and lead to conclusions concerning practical activity directed toward those ends. The role of prudence is to apply those ends, which function as principles, to particular conclusions regarding particular activity. "Thus, prudence does not have the role of predetermining (*praestituere*) the end to moral virtue, but only the function of directing the activity of virtue leading toward the end."⁷⁹

77. Cf. note 71 above.

78. *Ila-IIae*.47.6.ob.3: "...proprium est virtutis vel artis seu potentiae ad quam pertinet finis ut praecipiat aliis virtutibus seu artibus ad quae pertinent ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed prudentia disponit de aliis virtutibus moralibus et praecipit eis. Ergo praestituit eis finem." Ad 3: "...dicendum quod finis non pertinet ad virtutes morales tanquam ipsae praestituant finem: sed quia tendunt in finem a ratione naturali praestitutum. Ad quod iuvantur per prudentiam, quae eis viam parat, disponendo ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde relinquitur quod prudentia sit nobilior virtutibus moralibus, et moveat eas. Sed synderesis movet prudentiam, sicut intellectus principiorum scientiam."

79. The text of *Sent.* III, d. 33, q. 2, a. 3co., cited above in notes 62-63 on pp. 55-56 is profitably compared with the following. *Ila-IIae*.47.6c: "Respondeo dicendum quod finis virtutum moralium est bonum humanum. Bonum autem humanae animae est secundum rationem esse; ut patet per Dionysium, 4 cap. *De div. nom.* Unde necesse est quod fines moralium virtutum praexistant in ratione. Sicut autem in ratione speculativa

The path followed from *Super Ethica*.VI.18 to *Secunda secundae*.47.6 has been long. In the *Sentence-Commentary*, written shortly after the end of Aquinas's days as a student of Albert, Aquinas distinguished reason's action of predetermining the end of virtue from the predetermination of the end effected by prudence. By the former activity, reason directs the actions leading to the acquisition of moral virtue; in distinction, prudence determines the end by determining actions directed toward the end. In the choice to use "predetermine the end," the influence of Albert is visible. However, subsequently in the same work, Aquinas spoke yet more like Albert by referring to prudence as "cause" and "generator" of moral virtue. Later, in the *De veritate*, when discussing the activity of prudence, Aquinas used a more original voice. Nothing is now said of prudence as cause of virtue; nor is "reason, perfected for this purpose, by prudence," asserted to predetermine the end. Instead, the end of human activity exists initially in natural intellectual cognition, and only subsequently in the agent's affections through the inclinations of acquired moral virtue. But then the *Prima secundae* returned to Albert's way of speaking insofar as the superiority of prudence was proposed as lying in its action of predetermining the end of moral virtue. Yet, very shortly thereafter, in the *Secunda secundae*, this use of "predetermine" is set aside for good. Reverting to the manner of speaking of the *De veritate*, Aquinas asserted that practical reason contains naturally the ends of moral virtue, while prudence has only the task of directing activity toward that end. If we now read *SLE*.VI.11 against this background of a gradual movement away from the language and doctrine of *Super Ethica*.VI.18, then Aquinas's comment appears as a final stage in his interpretation of Aristotle's notion that moral virtue is not only "according to correct reason," but also "with correct reason."

Earlier in the *SLE* than Chapter 11 of Book VI where he comments on the text at the basis of *Super Ethica*.VI.18, Aquinas had already differed with

sunt quaedam ut naturaliter nota, quorum est intellectus; et quaedam quae per illa innotescunt, scilicet conclusiones, quarum est scientia: ita in ratione practica praexistunt quaedam ut principia naturaliter nota, et huiusmodi sunt fines virtutum moralium, quia finis se habet in operabilibus sicut principium in speculativis,...; et quaedam sunt in ratione practica ut conclusiones, et huiusmodi sunt ea quae sunt ad finem, in quae pervenimus ex ipsis finibus. Et horum est prudentia, applicans universalia principia ad particulares conclusiones operabilium. Et ideo ad prudentiam non pertinet praestituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed solum disponere de his quae sunt ad finem."

Albert's interpretation of the doctrine that prudence "is not with reason alone."⁸⁰ Albert had interpreted this text as indicating that prudence is in reason together with the innate principles of the natural law.⁸¹ In contrast Aquinas reads Aristotle as proposing that prudence cannot be in reason unless the appetite, rational as well as sensitive, is correctly oriented to the agent's ultimate end. Because of this orientation of the appetite, "reason is continuously at work in regard to activity where prudence is relevant." As a consequence, prudence can never be forgotten.⁸²

This text makes apparent that Aquinas has added to the discussion of prudence an element absent from the *Super Ethica*. Whereas for the latter, prudence is presented solely in terms of cognition, Aquinas has interjected an appetitive aspect. For Albert, prudence is developed from the principles of natural law when through an "application to work," reason becomes habitually correct, i.e., prudential, in regard to a certain area of activity. Yet, despite this "application to work," prudence remains solely something rational. Aquinas, however, has a more holistic view. Writing of prudence as if he conceives of a prudent agent rather than of a habitus in a potency, Aquinas very clearly distinguishes his notion of prudence from Albert's:

prudence is not in reason alone, but it has something in the appetite; therefore, all those [species] which were mentioned [i.e., correct reasoning about a single agent, about the domestic unit, or about political society] are species of prudence insofar as they consist, not in reason alone, but have something in the appetite; insofar as they are in reason alone, they are said to be certain practical sciences, namely, ethics, *yconomica*, and politics.⁸³

80. *NE*.VI.5.1140b28: "Sed tamen neque habitus cum ratione solum." Cf. *SLE*, p. 345.

81. Cf. above, p. 53.

82. *SLE*.VI.4.185-96.S1174: "Et tamen, quamvis prudentia sit in hac parte rationis [i.e., in parte opinativa, seu in vi cogitativa] sicut in subiecto, ratione cuius dicitur virtus intellectualis, non tamen est cum sola ratione, sicut ars vel scientia, sed requirit rectitudinem appetitus. Et huius signum est quia habitus qui est in sola ratione potest oblivioni tradi, sicut ars et scientia, nisi sit habitus naturalis, sicut intellectus; prudentia non traditur oblivioni per dissuetudinem, aboletur cessante appetitu recto qui, quandiu manet, facit rationem continue exerceri circa ea quae sunt prudentiae, ita quod oblivio subrepre non potest."

83. *SLE*.VI.7.88-95.S1200: "...prudentia non est in ratione solum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu; omnia ergo de quibus hic fit mentio [scilicet, recta ratio agibilium circa unum

It is as if Aquinas asserts that Albert has mistaken the three above-mentioned practical sciences for prudence. Prudence is not solely a cognitive habitus, but "it has something in the appetite." This mode of speaking does not conform well to the Aristotelian notion of a habitus in a potency; from that perspective, prudence can only be in one potency, and that is particular reason. But as noted earlier, Aquinas takes here a more holistic view and envisions a prudent agent in whom cognition and desire are integrated. Yet in this, Aquinas can be seen as true to the *intentio Aristotelis* for, as he notes, Aristotle "says that it is necessary to take the definition of prudence by considering those persons who are said to be prudent."⁸⁴

In *SLE.VI.11*, Aquinas divides Aristotle's text in a way identical to that proposed by Albert in the parallel *Super Ethica.VI.18*. An additional, though very slight, indication that Aquinas attended closely to Albert's exposition at this point is the presence in this Chapter 11 of two references to the "Socratics" (*Socratici*) at points paralleling similar references in the *Super Ethica.VI.18*.⁸⁵ As noted, it is in this *lectio* that Albert offered his lengthy discussion of the four bases because of which the moral virtues stand in need of prudence. The first of these concerned the constitution by "reason, which is perfected for this purpose by prudence," of the moral virtues as habitus existing in the mean.⁸⁶ As we interpreted this notion above, Albert intends that imperfect prudence is gradually developed in regard to a particular moral virtue, justice say; only when all the moral virtues have been acquired does the one perfect habitus of prudence exist.⁸⁷ In contrast, when Aquinas in *SLE.VI.11* comments on Aristotle's notion that virtue is both according to and with correct reason, he asserts only that neither moral virtue nor prudence can exist without the other.⁸⁸ Yet a few lines earlier in

hominem, vel circa multitudinem civilem, vel circa familiam] sunt species prudentiae in quantum non in ratione sola consistunt, sed habent aliquid in appetitu; in quantum enim sunt in sola ratione, dicuntur quaedam scientiae practicae, scilicet ethica, yconomica et politica."

84. *Ibid.VI.4.12-14.S1161*. Aquinas comments here on *NE.VI.5.1140a24-25*: "De prudentia autem sic utique assumamus speculantes quos utique dicimus prudentes." Cf. *SLE*, p. 344.

85. Compare (1) *Super Ethica.VI.18.p512,9-10* with *SLE.VI.11.78-80.S1281*, and (2) *Super Ethica.VI.18.p512,62* with *SLE.VI.11.141-42.S1286*.

86. *Super Ethica.VI.18.p509,28-49*. See note 47 on page 50 above.

87. Cf. above, p. 54.

88. *SLE.VI.11.120-24.S1285*. Cf. note 45 on p. 49 above.

the same Chapter, Aquinas introduced a doctrine that reveals his complete separation from the position of Albert.

There are, Aquinas asserts, parallel proportions existing between, on the one hand, natural virtue and moral virtue, and, on the other, natural ingenuity (*dinotica*) and prudence.⁸⁹ This reference to the relation of natural ingenuity and prudence is to a doctrine presented in the preceding Chapter. There, natural ingenuity was proposed as an "operative principle," the potency that grasps "ways leading to [the agent's] end." This principle is, we are told, a necessary one in regard to the acquisition of moral virtue.⁹⁰ The difference between this principle of natural ingenuity and prudence is this: to the agent possessing ingenuity, the moral virtues are added, and then, the agent is prudent.⁹¹ The gulf between Aquinas's conception of prudence and that of Albert is becoming clear. In place of Albert's "seed" of prudence or the innate principles, which gradually develop into a habitus of a particular kind of imperfect prudence - for instance, prudence respecting justice - Aquinas posits natural ingenuity, which guided by the first practical principles, and presupposing the correct orientation of the rational appetite, enables an agent to acquire the one habitus of prudence in tandem with the acquisition of all the moral virtues.

It was against this background of Chapter 10, that in *SLE.VI.11* Aquinas proposes a parallel between natural ingenuity and prudence on the one hand, and, on the other, natural virtue and moral virtue. About natural virtue, Aquinas asserts in effect that experience shows us that individual agents are by birth

89. *Ibid.15-22.S1275*: "...ita enim se habet circa virtutem moralem sicut dictum est de prudentia et dinotica, quod scilicet sicut ista duo non sunt idem penitus, sed tamen habent aliquam similitudinem ad invicem in quantum utraque advenit convenientes vias ad finem propositum, ita etiam videtur se habere circa virtutem naturalem et principalem, id est moralem, quae est perfecta virtus."

90. *Ibid.10.200-07.S1271*: "...virtus moralis facit electionem rectam, quantum scilicet ad intentionem finis, sed ea quae nata sunt fieri propter finem non pertinent ad virtutem moralem, sed ad quandam aliam potentiam, id est ad quoddam aliud operativum principium, quod ingeniatur vias ducentes ad finem; et sic huiusmodi principium est necessarium ad hoc quod homo sit virtuosus." See also, *Ibid.208-23.S1272*.

91. *Ibid.224-31.S1273*: "...ostendit quid prudentia addat supra praedictum principium. Et dicit quod prudentia non est omnino idem quod praedicta potentia, scilicet dinotica, sed tamen non potest esse sine ea. Sed in anima huic visui, id est huic cognoscitivo principio, scilicet dinoticae, habitus prudentiae non fit sine virtute morali..."

oriented to this or that way of acting, and oriented in a greater or lesser degree.⁹² However, this natural virtue is more complex than the expression itself signifies, for it comprises three elements: (1) the first principles of practical affairs naturally implanted in reason; (2) natural motion of the will to good apprehended intellectually; and (3) a natural composition of the sensitive appetite. Only the last-mentioned varies from person to person.⁹³ With this doctrine, Aquinas has made clear that reason in the form of ingenuity (*dinotica*), aided by cognition of first practical principles, is equipped to guide the development of virtue. In this sense, natural virtue is related to moral virtue just as *dinotica* is to prudence.⁹⁴

A few lines later in the same Chapter 11, Aquinas once again differs with Albert. The context continues to be Aristotle's doctrine of the need for the simultaneous possession of moral virtue and prudence. Both Albert and Aquinas remark on the oneness of prudence when all virtues are possessed together with prudence. However, Albert asserts that prudence is one "as long as it is had

92. *Ibid.* 11.22-29.S1276: "Et quod sit aliqua virtus naturalis quae praesupponitur morali, patet per hoc quod singuli mores virtutum vel vitiorum videntur aliquantulum existere aliquibus hominibus naturaliter; statim enim quidem homines a sua nativitate videntur esse iusti vel temperati vel fortes propter naturalem dispositionem qua inclinantur ad opera virtutum."

93. *Ibid.* 11.29-42.S1276-77: "Quae quidem naturalis dispositio quantum ad tria potest attendi: primo quidem ex parte rationis, cui naturaliter indita sunt prima principia operabilium humanorum, puta nulli esse nocendum et similia; secundo ex parte voluntatis, quae de se naturaliter movetur a bono intellecto sicut a proprio obiecto; tertio ex parte appetitus sensitivi, secundum quod ex naturali complexione quidam sunt dispositi ad iram, quidam ad concupiscentias...; sed prima duo communia sunt omnibus hominibus, sed hoc tertium est quod differentiam facit in hominibus..."

94. *Ibid.* 55-72.S1279-80: "...si enim aliquis habeat fortem inclinationem ad opus alicuius virtutis moralis et non adhibeat discretionem, accidet gravis laesio vel corporis proprii, sicut in eo qui inclinatur ad abstinentiam sine discretionem, vel rerum exteriorum, si inclinatur ad liberalitatem, et simile est in aliis virtutibus. Sed, si huiusmodi inclinatio coaccipiat in operando intellectum, ut scilicet cum discretionem operetur, tunc multum differet secundum excellentiam bonitatis, et habitus qui erit similis tali operationi cum discretionem factae, erit proprie et perfecte virtus, quae est moralis. Sicut igitur in parte animae opinativa sunt duae species principiorum operatorum, scilicet *dinotica* et prudentia, ita etiam in parte appetitiva quae pertinet ad mores, sunt duae species, scilicet virtus naturalis et moralis, quae est principalis, et haec non potest fieri sine prudentia, sicut ostensum est."

perfectly."⁹⁵ Implied is the possibility, already mentioned, that prudence can exist in an imperfect form. Such a distinction as that between perfect prudence, existing together with all virtue, and imperfect prudence, which accompanies an individual virtue, is one completely foreign to Aquinas. Immediately subsequent to his assertion that "one virtue" of prudence is had when all virtues are had, Aquinas explains that Aristotle "significantly" referred to "one existing" virtue of prudence, because there are not different habitus of prudence concerning different moral virtues. Instead, prudence has only one set of principles applicable to all moral matter. Consequently, either the one virtue of prudence is had together with all moral virtues, or no moral virtues and no prudence is present.⁹⁶ Aquinas has now completed the development of his doctrine of moral virtue as both "according to" and "with" prudence. It is a doctrine he offers in preference to that he had learned from Albert.⁹⁷

FRIENDSHIP AS "VIRTUE OR WITH VIRTUE"

Aristotle opens Book VIII of the *Ethics* with the assertion that friendship is to be studied and then announces that friendship is "a certain virtue or with virtue."⁹⁸ Albert's direct comment on Aristotle's words offers no explanation

95. *Super Ethica*. VI.18.p512,74-76: "Et hoc probat per hoc quod omnes simul habentur cum prudentia, quae est una, dummodo perfecte habeatur." *SLE*. VI.11.151-54.S1287: "...quando prudentia quae est una virtus inerat, omnes simul inerunt cum ea, quorum nulla erit, prudentia non existente."

96. *Ibid.* 11.154-64.S1288: "Signanter autem dicit uni existenti, quia si essent diversae prudentiae circa materias diversarum virtutum moralium, sicut sunt diversa artificiorum genera, nihil prohiberet unam virtutem moralem esse sine alia, unaquaque earum habente prudentiam sibi correspondentem; sed hoc non potest esse, quia eadem sunt principia prudentiae ad totam materiam moralem, ut scilicet omnia redigantur ad regulam rationis; et ideo propter prudentiae unitatem omnes virtutes morales sunt sibi conexas." In *Ibid.* 164-70.S1288, Aquinas admits that a particular virtue may be absent because of a defect of some kind; e.g., a poor person cannot have the virtue of magnificence. Yet even in such cases, the person's prudence is ready for action proper to the virtue of magnificence, were the defect in wealth remedied.

97. Additional aspects of the difference between Aquinas and Albert are examined in Ch. 5, "Aspects of prudence," pp. 199-206.

98. *NE*. VIII.1.1155a3-4: "Est enim virtus quaedam vel cum virtute." Cf. *Super Ethica*, p593,70; *SLE*, p441.

concerning what appears to be a disjunction, "either virtue or with virtue." Instead, he reads the expression as an argument for the necessity of examining friendship in ethics: "Whatever is a virtue or not without virtue is necessary for an ethical treatise; but friendship is of this type; therefore, etc."⁹⁹ However, in a preparatory question he had proposed that friendship is a virtue which results from the presence of all the other virtues. Continuing, he had explained that, like continence, friendship is a secondary or "annexed" intellectual virtue. However, unlike continence, which brings inferior potencies into accord with reason, friendship perfects reason in its tendency toward another person.¹⁰⁰ Obviously then, Albert understands Aristotle's statement that friendship "is a certain virtue or with virtue" as proposing that friendship is a virtue accruing to the agent as a result of the possession of all the moral virtues. That is, the "or" should be read as "in other words": friendship "is a certain virtue, in other words, with virtue."

In this same preparatory question, Albert notes the proposal that friendship is actually the virtue of justice. As evidence for the claim, the essence of justice as equality is remarked, to which is added the claim that friendship brings about the greatest equality by binding one person to another.¹⁰¹ Responding to this argument, Albert insists that friendship cannot be identified with justice; it is not justice in the proper sense, nor even in a metaphorical sense. In justice, the equality between persons is a matter of what each owes the other. While equality is found in friendship as its matter, it is considered entirely from

99. *Super Ethica*. VIII.1.p593,57-60.

100. In *Ibid*.p592,49-64, Albert explains that "friendship," as a moral virtue concerning life in society, can be first, a virtue standing in the mean between the habitus typical of a flatterer and that of an argumentative person, and second, the virtue Cicero called benevolence. Then in lines 64-75, he writes: "Secundum autem quod consequitur omnem virtutem, est effectus omnis virtutis, et haec est vera amicitia, quae facit tendere in alterum propter honestum, quod est in illo; et sic est de habitibus intellectualibus adiunctis sicut et continentia. Virtus enim intellectualis aut perficit rationem in se, et sic sunt illae de quibus determinatum est in Sexto, aut secundum quod per bonum rationis tendit in inferiorem potentiam, et sic est continentia, de qua determinatum est in Septimo, aut secundum quod tendit in proximum, et sic est amicitia, de qua hic agitur." Cf. also *Ibid*.5.p612,57-60: "...in essentia amicitiae non est nisi habitus, et ipsa essentia sua est tantum in ratione, ordinata tamen ad inferiores vires, sed adiungitur sibi passio amationis, quae est in concupiscibili."

101. *Ibid*.1.p592,46-48: "Praeterea, ratio iustitiae consistit in aequalitate; sed aequalissimum efficit amicitia, quae nectit unum alteri; ergo maxime [amicitia] videtur esse iustitia."

another perspective.¹⁰²

Aquinas's interest in this opening *lectio* of Albert's *Super Ethica*. VIII is evidenced by the borrowings from it that are visible in the initial chapter of *SLE*. VIII.¹⁰³ However, in opening this chapter, Aquinas appears on two counts to distinguish his own view of Aristotle from Albert's. First, Aquinas distinguishes friendship from virtues, both moral and intellectual, and proposes that friendship "is founded on virtue as a certain effect of virtue."¹⁰⁴ The other difference between Aquinas's thought and the earlier *Super Ethica* appears very shortly after the above as Aquinas proposes the first reason why friendship is studied in moral philosophy. Since this philosophy considers the virtues, he asserts, it must study friendship, which "is a certain virtue, namely, insofar as it is a habitus productive of choice, as will be said below." However, the habitus with which friendship is identified "is reduced to the genus of justice insofar as it shows a proportion, as will be said below." After having thus qualified

102. *Ibid*.p592,78-82: "Sed amicitia non potest dici iustitia proprie neque metaphorice, quia non accipit aequale secundum rationem debiti, unde est ratio iustitiae, sed tantum materialiter sub alia ratione."

103. Compare these comments on *NE*. VIII.1.1155a20: "unde et philanthropos laudamus." (For Aristotle's text, cf. *Super Ethica*, p593,78; *SLE*, p441, which has "philanthropos.") *Super Ethica*. VIII.1.p594,61-64: "Et dicit, quod inde est, quod philanthropos, id est amatores hominum, laudamus quasi perficientes illud ad quod etiam natura communis inclinatur." *SLE*. VIII.1.72-75.S1541: "...et ideo laudamus philanthropos, id est amatores hominum, quasi implentes id quod est homini naturale, ut manifeste apparet in erroribus viarum." - Another pair of comments concern *NE*. VIII.1.1155a29-31. Aquinas's version of Aristotle reads (*SLE*, p441): "Philophilos enim laudamus philophiliae videtur bonorum aliquid esse, et quidam eosdem existimant viros bonos esse et amicos." Albert's version of Aristotle (*Super Ethica*, p593,83) has "et poliphilia" in place of "philophiliae." Concerning the comments of Albert and Aquinas given below, Gauthier remarks (Cf. *SLE*, p443, note to lines 109-110) that Aquinas took Albert's correct reading of "poliphilia" or "many loves" and applied it incorrectly to his own version's "philophilia" or "lover of love." *Super Ethica*. VIII.1.p595,3-6: "...sed secundum poliphiliam id est multiplicatam amicitiam, laudantur homines ut philophili, id est amatores amicitiae; ergo poliphilia est bonum et honestum." *SLE*. VIII.1.108-11.S1544: "Laudamus enim philophilos, id est amatores amicorum, et philophilia, id est amicitia multorum, videtur esse aliquid boni, in tantum quod quidam existimant eosdem esse viros bonos et amicos."

104. *SLE*. VIII.1.1-6.S1538: "Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus et continentia, quae est quiddam imperfectum in genere virtutis, hic consequenter determinat de amicitia, quae supra virtutem fundatur sicut quidam virtutis effectus."

friendship's status as a virtue, he then concludes this discussion of the reason for studying friendship by repeating the doctrine with which he began the chapter: "or at least it is with virtue, namely, insofar as virtue is the cause of true friendship."¹⁰⁵

Here then is the contrast. For Albert, friendship is an adjunct intellectual virtue resulting from the presence of all the other moral virtues. For Aquinas, friendship appears as the effect of virtue; when he refers to friendship as itself a virtue, it is only to assert the existence of a habitus productive of choice. As well, there is the second contrast insofar as Aquinas would place the habitus of friendship within the genus of justice, while Albert asserts friendship is not even metaphorically justice.

When Aquinas asserted that in a latter passage there is to be found the treatment of friendship as "a certain virtue, namely, insofar as it is a habitus productive of choice," he was referring to *SLE.VIII.5*. There, one notes an important difference between the interpretation espoused by Aquinas and that given by Albert in the corresponding *lectio 5* of *Super Ethica.VIII*. In the latter, Aristotle is presented as beginning the discussion of the subjects of friendship.¹⁰⁶ The passage referred to is *NE.VIII.4.1157b1-5.1157b28*. According to Albert, from the end of this passage, and continuing until 1158a1, Aristotle distinguishes between friendship and a passion of love (*amatio*).¹⁰⁷ Immediately after he has paraphrased Aristotle's thought on that distinction, Albert asks his reader "to note" that in the section just explained Aristotle "intimates" first, that friendship is a habitus because a choice comes from a habitus and it is only by choice that one loves another for the other's sake. But second, the reader is "to note" that the choice is accompanied by a concupiscible passion, since in friendship each lover loves the beloved not only for the latter's sake, but also for the good the lover receives from the beloved.¹⁰⁸ As revealed by the above "note," for Albert the significant doctrine here is that of friendship as a habitus of virtue.

When Aquinas examined the text interpreted by Albert in the way

105. *Ibid.*19-26.S1538: "Et prima ratio quare de amicitia sit tractandum est quia consideratio virtutis pertinet ad moralem philosophum; amicitia autem est quaedam virtus, in quantum scilicet est habitus electivus, ut infra dicetur, et reducitur ad genus iustitiae, in quantum exhibet proportionale, ut infra dicetur, vel saltem est cum virtute, in quantum scilicet virtus est causa verae amicitiae."

106. *Super Ethica.VIII.5*.p612,61-62.

107. *Ibid.*p613,56-70.

108. *Ibid.*p613,70-76. For this text, see note 112 below.

described above, he found something different. The first five lines of the Aristotelian passage are integrated by Aquinas with the discussion of the previous chapter.¹⁰⁹ As for the remainder of the Aristotelian text spoken of by Albert (*NE.VIII.5.1157b5-1158a1*), Aquinas announces it as offering a distinction between friendship as habitus and friendship as act.¹¹⁰ Although he subdivides Aristotle's text differently than had Albert, Aquinas is in substantial agreement with the latter respecting what Aristotle says here about friendship as habitus. That is, the love that friends show each other is chosen in a choice deriving from the possession of a habitus by each friend.¹¹¹ However, as he concludes his treatment of Aristotle's words, Aquinas adds a note at a point in his commentary exactly paralleling the point chosen by Albert to call his reader's attention to the doctrine "intimated" by Aristotle. Whereas Albert had advised his reader that Aristotle understood friendship as a habitus, Aquinas takes pains to indicate the apparently opposed doctrine: "Above, the Philosopher did not absolutely state that [friendship] was a virtue, but he added, 'or with virtue,' because [friendship] seems to add something beyond the meaning of virtue."¹¹²

Thus, Aquinas has separated himself from Albert's view of friendship. For the latter, friendship is a secondary or annexed intellectual virtue perfecting reason in its tendency toward another person and, as such, results from the possession of other virtues. To the contrary, Aquinas holds that in Aristotle's eyes, friendship is not a virtue, but the effect of virtue, i.e., "with virtue," for the act of friendship includes a mutual return of love, while a virtuous act is only the act of one person. Nonetheless, Aquinas agrees with Albert that each person in a relation of friendship must possess a habitus from which comes the choice of

109. *NE.VIII.4.1157a30-b5* are seen by Aquinas as part of the earlier discussion of the three species of friendship. Cf. *SLE.VIII.4.111-39.S1594-95*.

110. *Ibid.*5.1-5.S1596.

111. *Ibid.*98-113.S1602-03.

112. Here are the two concluding notes. *Super Ethica.VIII.5*.p613,70-76: "Et nota, quod Philosophus innuit in littera amicitiam esse habitum, in quantum unus amat alium gratia sui ipsius, hoc enim est ex electione, et quod non est sine passione concupiscentiae, in quantum amans amatum non solum amat ipsum ut bonum simpliciter, sed ut bonum sibi ipsi." *SLE.VIII.5.137-44.S1605*: "Et hoc [i.e., aequalitas in quantum amicitia requirit mutuam amationem] videtur addere super modum virtutis; nam in qualibet virtute sufficit actus virtuosus, sed in amicitia non sufficit actus unius, sed oportet quod concurrant actus duorum mutuo se amantium; et ideo Philosophus supra non dixit absolute quod esse virtus, sed addidit: 'vel cum virtute,' quia videtur aliquid addere supra rationem virtutis."

good for the friend's sake. However, although this is never explicitly stated by Aquinas, the habitus required in each friend must be a habitus in the will rather than in reason, as Albert proposed. After all, for Aquinas, the act specifying this habitus is the choice to return the love received from one's friend.

The above discussion of the differing interpretations of Albert and Aquinas does not specify everything by which the two commentators differ in regard to friendship. As noted at the beginning of this section, Albert and Aquinas differ concerning the appropriateness of identifying friendship as justice. Albert says quite categorically that friendship is not justice, even when one speaks metaphorically.¹¹³ But Aquinas asserts with equal clarity that the habitus associated with friendship "is reduced to the genus of justice, insofar as it [i.e., friendship] shows proportion, as will be said below."¹¹⁴

Albert returns to the question of whether friendship can be identified with justice when, at a later point, he raises a question regarding Aristotle's statement that justice and friendship show the same matter. In solving this question, Albert remarks that the authors of Books VIII and IX of the *Greek Commentaries* translated by Grosseteste held friendship was a species of justice because Aristotle had asserted friendship and justice have the same matter.¹¹⁵ In the remainder of his solution, Albert uses this opinion as a vehicle to clarify the limitations of the identity of friendship and justice.

Justice and friendship do share the same matter, Albert concedes. Both concern *communicatio* - "association" or "sharing" or even "communication." Notwithstanding, association or sharing receives a different formal perfection from justice than it does from friendship. Justice concerns the things shared from the perspective of what the agent acting owes another person or persons. When acting from friendship, the "bond of affection" between the agent and his friend is the perspective from which something is shared. While we might say both friendship and justice have as their end a sharing or an association with another person, their ends are not identical. The just agent seeks an association or sharing in terms of what is owed another; he seeks an equality of proportion between what is his own and what is owed the other. The friend, on the other hand, intends an association or sharing on the basis of his affection for the good of the other person; his goal is to preserve both what is common to and what unifies himself and his friend. As a consequence of these differences, only in terms of their matter can friendship be seen as a species of justice. In its form and in its goal,

113. *Super Ethica*. VIII.1.p592,78-82. Cf. note 102 on page 69 above.

114. *SLE*. VIII.1.19-26.S1538. Cf. note 105 on page 70 above.

115. *Super Ethica*. VIII.9.p627,92 - p628,4.

friendship is definitely not justice.¹¹⁶

Although Aquinas does not step outside his comment on Aristotle to raise and resolve questions as does Albert, he yet makes it evident that he holds an opposing view to that of his former teacher. In the opening Chapter of *SLE*. VIII, we are told that "what is most just conserves and repairs friendship."¹¹⁷ In the context, Aquinas refers to a just action between friends and is thus proposing a type of identity between friendship and justice. Is not a habitus conserved and repaired only through acts proper to the habitus itself?¹¹⁸ The Aristotelian text he comments on in *Ethics*. VIII appears to merit this reading, for Aristotle wrote: "Actions proper to friendship appear to fall under 'just things'."¹¹⁹

Albert has a quite different interpretation of Aristotle's words. Aristotle is seen as comparing friendship to justice understood in the proper sense when the Philosopher asserts that acts proper to friendship are to be counted as "just things." Yet, Albert explains, acts proper to friendship are only metaphorically just acts, because the mean of justice is an equality according to arithmetic or geometrical proportion, but the mean of friendship is the greatest equality between

116. *Ibid*.p628,4-28: "Sed quia amicitia et iustitia differunt secundum formam virtutis, ideo aliter dicendum, quod amicitia et iustitia communicant in materia et fine, non tantum remoto, sed propinquo, non tamen proprio. Res enim, prout in communicationem veniunt, possunt dupliciter considerari: aut secundum rationem debiti, prout hoc efficitur meum et illud tuum, et sic sunt propria materia iustitiae. Aut secundum quod uniunt duos in eodem opere vel officio, in quantum uterque operatur circa illud ut circa commune ad commune lucrum, et sic sunt amicitiae materia, quia sic uniunt utrumque in voluntate, quia unus vult lucrum alterius sicut suum, secundum quod adhuc indivisum est huius lucrum a lucro istius. Et sic conveniunt in materia iustitia et amicitia, tamen alio et alio perficitur formaliter materia utriusque, quia forma amicitiae est in vinculo affectus, forma iustitiae in aequalitate proportionis; et sic amicitia non est species iustitiae nisi materialiter. Et similiter etiam differunt et conveniunt in fine, quia utraque est gratia conferentis ad vitam, sed amicitia ordinatur in illud sicut in commune et uniens, iustitia sicut in proprium et debitum."

117. *SLE*. VIII.1.99-101.S1543: "'Et illud quod est maxime iustum videtur esse conservativum et reparativum amicitiae."

118. *Ibid*.II.11.

119. *NE*. VIII.1.1155a28: "Et iustorum quod maxime amicabile esse videtur." Cf. *SLE*, p441; *Super Ethica*, p593,82.

friends.¹²⁰

Aquinas's doctrine that "what is most just conserves and repairs friendship" implies a type of identity between friendship and justice - certainly sufficient identity for Aquinas to have remarked in opening *SLE.VIII.1* that the habitus associated with friendship "is reduced to the genus of justice, insofar as it [i.e., friendship] shows proportion, as will be said below." The reference is apparently to the section of *SLE.VIII.7* where the topic is the manner in which unequal partners in friendship show to one another what is appropriate.¹²¹ Instances of such friendships are those between father and son, husband and wife. Aquinas's interpretation stresses an "equality of proportion" between the affection each friend has for the other as the key to understanding friendships between unequal persons. The affection (*amatio*) between the friends must be in proportion to the "dignity" of each: "the better will be loved more than he will love." As examples of "the better," Aquinas mentions the more useful and the one offering his friend more pleasure than he himself receives from his friend. Yet even though the topic is friendship between unequal persons, Aquinas does not overlook Aristotle's final assertion that the proportion of affection to dignity insures the equality of proportion essential to friendship itself.¹²²

120. *Super Ethica.VIII.1*.p594,85-92: "Secundo ibi: *et iustorum*, ostendit idem per comparationem ad iustitiam proprie dictam. Et dicit, quod *amicabile*, neutri generis, maxime videtur esse de numero iustorum, tamen secundum metaphoram, quia medium iustitiae proprie dictae est in aequalitate secundum geometricam et arithmeticam proportionem, et amicitia reducitur ad maximam aequalitatem..." See note 102 on p. 69 above, where friendship is said not to be justice even metaphorically. That does not seem contrary to the present notion that acts of friendship, "*amicabile*," can be metaphorically just, as the sharing of metaphorically common matter does not signify that habitus respecting such matter are in the same genus in any sense.

121. I follow Gauthier's suggestion regarding this reference. Cf. *SLE*, p442, note to line 25. The Spiazzi edition suggests several other passages, but of these only *SLE.VIII.2.96-97*.S1559 appears probable: "habet [amicitia] quandam commutationem amoris secundum formam commutativae iustitiae."

122. *Ibid.7.84-92*.S1630: "Et dicit quod in omnibus amicitis quae sunt secundum superabundantiam unius personae ad aliam, oportet fieri amationem secundum proportionem, ut scilicet melior plus ametur quam amet, et similis ratio est de utiliori et de delectabiliore vel qualitercumque aliter excellentiori. Cum enim uterque ametur secundum dignitatem, tunc fiet quaedam aequalitas, scilicet proportionis, quae videtur ad amicitiam pertinere." The final statement in this passage on which Aquinas is commenting reads (*NE.VIII.7.1158b27-28*): "Cum enim secundum dignitatem amatio fiat, tunc fit aliquo modo aequalitas, quod utique amicitiae esse videtur." Cf. *SLE*, p463.

Aristotle follows this proposal about establishing an equality of proportion in friendships between unequals by a comparison of justice and friendship.¹²³ As Aquinas explains, the establishment of equality of affection is a prerequisite for friendship and is the basis for each friend's performance of an action proportionate to the other's dignity. But in justice, the opposite must occur. First, each person in the just relationship must note the proportionate worth of what is to be exchanged. This can then be followed by an equal exchange.¹²⁴

These various statements about friendships and justice enable us to grasp somewhat Aquinas's doctrine of the habitus by which a friend is able to love with the love constituting friendship. The habitus is concerned with establishing an equality between two persons in terms of a proportion between the love given by each to the other and the worth or dignity of each as object of love. When two persons exercise such a habitus in regard to one another, friendship is had. Because the habitus has this function of establishing an equality of proportion, it falls under the genus of justice as a type of habitus of justice. Yet it is not the virtue of justice, for the latter habitus seeks to establish an equality of proportion on the basis of what an agent owes another. This notion of Aquinas is assuredly quite different from Albert's conception. Not only does the latter understand Aristotle to consider friendship as a virtue, consequent on the possession of all the other virtues, but in addition Albert posits this virtue in the intellect, refusing to see it as in any sense as a habitus of justice.

In this Chapter, four additional differences between the *SLE* and some of its predecessors have been examined. Weight is thus added to the conclusion of Chapter 1, namely, that the *SLE* was intended to supplant earlier interpretations of the *Ethics*, and that Aquinas's great interest in Aristotle's explanation of human happiness motivated the composition of the *SLE*. But is the moral theory Aquinas proposes in the *SLE* a philosophical one, or has Aquinas transformed Aristotelian moral philosophy into something Christian and theological?

To answer that question, we must examine the so-called Christian and

123. *NE.VIII.7.1158b29-33*. Cf. *SLE*, p462.

124. *SLE.VIII.7.101-07*.S1631: "...circa iustitiam oportet quod primo attendatur vel aestimetur dignitas secundum proportionem et tunc fiet commutatio secundum aequalitatem; sed in amicitia oportet et converso quod primo attendatur aliqua aequalitas inter personas mutuo se amantes et secundo exhibeatur utrique quod est secundum dignitatem."

theological doctrines that Aquinas is said to have introduced into his comment on the *Ethics*. However, that examination presupposes in turn that we come to grips with the question of Aquinas's attitude toward philosophy. Might Jordan be correct in asserting that Aquinas would never "do" philosophy? Does Bradley have truth in his corner in claiming that Aquinas's belief in the beatific vision as the human agent's sole ultimate end rendered impossible the proposal of a moral philosophy centered on a human end attainable in this life? I believe the answer to both questions is clearly "no." To substantiate that belief, I have devoted Chapter 3 to a variety of aspects of philosophy's situation at Paris between 1215 and 1283. As we shall see, Aquinas took an active role in the philosophical debates of the time. Even more, some of the philosophical positions he adopted appear to have shocked Masters of Theology more than they did Masters of Arts.

3

ASPECTS OF PHILOSOPHY IN PARIS: 1215-1283

The *SLE* is today often regarded as a theological work, one said to involve in fundamental ways various Christian doctrines, e.g., divine particular providence or personal immortality. Before examining the presence of such doctrines, as well as their so-called Christian character, it is useful to consider the feasibility of regarding the *SLE* as a philosophical document. To this end, the present chapter studies some aspects of the situation of philosophy in Paris between 1215 and 1283. On the basis of this examination, it is suggested that there are no grounds for supposing on the part of Aquinas some subjective or doctrinal obstacle that would have prevented him from composing a philosophical interpretation of the *Ethics*.

The *Ethics*-commentaries noted in Chapter 1 as belonging to Stage 1, as well as the student guide of the same period, all date from the 40-years extending between two important documents concerning teaching at the Parisian Faculty of Arts. In 1215, the Cardinal-legate, Robert de Courçon, prescribed logic as the principal philosophical content for courses required of students. Although courses on Aristotle's *Ethics* were permitted, they were relegated to feast days, while instruction on the *Metaphysics* and other works of natural philosophy were forbidden.¹ However, in 1255, by unanimous decision, the Masters of the Faculty of Arts, in addition to prescribing the beginning dates, the length, and the content of courses in logic, did the same for the now required instruction relative to Aristotle's *Ethics*, *Metaphysics*, and other works of natural philosophy.²

During this same 40 year period, the growth of interest in philosophy is also attested by several "introductions." Dating from the 1230s, the anonymous *Accessus philosophorum* appears intended to introduce students to the meaning and value of the philosophical studies they were to undertake at the Arts Faculty. Resembling an introductory lecture rather than the proposal of material on which one is examined, the *Accessus* offers four definitions of philosophy, while relating each to one of the four causes: "philosophy is man's integral cognition arising

1. H. Denifle & E. Châtelain (ed): *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (Paris, 1889) T. I, p. 78, n. 20.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 277-79, n. 246.

from himself" (efficient cause); "philosophy is cognition of divine and human things conjoined with the meaning of a proper life" (material cause); "philosophy is the assimilation to the creator's works by means of human power" (formal cause); and "philosophy is cognition of the being of the universe" (final cause).³ The anonymous author's consciousness of the power of reason is again clear from his explanation of the three bases on which philosophy is to be desired: through the acquisition of the speculative sciences and the active virtues, philosophy "informs" or "provides a formation to the human mind (*informatio intellectus humani*)"; by knowledge of things which have been made, "we are incited to the love and fear and reverence of such a creator"; and before philosophy can be pursued, we must have "a contempt for a profusion of transitory goods, a desire of future happiness, [and] an enlightened mind."⁴ - If one were to delete the references to a creator and to things created, one might wonder whether the writer proposing such a view of philosophy had not been a near contemporary of Plato and Aristotle!

Other known introductions from this 40 year period speak in equally glowing terms of philosophy. From near 1245, the anonymous *Philosophica disciplina* offers almost word for word the definitions and reasons for studying philosophy as are found in the *Accessus*.⁵ Additionally, this work offers the following perceptive remark, thus indicating an insight into philosophy available only as the result of a rational investigation into the world: "Philosophy is cognition of man by man," because "when man is known, corporeal and spiritual substance is known in him; consequently, he knows substances in other things which otherwise could not truly be known."⁶

Other introductions are also extant. A *Philosophia* of Nicolas of Paris, dating like the *Accessus* from the 1230s, provides explanations of natural, moral, and rational philosophy. Speaking broadly of natural philosophy, Nicholas divides it into metaphysics, mathematics, and natural philosophy in the strict sense, a division made on the basis of the separation from or connection with

3. *Accessus philosophorum. VII. artium liberalium*, p. 181, 17-23 in Claude Lafleur: *Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle* (Montréal/Paris: Inst. d'Étude médiévales/Vrin, 1988).

4. *Ibid.*, p. 179, 2 - p. 180, 14.

5. *Philosophica disciplina*, p. 257, 1-15 in Lafleur: *Quatre introductions*.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 258, 20-24.

matter in being and/or in definition of the object of each branch of philosophy.⁷ From roughly 1250, Arnulf of Provence's *Divisio scientiarum* offers a similar understanding of natural philosophy.⁸

Also reflecting the instruction offered students in the 1250s is the *Triplex est principium* of Adenulfe of Anagni in which philosophy is divided according to the three principles at the source of things as their causes: nature, custom or habit (*mos*), and reason. From nature arise the subjects of metaphysics, mathematics, and natural philosophy taken in the strict sense. Again we are offered a division of these sciences on the basis of a connection with or abstraction from matter and motion.⁹

Additionally, there is the student guide of Barcelona (c. 1240) which, as well as dealing with what the student should expect in examinations relative to the *Ethics*, speaks of metaphysics, natural philosophy, and the soul. Concerning metaphysics, for instance, the guide proposes it as the study of being in two ways; first, metaphysics's subject is being understood as the first being from which all things come into being and are conserved in being; and second, insofar as being is said of the principle of each thing, namely, of its substance, being is also the subject of metaphysics.¹⁰ A somewhat similar doctrine is found in *Primo queritur utrum philosophia* of an anonymous Master of Arts. The author asks "whether there can be a science of common being (*ens in communi*)." Responding, he proposes that being can be the subject of a science insofar as it stands for the causal principle of all things that are brought into being. Moreover, insofar as "being" is taken as an analogous notion predicated of what is posterior by relating it to what is prior, i.e., predicated of accident by relating it to substance, then

7. *Philosophia*, nn. 7-18 & 23-24 in Claude Lafleur & Joanne Carrier: "L'Introduction à la philosophie de maître Nicolas de Paris," pp. 447-65 in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Autour du "Guide de l'étudiant" du ms. Ripoll 109* (eds. C. Lafleur & J. Carrier) (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997).

8. *Arnulfus Provincialis. Divisio scientiarum*, p. 332, 6 - p. 323, 19 in Lafleur: *Quatre introductions*.

9. Claude Lafleur & Joanne Carrier: "Le prologue 'Triplex est principium' du commentaires d'Adenulfe d'Anagni sur les *Topics* d'Aristote (extrait)," p. 246 (for dating); p. 437, nn. 1-2 (for the division of the sciences) in *L'enseignement...Autour du "Guide."*

10. Alain de Libera: "Structure du corpus scolaire de la métaphysique dans la première moitié du XIIIe siècle," pp. 63-64 in *L'enseignement...Autour du 'Guide'.*

again being can be the subject of a science.¹¹ In addition, according to the Barcelona student guide, the metaphysical study of the first being is not had in either of the Latin translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* then known,¹² but is contained in the *Liber de causis*, attributed by the guide to Aristotle.¹³

Given these introductions and the student guide, one naturally wonders whether the Faculty of Arts had become a Faculty of Philosophy by 1255. After all, the Masters were not prescribing in their decree of that year any new content for instruction, but only insisting on the time, duration, and starting point for works already serving as subjects of instruction. Claude Lafleur, the scholar chiefly responsible for the editions of many introductions to philosophy and for the forthcoming publication of the student guide, has styled these works "an apology in favor of rationality"; as such, he sees them as calling into question the position of philosophy as the "handmaiden" of theology.¹⁴ Yet Prof. de Libera has argued at length that during this early period philosophy had a role in the Faculty of Arts only insofar as, alongside the liberal arts, it prepared students for work beyond the Faculty, whether as students of theology or as men active in the world outside the University.¹⁵ However, whatever the situation of philosophy within the Faculty, the fact remains that Aristotle's works provided the central basis of instruction by 1255 and that Averroes's commentaries were the indispensable guide to those works. From Averroes, both Masters and students undoubtedly learned that science was theoretical knowledge acquired by demonstration from

11. *Primo queritur utrum philosophia*, par. 21, as found on pp. 392-93 of Claude Lafleur & Joanne Carrier: "Le recueil du questions '*Primo queritur utrum philosophia*,'" in *L'enseignement...Autour du 'Guide'*, pp. 382-419.

12. *Metaphysica vetus* contained Book I; *metaphysica nova* contained Books I-X and XII, then considered as "XI"; the genuine Book XI was unknown until the 1270s with the translation of Moerbeke.

13. de Libera: "Structure du corpus," pp. 68-75.

14. Claude Lafleur: "Les textes 'didascaliques,'" p. 362 in *L'enseignement...Autour du 'Guide'*.

15. Alain de Libera: "Faculté des arts ou Faculté de philosophie? Sur l'idée de philosophie et l'idéal philosophique au XIIIe siècle," pp. 429-44 in *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles)* (eds. O. Weijers & L. Holtz) (Brepols, 1997). The year 1263 is noted as the date by which the Faculty of Arts is a Faculty of Philosophy by R.-A. Gauthier: "Notes sur les débuts (1225-1240) du premier 'Averroïsme,'" *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982), pp. 329-30.

principles. This notion not only enabled theologians to see their *sacra doctrina* as conclusions certain in their dependence on articles of faith. As well, metaphysics and natural philosophy in the strict sense were thus understood as certain knowledge in the form of conclusions derived from natural principles.¹⁶

Notwithstanding the praise of philosophy found in the several introductions and the place of philosophy in the instruction in the Arts Faculty by the year 1255, the Masters of Arts were not free from external constraints. In 1240, for example, the Bishop of Paris condemned the doctrine according to which the human mind is unable to come to some understanding of God's reality, and in 1243, the general chapter of the Dominicans ordered all its members to avoid that doctrine.¹⁷

Nor was this prescription of a doctrine the only restraint on philosophy. Roger Bacon, who had taught at Paris in the 1240s and 1250s, explained that in 1257 he had ceased writing on certain philosophical topics because of a ban on such writing by the Franciscan order which he had shortly before joined. In the 1260s, during Bonaventure's years as Master General of the Franciscans, the friars were forbidden to publish outside the order any work not authorized by those in authority within the order. Then too, already in 1243, Dominicans were forbidden to compose "curious works" on subjects such as magic or alchemy; in 1254 and in 1256, they were also forbidden to publish works not examined by an expert named by authorities within the order. Even earlier, in 1225 John Scotus Erigena's *Periphyseon* was ordered burned and anyone keeping a part of it was excommunicated. This was not the only instance of book burning ordered by authorities, though the books thus destroyed were principally works of theology and spirituality.¹⁸

Given these types of limitation on the freedom to think and to publish, it is all the more important that Aquinas's mentor from 1245-1252, Albert the Great, should have referred in lectures attended by Aquinas to the "brute animals...especially in the Dominican order" who ignorantly hinder the use of

16. On the importance of Averroes for this understanding of science, see Charles H. Lohr: "The New Aristotle and 'science' in the Paris arts faculty (1255)," pp. 258-61 in *L'enseignement des disciplines*.

17. *Chartularium*, I, p. 170, n. 128 and p. 173, n. 130.

18. Cf. Luca Bianchi: "Censure, liberté et progrès intellectuel à l'Université de Paris au XIIIe siècle," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 63 (1996), pp. 45-93.

philosophy in the service of faith.¹⁹ Equally important in this light is Albert's own philosophical activity. While some of his assertions lead one to expect his Aristotelian commentaries will be limited to presenting the thought of the text with which he works,²⁰ he frequently and explicitly engaged in philosophizing.²¹ Then too, there are the numerous doctrines in his commentaries which are truly original contributions to philosophy, even though not characterized as such, for example, the division of universals into *ante rem*, *in re*, and *post rem*.²² As for the characterization of philosophy and its distinction from theology, Albert is quite clear. Science, he proposes, proceeds by deduction, beginning from its own proper principles, for science's sole end is knowledge.²³ Further, the search for causes is characteristic of all branches of philosophy.²⁴ Granted its goal, philosophy should not attend to just any doctrine; it is sufficient to discuss

19. *Super Dionysii epistulas*, p504,28-32: "Quamvis quidem, quia nesciunt, omnibus modis velint impugnare usum philosophie (in assertione fidei), et maxime in predicatoribus, ubi nullus eis resistit, tamquam bruta animalia blasphemantes in hiis quae ignorant."

20. E.g., *Physica* I.1.p1,43-49, especially lines 48-49: "nostra intentio est omnes dictas [3] partes [philosophiae] facere Latinis intelligibiles."

21. E.g., *De natura loci* I.7.p13,44-51: "Quia autem de hac opinione mentio erit in secundo libro De causis proprietatum elementorum, ideo illuc differemus disputationem contra ipsam, praecipue, quia nos in libro tertio De caelo et mundo probavimus terram directe esse locatam sub omnibus aliis elementis in medio mundi, in quantum est medium mundi. Hoc enim satis refellit errorem, qui hic dictus est." *Ibid*, p14,41-47: "Tamen philosophi diversa valde scribunt de hoc, et ideo dicemus, sicut nobis videtur, non praeiudicantes aliter dicentibus; in Libro enim Meteororum aliquid iterum dicemus de hoc secundum sententias philosophorum. Sed quidquid ibi dicturi simus, hoc erit opinionis aliorum. Hic autem vere scripsimus opinionem nostram." On this topic, cf. Micael Schooyans: *Recherches sur la distinction entre philosophie et théologie chez saint Albert le Grand*. Dissertation. Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1950, pp. 48-49.

22. *De praedicabilibus* II.3, (Borgnet, I, 24) as cited in Schooyans: *Recherches*, p. 208. Cf. S. Wlodek: "Albert le Grand et les Albertistes du XVe siècle. Le problème des universaux," in *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeite, sein Werk, seine Wirkung* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981) pp. 193-207.

23. *Physica* I.1.5.p.8,22-51.

24. *Meteororum* II.2.2, (Borgnet, IV, 546) as cited in Schooyans: *Recherches*, p. 221.

sylogisms proposed in favor of a doctrine.²⁵ Of physics, Albert explained that it deals only with the area covered by its principles.²⁶ An example of what ought not be attempted by philosophy is the identification of separated intelligences with angels; while some Moslems and Jews have attempted this, he notes, "in no way can they prove it from the principles of any philosophy."²⁷ As for the difference between philosophical and theological studies of morality, Albert affirmed that the former considers human activity performed by means of acquired natural virtues, while theology is concerned with actions dependent on infused virtue.²⁸

Particularly interesting is the detailed picture Albert presented of theology and philosophy in the lectures on the *Ethics* attended by Aquinas and taken down by him in the form of a *reportatio*. In responding negatively to the question whether philosophical and theological contemplation are the same, Albert offers the following doctrines. The contemplation of philosophers is not accompanied by wonder or amazement (*admiratio*) as is that of theologians. Notwithstanding, each form of contemplation is an intellectual examination of some spiritual things, an examination ordered to resting in God, i.e., ordered to supreme happiness; moreover, each type of contemplation is divorced from any impediment arising from the subject's passions or from a doubt depending on faith. Yet philosophical and theological contemplation differ in regard to the habitus from which each flows, for the philosophical habitus is acquired wisdom, while the theologian contemplates by means of light infused by God. As well, the two types of contemplation differ in their ends, for that of theology is the contemplation of God in the afterlife (*in patria*), while the philosopher's goal is the vision by which God is seen in some way in this life (*in via*). By their objects, the two contemplations differ not in the substance of the object, but in the way the object is attained; that is, the philosopher contemplates God in the demonstrative conclusions, while the theologian contemplates God as transcending human reason; thus, the philosopher rests in the certitude of demonstration, but the theologian rests in the First Truth because of itself, not because of reason, and so the theologian, unlike the

25. *De caelo et mundo* II.13.p.109,36-44.

26. *Physica*. I.2.1.p.16,83-89.

27. *De praedicamentis* 2.12 (Borgnet, I, 198s). Also, *De caelo et mundo* I.4.10.p103,7-12, where Albert explains that natural philosophy does not investigate miracles, but only those things which follow from natural causes.

28. Edouard Wéber, O.P.: "La relation de la philosophie et de la théologie selon Albert le Grand," *Archives de philosophie*, 43 (1980) p. 566.

philosopher, is lost in admiration.²⁹

These doctrines, proposed by Albert, taken down by Aquinas, are not those of one either dismissive of or frightened by philosophy. In their light, one understands how it was possible for Albert to make an "option for Aristotle," that is, to commit himself to using Aristotelian philosophical doctrines in constructing his theology.³⁰

It is principally from Albert that Aquinas is thought to have initially acquired his views both of philosophy as an intellectual discipline and of Aristotle's doctrines on a variety of topics. It is not surprising then, that from his earliest works, Aquinas does not hesitate to appeal to philosophy. For example, in his *Sentence-Commentary*, when proposing a survey of positions on divine providence, he remarks of the view of Democritus that "this position has been sufficiently and efficaciously disproved in philosophy," and concerning the Manichean theory of two Gods, he writes, "this position was disproved by philosophers."³¹ The unexceptional nature of these appeals to philosophy becomes clear when one examines Aquinas's discussion of eight propositions in Lombard's *Sentences* that, according to Bonaventure, were rejected almost universally by Parisian theologians.³² For instance, the first view of Lombard generally rejected by Masters stated that "The Holy Spirit is the love or charity by which we love God and neighbor," the "very same Holy Spirit by which the Father and the Son love each Other and love us." In opposing this theological position, Aquinas offers three metaphysical arguments. (1) Because whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver, and because the

29. *Super Ethica*.X.16.p774,70 - p775,13.

30. Cf. Gauthier: *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 178-79. Cf. also: James A. Weisheipl, O.P.: *Thomas d'Aquino and Albert, his Teacher* (Toronto: Pont. Inst. Med. Stud., 1980) p. 9: "Albert's audacity in lecturing on Aristotle's philosophy in a theological *studium* [at Cologne] is another example not only of his independence, but also of his conviction that philosophy and science are indispensable for the theological studies. It was this same conviction and audacity that prompted Albert to 'rewrite' the whole of Peripatetic philosophy."

31. *Sent.*I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2.

32. Edward A. Synan: "Brother Thomas, the Master, and the Masters," *St Thomas Aquinas. 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies* (Toronto: Pont. Inst. Med. Stud., 1974) V. 2, pp. 220-21. Cf. Bonaventure: *Sent.*, II, d. 44, dubium 3, in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1885) V. 2, p. 1016: "Non tamen est mirandum, si in tot et tam bonis dictis Magister dixit aliquid minus complete; ...licet in aliquibus locis declinaverit ab opinionibus communibus et parti minus probabili adhaeserit, praecipue in octo locis."

creature's mode is finite, the uncreated love which is the Holy Spirit can only be received in a finite or created way by the creature. The second and third arguments equally demonstrate Aquinas's respect for philosophy: (2) because every assimilation is through a form, and since by charity we are made conformable to God, charity must be a created form in the soul; (3) because God is present differently in those he has sanctified than he is present to every creature as such, and because this diversity is to be accounted for by a diversity external to God rather than by a diversity in God, charity is a created reality within the soul of those God has sanctified.³³ To be sure, by these arguments Aquinas reasons theologically. Notwithstanding, he does so by bringing philosophical doctrines to bear on an aspect of faith, namely, the invisible sending of the Holy Spirit to the sanctified. Aquinas is asserting in effect that Lombard's interpretation of the doctrine of charity cannot be correct because it violates what philosophy tells us of reality. Significantly, in discussing all but one of the eight views of Lombard listed by Bonaventure, Aquinas employs considerations specifically philosophical.³⁴

Aquinas's trust in philosophy continues in the *De veritate* (1256-1259) when, in regard to the ancient philosophers who proposed that all events in our world are necessitated, he notes that "this position was disproved by philosophers."³⁵

Additionally, in these same early works, Aquinas reveals his acceptance of Aristotle's notion of science as certain knowledge based on principles proper to the object examined.³⁶ Somewhat later and now in Italy, Aquinas offers in Book II of the *Summa contra Gentiles* (1259-1264) as precise a distinction of philosophy and theology as one might wish. While human philosophy is said to consider things as they are, Christian faith is proposed as examining them both as representing and as directed to God. This difference leads the philosopher to consider what naturally belongs to things, while the believer considers only what belongs to things as related to God. Accordingly, both the *sacra doctrina* of faith and the individual branches of philosophy limit their considerations to certain

33. Synan: "Brother Thomas," pp. 227-29. Cf. Aquinas: *Sent.*, I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, sc. 1-3.

34. Synan: "Brother Thomas," p. 238. Synan discusses Aquinas's responses to the remaining seven views of Lombard in pp. 230-40.

35. *De verit.*, q. 5, a. 2.

36. *Sent.*I, d.35, q.1, a.1, ag.5 & ra.5; *De verit.*2.1.ob.4 & ad 4. This question of the *De verit.* dates from 1256.

well-defined areas. Even though the philosopher and the believer might consider the same aspect of a creature, they proceed by working from different principles, the philosopher from the causes proper to the thing considered, the believer from the First Cause. Because of this last-mentioned difference, the believer's wisdom is higher than philosophical wisdom and so, can use philosophical principles. Finally, philosophy begins by considering creatures and from them arrives at God; the doctrine of faith, however, begins from a consideration of God and in that light knows creatures.³⁷

"The believer's wisdom is higher than philosophical wisdom and so, can use philosophical principles." While Aquinas's use of Aristotle in his theology, his "option for Aristotle," is self-evident, it is interesting to note some statistics in this regard. In his first major work, the *Sentence Commentary*, Aristotle is cited more than 2000 times: to speak only of the more important Aristotelian works, there are some 800 citations of the *Ethics*, around 300 of the *Metaphysics*, another 250 each of the *Physics* and the *De anima*.³⁸ As for the *Summa contra Gentiles* (1259-1264), in Books I-III Aristotle is cited 432 times while Scripture is cited 602 times; only in Book IV, which treats of issues foreign to Aristotle, do we find a small number of citations of the Philosopher.³⁹

Yet before Aquinas returned to Paris in September of 1268,⁴⁰ some Parisian Masters of Arts appear to have breached the acceptable limits in their praise of philosophy, at least the limits as theologians and religious authorities would have set them. For example, dating from c. 1265 is the *Philosophia* of Aubry of Rheims. Echoing what must have become traditional in the Arts Faculty, he proposes, as did the *Accessus philosophorum* of the 1230s and the *Philosophica disciplina* of near 1245, the three aspects of a philosopher which illustrate the value of his science: "the contempt of a profusion of transitory goods, the appetite for divine happiness, and an enlightened mind."⁴¹ Continuing, Aubry cites both Averroes and Aristotle as he argues that "the term 'man' is said equivocally of man perfected by the speculative sciences and other men, just as

37. *Sum. con. gent.* II.4.

38. Torrell: *Initiation*, p. 60.

39. Gauthier: *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 180.

40. For this date, cf. Torrell: *Initiation*, pp. 261-65.

41. *Philosophia*, lines 5-11. This work is edited as an appendix to R.-A. Gauthier: "Notes sur Siger de Brabant. II. Siger en 1272-1275. Aubry de Reims et la scission des Normands," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 68 (1984), pp. 29-48.

'animal' is said equivocally of a living man and a picture of one."⁴² The basis for this startling statement is man's natural desire for knowledge; as one of Aubry's authorities asserted, "You ought to study since for this alone were you born."⁴³ As he moves forward in his praise of philosophy, Aubry becomes more and more extreme. Citing in one paragraph Augustine and Boethius, as well as Aristotle's *Ethics*, he concludes that "philosophy is to be desired and loved by human beings above all things."⁴⁴ As if this praise were not sufficient, Aubry denounces those contemptuous of philosophy by applying to them the language used in the Book of Wisdom and in the Psalms of men denying the reality of God.⁴⁵ Still not satisfied, he constructs a litany in praise of philosophy, among whose expressions are some traditionally used of the Virgin Mary: "remarkable miracle of reason, powerful counsel of nature, revealing by acute arguments the causes of all things, promising beatitude to its possessor, ... ladder of virtues, teacher (*magisterium*) of life, form of sanctity, norm of justice, watch-tower of virginity, example of chastity, dwelling place of purity, way of prudence..." Only by his final title of praise - "*fidei disciplina*" - does he give any reason to suspect philosophy might aid faith rather than replace it.⁴⁶ Yet, are we to translate this last title as indicating philosophy "instructs us in faith," or as "knowledge of faith"? In either case, this slight nod to faith, if such it is, mitigates hardly at all philosophy's claims to the supreme role in life.

Olivier the Breton's introduction (probably, late 1260s) offers much the same justification of philosophy as the ultimate human perfection. Both Averroes and Aristotle are appealed to for the doctrine that the highest, most natural human appetite is for knowledge.⁴⁷ As well, the term "man" is once again said to be used equivocally of the man with speculative knowledge and the man without it, "just

42. On the Averroist implications of this notion of "man": Luca Bianchi: "Filosofi, Uomini, e Brutti. Note per la storia di un'antropologia 'Averroista'," *Rinascimento* 32 (1992), pp. 185-201.

43. *Philosophia*, lines 12-26 & 81-101. The authority may be Averroes. Cf. the following page.

44. *Ibid.*, lines 30-44.

45. *Ibid.*, lines 104-112.

46. *Ibid.*, lines 232-37.

47. *Introduction*, n. 8; Olivier's text is edited in Claude Lafleur & Joanne Carrier: "L'Introduction à la philosophie de maître Olivier le Breton," pp. 467-87 of *L'enseignement... Autour du "Guide"*.

as if [we were speaking] of a true man and a picture of man."⁴⁸ What for the *Accessus*, the *Philosophica disciplina*, and Aubry's *Philosophia* were the three conditions or the psychological aspects characterizing the philosopher are now proposed by Olivier as the extrinsic supports (*adminiculantia*) of philosophy. On the other hand, as intrinsic aids, the philosopher has the ability to define the objects being studied as well as the power to draw conclusions from definitions.⁴⁹ When he subsequently turns to the definition of philosophy, Olivier appears at first to assign it a rather modest role in human life: "Philosophy is the love of wisdom, a love consequent on the possession of knowledge." However, as he continues by offering additional definitions, one suspects that here again is had a vision and a prospectus for philosophy that might raise legitimate fears in the hearts of theologians: "Philosophy is busying-one's-self-about death (*studium mortis*), the disgust of death (*tedium mortis*), and the anxiety over death (*sollicitudo mortis*"); as Cicero has it, "Philosophy is what heals souls, removes vain anxiety, frees us from cupidity, and removes and expels error"; for Quintilian, philosophy is "the love of science, the use of reading, limited not by the time one is at school, but by the length of one's life"; according to Averroes, "Let study be to you as if you knew that for it you were born"; finally, from Seneca we hear, "If you were to have a foot in the grave, you should yet wish to learn."⁵⁰ Powerful and startling language in a setting where academic and religious authorities regarded faith and theology as having the final words on life!

Finally, there is the better known *De summo bono* of Boethius of Dacia, dating from around 1270, thus after Aquinas's return to Paris. From this very orderly and tightly argued work, we learn that the supreme good for man depends on his intellect;⁵¹ that the higher or speculative intellect is perfected in knowing and enjoying the knowledge of the totality of beings coming from and through the first being;⁵² and that perfection for the practical intellect consists in acting well while taking pleasure from that activity.⁵³ Because beatitude is man's highest

48. *Ibid.*, n. 24.

49. *Ibid.*, n. 9.

50. *Ibid.*, n. 11.

51. *De summo bono*, lines 1-14 in *Opera*, V. 6, pars 2 (ed. N. G. Green-Pedersen) (Hunia: G-E-G-GAD, 1976).

52. *Ibid.*, lines 26-54.

53. *Ibid.*, lines 55-61.

good, the above perfections of the speculative and practical intellects are true human beatitude, the greatest good possible in this life, and the good closest to that which faith teaches us to expect in the future.⁵⁴

Taken as a whole, there is nothing thus far in Boethius's work to elicit concern in the heart of a conservative theologian or authority. Boethius, by the reference to faith, has made clear that all his talk about the greatest human perfection is only from a philosophical point of view, while from faith's perspective there is a higher beatitude. However, as he continues, Boethius' language is in important ways not well chosen if philosophy is to be seen as subordinate to or, at least, as a lesser perfection than that promised by faith.

Not only does the philosopher attain beatitude by his mode of life, Boethius explains, but every action not directed to this supreme good is a sin.⁵⁵ Further, men who exercise their highest power, namely, the intellect, are in the best state possible for human beings; these men are of course philosophers, who devote their lives to the study of wisdom.⁵⁶ Moreover, the philosopher will know good and evil, virtue and vice, and will accordingly be able to choose correctly, something difficult for the ignorant.⁵⁷ Inescapably, the philosopher's life of morally good actions will lead to the correct use of the speculative intellect and thus, eventually to knowledge and love of the first cause of all things.⁵⁸ "This is the philosopher's life, [and] whosoever does not have it does not have a correct life."⁵⁹

But Parisian Masters of Arts had not only become extreme in their praise of philosophy. Some had, in addition, begun to propose doctrines more directly unacceptable to Christian faith. The Franciscan, William of Baglione, sometime between 1260-1267 referred to some Masters as "philosophizing" and thus

54. *Ibid.*, lines 65-78.

55. *Ibid.*, lines 103-06.

56. *Ibid.*, lines 120-48.

57. *Ibid.*, lines 149-64.

58. *Ibid.*, lines 165-238.

59. *Ibid.*, lines 239-40: "Haec est vita philosophi, quam quicumque non habuerit non habet rectam vitam." As John F. Wippel has remarked, "...the *De summo bono* could easily be read by Christian thinkers of Boethius's day or, for that matter, of our own, as trumpeting a kind of philosophical imperialism." Cf.: *Medieval Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and Reason*, The Aquinas Lecture, 1995 (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Pr., 1995), p. 61.

asserting that "it is certain that the separated spirit cannot suffer from [hell's] fire."⁶⁰ In addition, William directs a question against those asserting that there exists one eternal intellect which acts upon the images or phantasms of individual human beings, thus causing the latter's experience of understanding. If this doctrine of one intellect for all human persons is accepted, William sees several consequences contrary to faith: for instance, humanity could not have been saved by the Son of God's assumption of an intellectual soul; and there could have been no first man, for the one eternal intellect has eternally been intellecting the meanings of human images.⁶¹ Whether William is thinking of any particular Master of Arts in his *De unitate intellectus* is not clear, for he speaks only of the text of Averroes. However, one supposes Averroes's doctrine was at least being discussed in the Faculty of Arts, since William went to the trouble of pointing out the heretical consequences of that doctrine.

From the 1267 Lenten sermons of Bonaventure, it appears that the unicity of the intellect was not the only philosophical doctrine of concern to theologians and religious authorities. "From the wicked undertaking of philosophical investigation proceed errors among philosophers," he affirmed, before offering the examples of an eternal world and one intellect for all men. The latter doctrine "perverts the entire sacred Scripture," he explained, and then he asserted once more, "Therefore to posit this comes from the wicked undertaking of philosophical investigation."⁶² Surely a benevolent interpreter in 1267 might have taken Bonaventure's remarks, not as a wholesale condemnation of philosophy, but as directed only at select "undertakings of philosophical investigation." Yet one can feel rather certain that not all interpreters were benevolent. However, it is more difficult to interpret as favorable to some philosophers the content of a university sermon Bonaventure delivered on Dec. 26, 1267. On this occasion, he distinguished between what is held concerning virtuous activity by Christian wisdom and what is asserted in the works of philosophers. Because philosophers speak of human action from an external perspective, their teaching must be

60. Ignatius Brady, O.F.M.: "Background to the Condemnation of 1270: Master William of Baglione, O.F.M.," *Franciscan Studies* 30 (1970), p. 47. Also, see p. 46 where William refers to "naturalis philosophus" as proving and asserting that without matter there can be no action and passion (*actio* and *passio*).

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-41.

62. *Collationes de decem praeceptis*, Col. II, n. 25 in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1891) V. V, p. 514: "Ex improbo ausu investigationis philosophicae procedunt errores in philosophis... Hoc igitur ponere provenit ex improbo ausu investigationis philosophicae."

studied carefully, or it will lead to error. For example, philosophers say that a person is good whose actions are good. While that is true in the natural order, it is not so in the order of grace where we assert that "If we are good, then we perform good actions."⁶³ In his 1268 Lenten sermons, Bonaventure turned once again to errors against Christian faith and sacred Scripture; this time, to the eternity of the world and the unicity of the intellect is added the erroneous doctrine of the necessity of human actions. (This latter is the doctrine against which Aquinas was to write his *De malo*, q. 6 later in 1270.) The context in which these errors are mentioned, the gift of intellectus, might well have appeared significant to Bonaventure's listeners, for it is relatively easy to interpret this sermon as claiming that only through an intellection given by God can one reach truth and avoid errors such as the three mentioned.⁶⁴

In 1269, shortly after Aquinas's return to Paris, Siger of Brabant composed his *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*.⁶⁵ Here, he asserted the doctrines of Averroes: the unique and eternal intellect is not the substantial form of individual human beings but only the cause of human intellection through its union with the sensible images or phantasms in individual human bodies. Human choice is thus logically the necessary result of the action of the eternal intellect since the will, a passive potency, is necessarily moved by the apprehension received from the unique, eternal intellect.⁶⁶

63. *Collatio 10: Stephanus plenus gratia etc.* in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1901) V. IX, p. 482: "Sapientia christiana aliud dicit de operibus virtutum et aliud philosophi; philosophi dicunt secundum exteriorem intellectum, et nisi sane intelligantur, ducunt in errorem. Dicunt: boni sumus, quia bona facimus; sed certe bonum non est meritorium, nisi sit gratia informatum. Bonum facimus, ergo boni sumus; verum est de virtute consuetudinali...; vera autem bonitas est, quia, si boni sumus, bona facimus;"

64. *Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sanctus*, Col. VIII, n. 12, p. 496 in *Ibid.*: "Alius est intellectus, qui est ianua considerationum scientialium... Iste intellectus, qui est ianua considerationum scientialium, partim est a dictamine naturae, id est a lumine interiori; partim ex frequentia experientiae, sicut a lumine exteriori; et partim ex illustratione lucis aeternae, sicut a lumine superiori." After discussing each of these three parts of intellectus in nn. 13-15, pp. 496-97, he treats the errors in n. 16, pp. 497-98. - On these sermons of Bonaventure, cf. Fernand Van Steenberghen: *Maître Siger de Brabant*, *Philosophes Médiévaux* T. 21, (Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires/Vander-Oyez, 1977) pp. 33-46.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 383-87. Also see Van Steenberghen: *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle* (Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires/Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1966) pp. 431; 386-

The Paris to which Aquinas returns in late 1268 was thus the locus of controversies regarding the unicity of the intellect, the eternity of the world, and the necessity of choice. In addition, philosophy had been exalted to a degree that surely was unacceptable to theologians and religious authorities. What is essential for our present concern is the fact that Aquinas's "option for Aristotle" and his interest in philosophy appear to have been in no way negatively affected by the situation at Paris. In this regard, sometime in 1270, but prior to the condemnation of December 10 of that year, Aquinas spoke out in unusually harsh terms against those proposing that the human will is necessarily moved to choose.⁶⁷ While he points out that the doctrine is heretical since its truth would destroy any possibility of human activity being worthy either of reward or punishment, he speaks almost exclusively of this doctrine as an "extraneous opinion of philosophy" which "subverts all principles of moral philosophy." Further, he charges that those positing this doctrine of the will were led partly by "impudence" (*protervia*), partly by "sophistical arguments which they could not answer." Not only does Aquinas indicate that the doctrine at issue is false because of its philosophical background, but subsequently he rejects the doctrine in a philosophical manner. The rejection, too well known to require much discussion here, is explicitly based first, on the consideration of human activity as proceeding from a principle proper to human beings, namely, from the inclination of the will subsequent to an apprehension; and second, on the detailed consideration of how human rational potencies are moved.⁶⁸

Obviously, only slight courage would have been required for a Parisian Master of Theology such as Aquinas to reject by philosophical means a doctrine of the will heretical by Christian standards. Yet by its arguments, the *De malo*, q. 6 reveals an author implicitly taking a stand on philosophy as a science valuable in itself and possessing its own principles and methods. Moreover, the doctrine of this disputed question reveals an Aquinas alert to the nuances of the philosophical currents at Paris and open to the further development of his own thought. In this regard, *De malo*, q. 6 envisioned more persons than simply those teaching the human will to be necessarily moved in its choices. Reflecting as it does a change in the vocabulary Aquinas was accustomed to use in discussing choice, it must be read as Aquinas's concession, principally linguistic yet also

87.

67. Some still question this dating of the *De malo*, q. 6. For a summary of the issue and reasons for placing the work in Paris prior to Dec. 10, 1270, see Torrell: *Initiation*, pp. 293-96.

68. *De malo*, q. 6, a. unicus.

doctrinal, to certain Parisian Masters.

During his first stay in Paris, Aquinas had disputed the questions published as *De veritate*. In that work, he implicitly, yet clearly, accepted the characterization of the will as a passive potency. By such a characterization he opened himself to the objection that, as an appetite moved by the apprehended good presented to it, the will is moved necessarily to choose. In responding to this objection, Aquinas claimed that the intellect moves the will only after the fashion of an end; that is, the apprehended good serves as the final cause of the will's choice.⁶⁹ This doctrine of the will as a passive potency was but part of Aquinas's larger view where freedom of choice is guaranteed by the freedom of the practical judgment preceding choice. However, the Franciscan, Gauthier of Bruges was unconvinced of the sufficiency of that explanation. Against Aquinas, he insisted in questions disputed in 1267-1269 that the final practical judgment is based on intellectual evidence and so, is not free. According to Gauthier, the only way to save freedom of choice is to accept the will as essentially an active potency capable of accepting or rejecting whatever final cause is represented by the apprehended good presented to it. While Gauthier admits the will is first moved by God, as so moved it nonetheless has complete freedom to accept or reject the good shown it.⁷⁰

Another Master, the secular Gerard of Abbeville, regarded as a defender of the Franciscan school, also spoke out in 1269 against the conception of the will as a passive potency. The will, he explained, is not purely passive; insofar as it is presented an object by the intellect, the will's passivity is evident, although to speak of the will as being "moved" by the object presented to it is to speak metaphorically. The will, conceived by Gerard as the *liberum arbitrium*, or "the faculty of will and reason," is an active potency, moving itself in all its acts, i.e., in deliberation, in judgment, in choice, and so on.⁷¹

69. *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 12, ob. 3 & ad 3.

70. Odon Lottin: "Libre arbitre et liberté depuis saint Anselme jusqu'à la fin du XIII^e siècle," *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*. T. I: *Problèmes de psychologie* (Louvain/Gembloux: Mont César/Duculot, 1942), pp. 245-47. Gauthier's text is found in: *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. E. Longré, *Les Philosophes Belges*, T. X (Louvain, 1928), pp. 40, 50.

71. Lottin: "Libre arbitre," pp. 249-50. Also, see: Odon Lottin: "La psychologie de l'acte humain chez Jean Damascène et les théologiens du XIII^e siècle occidental," *Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, I, 2^e edit. (Gembloux: Duculot, 1957) pp. 413-14. Adriaan Pattin: "La volonté chez l'homme selon Gérard d'Abbeville (+1277)," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 20 (1978), pp. 72-73. For the text of

After his return to Paris in late 1268, and prior to late 1270 when the *De malo*, q. 6 was disputed, Aquinas encountered arguments such as those of Gauthier and Gerard contrary in some ways to his conception of the will. It is surely significant that the *De malo* asserts a doctrine of the will in terms hitherto not used by Aquinas. The object presented by the intellect is no longer said to move the will as a final cause, but now as a formal cause, which is a doctrine proposed by both Gauthier and Gerard.⁷² Additionally, in this work Aquinas appears to avoid the direct characterization of the will as either a passive or an active potency. While both terms are used in the objections, in his responses Aquinas never denies their applicability to the will. His explicit doctrine goes only as far as the assertion that the will is passive insofar as it is moved by God from a condition of not choosing to one in which it can choose; yet the will is active inasmuch as it moves itself in choosing.⁷³ Thus, the *De malo*, q. 6 reveals Aquinas not only content to refute by philosophy a doctrine having heretical consequences, but also attuned and engaged in philosophical discussions with other Masters.⁷⁴

Aquinas's attitude toward philosophy was illustrated once more that same year with the publication of his *De unitate intellectus*. Here, Aquinas opposes the Averroist teachings of some Parisian Masters of Arts, most likely including Siger of Brabant, who were denying the existence of individual intellects functioning as the forms of individual human beings. Rather than posit such a multitude of intellects, the Averroists in question admitted only one eternal intellect which existed separated from all human bodies. While noting that he will not show this doctrine is erroneous because it contradicts Christian faith -- that is too obvious,

Gerard, see: "Gérard d'Abbeville: *Quaestiones de cogitatione*," *Archive d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 31 (1964), pp. 243-51.

72. Lottin: "Libre arbitre," p. 260.

73. See especially objections 4, 7, 16, 17, 18 and the responses in *De malo*, q. 6, a. un.

74. According to Odon Lottin, the *De malo*, q. 6 shows Aquinas "weakening the earlier radical terms" in which he spoke of choice, without repudiating totally his fundamental thesis. Cf. "Pour un commentaire historique de la morale de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, T. 3, P. 2 (Gembloux: Duculot, 1949) pp. 590-91. Daniel Westberg: "Did Aquinas Change his Mind about the Will?" *The Thomist*, 58 (1994), pp. 41-60 argues that Aquinas did not change his doctrine of the roles of intellect and will in *De malo*, q. 6, but only explained metaphysically the interaction of intellect and will in opposition to those Masters stressing the spontaneity of the will.

he asserts -- Aquinas proposes to explain how the Averroist doctrine is equally contrary to philosophical principles.⁷⁵ In carrying out his proposal, Aquinas presents Aristotle's position on the possible intellect, its role as the human form, and then proceeds to present and attack the erroneous notion of the Averroists. In his final paragraph, he states: "These things which we have written in destroying the aforesaid error are not through doctrines of faith but by arguments and doctrines of philosophers."⁷⁶ As Van Steenberghen noted, the *De unitate intellectus* manifests on the part of Aquinas "the will to dispute with Averroes the heritage of Aristotle, (a heritage) compromised by the Arab commentator, and to bequeath to Christian thought the essential intuitions of the Peripatetic school."⁷⁷

The University of Paris within which Aquinas "disputed the heritage of Aristotle" was a closed milieu. Aquinas could easily have become aware of the teachings of Masters in both Arts and Theology from the notes of students residing at the Dominican convent of St. Jacques. Van Steenberghen has argued that both Aquinas's procedure and doctrine in the *De unitate intellectus* indicate that his information about the Averroist doctrines being proposed came from student notes and reflected the teachings of more than one Master.⁷⁸ Granted this "closed" character of Aquinas's academic world, his opposition to the Averroists would be immediately and universally known.

As might be expected, the *De unitate intellectus* failed to convert at least some of those to whom it was directed. Siger, for instance, responded with a *De intellectu*, now lost, which he sent to Aquinas before December of 1270. As well, an anonymous *Questiones de anima* exists which attempted to answer Aquinas and so, probably also predated the condemnation of Dec. 10, 1270. That condemnation would have rendered unnecessary any further writing on this subject by Aquinas and constitutes at least a partial explanation why none exists.⁷⁹

75. *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, c. 1, p. 291,29-38.S174.

76. *Ibid.*, c. 5, p.314,431-33.S268.

77. Van Steenberghen: *La philosophie*, p. 437. In the light of this history of the growth of interest in philosophy, Jordan's proposal that the *De unitate intellectus* is merely polemical and not a philosophical work appears difficult to maintain. See Jordan: "Theology and Philosophy," p. 233.

78. Van Steenberghen: *Maître Siger*, pp. 59-61. See also, the introduction to *De unitate intellectus*, sect. 6, pp. 250-51.

79. Van Steenberghen: *Maître Siger*, pp. 61-70. Also, the introduction to *De unitate intellectus*, sect. 5, pp. 249-50.

As for the attitude of Parisian theologians regarding the *De unitate intellectus*, it is scarcely credible that this defense of Aristotle would have been favorably received, given both the currency of unacceptable philosophical doctrines, as well as the extreme praise of philosophy noted above. It is not surprising that Paris's Bishop Tempier on December 10, 1270 condemned 13 propositions and excommunicated all who in the future knowingly taught or assented to them. Four of these propositions were equivalent to the doctrines Aquinas opposed by his philosophical arguments in the *De malo*, q. 6 and the *De unitate intellectus*. Of the remaining condemned propositions, three pertained to the doctrine of the eternity of the world, two to God's knowledge of creatures, two to the fate of the soul after death, one to divine providence, and one to God's ability to give immortality to creatures in an afterlife.⁸⁰ Apart from the fact of the condemnation itself, the range of philosophical issues covered cannot but have had a chilling effect on those convinced of philosophy's value. Then too, one easily imagines the exhilarating effect of the event on Masters and others in positions of authority, whether religious or academic, who had in any sense a negative view of philosophy.

The crisis in philosophical affairs at this time is clear from several other events which can be seen as flowing from the December, 1270 condemnation. The first is a question submitted to Aquinas only a few months later in his quodlibetal disputations of Lent, 1271: "Whether one is held to avoid those excommunicated persons concerning whose excommunication there are diverse opinions among experts."⁸¹ This question appears to reflect a genuine question of conscience. Masters and students opposed to the suspect Arts Masters would certainly not want the latter's teachings to be listened to, and the undecided would desire guidance. (Aquinas's answer to the question is unsurprising: we should adhere to the view of those in authority; not to do so would harm the common good, as well as overlook their study of the issues involved.)

Another aspect of the concern over philosophy felt by some theologians and religious authorities appears with the request made of Aquinas, Albert the Great, and Robert Kilwardby by the Dominican Master General in the Spring of 1271. All three were asked to comment on 43 articles dealing principally with cosmological issues (actions of heavenly bodies and of angels on earthly events, the location of hell, cognition of the distance from the surface of the earth to its center, and so on.) Aquinas was asked whether the opinions expressed in the articles were held by "*Sancti*," i.e., by Church doctors and fathers or other

80. *Chartularium*, T. I, n. 432, pp. 486-87.

81. *Quodl.* IV, q. 8, a. 3.

Christian authorities, whether he himself proposed the opinions expressed in the articles, and if he did not, whether he regarded them as acceptable.⁸² Aquinas responded on April 2, 1271, the very day after he had received the request. His response is significant for his attitude on several issues. Initially, one notes his insistence on the danger of incorrectly treating doctrines commonly proposed by philosophers:

It seems safer to me that those things which philosophers commonly hold and which are not repugnant to our faith are neither to be affirmed as dogmas of faith, although they are sometimes introduced under the title of philosophy, nor denied as contrary to faith. [We should follow this rule] less the occasion to condemn the doctrine of faith be given to the wise one's of this world.⁸³

Implicit here is a sense of the separation of philosophy from faith and theology. What is only implicit here becomes explicit when he speaks to another article touching on Aristotle's reference to the human intellect as "divine." About this, he writes: "I do not see that it is the business of the doctrine of faith how the Philosopher's words are explained." And as if scornfully, though politely, dismissing the concern over Aristotle's use of "divine," he cites Averroes - of all people! - as explaining that "a thing is not called divine because it is by its essence God, but by a certain participation of resemblance, just as anything great and admirable is customarily called divine."⁸⁴ Aquinas's scorn in regard to the concern over the acceptability of doctrines appears again with the article touching on the location of hell: "Where hell is, whether near the center of the earth, or near the surface, I think has nothing to do with the doctrine of faith, and it is superfluous to worry about affirming or opposing such things."⁸⁵ The words with which Aquinas closes the *Response* requested by the Master General appear to express again, and quite forcefully, his conviction that theologians ought not be overly concerned about the results of philosophical activity as such: "These are, Reverend Father, what occurs for the present..., although many of these topics are outside the boundaries of Theology; but by your injunction a duty was laid on me

82. *Responsio ad magistrum Joannem de Verzellis de 43 articulis*, p327,4-14.

83. *Ibid.*, p327,51-58.

84. *Ibid.*, art.34, p333,476-83.

85. *Ibid.*, art.32, p333,442-46.

which the profession of my office in no way required."⁸⁶

In contrast with Aquinas's openness is a third incident, namely, the severe rupture in the Arts Faculty near Christmas, 1271 on the occasion of the election of a new rector. The majority candidate, Alberic of Reims, was thought incapable by a minority party whose members preferred Siger of Brabant. After an appeal to Rome against Alberic's election, a new vote was held on March 27, 1272 to which only the majority party was invited. As a consequence, the minority party elected its own rector, probably Siger, and for the next three years, there were two separate, functioning Faculties of Arts at the University.⁸⁷

Very shortly after the above, on April 1, 1272, a degree of the Masters adhering to the majority party revealed the extent to which the investigative freedom of philosophers was thereafter to be curtailed. No Master, they asserted, nor bachelor, was to discuss any question purely theological. Further, if a philosophical problem having a bearing on theology was discussed, it had to be resolved in favor of Christian faith; all arguments contrary to faith had either to be refuted or at least declared "absolutely false and totally erroneous."⁸⁸ From the wording of this degree, it appears that most of the Masters approving it were professors of logic, as the document stresses that some were professors of natural philosophy. From this, it follows that the minority party, thought to number less than a fourth of the total number of Arts Masters, would have been the natural philosophy professors likely to be interested in the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle.⁸⁹ Another indication of the seriousness of this official attempt to dampen philosophical ardor is the supposition that the decree was issued at the "pressing request" of conservative Masters of Theology.⁹⁰

However, it is much easier to understand the fear of philosophy implied by the condemnation of 1270 and the above decree of 1272, as well as by Bonaventure's sermons of 1267 and 1268, when these acts are seen against the background of the above-mentioned works of Aubry, Olivier, Boethius, and Siger. One understands then how Paris's conservative Bishop Tempier and its conservative Masters of Theology would have felt the need to go further and to condemn on March 7, 1277 an additional 219 proposition among which were n.

86. *Ibid.*, p335,614-19.

87. Van Steenberghen: *Maitre Siger*, pp. 80-83.

88. *Chartularium*, T. I, n. 441, pp. 499-500.

89. Van Steenberghen: *Maitre Siger*, pp. 82-84.

90. On this supposition, see Bianchi: "Censure, liberté at progrès intellectuel," p. 61.

40: "That there is no more excellent state than to give oneself to philosophy," and n. 154: "That philosophers are the only wise men of the world."⁹¹

This discussion of the intellectual climate respecting philosophy in Paris provides a partial explanation of the lack of a favorable reception that might be given Aquinas's defense of Aristotle in the *De unitate intellectus* and his philosophical refutation of a heretical doctrine in *De malo*, q. 6. By the publication of these two works, Aquinas undoubtedly made clear his position as a thinker standing between, on the one hand, ecclesiastical authorities and conservative Masters of Theology and on the other, adherents of a radical ideal of philosophy. In this regard, the *De unitate intellectus* not only defended the pagan philosopher, Aristotle, in refuting a doctrine fatal to a good deal of Christian faith, but asserted as the first step in Aristotle's defense, the latter's doctrine of the unicity of substantial form, that is, the doctrine that a substance is made what it is by a single substantial form. This was a doctrine that many theologians, including some Dominicans but especially Franciscans, regarded as having heretical consequences when applied to the person of Christ. Earlier, in his first Lenten quodlibet after his return to Paris (Lent, 1269), Aquinas had proposed this Aristotelian doctrine in the context of the question of whether the advent of the human soul excludes the substantial form which up to that point had constituted as a living body the body now receiving the soul. His response, containing three references to Aristotle, insists on the impossibility of a plurality of substantial forms in a being simply one. For instance, he writes: "A thing evidently has being through its form, and hence it has unity through its form. Because of this, wherever there are many forms, there is not a being simply one; for example, a white man is not simply one thing, nor, as the Philosopher says, would a two-footed animal be simply one thing if it were an animal in virtue of one form and two-footed in virtue of another."⁹² In his Advent quodlibet of the same year, he once again defended the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form, but this time in a context guaranteed to upset his opponents. The question now asked was whether the humanity of Christ during the three days between his death and resurrection was identical with the humanity Christ had before his death. Those theologians holding the doctrine of plurality of substantial forms would have approached this question with the understanding that Christ's dead body remained the same human body in virtue of the substantial form of corporeity had before his death; from this perspective, when Christ's soul reentered his body at the resurrection, it did not cause the destruction of the form of corporeity. In the

91. *Chartularium*, T. I, pp. 545 & 552.

92. *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, a. 1c.

minds of the proponents of this approach, if one did not accept the plurality of forms, one had to say the dead body in the tomb was not the same body Christ had before his death and after his resurrection. By refusing the plurality of forms and the response to the above question it supported, Aquinas became heretical in the minds of many. It mattered not that, as he explained in this quodlibet, although Christ's death necessitated the separation of the soul and the body and so, the loss of the substantial form that normally makes a body a human one, the body in the tomb remained the same body it had been before Christ's death because it continued to exist as the body united to the second person of the Trinity.⁹³ Nor was Aquinas' standing improved when in a subsequent quodlibet of Lent, 1270, he proposed anew Aristotle's doctrine in the context of another discussion of Christ's body.⁹⁴ Consequently, when in the *De unitate intellectus* of that same year Aquinas proposes again Aristotle's doctrine of the unicity of substantial form as an integral part of his defense of Aristotle's doctrine of the intellectual soul, his procedure would not have satisfied many.⁹⁵ Notwithstanding, in his new quodlibet of Lent, 1271, Aquinas once again implied his adherence to Aristotle's doctrine of the unicity of substantial form when he treated the question of the identity of Christ's body on the cross and in the tomb.⁹⁶ It is surely significant as a sign of the times that one *reportatio* of Bonaventure's Lenten sermons of 1273 refers to Aquinas's doctrine of the unicity of the substantial form as "insane"; in another, a milder judgment is found, namely, that the doctrine is not true.⁹⁷

As important as is the doctrine of the unicity of form for understanding the opposition to Aquinas on the part of conservative theologians and religious authorities,⁹⁸ one ought not overlook the conflict between Aquinas and the

93. *Quodlibet* II, q. 1, a. 1c.

94. *Quodlibet* III, q. 2, a. 2 (Lent, 1270): "Utrum oculus Christi post mortem dicatur aequivoce oculus vel univoce."

95. *De unitate intellectus*, c. 1, p291,31 - p292,74.S175-76.

96. *Quodlibet* IV, q. 5, a. un. (Lent, 1271): "Utrum sit unum numero corpus Christi affixum cruci et iacens in sepulcro." Here, the ad 1 implies the solution he had proposed more clearly in earlier quodlibets. However, the advocates of a plurality of form would not have misunderstood his position.

97. Edouard-Henri Wéber: *Dialogue et dissensions entre saint Bonaventure et saint Thomas d'Aquin à Paris (1272-1273)* (Paris: Vrin, 1974) p. 20.

98. The testimony of Henry of Ghent, John Peckham, and William of la Mare has led to the suggestion that an investigation of Aquinas's doctrine of the unicity of substantial

Franciscan John Peckham concerning the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world. According to the explanation now generally accepted, Aquinas was present at Peckham's inaugural lecture in 1269 or shortly thereafter when the latter implicitly upheld the thesis that, philosophically speaking, the world could only have been created in time as is proposed by Scriptures. The following day, when Peckham reviewed his position, Aquinas "calmly but firmly" argued for the opposite conclusion, namely, that there is no philosophical contradiction in the thesis that the world was created from eternity. Shortly thereafter, Aquinas wrote the *De aeternitate mundi* proposing now in writing the arguments he had earlier offered orally against Peckham's position.⁹⁹

Aquinas sums up the subject of this short work in this sentence: "We must see whether it is possible that something has always existed and yet is totally caused by God." He immediately adds that, since all agree that God, because of his infinite power, can make something eternal, the only question is "whether it is possible that something made can be eternal."¹⁰⁰ The method adopted to decide the question is purely philosophical: "The entire question consists in this, whether or not [the notions] 'to be created by God according to one's total substance' and 'not to have a beginning of one's duration' are mutually exclusive."¹⁰¹ Aquinas's philosophical response to this philosophical question proceeds first, by showing that an agent cause (in this case, God) need not precede its effect (here, the created universe);¹⁰² and second, by showing that, from the point of view of something made, the notion of "made from nothing" does not imply the need for there to have

form was undertaken in connection with the condemnation of 1277. Cf. J. M. M. H. Thijssen: "1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome," *Vivarium*, 35 (1997) pp 72-101. While Aquinas may not have been signaled out, the unicity of substantial form was most certainly examined at that time as a suspect doctrine.

99. Torrell: *Initiation*, pp. 268-73. A more detailed analysis of the historical data relative to the dispute between Peckham and Aquinas over the eternity of the world is had in: Ignatius Brady, O.F.M.: "John Peckham and the Background of Aquinas's *De aeternitate mundi*," in *St. Thomas Aquinas. 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies* (Toronto: Pont. Inst. Med. Stud., 1974) esp. pp. 149-54.

100. *De aeternitate mundi*, p85,13-25.S295.

101. *Ibid.*, p86,77-80.S298.

102. *Ibid.*, p86,88 - p87,157.S298-302.

been a time before the being was made.¹⁰³

Subsequent events make clear that the intellectual climate at Paris was not at all receptive of these and other philosophical positions advanced by Aquinas. At some point during the years 1269-1272, Aquinas submitted his doctrine of the unicity of substantial form to the collective judgment of the Bishop of Paris and the Masters of Theology. John Peckham, who was present on the occasion of the discussion, mentions the incident in three different letters while making clear his undying conviction of the dangerous character of Aquinas's position.¹⁰⁴ However, from what is known of Aquinas's thought, one feels confident in assuming he would on this occasion have attempted to convince his opponents of the philosophical soundness of the doctrine as well as the lack of any harmful consequences for faith.

In regard to the position of this doctrine in Aquinas's thought, we have much to learn from Torrell's analysis of Aquinas's spirituality. In the background of Aquinas's insistence that the soul is the only substantial form of the human person, there stands in Torrell's analysis the doctrine of the goodness of the universe as a reflection of its creator; even subsequent to Adam's fall, human nature remains an image of God and so, fundamentally good. Consequently, grace will not replace a corrupted human nature with something god-like, but will instead raise the naturally good human nature to a new and higher form of life. Thus the entire human person, not merely the intellect and the will, but along with these the bodily passions are integrated into the life of the infused virtues. By adopting Aristotle's doctrine of the unicity of substantial form, Aquinas insured that every aspect of human nature has one source. As a result, the grace present in that source, the soul, can have its effect throughout the human being. Just as the soul is the source of all aspects of the person, including thus the irascible and concupiscible passions, so too grace in the soul can bring about the orientation of

103. *Ibid.*, p87,158 - p88,210.S303-06. The remainder of the work (1) shows that neither Augustine (p88,211-39.S307; p89,278-96.S307-09) nor the "best philosophers" (p88,210- p89,264.S307) perceived a contradiction in the notion of an eternal, created universe; (2) offers a philosophical response taken from Boethius to authorities agreeing with Aquinas's opponents (p89,265-77.S308); and (3) brushes aside his opponents fears of heretical consequences following upon the possibility of an eternally, created universe (p89,297-308.S309). - In "Theology and Philosophy," p. 233, Jordan includes the *De aeternitate mundi* under works only seeming to be philosophy because they are part of a polemic.

104. *Chartularium*, T. I, n. 517, pp. 624-26; n. 518, pp. 626-27; n. 523, pp. 634-35.

those passions to its divine goal.¹⁰⁵

Another indication that the climate in which Aquinas worked would have been unreceptive of his doctrinal positions is had in Bonaventure's Easter sermons of 1273. Preaching after Aquinas had left Paris, Bonaventure applies to certain philosophers the biblical image of "light divided from darkness." Living in darkness are said to be those philosophers who follow Aristotle in denying the existence of God as the exemplar and efficient cause of creation. These errors are rooted in Aristotle's arguments in the *Ethics* against the Platonic idea of good and in his insistence in the *Metaphysics* that God is merely the final cause of the universe's motion insofar as he only knows himself.¹⁰⁶ In a subsequent sermon in this series, Bonaventure recognizes that these philosophers "living in darkness" attempt to excuse Aristotle for not speaking of happiness in a life after death; that topic, these philosophers explain, was outside the area of his interest. But that excuse is not one Bonaventure will accept.¹⁰⁷ While Bonaventure could not have intended to include Aquinas among those "living in darkness," Aquinas too excuses Aristotle for having limited the discussion of happiness to our present life.¹⁰⁸ Hence, once again, we find evidence that Aquinas was out of step with some of his contemporaries in his attitude toward Aristotle.

A third important indication of the attitude of Aquinas's contemporaries toward philosophy was the wholesale condemnation of March 7, 1277 of 219 propositions. To be sure, the greater part of these propositions finding disfavor with Paris's Bishop Tempier and the conservative Masters of Theology, while purely philosophical, are clearly contrary to Christian faith.¹⁰⁹ Yet several of the

105. Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P.: *Saint Thomas d'Aquin, maître spirituel* (Fribourg, Suisse/Paris: Éditions Universitaires/Éditions du Cerf, 1996) chapters X-XI. - One cannot imagine either a more complete or a better introduction to Aquinas than that provided by Torrell.

106. *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, Col. VI, n. 2 in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1898) V. V, p. 361.

107. *Ibid.*, Col. VII, nn. 2-3, pp. 365-66. Bonaventure appears milder here, equating "darkness" with not having faith, giving thereby a more understanding impression of Aristotelians than he projected in *Collatio VI*.

108. Cf. *SLE*.1.17.57-60.S206; 142-52.S212. Also, *Ibid.*, 9.162-65.S113.

109. E.g.: Proposition n. 157: "That the man is sufficiently disposed to eternal happiness if he is oriented intellectually and affectively by intellectual and moral virtues as spoken of by the Philosopher in the *Ethics*." The list of condemned propositions is found in *Chartularium*, T. I, pp. 543-55, n. 473.

propositions, while antagonistic to faith, are so indirectly through an exaltation of reason, e.g., proposition n. 37: "That nothing is to be believed, except what is known of itself (*per se*) or what can be asserted on the basis of what is known of itself"; n. 150: "That man ought not be satisfied in having certitude [solely] based on authority in regard to this or that question."¹¹⁰ Anyone approving of the condemnation of philosophical propositions of the latter kind evidences a deep-rooted disbelief in the ability of human reason, if left to itself, to discern the difference between what is rationally correct and what is incorrect.¹¹¹ Such a judgment appears also to be that of James of Douai as he speaks of the crisis that culminated with the condemnation of 1277. This Master of Arts, after explaining how evil, jealousy, and ignorance could be at the basis of the oppression to which philosophers are subjected "in these days," turns to a fourth source of oppression, namely, the foolishness of the philosophers whose words were condemned. It is because of their foolishness that they pervert faith, he asserts. Then, insisting that philosophers cannot pervert the faith of others, he adds:

If there are philosophers who harm anyone's faith, I think they do not truly know philosophy, but only appear to do so... I believe that a philosopher, using reason, can defend the truth, that he can discuss with those denying it, and also judge of errors much better than an incompetent person who is not a philosopher and who does not use reason.¹¹²

The Franciscan character of the condemnation shown by the presence of nine philosophical propositions respecting the will provides an additional indication of Aquinas's importance as a philosopher in the eyes of his Parisian contemporaries. Lottin finds it "evident" that the presence of these particular propositions was inspired by the Franciscan tradition of Gauthier of Bruges, and Matthew of Aquasparta, a tradition favored by the secular Masters Gerard of Abbeville and Henry of Ghent. By the inclusions of these particular propositions, the condemnation attempted to underline the will's active character in opposition to the influence on the will of judgment. In this, the condemnation has an anti-

110. See also propositions nn. 40 and 154 on p. 99 above.

111. The 219 condemned propositions are jumbled together with no order, a fact betraying the haste of the investigation resulting in the condemnation. According to Giles of Rome, present in Paris at that time, the inclusion of orthodox doctrines in the condemnation revealed the partiality of the judges compiling them. Cf. Van Steenberghen: *Maître Siger*, pp. 151, 153.

112. For the Latin, see: R.-A. Gauthier: *Magnanimité. L'idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne* (Paris, 1951), p. 160, note 2.

Thomist air, apparently envisioning some statements found in Aquinas's *De veritate*.¹¹³

Also inspired by fear of Aquinas's influence was William de la Mare's *Correctorium fratris Thomae* (c. 1277-79). In this work are proposed 117 articles, each of which presents an "unacceptable" doctrine of Aquinas, then outlines the motives because of which the doctrine is to be condemned, and finally, in the case of many doctrines, offers a refutation of Aquinas's arguments for the doctrine.¹¹⁴ In 1282, the general chapter of the Franciscans ordered that no one was to read the works of Aquinas except in a copy to which were annexed William's corrections.¹¹⁵

In William's *Correctorium*, as in the response to it by Richard Knapwell (c. 1282-83), there is abundant evidence that both authors considered many of Aquinas's doctrines and arguments to be philosophical. For instance, William writes of the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form that "it was condemned by the Masters first, because many things contrary to Catholic faith follow from it, and second, because it contradicts philosophy."¹¹⁶ In responding, Knapwell denies that the Masters of Theology had ever condemned Aquinas's doctrine, "nor is it inconsistent with philosophy, but rather is supported by it."¹¹⁷

As evident from the discussions of this section, the period extending from

113. Lottin: "Libre arbitre," pp. 279-80. Especially opposed to Aquinas's doctrine as found in the *De veritate* are propositions 157: "Quod duobus bonis propositis quod fortius est fortius movet," and propositions 158: "Quod homo in omnibus actionibus suis sequitur appetitum, et semper maiorem." Cf. *De verit.*, q. 22, a. 15: "Sed eligere est actus voluntatis, secundum quod ratio proponit ei bonum ut utilius ad finem." On proposition 157 and its relation to Aquinas, cf. Roland Hissette: *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires/Vander-Oyez, 1977) pp. 241-46.

114. Van Steenberghen has noted the following statistics: 47 "erroneous" doctrines are taken from the *Pars prima* of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, 12 from the *Prima secundae*, 16 from the *Secunda secundae*, 9 from the *De veritate*, 1 from the *De virtutibus*, 4 from the *De potentia*, 9 from the *quodlibets*, and 9 from the first book of the *Sentence Commentary*. Cf. *La philosophie*, p. 490.

115. *Ibid.*

116. (Ed. P. Glorieux): *Les premières polémiques thomiste. I. Le correctorium corruptorii "Quare"* (Kain, 1927) p. 129. The text of Knapwell's response, edited here, contains the entire *Correctorium* of William.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

1215 to 1283 contains many witnesses to the growth of interest in philosophy, to the misuse of philosophy by some, and to the negative response of conservative theologians and religious authorities. Also had are several witnesses to Aquinas's high regard for philosophy as well as to his willingness to take a public stand on philosophy in opposition to its opponents. In this connection, one cites the *De malo*, q. 6, the *De unitate intellectus*, the *De aeternitate mundi*, and the repeated proposals of the unicity of substantial form in his quodlibetal questions.

In the same years in which Aquinas's stand for philosophy as a search for truth is evidenced by the above works, he wrote his comment on Aristotle's *Ethics*, as well as the bulk of his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*. With this last fact added to those outlined in this Chapter regarding philosophy at Paris between 1215 and 1283, is it permissible to claim *a priori* that such Aristotelian commentaries as these could not have been intended principally as statements of the philosophy their author regarded as true? I think not. Accordingly, I take it as granted, not that the Aristotelian commentaries represent Aquinas's *Summa philosophiae*, but only that they might represent as much of Aquinas's philosophy as could legitimately be proposed within the confines set by Aristotle's texts.

In concluding this account of the situation of philosophy, it is fitting to note several witnesses to Aquinas's philosophical reputation. First, there is the request made to the general chapter of the Dominicans by the Rector of the University of Paris and the other Masters of the Faculty of Arts shortly after they had heard of Aquinas's death:

We humbly ask that there be swiftly sent to us the writings concerning philosophy that Aquinas began at Paris, but which remained unfinished at the time of his departure, and which we believe he finished after the move... He had especially promised to send them to us.¹¹⁸

As one historian of this period has remarked, "...it is certainly extraordinary that all the Masters of Arts should have looked upon a theologian as a co-worker in their task of shedding light on the mysteries of nature and in interpreting the writings of the great philosophers."¹¹⁹

Another contemporary witness to Aquinas's standing is Siger of Brabant

118. *Chartularium*, T. I, n. 447, pp. 504-05. The principal works mentioned are commentaries on Simplicius, on Aristotle's *De caelo et mundo*, and on the *Timaeus*. The Rector of the University was traditionally elected from among the Masters of Art.

119. William Dunphy: "The *Quinque viae* and some Parisian Professors of Philosophy," in *St. Thomas Aquinas. 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies* (Toronto: Pont. Inst. Med. Stud., 1974) V. 2, p. 72.

who had been one of the Masters of Arts against whose Averroist positions Aquinas most likely directed the *De unitate intellectus*. Very shortly after his initial response to the latter work, Siger became more appreciative of Aquinas's thought, and in his *De anima intellectiva* (1273-1274) he refers to Aquinas and to Albert as "*praecipui viri in philosophia*." Then too, in the modified positions he proposed in this same work, Siger demonstrated the careful attention he had paid to the arguments of Aquinas's *De unitate intellectus*. Additionally, Siger drew on Aquinas's *Prima pars* and *Physics-Commentary* in his own *Liber de causis* (1274-1176) when he wrote once more on the intellectual soul.¹²⁰

Additionally, both Peter of Auvergne in his questions on *Metaphysics*.XII (c. 1274-1277) and the unknown author of some questions on *Physics*.VIII (c. 1270-1277) borrowed heavily from the philosophical doctrines concerning the existence of God found in Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*. By looking to Aquinas for assistance in dealing with the question of God's existence, these two Parisian Masters of Arts strikingly confirm the respect for Aquinas's philosophical work manifested in the letter sent to the Dominican General Chapter by the Arts Masters on the occasion of Aquinas's death.¹²¹

A final witness to Aquinas's status as a philosopher and to his *Ethics-Commentary* as an expression of moral philosophy is had in three "Averroist Commentaries" on the *Ethics* seemingly composed between the condemnation of 1277 and the end of the 13th century. All three commentaries appear to have had a common source written shortly before the 1277 decree. From that source, probably also a commentary, the three Averroist authors seem to have borrowed arguments and procedures, some originally found in Albert's *Super Ethica*, others in Aquinas's *SLE* and *Summa theologiae*. Additionally, one of these authors, that of the "Vatican Commentary" (c. 1290), evidences "a personal and constant recourse" to Aquinas.¹²² A second author, Gilles of Orleans (c. late 13th century), shows frequent use of the *SLE* and at times even explicit references to it.¹²³ When these Averroist commentators on the *Ethics*, intent as they were to propose a

120. For the influence on Siger of Aquinas's philosophical doctrines regarding the soul, see: Edward P. Mahoney: "Saint Thomas and Siger of Brabant Revisited," *The Review of Metaphysics*, 27 (1974) pp. 531-53.

121. On these borrowings from Aquinas, see: Dunphy: "The *Quinque viae*," pp. 73-93.

122. R.-A. Gauthier: "Trois commentaires 'Averroistes' sur l'Ethique à Nicomacque," *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 16 (1947-1948), pp. 334-35. For the dating, cf. pp. 219-22.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 334, with note 1; p. 73, with note 1; for the dating, pp. 222-24.

moral philosophy, experienced the need to turn back to the doctrine of Aquinas's *SLE* some years after his death, do we not have a sign, not just of the philosophical character of the *SLE*, but also of the philosophical significance of its contents?¹²⁴

Let us accept then that 13th century Masters of Arts regarded Aquinas as not only a philosopher, but as one of the greatest of his day; additionally, let us agree that some Masters of Theology feared the influence of his philosophical thought. In this light, what grounds have we of the 20th century to deny a priori that his Aristotelian commentaries might be essentially and even completely proposals of philosophical doctrines he regarded as correct?¹²⁵ With this in mind, the following chapter examines those doctrines whose presence in the *SLE* has led some to regard it as a theological work.

124. The third of these commentaries, Paris Nat. Lat. 14698, is dated as shortly after the condemnation of 1277. Cf., *Ibid.*, pp. 225-29.

125. For a different view, see Jordan: "Theology and Philosophy"; "Thomas Aquinas' Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries," *Philosophy and the God of Abraham. Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, O.P.*, ed. R. J. Long (Toronto: Pont. Inst. Med. Stud., 1991) pp. 99-112; and "Aquinas Reading Aristotle's *Ethics*." - Aquinas's *Metaphysics-Commentary* offers an illustration of its author's philosophical intent. When approached historically, this commentary is seen to have been quite evidently intended to replace what Aquinas regarded as the incorrect interpretations proposed by his predecessors. And, given Aquinas's position as a 13th century theologian constructing *sacra doctrina* with the aid of Aristotelian doctrine, why would he have devoted time to presenting interpretations of Aristotelian doctrines (corrected, characterized, modified as necessary) unless he considered them as true philosophy? Cf. J. C. Doig: *Aquinas on Metaphysics. A historico-doctrinal study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Nijhoff: The Hague, 1972). - Additionally, how explain the opposition between Aquinas and his predecessors noted in Chs. 1-2 above?

THE *SLE*: PHILOSOPHY OR THEOLOGY?

Chapters 1 and 2 illustrated the nature of the *SLE* as a work intended to offset and to supplant previous interpretations of the *Ethics*, in particular, the *Super Ethica* of Albert the Great. Important in Aquinas's eyes was the substitution of the *SLE* for those earlier commentaries that placed a dichotomy between the happiness Aristotle discussed in *Ethics.I* and that proposed in *Ethics.X* as associated with contemplation. Then, in Chapter 3, we examined some aspects of the situation of philosophy at Paris between 1215 and 1283. This led to the conclusion that it would not have been at all out of character for Aquinas to have proposed a philosophical interpretation of the *Ethics*. In the present Chapter, I propose to examine the grounds which appear to have provided the greatest support for concluding that the *SLE* is a theological work. In this regard, Jaffa's comparative study of the *Ethics* and the *SLE* provides a useful focus.

Unlike subsequent proponents of Aquinas's commentaries as works of theology, Jaffa examined in great detail the *SLE* and the *Ethics*, explaining their ultimate differences by reference to six "principles of Christian ethics" which he perceived at the basis of the *SLE* and which he insists Aquinas incorrectly attributes to Aristotle. Accordingly, in the *SLE* Aquinas is perceived as "one who subordinates philosophical to theological principles, and interprets the data of philosophy from the viewpoint of theology."¹

I propose here a consideration of the six so-called "principles of Christian ethics" listed by Jaffa. Generally, one or more of these principles finds a place in any argument concluding to the theological or Christian character of the content of the *SLE*. As listed by Jaffa, these principles are the following:

- Belief in divine particular providence.
- Belief that perfect happiness is impossible in this life.
- Belief in the necessity of personal immortality to complete the happiness intended, evidently by nature.
- Belief in personal immortality.
- Belief in the special creation of individual souls.

1. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, pp. 187-88; 190.

Belief in a divinely implanted "natural" habit of the moral virtues.²

While these principles must be examined, it is not sufficient to investigate only the passages of the *SLE* where they are thought present. A broader perspective is required, namely, an examination of the other works of Aquinas in which the same doctrines appear. As shall become evident, the *SLE* was far from being the first work in which Aquinas connected these doctrines with Aristotle. Additionally, we will find that these doctrines were, in Aquinas's mind, not Christian or theological as presented in the *SLE*, but philosophical. Thus as concerns the nature of the *SLE*, it will not ultimately matter whether or not these principles serve as a foundation for what contemporary exegesis can pinpoint as the difference between Aristotle's doctrine of moral philosophy and Aquinas's commentary. Nor will it be significant whether these principles are or are not Aristotle's own. What will be of importance is that Aquinas will appear to have attempted in the *SLE*, not a theological statement of some moral issues, but an exposition of Aristotle's moral system as he, Aquinas, understood and amplified it.

DIVINE PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE

Jaffa found this doctrine implicitly attributed to Aristotle in *SLE.I* when the cause of happiness is under consideration. Aquinas explains this cause may be undetermined and incidental (*per accidens*), in which case the cause would be chance (*fortuna*). But the cause may also be determined and *per se*, and this could be either a divine or a human cause.³ In discussing subsequently the possibility that God is the cause of happiness, Aquinas begins an assertion with this conditional clause: "if happiness is not some gift sent immediately by God,

2. *Ibid.*, p. 187. Jaffa introduces these principles as follows: pp. 186-87: "...although Thomas never appeals to any non-Aristotelian principles to interpret Aristotle's words, he nonetheless imputes non-Aristotelian principles to Aristotle, although treating them as if they were Aristotelian. We conclude then that Thomas' assumption as to the harmony of natural and revealed doctrine, at least in so far as Aristotle is to be considered a representative of the former, is entirely unwarranted. Thomas' 'success' in creating the appearance of such harmony, is due, we believe, entirely to his imputation to Aristotle of such non-Aristotelian principles as the following:"

3. *SLE.I.14.6-11.S165.*

but comes to man because of virtue...or by study...or by exercise..."⁴ Jaffa remarks, without discussion, that here Aquinas suggests "happiness is sent *mediately*, and hence providentially."⁵

Actually, the context makes a better case than Jaffa does for seeing in Aquinas's discussion a belief in divine particular providence. Yet that context also appears to justify Aquinas's interpretation. The passage of Aristotle Aquinas examines begins by proposing several options: happiness is something "learned" or "acquired" or "gained by exercise" or "had through divine providence (*divina particula*)" or "had by chance." Next, Aristotle indicates that if the gods give gifts to men, it is "reasonable" to suppose that the greatest of all gifts, namely, happiness, is from God; but, we are told, it is not the concern of ethics to study the question of God's gifts. Finally, the passage notes that "if it [happiness] is not sent by God," but gained in some human way, happiness is nonetheless something divine and the best.⁶

Aquinas saw in this passage of Aristotle the doctrine that happiness is a gift of God. In this regard, he saw Aristotle proposing in effect this conditional proposition, "If we receive any gifts from the separated substances, then it is reasonable that happiness, the greatest of human goods, is from the supreme God." As for the antecedent, Aquinas remarks that as is explained in metaphysics, both our bodies and our intellects receive their perfections from the beings above them, namely, from heavenly bodies and separated intellects. Hence, the consequent follows: it is reasonable to hold that happiness is from a divine

4. *Ibid.* 66-74.S169: "...si felicitas non sit aliquod donum missum immediate a Deo sed adveniat homini propter virtutem, sicut aliquid assuescibile, vel propter aliquam disciplinam, sicut aliquid discibile, vel propter aliquam exercitationem, sicut aliquid exercitabile, nihilominus videtur felicitas esse aliquid divinissimum, quia, cum sit praemium et finis virtutis, sequitur quod sit optimum et divinum aliquid et beatum."

5. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*: p. 155. The words cited appear to be Jaffa's total case for asserting the presence in the *SLE* of a belief in divine particular providence.

6. *NE.I.9.1099b9-17*: "Unde et quaeritur utrum [felicitas] est discibile vel assuescibile vel aliter qualiter exercitabile vel secundum quandam divinam particulam vel propter fortunam advenit. Si quidem igitur et aliud aliquod deorum est donum hominibus, rationabile et felicitatem Dei datum esse et maxime humanorum quanto optimo. Sed hoc quidem forte alterius erit utique perscrutationis magis proprium. Videtur, autem et si non a Deo missum est, sed propter virtutem et quandam disciplinam vel exercitationem advenit, divinissimum esse; virtutis enim praemium et finis optimum videtur et divinum quid et beatum." Cf. *SLE*, p. 49.

cause.⁷ Additionally, Aquinas notes that Aristotle shows that the assertion of happiness as dependent on a human cause is, in contrast with the reasonableness of positing a divine cause, a doctrine that we “can accept” (*tolerabiliter*, “endurable,” “tolerable”). The explanation Aquinas finds for the acceptability of a human cause for happiness is this: man still cooperates, even if happiness is principally from God. - Although Aquinas does not mention it here, human happiness has already been described as a perfect and self-sufficient good attained through the exercise of the highest virtue; thus, happiness has already been proposed as having a human cause.⁸ - Aristotle is said to prove subsequently in two ways that it is tolerable to hold that, even if God is the principal cause of happiness, human individuals cooperate with God. First, even if happiness has a human cause, it remains the best and something divine for something is considered divine not only because it is from God, but also because it assimilates us to God by the degree of its goodness.⁹ The second proof of the acceptability

7. *SLE*.I.14.34-36.S167: “...primo ostendit quod maxime rationabile est quod felicitas sit ab causa divina”; 40-44.S167: “Dicit ergo primo quod si aliquid aliud ex dono deorum, id est substantiarum separatarum quas antiqui deos vocabant, datur hominibus, rationabile est quod felicitas sit donum Dei supremi, quia ipsa est optimum inter bona humana.” 50-58.S168: “Quod autem a substantiis separatis aliquid detur hominibus, evidens fit ex ipsa convenientia hominum ad substantias separatas secundum intellectualem virtutem: sicut enim corpora inferiora recipiunt suas perfectiones a corporibus superioribus, ita intellectus inferiores ab intellectibus superioribus. Circa hoc autem non diutius immoratur, sed dicit hoc esse magis proprium alterius perscrutationis, scilicet metaphysicae.” - Based on a comparison of Aristotle’s Greek text with the Spiazzi edition of Aquinas’s *Ethics-Commentary*, Papadis: *Die Rezeption*, pp. 91, 115-16, 177, concluded that Aquinas speaks as a Christian in asserting in the above passage that God is the cause of happiness.

8. E.g.: *Ibid*.I.10.136-40.S128: “Si igitur opus hominis consistit in quadam vita prout scilicet homo operatur secundum rationem, sequitur quod boni hominis sit bene operari secundum rationem et optimi hominis, scilicet felicitas, optime hoc facere.”

9. *Ibid*.14.59-76.S169: “...ostendit tolerabiliter dici quod felicitas sit ex causa humana, quia, etiam si sit a Deo principaliter, tamen adhuc homo aliquid cooperatur. Hoc autem ostendit dupliciter. Primo quidem per hoc quod, si est a causa humana, non removetur id quod est proprium felicitati, scilicet quod sit aliquid optimum et divinum. Et dicit quod, si felicitas non sit aliquid donum missum immediate a Deo sed adveniat homini propter virtutem, sicut aliquid assuescibile, vel propter aliquam disciplinam, sicut aliquid discibile, vel propter aliquam exercitationem, sicut aliquid exercitabile, nihilominus videtur felicitas esse aliquid divinissimum, quia, cum sit praemium et finis virtutis, sequitur quod sit optimum et divinum aliquid et beatum. Non enim dicitur aliquid divinum propter hoc solum quia est a Deo, sed etiam quia nos Deo assimilatur

of the notion that happiness is attained by cooperating with God lies in the fact that such a notion implies that happiness, the end of human nature, is open to all agents possessing that nature.¹⁰

Whereas Jaffa asserts Aquinas “suggests” happiness is sent mediately, in the immediate context as described above, Aquinas does all but affirm the doctrine in straightforward language. Does he not seem to say, “it is *reasonable* to hold that happiness is a gift of God, yet *acceptable* to maintain that it is not from God immediately, but from man in the sense that man performs certain actions in conformity with God’s provident rule?”¹¹

That Aquinas would have felt justified in attributing to Aristotle in the *SLE* a doctrine of divine particular providence becomes more evident if an examination is pursued of the works in which Aquinas directly raises the question of providence, that is, in the *Sentence-Commentary*, the *De veritate*, the *Summa contra gentiles*, the *Compendium theologiae*, the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae*, and in the final chapter of the *Metaphysics-Commentary*. In all these works, excepting the *Prima pars*, one finds a role played by an example proposed by Aristotle in the final chapter of *Metaphysics*.XII. The example is found in the following:

We must examine how the good and the best of the whole [universe] is situated by nature, whether as something separate and of itself, or [whether as] in an order, or in both ways as is the case with an army. For [an army’s] good [is had] both in [its] order and in [its] leader, and more in the leader. For he does not exist for the sake of the order, but the order exists for his sake.¹²

propter excellentiam bonitatis.”

10. *Ibid*.77-88.S170: “Secundo...ostendit idem per hoc quod haec positio conservat felicitati id quod pertinet ad finem alicuius naturae, ut scilicet sit commune aliquid his quae habent naturam illam. Non enim natura deficit ab eo quod intendit nisi in paucioribus, et ita, si felicitas est finis humanae naturae, oportet quod possit esse communis omnibus vel pluribus habentibus humanam naturam; et istud salvatur sit ex causa humana, quia sic per quandam disciplinam et studium poterit provenire omnibus non habentibus aliquid impedimentum ad operandum opera virtutis...”

11. On the correctness of Aquinas’s interpretation, given his Latin version of the *Ethics*, cf. R.-A. Gauthier: “Trois commentaires ‘Averroistes’,” pp. 248-49.

12. *Meta*.XII.10.1075a11-16: “Perscrutandum autem est qualiter se habet totius natura bonum et optimum, utrum separatum quid et idem secundum se aut ordine. Aut utroque modo sicut exercitus? Et enim in ordine bene et miles, et magis hic; non enim ille propter ordinem sed ille propter hunc est.” This is the *Media* translation as found in

Only in the *Prima pars* is the above example of an army and its leader not found in Aquinas's discussion of providence. As regards the remaining five works, only the *Sentence-Commentary* does not contain an argument for divine providence built on the example.

In the *Sentence-Commentary*, published in 1256 and reflecting Aquinas's teaching as a Bachelor of the Sentences, the example of the order integral to an army is cited in an article asking whether divine providence is a science. One of the concepts used in responding is that of "disposition," which Aquinas distinguishes from providence itself. Of "disposition," he proposes understanding it as referring to the order which God places in things, the order not only of things to one another - which is the order enabling them to reach their ultimate goal - but also the order of the total universe to God. Then, summoning Aristotle as an *auctoritas*, Aquinas remarks, "as also the Philosopher posits in that place where he proposes the example of the order of parts of an army to one another and to the good of its leader." In distinction from the disposition of things, exemplified by the order of an army, providence is the divine communication to things of whatever is needed to preserve the order determined as a disposition.¹³

After proposing in article one the above definition of providence as well as Aristotle's example in support of the definition of disposition, Aquinas turns in the remaining article to the question of whether divine providence reaches all things. His affirmative response attributes no argument for providence to Aristotle, but cites only Dionysius and Boethius, and these only in support of minor principles functioning in his argument.¹⁴ However, Aristotle is mentioned

Aristoteles Latinus, 25.2, *Metaphysica*. *Translatio anonyma sive 'media'*, edit. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden: Brill, 1976). This version was used by Aquinas in his *SCG*, *Prima pars*, and possibly in the *De veritate*; the *Vetus* translation was cited in the *Sentence-Commentary*, and the *Moerbecana* used in the commentary on *Metaphysics*.XII. Cf. Doig: *Aquinas on Metaphysics*, pp. 4-7, 10. The *Moerbecana* version has slight verbal differences, but no difference of meaning. Cf. *Aristoteles Latinus*, 25.3-2, *Metaphysica Lib. I-XIV, Recensio et translatio G. De Moerbeka*, edit. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden: Brill, 1995).

13. *Sent.*I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1: "Sed dispositio dicitur ratione duplicis ordinis quem ponit in rebus; scilicet rei ad rem, secundum quod juvant se invicem ad consequendum finem ultimum; et iterum totius universi ad ipsum deum: sicut etiam philosophus ponit, ubi etiam ponit exemplum de ordine partium exercitus ad invicem, et ad bonum ducis. Providentia autem dicitur secundum quod rebus ita ordinatis attribuit ea quae ordinem conservant et propellit omnium inordinationem."

14. *Ibid.*, a. 2: "...sicut enim dicit Dionysius, non est providentia naturas rei destruere, sed salvare." "...quod quanto vicinius est (res aliqua) deo, tanto a necessitate naturalium

in the first and lengthiest part of the *corpus* of this second article. The context is a survey of the diverse positions on providence offered by "wise men," a survey intended as an aid in avoiding their errors. One type of error is had in the restriction of divine providence to species, a theory which excludes from divine care individuals as such, with the exception of individuals identified as necessary beings. Regarding this error, Aquinas writes:

This opinion is attributed to Aristotle. Even though it cannot be found expressly stated in his words, the Commentator explicitly posits it in *Metaphysics*.XI [read "XII"].¹⁵ He says it is not proper to divine goodness to have care for singular things except insofar as they share a common nature, as for example, that a spider knows how to make a web.¹⁶

The language of the above reference to the heretical view attributed to Aristotle appears to indicate that Aquinas had not yet mastered the section of *Metaphysics*.XII in which he will later find proposed both Aristotle's doctrine of providence and the example of the order integral to an army. Yet with the *De veritate*, finished by 1259, Aquinas's conception of Aristotle's doctrine is remarkably different. That Aquinas should have studied (or re-studied) Aristotle's words in preparation for the *De veritate* treatment of providence is not surprising. With his inauguration in 1256 as a Master of Theology, one of Aquinas's principal duties became that of presiding at and determining public disputations, a task requiring a considerable mastery of the relevant material. During the years 1256-1257, one of the topics disputed under his direction was that of divine providence.

Aquinas's rethinking of the doctrine of providence is evident from the very first article of question 5 of the *De veritate*. Its issue, paralleling that of the first article on providence in the *Sentence-Commentary*, is the divine attribute with which providence is to be identified. In the earlier work, Aquinas proceeded by examining the conceptions of "science," "disposition," and "providence" in the

causarum magis est liberum, ut dicit Boetius."

15. *Metaphysics*.XI first appeared in Latin in 1270. Before that time, *Metaphysics*.XII was considered as "Book XI." When "*Metaphysics*.XII" is found in works written before 1270, the "XII" is an editor's correction.

16. *Sent.*I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2: "...et ista opinio imponitur Aristoteli: quamvis ex verbis suis expresse haberi non possit, sed commentator suus expresse ponit eam in 11 metaph. Dicit enim, quod non est fas divinae bonitati habere sollicitudinem de singularibus nisi secundum quod habent communicationem in natura communi, sicut quod aranea sciat facere telam..." Averroes's text is *Meta*.XII.52.fol.338rD.

effort to determine the definition of the last-mentioned item.¹⁷ However, the *De veritate* presentation focuses almost immediately on prudence, since divine providence is said to be understandable only by analogy with human prudence. Interestingly, the subsequent discussion refers to the *Ethics* on five occasions as it moves toward proposing and elaborating the familiar Aristotelian notion of prudence as correct reason about things to be done.¹⁸

Even more indicative of the development that has occurred in his approach to providence is Aquinas's use of Aristotle's example of the order of the parts of an army to one another and the order of the army to its leader. The example is offered in article 3 of the same question where Aquinas asks whether divine providence extends to corruptible things. The answer asserts first, that God's providence, similar to the care a *paterfamilias* exercises over his home, stresses the good of the whole rather than the good of any one particular thing. Continuing, Aquinas explains that some authors have ignored this truth, and instead proposed either that corruptible things are not covered by governance at all, or, if governed, are ruled by contrary principles. At this point, Aquinas invokes Aristotle's refutation of this error, a refutation depending on the example of the twofold order of an army. Below is the first part of Aquinas's statement of Aristotle's refutation.

The Philosopher in *Metaphysics*.XII rejects this opinion by the example of an army in which a twofold order is found, one by which the parts of the army are ordered to one another, the other by which they are ordered to an external good, namely, to the good of the leader. The order by which the parts of the army are ordered to one another is for the sake of that order by which the entire army is oriented to the leader. Hence, if there were no order toward the leader, there would be no order of the parts of the army to one another. Wherever, therefore, we find a multitude [of things] ordered to one another, they must be ordered to an external principle.¹⁹

17. Cf. *Sent.*I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1 which is partially cited in note 13 above.

18. Cf. *De verit.*5.1.

19. *Ibid.*5.3.p146,72-84: "Quam opinionem Philosophus in XI [read: "XII"] *Metaphysicae* reprobat per similitudinem exercitus, in quo invenimus duplicem ordinem, unum quo exercitus partes ordinantur ad invicem, alium quo ordinantur ad bonum exterius, scilicet bonum ducis; et ordo ille quo partes exercitus ordinantur ad invicem, est propter illum ordinem quo totus exercitus ordinatur ad ducem; unde si non esset ordo ad ducem, non esset ordo partium exercitus ad invicem. Quantumcumque ergo multitudinem invenimus ordinatam ad invicem, oportet eam ordinari ad exterius principium."

Thus far, Aquinas may be taken as implying that the parts of the universe, corporeal and incorporeal substances, are ordered to one another and that this order is for the sake of the principle imposing the order. As he continues, he builds on that implication by characterizing the order of substances to one another as a matter of "usefulness," and by asserting that the structure of that "usefulness" requires that there be but one order of providence posited by a principle external to the universe:

However, the parts of the universe, corruptible and incorruptible, are ordered to one another, not incidentally, but of themselves. We see the usefulness of heavenly bodies to corruptible bodies, [a usefulness] present always, or for the most part, according to the same mode [of usefulness]. Hence, it must be that all parts, corruptible and incorruptible, are in a unitary order of the providence of an external principle that is outside the universe. From this, the Philosopher concludes that it is necessary to posit in the universe one dominating [principle], not many.²⁰

Aquinas has thus attributed to Aristotle - specifically, in the final chapter of *Metaphysics*.XII - a proof that there is only one order intrinsic to the universe and that this order is imposed by a principle external to the universe. This attribution to Aristotle of a divine particular providence is quite different from what was found in the *Sentence-Commentary* where Aquinas mentioned Averroes's attribution to Aristotle of the doctrine of providence only according to species.

Moreover, Aquinas's understanding of Aristotle's use of the example of the army has evolved. In the *Sentence-Commentary*, the example clarified the notion of "disposition," that is, of the order God places in the universe, both the order of things to one another which enables them to reach their goal, and the order of the universe to God. This "disposition" is said to be distinct from providence, which is described as the giving to things of what is needed to conserve their double order.²¹ Given these doctrines, at the time he wrote the *Sentence-Commentary*, Aquinas must have regarded the role of the example of the army in *Metaphysics*.XII as nothing more than an illustration of the twofold order

20. *Ibid.*p146,84 - p147,95: "Partes autem universi corruptibiles et incorruptibiles sunt ad invicem ordinatae non per accidens, sed per se: videmus enim ex corporibus caelestibus utilitates provenientes in corporibus corruptibilibus vel semper vel in maiori parte secundum eundem modum. Unde oportet omnia corruptibilia et incorruptibilia esse in uno ordine providentiae principii exterioris quod est extra universum: unde Philosophus concludit quod necesse est ponere in universo unum dominatum et non plures."

21. Cf. note 13 above.

of things within the universe to one another and of the universe as a whole to God. However, in the *De veritate*, Aristotle is perceived as using the example to propose that the prime mover, as illustrated by the leader of the army, is not only the end of the order of the universe, but also the source of the one providential order governing the entire universe.

The *Summa contra gentiles*, finished by 1264 or 1265, is the next work in which Aristotle's example of the order of an army plays a role in the discussion of providence, although Aristotle's name is not connected with the example. Because all 163 chapters of Part 3 of this work focus on one or other aspect of providence, the scope of each chapter is severely limited. In the chapter of the *Summa contra gentiles* where the example appears, Aquinas seeks to show only that God governs by providence. Accordingly, Aquinas merely repeats the example, while adding a reference to the fact that the supreme art in a field commands the function of its subordinate arts in the light of the supreme art's goal. In this way, Aquinas implies that the order of the parts of an army to one another, as well as the army's order to its leader are imposed by the leader, who must be external to the order imposed; as applied to our universe, the order among things themselves, as well as the order of things to God pertains to divine providence. By thus asserting God's governance, Aquinas asserts the leader's efficient causality.²² Even though no mention of Aristotle occurs in the argument, there ought be no doubt that it is the example of *Metaphysics*.XII that Aquinas uses. Thus, Aquinas implicitly attributes to Aristotle the notion of divine particular providence by his argument here in the *Summa contra gentiles*. After all, only such a doctrine is compatible with the other doctrines attributed to Aristotle in this work. For example, Book I, Chapter 13 offers "reasons by which Aristotle proceeded to prove that God exists," that is, two proofs from motion, to which is attached an argument from *Metaphysics*.II showing that God is the first efficient cause.²³

22. *SCG*.III.64: "Quandocumque enim aliqua ordinatur ad aliquem finem, omnia dispositioni illius subiacent ad quem principaliter pertinet ille finis, sicut in exercitu apparet: omnes enim partes exercitus, et eorum opera, ordinantur ad bonum ducis, quod est victoria, sicut in ultimum finem; et propter hoc ad ducem pertinet totum exercitum gubernare. Similiter ars quae est de fine, imperat et dat leges arti quae est de his quae sunt ad finem: ut civilis militari, et militaris equestri, et ars gubernatoria navifactivae. Cum igitur omnia ordinentur ad bonitatem divinam sicut in finem, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus, ad quem principaliter illa bonitas pertinet, sicut substantialiter habita et intellecta et amata, sit gubernator omnium rerum."

23. *Ibid*.I.13: "Primo autem ponemus rationes quibus Aristoteles procedit ad probandum Deum esse. Qui hoc probare intendit ex parte motus duabus viis... Procedit

Additionally, in arguing in the same work that divine providence extends to singular contingents, Aquinas refers to the doctrine of divine cognition of singulars. This latter doctrine in turn was earlier proposed with the aid of a conclusion Aristotle offered in relation to Empedocles, that is, God would be the most foolish of all things, if he did not know singulars, for even men have such knowledge.²⁴ Then too, Aquinas offers an argument for the doctrine of immediate providence, resting his reasoning partially on the same doctrine of divine cognition of singulars. With the latter doctrine at hand, he argues that God, whose will is the principle of all goodness, would will the order in which the good of creatures is had; thus, he immediately constitutes the order in creatures.²⁵

When Aquinas's use of the example of the order integral to an army is thus viewed against the other doctrines, either immediately or mediately, explicitly or implicitly, attributed to Aristotle in the *Summa contra gentiles*, it seems clear that at the time he wrote that work Aquinas regarded as Aristotle's the doctrine of divine particular providence. Not surprisingly then, the only slightly later *Compendium theologiae* (1265-1267) also builds its argument for divine providence on the example of an army, its twofold order, and its leader.²⁶

As noted much earlier, the *Prima pars* (finished c.1268), alone among the works where divine providence is an issue, does not cite Aristotle's example of the army.²⁷ However, the example is necessarily in the forefront of Aquinas's thought when he comments on the final chapter of *Metaphysics*.XII where the example is proposed by Aristotle. Whether this part of the commentary preceded or is posterior to the *SLE* is uncertain, although Aquinas is thought to have continued

autem Philosophus alia via in II *Metaphys.*, ad ostendendum non posse procedi in infinitum in causis efficientibus, sed esse devenire ad unam causam primam: et hanc dicimus Deum."

24. *Ibid*.I.65: "Sequeretur inconueniens quod Philosophus contra Empedoclem inducit, scilicet Deum esse insipientissimum, si singularia non cognoscit, quae etiam homines cognoscunt." The reference is to *De anima*.I.5.410b4 and *Metaphysics*.III.4.1000b4.

25. *SCG*.III.76.

26. *Comp. theol*.I.123.p126,2-12: "Quaecumque enim ordinantur ad finem alicuius agentis, ab illo agente diriguntur in finem sicut omnes qui sunt in exercitu ordinantur ad finem ducis qui est victoria, et ab eo diriguntur in finem. Supra autem ostensum est quod omnia suis actibus tendunt in finem divinae bonitatis; ab ipso igitur Deo, cuius hic finis proprius est, omnia diriguntur in finem. Hoc autem est providentiae alicuius regi et gubernari; omnia igitur divina providentia reguntur."

27. *ST*.Ia.22.1-4.

work on his *Metaphysics-Commentary* during his final stay in Paris (1268-1272).²⁸

Before considering this last-mentioned commentary, I note that *SLE*.I.6 also refers to Aristotle's example. Speaking of the latter's criticism of the Platonic idea of the good, Aquinas writes as follows:

Aristotle does not intend to disprove Plato's opinion insofar as the latter posits one separate good on which all good things would depend, for Aristotle himself posits in *Metaphysics*.XII a certain good separated from the entire universe, [and] to which the entire universe is ordered as an army to the good of [its] leader.²⁹

In beginning this examination of works prior to the *SLE* where Aquinas discusses providence, I cited the lines from *Metaphysics*.XII which contain the example of the army.³⁰ In his commentary, Aquinas sees in those lines an answer to a question raised in the lines immediately preceding: Does the nature of the universe have its proper end in something separate from it, or in the order of its parts? In answer, Aquinas will claim the universe has as its end both a separated good and the intrinsic good of the order of its parts.³¹ As he turns directly to Aristotle's words to illustrate the presence in them of this doctrine, it is clear he believes the example of the army was proposed in part to make this point. But before commenting on the example itself, Aquinas reminds his reader of what Aristotle had already argued, that is, the existence of the prime mover, or the

28. Cf. Doig: *Aquinas on Metaphysics*, pp. 10-21; Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas*, p. 502.

29. *SLE*.I.6.87-93.S79: "...Aristoteles non intendit improbare opinionem Platonis quantum ad hoc quod ponebat unum bonum separatum a quo dependerent omnia bona, nam et ipse Aristoteles in XII Metaphysicae ponit quoddam bonum separatum a toto universo, ad totum universum ordinatur sicut exercitus ad bonum ducis." At the very beginning of the *SLE*, in I.1.10-14.S1, Aquinas's interest in Aristotle's example is shown when he cites the order of an army to its leader and refers to *Metaphysics*.XII in explaining the order the intellect imposes on things.

30. Cf. p. 113 above, with note 12.

31. *In XII Meta*.12.2628-2629: "Quaerit ergo Philosophus utrum natura totius universi habeat bonum et optimum, idest finem proprium, quasi aliquid separatum a se, vel habeat bonum et optimum in ordine suarum partium, per modum, quo bonum alicuius rei naturalis est sua forma. ...Prima enim ostendit, quod universum habet bonum separatum, et bonum ordinis."

separated good which is the end of and the good desired by the entire universe. Then, building on this doctrine, he proposes the principle which answers Aristotle's question. That is, all things having one end come together both in an order to the end and in an order to one another.³² The example of an army and its leader is then offered as the clarification and illustration of this notion of order.

As we see in an army, for the good of the army is both in the very order of the army, and in the leader who presides over the army; but the good of the army is more in the leader than in the order [of the army itself]. [This is so] because the end is more potent in goodness than the things ordered to the end. The order of the army is for the sake of fulfilling the good of the leader, namely, the leader's intent to gain victory. The converse, however, is not true, i.e., the leader's good is not for the sake of the good of the order [of parts of the army to one another and of the army to the leader].³³

In this explanation of the example, Aquinas sees the crucial support for the contention that the universe has both a good separated from it toward which it moves and an internal good in the order of its parts. All that remains for a commentator is to relate this notion of order to the broader question of the relation of the prime mover and the world. Here, the principle invoked is unexceptional in an Aristotelian or Thomist philosophy: because the meaning (*ratio*) of things ordered to an end is taken from the end, the order itself is "from" the end.³⁴ But in what sense is the order of the universe "from" the end? As if answering our question, Aquinas notes his presupposition of doctrines affirmed earlier in the commentary, namely, that the prime mover possesses intellect and will and is

32. *Ibid.*2629: "Dicit ergo primo, quod universum habet utroque modo bonum et finem. Est enim aliquod bonum separatum, quod est primum movens, ex quo dependet caelum et tota natura, sicut ex fine et bono appetibili, ut ostensum est. Et, quia omnia, quorum unum est finis, oportet quod in ordine ad finem convenient, necesse est, quod in partibus universi ordo aliquis inveniatur; et sic universum habet et bonum separatum, et bonum ordinis."

33. *Ibid.*2630: "Sicut videmus in exercitu: nam bonum exercitus est et in ipso ordine exercitus, et in duce, qui exercitu praesidet: sed magis est bonum exercitus in duce, quam in ordine: quia finis potior est in bonitate his quae sunt ad finem: ordo autem exercitus est propter bonum ducis adimplendum, scilicet ducis voluntatem in victoriae consecutionem; non autem e converso, bonum ducis est propter bonum ordinis."

34. *Ibid.*2631: "Et, quia ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex fine, ideo necesse est quod non solum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem, sed etiam quod a duce sit ordo exercitus..."

therefore the source of all order in the universe.³⁵

What could be clearer in this text from the final chapter of his commentary on *Metaphysics*.XII than Aquinas's conviction that Aristotle offered the example of the order of an army in illustration of the doctrine of the divine particular providence exercised by the prime mover who is God? Further, the doctrine of this final chapter of Aquinas's commentary agrees quite well with the intent guiding the commentary, namely, to counteract the views of others, in particular of Averroes and Albert, concerning Aristotle's notion of God. Both of these predecessors of Aquinas asserted in their commentaries that Aristotle had no proof of God other than that of the prime mover in the *Physics*.³⁶

This examination of Aquinas's discussion of providence and the use of Aristotle's example of the twofold order of an army was undertaken to discover additional evidence suggesting that Aquinas believed himself justified when, in *SLE*.I.14, he attributes to Aristotle a doctrine of providence. Rather than having introduced his Christian belief in divine particular providence, Aquinas has only proposed the philosophical doctrine of providence he found in *Metaphysics*.XII.

IMPERFECT HAPPINESS IN THIS LIFE. PERSONAL IMMORTALITY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR COMPLETE HAPPINESS IN A LIFE TO COME

These are the second and third "principles of Christian ethics" Jaffa finds Aquinas attributing to Aristotle in the *SLE*. Although Jaffa has listed these two principles separately, they will be treated together here. When Aquinas proposes the imperfection of happiness in this life, he couples this claim with another, namely, that perfect happiness is possible after death.³⁷ This last claim in turn

35. *Ibid.*: "Totus enim order universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet explicatur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet, quod a primo movente sit tota ordinatio universi."

36. Cf. Doig: *Aquinas on Metaphysics*, p. 400, for the pages referenced under "proof of God" in the Index. Also, pp. 383-86 for the general conclusion.

37. Agreeing with Jaffa is Bradley: *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, p. 404: "In formulating the doctrine of *beatitudo imperfecta*, Aquinas steps out of the Aristotelian framework; at this point, Aquinas ascends, in an explicitly theological way, from the likelihood of this-worldly unhappiness to the possibility of otherworldly happiness." Papadis: *Die Rezeption*, pp. 75-82 sees in the background of Aquinas's interpretation of "imperfect happiness" the doctrine of the beatific vision of God achievable by means

necessarily implies personal immortality. When we have examined the relevant evidence, I shall propose that the first two claims are proposed neither as religious beliefs nor as theological positions, but as philosophical doctrines Aquinas thought were held by Aristotle.

The doctrine of the impossibility of perfect happiness in this life first appears in the *SLE* when Aquinas speaks of Aristotle's phrase "blessed as men" (*beatos autem ut homines*). In *Ethics*.I.10, Aristotle asks whether, in view of the ever changing fortunes of life, anyone can be considered happy while still alive. The discussion concludes with the assertion that whenever he considers a living person "blessed," he will understand this to be "blessed as men." Actually, Aristotle is asserting that the happy person is one whose present life of virtue promises the continuance of the same kind of life in the future, despite ever changing fortune.³⁸ Given this context, "blessed as men" implies that happiness, as capable of realization in this life, is something imperfect in comparison with the abstract description of happiness as "perfect and self-sufficient and the end of activity."³⁹

In Aquinas's works, "blessed as men" first appears in an objection in the *Sentence-Commentary*, when the question is whether angels were created "blessed," that is, happy. An objection offers an affirmative answer based on the authority of Augustine. The latter had spoken of the angel's perseverance in happiness, and the objector interprets this as the effect of grace, not of nature. On this basis, the conclusion is had: to persevere in beatitude presupposes being created in a state of blessedness.⁴⁰ Aquinas's response contains his first use of "blessed as men," and Aristotle is mentioned as the expression's source.

As is so often the case in Aquinas's writings, the meaning of a response to an objection is most evident when seen in the context of the *corpus* of the

of infused virtues. In contrast, Livio Melina argues that Aquinas's stress on "the happiness of the present life" is his way of asserting that moral philosophy has a business of its own as legitimate as that of moral theology. Cf. *La Conoscenza morale. Linee di riflessione sul Commento di San Tommaso all'Etica Nicomachea* (Rome: Città Nuova Editrice, 1987) pp. 133-38.

38. Cf. *NE*.I.10.1101a14-21. Cf. *SLE*, p. 57 for the version Aquinas commented on. In lines a19-21, Aristotle writes: "Si autem ita, beatos dicimus viventium quibus existunt et existent quae dicta sunt, beatos autem ut homines."

39. *NE*.I.7.1097b20-21: "Perfectum itaque quid videtur et per se sufficiens felicitas, operatorum existens finis." Cf. *SLE*, p. 31.

40. *Sent*.II, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ag. 1.

article. There, Aquinas first asserts that beatitude or happiness is, for rational or intellectual beings, the most perfect activity of the intellect, namely, contemplation of God. Subsequently, the differing types of contemplation natural or proper to God, to angels, and to men are described. In this context, Aquinas remarks that angels, when created, enjoyed the contemplation of God natural or proper to themselves as angels, or, as he expresses it, "according to that time." Yet angels were from their creation capable of a higher form of contemplation, although unable to attain that contemplation except through divine assistance. Thus, angels were not created in the state of beatitude understood as perfect beatitude.⁴¹ - Although Aquinas does not, he could have said in this *corpus* that angels at their creation were "blessed as angels." In relation to the perfection the good angels were to receive by grace, the initial state was thus an imperfect one. - It is against this doctrinal background that Aquinas responds to the objection claiming angels were happy from the moment of their creation. Here is that response.

...Augustine named "beatitude" that natural vision of God by which the angels were not blessed simply speaking, since they were capable of greater perfection in some way, namely, according to that time, just as the philosopher says some in this life [are] blessed, not simply but as men.⁴²

Read in the light of the doctrine of the *corpus*, which is surely the correct procedure, Aquinas is seen in this response to use "blessed as men" to imply the imperfection of the happiness proper to human nature when it is compared to the perfection of a supernatural happiness open to man after death. Of course, such a comparison is not what Aristotle intended to convey by the expression.

However, the correct understanding of what Aristotle intended is found in a later section of the *Sentence-Commentary* when the question under discussion is "whether beatitude is had in this life." In the three *sed contra*, "beatitude" or "happiness" is understood respectively, as what cannot be lost, what is self-sufficient, and what is the greatest good. Contrary to the permanency of happiness is the fact of death; against self-sufficiency is the fact that human beings always desire to know more than they do, as well as desire to be rid of bodily infirmities; opposing the possession of the greatest good are the ever present evils that are mixed with good in this life. On these bases, Aquinas asserts

41. *Ibid.*, corpus.

42. *Ibid.*, ra. 1: "...Augustinus nominat 'beatitudinem' illam visionem dei naturalem; per quam tamen non erant beati simpliciter, cum majoris perfectionis capaces essent secundum quid, scilicet secundum tempus illud: sicut et philosophus, dicit aliquos in hac vita beatos, non simpliciter sed ut homines."

the impossibility of beatitude in this life.⁴³

The *corpus* that follows begins with the notion of human beatitude as involving the cessation of all desire, a condition consequent on achieving the end toward which the human person naturally moves.⁴⁴ Since such a conception of beatitude entails immobility and permanence, Aquinas notes various interpretations of these two conditions of happiness. Plato is said to have limited the permanence of happiness to the span of human life; as for the immobility of happiness, he proposed the unchanging character of the activity resulting in happiness. Aquinas explains that, according to Aristotle, this position intends that the happy person is he whose beatitude lasts until his death; however, an individual's condition, regardless of how perfect it may be, can always change this side of death, and so, no one could be judged happy until he is dead. But this doctrine Aristotle is said to oppose on the grounds that, when the person was alive and happy, he could not be said to be happy, but only when he is dead and no longer happy! Given this absurdity, Aristotle proposed his own view: beatitude, properly speaking, a permanent and immobile condition, is not possible for human beings; what however can be achieved is a modest share in permanence and unchangeableness in accord with human nature. Such a condition would consist in the possession of virtue so firm that the individual person could not easily be turned aside from acting virtuously. Those human persons having such a limited immobility, Aristotle would consider "blessed as men."⁴⁵

As summarized above, Aquinas has correctly explained Aristotle's position regarding "blessed as men." Further, with this exposition of Aristotle's

43. *Sent.* IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1d, sc. 1, 2, 3.

44. *Ibid.*, corpus: "...in voluntariis se habet appetitus finis, et eorum quae propter finem appetuntur, ad consecutionem finis; et ideo sicut quando res naturalis pervenit ad terminum, cessat motus ejus; ita voluntas cum habet quod quaerit, appetitus ejus desistit, conversus in amorem vel delectationem. Beatitudo ergo cum sit finis ad quem referuntur omnia desideria, oportet quod sit tale aliquid, quo habito nihil ulterius desiderandum restet."

45. *Ibid.*: "Unde philosophus ibidem ponit aliam sententiam de beatitudine, sive de felicitate; ut scilicet dicatur, quod beatitudo, secundum suam perfectam rationem, perpetuitatem et immobilitatem absolutam habeat. Sed secundum perfectam rationem beatitudo non est possibilis homini accidere; sed possibile est hominem esse in aliqua participatione ipsius, licet modica, et ex hoc eum dici beatum; et ideo non oportet hominem beatum esse perpetuum et immutabilem simpliciter, sed secundum conditionem humanae naturae; unde subjungit, beatos autem ut homines. Talis autem immutabilitas accidit homini quando sunt in ipso firmati habitus virtutum, ut non de facili posset deflecti ab actu secundum virtutem."

thought, an answer has been proposed to the question, "whether beatitude can be had in this life." Yet in terms of both the length of the *corpus* and the total doctrine of interest to Aquinas, our summary has reached only the midpoint of the article. Now, Aquinas proceeds to assert the unreasonableness of the answer he has just outlined. However, he does this, not as a theologian, but as a philosopher.

"Happiness or beatitude is commonly posited by everyone as the good proper to rational or intellectual nature," Aquinas asserts in beginning this second part of the discussion. Accordingly, wherever a rational or intellectual nature is had essentially, and not only in a participated way, there one must posit as the goal of that nature essential beatitude, that is, beatitude in the strict or complete sense, and not some share in beatitude. In addition, since the human person possesses what is essentially reason and intellect, we must admit the possibility of achieving true, essential beatitude, instead of just some share in it. Unless we agree with this conclusion, we will regard as natural the inevitable frustration of the human appetite, a frustration arising from what then would be the absolute impossibility of reaching the goal desired. Accordingly, since the changing conditions render beatitude impossible in this life, we must also admit that necessarily human persons can attain the end of their lives after death.⁴⁶ - Bearing on this discussion is Aquinas's statement in the opening book of this work: "...according to the philosopher, the ultimate end of human life is the contemplation of God. If therefore man cannot reach this end, he would have been constituted in vain. According to the philosopher, a reality is in vain which is oriented to an end it does not attain."⁴⁷

46. *Ibid.*: "Sed ista etiam positio non videtur esse rationabilis. Ab omnibus enim communiter ponitur quod felicitas, sive beatitudo, est bonum rationalis vel intellectualis naturae; et ideo oporteret ubi invenitur natura rationalis vel intellectualis per essentiam, et non solum per participationem, etiam beatitudo ponatur per essentiam, et non per participationem; et ideo cum in homine sit non solum aliqua redundantia intellectus, sicut est in brutis..., sed est in eis ratio et intellectus per essentiam; oporteret ponere quod ad veram beatitudinem quandoque pervenire possit, et non tantum ad aliquam beatitudinis participationem; alias appetitus naturalis intellectualis naturae quae est in homine, frustraretur. Beatitudo autem vera non potest poni in hac vita propter mutabilitates varias quibus homo subjacet; unde necesse est beatitudinem quae est finis humanae vitae, esse post hanc vitam." Guindon remarks that in this passage Aquinas corrects Aristotle "in the name itself of reason." See *Béatitude et Théologie morale*, pp. 209, 236.

47. *Sent.*I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, sc. 2: "...etiam secundum philosophum, ultimus finis humanae vitae est contemplatio dei. Si igitur ad hoc homo non posset pertingere, in vanum esset constitutus; quia vanum est, secundum philosophum, quod ad aliquem finem est, quem non attingit."

With this doctrine, Aquinas - as a philosopher - has completed, in a way Aristotle never intended, the latter's doctrine of happiness as the ultimate end of human nature. Notwithstanding, in the article from *Sentences*.IV being examined, Aquinas has not yet arrived at the end of all he wants to say on the topic of the attainment of happiness. Most of the detail he now presents however, and it principally concerns the position of Averroes on human happiness, is not pertinent to our present interest. However, important for present purposes is first, his statement of Averroes's position, namely, happiness is possible in this life through a connection with separated substances; second, the rejection of this position; and third, the statement closing the *corpus*: "The Philosopher came to a decision on this [limited] happiness in the book of *Ethics*; but he neither asserted nor denied the other [happiness] which is after this life."⁴⁸

The reason for summarizing at such length Aquinas's discussion of "whether happiness is had in this life" is this: the passage in the *SLE* so central for Jaffa's claim that Aquinas introduces his Christian belief relative to the imperfection of happiness in this life reads like a "thesis statement" for the discussion just noted in the *Sentence-Commentary*. The discussion in the latter contains both a correct statement of Aristotle's position of "blessed as men" and Aquinas's philosophical correction of and addition to it. As shall be argued below, the same can be asserted of the crucial passage in the *SLE*.

On three additional occasions prior to composing the *SLE*, Aquinas refers again to the Aristotle's expression, "blessed as men." In one chapter of the *Summa contra gentiles*, Aquinas offers 12 proofs "that the ultimate happiness of man is not in this life."⁴⁹ The longest of these cites "blessed as men" and attributes it to Aristotle. This particular argument begins by contrasting with the imperfect and participated cognition available to the human intellect the intellectual good of separated substances, i.e., their perfect cognition of God. This contrast permits the conclusion that human beings cannot have perfect happiness in this life, but only a share in happiness. Subsequently, Aquinas explains:

This appears to have been the view of Aristotle concerning happiness. Hence, after he has shown in *Ethics*.I, where he asks whether misfortune takes away happiness, that happiness lies in those virtuous activities which are most enduring in this life, he concludes that those persons in whom there is in this life the perfection of virtuous activity are "blessed as men," i.e., men who have

48. *Ibid.*.IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1d corpus: "...et de hac felicitate philosophus in lib. *Ethic.* determinat, aliam, quae est post hanc vitam, nec asserens nec negans."

49. *SCG*.III.48.

not achieved happiness simply speaking but in a human fashion.⁵⁰

Not only does Aquinas offer in this *Summa* the above correct interpretation of Aristotle just as he had earlier in the *Sentence-Commentary*, but he subsequently proposes a philosophical addition which leads to the same conclusion found in that earlier work, namely, that the ultimate human end can be attained after death. However, Aquinas arrives at this conclusion in a different manner, forced to develop a new argument by the context of his questions, that is, by the content of the eight proofs offered prior to the discussion of Aristotle's view.⁵¹

Aquinas begins by asserting that man occupies an intermediary position between the more perfect separated substances and the less perfect irrational creatures. Accordingly, man must achieve his ultimate end in a more perfect way than do the latter beings. About this, he notes that the desires of the latter group are quieted, e.g., heavy objects come to rest when they reach their proper place, and the desires of animals cease when their senses are satisfied. Even more so then must man's natural desires be quieted. Since this cannot be in this life, it must occur after death.⁵² Yet Aquinas's argument is not yet complete. Needed is the complementary doctrine we saw in the parallel passage of the *Sentence-Commentary*. Thus, he writes: "The desire of nature [for happiness] would be in vain if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore, man's natural desire is capable of fulfillment...after this life."⁵³

50. *Ibid.*: "Et haec videtur fuisse sententia Aristotelis de felicitate. Unde in I *Ethicorum*, ubi inquit utrum infortunia tollant felicitatem, ostenso quod felicitas sit in operibus virtutis, quae maxime permanentes in hac vita esse videntur, concludit illos quibus talis perfectio in hac vita adest, esse beatos ut homines, quasi non simpliciter ad felicitatem pertingentes, sed modo humano."

51. *Ibid.*: "Quod autem praedicta responsio [Aristotelis] rationes praemissas non evacuet, ostendendum est."

52. The part of Aquinas's presentation of interest is as follows. *Ibid.*: "Oportet igitur multo fortius quod, cum homo pervenerit ad suum finem ultimum, naturale eius desiderium quietetur. Sed hoc non potest fieri in vita ista. Ergo homo non consequitur felicitatem, prout est finis proprius eius, in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet ergo quod consequatur post hanc vitam."

53. *Ibid.*: "Impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane... Esset autem inane desiderium naturae si nunquam posset impleri. Est igitur implebile desiderium naturale hominis. Non autem in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod impleatur post hanc vitam. Est igitur felicitas ultima hominis post hanc vitam." Earlier, in *Ibid.*.II.55, he argues for the incorruptibility of intellectual substances on the basis of the natural

An additional element of Aquinas's presentation is a reference to Averroes's doctrine that man's ultimate happiness is to be achieved in this life through a connection with a separated substance. By remarking this doctrine, Aquinas adds the third of the elements that earlier in the *Sentence-Commentary* were brought forward in regard to the possibility of achieving perfect happiness in this life: (1) a correct explanation of Aristotle's "blessed as men"; (2) the claim that the exigencies of a natural desire force the conclusion that ultimate human happiness is attainable after death; and (3) the mention of Averroes's doctrine of perfect human happiness as possible in this life by a connection with the separated substances.

In the context of this reference to Averroes, Aquinas adds a statement of Aristotle's position: because the intellectual desire to know all things cannot be satisfied in this life, our happiness is not perfect, but only human.⁵⁴ Immediately subsequent, in what for Aquinas is an extraordinarily personal statement, he underlines the importance of the philosophical proofs just offered for the possibility of perfect happiness after death.

In this situation it is sufficiently evident what great anxiety these brilliant men suffered because of their doctrines. We will be freed from this anxiety if we propose, in agreement with the proofs offered above, that man can attain true happiness after this life when his soul exists in an immortal state...⁵⁵

desire for continued existence. The argument begins: "Impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane: natura enim nihil facit frustra. Sed quilibet intelligens naturaliter desiderat esse perpetuum: non solum ut perpetuetur esse secundum speciem, sed etiam individuum. Quod sic patet." Aquinas then proposes that natural desire is present in some things as a result of apprehension, in others from the inclination of natural principles. Both sorts of entities resist, each in its own way, whatever threatens corruption. In concluding, he writes: "Illa igitur quae ipsum esse perpetuum cognoscunt et apprehendunt, desiderant ipsum naturali desiderio. Hoc autem convenit omnibus substantiis intelligentibus. Omnes igitur substantiae intelligentes naturali desiderio appetunt esse semper. Ergo impossibile est quod esse deficiant." A shorter version of this argument is found in *ST.Ia.75.6c*.

54. *SCG.III.48*: "...Alexander et Averroes posuerunt ultimam hominis felicitatem non esse in cognitione humana, quae est per scientias speculativas, sed per continuationem cum substantia separata, quam esse credebant possibilem homini in hac vita. Quia vero Aristoteles vidit quod non est alia cognitio hominis in hac vita quam per scientias speculativas, posuit hominem non consequi felicitatem perfectam, sed suo modo."

55. *Ibid.*: "In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia. A quibus angustiis liberabimur si ponamus, secundum probationes

In the final two passages prior to the *SLE* in which "blessed as men" is cited, all three of the elements mentioned above are not presented. Undoubtedly, both the context and the audience for whom Aquinas writes in these final passages explain this absence.

In the *Prima secundae*, Aquinas asks whether beatitude is an activity. In responding to the objection that beatitude is eternal life, not an activity, he distinguishes between divine, angelic, and human beatitude. God's beatitude, while it is his essence and his being, is also his activity. In angels, beatitude is had by the one, continuous activity through which angels are joined to God himself. Human happiness too, inasmuch as it can be achieved in the present life, is according to an activity by which human beings are joined to God in contemplation. However, this human activity is not continuous, but rather a series of acts. For this reason, perfect beatitude is not had by human beings in this life.⁵⁶ "Hence, the Philosopher in *Ethics*.I, positing man's beatitude in this life, says it is imperfect, and concludes after much discussion, that we say [they are] blessed as men."⁵⁷ Again, we see that Aquinas has correctly proposed Aristotle as implying that human happiness is imperfect insofar as it necessarily falls short of an unattainable ideal of human activity.

Only a few articles later in the *Prima secundae*, Aquinas asks whether beatitude can be lost. The answer distinguishes between the "imperfect happiness such as can be had in this life," and the "perfect beatitude which is looked for in an after life." Regarding the former, contemplative happiness can be lost insofar as the habitus of science are lost through weakness; or because the cares of life come to occupy one's attention; as for active happiness, that too can fade away insofar as one's virtues can be replaced by vice.⁵⁸ Following this exposition, Aquinas turns to his authority in regard to happiness in this life. "Because the beatitude of this life can be lost - which seems to be contrary to the essence (*ratio*) of beatitude - the Philosopher says in *Ethics*.I, some are blessed in this life, not

praemissas, hominem ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortalis existente..."

56. *Ia-IIae*.3.2.ad4 um.

57. *Ibid.*: "Unde Philosophus, in I *Ethics*., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens: Beatos autem dicimus ut homines."

58. *Ibid*.5.4c.

simply, but as men whose nature is subject to change."⁵⁹

As we have seen, prior to composing the *SLE*, Aquinas cites Aristotle's "blessed as men" in five passages. These divide naturally into two groups. First, there is the passage from *Sent*.II, dist. 4, where the topic evoking the citation of "blessed as men" was completely foreign to the issue prompting the coining of the expression by Aristotle. Aquinas's topic in that place was whether angels were created blessed, and in citing "blessed as men" he followed the medieval practice so foreign to us of using an authoritative expression in a context other than that intended by the author of the expression. As for the second group of passages, these are the remaining four: *Sent*.IV, dist. 49, asking whether beatitude is had in this life; *SCG*.III.48, offering proofs that the ultimate happiness of man is not had in this life; *Ia-IIae*.3.2, asserting beatitude's condition as an activity; and *Ia-IIae*.5.4, discussing the possibility of losing beatitude. In these four cases, Aquinas cites "blessed as men" with the meaning intended by Aristotle, namely, the imperfect happiness actually possible in life as opposed to the ideal conception of happiness formed in moral philosophy.

In addition, whenever Aquinas's topic was identical to that of Aristotle, as it is in *Sent*.IV, dist. 49 and *SCG*.III.48, Aquinas makes the same three philosophical points we have mentioned, i.e., (1) human happiness is imperfect in this life, as is supported by Aristotle in asserting "blessed as men"; (2) the possibility of achieving perfect human happiness is proposed on the basis of the impossibility of the human natural desire being in vain, and (3) Averroes's doctrine of the attainment of happiness in this life through a connection with a separated substance is both noted and denied, at least implicitly. Against this background, we can profitably turn now to Aquinas's comment in *SLE*.I.16.

Three parts can be distinguished in Aquinas's comment. First, he sees Aristotle stating the conditions sufficient for calling someone happy in this life, namely, activity according to perfect virtue, activity supported by the presence of the external goods the activity presupposes, and this "through a long time."⁶⁰ Second, Aquinas finds that Aristotle subsequently describes human happiness in a somewhat more exalted way than that just used. This new way of speaking takes into account that happiness ought to result from the best sort of human life, namely, from virtuous activity through an entire life, completed by the proper sort of death. This reference to a proper death, Aquinas appears to imply, is needed lest we forget that, while the future is unknown, happiness remains the result of

59. *Ibid.*: "Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest, quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo Philosophus dicit, in I *Ethics*., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non simpliciter, sed sicut homines, quorum natura mutationi subiecta est."

60. *SLE*.I.16.198-204.S200.

the perfect and greatest life. It is of individuals who live in the way described both now and in the future that we can use the terms "blessed."⁶¹ At this point, Aquinas interprets the expression, "blessed as men," as well as offers the same philosophical addition found in *Sent.IV*, dist. 49 and *SCG.III.48*.

But because these things do not seem always to meet the conditions posited above for happiness, [Aristotle] adds that we call such persons blessed as men, who, in this life which is subjected to mutability, cannot have perfect beatitude. Because the desire of nature is not in vain, it can be rightly thought that perfect beatitude is reserved to man after this life.⁶²

In this passage of the *SLE*, quite evident are two of the elements noted in *Sent.IV*, dist. 49 and in *SCG.III.48*. The third element - Averroes's doctrine of human happiness as possible through a connection with separated substances - is also present in the *SLE*, although earlier in *SLE.I.14* and later in *SLE.X.13*.⁶³ However, one may wonder both why Aquinas mentioned in the *SLE* the possibility of attaining happiness after death and, since he did mention it, why he has not spelled out an argument as in previous works. The most likely answer to both questions is the same, namely, because the *SLE*'s subject matter is happiness in the present life, the identical subject matter discussed in the parallel passages of *Sent.IV*, dist. 49 and *SCG.III.48*. Aquinas speaks directly in all three places of this topic, as opposed to bringing in the doctrine of human happiness when the topic is either different (e.g., *Sent.II*, dist 4, where the topic was whether angels were created in a condition of beatitude), or concerns only aspects of human happiness (e.g., *Ia-IIae.3* and 5, where the discussion centered respectively on whether beatitude is an activity and whether beatitude can be lost). Thus, one has an explanation for why Aquinas introduces into the *SLE* the possibility of attaining happiness in an afterlife, as well as Averroes's notion of human happiness in this life.⁶⁴ But why does he not propose more extensively an

61. *Ibid.*205-18.S201.

62. *Ibid.*218-25.S202: "...sed quia ista videntur non usquequaque attingere ad condiciones supra de felicitate positas, subdit quod tales dicimus beatos sicut homines, qui in hac vita mutabilitati subiecta non possunt perfectam beatitudinem habere. Et quia non est inane naturae desiderium, recte aestimari potest quod reservatur homini perfecta beatitudo post hanc vitam."

63. Cf. *Ibid.*I.14.90-95.S170 and X.13.139-41.S2135.

64. If one examines only the texts of Aristotle and Aquinas, one might easily conclude that by the doctrine of imperfect happiness, "Aquinas ascends in an explicitly

argument for the possibility of attaining perfect happiness after death? Obviously, because he is engaged in presenting the meaning of Aristotle's *Ethics*. As is clear from an examination of the *SLE*, and even clearer if one compares Aquinas's commentary to the *Super Ethica* of Albert, Aquinas never introduces into the *SLE* more than is needed for the understanding of the *Ethics* and for the realization that Aristotle's moral thought does not contradict Aquinas's vision of Christian theology.⁶⁵

On two other occasions in the *SLE*, Aquinas refers to the limited happiness proper to man in this life, the doctrine Aristotle expresses as "blessed as men." On the first of these, Aquinas is discussing the freedom from the activity of daily living coincident with contemplative activity. He remarks that in this latter activity there seems "to exist all those things customarily attributed to the blessed." After mentioning a few of these, for example, self-sufficiency and freedom from daily activity, he asserts, "I say [these exist] as much as is possible to a man living a mortal life, in which type of life [these things] cannot exist perfectly."⁶⁶

Only two chapters later, Aquinas again raises the topic of the imperfection of happiness in this life. This time, both *Ethics.I* and "blessed as men" are cited. In this context, Aquinas has just asserted that, since the happiness of man is to be loved by God, the wise are most especially happy. This makes

theological way, from the likelihood of this-worldly happiness to the possibility of other worldly happiness." Cf. Bradley: *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, p. 404. An identical restriction to the texts of the *SLE* and the *Ethics* underlies the affirmation that "The whole of the Aristotelian happiness had therefore to be located in the imperfect happiness of the present life...With this framework of the Christian tradition made manifest, the commentary of Aquinas on the *Ethics*...occupies itself with explaining the text..., with only the occasional indication...that it is placing the whole consideration in a Christian setting." Cf. Owens: "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," p. 231.

65. Unlike Aquinas, Albert seldom misses the opportunity to raise in conjunction with each segment of his direct comment on Aristotle's words supplementary questions of interest to philosophers or theologians. For example, in regard to the passage containing the expression "blessed as men," Albert asks whether Aristotle needed to speak of the happy person as one who conquers misfortunes and who ends his life well. Cf. *Super Ethica.I.12*.p69,45-79.

66. *SLE.X.11.66-73.S2103*: "...sic igitur patet quod secundum huiusmodi operationem speculativam intellectus manifeste apparent omnia existere in homine quaecumque solent attribui beato, scilicet quod sit per se sufficiens et quod vacet et quod non labore, et hoc dico quantum possibile est homini mortalem vitam agentis, in qua vita huiusmodi non possunt perfecte existere."

clear, he remarks, that Aristotle sees the ultimate human happiness as lying in the activity of wisdom, a fact that refutes Averroes's contention that human happiness comes from a connection with the separated agent intellect.⁶⁷ Having made this point, Aquinas concludes by directing an aside to his reader to insure that the preceding discussion of man's ultimate happiness is not misunderstood.

We must take into account the fact that [Aristotle] does not posit perfect happiness in this life, but such happiness as can be appropriate to a human and a mortal life. Thus, he said above in Book I, "blessed as men."⁶⁸

It has been objected that these two references in *SLE.X* to Aristotle's notion of human happiness as imperfect are not justified. This objection is grounded in the conviction that Aristotle speaks in *Ethics.I* only of happiness consequent on the life of moral virtue; additionally, since the happiness spoken of in Book X is contemplative happiness, which may after all, according to our contemporary view of Aristotle, come to man as Averroes claims, Aquinas is said to have had no right to interpret contemplative happiness as imperfect - "blessed as men."⁶⁹

To this objection, there can be only one reply. What is important as concerns the *SLE* is first, whether Aquinas writes in accord with what he considers Aristotle to mean, and second, whether any additions on the part of Aquinas can be shown to have been regarded by him as rooted in philosophical argument. Consequently, the fact that Aquinas's account of Aristotle's words is not always in agreement with some, or even with all, contemporary exegesis is simply not *ad rem*.

We have been examining the presence in the *SLE* of the attribution to Aristotle of what have been called two "principles of Christian ethics." The first of these is the "belief that perfect happiness is impossible in this life"; the second, the "belief in the necessity of personal immortality to complete the happiness intended, evidently by nature." Our procedure has been to trace Aquinas's use of the expression "blessed as men" from its initial appearance in the Sentence-Commentary to its final appearance within the *SLE*. This examination did not

67. *Ibid.* 13.127-41.S2134-35.

68. *Ibid.* 141-44.S2136: "Attendendum etiam quod in hac vita non ponit perfectam felicitatem, sed talem qualis potest competere humanae et mortali vitae; unde et supra in I dixit: 'Beatos autem ut homines'."

69. This I take to be Jaffa's objection. Cf.: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, pp. 150-66.

reveal the attribution to Aristotle of Christian beliefs. Rather, it enabled us to see that Aquinas understood and, except for his initial use of it, correctly presented the meaning Aristotle intended for "blessed as men." Further, by tracing Aquinas's use of the expression, we discovered that in the *SLE*, as elsewhere, he completed Aristotle's doctrine of human happiness, not by interjecting some Christian belief, but by the addition of his own philosophically argued conviction that perfect happiness is open to man after death.⁷⁰

However, we have not yet finished with the topic of human immortality. Jaffa wisely formulated the doctrine of human immortality as a separate principle found in the *SLE*. In his comments on the *Ethics*, Aquinas seems to propose personal immortality as a truth that can be judged on its own, and not merely a doctrine implied in the need to conclude to the possibility of perfect happiness after death. To this separate affirmation of immortality, I now turn.

PERSONAL IMMORTALITY TAUGHT BY ARISTOTLE

Jaffa finds that Aquinas "virtually imputes" to Aristotle the doctrine of personal immortality. For instance, when Aristotle notes that some persons may wish for impossible things and then offers immortality as an example, Aquinas remarks that immortality "is impossible according to the state of this corruptible life."⁷¹ Or, there is Aquinas's comment on Aristotle's statement that, since happiness is an activity, and since the dead do not act, the dead are not happy. On this occasion, Aquinas asserts that "we must take into account the fact that the Philosopher does not speak here of the happiness of a future life, but of the happiness of the present."⁷² One could quite easily adduce other instances.⁷³ However, to do so seems pointless, just as there is no reason to contest the assertion that in the *SLE* Aquinas writes as if personal immortality were a doctrine

70. C. J. Pinto de Oliveira, in: "La finalité dans la morale thomiste," *Angelicum*, 69 (1972), pp. 301-26, suggests that Aquinas's emphasis on the doctrine of the natural desire to see God, which appears in the *SLE* as the desire for happiness; is explainable by reference to ecclesiastical reactions in the 1240s against Parisian Masters denying the possibility of the beatific vision. - Given the date of the *SLE*'s composition, this suggestion seems weak.

71. *SLE.III.5.155-65.S444.*

72. *Ibid.I.15.43-56.S180.*

73. Cf. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, pp. 146-48.

held by Aristotle. Of greater value is the effort to discover why and in what circumstances Aquinas became convinced that it is correct to attribute this doctrine to Aristotle.

Aquinas's *Sentence-Commentary* offers evidence that Aquinas is convinced that many of Aristotle's assertions permit the inference of the immortality of the human soul. As well, one finds that Aquinas recognized in Aristotle's writings the doctrine of an immortal intellect. Yet what one does not see in this early work is a willingness on the part of Aquinas to commit himself to a complete statement of Aristotle's doctrine on the soul. That is, does Aristotle hold the soul of each individual human being is a distinct intellectual and immortal soul? Aquinas offers no answer.

For example, *Sent. II*, dist. 19 asks, "whether the soul is corrupted when the body is." In each *sed contra*, and there are four, at least one work of Aristotle is cited as either proposing the soul is not corrupted or as asserting a doctrine from which the immortality of the soul can be inferred.⁷⁴ Yet the lengthy *corpus*, in presenting four possible positions on the question of the corruptibility of the soul, lists only these: the doctrine of the ancient naturalists, the view of Pythagoras and Plato, Averroes's conception, and "what our faith holds," which is of course that each human person has an incorruptible soul. Aristotle is mentioned here only twice. First, he is said to have "sufficiently checked [the doctrine of the naturalists] by showing the intellect has abstract being not dependent on the body; because of this the intellect is not said to be an act of the body."⁷⁵ Yet where or how Aristotle has shown this doctrine we are not told. The second mention of Aristotle in the *corpus* asserts that he "condemns" the position of Pythagoras and Plato, "showing in *De anima. I* that the soul is the form of the body and its motor."⁷⁶ The reader is again left to wonder what precisely is meant by soul. Additionally, in arguing against the ancient naturalists, Aquinas takes 35 lines to present a melange of doctrines from Avicenna and the *Liber de causis*, in contrast to the less than four occupied by Aristotle's two contributions.

74. E.g., *Sent. II*, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 1, sc. 1: "...dicit philosophus in II de anima, quod reliquum genus animae, scilicet intellectus, separatur ab aliis partibus animae, sicut perpetuum a corruptibili; et in I de anima, quod intellectus videtur substantia quaedam esse, et non corrumpi."

75. *Ibid.*, *corpus*: "Hanc autem opinionem Aristoteles, sufficienter infringit, ostendens intellectum habere esse absolutum, non dependens a corpore; propter quod dicitur non esse actus corporis." - The comma after "Aristoteles" appears to be misplaced.

76. *Ibid.*: "Et hanc positionem improbat philosophus in I de anima, ostendens quod anima est forma corporis et motor eius."

In this distinction 19, Averroes's response to the question concerning the corruptibility of the soul is sketched only briefly, but the reader is referred to an earlier discussion for its refutation. The earlier presentation, in distinction 17, answers the question, "whether the intellectual soul or the intellect is one in all men." In the unusually lengthy *corpus* of this question, Aristotle appears initially as the philosopher who proposed the distinction of the agent and possible intellects and thus created a puzzle that subsequent generations of philosophers have attempted to resolve.⁷⁷ The philosophers whose solutions are described and rejected are Alexander, Avempace, Avicenna, Themistius, Theophrastus, and Averroes. In rejecting these solutions, Aquinas never offers a solution described as "Aristotle's." Moreover, his use of Aristotle is limited to the mention of one or other doctrine of Aristotle that is contradicted by the solution being described. For instance, "But this cannot hold up according to the opinion of Aristotle, who wanted the possible intellect to be receptive of intelligible species." Or, "But this is impossible, because, according to the Philosopher in *De anima. III*, the phantasms which are in the imaginative power are related to the human intellect as colors are to sight."⁷⁸ Finally, when Aquinas proposes at considerable length his own view of how the agent and possible intellects are powers of the intellectual soul of each human being, no mention whatsoever is made of Aristotle.

Perhaps this reticence in detailing Aristotle's doctrine of the human soul had its basis in a lack of study of the *De anima* on Aquinas's part. But whatever may have been the cause, it was no longer operative on the next occasion the intellect and the human soul are discussed at length, namely, in Chapters 47-90 of *Summa contra gentiles. II* (between 1261 and 1265). Here, citations of Aristotle and references to what he has "proved" and "demonstrated" appear at every turn. It becomes very clear that Aquinas accepts as his own what he understands as Aristotle's doctrine of the human immortal soul. Yet the path which Aquinas follows in this *Summa* appears to reflect the conviction that the

77. *Ibid.*, dist. 17, q. 2, a. 1co.: "...in hoc fere omnes philosophi concordant post Aristotelem; quod intellectus agens et possibilis differunt secundum substantiam; et quod intellectus agens sit substantia quaedam separata... de intellectu autem possibili similiter fuit magna diversitas inter philosophos sequentes Aristotelem. ...et ad hanc positionem deducuntur qui ex demonstratione Aristotelis volunt habere, quod intellectus possibilis sit unus in omnibus."

78. These are the other two appeals to Aristotle: *Ibid.*, *corpus*: "...adhuc sequeretur quod illae species quae sunt ab aeterno in intellectu possibili, non essent abstracto ab aliquibus phantasmatibus; et hoc est contra intentionem et verba philosophi." "...quod est contra philosophum in VIII metaph., ubi dicitur animam corpori nullo mediante uniri..."

best way to propose his own doctrine is in the context of disproving what he considers the misinterpretations of Aristotle that have occurred. Notwithstanding the complexity and length of his treatment of the soul, the reason why he attributes to Aristotle the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul is readily evident if we trace out the relatively brief path suggested by an argument in the chapter proposing "that the human soul is not corrupted when the body is corrupted." There, Aquinas writes:

This [doctrine] also appears by the authority of Aristotle. He says in *De anima*.I, that the intellect is seen to be a certain substance and not to be corrupted. From what has been said, one sees that this cannot be understood of a separate substance which is either the possible or the agent intellect.⁷⁹

By this expression, "from what has been said" (*ex praemissis*), Aquinas surely refers particularly to Chapters 61 and 78. In these chapters, he intends to show that Averroes incorrectly interpreted Aristotle in understanding the possible and agent intellects as intellectual substances distinct from the human person. Thus, for our purposes, it will suffice to understand how Aquinas finds in Aristotle the doctrine that the agent and possible intellects are powers of the human soul.

In Chapter 61, whose subject is the possible intellect, Aquinas opens with this: "We will make evident that the aforesaid opinion [of Averroes regarding the possible intellect] is contrary to the doctrine of Aristotle."⁸⁰ The argument begins with one definition of the soul given in *De anima*.II: "the first act of an organic physical body having life in potency." Shortly after recalling this, Aquinas explains that Aristotle noted that this definition is universal, thus applicable to all souls.⁸¹ To this doctrine of the soul as the act of a body, Aquinas then adds a doctrine Aristotle proposes in the same chapter of *De anima*.II, namely, that parts of the soul are separable. Since Aristotle can only mean the intellectual parts when he refers to separable parts, Aquinas insists that it follows that the

79. *SCG*.II.79: "Hoc etiam apparet per auctoritatem Aristotelis. Dicit enim, in I de Anima, quod intellectus videtur substantia quaedam esse, et non corrupti. Quod autem hoc non possit intelligi de aliqua substantia separata quae sit intellectus possibilis vel agens, ex praemissis haberi potest."

80. *Ibid*.61: "...ostendemus manifeste quod praedicta opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis."

81. *Ibid*.: "Primo quidem, quia Aristoteles, in II de anima, definit animam dicens quod est actus primus physici corporis organici potentia vitam habentis: et postea subiungit quod haec est definitio universaliter dicta de omni anima."

intellectual parts, although separable, are the act of a body.⁸²

Because Averroes interpreted Aristotle's definition of the soul as equivocally predicated of the human soul and of the intellect, Aquinas proceeds to the explanation of the "correct interpretation" of a key text used by Averroes. The text is found in a later passage of the same chapter of *De anima*.II and reads: "Nothing is yet clear regarding the intellect and the perspective power [i.e., the power that aims at comprehension, or the speculative power],⁸³ but it seems to be another kind of soul."⁸⁴ By this statement, Aquinas explains, Aristotle did not mean that the universal definition of soul does not apply to the intellect; he meant only that the intellectual part of the soul differs from the sensitive and nutritive parts. To explain what he meant by "another" kind of soul, Aristotle added: "And this alone [i.e., the intellect] can be separated as the everlasting is from the corruptible." Further, by asserting, "Nothing is yet clear regarding the intellect," Aristotle did not intend, as Averroes thought, that we do not know whether the intellect is a soul. If Aristotle had said, "Nothing has yet been stated," Averroes would have had reason for his interpretation; but Aristotle's words were, "Nothing is yet clear," that is, while we know the intellect is a soul, we do not yet understand what is proper to it.⁸⁵ - Regardless of the level of Aquinas's knowledge of the *De anima* at the time of the earlier *Sentence-Commentary*, in writing this chapter of the *Summa contra gentiles*, he felt confident in proposing his

82. *Ibid*.: "Postmodum autem, in eodem capitulo, subiungit esse quasdam partes animae separabiles. Quae non sunt nisi intellectivae. Relinquitur igitur quod illae partes sunt actus corporis."

83. On the meaning of "*perspectiva potentia*," cf. Ray J. Deferrari: *A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Boston: St. Paul Edit., 1986), p. 810. See also, Aquinas: *SLDA*.II.4.106-07.P268.

84. *De anima*.II.1.413b24-25: "De intellectu autem et perspectiva potentia, nichil adhuc manifestum est, set videtur genus alterum anime esse..." Cf. *SLDA*, p. 82.

85. *SCG*.II.61: "Nec est contra hoc quod postea subiungit: De intellectu autem et perspectiva potentia nihil est adhuc manifestum, sed videtur animae alterum genus esse. Non enim per hoc vult intellectum alienare a communi definitione animae, sed a propriis naturis aliarum partium:... Unde, et ostenderet in quo dixerit alterum, subiungit: Et hoc solum contingit separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. - Nec est intentio Aristotelis, ut Commentator praedictus fingit, dicere quod nondum est manifestum de intellectu utrum intellectus sit anima, sicut de aliis principis. Non enim textus verus habet, nihil est declaratum, sive, nihil est dictum, sed, nihil est manifestum: quod intelligendum est quantum ad id quod est proprium ei, non quantum ad communem definitionem."

interpretation of Aristotle's thought on the soul.

As if what he had thus far said were not enough to show that Aristotle regarded the possible intellect as a separable part of the human soul, Aquinas offers three more arguments, each dependent on some text of the *De anima*. (1) The intellect is among the soul's powers since Aristotle named it the "perspective power," and man's powers are not external to the soul. (2) In speaking of the possible intellect, Aristotle calls it the part of the soul by which the soul knows and has wisdom. (3) Aristotle proposes the nature of the possible intellect when he says it is the intellect by which the soul opines and understands.⁸⁶

Whether or not one agrees with Aquinas's interpretation, nothing could be clearer in Chapter 61 than that he intends to explain how he finds in Aristotle the doctrine of the possible intellect as a separable part of the soul and yet, an act of the body. In Chapter 78, he intends to do the same in regard to Aristotle's doctrine of the agent intellect.

In the opening sentence of Chapter 78, Aquinas gives us this statement of his intention: "We must show from Aristotle's words that he did not hold that the agent intellect is a separate substance."⁸⁷ The arguments Aquinas then sets forth cite statements of Aristotle which are subsequently interpreted as entailing that the agent intellect is part of the human soul. The first of these arguments is sufficient for our purpose. (As shall be noted below, this argument is one Aquinas reuses at several later stages of his career.)

Aquinas first asserts that, according to Aristotle, the same differences are found in the soul that are found in every nature. There is something that resembles matter and which is potential to everything within a certain genus; yet there is also a cause, which like an efficient cause, makes everything within the genus. These two types of things are considered by Aristotle to be in the soul necessarily. The material-like element is the possible intellect "in which all things become intelligible." The other element, resembling an efficient cause, is the agent intellect, or "that whose power extends to making all things." In Aristotle's words, we see, Aquinas asserts, both that the agent and possible intellects are "differences" of the soul, and that they are in the soul. Consequently, neither

86. By way of example, here is the second of the arguments. *Ibid.*: "Item. In III *de Anima*, incipiens loqui de intellectu possibili, nominat eum partem animae, dicens: De parte autem animae qua cognoscit anima et sapit. In quo manifeste ostendit quod intellectus possibilis est aliquid animae."

87. *SCG.II.78*: "...ostendendum est ex verbis eius [i.e., Aristotelis] quod ipse hoc non sensit de intellectu agente, quod sit substantia separata."

agent nor possible intellect is a separate substance.⁸⁸

From Chapter 61 we know that the possible intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul, while from Chapter 78 we know that the agent intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul. With this information, we can return to the argument cited earlier relative to the incorruptibility of the human soul:

This [doctrine] also appears by the authority of Aristotle. He says in *De anima*.I, that the intellect is seen to be a certain substance and not to be corrupted. From what has been said [i.e., in Chapters 61 and 78], one sees that this cannot be understood of a separate substance which is either the possible or the agent intellect.⁸⁹

On the basis of these readings of Aristotle proposed in the *Summa contra gentiles*, it appears incorrect to charge Aquinas with introducing his religious beliefs whenever, in the *SLE*, he attributes to Aristotle the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul.

In works subsequent to this *Summa*, Aquinas reiterates his interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the human soul. However, in the *Q.D. De anima* (1265-1266), Aquinas's thought is not focused as directly on Aristotle's doctrine, but as befits a disputed question, he treats more exclusively issues touching directly on the nature of soul, for instance, "whether the human soul can be a form and a particular thing," and "whether the soul separated from the body can have an act of intellection."⁹⁰ Notwithstanding, Aquinas clearly indicates his interpretation of Aristotle as well as his implicit rejection of typically Averroist doctrine. For

88. *Ibid.*: "Dicit enim, primo, quod, sicut in omni natura est aliquid quasi materia in unoquoque genere, et hoc est in potentia ad omnia quae sunt illius generis; et altera causa est quasi efficiens, quod facit omnia quae sunt illius generis, sicut se habet ars ad materiam: necesse est et in anima esse has differentias. Et huiusmodi quidem, scilicet quod in anima est sicut materia, est intellectus (possibilis) in quo fiunt omnia intelligibilia. Ille vero, qui in anima est sicut efficiens causa, est intellectus in quo est omnia facere (scilicet intelligibilia in actu), idest intellectus agens... Ex his manifeste habetur quod intellectus agens non est substantia separata, sed magis aliquid animae: expresse enim dicit quod intellectus possibilis et agens sunt differentiae animae, et quod sunt in anima. Neutra ergo earum est substantia separata." Aquinas is referring to *De anima*.III.5.430a10-16; cf. *SLDA*, p. 218. Aristotle's text and Aquinas's comment on it are found, respectively, in notes 109 and 110 on page 147 below.

89. *SCG.II.79*; cf. note 79 on page 138 above.

90. *Q.D. de anima*, q. un., aa. 1 & 15.

instance, subsequent to objections arguing against the existence of an agent intellect," the *sed contra* follows the example of *Summa contra gentiles*.II.78 by referring to *De anima*.III's doctrine of the need in every nature of both a material element and a second element resembling an agent cause; here, in this disputed question, the material element is styled "what is in potency" and the causal element, the "agent." Aquinas concludes as he did in the *Summa contra gentiles*: as concerns the soul, the potential element is the possible intellect and the active element, the agent intellect.⁹¹ The very next article also contains a *sed contra* offering the identical argument, although now in terms closer to those of the *Summa contra gentiles*.⁹²

In regard to the immortality of the soul, Aquinas argues here in the *Q.D. de anima* much as he did in *Summa contra gentiles*.II.79. That is, because Aristotle holds the intellect to be incorruptible, and because the agent and possible intellects are parts of the human soul, the human soul is incorruptible.⁹³

Just as Aristotle's doctrine of the soul makes an appearance, so too Averroes's view of the possible intellect does not pass unnoticed and uncriticized. The discussion of the human soul necessitated speaking of the possible and agent intellects. As in his earlier writings, here in this disputed question, Aquinas does not appear able to speak of these intellectual powers without responding to Averroes's doctrine that they are distinct from the human soul.⁹⁴

91. *Ibid.*, q. un., a. 4: "Sed contra, est ratio Aristotelis in III *de Anima*; quod cum in omni natura sit agens et id quod est in potentia, oportet haec duo in anima esse, quorum alterum est intellectus agens, alterum intellectus possibilis."

92. *Ibid.*, a. 5: "Sed contra 1. Est quod dicitur in V [read: "III"] *de Anima*: quod sicut in omni natura est aliquid, hoc quidem ut materia aliud autem quod est factivum, ita necesse est in anima esse has differentias; ad quorum unum pertinet intellectus possibilis, ad alterum intellectus agens. Uterque ergo intellectus, possibilis scilicet et agens, est aliquid in anima." The text of *SCG*.II.78 is in note 88 above.

93. *Ibid.*, a. 14: "...necesse est quod [principium intellectivum] est incorruptibilis. Et hoc est quod etiam Philosophus dicit quod intellectus est quoddam divinum et perpetuum. Ostensum est autem in praecedentibus quaestionibus quod principium intellectivum quo homo intelligit, non est aliqua substantia separata; sed est aliquid formaliter inhaerens homini, quod est anima, vel pars animae. Unde relinquitur ex praedictis quod anima humana sit incorruptibilis." The text of *SCG*.II.79 is found above in note 79 on page 138.

94. *Ibid.*, a. 2, where Averroes is named and criticism offered of his position on the connection of the possible intellect to the human body; a. 3, where Averroes's doctrine on the unicity of the possible intellect is criticized, although Averroes is not named; a.

In the two works later than the *Sentence-Commentary* that have thus far been examined, Aquinas always introduced into the discussion of human personal immortality both the doctrines of Aristotle and their interpretations by Averroes. But Aquinas proceeds somewhat differently in the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae* insofar as the discussion of the soul's immortality is carried through with no mention of Aristotle or his work.⁹⁵ However, when he argues that the human intellectual principle is the form of the human body, he offers what he asserts is Aristotle's demonstration as found in *De anima*.II. Paraphrased, that argument is this:

Everything acts in virtue of its form, and so, the human body lives by its form, the soul. Thus, the human soul is the first act by which we perform the activities found in human life, namely, nutrition, sensation, locomotion, and acts of intellect. Necessarily then, the form of the human body is the principle of intellectual activity, i.e., the intellect.⁹⁶

The above demonstration proposed in the *Prima pars* is substantially the demonstration Aquinas notes in his *De anima-Commentary*, a work completed the same year as the *Prima pars*.⁹⁷

5, where again Averroes is not mentioned, although the doctrine of a separate agent intellect is criticized.

95. Cf. *ST. Ia*.75.6.

96. *Ibid.*.76.1: "...necesse est dicere quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuitur.... Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu: unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima: anima enim est primum quod nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis. - Et haec est demonstratio Aristotelis in II *De anima*."

97. *SLDA*.II.1.163-240.P219-23: "Sciendum autem est quod hec explanatio [idest, ratio vitae est "quod per se ipsum habet alimentum, augmentum et decrementum"] magis est per modum exempli quam per modum diffinitionis: non enim ex hoc solo quod aliquid habet augmentum et decrementum vivit, set etiam ex hoc quod sentit et intelligit et alia opera vite exercere potest; unde in substantiis separatis est vita ex hoc quod habent intellectum et voluntatem, ut patet in XI [read: "XII"] Metaphisice, licet non sit in eis augmentum et alimentum; ... Propria autem ratio vite est ex hoc quod aliquid est natum

In this commentary, Averroes's doctrine of the intellect is discussed and refuted as unfaithful to the teachings of Aristotle. The argument for the immortality of the soul as proposed in *Summa contra gentiles*.II.79 is relevant here. That argument can be rephrased in this fashion:

The intellect is seen to be a certain substance not to be corrupted.
Aristotle understood the intellect in its agent and possible powers to be part of the human soul, not separated from it.
Therefore, for Aristotle the human soul, in regard to its intellectual part, is not corrupted.⁹⁸

The crucial elements of this argument are found once again in Chapters 1 and 4 of Aquinas's comment on *De anima*.III, where Averroes's doctrines are proposed as contrary to Aristotle's words.⁹⁹

In Chapter 1, after his direct comment on Aristotle's text, Aquinas explains that Aristotle's words had deceived some readers to such an extent that they posited as Aristotle's the doctrine of the possible intellect as a separate substance. In his rebuttal of this reading of Aristotle, Aquinas cites several of Aristotle's phrases as pointing to the error of the above interpretation. First, there

movere se ipsum, large accipiendo motum, prout etiam intellectualis operatio motus quidam dicitur,... Concludit ergo primo ex predictis quod, cum corpora phisica maxime videantur esse substancie et omne corpus habens vitam sit corpus phisicum, necesse est dicere quod omne corpus habens vitam sit substancia et, cum sit ens actu, necesse est quod sit substancia composita. Quia vero cum dico corpus habens vitam, duo dico, scilicet quod est *corpus et quod est huiusmodi corpus*, scilicet habens vitam, non potest dici quod illa pars corporis habentis vitam que dicitur corpus sit anima: per animam enim intelligimus id quo habens vitam vivit, unde oportet quod intelligatur sicut aliquid in subiecto existens..., corpus autem quod recipit vitam *magis est sicut subiectum et materia* quam sicut aliquid *in subiecto* existens. Sic igitur, cum sit triplex substancia, scilicet compositum, materia et forma, et anima non est ipsum compositum,... neque est materia,... relinquitur... quod anima sit substancia sicut forma vel species talis corporis, scilicet corporis phisici habentis in potencia vitam. Dicit autem habentis vitam potencia, et non simpliciter habentis vitam: nam corpus habens vitam intelligitur ad vitam sicut composita vivens...; materia autem corporis vivi est id quod comparatur ad vitam sicut potencia ad actum, et hic actus est anima, secundum quam corpus vivit,... Et ne aliquis crederet quod anima sic esset actus sicut aliqua forma accidentalis actus est, ad hoc removendum subdit quod anima est sic *substancia sicut actus*, id est sicut forma..."

98. Cf. page 138 above, with note 79.

99. Chapters 1 and 4 of the Leonine edition of *SLDA*.III are *lectiones* 7 and 10 of Book III of the Pirotta edition of the commentary.

is Aristotle's statement in regard to his discussion of the possible intellect; "I call 'intellect' that by which the soul opines and understands."¹⁰⁰ This assertion, Aquinas explains, means that each individual person formally understands by the possible intellect. To understand "formally" is to have the reality of understanding, and that, in turn, is to understand by a form or power that is really one's own. Hence, the possible intellect, or the form by which the individual understands, cannot be an intellectual substance separated in being from the individual.¹⁰¹ Second, the words with which Aristotle opens his chapter on the possible intellect show the falsity of the notion that the possible intellect is a being separate from the human soul: "However, concerning the part of the soul by which the soul knows..."¹⁰² Third, immediately subsequent to those words, Aristotle proceeds to ask whether the soul understands "by something separate or by something not separate in magnitude but in reason [or meaning]."¹⁰³ Thus, Aristotle's procedure does not close off the possibility that the intellect is a part of the human soul.¹⁰⁴ Finally - although this repeats the first citation above -

100. *De anima*.III.4.429a23. Cf. *SLDA*, p. 201.

101. *Ibid*.III.1.284-305.P690: "Si autem intelligit, oportet quod aliquo, formaliter loquendo, intelligat; hoc autem est intellectus possibilis, de quo Philosophus dicit: 'Dico autem intellectum quo intelligit et opinatur anima'; intellectus igitur possibilis est quo hic homo, formaliter loquendo, intelligit. Id autem quo aliquid operatur sicut activo principio potest secundum esse separari ab eo quod operatur, ut si dicamus quod ballivus operatur per regem quia rex movet eum ad operandum; set impossibile est id quo aliquid formaliter operatur separari ab eo secundum esse; quod ideo est quia nichil agit nisi secundum quod est actu; sic igitur aliquid formaliter aliquo operatur sicut eo fit actu; non autem fit aliquid aliquo ens actu si sit separatum ab eo secundum esse; unde impossibile est quod illud quo aliquid agit formaliter sit separatum ab eo secundum esse; impossibile est igitur quod intellectus possibilis quo homo intelligit quandoque quidem in potencia quandoque autem in actu sit separatus ab eo secundum esse."

102. *Ibid*.358-63.P696: "Manifestum est etiam quod hec positio est contra intentionem Aristotilis. Et primo quidem quia Aristotiles hic inquit 'de parte anime': sic enim hunc tractatum incipit; unde manifestum est quod intellectus possibilis est pars anime et non est substancia separata."

103. *De anima*.III.4.429a11-12. Cf. *SLDA*, p. 201.

104. *Ibid*.III.1.363-68.P697: "Item, ex hoc quod ipse procedit ad inquirendum de intellectu sive sit separabilis subiecto ab aliis partibus anime sive non: unde patet quod suus processus stat etiam si intellectus subiecto non sit separabilis ab aliis partibus anime."

Aristotle asserted the intellect was that by which the soul understands. From all these phrases, Aquinas concludes that Aristotle is not proposing that the intellect is separated from the soul as a separate substance.¹⁰⁵ To this rejection of the Averroist interpretation as untrue to Aristotle, Aquinas adds a concluding remark about the adjective “separated” used when Aristotle said, “The sensitive part is not without a body; however, this [i.e., the intellect] is separated.”¹⁰⁶ By “separated” is meant that the intellect does not have a bodily organ as do the senses. This fact in turn can be traced to the human soul as transcending the capability of matter: the human body cannot totally “include” or take into itself the being and the power of the human soul. As a consequence, the soul has an action in which the body has no share. Hence, the intellect is separate from the body in this respect.¹⁰⁷

In the above, Aquinas did not assert the soul was incorruptible. However, the weight of Aquinas’s argument for the incorruptibility of the soul in the *Summa contra gentiles*.II.79 fell on the subordinate proof that the possible and agent intellects are part of the human soul. In Book III, Chapter 4 of the *De anima-Commentary*, in the context of arguing that the agent intellect too is part of the human soul, Aquinas implies the soul’s incorruptibility.

In this Chapter 4, after explaining that the agent intellect, like the possible intellect, is part of the soul, Aquinas explains how Aristotle’s intention is contradicted by those positing the agent intellect as a separate substance, different in substance from the possible intellect. Aquinas affirms that Aristotle “expressly says” the agent and possible intellects are in the soul, that is, that they are “parts or potencies of the soul, not some separate substances.”¹⁰⁸ The passage where

105. *Ibid.*368-72.P698: “Item, per hoc quod dicit quod intellectus est quo anima intelligit. Hec enim omnia ostendunt quod Aristotiles non dixit intellectum esse separatum sicut sunt substantie separate.”

106. *De anima*.III.4.429b5. Cf. *SLDA*, p. 201.

107. *Ibid.*III.1.375-83.P699: “...dicitur enim ‘separatus’ intellectus, quia non habet organum sicut sensus. Et hoc contingit quia anima humana propter sui nobilitatem supergreditur facultatem materie corporalis et non potest totaliter includi ab ea; unde remanet ei aliqua actio in qua materia corporalis non communicat et propter hoc potencia eius ad hanc actionem non habet organum corporale, et sic intellectus est separatus.”

108. *Ibid.*4.122-27.P736: “Est etiam predicta positio contra Aristotilis intentionem qui expresse dicit has duas differentias, scilicet intellectum agentem et intellectum possibilem, esse in anima, ex quo expresse dat intelligere quod sint partes vel potencie anime et non alique substantie separate.”

Aristotle “expressly” proposes this doctrine is the following on which Aquinas commented at the beginning of this Chapter 4:

Because just as in every nature, there is something material in every genus whatsoever (this is all that in potency), [and] another thing [that is] the cause and the maker, which in making everything is like art is to matter, necessarily there are in the soul these differences, and of this sort are the intellect in which all are made [and] the intellect by which all are made...¹⁰⁹

The above is the same passage Aquinas cited in the discussion of Aristotle’s doctrine in *Summa contra gentiles*.II.78 and in articles 3 and 4 of the *Q.D. de anima*. Naturally, Aquinas experiences no difficulty in explaining that here Aristotle proposes the possible and agent intellects as parts of the human soul.¹¹⁰

To complete the argument for the immortality of the human soul, all that is needed is some doctrine similar to what we found in *Summa contra gentiles*.II.79, namely, a statement that the intellect is incorruptible. This doctrine too is found in the Chapter 4 we are examining when Aquinas comments on these words: “This alone is separate which truly is. And this alone is immortal and everlasting.”¹¹¹ In these words, Aquinas finds Aristotle positing the conditions of both parts of the intellect; there is no other way to understand them, Aquinas asserts. By “separated,” Aristotle means that intellectual activity is not the activity of any corporeal organ. It was said at the beginning of Book III that, if any activity of the soul is proper to the soul, i.e., involves only the soul, then the

109. *De anima*.III.5.430a10-16 (*SLDA*, p. 218): “Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura est aliquid hoc quidem materia in unoquoque genere (hoc autem est potencia omnia illa), alterum autem causa et factivum, quod in faciendo omnia ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse est in anima esse has differentias, et est huiusmodi quidem intellectus in quod omnia fiunt, ille vero quo omnia est facere...”

110. *Ibid.*III.4.8-22.P728: “...primo ostendit esse intellectum agentem preter intellectum possibilem... Ponit ergo circa primum talem rationem: in omni natura que est quandoque in potencia et quandoque in actu oportet ponere aliquid quod est sicut materia in unoquoque genere (quod scilicet est in potencia ad omnia que sunt illius generis), et aliud quod est sicut causa agens et factivum, quod ita se habet in faciendo omnia sicut ars ad materiam; set anima secundum partem intellectivam quandoque est in potencia et quandoque in actu, necesse est igitur in anima intellectiva esse has differentias, ut scilicet sit unus intellectus in quo possunt omnia intelligibilia fieri (et hic est intellectus possibilis, de quo supra dictum est) et alius intellectus sit ad hoc quod possit omnia intelligibilia facere in actu (qui vocatur intellectus agens)...”

111. *De anima*.III.5.430a22. Cf. *SLDA*, p. 218.

soul is separate. In accord with this, Aristotle concludes that the intellectual part of the soul is incorruptible and everlasting. Further, by "everlasting," is meant only that the soul will always be, not that it always was in the past. "This is why *Metaphysics*.XII asserts that form is never prior to matter, but the soul remains after matter, 'not every form, but the intellect'."¹¹²

Without a doubt, the *Commentary on the De anima* makes clear that Aquinas believed strongly that Aristotle taught the immortality of the human soul, and that Aristotle based this doctrine on the separation from matter of the soul's intellectual activity.¹¹³ Moreover, no Parisian Master could have failed to recognize this belief on the part of Aquinas after the publication in late 1270 of his *De unitate intellectus*.

Aquinas has but one goal in the *De unitate intellectus*. As he expressly states, he intends to refute the Averroist doctrine of the intellect, namely, that the intellect called "possible" by Aristotle and "material" by Averroes is one substance separated in being from the human body, a substance not united to the body as its form, but serving as the intellect for all human individuals.¹¹⁴ To explain the procedure to be adopted in this refutation, Aquinas asserts, "We will first show that the aforesaid position is completely repugnant to Aristotle's words and opinions."¹¹⁵

112. *Ibid.*.III.4.198-220.P742-43: "Deinde cum dicit: *Separatus autem*, ponit condiciones totius intellective partis... Dicit ergo primo quod *solus* intellectus *separatus* est hoc quod vere est. Quod quidem non potest intelligi neque de intellectu agente neque de intellectu possibili tantum, set de utroque, quia de utroque supra dixit quod est separatus; et sic patet quod hic loquitur de tota parte intellectiva, que quidem dicitur separata ex hoc quod habet operationem sine organo corporali. Et quia in principio huius libri dixit quod, si aliqua operatio anime sit propria ei, contingit animam separari, concludit quod hec sola pars anime, scilicet intellectiva, est incorruptibilis et perpetua; ... Dicitur autem perpetua non quia semper fuerit, set quia semper erit; unde Philosophus dicit in XI [read: "XII"] *Methaphisice* quod forma nunquam est ante materiam, set posterius remanet anima, 'non omnis set intellectus'."

113. Aquinas's understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of the possible and agent intellects may have been influenced by his interpretation of the two definitions of the soul in *De anima*.II.1-2. A similar case can be made concerning Averroes's understanding of these Aristotelian doctrines. Cf. James C. Doig: "Toward Understanding Aquinas' 'Com. in de anima'. A Comparative Study of Aquinas and Averroes on the Definition of Soul ('De anima' B, 1-2)," *Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica*, 66 (1974) pp. 436-74.

114. *De unit. intel.*, c. 1, p. 291,7-19.S173.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 291,37-38.S174.

While Aquinas discusses at great length Aristotle's words found in the *De anima*, the following, which contains elements from *Metaphysics*.XII and *De anima*.III, suffices for our purpose. Aquinas begins with this statement of his intention: "We will show by the words of Aristotle that he posited in such a way the intellectual soul as the form [of the human body] that he nonetheless posited it as incorruptible."¹¹⁶ Subsequent to this statement, Aquinas cites *Metaphysics*.XII and then argues much as he did in the *De anima-Commentary*:

In *Metaphysics*.XII, after he showed that forms do not pre-exist matter..., he asked whether any form remains after matter, and he said: "...In some cases nothing prevents it, e.g., the soul is of this type, not every soul, but the intellect..." Therefore, it is clear that he says that nothing prohibits the soul, whose intellectual part is the form, from remaining after the body, even though it did not exist before the body.¹¹⁷

Now that he has shown "from the aforementioned words of Aristotle" that the intellectual part of the human form or soul remains after the death of the body, Aquinas turns to other words of Aristotle for the explanation of this survival of the soul. First, he finds in the following from the *De anima* the reason why the intellect alone survives: "That alone is separate which truly is; this alone is immortal and everlasting."¹¹⁸ Pursuing the matter further, Aquinas next refers to these words of the *De anima*.I:

116. *Ibid.*, p. 297,576 - p. 298,579.S195: "...ostendendum est per verba Aristotilis, quod sic posuit intellectivam animam esse formam quod tamen posuit eam incorruptibilem."

117. *Ibid.*, p. 298,580-93.S196: "In undecimo [read: "duodecimo"] enim *Methaphisice*, postquam ostenderit quod forme non sunt ante materias,... inquit utrum aliqua forma remaneat post materiam: et dicit sic...: '...In quibusdam enim nichil prohibet, ut si anima huiusmodi est, non omnis sed intellectus...' Patet ergo quod animam, que est forma quantum ad intellectivam partem, dicit nichil prohibere remanere post corpus, et tamen ante corpus non fuisse."

118. *Ibid.*, p. 298,600-12.S197: "Cum igitur, secundum praemissa Aristotilis verba, hec forma quae est anima, post corpus remaneat, non tota sed intellectus, considerandum restat quare magis anima secundum partem intellectivam post corpus remaneat, quam secundum alias partes, et quam alie forme post suas materias. Cuius quidem rationem ex ipsis Aristotilis verbis assumere oportet: dicit enim: 'Separatum autem est solum hoc quod vere est; et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est.' Hanc igitur rationem assignare videtur quare hoc solum immortale et perpetuum esse videtur, quia hoc solum est separatum."

"If there is a work or a passion proper to the soul, it belongs to the soul to be separated [from the body]; however, if no work or passion is proper to the soul, the soul cannot be separated."¹¹⁹

Continuing, Aquinas explains that the reason for positing separation or non-separation from matter as the consequence of the recognition of a certain type of work or passion is this: each thing acts in conformity with its being. Accordingly, if a form has a proper action not in any way mixed with matter, the form itself has being which does not depend on the being of any matter-form composite. Further, if that form is the form of a composite, the composite's being depends on the being of the form. Thus, when the human composite, whose being depends on that form, is destroyed, the form or intellectual soul remains.¹²⁰

This examination of Aquinas's works has revealed a constant refrain beginning with the *Summa contra gentiles*.II and extending to the *De unitate intellectus*. "Aristotle proposes the immortality of the human soul," Aquinas asserts over and over again. The principal basis for the attribution of this doctrine to Aristotle appears to be a combination of the latter's discussion of the agent and possible intellects in *De anima*.III, the need for a material element and an active element in every nature as explained in the same Book, the first definition of the soul in *De anima*.II, and the reference to the soul's proper work just noted from *De anima*.I. Regardless of one's opinion of the correctness of Aquinas's interpretation, there can be no doubt that he found in Aristotle the philosophical doctrine of the immortality of the human soul.¹²¹ Hence, there is no justification

119. *Ibid.*, p. 298,622-25.S198: "Dixerat autem Aristotiles in principio libri *De anima*, quod 'si est aliquid anime operum aut passionum proprium, continget utique ipsam separari; si vero nullum est proprium ipsius, non utique erit separabilis'."

120. *Ibid.*, p. 298,625-53.S198: "Cuius quidem consequentie ratio talis est, quia unumquodque operatur in quantum est ens; eo igitur modo unicuique competit operari quo sibi competit esse... Et similis ratio est de formis substantialibus, quae nullam operationem habent absque communicatione materie, hoc excepto quod huiusmodi forme sunt principium essendi substantialiter. Forma igitur que habet operationem secundum aliquam sui potentiam vel virtutem absque communicatione sue materie, ipsa est quae habet esse, nec est per esse compositi tantum, sicut alie forme, sed magis compositum est per esse eius. Et ideo destructo composito destruitur illa forma, que est per esse compositi; non autem oportet quod destruat ad destructionem compositi, illa forma per cuius esse compositum est, et non ipsa per esse compositi."

121. Given the importance for the discussion of contemplative happiness of the doctrine of the intellect as "in" the human agent, Guindon expressed surprise that Aquinas did not explicitly argue for the latter doctrine in the *SLE*, but is content to leave the doctrine

for regarding as theological that same doctrine when it appears in the *SLE*.

SPECIAL CREATION OF SOULS

Thomas virtually imputes to Aristotle his own view that human souls are brought into being by creation, which is the only way in which he could consistently speak of them as not eternal, yet immortal.¹²²

The above is asserted by Jaffa in regard to Aquinas's insistence on the imperfection of present happiness and the possibility of perfect happiness in an afterlife. What is at issue is the question of God as creator: Did Aristotle regard God as a creator? For Aquinas, the answer is clearly "yes."

While Aquinas writes regularly of God as creator, he very seldom speaks of Aristotle in this connection. When he does, however, the doctrines of *Metaphysics*.II are at least implied, if not cited. The first occasion on which Aquinas connects Aristotle and creation by God is in the *Summa contra gentiles* where *Metaphysics*.II is said to contain an argument for God as the first efficient cause. There, Aquinas insists, Aristotle showed the impossibility of an infinite series of efficient causes.¹²³

Subsequently, in the *Q.D. de potentia* (1265-1266), on the authority of Augustine, Aquinas asserts that Aristotle posited God as the cause of existence.¹²⁴ Later in the same article of the *De potentia*, we are told of the "Philosopher's proof," i.e., Aristotle's proof, that all perfection is received from God. As in the *Summa contra gentiles*, *Metaphysics*.II is noted as the *locus* of this proof. This

"in doubt" and to offer only "certain signs from which it can be known that the intellect is the greatest of those things in man." (Cf. *SLE*.X.10.6-21.S2080-81) Cf. Guindon: *Béatitude et Théologie morale*, p. 175. Guindon's surprise is perhaps explained by his refusal to accept Gauthier's dating of the *SLE* as posterior to Aquinas's anti-Averroist activity circa 1270. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

122. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, p. 164.

123. *SCG*.I.13: "Procedit autem Philosophus alia via in II *Metaphys.*, ad ostendendum non posse procedi in infinitum in causis efficientibus, sed esse devenire ad unam causam primam: et hanc dicimus Deum."

124. *De pot.*3.5: "Postiores vero philosophi, ut Plato, Aristoteles... posuerunt aliquam universalem causam rerum, a qua omnia alia in esse prodirent, ut patet per Augustinum." Perhaps, Aquinas thinks of *The City of God*, VIII, 4, where Plato, but not Aristotle, is credited with the doctrine of God as the cause of existence.

article in the *De potentia* does not discuss direct proofs of God and in this resembles the chapter noted in the earlier *Summa contra gentiles*. In the *De potentia*, Aquinas presents this "Philosopher's proof" when his task is to show that there is nothing that is not created by God. With this task in mind, he initially asserts that entities are not caused by matter as the earliest philosophers have held, nor by causes intrinsic to the universe such as intellect or friendship. Rather, because there exist greater and lesser degrees of a perfection in entities, the instances of this perfection are received from the being possessing the perfection in the highest degree. An example is had in bodies whose varying degrees of heat are to be explained in dependence on fire, which as the hottest of things is the principle of heat in other things. - At this point, Aquinas interrupts his argument to remind us of the proof which gave him the right to presuppose that a God exists when he posed the question of this article, namely, whether all creatures are created by God. That proof is the argument for the prime mover, the argument given by philosophers. - After this digression, Aquinas returns to his argument and asserts, "Granted this [i.e., that there exists the most perfect and most true being, or the prime mover], all less perfect things receive their being from that most perfect being. And this is the Philosopher's proof."¹²⁵ While Aquinas does not identify the work in which Aristotle's proof is found, most certainly *Metaphysics*.II.1 is intended. However, the passage is not the same as that intended by the reference to *Metaphysics*.II in the *Summa contra gentiles*, where Aristotle is said to have demonstrated the existence of a first efficient cause.¹²⁶

Again, I note the context of this reference in the *De potentia* to "the Philosopher's proof," namely, the context specified by the question, "Can there be something not created by God?" In asking that question, Aquinas presupposes the existence of God. Against this background, a principle from *Metaphysics*.II is invoked, namely, that lesser instances of a perfection receive that perfection from the being possessing the perfection in the highest way. Because the

125. *Ibid.*: "...cum aliquid invenitur a pluribus diversimode participatum oportet quod ab eo in quo perfectissime invenitur, attribuat omnibus illis in quibus imperfectius invenitur. Nam ea quae positive secundum magis et minus dicuntur, hoc habet ex accessu remotiori vel propinquiori ad aliquid unum: si enim unicuique eorum ex se ipso illud conveniret, non esset ratio cur perfectius in uno quam in alio inveniretur; sicut videmus quod ignis, qui est in fine caliditatis, est caloris principium in omnibus calidis. Est autem ponere unum ens, quod est perfectissimum et verissimum ens: quod ex hoc probatur, quia est aliquid movens omnino immobile et perfectissimum, ut a philosophis est probatum. Oportet ergo quod omnia alia minus perfecta ab ipso esse recipiant. Et haec est probatio Philosophi."

126. Cf. note 123 above.

perfection of interest here is being, this principle - taken from Aristotle - enables Aquinas to conclude that the first immobile mover proved by "philosophers" is the cause of all created being.

The importance of this passage from *Metaphysics*.II for the attribution to Aristotle of the doctrine of a creator-God is clear once more in the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae*, when it is cited in the fourth of the *quinque viae*. Yet this fourth way differs from the "Philosopher's proof" we have just noted in the *De potentia*. Rather than apply the principle from *Metaphysics*.II to a God known to exist, the fourth way uses the principle as the structure of a proof of a creator-God.

If a perfection is found in greater or lesser degrees, begins this fourth way, then it must also exist in the highest degree. Thus, there exists the truest, the best, and the greatest being, as is asserted in *Metaphysics*.II. Further, as the same Book holds, the highest in a genus is the cause of other things within that genus, and thus the greatest being, or God, is the cause of the being of all other things.¹²⁷

When we turn to Aquinas's *Metaphysics-Commentary* for his interpretation of the passage from Book II.1 that he has referred to in both the *De potentia* and the *Prima pars*, it is helpful to have Aristotle's words before us. In the following translation of those words, I have introduced in brackets the divisions Aquinas finds when he proposes his interpretation of Aristotle's meaning in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*.

[I. What Aristotle intends to prove.]

Calling first philosophy the "science of truth" is correct.

[II. Aristotle's two proofs that first philosophy is the "science of truth"]

[A. Proof based on wisdom as speculative, not practical]

The end of theoretical science is truth, and the end of practical science is a work. If practical science intends to discover a cause, it does not consider this cause for itself, but for the sake of a determined and present action.

[B. Proof based on first philosophy as cognition of first causes]

However, we do not know what is true without its cause.

127. *ST.Ia.2.3*: "Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile; et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est: sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens: nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II *Metapys*. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis: sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum."

[III. Aristotle adds to the discussion a universal proposition]

One thing that is among many is the greatest insofar as, in a univocal sense, it is in the others. For instance, fire is the hottest since it is the cause of the heat had by other things. This is why the truest thing is the cause of the truth of posterior things.

[IV. Aristotle draws a further conclusion]

Hence, the principles of eternally existing things are necessarily the truest. These principles are not sometimes true, nor is there some cause of the being of these principles, but they are the causes of the being of other things.

[V. Aristotle's corollary]

This is why, just as a thing is related to being, so it is related to truth.¹²⁸

Aquinas's interpretation of divisions I and II.A of Aristotle's text need not be examined here.¹²⁹ As concerns II.B, Aquinas explains that, while there are many speculative sciences studying truth, Aristotle must show that first philosophy considers truth more than any other science. Aristotle's argument is this: we only have a science of truth, i.e., cognition of truth, by knowing a cause; it follows that there are causes of those truths of which there are sciences. Accordingly, Aristotle's conclusion follows, namely, that as the study of the first causes, first philosophy is most especially, or in a way surpassing that found in any other science, the cognition of truth.¹³⁰

Of singular importance, as concerns first philosophy, is the above connection of first causes and the cognition of truth: to know a reality completely is to know its causes. Against this background, Aquinas, in commenting on division III, asserts that Aristotle introduces the following universal proposition: "That one thing is said to be the greatest among many which is the cause of

128. *Meta.* II.1.993b20-30. The translation is of the *Vetus* version. Cf. *Aristoteles Latinus*, V. 25.1-1a, edit. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Bruxelles/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970), pp. 119-20. For Aquinas's use of the *Vetus* in this commentary, cf.: Doig: *Aquinas on Metaphysics*, pp. 4-5, 9.

129. They are found in *In II Meta.* 2.289-90.

130. *Ibid.* 291: "Sed quia multae sunt scientiae speculativae, quae veritatem considerant, utpote geometria et arithmetica, fuit necessarium consequenter ostendere, quod philosophia prima maxime consideret veritatem, propter id quod supra ostensum est, scilicet quod est considerata primarum causarum. Et ideo argumentatur sic. Scientia de vero non habetur nisi per causam: ex quo apparet, quod eorum verorum, de quibus est scientia aliqua, sunt aliquae causae, quae etiam veritatem habent..."

something univocally predicated of the others."¹³¹ When one looks back to Aristotle's text, one sees that Aquinas developed this universal proposition by combining the first and the third sentences of division III. Yet in effecting that combination, he has not falsified Aristotle's intention of asserting that, because an entity is the cause of truth in other things, that entity is the truest of true things.

Subsequent to stating the above universal proposition, Aquinas explains why Aristotle introduced both the reference to univocity and the example of "heat" as asserted of fire and of the elements constituting bodies. "Heat" is univocal in these uses. However, there is another use of "heat," as when the sun is said to be hot because it causes heat in other bodies, both in the heavenly bodies and in those on earth. The physical explanation of these different instances of heat focuses on the differences between the matter had in both the sun and heavenly bodies on the one hand, and, on the other, the matter of earthly bodies. Whereas "heat" is used univocally in regard to fire as the hottest of earthly bodies, "heat" is applied to the sun in the sense of "something more than the hottest." This difference in the usage of "heat" points to the fact that the sun's heat is a superior species to the heat it causes in other bodies.¹³²

After this discussion of the two uses of "heat," yet still in reference to division III of Aristotle's text, Aquinas applies the above universal proposition, now stripped of any reference to univocity, to Aristotle's subject, that is, to the science of first causes as the cognition of truth. Here we are told that "truth" is not a term applicable only to one particular species of reality. Instead, "truth" is a notion applied commonly to every reality. As a result - and in accordance with the example of "heat" as used analogically of the sun - the first cause of truth shares with its effects both the term and a meaning of "truth." Thus, in line with the universal principle, that being which causes the truth of all things is itself the truest of all things.¹³³

Whereas in division III, Aristotle was seen as introducing a universal proposition which permitted him to conclude that the cause of the truth of things is the truest of things, in division IV he is said to draw a further conclusion by

130. *Ibid.* 292: "Deinde adiungit quamdam universalem propositionem, quae talis est. Unumquodque inter alia maxime dicitur, ex quo causatur in aliis aliquid univoce predicatum de eis."

132. *Ibid.* 292-93.

133. *Ibid.* 294: "Nomen autem veritatis non est proprium alicui speciei, sed se habet communiter ad omnia entia. Unde, quia illud quod est causa veritatis, est causa communicans cum effectu in nomine et ratione communi, sequitur quod illud, quod est posterioribus causa ut sint vera, sit verissimum."

speaking of the principles of heavenly bodies. It is in this context that Aquinas finds Aristotle asserting the doctrine that there exists a first cause, not only of the motion of things, but also of the being of all things, i.e., a creator-God.

Aquinas interprets Aristotle in division IV as proposing a double argument for the doctrine that the principles of the eternal, heavenly bodies are necessarily the truest of all things. This conclusion is drawn first, because the heavenly bodies, unlike those of our earth, are eternal, not subject to generation and corruption.¹³⁴ The second basis for concluding to the principles as the truest of things is this: "They [i.e., the principles] have no cause, but they are the cause of the being of other things." This means, Aquinas explains, that the principles "transcend in truth and in being" the heavenly bodies. Thus, the heavenly bodies "have a cause not only in regard to their motion, as some have thought, but also in regard to their being, as here the Philosopher says expressly."¹³⁵

Also noteworthy is the echo of this statement in Aquinas's comment on *Metaphysics*.VI: "From this there appears evidently the falsity of the opinion of those who posit that Aristotle held that God is not the cause of the substance of the heaven, but only of its motion."¹³⁶ As has been argued elsewhere, this attribution to Aristotle of the doctrine of a creator God is an essential element in his opposition to what he saw as the incorrect interpretations of the *Metaphysics* proposed especially by Averroes and by Albert.¹³⁷

The comment of Aquinas on *Metaphysics*.II.1 that we have examined concerns the passage intended when the *De potentia* and the *Prima pars* attributed to Aristotle the doctrine of a first cause of being. In the *Summa contra gentiles*, the reference is to the subsequent Chapter 2. There, as interpreted by Aquinas in his commentary, Aristotle removes a possible obstacle to Chapter 1's proof that

134. *Ibid.*295: "Ex quo ulterius concludit quod principia eorum, quae sunt semper, scilicet corporum caelestium, necesse est esse verissima. Et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia non sunt quandoque vera et quandoque non, et per hoc transcendunt in veritate generabilia et corruptibilia, quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt."

135. *Ibid.*: "Secundo, quia nihil est eis causa, sed ipsa sunt causa essendi aliis. Et per hoc transcendunt in veritate et entitate corpora caelestia: quae etsi sint incorruptibilia, tamen habent causam non solum quantum ad suum moveri, ut quidam opinati sunt, sed etiam quantum ad suum esse, ut hic Philosophus expresse dicit."

136. *Ibid.*.VI.1.1164: "Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum, qui posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse, quod Deus non sit causa substantiae caeli, sed solum motus eius."

137. Cf. Doig: *Aquinas on Metaphysics*, pp. 194-209.

the science of first causes is the cognition of truth. Obviously that proof rested on the doctrine that first philosophy considers first causes. What if there were no first causes, but only an infinite series of causes? It is to remove that possibility that Aristotle is said to argue in Chapter 2 for the impossibility of an infinite series.¹³⁸

While the entirety of Aristotle's Chapter 2 concerns the same topic, its initial sentence is for Aquinas a statement of what the remainder of the Chapter seeks to prove. That sentence of the *Metaphysics* reads:

Clearly, there is some principle, and the causes of things are not infinite, neither in the sense of an infinite series of causes [of the same specific kind], nor in the sense of an infinite series of specifically different causes.¹³⁹

Since the remainder of the Chapter argues that various types of infinite series of causes are impossible, one understands why Aquinas asserts in the *Summa contra gentiles* that *Metaphysics*.II contains a proof of a first efficient cause.

There ought to be no doubt that when, in the *SLE*, Aquinas "virtually imputes" to Aristotle the doctrine of the special creation of souls, he is not introducing a "principle of Christian ethics." Rather, he attributes to Aristotle the notion of a creator-God that he finds in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Of course, there is a notable difference between Aquinas's use of *Metaphysics*.II.1 in the *De potentia* and in the *Prima pars*, on the one hand, and, on the other, his exposition of Aristotle's thought in his commentary. In the latter, Aquinas implies that one moves from cognition of the cause of a perfection to the conclusion that the cause possesses the perfection in the supreme degree. However, in the *De potentia* and the *Prima pars*, Aquinas indicates that when one knows the existence of the highest instance of a perfection, one concludes that the highest instance is the cause of all inferior instances of the perfection.¹⁴⁰ Regardless of this difference however, there is no doubt that Aquinas believed he had found in Aristotle philosophical proofs of a creator-God.

138. *In II Meta*.2.299: "Removet quoddam, per quod praecedens probatio posset infringi: quae procedebat ex suppositione huius, quod philosophia prima considerat causas primas. Hoc autem tolleretur si causae in infinitum procederent. Tunc enim non essent aliquae primae causae. Unde hoc hic removere intendit:..."

139. *Meta*.II.2.994a1-3. This is the *Vetus* version. Cf. *Aristoteles latinus*, 25.1-1a, p. 120.

140. Brian Davies, O.P. called my attention to this difference.

A NATURAL HABIT OF THE MORAL VIRTUES

Jaffa asks whether there is:

... anything in the nature of man...which leads him to know the goodness and desirability of certain kinds of moral conduct, analogous to the way in which he is led to recognize the intrinsic goodness of theoretical knowledge... The question, then, is whether there is a natural habit by which we are commanded to do the acts of the virtues, and by which we have a sufficient knowledge of these actions to be able to carry out the commands.¹⁴¹

As Jaffa concludes, Aquinas implies an affirmative answer to these questions when he posits a natural cognition of indemonstrable principles of practical reasoning paralleling the naturally possessed virtue of intellectus which contains the equally indemonstrable principles of speculative thinking.¹⁴² The question for us is whether this natural habitus of the principles of practical reasoning is, as Jaffa claims, proposed as a "principle of Christian ethics."¹⁴³ A correct answer

141. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, pp. 171-72.

142. *SLE.V.12.49-56.S1018*: "Sicut enim in speculativis sunt quaedam naturaliter cognita, ut principia indemonstrabilia et quae sunt propinqua his, quaedam vero studio hominum adinventata, ita etiam in operativis sunt quaedam principia naturaliter cognita, quasi indemonstrabilia principia et propinqua his, ut malum esse vitandum, nulli esse iniuste nocendum, non esse furandum et similia..." Cf. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, p. 175 with note 22 on p. 223. - Earlier than the above, Aquinas had asserted the natural cognition of first practical principles; cf. *SLE.II.4.97-106.S286*.

143. Crucial for Jaffa's claim is the perceived difference between Aristotle and Aquinas on the *iustum naturale*. While denying the difference is as complete as Jaffa believes, Melina admits that Aquinas has made more precise Aristotle's doctrine. Cf. *La Conoscenza morale*, pp. 78-84. However, our question is solely whether Aquinas attributes any Christian doctrine to Aristotle, or whether, on the contrary, Aquinas proposes what he sees Aristotle teaching, adding at the most only philosophical explanations and prolongations of Aristotle's doctrine. Bradley: *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, p. 254, claims the introduction of synderesis (i.e., a habitus of first practical principles) into Aquinas's moral doctrine is "an outstanding example of Christian philosophy" and that "the principles of synderesis are the foundations for a moral philosophy, but one inspired" by faith. While admitting synderesis may be "philosophically defended by reference to human nature and its necessary ends," and is then, an Aristotelian notion, Bradley insists revelation was needed to lead Aquinas to the doctrine of synderesis. - While some may find acceptable this manner of speaking typical of adherents of the legitimacy of "Christian philosophy," I suggest it hides the

to this question presupposes an awareness of the cultural milieu leading Aquinas to propose the doctrine Jaffa calls a "natural habit of the moral virtues" and which, prior to the *SLE*, Aquinas sometimes called synderesis. I shall claim that Aquinas came of age in an intellectual climate in which it was inconceivable not to accept as a fact the existence in each individual of both a conscience and synderesis, i.e., an innate cognition of universal principles of morality. This intellectual climate I call "the culture of synderesis," for it was taken for granted by those speculating about morality.

The story of "the culture of synderesis" begins with a passage from Jerome's biblical commentary on Ezekiel's vision of the four living creatures, i.e., a man, a lion, an ox, and an eagle. Jerome writes:

According to Plato, many refer the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible parts of the soul to the man, the lion, and the ox... They posit a fourth [part] which is above and other than the three [mentioned above, and] which the Greeks call *synteresin*. This spark of conscience in the breast of Cain was not extinguished after he was ejected from paradise. This [spark] is the part by which we feel that we sin whenever we have been conquered by voluptuousness or by anger and during the time when we are deceived by a semblance of [correct] reason. They assign this [spark of conscience] as proper to the eagle, and they say it does not mix with the other three [parts of the soul], but corrects the three erring parts. In the Scriptures, we sometimes find this [part] called the spirit "which intercedes for us with inarticulate groans" (Rom. 8, 26). "No one knows those things belonging to man, except the spirit which is in him" (I Cor. 2, 11). And Paul, writing to the Thessalonians, prays that man will be kept integral in soul and body (I Thess. 5, 23). Nonetheless, from what is written in Proverbs, "The impious will condemn this [spark of conscience] when they fall deeply into sin," we discern that this conscience is cast down among some persons and loses its place. Such persons have no decency nor shame concerning sin and deserve to hear "Your face has been made that of a harlot, and you will not show shame" (Jeremiah, 3, 3).¹⁴⁴

fact, if it does not contradict it, that Aquinas's acceptance of synderesis is a philosophical "insight motivated by the knowledge of revelation," and not "an insight of theology," i.e., a "Christian principle." Cf. the discussion of Kleber above on pp. XII-XIII.

144. Translation from the Latin as cited in Odon Lottin: "Syndérèse et conscience au XIIe et XIIIe siècles," in *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, (Louvain/Gembloux: Mont César/Duculot, 1948) T. 2, pp. 103-104. A historical perspective on Aquinas's doctrine of natural law is also had in Lottin's *Le Droit Naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs*, 2 ed. (Bruges: Beyaert, 1931). Also see his "La loi naturelle depuis le début du XIIe siècle jusqu'à saint Thomas d'Aquin,"

Dom Odon Lottin has studied in considerable detail the speculation on synderesis and conscience in the 12th and 13th centuries that takes its point of departure principally from the above passage of Jerome. As he has remarked, the questions raised by Jerome's words are numerous. Are synderesis and conscience the same or distinct? Is synderesis a fourth part or power of the soul and somehow placed over the other parts, or is it something functioning as a guide from within each of the other parts? Is synderesis to be connected with a cognitive or with an affective part of the soul? Can synderesis be extinguished by sin? Can synderesis err? Is conscience a power of the soul? And so on.¹⁴⁵ The variety of answers to these and other questions that were proposed between the mid-12th century and the time of Aquinas created the culture in which the latter spontaneously developed his own doctrines of synderesis and conscience.

The beginnings of speculation concerning synderesis are exemplified by the following figures and their doctrines.

Peter Lombard in his *Sentences* (c. 1152) refers to the text of Jerome, although he omits the term "synderesis." Man naturally wills good and hates evil since he was created with a good will; he possesses a "higher spark of reason," which, as Jerome says, was not extinguished in Cain.¹⁴⁶

Magister Udo in his *Sentence-Commentary* (c. 1160-1165) notes an objection arguing that reason cannot consent to a grave sin because, as Jerome's text explains, synderesis or superior reason was not destroyed in Cain, but remains as continuously corrective of the sins of the other three parts of the soul. In response, Udo explains that reason consents to serious sin in permitting the will to consent; Jerome's text is to be understood as asserting that synderesis or superior reason never approves of sin, although it mixes with sin by consenting to it and by enjoying it.¹⁴⁷

Simon of Bisignano (between 1173 and 1176) identifies the natural law (*ius*) spoken of by Gratian as the superior part of the soul, i.e., as reason which is

Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, (Louvain/Gembloux: Mont César/Duculot, 1948) T. 2, pp. 69-100.

145. Lottin: "Syndérèse," pp. 104-105.

146. *Ibid.*, p. 106, with note 5.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 107-108.

called synderesis.¹⁴⁸

Stephen Langton (1200-1206) asserts that *liberum arbitrium*, traditionally styled "the faculty of reason and will," judges between either, on the one hand, following synderesis or the rational power protesting against evil and inclining to good, or, on the other, following the concupiscible appetite which invites to evil. Synderesis is part of the rational power, although not part of *liberum arbitrium*. Even though conscience is a work of reason, it involves remorse regarding particular action and so is distinct from synderesis which remains on the level of generalities in persuading us toward good and away from evil.¹⁴⁹

The examination of these early attempts to fathom moral activity reveals to some degree a distinction in the proposals of the four authors between experiential elements and others having their source somehow in religion. In Lombard's case, "man as created with a good will" is a doctrine whose source is faith. Religion has also inspired the notion that hatred of sin results from a remnant of the condition enjoyed by man in Paradise. In contrast, experience is the source of the awareness of Lombard and Langton that remorse over sin exists. As well, faith was not necessary to see that reason consents to sin. However, in addition to these elements, there remains constant in the speculation of these four authors some conception of man's natural knowledge of good and evil. It may be that the theological or exegetical comment of Jerome brought this notion to the fore when he spoke of synderesis; yet that there are natural laws of good and evil to be followed is scarcely a notion deriving from Christian or Jewish scriptures. Be that as it may, our question is whether the on-going attempts to find a place for synderesis in human consciousness, as well as the efforts to relate synderesis to conscience, might not gradually have developed into an unquestioning assumption regarding synderesis. That is, might medieval authors have come to assume that a natural cognition of universal principles of right and wrong is presupposed by conscience?

Lottin has discovered in the thirty years subsequent to Langton a continued interest in synderesis. For example, in an anonymous Cambridge manuscript, synderesis is presented as an accidental property of the human soul

148. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

149. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-13. For Langton's text on *liberum arbitrium*, see Odon Lottin: "Libre arbitre et liberté depuis saint Anselm jusqu'à la fin du XIIIe siècle," in *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 2nd edit. (Gembloux: Duculot, 1957) T. 1, p. 62.

which is extinguished in the damned.¹⁵⁰ Or, Alexander Neckham (d. 1217) finds synderesis to be the superior part of reason enabling man to reflect upon himself and, by thus understanding his condition, to discern good and evil.¹⁵¹ Yet while these and other authors speak of synderesis, during these years its nature is only mentioned when an author investigates *liberum arbitrium* or when the question asked concerns such topics as the possibility of meriting by synderesis, the possibility of an error of synderesis, and so on. No one appears to have paused to investigate the nature of synderesis by considering the various views then current.

As well, very little agreement emerges during this period in regard to synderesis. One point alone seems fixed: synderesis is a type of rational guardian in the moral order. Called "a spark of reason" by one and "the law (*ius*) of nature" by another, synderesis is everywhere proposed as a rational element that in one way or another can guarantee the correctness of human behavior. The exact relationship between synderesis and reason is variously conceived; for some, synderesis is the superior part of reason, while for others it is natural reason in contrast with reason engaged in deliberation. Even in regard to the question of whether it can ever be extinguished, there is no unanimity. William of Auvergne, for instance, insists that synderesis no longer "murmurs against evil" in those completely given to vice as well as in the case of heretics willing to die for their beliefs.¹⁵²

Additionally, despite synderesis's role as the guardian of morality, not all agree on the question of whether it can ever be mistaken. Stephen Langton had regarded synderesis as "the power by which man naturally detests evil" and hence, as an indefectible power. In contrast, William of Auxerre held that synderesis is only infallible when, from itself as the image of God, it turns upward toward God himself; but when reason begins from sensible things, then synderesis can be deceived.¹⁵³

Jerome's comment on Ezekiel, the classic authoritative text for the notion of synderesis, implied that this element of the soul is a fourth faculty alongside the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible parts. Yet only with Philip the Chancellor (d. 1236) do we find a treatise devoted to the nature of synderesis. About this "spark of conscience," Philip first asks, "whether it is a potency of the

soul, or [whether it is] some habitus connatural from the beginning, [that is,] a being in the soul?" In responding, Philip initially argues that synderesis is a potency: just as that power of the soul which philosophers call the agent intellect always contemplates the truth, so an accompanying affective power of the soul, that is, synderesis, is permanently oriented to good and away from evil.¹⁵⁴ Yet after proposing two more arguments for the same conclusion, Philip explains reasons for considering synderesis a habitus. In his first argument, he notes John Damascene's concept of *proheresis*, the habitus perfecting the will by insuring the correct choice following on deliberation. Just as the choosing-will is perfected by this habitus of *proheresis*, so the natural will, i.e., the desire for the good appropriate to the rational soul, is perfected by synderesis. As the habitus of the natural will, synderesis simply directs the will toward good.¹⁵⁵ Additionally, Philip notes the need for an element in the soul to counteract the *fomes*, or the incitement of evil desire inclining the will to sin; this corrective element is synderesis which is, accordingly, a habitus added to the soul.¹⁵⁶

Faced with these arguments, some pointing to synderesis as a potency, others to it as a habitus, Philip proposes that the form of the name "synderesis" appears to indicate a habitus more than a potency, even though it is actually the name of an innate habitual potency (*potentia habitualis*), a potency with a habitus. That is, since the reality of synderesis seems to include both what is proper to a habitus and to a potency, it is best to consider it a habitual potency. As if elaborating on this conclusion, Philip observes in closing that synderesis is to be considered an intrinsic light by which good is recognized, yet a light, which, with the potency, makes one and the same thing.¹⁵⁷

After having thus opted for the notion that synderesis is a potency, albeit a habitual potency, Philip asks whether it is to be identified with the *liberum arbitrium*,¹⁵⁸ or whether it is to be considered as reason. Philip's answer begins by remarking that reason and the concupiscible and irascible appetites are the three powers of the rational soul. In God's plan, "synderesis will be the part of the first rectitude of men, which was had by Adam." Insofar as some of that

154. *Ibid.*, p. 138; p. 141, lines 39-44.

155. *Ibid.*, p. 139; p. 141, lines 60-65.

156. *Ibid.*, p. 141, lines 66-73.

157. *Ibid.*, p. 141, line 79 - p. 142, line 104.

158. For Philip's identification of *liberum arbitrium*, or the power to do what one wants, with both a potency and a habitus, cf. Lottin: "Libre arbitre...", pp. 74-76.

150. Lottin: "Syndérèse," pp. 114-15.

151. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-22.

152. *Ibid.*, p. 134; 136.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 137; p. 125 with note I.

“rectitude” remains with us, it can be called synderesis. As such, it is not a separate part of the soul, but is involved in each of the three parts, directing each of them to good and away from evil.¹⁵⁹ Notwithstanding this solution, Philip suggests one can also identify synderesis with intelligence insofar as distinct from and above the rational, concupiscible, and irascible parts of the soul, it is oriented toward the highest good rather than toward good in this or that action.¹⁶⁰ - As Lottin has remarked, Philip is obviously attempting to avoid contradicting any of the authorities whose statements have been attached to the conception of synderesis.¹⁶¹

As for how synderesis “murmurs against evil,” Philip explains that it moves in a general sense the *liberum arbitrium* toward good and away from evil. Thus, “it moves toward the common good that is found in this or in that good. It does not therefore move to a particular good of itself, but to the common good found in the particular.”¹⁶²

With these interpretations of the nature of synderesis as the backdrop, Philip asks whether synderesis is fallible. Reasons for an affirmative answer are not hard to find. For instance, the entirety of the soul of the damned is punished for sin; accordingly, the soul in all its parts, including synderesis, must have sinned.¹⁶³ Yet the arguments against the possibility of an erroneous or sinful synderesis are stronger. First, the act of consenting to sin is contrary to the act of protesting against sin; since the latter act is proper to synderesis, the first must be contrary to it. Second, every power of the soul is an inclination toward good; for example, the sensitive power moves in the direction of what is pleasurable to sense, and the spiritual or rational power moves toward what is pleasurable to the rational soul, namely, the supreme good; this last power is synderesis, which, as a movement toward the supreme good, cannot sin. Finally, synderesis looks to good and evil according to universal considerations; quite different are the deliberations regarding singular actions in which alone evil is found; hence, synderesis is divorced from sin.¹⁶⁴ Against this background, Philip recalls the two

159. Lottin: “Syndérèse,” p. 144; p. 147, lines 76-90.

160. *Ibid.*, p. 144; p. 147, lines 98-107.

161. *Ibid.*, p. 144. In Philip’s text on page 145ff, the authorities are clearly identified.

162. *Ibid.*, p. 144; p. 148, lines 128-31.

163. *Ibid.*, p. 149, lines 9-11.

164. *Ibid.*, p. 149; p. 151, lines 21-35.

possible conceptions of synderesis proposed in the preceding question. If synderesis is considered in each part of the soul to be the remnant of rectitude which survived Adam’s sin, then clearly synderesis does not sin. Then too, if synderesis is taken as intelligence distinct from the rational, concupiscible, and irascible parts of the soul, or accepted even as intelligence with a habitus, then again, as such, it does not sin or err. Sin is the act of the *liberum arbitrium* when it interferes with synderesis.¹⁶⁵

Can synderesis be extinguished? is Philip’s final question. Like others before him, Philip answers in the negative, explaining that the example of the heretics who are willing to die reveals the presence of synderesis’s universal precept that one must hold to one’s beliefs. The rational deliberation that preceded the acceptance of the heretical belief is erroneous in the case of the heretic, not the act of synderesis.¹⁶⁶

The details thus far noted considering the interpretations of synderesis illustrate the cultural milieu in which subsequent 13th century authors were to offer their own views of synderesis. To any author writing after Philip, it appears to have been inconceivable not to explain the nature of synderesis and its role as a guide to correct human conduct. An example from our contemporary approach to political theory illustrates the impact of a cultural milieu on the discussion of human affairs; for instance, in the examination of the concept of a just government, it is today simply unthinkable that anyone propose a theory of justice in which human rights are not assumed and in which the equality of human persons is not taken for granted.¹⁶⁷ In a parallel fashion, subsequent to Philip’s treatise, 13th century authors naturally found a place in moral theory for synderesis as the guardian of morality. Accordingly, it was only to be supposed that Aquinas would expect to find in Aristotle some teaching respecting the element internal to human persons by which they are ordered to morally correct actions.

However, before turning to Aquinas’s doctrine of synderesis and his attribution to Aristotle of its reality, if not the use of its name, aspects of some of the more immediate predecessors of Aquinas remain to be considered.

An anonymous author (Douay 434; 1231-1235), similarly to Philip, regards

165. *Ibid.*, p. 149; p. 151, lines 36-55.

166. *Ibid.*, p. 152; p. 154, lines 50-58.

167. This in spite of the fact that, as the literature makes abundantly clear, there is no agreement on how to define “human right,” nor on the identity of rights, nor even on an argument to justify the existence of rights.

synderesis as a natural habitual potency inclined toward good and murmuring against evil. Synderesis is neither reason nor a part of reason, but similar to *liberum arbitrium*, it is the two potencies of reason and will. It thus makes both correct. As such, synderesis never errs and can be identified with an innate conscience. Error or sin results from an acquired conscience. As Jerome says, synderesis can "fall," but only in the sense that *liberum arbitrium* succumbs to sin. Since synderesis includes rectitude, light, and judgment, it is never completely extinguished; even though in sinners and in the damned it no longer inclines to good, it continues to murmur against evil.¹⁶⁸

Alexander of Hales, in his *Sentence-Commentary* (after 1235), appears to follow in part the above anonymous author as well as Philip. Considered formally, synderesis is a connatural habitus, but materially considered, it is an innate power of judging identified as a light. As a natural light, it resides in *liberum arbitrium*, while it is above deliberating reason. As Jerome says, synderesis is not extinct in Cain and so, it does not err. In sinners, it can only murmur against evil, although in the damned it is totally extinguished.¹⁶⁹

A *Summa theologiae* (finished by 1250), incorrectly attributed to Alexander of Hales, follows Philip in many ways. Synderesis is a habitual potency identical to natural reason; thus, it is over the reason that deliberates. Yet synderesis is also natural will, but not the will that deliberates. As natural reason and natural will, synderesis cannot err. In regard to the question, whether synderesis is ever extinguished, this work follows Philip completely. Conscience can be both an innate habitus and an acquired one. The former is joined to synderesis, the latter to reason as receiving reason's practical judgment.¹⁷⁰

Gauthier de Chateau-Thierry (Chancellor at Paris from 1246-1249), offers a lengthy question on conscience, in the course of which his doctrine of synderesis becomes clear. "Conscience" is used by some for (1) what is held by conscience, i.e., the natural law, as in "Do to others what you wish to happen to you"; (2) the potency holding a precept by conscience, and this is synderesis or superior reason according to Jerome's comment on Ezekiel; (3) the acceptance by inferior reason of the *dictum* of conscience; here is the possibility of an erroneous conscience; and

(4) a natural habitus of the superior reason disposing man to flee evil and love good, and this is called synderesis by some who see it as a potency with a habitus. After rejecting each, he proposes a view of synderesis dependent on the doctrine that God gives to human nature everything needed for man to move naturally toward God as his end. In addition to the potencies of knowing and willing, and the liberty to use both potencies, there is required natural law by which man knows what is prohibited and what is to be done. This law is "a spark of the eternal light by which the potency of the soul is illuminated." Human nature also requires synderesis, or the superior part of reason tending toward God, and reason taking its direction from natural law. Finally, human nature is given inferior reason, which will not err as long as it is oriented toward synderesis. When synderesis turns to created things, seeing them in the light of natural law, conscience is had. Thus, conscience is a potency with the habitus of synderesis, but with an activity different from that of synderesis.¹⁷¹

Odo Rigaldus (Parisian Master of Arts, 1244-1247) agrees with Philip in proposing synderesis as the innate habitual potency naturally moving toward good and murmuring against evil. When universal cognition of synderesis is united with the *liberum arbitrium*, conscience is had. Synderesis, as a natural motion, never errs, but it can be drowned out, although not extinguished, in the sinner.¹⁷²

Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences* (1250-1255) proposes that, just as the intellect has naturally a light directing it in knowing, so the will has a natural authority directing its activity of desiring. Conscience is the intellect's light directing moral activity; synderesis is the will's authority to direct the same activity, for the intellect needs an efficient cause moving it to consider moral activity. Both conscience and synderesis can be understood either as a habitus respectively of the intellect and will, or as these same potencies with their natural habitus. The latter is the more common consideration. Synderesis never errs, although its voice can go unheard in the sinner. Yet synderesis is never extinguished.¹⁷³

Albert the Great wrote of synderesis in his *Summa de homine* around 1242 and so, perhaps prior to the work of Odo and of Gauthier of Chateau-

168. *Ibid.*, pp. 157-63.

169. *Ibid.*, pp. 174-78.

170. *Ibid.*, pp. 178-82.

171. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-96. Gauthier's four-fold discussion of conscience is adopted by Aquinas in *Sent.* II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 4. See below, pp. 176-77.

172. Lottin: "Syndérèse," pp. 196-202.

173. *Ibid.*, pp. 203-10.

Thierry, and certainly before that of Bonaventure. However, as the teacher of Aquinas, his position in the "culture of synderesis" is best noted immediately prior to that of his pupil and, additionally, noted at greater length than that of other authors.

Albert approaches the essence and the definition of synderesis by recounting various positions proposed by his predecessors. According to St. Basil, synderesis is a potency, for it is "the natural judgment of the soul, by which evil is separated from good...a power of the soul having naturally inscribed within itself the seeds of judgment." As confirmation of this view, there are authorities such as Jerome.¹⁷⁴ However, Albert notes the existence of the contrary position, namely, that synderesis is a habitus. In favor of this are both the etymology of the word, i.e., *scientia haerens*, or "holding fast by science," as well as the opposition between synderesis and the habitus of concupiscence.¹⁷⁵

As for the position asserting synderesis is a habitual potency, that is, a potency with a habitus, Albert asks, "Which potency?" He notes that some authors, basing themselves on Aristotle's doctrine that practical reason is always true, insist that synderesis is practical reason. As well, since philosophers posit practical reason as the soul's sole cognitive faculty moving toward good, synderesis must be that faculty.¹⁷⁶ Albert also remarks that Jerome sees synderesis as the remnant of the original rectitude of life Adam had before the fall; as such a remnant, synderesis is a potency that directs all the others. - This recalls the position of Philip.¹⁷⁷ - A final position regarding synderesis as a potency with a habitus conceives it as a combination of reason, will, and the irascible appetite: reason, because synderesis judges; the will, because synderesis inclines toward good; and the irascible appetite, because of the force with which synderesis resists evil.¹⁷⁸

In opposition to these views of his predecessors, Albert proposes synderesis as "the power with the habitus of the principles of natural law."¹⁷⁹ Just

174. *Ibid.*, p. 210-11.

175. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

176. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

177. *Ibid.*

178. *Ibid.*

179. *Summa de creaturis*, q. 71, a. 1, ad 3um (ed. Borgnet, T. 35): "Synderesis est vis cum habitu principiorum iuris naturalis." Lottin: "Syndérèse," p. 212.

as in the speculative arena there are universal principles naturally in man by which he is aided in arriving at truth, so in practical affairs there are universal principles aiding practical reason to distinguish evil and good. Among these principles are such as, "We ought not fornicate"; "We ought not kill"; and "We should be compassionate toward those who suffer." Moreover, since conscience follows on synderesis and practical reason, synderesis is called "the spark of conscience." Clearly, as described, synderesis does not err, but all error comes from practical reason.¹⁸⁰

Albert appears similar to Philip the Chancellor both in regard to the conception of synderesis as a potency with a habitus, and in placing the distinction between synderesis and conscience in that between abstract cognition and the involvement in particular activity.¹⁸¹

On the other hand, Albert's position is at odds with that later adopted by Bonaventure. As noted above, the latter believed that conscience in reason stood in need of a moving or efficient cause; that cause, Bonaventure identified as the habitual cognition of synderesis located in the will. For Albert, synderesis is a moving cause, but only in a formal, not in an efficient sense. From Aristotle, Albert adopted the notion of practical reason as the form or directing cause of action; as such, synderesis prescribes for conscience the basic norms that ought to govern conduct.¹⁸²

Synderesis and conscience are discussed anew in two anonymous questions thought to be by Albert and certainly disputed in Paris around 1248.¹⁸³ Here, Albert's positions are proposed with somewhat more detail, especially in regard to the distinctions of the potencies of the soul. On one side are those potencies which execute motion, i.e., cause the performance of chosen activities. Opposed to these are potencies whose activity is directive only. Of the latter group, one orients human activity toward its end in God. Here a subdivision is had; there is first, superior reason which directs by universal principles of law; second, there is inferior reason, which directs by particular rules determined to specific types of acts. Synderesis is the superior reason as possessing universal principles of practical affairs; as such synderesis parallels the intellectus of

180. Lottin: "Syndérèse," pp. 212-13.

181. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

182. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

183. The texts are discussed in F. M. Henquinet: "Vingt-deux questions inédites d'Albert le Grand dans un manuscrit à l'usage de s. Thomas d'Aquin," *The New Scholasticism*, 9 (1935) pp. 283-328.

universal principles by which speculation is governed. As for conscience, it is the "decree of reason" applying the directive or the "decree of synderesis" to particular action; it is an act of reason subsuming the particular under the universal of synderesis.¹⁸⁴ - While these doctrines are important insofar as they were proposed by Aquinas's teacher, they become even more significant since the manuscript containing these two questions was probably written by Aquinas, if not also possessed by him.¹⁸⁵

Another work of Albert to be noted is his *Super Ethica*. In preparing this final version of his Cologne lectures on the *Ethics*, Albert is thought to have employed the *reportatio* of those lectures prepared by Aquinas. Of interest to the present investigation is the section where Albert proposes his interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of what is just by nature (*naturale iustum*). The parallel segment of the *SLE* is central to Jaffa's claim that Aquinas incorrectly attributes to Aristotle a natural habitus of unchanging principles of morality.¹⁸⁶

Book V of the *Super Ethica*, following Aristotle, contrasts what is just by nature with what is just only by law. As Albert understands Aristotle's text, the naturally just is said to be always and everywhere binding on every human person. Moreover, it is "just from its substance and does not have strength from 'being seen or not being seen'." By this last phrase, "being seen or not being seen," Albert refers to Aristotle's words, interpreting them as asserting that the force of the naturally just in no way depends on whether or not the naturally just is understood by the average person.¹⁸⁷

Distinct from what is just by nature is the legally just. According to Albert, the stress in Aristotle's presentation is on the lack of binding force had by the legally just in comparison to the naturally just. Prior to the establishment of a law by a legitimate authority within society, acts envisioned by a law are neither

184. Lottin: "Syndèrèse," pp. 218-21. Excerpts of the texts of the questions *De conscientia* and *De synderesi* are found respectively on p. 318 and pp. 320-321 of Henquinet: "Vingt-deux questions."

185. *Ibid.*, p. 322. This judgment is based on the scribe's hand in the manuscript.

186. For a central portion of Aquinas's comment, see note 142 on page 158 above.

187. *Super Ethica*. V.11.p361,31-36: "Et dicit quod est *naturale iustum*, quod *ubique* et semper et ad omnes habet eandem potentiam, idest vigorem iustitiae, ex eo quod ex ipsa sua substantia iustum est *et non* habet vigorem ex *videri vel non*, idest ex eo quod sic videatur de eo vulgaribus vel non videatur." In responding to an objection in a question of the same lesson, Albert says much the same about these words of Aristotle; cf. *Ibid.*, p357,36-42.

right nor wrong, just nor unjust. As Albert phrases it, before the law is proclaimed, "it makes no difference whether something happens one way or another." Elaborating, he recalls Aristotle's example of the law of both Athenians and Spartans regarding the redemption of captives for the sum of one *mina*. That this is the just price for redeeming a captive is solely a matter of human law.¹⁸⁸

Immediately subsequent to the words of the *Ethics* on which Albert has been commenting, Aristotle writes:

It seems to some that [just] things are such [i.e., legally just], for what is by nature is immobile and everywhere has the same power, [e.g.,] fire burns here and in Persia; however they see that what is just changes. This is only partially true. [Literally: This however is not so, but it is as.] Although among the gods it is never true that what is uniform changes, among us there are things by nature which change because all things [here change]. But nonetheless, this thing is [just] by nature, that thing however is not [just] by nature.¹⁸⁹

Regarding this text, Jaffa claims, against Aquinas's reading, that Aristotle is asserting that whatever is just changes, the naturally just as well as the legally just.¹⁹⁰ In contrast, Aquinas's teacher finds a more complex doctrine here, one in keeping with "the culture of synderesis." Albert writes:

Then when [Aristotle] says: "It seems to some," he proposes an opinion urged against what has been said. First, he posits the opinion with its argument. The opinion was that everything just has no difference of itself [i.e., never changes] but all change in just things comes from the law. The argument for this opinion was as follows. Those things which are natural are immutable and have everywhere the same power, e.g., fire burns here and in Persia; but whatever is just changes in diverse times and in diverse regions; therefore, nothing is naturally just. Second, here [where Aristotle says]: "This however is not," he responds [to the objection]; first, he proposes the solution, saying: "This however," namely, that natural things do not move in any way, "is not

188. *Ibid.*, p361,36-55: "Secundo cum dicit: *legale*, exponit legale iustum. Et primo exponit ipsum ex hoc, unde non habet vigorem. Et dicit, quod *legale iustum* est, *quod ex principio*, idest antequam sanciatu lege, *nihil differt*, utrum *sic vel aliter* fiat, sed habet differentiam tantum ex positione legis. Et ponit exemplum de quadam lege quae fuit posita inter Athenienses et Lacedaemonas, ... scilicet quod captivus inter ipsos non nisi *mina una redimebatur*, ... Et hoc pertinet ad leges humanas... Et dicit, quod *legalia* sunt *quaecumque in singularibus lege ponunt*, idest statuunt, habentes auctoritatem."

189. *NE*. V.7.1134b24-30. Cf. *Super Ethica*, p361,67-70.

190. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, pp. 180-81.

so," i.e., is not universally true, as they say; but "it is as" if it is true and it is as if it is not true, because natural things are not moved in their essence; but in their use they can be moved. What is unvariable among the gods is never the same as among us, because among them there is no variation, but with us even what is according to nature is changeable as regards its use. Everything in us and concerning us is mobile. [Aristotle] does not intend to speak of motion in place, because the earth does not move, but of the alteration occurring in human conditions. Those [posing the objection] wanted to reason about what is naturally just for us as if it were the same as with the gods. But although [what is just] is changeable, some things are natural and some are not... It is clear that the legally just is changeable as regards its use and its essence, but the naturally just only in its use.¹⁹¹

As is clear from this text, Albert continues to find in Aristotle a firm distinction between what is naturally just and what is only legally just. The latter is changeable; both the law itself and the way it is applied can be changed. On the other hand, the naturally just as such in unchanging, although the application of the universal to a particular action is not always the same.

In the questions preceding the above comments from *Super Ethica*.V.11, Albert reiterates the distinction between the legally just and the naturally just. In addition, he paints a more detailed picture of these categories. For instance, something naturally unjust is prohibited because it is evil, whereas the legally

191. *Super Ethica*.V.11.p362,1-29: "Deinde cum dicit: *Videtur autem quibusdam, ponit opinionem contra praedicta. Et primo ponit opinionem cum ratione sua. Et haec opinio erat, quod omnia iusta essent ex seipsis nullam differentiam habentia, sed tantum ex lege. Et horum ratio talis erat: Quae naturalia sunt, sunt immutabilia et ubique habent eandem potentiam, sicut ignis ardet hic et in Persis; sed omnia iusta moventur in diversis temporibus et diversis regionibus; ergo nulla sunt naturaliter iusta. Secundo ibi: Hoc autem non est, solvit et primo ponit solutionem dicens: Hoc autem, scilicet quod naturalia nullo modo moveantur, non est sic habens, idest non est universaliter verum, ut ipsi dicunt, sed est ut sic et est ut non, quia secundum essentiam non remouentur, sed secundum usum possunt removeri. Quamvis aequaliter habens apud deos nequaquam sit sicut apud nos, quia apud eos nullo modo variatur in aequalitate esse, sed apud nos illud etiam quod est secundum naturam, est mobile quantum ad usum, quia omne quod est in nobis et apud nos, mobile est; et non intendit de motu locali, quia terra non movetur, sed de alteratione, quae accidit in statibus humanis. Unde ipsi volebant ita ratiocinari de naturali iusto nostro, ac si esset in diis. Sed quamvis sint mobilia, tamen quaedam sunt naturalia et quaedam non.... Constant enim, quod legalia sunt mobilia quantum ad usum et quantum ad essentiam, sed naturalia tantum quantum ad usum."*

unjust is evil because it is prohibited.¹⁹² Something naturally unjust depends on human nature insofar as that nature is the principle of human activity.¹⁹³ In asserting that the naturally just depends on human nature, what is intended is a dependence on reason.¹⁹⁴ That is, man possesses the natural law (*ius*) by a natural habitus just as the principles of speculative reason are possessed in a natural habitus; examples of this natural law are, "We ought not injure anyone" and "Parents are to be honored."¹⁹⁵ Not all precepts of the natural law depend on human nature *qua* rational; from human nature as an animal nature arise natural law precepts such as those concerning sexual relations.¹⁹⁶ Yet all precepts of the natural law result from reason's deliberation about what effects or conserves the human good. However, on occasion it is necessary to advert to experience and custom before deciding on a natural precept such as what honoring parents, say, requires. In such cases, the law thus arising from experience and custom has no force until it is established by legitimate authority.¹⁹⁷

Finally, there is Albert's *De anima-Commentary* which devotes a chapter to the contrast Aristotle posits between the inerrant intellectus and the sometimes correct, sometimes incorrect appetite and phantasm.¹⁹⁸ Writing between 1254 and 1257, Albert explains the intellectus as "a habitual potency having the habitus of the principles of things moral and things to be made, in which there is no error, e.g., we ought not kill, we ought not commit adultery, we ought not steal..."¹⁹⁹ After proposing this meaning for Aristotle's inerrant intellectus, Albert adverts to

192. *Ibid.*, p.356,1-8.

193. *Ibid.*, p357,14-17.

194. *Ibid.*, p357,3-7.

195. *Ibid.*, p357,57-63.

196. *Ibid.*, p357,66-72.

197. *Ibid.*, p357,90 - p358,16; p360,46-61.

198. *De anima*.III.10.433a26-27: "Intellectus quidem igitur omnis rectus est. Appetitus autem et phantasia et recta et non recta sunt." Cf. Albert: *De anima*, in *Opera omnia*, (Münster: Aschendorff, 1968) T. 7, P. I, p. 235,82.

199. *Ibid.*.III, Tr. 4, c. 6, p235,29-33: "...hic enim [intellectus] nihil aliud est nisi potentia habitualis habens habitum principiorum moralium et factibilium, in quibus nullus est error, sicut non esse occidendum, non esse moechandum, non esse furandum..."

the "culture of synderesis" by asserting: "And so some authors call this intellectus 'natural judgments' (*naturale iudicarium*) in which the universal laws are described."²⁰⁰

Four chapters later, in what he styles "a digression," Albert examines doctrines of "Platonists and theologians" regarding the moving causes of human action. Here the habitus of "the first principles of mores" is named "synderesis"; in addition, numerous examples of these principles are given, e.g., "We ought to harm no one." As well, its inerrant character is again affirmed, and the source of synderesis in the natural law is asserted.²⁰¹

Albert's thought has been treated at length, in part because of its contribution to "the culture of synderesis" in which Aquinas the author came of age, in part because of the enormous respect Aquinas had for the doctrine of his teacher.

When Aquinas composed his *Sentence-Commentary* (1252-1256), he wrote from within the established "culture of synderesis" whose development has been sketched above. His first reference to synderesis describes it with the traditional phrase of "murmuring against evil"; additionally, synderesis is said to be the locus of the universal principles of the natural law, a fact necessitating that synderesis "murmurs against everything which happens contrary to the natural law."²⁰²

An even clearer indication of the tradition within which Aquinas works is found in a later article asking "whether synderesis is a habitus or a potency."²⁰³ In the first two objections, Jerome is cited in aid of a conception of synderesis as a potency; the third objection is taken from Albert, while the final two are developed by Aquinas from the third. These final three objections, as the first two, conclude that synderesis is a potency. In each of the two *sed contra*, Aquinas argues that synderesis is a habitus. In the first of these, Aquinas depends on Albert; in the second, either on Albert, Odo, or Philip.²⁰⁴

Moreover, even the *corpus* reveals the influence of "the culture of synderesis." Here, Aquinas argues for the rational potency's need of indemonstrable first principles from which reasoning begins: "Every [power of]

200. *Ibid.*, p235,38-40.

201. *Ibid.*, c. 10, p240,66 - p241,5.

202. *Sent.* II, d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, ag. 3 & ra. 3.

203. *Ibid.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3.

204. Lottin: "Syndérèse," p. 222, note 1.

reason must proceed from some cognition..., which is not had through the discourse connected with investigation, but which is immediately offered to the intellect." Paralleling the need of a habitus of first principles of speculative reasoning, or intellectus, practical reason also requires as its starting point principles known of themselves. Examples of practical principles are the precepts, "Evil is not to be done," and "The precepts of God are to be obeyed." This habitus of practical principles is synderesis, which must be distinguished from practical reason itself, not as one potency from another, but as a habitus from a potency. Synderesis is thus an innate habitus, effected by the light of the agent intellect, just as is intellectus or the habitus of speculative principles. Even though synderesis is the result of the intellect's light, sense and memory are needed for practical reason to know its principles, just as they are for speculative reason's cognition of a principle such as "The whole is greater than its part." However, after thus arguing that synderesis is a habitus, Aquinas closes the *corpus* by writing: "And so I say that synderesis names either only a habitus or a potency as at least subjected to the habitus that is innate in us."²⁰⁵

This final statement appears quite strange in the context of the *corpus*, as does the response to the second objection. The latter had asserted, on the authority of Jerome, that synderesis is the rational potency. In response, Aquinas writes: "In regard to the second [objection], we must say that the rational part is not simply called synderesis, but [it is called that] insofar as it concerns such a habitus."²⁰⁶ Is not that very close to saying synderesis is a potency with a habitus?

Concerning this attitude toward positions inherited from the "culture of synderesis," Lottin concludes that Aquinas shows himself to be an author

205. *Sent.* II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3: "...oportet quod omnis ratio ab aliqua cognitione procedat, quae uniformitatem et quietem quamdam habeat; quod non fit per discursum investigationis, sed subito intellectui offertur: sicut enim ratio in speculativis deducitur ab aliquibus principiis per se notis, quorum habitus intellectus dicitur; ita etiam oportet quod ratio practica ab aliquibus principiis per se notis deducatur, ut quod est malum non esse faciendum, praeceptis dei obediendum fore...: et horum quidem habitus est synderesis. Unde dico, quod synderesis a ratione practica distinguitur non quidem per substantiam potentiae, sed per habitum, qui est quodammodo innatus menti nostrae ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis, sicut et habitus principium speculativorum, ut, omne totum est majus sua parte...; licet ad determinationem cognitionis eorum sensu et memoria indegeamus... Et ideo dico, quod synderesis vel habitum tantum nominat, vel potentiam saltem subjectam habitui sic nobis innato."

206. *Ibid.*, ra. 2: "...rationalis pars non simpliciter vocatur synderesis, sed secundum quod talem habitum concernit."

"supremely respectful of the tradition." Rather than contradict the doctrine of synderesis as a potency with a habitus that was first enunciated by Philip the Chancellor, but more importantly, proposed by Albert, Aquinas has, if Lottin is correct, made a "concession to the ideas of the time."²⁰⁷ Yet despite the air of concession marking this article, it appears that Aquinas wishes to imply that synderesis, properly speaking, is the habitus of the first principles of practical reason.

In the subsequent article of his *Sentence-Commentary*, with Albert and contrary to Bonaventure, Aquinas speaks of synderesis as the habitus of the principles that practical reason applies in a practical syllogism. In this, Aquinas claims to depend on Aristotle. The question now asked is "whether conscience is an act." In the *corpus*, the four-fold division of conscience reviewed by Gauthier de Chateau-Thierry in arriving at his doctrine of conscience is employed in much the same manner as it was by Gauthier.²⁰⁸ Aquinas begins by noting that conscience is sometimes said to be (1) the precepts of morality; (2) the habitus by which one is disposed to view activity from the perspective of conscience, and in this sense both the natural law and its habitus are called conscience; (3) a potency, although this is an extrinsic and improper use of the term, for an examination of man's potencies reveals that none acts as conscience does. Against all three of these uses of conscience is the fact that none takes into account what is meant when conscience is said to bind and to make sin worse. Since no one is bound to do anything except subsequent to a consideration of the proposed action, there is this last and proper use of conscience, namely, (4) an actual consideration of reason.²⁰⁹

Although Aquinas has profited from Gauthier's procedure, his conclusion is quite different. The latter had asserted that conscience is the potency of reason

207. Lottin: "Syndérèse," pp. 223-24.

208. For Gauthier, see p. 166 above.

209. *Sent.* II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 4: "...conscientia multis modis accipitur. Quandoque enim dicitur conscientia ipsa res conscita;... quandoque vero dicitur habitus, quo quis disponitur ad consciendum; et secundum hoc ipsa lex naturalis et habitus rationis consuevit dici conscientia. Quidam etiam dicunt, quod conscientia quandoque potentia nominat; sed hoc nimis extraneum est, et improprie dictum: quod patet, si diligenter omnes potentiae animae inspiciantur. Nullo autem horum modorum conscientia sumitur, secundum quod in usum loquentium venit, prout dicitur ligare vel aggravare peccatum: nullus enim ligatur ad aliquid faciendum nisi per hoc quod considerat hoc esse agendum; unde quamdam actualem considerationem rationis, per conscientiam, communiter loquentes intelligere videntur."

with the habitus of synderesis, and that it differs from synderesis only by its activity. For Aquinas, however, conscience is an act of reason considering what is to be done, a doctrine appearing close to Albert's notion of conscience as a "decree of reason" applying a "decree of synderesis" to practical action.²¹⁰ The further influence of Albert is seen as Aquinas turns to Aristotle for aid in explaining the actual consideration of reason identified as conscience. From Aristotle, Albert had adopted practical reason as the form or directing cause of action. Aquinas now goes further in adopting and adapting to his needs Aristotle's explanation in *Ethics*. VI of practical reasoning.

But we must see what this actual consideration of reason is. We ought therefore to know that, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics*. VI, reason uses syllogisms in regard to what is to be chosen and what is to be fled.²¹¹

Continuing, Aquinas remarks that there are three propositions in a practical syllogism. The major, a universal proposition respecting activity, comes from an act of synderesis; the minor will arise from an act of either superior or inferior reason. The consideration of the conclusion of the syllogism is the consideration of conscience. For instance, synderesis proposes as the major, "We are to avoid evil"; the minor, "Adultery is evil," can come from superior reason as a divine prohibition, or from the recognition by inferior reason that adultery is evil because unjust; and the conclusion, "We should avoid adultery," belongs to conscience and applies not only presently, but at all time.²¹² In calling such a conclusion

210. See above, page 170.

211. *Sent.* II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 4: "...sed quae sit illa actualis rationis consideratio, videndum est. Sciendum est igitur, quod sicut in 6 ethic. philosophus dicit, ratio in eligendis et fugiendis, quibusdam syllogismis utitur."

212. *Ibid.*: "In syllogismo autem est triplex consideratio, secundum tres propositiones, ex quarum duabus tertia concluditur. Ita etiam contingit in proposito, dum ratio in operandis ex universalibus principiis circa particularia iudicium assumit. Et quia universalialia principia juris ad synderesim pertinent, rationes autem magis appropriatae ad opus, pertinent ad habitus, quibus ratio superior et inferior distinguuntur; synderesis in hoc syllogismo quasi majorem ministrat, cujus consideratio est actus synderesis; sed minorem ministrat ratio superior vel inferior, et ejus consideratio est ipsius actus; sed consideratio conclusionis elicita, est consideratio conscientiae. Verbi gratia, synderesis hanc proponit: omne malum est vitandum: ratio superior hanc assumit: adulterium est malum, quia lege dei prohibitum: sive ratio inferior assumeret illam, quia ei est malum, quia injustum, sive inhonestum: conclusio autem, quae est, adulterium hoc esse vitandum, ad conscientiam pertinet, et indifferenter, sive sit de praesenti vel de

“conscience,” we signify “science with another,” since universal science is applied to a particular act. From an example such as the above concerning adultery, as well as from the earlier discussion of the practical syllogism, it is clear that an erroneous conscience does not arise from an error of synderesis, but from an error of reason. This is also evident from the example used by so many in the past, namely, that of the heretic willing to be burned rather than swear to what he believes is false. The latter’s error is not in his conscience, but in his superior reason’s adherence to a false belief.²¹³ In concluding, Aquinas writes:

according to this mode it is clear how synderesis, natural law, and conscience differ, because natural law names the universal principles themselves of the law, synderesis names the habitus of those principles, or a potency with a habitus, and conscience names a certain application of the natural law to some action to be performed; this application is through a conclusion.²¹⁴

Once again, with the expression “or a potency with a habitus,” Aquinas has offered a gesture of respect toward his tradition and perhaps, toward his former teacher. Notwithstanding, the thrust of the *corpus* indicates that Aquinas most likely prefers to conceive of synderesis as simply the habitus of practical reason paralleling the habitus of intellectus in speculative reason.

A further appearance of the tradition within which Aquinas works is had only slightly later in the *Sentence-Commentary* when the topic is “whether the higher spark of reason can be extinguished.” “The higher spark of reason” is the phrase Lombard had used instead of Jerome’s “synderesis, the spark of conscience.”²¹⁵ In several of this article’s objections, elements of the “culture of synderesis” reappear. The first objection recalls Jerome’s comment on Ezekiel to the effect that conscience “falls” and concludes that so too does the higher spark of reason. In the third objection Aquinas resurrects the traditional phrase of “murmuring against evil,” and then proposes the equally traditional example of the heretic in whose life no such murmuring is said to occur; in responding,

praeterito vel futuro...”

213. *Ibid.*

214. *Ibid.*: “Et secundum hunc modum patet, qualiter differant synderesis, lex naturalis, et conscientia: quia lex naturalis nominat ipsa universalia principia juris, synderesis vero nominat habitum eorum, seu potentiam cum habitu; conscientia vero nominat applicationem quamdam legis naturalis ad aliquid faciendum per modum conclusionis cuiusdam.”

215. Cf. Lottin: “Syndérèse,” p. 106. For Lombard, see p. 160 above.

Aquinas sides with Philip the Chancellor and Albert in asserting the heretic’s error is not on the part of synderesis, but of conscience. Objection five, finally, cites the complete phrase, “murmur against evil and incline to good,” but now attaches it to the oft-used example of the damned in whom neither the murmuring, nor the inclination, is had.²¹⁶

The *corpus* of the article takes its point of departure from the Neoplatonic principle, that in the hierarchical order of creatures, whatever is superior in an entity resembles the inferior aspect of the entity of the next highest order of being. Accordingly, the rational nature of human beings must share in the ability of intellectual substances to know truth independently of any investigation or discourse. This non-discursive or purely intellectual cognition of truth is had in man’s natural apprehension of the first principles both of speculative and of practical reason. Thus, human beings have both the habitus of intellectus and the habitus of synderesis. Since a spark is a small bit flying off from a larger body of fire, synderesis and the superior part of reason are appropriately called a spark because of their small share of an angel’s intellectuality. Additionally, because synderesis transcends the rationality signified by man, as well as the concupiscible part of the soul signified by the ox and the irascible part symbolized by the lion, Jerome spoke of the eagle as transcending all other animals in its flight. Finally, just as the intellectus cannot err respecting its first principles, so synderesis cannot err in regard to the first principles of practical affairs. Because of this, the higher spark of reason, or synderesis, cannot be extinguished.²¹⁷

In the article just noted, Aquinas gives no indication that synderesis is anything except a habitus of reason. Neither does the subsequent article suggest that synderesis is anything other than the natural cognition of first practical principles.²¹⁸ However, in Book III of the *Sentence-Commentary*, when synderesis again appears, the claim is made that the habitus of synderesis, if not the name, is spoken of by Aristotle:

Just as in speculative reason there are innate principles of demonstrations, so

216. *Sent.* II, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1.

217. *Ibid.* which reads in part: “...in anima rationali, quae angelo in ordine creaturarum configuratur, sit aliqua participatio intellectualis virtutis, secundum quam aliquam veritatem sine inquisitione apprehendat, sicut apprehenduntur prima principia naturaliter cognita tam in speculativis quam etiam in operativis; unde et talis virtus intellectus vocatur, secundum quod est in speculativis, quae etiam secundum quod in operativis est, synderesis dicitur...”

218. *Ibid.*, a. 2. Here the question asked is “whether conscience sometimes errs.”

in practical reason there are the innate ends connatural to man; hence, concerning these [principles and ends], there is no acquired nor infused habitus, but a natural one, as for example, synderesis; in the place of synderesis, the Philosopher posits in *Ethics.VI* intellectus in practical affairs.²¹⁹

Regarding Aquinas's doctrine of synderesis as it appears in his *Sentence-Commentary*, several conclusions can now be drawn. (1) When he proposes synderesis as the natural habitus of the principles of practical affairs, that is, as the natural habitus of the precepts of the natural law, Aquinas presents his doctrine as one based on rational arguments. Initially, he asserts the need for a starting point in reasoning, whether speculative or practical; hence, each human person has naturally both the habitus of intellectus and the habitus of synderesis. But a second argument is had insofar as Aquinas invokes the Neo-platonic principle according to which entities at each level of the hierarchy of being participate by their highest potency in the lowest potency of entities on the next highest level. Thus, human nature has naturally some cognition that does not depend on the investigation appropriate to rationality; this cognition is identified as the two natural habitus of synderesis and intellectus. (2) Aquinas indicates in a two-fold manner that this doctrine of synderesis is at least implicit in the *Ethics*. Aristotle's notion of the syllogism implicit in practical reason requires the type of major premise that can ultimately be supplied only by a natural habitus of indemonstrable principles of morality. Then too, Aristotle is said to speak explicitly of an intellectus that functions in practical affairs in a way paralleling the role played by the intellectual virtue of intellectus in speculative reasoning: "There is an intellectus of the extremes in both [speculative and practical reason]; for intellectus and not reason is of first terms and extremes."²²⁰ (3) Although this conclusion is a historical one rather than textual as are the preceding two, I suggest the "culture of synderesis" led Aquinas quite naturally to assume the presence in each person of a natural habitus of the principles of morality. As happens in anyone's intellectual coming of age in a particular culture, Aquinas

219. *Sent.* III, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4d: "Unde sicut in ratione speculativa sunt innata principia demonstrationum, ita in ratione practica sunt innati fines connaturales homini; unde circa illa non est habitus acquisitus aut infusus, sed naturales, sicut synderesis, loco cuius philosophus in 6 ethic. ponit intellectum in operativis."

220. *NE.VI.11.1143a35-1143b1* (*SLE*, p. 365): "Et intellectus extremorum in utraque; et enim primorum terminorum et extremorum intellectus est et non ratio."

first assumed the reality of synderesis and only subsequently discovered arguments justifying his assumption. Yet even if one does not accept this third conclusion, the examination of texts comprising the "culture of synderesis" shows the incorrectness of styling as religiously based Aquinas's attribution to Aristotle of a natural habitus of principles of morality.

The few treatments of synderesis in the later works of Aquinas only bolster the three conclusions mentioned above. Synderesis is addressed in the *De veritate* according to the three-fold division made classic by Philip the Chancellor, that is, article 1, asking, Is synderesis a potency or a habitus?; article 2, with its question, Can synderesis sin?; and article 3's question, Is synderesis ever extinguished in anyone?²²¹ When he takes up the first question, Aquinas refers in the initial objection to Jerome's comment on Ezekiel, according to which synderesis is opposed to the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational potencies; on the basis of this opposition, the objection concludes that synderesis too must be a potency. In response, Aquinas points out that the four elements of the soul mentioned are opposed only as causal principles, not as potencies. Given the article's question, Aquinas implies that synderesis is to be conceived as a habitus. However, the remaining 15 objections all conclude that synderesis cannot be a potency with a habitus. More striking even that this common element of the objections is that Aquinas responds in every case that the basis of the objection does not justify its conclusion. Thus, responses 2 through 16 propose implicitly that synderesis can be conceived as a potency with a habitus - the position adopted by so many of Aquinas's predecessors, but most importantly perhaps by Albert. Notwithstanding, in each of the four *sed contra*, Aquinas argues that synderesis is a habitus.²²² To these arguments, Aquinas makes no response, a fact leading to the conclusion that here is his preferred position. In this light, the response to the objections are to be seen as his way of proclaiming the rational character of the alternate conception advanced earlier by Albert and others.

The *corpus* of the article appears to bear out this interpretation. There Aquinas proposes three diverse opinions held in regard to the nature of synderesis: (1) a potency superior to reason; (2) reason as naturally knowing something, i.e.,

221. *De veritate*. 16.1-3.

222. E.g., *Ibid.* 16.1: "Sed contra, si synderesis sit potentia oportet quod sit potentia rationalis; sed rationales potentiae se habent ad opposita; ergo synderesis ad opposita se habebit, quod potest esse falsum quia semper instigat ad bonum et nunquam autem ad malum." - While the basis of the argument, i.e., "a rational potency is related to opposites," may appear at first to involve a *petitio principii*, that is only an appearance. For Aquinas, the exercise of rationality is essentially a discursive procedure, and such procedure is never determined to one result.

a habitus; and (3) a potency with a habitus. Subsequent to noting these opinions, Aquinas writes: "However, it can be seen in this way what is the most true [conception]." The discussion following this pronouncement sees Aquinas arguing in three steps to the conclusion that synderesis is a habitus. First, arguing from the same Neo-platonic principle used in the *Sentence-Commentary*, Aquinas concludes human nature has naturally some cognition "immediately and without investigation."²²³ Secondly, he argues that this cognition must occur in two forms, namely, practical and speculative. - The basis of this argument is the presence in intellectual substances, i.e., in angels, of both forms of cognition. Angels have speculative intellection of the truth of things; as for their practical cognition, philosophers affirm that intellectual substances know the heavenly bodies they move as well as all natural forms, while theologians assert that angels are God's ministers in spiritual affairs affecting men. - This immediate and non-discursive cognition, both speculative and practical, must be present in man in an habitual way so that he is ready to use it whenever it is needed. The third step consists in little more than attaching to the above conclusion the traditional conceptions of intellectus and synderesis as the natural cognition, respectively, of speculative and practical indemonstrable principles. Concluding this portion of his *corpus*, Aquinas asserts: "However, this habitus [of synderesis] exists in no other potency than reason."

Yet even though he has now proposed, not only in the *corpus*, but also earlier in each of the *sed contra*, arguments concluding that synderesis is a habitus, Aquinas adds:

Therefore, it remains that this name "synderesis" either names absolutely a natural habitus similar to a habitus of principles, or it names the potency itself of reason with such a habitus. Whichever it is does not make much difference, because this does not cause a problem except in regard to the significance of the name.²²⁴

With this final thought, Aquinas surely reveals his acceptance of the "culture of synderesis," i.e., the conviction, rational not religious, that each human person possesses in a habitual way a natural cognition of the first principles of moral conduct. Whether one prefers to conceive of this natural cognition as a potency

223. For the use of this principle in the *Sentence-Commentary*, see page 180 above.

224. *De veritate*. 16.1.p504,246-52: "Restat igitur ut hoc nomen *synderesis* vel nominet absolute habitum naturalem similem habitui principiorum vel nominet ipsam potentiam rationis cum tali habitu, et quodcumque horum fuerit non multum differt, quia hoc non facit dubitationem nisi circa nominis significationem."

with a habitus or simply as a habitus is of little importance. Notwithstanding, Aquinas prefers the latter course.

The remaining two articles of the *De veritate*'s treatment of synderesis add nothing new to what was found in the *Sentence-Commentary*. Synderesis, Aquinas explains, has the duty of "murmuring against evil and inclining to good"; thus, it cannot sin.²²⁵ Nor can it ever be extinguished, for it is a habitual light, even though an individual's sinful pursuits can so absorb reason that the universal judgment of synderesis is never applied to a particular possible act.²²⁶

One final question of the *De veritate* deserves attention. When Aquinas asks with which divine attribute ought providence be identified, he approaches the answer by remarking that divine providence is best understood through analogy with human prudential activity. In this context, he repeats the interpretation of *Ethics*.VI given earlier in his *Sentence-Commentary*: "The end of human activity pre-exists in us in two ways." The first of these is

through natural cognition of the end of man, which natural cognition pertains to intellectus, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics*.VI, which [intellectus] is of the principles of things to be done just as [it is] also of things to be known; principles of things to be done are ends, as is said in the same book.²²⁷

Throughout the remainder of his career, Aquinas appears little concerned with the earlier discussions respecting the conception of synderesis. In his *De anima-Commentary* (1267-1268), in regard to the inerrant intellectus, Aquinas offers much the same doctrine as Albert. Although the name "synderesis" does not appear, Aquinas attributes to Aristotle the doctrine of an intellectus of the first practical principles.

Then when he [i.e., Aristotle] says: "The intellectus," he assigns on the basis of what has been said the reason of some accidents regarding motion or action, namely, he shows why we err in our actions and motions. He says that "every intellectus is correct." This must be understood of the intellectus of principles, for we do not err regarding the first principles of practical affairs which are

225. *Ibid.*2.

226. *Ibid.*3.

227. *Ibid.*5.1.p139,136-43: "Sed finis agibilium praexistit in nobis dupliciter: scilicet per cognitionem naturalem de fine hominis, quae quidem naturalis cognitio ad intellectum pertinet, secundum Philosophum in VI *Ethicorum*, qui est principiorum operabilium sicut et speculabilium; principia autem operabilium sunt fines, ut in eodem libro dicitur;..."

such as the following: We ought hurt no one, We ought do nothing unjustly, and similar [principles], just as we do not err concerning the first speculative principles.²²⁸

As mentioned in the opening sentence of the above citation, Aquinas saw in the *De anima* a discussion of error in moral activity. In that context, Aristotle's assertion of the inerrant intellectus appeared to him as a reference to a habitus of first practical principles.

Synderesis is unmentioned in the *Summa contra gentiles*, but does appear twice in the *De malo*. Yet in the latter work, synderesis is only described as "the universal principles of the natural law about which no one errs."²²⁹ In the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae*, one article is devoted to synderesis. Is this sudden waning of interest related to the *De veritate*'s reduction of the problem of synderesis to one concerning the use of the name? Perhaps, for the *Prima pars* is satisfied with asking, "whether synderesis is some special potency of the soul distinct from the others."²³⁰ - This article was written at roughly the same time as the *De anima-Commentary* noted shortly above.

Notwithstanding the scant attention now paid synderesis, Aquinas remains conscious of his tradition. Accordingly, the first objection in this article of the *Prima pars* recalls once more the classic text of Jerome: since the latter's comment on Ezekiel opposed synderesis to three potencies, namely, to the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, synderesis must also be a potency.²³¹ Aquinas asserts in response that Jerome distinguished the four as diverse acts, a fact necessitating no conclusion respecting distinct potencies.²³² The single *sed contra* offered is nearly identical to the first found in the parallel article of the *De veritate*. The sole difference is the attribution here to Aristotle

228. *SLDA*.III.9.101-10.P826: "Deinde cum dicit: *Intellectus quidem*, assignat ex premissis rationem cuiusdam accidentis circa motum vel actionem, ostendens scilicet quare in actionibus et motibus nostris erramus. Et dicit quod omnis *intellectus est rectus*. Quod intelligendum est de intellectu principiorum: non enim erramus circa prima principia in operabilibus, cuiusmodi sunt: Nulli esse nocendum, Non esse aliquid iniuste agendum, et similia, sicut nec erramus circa prima principia in speculativis."

229. *De malo*, q. 3, a. 12, ad 13. See also q. 16, a. 6, ad 5.

230. *ST.Ia*.79.12c.

231. *Ibid*.ob.1.

232. *Ibid*.ad 1.

of the doctrine that rational potencies are always related to opposites; the absence of such opposition in the act of synderesis points to the conclusion that synderesis cannot be a potency.²³³

That synderesis is a habitus is argued in the *corpus* with no gesture whatsoever to the acceptability of other uses of the name. In fact, Aquinas begins by asserting categorically that

...synderesis is not a potency, but a habitus, even though some have posited it as a potency higher than reason, and some have said it is reason itself, not *qua* reason [i.e., not as actually carrying through a discursive act], but reason as nature [i.e., reason as a natural orientation to truth].

The argument which then follows to show synderesis is a habitus is essentially similar to the first used in the *Sentence-Commentary*, namely, that all reasoning must begin from something naturally known. Accordingly, both speculative and practical reasoning proceed from principles naturally known of themselves. Just as *Ethics*.VI asserted the speculative principles were known in the natural habitus of intellectus, so the principles of practical things are naturally known by the habitus of synderesis. Insofar as from the principles of this habitus we proceed to judge what to do and to omit, synderesis aids us by "urging toward good and murmuring against evil."²³⁴

Several years later (c. 1271), Aquinas speaks of synderesis in the *Prima secundae*. In an article on the natural law, he asserts that "synderesis is called the law of our intellect insofar as it is a habitus containing the precepts of the natural

233. *Ibid*.: "Sed contra, potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita, secundum Philosophum. Synderesis autem non se habet ad opposita, sed ad bonum tantum inclinatur. Ergo synderesis non est potentia. Si enim esset potentia, oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia: non enim invenitur in brutis." Contrast with the text of *De veritate*.16.1 in note 222 on page 181 above.

234. *Ibid*.corpus: "...ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili... Constat autem quod, sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus. Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita, sicut principia speculabilium, ita et principia operabilium...et principia operabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad specialem potentiam; sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus synderesim. Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et murmurare de malo, in quantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et iudicamus inventa." Compare with the text of *Sent*.II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 in note 205 on page 175 above.

law, which [precepts] are the first principles of human activity."²³⁵

Aquinas's final reference to synderesis occurs in the *Secunda secundae*, finished the following year. Here, the topic is "whether prudence establishes the ends of the moral virtues." In this novel context, Aquinas explains that the ends in practical affairs, i.e., the ends of the moral virtues, parallel the first principles used in constructing science. These ends are used by prudence in determining particular conclusions about actions to perform or to omit. As for the initial cognition of the ends, this is had through synderesis. Thus, synderesis moves prudence by establishing the ends of the moral virtues just as the intellectus of principles moves science.²³⁶

In turning now to the *SLE*, I recall the conclusions drawn relative to the doctrine of synderesis in Aquinas's *Sentence-Commentary*: first, Aquinas offered rational arguments in defense of synderesis as a habitus of principles of the natural law; second, Aquinas asserted that synderesis is implied in *Ethics*. VI; and third, from within the "culture of synderesis," Aquinas came to accept and then to find a rational basis for synderesis. While the examination of the *De veritate* provided more support for the first and the third conclusion, as well as found again the identification of *Ethics*. VI as asserting an intellectus of first practical principles, it also discovered Aquinas asserting for the first time the relative unimportance of the disagreement over whether synderesis was to be regarded as a habitus or as a potency with a habitus. One readily presumes that, for Aquinas, what is crucial is the assignment to reason of a natural, habitual cognition of natural law precepts sufficient to serve as a guide for moral activity. Surely this is borne out by the little attention paid synderesis in the *Summa theologiae*. Yet what attention is paid synderesis only reinforces the first and the third conclusions. However, even granting the decline in the attention paid to synderesis, the reader cannot but be surprised to find not only no mention of synderesis in Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*, but as well no reference to a "natural habitus" of the first indemonstrable principles of morality. Interestingly, in the *Super Ethica*, Albert too appears to find neither need nor place to discuss synderesis in connection with the thought of Aristotle. Even though Albert offers the term "synderesis" twice, it is referred to only obliquely and then, only as "murmuring against evil."²³⁷ Notwithstanding, there is no doubt but that Aquinas was convinced that the *Ethics* contained a doctrine equivalent to synderesis.

As noted, Albert found that *Ethics*. V sharply distinguished the legally just

235. *ST. Ia-IIae*. 94.2. ad 2.

236. *ST. IIa-IIae*. 47.7c & ad 1 & ad 3.

237. Cf. *Super Ethica*. VII.6.p549,88; IX.5.p671,84.

and the naturally just; the former was seen to depend on a social constitution and not to be universally binding, while the naturally just was said to be everywhere in force because of what it is.²³⁸ The *SLE* reveals Aquinas following in the footsteps of his former teacher as concerns the general division of Aristotle's text where the issue is the legally just and the naturally just. Aristotle is understood to offer a clear distinction of the two types of just thing. In terms of their binding force, the naturally just binds everywhere with the same force - it binds "from nature"; the legally just, on the other hand, binds only in those places over which the law-giver has authority.²³⁹

Since neither in this context nor elsewhere does Aristotle appear to speak explicitly of the manner in which the naturally just is known, it is not surprising that Aquinas would wish to add at this point what he regards as the correct conception. Hence, immediately after the proposal of Aristotle's distinction of the naturally and legally just, he writes:

Just as in speculative things there is something naturally known, e.g., the indemonstrable principles and principles related to them which are discovered by man through study, so in operative matters there are principles natural known, that is, indemonstrable principles and others related to them, such as "We ought to avoid evil," "We ought to hurt no one unjustly," "We ought not steal," and similar principles.²⁴⁰

What is more natural than for Aquinas to complete Aristotle's doctrine of the naturally just by inserting in this way what has been indisputable since the text of Jerome was brought to the attention of 12th and 13th century theologians, namely,

238. See above, pp. 170-73.

239. *SLE*. V.12.34-48.S1018: "...manifestat membra divisionis praemissae... Uno modo secundum effectum vel virtutem, dicens quod iustum naturale est quod habet ubique eandem potentiam, id est virtutem, ad inducendum ad bonum et ad arcendum a malo; quod quidem contingit eo quod natura, quae est causa huius iusti, eadem est ubique apud omnes, iustum vero quod est ex positione alicuius civitatis vel principis apud illos tantum est virtuosum qui subduntur iurisdictioni illius civitatis vel principis. Alio modo manifestat hoc iustum secundum causam, cum dicit quod iustum naturale non consistit in videri vel non videri, id est non oritur ex aliqua opinione humana, sed ex natura."

240. *Ibid.* 49-56.S1018: "Sicut enim in speculativis sunt quaedam naturaliter cognita, ut principia indemonstrabilia et quae sunt propinqua his, quaedam vero studio hominum adinventata, ita etiam in operativis sunt quaedam principia naturaliter cognita, quasi indemonstrabilia principia et propinqua his, ut malum esse vitandum, nulli esse iniuste nocendum, non esse furandum et similia..."

that man has a natural cognition of right and wrong?

Shortly after the above, Aquinas comments on the text in which, according to Albert, Aristotle answers the objection that everything just is changeable.²⁴¹ Aquinas again shows himself to be the disciple of Albert as he finds in Aristotle's text essentially the same objection and response. However, the additional explanations and examples Aquinas offers reveal that he works, not as student imitating his master, but as one taking an insight he regards as true and subsequently developing it in his own way.

Aquinas begins by identifying the objection as that of the Cyrenaic followers of Aristippus. These philosophers argued that anything natural, i.e., "according to nature," is changeless and is everywhere found the same. They reasoned that nothing considered just appears to have these characteristics and, accordingly, everything regarded as just is only so because somewhere or other it has been constituted as a law. For instance, nothing seems more just than that an object deposited in the care of someone must be returned when requested by its owner. Yet surely a sword ought not be returned to its owner when the latter is a madman.²⁴²

As understood by Aquinas, Aristotle's response to this objection points to the difference between, on the one hand, the nature of changeless separate substances and heavenly bodies, and, on the other, changing human nature. However, while human beings are changeable because corruptible, there are some things about them by nature, e.g., that human beings have feet, even though some individuals may not have them by birth or may have lost them in some way after birth. Similarly, even though everything just may be to some extent changeable, there are yet some things naturally just.²⁴³

How can this be?, Aristotle is said to ask. If everything about us can change, what kind of thing is just by nature?²⁴⁴ Aquinas understands Aristotle's response to be this: whatever is natural for human beings is what is had in most cases, but not always; for example, a person's right hand is naturally stronger, but in a few cases a person's left hand is as strong as his right. Similarly, everything naturally just, such as the precept governing the return of objects received on

241. For Aristotle's text and Albert's comment, see above, p. 171.

242. *SLE.V.12.139-53.S1025.*

243. *Ibid.154-68.S1026.*

244. *Ibid.169-79.S1027.*

deposit, is generally to be observed, although there can be exceptions.²⁴⁵

After offering this as Aristotle's view of the naturally just, Aquinas adds his own further philosophical understanding. The human essence or nature is immutable, he explains; for instance, there is no changing the fact that men are animals. Additionally, whatever pertains to the justice between persons is unalterable, e.g., that we ought never steal. Those things that are a consequence of human nature, for instance, the dispositions of the owner who requests the return of his sword, can vary in a few cases.²⁴⁶

In what has been examined of Aquinas's discussion of the naturally just, there is nothing to justify Jaffa's assertion that a "principle of Christian ethics" has been introduced. Instead, Aquinas, undoubtedly influenced by his former teacher's reading of the *Ethics*, also finds in Aristotle's words a doctrine related to what the tradition of both these medieval authors styled natural law or the first indemonstrable principles of morality. Moreover, *Ethics.V* is not the only place where Aquinas sees the implication of a natural cognition of moral principles. In commenting on *Ethics.II*, Aquinas explains Aristotle's doctrine that one becomes virtuous by acting as a virtuous person acts, even though one's actions do not issue from virtues.²⁴⁷ To the question of how one can perform such actions when one is not virtuous, Aquinas answers by referring to reason's ability to regulate the appetites and so, to determine the proper actions. Reason has this ability since, in practical matters as in speculative, "the first principles of reason are naturally implanted in us."²⁴⁸

245. *Ibid.180-96.S1028.*

246. *Ibid.197-207.S1029*: "Est tamen attendendum quod, quia rationes etiam mutabilium sunt immutabiles, si quid est nobis naturale quasi pertinens ad ipsam hominis rationem nullo modo mutatur, puta hominem esse animal, quae autem consequuntur naturam, puta dispositiones, actiones et motus, mutantur ut in paucioribus; et similiter etiam illa quae pertinent ad ipsam iustitiae rationem nullo modo possunt mutari, puta non esse furandum, quod est iniustum facere, illa vero quae consequuntur mutantur ut in minori parte." The example of refusing to return a sword to a madman is added to this argument in *Ia-IIae.94.4*. From that discussion, it is clear that "dispositions, acts, and motions" are to be understood as concrete circumstances that affect the application of a natural law precept.

247. *Ibid.II.4.87-97.S285.*

248. *Ibid.97-106.S286*: "Si quis autem quaerat quomodo hoc est possibile, cum nihil reducat se de potentia in actum, dicendum est quod perfectio virtutis moralis, de qua nunc loquimur, consistit in hoc quod appetitus reguletur secundum rationem; prima autem rationis principia sunt naturaliter nobis indita, ita in operativis sicut in

Aquinas finds another occasion in *Ethics*.VI when it appears proper to propose as integral to Aristotle's moral thought the presence in man of first principles of moral activity. In this text, Aristotle is said to show that moral virtue cannot be had apart from prudence. Implicitly, this doctrine raises again the problem of how one acquires moral virtues. If one cannot have moral virtues without prudence, then, assuming one wishes to perform the acts which develop virtues, how does one know what actions to perform? Aristotle's answer, as explained by Aquinas, stresses the former's notion of a natural virtue or disposition which precedes complete or moral virtue.²⁴⁹ According to Aquinas, this natural virtue or disposition to virtuous action is constituted by three elements: first, in reason "the first principles of human activity are naturally implanted," e.g., "We ought to harm no one"; second, the will is naturally moved to the apprehended good as to its proper object; and third, from birth the individual's sensitive appetite is disposed either more or less in the way that ordinarily results from the possession of moral virtue. Obviously, this third element is what differentiates one individual from another. This, Aquinas concludes, is what Aristotle means in saying some persons are naturally courageous or naturally just.²⁵⁰ In this text, as earlier, Aquinas has found it necessary in explaining Aristotle to remind the reader of the natural cognition of first principles of morality. Implicitly at least, Aquinas is attributing to Aristotle

speculativis, et ideo sicut per principia praecognita facit aliquis inveniendō se scientem in actu, ita agendo secundum principia rationis practicae facit aliquis se virtuosum in actu."

249. *NE*.VI.13.1144b1-6: "...et enim virtus similiter habet ut prudentia ad dinoticam, non idem quidem, simile autem, sic et naturalis virtus ad principalem. Omnibus enim videtur singulos morum existere natura aequaliter, et enim iusti et temperati et fortes et alia habemus confestim a nativitate." Cf. *SLE*, p. 374.

250. *Ibid*.VI.11.22-44.S1276-78: "Et quod sit aliqua virtus naturalis quae praesupponitur morali, patet per hoc quod singuli mores virtutum vel vitiorum videntur aequaliter existere aliquibus hominibus naturaliter,... Quae quidem naturalis dispositio quantum ad tria potest attendi: primo quidem ex parte rationis, cui naturaliter indita sunt prima principia operabilium humanorum, puta nulli esse nocendum et similia; secundo ex parte voluntatis, quae de se naturaliter movetur a bono intellectu sicut a proprio obiecto; tertio ex parte appetitus sensitivi, secundum quod ex naturali complexione quidam sunt dispositi ad iram, quidam ad concupiscentias vel ad alias huiusmodi passiones aut magis aut minus aut mediocriter, in quo consistit virtus moralis; sed prima duo communia sunt omnibus hominibus, sed hoc tertium est quod differentiam facit in hominibus, unde secundum hoc dicit hic Philosophus quosdam esse naturaliter fortes vel iustos."

a doctrine of synderesis.

A problem remains to be faced. In the *Sentence-Commentary*, the *De veritate*, and the *De anima-Commentary*, Aquinas asserted that Aristotle proposes an intellectus of first practical principles; in the first two works, *Ethics*.VI is mentioned as the locus of this doctrine.²⁵¹ However, when Aquinas comments on *Ethics*.VI, he appears to have realized his mistake respecting Aristotle's doctrine in the passage concerned. The intellectus Aristotle speaks of in regard to practical matters is, according to Aquinas's comment in the *SLE*, an internal sense also called "particular reason." As in the case with the intellectus of the first principles of speculative reason, this practical intellectus concerns "extremes." However, whereas the extremes of interest to the speculative intellectus are the first terms from which the first indemonstrable principles of speculation are developed, the extremes of the practical intellectus are singulars. The habitus of intellectus in practical affairs is thus the habitus by which the cogitative power grasps the singulars from which singular propositions are constructed. The importance of this practical habitus comes from its role as supplying the proposition serving as the minor in a practical syllogism. As might be expected, this intellectus in practical affairs is perfected only through the experience coming with age and through the assistance of prudence.²⁵² Only in an extended sense is this habitus considered natural, namely, insofar as some persons are prepared for the habitus by a natural disposition of the body possessed at birth.²⁵³

Yet this change in his understanding of Aristotle's reference in *Ethics*.VI to an intellectus in practical affairs does not mean that Aquinas found no grounds in the *Ethics* for attributing to its author the doctrine of a natural habitus of the first principles of morality. Not only did he find in Book V the assertion of the

251. See above pages 180 and 183.

252. *SLE*.VI.9.158-68.S1247: "Est autem duplex intellectus, quorum hic quidem est circa immobiles terminos et primos, qui sunt secundum demonstrationes quae procedunt ab immobilibus et primis terminis, id est a principiis indemonstrabilibus quae sunt prima cognita...; sed intellectus qui est in practicis est alterius modi extremi, scilicet singularis, et contingentis et alterius propositionis, id est non universalis quae est quasi maior, sed singularis quae est minor in syllogismo operativo." *Ibid*.178-86.S1249: "Et, quia singularia proprie cognoscuntur per sensum, oportet quod homo horum singularium...habeat sensum non solum exteriorem, sed etiam interiorem, cuius supra dixit esse prudentiam, scilicet vim cogitativam sive aestimativam quae dicitur ratio particularis; unde hic sensus vocatur intellectus qui est circa singularia, et hunc Philosophus vocat in III De anima intellectum passivum, qui est corruptibilis." See also, *Ibid*.227-39.S1254.

253. *Ibid*.187-97.S1250.

naturally just, but in the topic of the acquisition of virtues in Books II and VI he saw that Aristotle implied reason's natural ability to know right from wrong on a universal level. In regard to this natural ability, Jaffa claims that Aquinas the Christian has attributed to Aristotle the doctrine of "a 'natural' habit of the moral virtues." However, the above examination of the tradition of synderesis reveals something quite different. Aquinas took the traditional doctrine of synderesis as the natural, general knowledge of morally right action and developed two philosophical arguments to justify asserting its existence as an inseparable part of human nature. First, there is practical reason's need of cognition of indemonstrable first principles of morality; second, there is the Neo-platonic principle according to which human nature partakes by its highest part of the powers of intellectual substance just as it partakes by its inferior part of the powers of animal nature. Because he had thus concluded philosophically to the existence of synderesis, and because his former teacher had found in the *Ethics* a doctrine of the naturally just, it is not all surprising that Aquinas found in Aristotle an implied need for a natural, habitual cognition of the first principles of morality.²⁵⁴

In concluding this chapter, it appears correct to assert that the presence in the *SLE* of the six so-called "principles of Christian ethics" points to nothing more than to our need to ask why or on what grounds they were introduced by Aquinas in commenting on the *Ethics*. For instance, the proposal in the *SLE* of divine particular providence does not permit us to conclude that Aquinas is writing as a theologian. The conclusion authorized by the presence of such a doctrine speaks not of Aquinas's intent in commenting on Aristotle's text. Instead, it speaks of a historical task incumbent on us. It points us, as in the present chapter, to the investigation of Aquinas's other works and their backgrounds. As it happens, the investigations of the present chapter support the conclusion that, by the doctrines made much of by Jaffa and others, Aquinas has introduced, not Christian principles, but philosophical ones. Further, the introduction of the doctrines in question aided the presentation of the moral philosophy Aquinas believed to have been proposed in the *Ethics*.

When this conclusion is added to the results of the preceding chapters, an even stronger case is had for regarding the *SLE* as Aquinas's statement of moral philosophy. Chapter I illustrated the *SLE*'s nature as an attempt to propose a unity in the *Ethics* different from that found there by earlier commentators.

254. Kleber: *Glück als Lebensziel*, p. 68, suggests that Aquinas recognized that the doctrine of first practical principles was not a genuine Aristotelian position, but that he considered it as a legitimate extension of Aristotle's view of the "naturally just."

According to Aquinas, the entirety of the *Ethics* rises out of Book I's discussion of ultimate human happiness; that discussion necessitated the examination of the virtues, both moral and intellectual, and then of continence and friendship in relation to virtue; once Aristotle's views on these topics were understood, the characteristics of the ultimate happiness obtainable by virtue could be investigated. It was in service of the exposition of such a unified view of morality that Aquinas introduced into the *SLE* the six philosophical doctrines discussed in this chapter.

The opposition, principally between Aquinas and Albert, but secondarily between Aquinas and Averroes, that was discussed in Chapter 2 focused more light on the former's intent to propose the moral system of Aristotle. In Chapter 3, some 13th century claims made for philosophy were investigated, as well as some philosophical doctrines emanating from the Parisian Faculty of Arts and responses to them. When some of Aquinas's work in philosophy and the conservative attitude of other Parisian figures were added, the resulting picture cast light both on Aquinas's attitude toward philosophy and his use of it. As a consequence, the present chapter's claim respecting the philosophical character of the *SLE* appears unexceptionable.

In this regard, the date to assign the *SLE* assumes a special importance. To many historians, the topics discussed in the *SLE* have suggested that the work was composed in preparation for the second or moral part of the *Summa theologiae*. Yet, more than 40 years ago, Gauthier gathered evidence showing that the initial half of the moral section of that *Summa* predates the *SLE*. With only one notable exception, this dating appears to have been generally accepted, although its consequence appear to remain unnoted.²⁵⁵ Yet were the *SLE* to be posterior to the entire *Pars secunda*, rather than only to the *Prima secundae*, we would have even more reason to consider the *SLE* Aquinas's way of saying to his Parisian audience, "Here is moral philosophy." In the following chapter, the question of the date of the *SLE* is once more raised.

255. For the dating, see Gauthier: "La date du commentaire." For its general acceptance, cf. Torrell: *Initiation*, pp. 331-32. The notable exception is Vernon J. Bourke: "The *Nicomachean Ethics* and Thomas Aquinas," in *St. Thomas Aquinas. 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies* (Toronto: Pont. Inst. Med. Stud., 1974) V. 1, pp. 239-59. For a view of the *SLE* based on the assumption that it precedes and prepares for the *Pars secunda*, see Jordan: "Aquinas reading Aristotle's *Ethics*."

DATING THE *SLE*

The date of the composition of the *SLE* is not without relation to a theory respecting its nature. If, for example, the *SLE* were to have been composed prior to, as well as in proximity to the writing of the *Prima secundae*, then there would be some reason for regarding the former work as undertaken in preparation for the moral part of the *Summa theologiae*. However, in the 1950s Gauthier argued that Aquinas composed the *SLE* in 1271-1272, and so, after the completion of the *Prima secundae*.¹ Subsequently, because of the use in the latter work of Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, a version possessed by Aquinas only in late 1270, Gauthier proposed the *Prima secundae* as having itself been written somewhat later than previously thought.² Consequently, Gauthier now dates the *Prima secundae* after early 1271 and the *Secunda secundae* after the summer of that year, thus late 1271-1272. Yet Gauthier's original dates of 1271-1272 for the *SLE*, as well as its posteriority relative to the *Prima secundae*, continue to stand.³

In what follows a portion of Gauthier's evidence for dating the *SLE* will be supplemented principally by information gained through a comparison of the *Tabula libri Ethicorum*, the *Super Ethica* of Albert, the *Secunda secundae*, and the *SLE*. Through these comparisons, it will appear with some probability that sections from Books II-VII of the *SLE* were written later than parallel passages of the *Secunda secundae*. Obviously, this suggests strongly that the *SLE* was not written in preparation for the moral part of the *Summa theologiae*. Additionally, it adds support to the view that Aquinas intended to propose the moral philosophy of the *SLE* as valuable in its own right.

1. Gauthier, "La date du commentaire," pp. 66-105.

2. Cf. Torrell, *Initiation*, p. 146, with note 12.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 227, with note 10.

THE *TABULA LIBRI ETHICORUM*

In 1304, the Parisian stationery of Andrew of Senon included Aquinas's *Tabula Ethicorum* among a list of exemplars of "books of philosophy" available for copying. These "books of philosophy" had been allotted to Andrew by Masters of the University.⁴ The presence of the *Tabula* in this list 32 years after Aquinas's final departure from Paris, and its inclusion in the company of his commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, *De anima*, *Physics*, *Ethics* and *De causis*, offer witness that the *Tabula*, as well as the other "books of philosophy," were regarded with considerable respect. Additionally, Gauthier discovered an indication of its even earlier importance when he noted the *Tabula* had been the source of one of the propositions condemned at Paris in March, 1277 by Bishop Tempier.⁵

The *Tabula* comprises individual statements grouped under principal ideas found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, ideas usually but not always listed alphabetically; for example, under "A" are found in this order "amari," "amicicia," "amabile," "amicus," and "amare." Under such ideas are grouped statements of three types: some citing only the text of the *Ethics*; others expressed in phrases taken from the *Super Ethica* of Albert; and finally, statements constituted by a fusion of words and phrases from both the *Ethics* and the *Super Ethica*. This last group is the largest, probably including more than half of the total.

The *Tabula* appears unfinished because of the occasional repetition of some statements; for instance, at both B 29 and B 118 is found "*Quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt*"; but then too, frequently the alphabetical ordering of the principal ideas is incorrect, as was shown by the earlier example of some of the ideas found under "A." Finally, some statements, classified according to their opening word or words, are placed under inappropriate headings. An example of this sort of erroneous classification is P 469, located under "*peccans*," although it reflects a passage in which Aristotle clarifies the conception of prudence: "*Quod*

4. Cf. Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, T. 47, p.73*. The *Tabula* was printed for the first time in: Th. Aquinas: *Opera omnia* (Rome: Leonine Comm., 1971) T. 48. Individual items or statements of the *Tabula* will be cited according to the letter of the alphabet under which the statement is found, followed by the number of the first line of the statement. E.g., "M 393" is the statement beginning on line 393 under the letter M.

5. Prop. 178: "Quod finis terribilium est mors. - Error, si excludat inferni terrorem qui extremus est." *Tabula*, M 393: "Quod mors est finis terribilissimum, quia terminus." For Gauthier's discussion of this point, cf. *Ibid.*, pp. B 49-50. Also see, Hissette: *Enquête*, pp. 304-07, where the proposition is numbered "213."

peccans in arte voluntarie est eligibilior quam qui peccat invitus; et converso est de prudentia."⁶

Gauthier has proposed that the *Tabula*'s statements were developed by Aquinas's secretaries acting under his general direction.⁷ This theory has the benefit of taking into account both the enormous quantity of writing Aquinas produced during his last stay in Paris, as well as his known use of secretaries. Additionally, this proposal accords well with the presumed nature of the *Tabula* as an aid constructed in preparation for some more personal work intended to be written during the same period, for instance, either the *SLE* or the *Pars secunda*. However, if Aquinas is accorded a larger and a more immediate role in drawing up those propositions of the *Tabula* which depend on the *Super Ethica*, then light is thrown on the very large number of passages of the *SLE* which indicate that Aquinas had recently reread the *Super Ethica*. This rereading of the *Super Ethica* at a time prior to composing the *SLE* accords with Gauthier's evidence pointing to the fact that, while the *SLE* depends frequently on the *Super Ethica*, Aquinas did not appear to be reading Albert's comments at the time in which the *SLE* was being written.⁸ Accordingly, let us suppose that whenever one of Aquinas's secretaries felt a doctrine or a statement of Aristotle needed clarification, Aquinas would indicate, after reading Albert's comment, a sentence or a paragraph from which the secretary might draw in clarifying Aristotle's thought. In addition, if the secretary is supposed to have subsequently drawn up the *Tabula*'s statement for which he requested Aquinas's assistance, then an explanation is had for the presence of some propositions in the *Tabula* with which Aquinas could not have agreed.⁹

An additional facet of Aquinas's work during the years 1271-1272 also

6. P 469 is intended to express NE.VI.5.1140b22-24: "Et in arte quidem volens peccans eligibilior, circa prudentiam autem minus, quemadmodum et circa virtutes." The Latin *Ethics* used in the *Tabula* is very close to that found in the Leonine edition of the *SLE*. Cf. *Tabula*, p. B 41.

7. *Tabula*, pp. B 51 - B 55.

8. Gauthier argues that the presence in the *SLE* of a large number of incorrect interpretations of Aristotle in passages paralleling the correct interpretations in the *Super Ethica* permit the conclusion that Albert's work was not being examined while Aquinas worked on the *SLE*. Cf. "*Praefatio*" in *SLE*, p.254*.

9. E.g., R 4: "Quod ratio operativa est optimum in homine et proprium; et secundum hoc inest ei proprium opus quod est felicitas." F 201: "Quod finis civilis est humanum bonum."

becomes intelligible if the above view of the *Tabula*'s construction is accepted. On several issues the *Secunda secundae*'s interpretation of Aristotle is at odds with that of the *SLE*, but in agreement with Albert's view in the *Super Ethica*. If we suppose Aquinas's active involvement in constructing the *Tabula* included a rapid rereading of much, if not all of Albert's exposition, we have an explanation for the influence of the *Super Ethica* on the *Secunda secundae*. Then too, if the much more intensive and detailed study of the *Ethics* needed for work on the *SLE*, together with the composition at least in part of the *SLE*, are seen as posterior to the composition of the *Secunda secundae*, then the differences between the latter's view of Aristotle and that of the *SLE* are explained.

In the light of these considerations, the following sequential stages of Aquinas's principal moral writings in 1271-1272 are proposed: (1) the construction of the *Tabula* by Aquinas's secretaries, dependent in part on Aquinas's reading of the *Super Ethica*; (2) the composition of the *Secunda secundae*, with its occasional, but clear indications of dependence on the *Super Ethica*; (3) Aquinas's intensive, detailed study of the *Ethics*; and (4) the composition of the *SLE* which shows dependence on the *Super Ethica*, as well as opposition both to that work and to the *Secunda secundae*. Common sense would indicate that the last-mentioned three stages may have partially overlapped. Nor is it impossible that an earlier draft of the *SLE* had been written in the 1260s and was revised either partially or totally after an intensive study of the *Ethics* and the writing of the *Secunda secundae*. Finally, we must also be open to the possibility that Aquinas intended to revise parts of the already completed *Secunda secundae* to bring it in line with the interpretations expressed in the later *SLE*.

The assumption that the *SLE* is posterior at least in part to the *Secunda secundae* poses anew the question of why it was written. As argued in preceding Chapters, the *SLE* is a philosophical statement. Ought one not assert that it represents Aquinas's attempt to propose the science of moral philosophy he thought both correct and of use to theology - or at least as much of that science as was consistent with a commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*? Dating sections of the *SLE* as posterior to the moral part of the *Summa theologiae* conforms to that view of the *SLE*.

Against the background of the above suppositions respecting the chronology of Aquinas's principal moral writings in 1271-1272, I turn now to an examination of those passages of the *Tabula*, the *Super Ethica*, the *Secunda secundae*, and the *SLE* which indicate that sections of the latter work were the last to be written.

ASPECTS OF PRUDENCE

Nearly five centuries ago, Cajetan recognized the need to come to terms with the difference between the discussions of the subject of prudence in *Secunda secundae*.⁴⁷ and in *SLE*.VI. While the former work regards prudence as a habitus in *reason*, the *SLE* locates prudence in *particular reason*, that is, in the interior sense known as the "cogitative power."¹⁰ Notwithstanding this rather clear opposition between the two texts, Cajetan synthesized the opposed doctrines by asserting as Aquinas's a conception of prudence as a habitus principally or *subiective* in the intellect and only secondarily in sense.¹¹ Given today's historical awareness of the development and evolution of doctrine, it appears more appropriate to set aside Cajetan's resolution and, instead, to admit the conflict between the *Secunda secundae* and the *SLE*, at the same time seeking an

10. *Iia-IIae*.47.1: "Visio autem non est virtus appetitivae, sed cognoscitivae. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia directe pertinet ad vim cognoscitivam. Non autem ad vim sensitivam... Unde relinquitur quod prudentia proprie sit in ratione." *Ibid*.3.ad 3: "...sicut Philosophus dicit, in VI *Ethic.*, prudentia non consistit in sensu exteriori, quo cognoscimus sensibilia propria: sed in sensu interiori, qui perficitur per memoriam et experimentum ad prompte iudicandum de particularibus expertis. Non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subiecto principali: sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quamdam applicationem pertingit ad huiusmodi sensum." *SLE*.VI.1.203-11.S1123: "Alio modo possunt accipi contingentia secundum quod sunt in particulari, et sic variabilia sunt nec cadit supra ea intellectus nisi mediantibus potentiis sensitivis; unde et inter partes animae sensitivae ponitur una potentia quae dicitur ratio particularis sive vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium; sic autem accipit hic Philosophus contingentia, ita enim cadunt sub consilio et operatione;" *Ibid*.4.178-96.S1174: "Deinde...ostendit quid sit subiectum prudentiae. Et dicit quod, cum duae sint partes animae rationalis, quarum una dicitur scientificum et alia rationcinativum sive opinativum, manifestum est quod prudentia est virtus alterius horum, scilicet opinativi; opinio enim est circa ea quae contingit aliter se habere, sicut et prudentia. Et tamen, quamvis prudentia sit in hac parte rationis sicut in subiecto, ratione cuius dicitur virtus intellectualis, non tamen est cum sola ratione, sicut ars vel scientia, sed requiritur rectitudinem appetitus." *Ibid*.7.255-63.S1215: "Et ad istum sensum, id est interiorem, magis pertinet prudentia, per quam perficitur ratio particularis ad recte aestimandum de singularibus intentionibus operabilium, unde et animalia bruta quae habent bonam aestimativam naturalem dicuntur participare prudentia; sed illius sensus qui est circa propria sensibilia est quaedam alia species perfectiva, puta industria quaedam discernendi colores et sapes et alia huiusmodi."

11. *Commentaria Cardinalis Caeietani*, no. III concerning *Iia-IIae*.47.3 in Th. Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, T. 8 (Rome: Leonine Comm., 1895) p. 351.

explanation of the differences between the texts.¹²

In addition to the already-mentioned difference between the two treatments of prudence, two other aspects of the texts are significant. First, there are their different interpretations of one aspect of Aristotle's assertion that prudence "is not only with reason." The *Secunda secundae* spells out this "not only" as indicating the "application of prudence" to activity, an application occurring by means of the will. In contrast, the *SLE* explains that the possession of prudence requires "rectitude of the appetite," i.e., the orientation of the appetite to the correct goal.¹³ Second, there is the *SLE*'s example of animals as sharing in prudence, a sharing comprehensible if prudence is a habitus of an interior sense.¹⁴

The understanding of the difference between the *Secunda secundae* and the *SLE* regarding these aspects of prudence must begin by recalling the doctrine of the *Super Ethica* on the opening chapter of *Ethics*.VI. As noted in Chapter 2 above, Albert sees Aristotle proposing in *Ethics*.VI a two-fold division of what in Book I had been seen as the essentially rational part of the soul.¹⁵ The justification for the further division now proposed in Book VI is this: objects generically different - in this case, contingent and necessary realities - are known by generically different parts of the rational soul.¹⁶ After presenting this argument, Albert turns to the names Aristotle offers: the part by which necessary reality is known is the "scientific" part in distinction from the "ratiocinative" part

12. Melina: *La Conoscenza morale*, pp. 176-81 asserts that *Ila-Ilae*.47.1-3 settled "magisterally and definitively" the question of the subject of prudence by positing prudence in practical reason. Yet, Melina finds the *SLE* proposing that prudence is "a mixed virtue," in part an intellectual habitus in reason, in part a moral virtue in the appetite. He thus witnesses, albeit unwillingly, to the fact of a difference at least in the manner in which Aquinas expresses his doctrine of prudence in the *Ila-Ilae* and the *SLE*. - Below, in note 123 on page 257, Melina's interpretation is discussed.

13. In addition to the texts of footnote 10 above, *Ila-Ilae*.47.1.ad 3: "...dicendum quod laus prudentiae non consistit in sola consideratione, sed in applicatione ad opus, quod est finis practicae rationis... Unde ibidem [i.e., *Ethic*.VI] Philosophus subdit quod prudentia non est solum cum ratione, sicut ars: habet enim, ut dictum est, applicationem ad opus, quod fit per voluntatem."

14. *SLE*.VI.7.255-63.S1215. Cf. note 10 above.

15. Albert's interpretation of this two-fold division, summarized briefly here, was discussed above in Chapter 2, "The two parts of the rational soul," especially pp. 38-42.

16. *Super Ethica*.VI. 2.p404,24-39.

by which the agent knows contingent beings.¹⁷

Although the above doctrine is presented straightforwardly in Albert's direct comment on Aristotle's text, in the questions he attaches to the comment Albert explains that Aristotle did not intend to propose two really distinct rational potencies. Thus, the division of the essentially rational soul into scientific and ratiocinative parts does not entail two potencies separated both really and in terms of their meaning such as is had in the case of the vegetative soul of a plant and the sensitive soul of an animal. When the vegetative and the sensitive potencies are considered simply as potencies, that is, when both are seen in this or in that individual animal, the vegetative is not distinct from the sensitive soul, even though vegetative actions are different from sensitive ones. By the present division into the scientific and the ratiocinative "potencies," Aristotle is understood as intending a division similar to that between the vegetative and the sensitive soul in one individual animal, or to that between two triangles and the square they comprise. In both animal and square, the parts are only potentially parts. So too, the scientific and the ratiocinative parts are potential parts of the essentially rational soul. Thus, for Albert the scientific part is never had without the ratiocinative, nor the ratiocinative without the scientific.¹⁸

Of course, the ratiocinative "potency" works in association with sense perceptions of contingent reality. The sense potency behind perception is genuinely other than reason by which ratiocination occurs. Further, although reason is one undivided intellectual potency, it is perfected by diverse habitus regarding the two different sorts of intellectual activity.¹⁹ Among the habitus perfecting the ratiocinative potential part of the intellect, Albert locates prudence.²⁰ Thus, as concerns the being of prudence, it is in reason as in its subject, and the act of the interior sense connected with ratiocination is not itself the prudent perception of the particular, although the act of sense does concern the particular object of prudence.²¹

17. *Ibid*.p404,40-54.

18. *Ibid*.p399,24-48; p399,71 - p400,15.

19. *Ibid*.p404,53-71.

20. *Ibid*.7.p444,9-20.

21. *Ibid*.13.p477,85-90: "...prudentia potest considerari aut quantum ad esse, quod habet in anima, et sic sensus non est perceptibilis prudentiae, cum sit in ratione. Sed si consideratur quantum ad obiecta, sic prudentia est sensus, quia est circa operabilia, quae sunt particularia et sensibilia." *Ibid*.p478,9-25: "...sed prudentia est *extremi*, cuius non

As for the permanence of prudence, although this virtue cannot be forgotten, Albert proposes that an agent can become less competent in "applying prudence to work" (*ad applicandum ad opus*). The reason for this lies in the dependence on experience and memory of the agent's ability to apply prudence.²²

Present in this discussion of prudence in the *Super Ethica* are the principal doctrines encountered in the texts cited earlier from *Secunda secundae*.⁴⁷ namely: (1) prudence is a habitus in reason that works in some way through an interior sense; (2) it works through the sense by an "application to work"; and (3) the application of prudence to work is perfected by experience and memory.²³ These doctrines were expressed by Albert in lessons 2, 7, and 13 of *Super Ethica*. VI, while lesson 2 also contained his explanation of Aristotle's intent in proposing the division of the essentially rational part of the soul into its ratiocinative and scientific potential parts.

If we examine the statements included in the *Tabula* to express the doctrines of those passages of the *Ethics* corresponding to Albert's *Super Ethica*. VI, lessons 2, 7, and 13, we can envision the degree to which Aquinas studied those particular comments of Albert in the course of developing the *Tabula*. 11 *Tabula* statements concern the section of the *Ethics* of interest in *Super Ethica*. VI.7, and, of these, seven reveal some dependence on Albert's work. When considered as a whole, the 11 statements reveal that their development required the careful reading of the entirety of Albert's comment in lesson 7.²⁴ The

est scientia nec intellectus, sed sensus... Sed iste sensus, scilicet communis, magis est prudentia, idest magis est circa prudenalia quam circa mathematica..."

22. *Ibid.* 7.p445,21-38: "Dicendum, quod prudentiae simpliciter et secundum totum non potest esse oblivio, sed bene potest esse, quod aliquis efficiatur minus habilis ad applicandum ad opus. Et huius ratio est, quia universalialia iuris sunt in nostra natura, in quibus substantialiter est prudentia, et ista semper manent; sed secundum applicationem ad opus particulare oportet, quod perficiamur per experimentum et per alia iura scripta, quia ius illud universale est. Unde non potest applicari eodem modo ad omnia, sed oportet, quod habeatur aliquid simile regulae Lesbiae aedificationis,...et quantum ad hoc generatur per experimentum et tempus, et ad hoc etiam datur ars memorandi in Rhetorica, quia argumenta rhetorica trahuntur a particularibus circumstantiis negotii, sed quantum ad principia est semper manens..."

23. Cf. note 10 on p. 199 above; note 13 on p. 200 above.

24. *Super Ethica*. VI.7 considers *NE*. VI.5.1140a24-b30. The list of *Tabula* statements concerning those lines is found in Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, T. 48, p. B 168. The statements depending on Albert's comment are the following: (the page and line numbers following each statement's number refer to the comment of Albert) C 146 -

following example of P 469 reveals the considerable dependence on the *Super Ethica* that becomes apparent when the relevant texts are set side by side. The bold-face words reveal the source of the *Tabula* statement in Albert's comment.

NE. VI.5.1140b22-24:
Et in arte quidem
volens peccans eligibili-
rior, circa prudentiam
autem minus, quemad-
modum circa virtutes.

Tabula, P 469: Quod
peccans in arte volun-
tarie est eligibilior
quam qui peccat invi-
tus; e converso est de
prudencia.

Super Ethica. VI.7
p443,88 - p444,1: Qui
peccat in arte volun-
tarie, est eligibilior ad
artem quam qui pec-
cat invitus; sed e con-
trario est de pruden-
tia.

As concerns the five *Tabula* statements regarding the 18 lines from *Ethics*. VI of concern to *Super Ethica*. VI. 2, two show dependence on Albert. Of these, V 168 reveals a slight dependence on the final lines of Albert's comment, while V 166 depends on the opening of the comment. Accordingly, one supposes Aquinas read the entirety of the 18 line comment on Aristotle's text.

Below, V 168 is compared with the relevant texts of Aristotle and Albert.

NE. VI.1.1139a15-17:
Sumendum ergo utri-
usque horum quis opti-
mus habitus, hic enim
virtus utriusque. Virtus
autem ad opus propri-
um.

Tabula. V 168: Quod
virtus est optimus
habitus quo perficitur
ad opus.

Super Ethica. VI.2
p404,57-61: Deinde
cum dicit: *Sumendum*,
concludit, quod oportet
sumere, quis est opti-
mus habitus, utriusque
harum partium, quia
talis habitus optimus
est, quo perficitur ad
opus proprium; huius-
modi autem est *virtus*,
ut patet ex his quae in
secundo dixit.

p443,2-5; P 416 - p443,11-22; F 229 - p443,32-33; P 451 - p443,39-42; P 469 - p443,88 - p444,1; P 423 - p444,5-20; O 219 - p444,21-27. - One of the reasons the *Tabula* is judged to have been left unfinished is visible in that the above statements, all taken from a passage where Aristotle deals with prudence, were not all grouped under *prudencia* or *prudens*, but also variously under *consilium*, *finis*, and *peccans*. - O 219 is one of a number of statements inserted into the *Tabula* at a later date, but most likely an authentic part of the work, although not grouped under any principal idea. Cf. Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, T. 48, p. B 47.

The final *lectio* of the *Super Ethica* important in the present context is number 13. While the *Tabula* provides less evidence than one would wish relative to Aquinas's reading of Albert's comment, it does appear to point to a study by Aquinas of the latter text. The comment of *Super Ethica*.VI.13 is brief, based on only 9 lines of the *Ethics*.²⁵ Regarding the text of Aristotle at issue, only two statements are had in the *Tabula*, one showing a slight dependence on the beginning of Albert's comment, the other indicating dependence on the end. By offering only the two statements, Aquinas appears to have decided that Aristotle made only two points. First, prudence, as knowledge of particulars, is neither science nor the habitus of intellectus. Concerning this, the *Tabula* offers P 437: "*Quod prudentia est extremi cuius non est intellectus neque scientia*," which appears to depend on Albert's comment.²⁶ While both Aristotle and Albert note that prudence deals with a sense knowing particulars, Aquinas makes no direct mention of this relation to sense in the *Tabula*, apparently believing it adequately covered by asserting that "*prudentia est extremi*."

The second important point made by Aristotle concerns the difference between deliberation and investigation. Aristotle says only that although they differ, deliberation is an investigation, a notion merely repeated by Albert.²⁷ In the *Tabula*, Aquinas suggests only a reminder: D 431: "*De differentia inter consilium et questionem*." However, the wording of this statement strikes one as suggested by the comment of Albert.²⁸

As is seen in the above examination of the *Tabula* and the *Super Ethica*, it is indeed possible that the doctrine of prudence in *Secunda secundae*.47 is dependent on Aquinas's reading of Albert's commentary around 1270-71. The question now becomes that of *SLE*.VI: what explains Aquinas's proposal of the

25. *NE*.VI.8.1142a23-9.1142a32.

26. *NE*.VI.8.1142a23-30: "Quoniam autem prudentia non est scientia, manifestum; extremi enim est, quemadmodum dictum est; operabile enim tale. Susceptibiles quidem igitur intellectui. Intellectus quidem enim terminorum quorum non est ratio, haec autem extremi cuius non est scientia, sed sensus, non qui propriorum, sed quali sentimus in mathematicis extremum trigonum... Sed iste magis sensu prudentia, illius autem alia species." Albert's comment occupies 27 lines, with the pertinent being *Super Ethica*.VI.13.p478,9-11: "sed prudentia est extremi, cuius non est scientia nec intellectus..."

27. Cf. *NE*.VI.9.1142a31-32. *Super Ethica*.VI.13.p478,27-32.

28. *Ibid*.p478,28-29: "...quia prudentia est circa consilium, ostendit differentiam inter quaestionem et consilium." Aristotle wrote in *NE*.VI.9.1142a31-32: "Quaerere autem et consilium differunt; consilium enim quaerere quoddam est."

doctrine of prudence as the habitus perfecting the interior sense or cogitative power?

The answer to this question lies in Aquinas's interpretation of what Aristotle intended in *Ethics*.VI by his division of the essentially rational soul into the scientific and ratiocinative parts. As noted, Albert asserted that this division is justified by the argument Aristotle proposed; yet, Albert qualified his stand by explaining that the division was not actually a division into really distinct parts, but only into potential parts of the one intellectual principle. Quite different is Aquinas's account.²⁹

After a straightforward exposition of Aristotle's division of the essentially rational soul into the scientific and ratiocinative parts, Aquinas remarks that by that division Aristotle was only proposing a problem (*dubitatio*). Continuing, Aquinas says in effect, that if this were not Aristotle's intent, he would by the division contradict the doctrine proposed in *De anima*.III, namely, that the intellect is divided only into the agent and the possible intellects, both of which are related to all reality, to necessary as well as to contingent beings.³⁰ Further, Aristotle's argument that objects generically different are known by generically different potencies is said to lack efficacy; only a diversity in formal objects necessitates a diversity of cognitive potencies. Thus, insofar as both necessary and contingent realities are known from the point of view of their quiddities, that is, from the perspective of what a reality is, they can be known by the same intellectual potency.³¹ On this basis, Aquinas maintains that Aristotle was not proposing as his own the doctrine that distinct potencies of the essentially rational soul are needed for the cognition of necessary and contingent beings.

The solution Aquinas offers to the problem raised by Aristotle recalls the two ways in which contingent beings are known: (1) from a universal viewpoint such as is had in natural sciences; this knowledge is found in the part of the

29. Aquinas's account, as summarized here, is discussed more fully above in Ch. 2, "The two parts of the rational soul," pp. 35-47.

30. *SLE*.VI.1.150-59.S1119. Aquinas follows this by adding two more reasons to show the division into scientific and ratiocinative parts is not intended by Aristotle as a division within the essentially rational part of the soul. That is, this division would violate: (1) the doctrine that the same potency can know the perfect and the imperfect in the same genus; and (2) the more universal potency or the intellect can know everything known by the lower potency or sense. Cf. *Ibid*.160-75.S1120-21.

31. *Ibid*.176-89.S1122.

intellectual soul called scientific,³² and (2) as existing in particular and changing things and, as such, contingents are known by the intellect acting through sensitive potencies.³³ Having offered this explanation, Aquinas proposes the existence of an internal sensitive potency named particular reason or the cogitative power. It is in relation to this part of the rational soul that Aristotle can speak of the cognition of contingent reality as contingent and so, distinguish it from the intellectual or scientific knowledge of both contingent and necessary being.³⁴

Given this understanding of the opening of *Ethics*.VI, Aquinas finds that later, when Aristotle connects prudence and the ratiocinative part of the soul, he intends to assert that prudence is the habitus of the interior sense called particular reason or the cogitative power. As a sign that prudence is indeed in the interior sense, we have our common practice of speaking of the prudent conduct of animals that respond well to the world they live in.³⁵

Accordingly, these conclusions appear justified: Aquinas proposes in his *SLE* the doctrine of prudence as a habitus of sense because that is the necessary consequence of what he understands as Aristotle's intent in proposing the distinction of the scientific and the ratiocinative parts of the soul; the different concept of prudence expounded in *Secunda secundae*.47 apparently depends on the *Super Ethica* through the *Tabula* as an intermediary. In the light of these conclusions, only the following chronological order appears acceptable: *Tabula*, *Secunda secundae*.47, *SLE*.VI.1, 4, & 7.

32. *Ibid.*190-203.S1123.

33. *Ibid.*203-06.S1123.

34. *Ibid.*206-14.S1123: "...unde et inter partes animae sensitivas ponitur una potentia quae dicitur ratio particularis sive vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium; sic autem accipit hic Philosophus contingentia, ita enim cadunt sub consilio et operatione; et propter hoc ad diversas partes animae rationalis pertinere dicit necessaria et contingentia, sicut universalis speculabilia et particularia operabilia."

35. Cf. *Ibid.*7.255-60.S1215: "Et ad istud sensum, id est interiorem, magis pertinet prudentia, per quam perficitur ratio particularis ad recte aestimandum de singularibus intentionibus operabilium, unde et animalia bruta quae habent bonam aestimativam naturalem dicuntur participare prudentia;" *Ibid.*4.178-85.S1174: "Deinde...ostendit quid sit subiectum prudentiae. Et dicit quod, cum duae sint partes animae rationalis, quarum una dicitur scientificum et alia ratiocinativum sive opinativum, manifestum est quod prudentia est virtus alterius horum, scilicet opinativi; opinio enim est circa ea quae continget aliter se habere, sicut et prudentia."

THE ETYMOLOGY OF *EPIEIKEIA*

Ethics.V.10 is devoted to *epieikeia* or the habitus by which the just action is determined in those cases in which the universal laws are defective. Since there is no simple Latin equivalent for this aspect of the virtue of justice, commentators felt called upon to provide an etymology. Hence, Albert explains in *Super Ethica*.V.15 that *epieikeia* means "above" or "superior to justice," and the virtue can be called "as it were, justice of itself":

epieikia dicitur ab 'epi', quod est 'supra' et 'dicaion', quod est 'iustitia', quasi 'supra iustitiam'; et virtus nominis est 'quasi per se iustitia'.³⁶

In the *Sentence Commentary*, Aquinas had asserted that, according to *Ethics*.V, "*epieicia*, as he [i.e., Aristotle] says, is something better (*excellentiore*) than legal justice" and follows in its decision the intention of the legislator.³⁷ In the *Secunda secundae*.120, Aquinas continues to propose Albert's etymology:

Sed *epieikeia* videtur esse principalior virtus quam iustitia, ut ipsum nomen sonat: dicitur enim ab *epi*, quod est *supra*, et *dikaion*, quod est *iustum*.³⁸ ...*epieikeia* est *melior quadam iustitia*...³⁹

In the *Tabula*, 12 statements are found that refer to the portion of the *Ethics* at the basis of *Super Ethica*.V.15. Of these, eight reveal a dependence on Albert's comment and, taken together, indicate Aquinas read the comment thoroughly.⁴⁰ While Albert's etymology is not repeated in the *Tabula*, this is perhaps not surprising as the *Tabula* is more concerned with the doctrine of the *Ethics* than with the usage of names.

Contrasting with the near identity of the *Super Ethica* and the *Secunda*

36. *Super Ethica*.V.15.p379,10-12.

37. *Sent.*III, d. 33, q. 3, a. 4e, ag. 5 & ra. 5.

38. *Ila-IIae*.120.2.ob 2.

39. *Ibid.*ad 2.

40. The statements refer to *NE*.V.10.1137a31-1138a2. Cf. *Tabula*, p. B 168. Of the 12, the following are dependent on the page and lines shown of *Super Ethica*.V.15: E 108 - p382,16-20; E 112 - p382,22-24; E 116 - p382,34-36; L 37 - p382,64-67; L 41 - p 382,76 - p383,3; E 125 - p383,17-20; L 48 - p383,26-30 & 37-44; E 128 - p 383,50-51 & 65.

secundae in regard to the etymology of *epieikeia*, *SLE.V.16* charts a new course, explaining the virtue now as “obeying the law in a higher way” by obeying the intention of the legislator:

Dicitur autem in graeco epiikes quasi id quod est conveniens vel decens, ab epy, quod est supra, et ycos, quod est obediens; quia videlicet per epiikiam aliquis excellentiori modo oboedit, dum observat intentionem legislatoris ubi dissonant verba legis.⁴¹

The similarity of the *Super Ethica* and the *Secunda secundae*, in conjunction with the change in Aquinas’s understanding evidenced in the *SLE*, based on a rethinking of Aristotle’s text, appear to indicate that *SLE.V.16* was composed after *Secunda secundae.120*. To suppose otherwise would imply the following much less credible scenario: after composing the *SLE*, with all the serious study of the *Ethics* and of the *Super Ethica* that effort reveals, Aquinas decided in the *Secunda secundae* to return to the etymology of Albert that he had rejected in writing the *SLE*!

PSEUDO-COURAGEOUS ACTION

Both the *Secunda secundae* and the *SLE* offer a three-fold division of Aristotle’s five types of courageous acts falling short of virtue. While *Secunda secundae.123* refers to its divisions as illustrating activity dependent on causes other than virtue, *SLE.III* finds the order of Aristotle’s treatment to be grounded in the requirements of moral virtue. Additionally, in the former work, the five types are synthesized in a fashion at odds with that of their presentation by Aristotle. As a consequence, the *Secunda secundae*, unlike the *SLE*, appears to imply a certain lack of logic in the order in which Aristotle discusses the five types of action.

For its part, *Super Ethica.III.10* opens with a lengthy comment on Aristotle’s five types of seemingly courageous action. That comment, however, does not offer a synthetic view of the types, but leaves that for the questions following the comment. There, Albert proposes ways to unify them and, in addition, implies the order of Aristotle’s presentation has a certain logic.

Albert raises a separate question regarding each type of action and in each case asks how the type under discussion differs from or falls short of true courage. In all five answers, he mentions the *motivum*, the moving or stimulating principle

41. *SLE.V.16.12-17.S1078*. In a note to these lines, the editor of the *SLE* admits he has not found the source of this new etymology.

behind the act. The schema below paraphrases his answers.

Civil Courage: *motivum* - the desire of honor rather than the habitus of courage, which moves after the fashion of a nature
end - the desire of honor rather than the good of virtue

Military Courage: *motivum* - the habitus of art acquired through actual experience in warfare rather than the habitus of moral virtue
end - victory rather than the good of virtue

Courage Resulting from Anger: *motivum* - the passion of anger
end - revenge rather than the good of courage

Courage Resulting from Hope: *motivum* - presumption concerning his own powers; acquired from the experience of many victories; differs from military courage as confidence in one’s own physical powers differs from art

Courage Resulting from Ignorance: *motivum* - the incorrect conception of the act being performed⁴²

Then in his final question, Albert proposes a division of the five types of action. Without now mentioning *motivum*, Albert implies the order of Aristotle’s presentation is based on the particular defect of each type. Since true courage has three characteristics, namely, a basis in the habitus of courage, performance for the sake of the end of courage, and direction given by the correct cognition, each pseudo-courageous act will fall short in regard to one of these three elements.⁴³

This over-all synthesis of Albert’s final question appears to have had little effect on Aquinas. But in the latter’s *Sentence Commentary*, written only slightly more than four years after he had left Albert’s *studium* in Cologne, Aquinas offers a division of the five acts whose dependence on Albert is as clear as it is unsurprising: the five acts are proposed according to their failure in regard to the *motivum*. When the same topic arises some 15 or so years later in the *Secunda secundae.123*, Aquinas repeats, albeit in modified terms, the conception of the

42. *Super Ethica.III.10.p191,58-62* for civil courage; p191,78-86 for military courage; p192,41-46 for courage resulting from anger; p193,1-5 for courage motivated by hope; p193,34-35 for courage founded on ignorance. In addition to the information shown in the above schema, Albert states in each case that there is had the same “matter and act” as in genuine courage.

43. *Ibid.p193,48-62*.

Sentence Commentary. In opening his response to an objection in article 1 of *Secunda secundae*.123, he asserts that Aristotle posits in *Ethics*.III five types of action only on the surface similar to true courage. Each of these types comes "from some cause other than virtue," he explains, adding that on that basis the acts can be divided into three groups. This opening is only verbally different from the beginning of the discussion in the *Sentence Commentary*, where the three-fold division depended on the failure to achieve the "correctness of the *motivum* or moving principle." Further, in the *Secunda secundae*, the presentation of the three divisions differs from the earlier discussion in little more than the choice of terms and the repositioning of the three divisions, that is, the second division is now in first place. Finally, both texts imply a lack of logic in Aristotle's discussion. Both texts propose that Aristotle's type 5 (courage resulting from ignorance), type 2 (military courage resulting from a habitus of art), and type 4 (courage resulting from the agent's past experiences) are all to be regarded as acts performed because the agent misconstrues the danger he faces. In the texts below, these types are grouped in division (2). In the *Sentence Commentary*, as a subdivision of acts performed because of a misinterpretation of the danger faced, types 2 and 4 are said to be effects of the agent's hope that he will overcome the difficulty. Thus, in both texts the order in which Aristotle takes up the five types of action is seen as lacking in logic. In the texts below, numbers and letters are added to identify the divisions and subdivisions.

III Sent., d.33, q.3, a.3co.:

Ad tertiam quaestionem de partibus quas philosophus ponit in 3 ethic... illae quas philosophus ponit, [a fortitudine deficiunt] quantum ad rectitudinem motivi; et ideo non sunt virtutes, sed participant aliquid de virtute fortitudinis. **Motivum autem ad actum fortitudinis potest esse triplex.**

IIa-IIae.123.1.ad 2:

Ad secundum dicendum quod exteriorem virtutis actum quandoque aliqui efficiunt non habentes virtutem, ex aliqua alia causa quam ex virtute. Et ideo Philosophus, in *III Ethic.*, ponit quinque modos eorum qui similiter dicuntur fortes, quasi exercentes actum fortitudinis praeter virtutem. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter.

III Sent., d.33, q.3, a.3co.:

(1) Uno modo intentio boni vel honesti; et sic fortitudinis virtus est vel alicujus temporalis boni vel honoris, vel alicujus hujusmodi; et sic deficit a ratione virtutis, et est fortitudo quam nominat politicam.

(2) Alio modo ex hoc quod removetur faciens difficultatem in actu fortitudinis, scilicet magnitudo periculi;

(a) et hoc quidem removetur per ignorantiam, et sic est ultimus modus; (b) et per spem vicendi, quae potest ex duobus consurgere;

(i) vel ex arte sive exercitio; et sic est militaris fortitudo;

(ii) vel experientia victoriae, sicut illi qui alias talia pericula evaserunt, et sic est penultimus modus.

(3) Tertio modo ex passione furoris, vel tristitia illatae, vel etiam timoris, vel desperationis; et sic est tertius modus.

IIa-IIae.123.1. ad 2:

(2) Primo quidem, quia feruntur in id quod est difficile ac si non esset difficile. Quod in tres modos dividitur.

(a) Quandoque enim hoc accidit propter ignorantiam: quia scilicet homo non percipit magnitudinem periculi.

(b.ii) Quandoque autem hoc accidit propter hoc quod homo est bonae spei ad pericula vincenda: puta cum expertus est se saepe pericula evasisse.

(b.i) Quandoque autem hoc accidit propter scientiam et artem quandam: sicut contingit in militibus, qui propter peritiam armorum et exercitium non reputant gravia pericula belli, aestimantes se per suam artem posse contra ea defendi...

(3) Alio modo agit aliquis actum fortitudinis sine virtute, propter impulsum passionis vel tristitiae, quam vult repellere; vel etiam irae.

(1) Tertio modo, propter electionem, non quidem finis debiti, sed alicuius temporalis commodi acquirendi, puta honoris, voluptatis vel lucri; vel alicuius incommodi vitandi, puta vituperii, afflictionis vel damni.

With a doubt, *Secunda secundae*.123.1.ad 2 is the work of the same author who, as a young *sententiarius* separated by only a few years from his student days under Albert, had written in his *Sentence Commentary* of Aristotle's five pseudo-courageous acts. However, with great probability, the author of the *Secunda secundae* did not now write with his earlier work open before him. The differences in language between the early and the late discussions of *Ethics*.III are too great for that. What appears more likely, based on the *Tabula* statements dependent on *Super Ethica*.III.10, is that the construction of the *Tabula* was sufficient to remind Aquinas of the general lines of his earlier conception - if he were to have forgotten them. Of the 27 statements in the *Tabula* related to the relevant lines of Aristotle, 17 are clearly dependent in varying degrees on Albert's

work, with five of them constituted almost exclusively from the latter's words.⁴⁴ Accordingly, the *Secunda secundae's* discussion of Aristotle's five types of seemingly courageous acts, every bit as much as their treatment in the *Sentence Commentary*, appears to depend on *Super Ethica*.III.10. On the other hand, *SLE*.III.16 adopts a noticeably different and independent view of Aristotle's presentation.

The requirements of virtue, we read in *SLE*.III.16, are cognition and a choice made because of the cognition. Granted these requirements, pseudo-courageous acts can fall short of genuine courage in three ways.⁴⁵ The three-fold division Aquinas then proposes is distinctly different from that expounded earlier. In place of the earlier groupings, with their implication that the order in which Aristotle proposes types 5, 2 and 4 is not wholly logical, Aquinas now finds a rational meaning in the order in which each of the five is discussed, an order evident as Aquinas proposes the three ways in which acts outwardly courageous can fail to meet the demands of true courage. The numbers introduced into the text below indicate the order in which Aristotle discusses the five types being spoken of.

(5) Uno modo quia non operatur sciens, et sic est unus modus non verae fortitudinis secundum quem dicitur aliquis fortis per ignorantiam. Alio modo quia aliquis non operatur ex electione, sed ex passione, (3) sive sit passio impellens ad pericula subeunda sicut est ira, (4) sive passio quietans animum a timore sicut est spes; et secundum hoc sumuntur duo modi non verae fortitudinis. Tertio modo deficit aliquis a vera fortitudine ex eo quod aliquis ex electione quidem operatur, (2) sed aut (non) eligit id quod eligit fortis, scilicet pericula sustinere, dum propter armorum peritiam reputat sibi non esse periculosum in bello configere sicut apparet in militibus; (1) aut quia eligit aliquis pericula sustinere, sed non propter illum finem propter quem eligit fortis, sed propter honores vel poenas quae a rectoribus civitatem proponuntur.

44. Aristotle's text is *NE*.III.8.1116a17-1117a28. The *Tabula* statements are listed in Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, T. 48, p. B 166. Statements depending on the *Super Ethica*, together with reference to the page and line of Albert's comment are these: F 344 - p187,5-10; H 21 - p 187,17-19; P 96 - p187,44-55; F 347 - p188,2-4; M 440 - p188,6-12; F 315 - p188,24-29; F 321 - p188, 33-36; F 409 - p188,40-42 & 47-50; F 306 - p 188,55-57; F 309 - p189,2-9; F 277 - p189,10-14; I 723 - p 189,22-23; F 284 - p189,30-33; E 4 - p189,38-39; F 287 - p189,41-42; I 68 - p189,50-58; A 782 - p189,59-62.

45. *SLE*.III.16.6-10.S559: "Cum enim vera fortitudo sit virtus moralis ad quam requiritur scire et propter hoc eligere, potest quidem aliquis exercens actum fortitudinis tripliciter a vera fortitudine deficere."

Secundum hoc ergo dividitur pars ista in quinque partes.⁴⁶

Apparent in the above comparisons is the extensive similarity between the discussions in the *Sentence Commentary* and the *Secunda secundae*, together with their implication of a lack of logic in the order of presentation Aristotle followed in proposing types 5, 2, and 4. Clear too is the probable source of those explanations in Albert's stress in the *Super Ethica* on the *motivum* lacking in pseudo-courageous activity. Evident as well is the greater knowledge of and respect for Aristotle's text shown as the *SLE* finds Aristotle ordering the five types of acts according to virtue's need of cognition and of choice made because of cognition. As a consequence, it is scarcely credible that Aquinas would have first composed the *SLE's* discussion, based as it is on a detailed and careful study of the *Ethics*, only later to have decided to return to a view closer to that of Albert in the *Super Ethica*. Thus, there is reason to suppose *Secunda secundae*.123 was composed earlier than *SLE*.III.16.

THE ETYMOLOGY OF *APYROCALIA*

In speaking of the virtue of magnificence in the *Secunda secundae*, Aquinas turns to the vice opposed to the virtue by excess. As an authority for the existence of this vice, *Ethics*.II and IV are invoked in the *sed contra* of question 135.2. Interestingly, the *Super Ethica*, the *Secunda secundae*, and the *SLE* agree on the etymology of the first of the two Greek terms used for the vice, namely, *banausia*. According to Albert, this Greek term is to be translated both as "incendium" or "fire" and as "fumus," literally "smoke," but figuratively, "all consuming fire." On the other hand, the *Secunda secundae* suggests "furnus" or "furnace," since a furnace, like the fire it contains, consumes everything within it. Finally, in the *SLE*, Aquinas proposes "fornax" or "furnace," because the vice resembles a furnace in being all consuming.⁴⁷

Contrasting with the above unanimity is the disagreement had regarding the etymology of "apeirocalia" or "apyrocalia," the second Greek term used to signify the vice opposed to magnificence by excess. Here, Aquinas breaks new ground in the *SLE*. The *Super Ethica* and the *Secunda secundae* speak of "sine decenti igne," while the former also refers to "sine bono igne" as the meaning of

46. *Ibid*.10-27.S559-61.

47. Cf. *Super Ethica*.II.7.p128,46-49; IV.5.p245,29-30; 7.p251,72-77. *Ila-Ilae*.135.2c. *SLE*.II.8.180-82.S344; IV.6.79-82.S711; 7.174-77.S732.

the Greek term. That is, just as a fire that is not appropriate or good burns more than it ought, so too the vice. Quite different is the proposal of the *SLE*, which sees "*apyrocalia*" as "*sine experientia boni*," or "without the experience of good." The agent possessing the vice spends more than he ought because of his lack of experience of the correct use of one's wealth. Below are the texts for comparison.

Super Ethica.II.7
p 1 2 8 , 4 9 - 5 2 :
...*apeirocalia* ab 'a',
quod est sine, et 'pyr',
quod est ignis, et
'calos', quod est pul-
chrum vel decens,
quasi **sine decenti
igne, quia indecenter
consumunt.**

Ibid.IV.5.p245,30-32:
...*apeirocalia* ab 'a',
quod est 'sine', et
'pyr', quod est 'ignis',
et 'calos', quod est
'bonum', quasi '**sine
bono igne**', quia ignis
bonus est moderatus.

Ila-Ilae.135.2c:
...*apyrocalia*, idest
**sine bono igne, quia
ad modum ignis con-
sumit non propter
bonum.** Unde latine
hoc vitium nominari
potest consumptio.

SLE.II.8.175-80.S344:
Sed superabundantia
respectu magnificentia
vocatur *apyrocalia*, ab
a, quod est sine, et
pyros, quod est experi-
entia, et calos, quod est
bonum, quasi **sine ex-
perientia boni; quia
scilicet multa expen-
dentes non curant
qualiter bene expen-
dant.**

Ibid.IV.6.83-85.S711:
...*apyrocalia*, quasi
**sine experientia boni,
quia scilicet inexperti
sunt qualiter oportet
bonum operari...**

The examination of the *Tabula* and the *Super Ethica*.II.7 yields some slight evidence that Aquinas read the latter in developing statements for the *Tabula*.⁴⁸ However, the *Tabula*'s relation to the relevant sections of *Super Ethica*.IV is different. Of the five *Tabula* statements paralleling Albert's relatively short chapter 5 - the second locus of the etymologies - three statements show dependence on Albert. This dependence is especially obvious in P 5, the final statement and one taken from the lines immediately preceding Albert's

48. The reference to *Ethics*.II in the *sed contra* of *Secunda secundae*.135.2 is to 7.1107b19-20. The *Tabula*'s one statement concerning those lines has the appearance of being only a paraphrase of Aristotle's text. Yet this is not surprising as Aristotle's entire chapter 7 is but a summary statement of the mean in a variety of virtues. The content of that chapter appears to have posed few questions of interpretation for Aquinas, or for his secretaries, as only five of the *Tabula*'s 20 statements relative to that chapter show any sign of dependence on the *Super Ethica*.

discussion of *banausia* and *apeirocalia*.⁴⁹ Hence, if we presume *Secunda secundae*.135.2 followed the development of the *Tabula* and preceded the composition of *SLE*.II and IV, it is understandable that in offering the two etymologies in the *Secunda secundae* Aquinas was recalling what he had learned - or remembered - from Albert.

The presumption of the prior composition of *Secunda secundae*.135.2 appears justified if we note the source of the etymologies in *SLE*.II and IV. In a lexicon of Greek terms used by Aquinas, the following are found:

banausia: ars inliberalis que fiebat in igne
apeyrocalia: inexperientia boni⁵⁰

The similarity between these etymologies and Aquinas's proposals in *SLE*.II and IV points to the lexicon as the source of Aquinas's thought. If Aquinas had developed first, the *Tabula*, then the *SLE*, and only later, the *Secunda secundae*, the following rather illogical scenario must be imagined: while working on the *Tabula*, Aquinas likely learned - or recalled - Albert's etymologies for the two Greek terms; in composing *SLE*.II and IV, he followed the lead of a lexicon; subsequently, in *Secunda secundae*.135.2 he decided to propose Albert's etymologies. It appears more logical to conclude that, fresh from the composition of the *Tabula*, Aquinas proposed in the *Secunda secundae* what he remembered of the *Super Ethica*'s discussion, and later, in the *SLE*, he offered etymologies on the basis of a lexicon of Greek terms.

IS THE VIRTUOUS AGENT DISPOSED TO BE ASHAMED?

Question 144 of the *Secunda secundae* is devoted to the topic of shame. In the *sed contra* of the first article, Aristotle is cited as asserting in both *Ethics*.II and IV that shame is not a virtue. Then, in article 4 the question is raised, whether shame is something possible for a virtuous agent, and now the *sed contra* asserts, "The Philosopher says in *Ethics*.IV that 'shame is not had by a morally good

49. P 5 depends on *Super Ethica*.IV.5.p245,26-27. The etymology of the two Greek terms is found in the subsequent sentence, p245,29-34.

50. Cf. Aquinas: *Opera omnia*, T.47-I, pp. 259* and 263*; also, p. 104, note to lines 175-80.

person (*verecundia non est hominis studiosi*).⁵¹ Yet, as the *corpus* concludes:

“Yet, they [i.e., virtuous agents and the elderly] are disposed in such a way that, were there to be something disgraceful in their lives, they would be ashamed; hence the Philosopher says in *Ethics*.IV that ‘shame belongs conditionally to the morally good person’ (*verecundia ex suppositione studiosi*).”

This last reference to Aristotle goes beyond what Aquinas’s Latin version of the *Ethics* actually states. Instead of “shame belongs conditionally to the morally good person (*verecundia ex suppositione studiosi*),” it has “shame is conditionally something good (*Erit autem utique verecundia ex suppositione studiosum*).”⁵² However, even if we were to suppose that the term “*studiosi*” in the *Summa* is another example of the inaccuracy of the Leonine edition, it remains that Aquinas does assert the conditional presence in the virtuous agent of a disposition to be ashamed. While this is a doctrine that is rejected by the *SLE*, the *Tabula* indicates the *Secunda secundae*’s view possibly originated in the *Super Ethica*.

Albert saw *NE*.IV.9.1128b21-33 as Aristotle’s attempt to identify the type of person who is disposed to the habitus of shame.⁵³ In his first step, Aristotle was said to show that the morally good person is not disposed to be ashamed, since he will not perform the type of disgraceful act that ought to evoke shame in the agent responsible for the act.⁵⁴ Aristotle’s second and more complex step is presented as the attempt to decide whether shame is something praiseworthy. He notes first that, since it is praiseworthy to be ashamed of one’s evil act, shame appears to be morally good. But, Aristotle argues, the morally good person would not choose to perform an evil act, and so, it does not follow that shame is something good.⁵⁵ Consequently, Albert offers this as Aristotle’s answer to the question of whether the morally good person is disposed to be

51. Aquinas paraphrases slightly rather than cites *NE*.IV.9.1128b21-22. Cf. *SLE*, p. 259.

52. *NE*.IV.9.1128b29-30. Cf. *SLE*, p. 259.

53. *Super Ethica*.IV.16.p304,27-30: “...ostendit...quorum sit secundum dispositionem habitus.” *Ibid*.p304,41-42: “Deinde cum dicit: *Neque enim studiosi*, ostendit quorum sit ex dispositione habitus.”

54. *Ibid*.p304,45-57.

55. *Ibid*.p304,58-73.

ashamed: “Shame is morally good on the supposition that, if the agent has performed a disgraceful act, his shame is good and praiseworthy”; yet shame is not to be placed among virtues, which are praised for what they are of themselves or *per se* and not on some supposition. Thus, shame is not something simply good.⁵⁶

Albert’s interpretation of Aristotle’s position is identical to that of the *Secunda secundae*.144.4, which asserts that the elderly and the virtuous lack shame insofar as they do not regard themselves as capable of anything disgraceful, “Yet they are disposed in such a way that, were there anything disgraceful in their lives, they would be ashamed; hence, the Philosopher says in *Ethics*.IV that ‘shame belongs conditionally to the morally good person’.”⁵⁷

That Aquinas had carefully studied the *Super Ethica* regarding shame is witnessed by all three of the relevant *Tabula* statements. V 290 of the *Tabula*, as is evident below, is almost completely dependent on Albert’s doctrine.⁵⁸ The words in bold-face type in the text from the *Super Ethica* are the inspiration for the wording of V 290.

NE.IV.9.1128b29-31:
Erit autem utique verecundia ex suppositione studiosum; si enim operetur, verecundabitur utique. Non est autem hoc circa virtutes.

Tabula, V 290: **Quod verecundia ex suppositione erit studiosum, quia si operetur turpia, verecundabitur studiose et laudabiliter; set hoc non est in virtutibus quod aliquo supposito laudentur, set per se.**

Super Ethica.IV.16.p305,1-5: Deinde cum dicit: *Erit autem*, solvit [quaestionem, quorum sit ex dispositione habitus]. Et dicit, **quod verecundia est studiosum ex suppositione, quia si operetur turpia verecundabitur quis studiose et laudabiliter; sed hoc non est in virtutibus, quae sunt secundum se studiosa, quod aliquo supposito laudentur, sed per se.**

56. *Ibid*.p305,1-7.

57. *IIa-IIae*.144.4: “Sunt tamen sic dispositi ut si in eis esset aliquid turpe, de hoc verecundarentur: unde Philosophus dicit, in IV *Ethic.*, quod verecundia est ex suppositione studiosi.”

58. The other two *Tabula* statements relevant to the discussion of shame are the following: V 287 - p304,46-47; S 166 - p304,73. (The page and line numbers refer to *Super Ethica*.IV.16.)

The above makes clear that Aquinas read the *Super Ethica* in developing V 290. Accordingly, he saw Albert's answer to the question of whether the morally good person is disposed to be ashamed, namely, he is so disposed on the supposition that he has acted immorally. This answer Aquinas stated explicitly in V 290: "shame is conditionally something good," for, if the virtuous agent acted immorally, "he would be ashamed in a way both good and praiseworthy." But in the *SLE*, Aquinas proposes that the expression "shame is conditionally something good (*verecundia ex suppositione studiosum*)" is not a statement of Aristotle's position, but rather an objection to it.

The summary below presents the quite different understanding of the *SLE* regarding the texts cited in the *Secunda secundae*. The passage cited in the *sed contra* of *Secunda secundae*.144.4 is interpreted in "I," while the closing citation of that article's *corpus* ("shame is conditionally something good") is the Latin proposition mentioned in "II.B.(2)." In subdivision "II.B" of the summary, Aquinas offers Aristotle's two answers to the objection that the virtuous agent has a disposition to be ashamed, were he to have performed something disgraceful. In "II.B.(2)" Aquinas interprets the proposition "*Erit autem utique verecundia ex suppositione studiosum*" as a restatement of the objection. In that same subsection, in explaining Aristotle's response to this objection, Aquinas is in effect arguing that the virtuous agent has no conditional disposition to be ashamed. Yet Albert's commentary on the above proposition of the *Ethics* appears to imply the existence of such a disposition, and it was from this comment of Albert that *Tabula* statement V 290 was formed, just as it was to this proposition of the *Ethics* that the *Secunda secundae* appeals for the authoritative justification of its affirmation that there exists in the virtuous a conditional disposition to be ashamed. Here in summary form is Aquinas's comment in the *SLE*.

I. With the proposition beginning "*Neque enim studiosi est verecundia*," Aristotle shows shame is not present in the life of the virtuous (*SLE*.IV.17.72-82.S874).

II. Aristotle responds to three objections to the above doctrine.

A. The objection that shame concerns what is thought to be wrong as well as what is truly wrong is not opposed to the above doctrine, since the virtuous agent neither does what is truly wrong nor what is only thought to be wrong (*Ibid*.83-95.S875-76).

B. It is incorrect to claim that, although the virtuous agent has nothing of which to be ashamed, "he is yet disposed in such a way that were something base to have been performed, he would be ashamed. If one were to think that shame therefore belongs to the virtuous, [Aristotle] proves this is inappropriate in two ways" (*Ibid*.96-103.S877).

(1) Since shame concerns only voluntary defects -defects repugnant to the virtuous - shame does not belong to them (*Ibid*.103-12.S878).

(2) "Secondly, he responds to the above objection where he says, 'Shame will be something conditionally good (*Erit autem utique verecundia ex suppositione studiosum*).' He says that according to the above objection shame would be conditionally something virtuous (*verecundia esset quiddam virtuosum ex suppositione*), because the virtuous person would be ashamed if he did something shameful. However, this is not among the things properly belonging to virtuous agents, but rather among those absolutely belonging to them, as is clear in regard to all virtues. Hence, it remains that shame does not properly pertain to the virtuous agent" (*Ibid*.113-21).⁵⁹

C. To the objection that shame is virtuous because it would be wrong either to be proud of or not to be ashamed of something base, Aristotle's response notes that the conclusion does not necessarily follow, because neither being proud nor failing to be ashamed of an evil act would be had in a virtuous agent, on the assumption he has performed an evil act. All one can conclude is that, on the supposition of the performance of a base act, it would be more appropriate that a virtuous person be ashamed than that he lack shame. And so, shame is not a virtue, for if it were, it would be found in virtuous agents (*Ibid*.122-34.S880-81).

III. Aristotle does not speak here of shame as a passion worthy of praise, as his intent is only to explain that shame is not a virtue (*Ibid*.135-42.S882).

In stark contrast with the *Secunda secundae*, the above position of the *SLE* is that the disposition to be ashamed is not something had by the virtuous as if it were something properly belonging to them. Rather, shame "absolutely" belongs to the virtuous, i.e., not as virtuous, but as an agent. Consequently, all one can claim, as item C makes clear, is that it is better that a virtuous agent be ashamed than not, provided he has performed a disgraceful act.

Not only do *SLE*.IV.17 and *Secunda secundae*.144.4 assert diverse doctrines regarding the possibility that the virtuous as such is disposed to be ashamed, should the occasion arise. Through the witness of *Tabula*, V 290, the *Super Ethica* appears as the source of the doctrine of the *Secunda secundae*. Once again, a posterior date for the composition of a passage of the *SLE* seems logical.

The five groups of texts thus far examined in this Chapter reveal that:

59. *SLE*.IV.17.113-21.S879: "Secundo excludit praedictam obviationem, ibi: *Erit autem utique* etc. Et dicit quod secundum praedictam obviationem verecundia esset quiddam virtuosum ex suppositione, quia scilicet verecundaretur virtuosus si turpia operaretur. Hoc autem non est de his quae proprie conveniunt virtuosus, immo absolute eis conveniunt, sicut patet circa omnes virtutes. Unde relinquitur quod verecundia non proprie conveniat virtuosus."

- Ila-IIae.47* on prudence preceded *SLE.VI.1, 4, & 7*;
Ila-IIae.120 on *epieikeia* preceded *SLE.V.16*;
Ila-IIae.123 on pseudo-courageous action preceded *SLE.III.16*;
Ila-IIae.135 on *apurocalia* preceded *SLE.II.8* and *IV.6*;
Ila-IIae.144 on a disposition to be ashamed preceded *SLE.IV.17*.

Additionally, the consideration of several other doctrines adds in various ways weight to the suggested relative dating of the above sections of the *Secunda secundae* and the *SLE*. First, there is the matter of generosity as a potential part of a principal virtue. Second, there is a matter of vocabulary in Aquinas's treatment of the magnanimous agent. Then, we have the doctrine of continence. Until well into the *Secunda secundae* Aquinas agreed with the *Super Ethica* in placing that habitus in reason. Only very late in the *Secunda secundae* does he formulate a new interpretation of Aristotle's view on this topic, an interpretation seemingly predating the *SLE*'s discussion.

GENEROSITY AS SECONDARY TO A PRINCIPAL VIRTUE

Secunda secundae, question 161 turns to the task of relating humility to one of the four cardinal or principal virtues. In accord with the oft-repeated doctrine of secondary virtues as potential parts of principal virtues,⁶⁰ humility is proposed as a potential part of temperance since, as is true of temperance, humility restrains or represses the impetus of a passion. At this point, *Ethics.IV* is noted for identifying as temperate the agent "whom we can call humble."⁶¹ When the *Secunda secundae* had earlier in question 143 presented a list of 10 potential parts of temperance, taken still in the broad sense as moderating a

60. Cf. *Ila-IIae.48.1; 128.1; 137.3; 143.1; 157.3.ad 2; 161.4*.

61. *Ibid.*, 161.4: "[Utrum humilitas sit pars modestiae vel temperantiae.] ...sicut supra dictum est, in assignando partes virtutibus praecipue attenditur similitudo quantum ad modum virtutis. Modus autem temperantiae, ex quo maxime laudem habet, est refrenatio vel repressio impetus alicuius passionis. Et ideo omnes virtutes refrenantes sive reprimentes impetus aliquarum affectionum, vel actiones moderantes, ponuntur partes temperantiae. Sicut autem mansuetudo reprimit motum irae, ita etiam humilitas reprimit motum spei, qui est motus spiritus in magna tendentis. Et ideo, sicut mansuetudo ponitur pars temperantiae, ita etiam humilitas. Unde et Philosophus, in *IV Ethic.*, eum qui tendit in parva secundum suum modum, dicit non esse magnanimum, sed temperatum: quem nos humilem dicere possumus."

passion, humility was included, but generosity was not.⁶² Further, in question 117, the *Secunda secundae* had explained that generosity (*liberalitas*) was a potential part of justice. This identification assumed a broad sense of justice as involving first, activity regarding another person, and second, activity concerning external things.⁶³

When looking to the *SLE*'s comment on the section of *Ethics.IV* referred to in *Secunda secundae*, question 161, one finds Aquinas saying much the same as in the latter work in regard to a virtue identifiable as humility. Temperance, in the broad sense, is any moderating activity, and, accordingly, that agent is temperate who sees himself as having small merit.⁶⁴ However, elsewhere in *SLE.IV*, one finds that generosity is similar to temperance in that both moderate passions: whereas "temperance moderates the concupiscible desires for the pleasures of touch, so generosity moderates the excessive desire of acquiring or

62. *Ibid.*, 143.1: "[Utrum convenienter assignentur partes temperantiae.] Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis principalis dicuntur virtutes secundariae, quae modum quem principalis virtus observat circa aliquam principalem materiam, eundem observant in quibusdam aliis materiis in quibus non est ita difficile. Pertinet autem ad temperantiam moderari delectationes tactus, quas difficillimum est moderari. Unde quaecumque virtus moderationem quandam operatur in aliqua materia et refrenationem appetitus in aliquid tendentis, poni potest pars temperantiae sicut virtus ei adiuncta. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter: uno modo, in interioribus motibus animi; alio modo, in exterioribus motibus et actibus corporis; tertio modo, in exterioribus rebus. Praeter motum autem concupiscentiae, quem moderatur et refrenat temperantia, tres motus inveniuntur in anima tendentes in aliquid. Primus quidem est... Alius autem motus interior in aliquid tendens est motus spei, et audaciae, quae ipsam consequitur; et hunc motum moderatur sive refrenat humilitas. Tertius..."

63. *Ibid.*, 117.5: "[Utrum liberalitas est pars iustitiae.] Sed contra... Ergo liberalitas ad iustitiam pertinet." [Corpus] "...liberalitas non est species iustitiae [i.e., not a "subjective part" of justice]: quia iustitia exhibet alteri quod est eius, liberalitas autem exhibet id quod est suum. Habet tamen quandam convenientem cum iustitia in duobus. Primo quidem, quia principaliter est ad alterum, sicut et iustitia. Secundo, quia est circa res exteriores, sicut et iustitia: licet secundum aliam rationem... Et ideo liberalitas a quibusdam ponitur [potentialis] pars iustitiae, sicut virtus ei annexa ut principali." "Ad tertium... Sed datio liberalitatis provenit ex eo quod dans est aequaliter affectus circa pecuniam, dum eam non concupiscit neque amat. Unde etiam non solum amicis, sed etiam ignotis dat, quando oportet. Unde non pertinet ad caritatem, sed magis ad iustitiam, quae est circa res exteriores."

64. *SLE.IV.8.46-50.S738*: "...ostendit quod magnanimus dignificet se ipsum magnis. Ille enim qui est dignus parvis et his se ipsum dignificat potest dici temperatus, prout temperantia large sumitur pro quacumque moderatione."

possessing external things."⁶⁵ The implication in the *SLE* is that generosity is a potential part of temperance, not of justice.

Given the extensive study of the *Ethics* required for composing the *SLE*, were the *Secunda secundae* to be assumed the later of the two works, one would expect to find in the latter the extremely broad view of the moderation of passion that enabled the *SLE* to see the generous agent as temperate. Thus, generosity would surely have been noted in the *Secunda secundae* as a potential part of temperance in question 143. As well, question 117 would not have characterized generosity as part of justice. Hence, I suggest that here is some evidence, however slight, that the *Secunda secundae*'s doctrine on the potential parts of temperance preceded the composition of the parallel passages of the *SLE*.IV on temperance and generosity.

THE MAGNANIMOUS AGENT AND HONOR; "PIGER" OR "TARDUS"?

Among the evidence Gauthier used for concluding that the *SLE* was composed close to the time of the *Secunda secundae*, but posterior to the *Prima secundae*, was the doctrine in both the former works of honor as the object of magnanimity, as well as certain related doctrines concerning pride and humility.⁶⁶ Without explanation, however, Gauthier assumed the *SLE*'s treatment of magnanimity in Books II and IV was earlier than that of questions 129-30 of the *Secunda secundae*.⁶⁷ While the *Tabula Libri Ethicorum* was almost an unknown work at the time of Gauthier's dating of the *SLE*, now that the former is available, it casts new light on Aquinas's treatment of magnanimity. Evidence shows that quite possibly the construction of the *Tabula* brought to Aquinas's attention the fact that magnanimity's object was honor and not great or difficult things as he had previously taught.

In commenting on *Ethics*.II, Albert had explained that, as concerns honor and honorable things, Aristotle proposes as a mean the virtue of magnanimity,

65. *Ibid*.IV.1.32-38.S650: "Dicit ergo primo quod post temperantiam dicendum est de liberalitate. Et hoc propter convenientiam liberalitatis ad temperantiam; sicut enim temperantia moderatur concupiscentias delectionum tactus, ita liberalitas moderatur cupiditatem acquirendi vel possidendi res exteriores."

66. Gauthier: "La date du commentaire," pp.76-84.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

whose opposed vices are pusillanimity and *chaunotes*.⁶⁸ When Aquinas constructed the *Tabula*'s statement concerning the passage in *Ethics*.II on which Albert was commenting (*NE*.II.7.1107b21-1108a3), he stayed closer to Aristotle's words than to Albert's. Nonetheless, M 148 of the *Tabula* affirms magnanimity has honor as its object, and in addition it mentions the vices opposed to magnanimity.⁶⁹

In turning to the extensive treatment of magnanimity in *Ethics*.IV, Albert had commented on what he took to be Aristotle's first argument for honor's claim to be magnanimity's object. This argument is based on the reality of magnanimity as a virtue. A person who is great, explains Albert, worthily surrounds himself with great things. But the greatest of external goods is honor, and so, honor is the object of magnanimity.⁷⁰ The *Tabula*'s statements on the doctrine of magnanimity proposed in *Ethics*.IV, as was true of the statements referring to the discussion in *Ethics*.II, while scarcely more than a reworking of Aristotle's words, do borrow from the *Super Ethica* in at least four of the 10 statements.⁷¹ Two of these four, M 64 and M 153, propose respectively the beginning and the conclusion of Albert's three-step argument that magnanimity's matter or object is honor. Together, they provide an adequate summary of Albert's comment.

M 64: Quod magnanimus est circa unum maximum.

M 153: Quod maximum circa quod est magnanimitas est illud quod diis attribuius et quod desiderant qui in dignitate sunt et quod est premium virtutum, et hoc est honor.

Additionally, the *Tabula* contains in all five affirmations of honor as the object of magnanimity.⁷² Given these sorts of statements in the *Tabula*, it appears

68. *Super Ethica*.II.7.p129,1-5: "Deinde cum dicit: Circa honores, ponit quintam medietatem in honoribus et in honorabilibus, quae dicitur magnanimitas, qua aliquis decenter se habet ad desiderandum honores, et defectus oppositus dicitur pussillanimitas et abundantia chaunotes."

69. *Tabula*, M 148: "Quod magnanimitas circa honores et inhonoraciones; superhabundantia autem caymotes, defectus vero pussillanimitas."

70. *Super Ethica*.IV.8.p256,8-30.

71. The four statements and the page and lines of their source in *Super Ethica*.IV.8 are as follows: P 14 - p255,55-56; M 64 - p256,13; M 153 - p256,26-30; M 69 - p256,43-45.

72. M 66; M 79; M 146; M 148; M 153.

reasonable to assume the development of these statements might have brought home to Aquinas the errors in his previous view of magnanimity's object, and so, explain the views of magnanimity's object proposed in his subsequent works, i.e., in the *Secunda secundae* and the *SLE*.

However, there is an additional aspect of the *Tabula* that makes it likely that its treatment of magnanimity affected the *Secunda secundae*. In *Secunda secundae*.47, the use of *piger* ("lazy") and *pigritia* ("laziness") point to Albert's commentary as their source. Although question 47 concerns the connection of prudence and "solicitude" or forethought, one objection cites *Ethics*.II as affirming that the magnanimous agent is "lazy and idle" - *pigrum esse et otiosum*. The objection continues by explaining that "laziness," or *pigritia*, is opposed to solicitude.⁷³ The response asserts that the magnanimous agent is not styled *piger et otiosus* as if he is never solicitous. Instead, he has earned this characterization because, negatively speaking, he is not overly solicitous about many things, while, positively speaking, he trusts in what is worthy of having his trust, and thus he does not waste his solicitude on them.⁷⁴

Significantly, the Latin version of the *Ethics* Aquinas regularly used in the *Pars secunda*, the *SLE*, and the *Tabula* employs the term "*tardus*" rather than "*piger*." Yet, in the *Tabula*'s M 20, a statement clearly revealing its dependence on the *Super Ethica*, Aquinas begins with "That the magnanimous agent is idle and lazy (*esse ociosum et pigrum*)..." - the wording Albert employs and that is taken up in the *Secunda secundae*.⁷⁵ But in the *SLE*, Aquinas adheres to the terminology of the version of the *Ethics* on which he comments, namely, "*otiosum*

73. *Ia-IIae*.47.9.ob 3: "Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in IV, *Ethic.*, quod ad magnanimum pertinet *pigrum esse et otiosum*. *Pigritiae* autem opponitur sollicitudo."

74. *Ibid.* ad 3: "...magnanimus dicitur esse *piger et otiosus*, non quia de nullo sit sollicitus: sed quia non est superflue sollicitus de multis, sed confidit in his de quibus confidendum est, et circa illa non superflue sollicitatur."

75. *Tabula*, M 20: "Quod magnanimi est esse ociosum et pigrum, in quantum non intromittit se quibuslibet operibus, set ubi honor magnus et opus, et est paucorum operativus set magnorum et nobilium." *Super Ethica*.IV.10.p263,33-38, writing about the properties of the magnanimous agent in his relation to others, asserts: "...et sic ponit [Aristoteles] primam et dicit, quod suum est esse *otiosum et pigrum*, in quantum non immittit se quibuslibet operibus, *sed vel*, idest solum, operatur in his in quibus est *magnus honor vel* magnum *opus*. Et quia sunt pauca, ideo est *paucarum operationum* et tamen *magnarum et nobilium*." Aquinas's version of the *Ethics*: NE.IV.3.1124b24-26 (*SLE*, p. 232): "Et otiosum esse et tardum, sed vel ubi honor magnus vel opus. Et paucorum quidem operativum, magnorum autem et nominabilium."

esse et tardum."⁷⁶ It is quite understandable that, in composing the *Secunda secundae* after constructing the *Tabula*, Aquinas might not note that the translation he was using at the time links "*otiosum*" with "*tardum*," and not with "*pigrum*" as did the *Super Ethica* and the *Tabula*. Then, on the assumption that the *SLE* is a later work, there one see Aquinas adhering to the "*otiosum esse et tardum*" found in the text he works with.

Although the proposal of honor as magnanimity's object subsequent to the development of the *Tabula*, and the use of "*piger*" and "*pigritia*" in the *Secunda secundae*, provide only a very slight indication that passages of the *SLE*.IV might be later than sections of *Secunda secundae*.47, they nonetheless add weight to the evidence already noted.

A DEVELOPMENT CONCERNING CONTINENCE

That the *SLE* was written after the *Prima secundae* was also proposed by Gauthier on the basis of changes respecting the habitus of continence and perseverance.⁷⁷ Whereas the *Prima secundae* had assigned reason as the subject of these habitus, a doctrine repeated in *Secunda secundae*.53.5, both *Secunda secundae*.155.3 and *SLE*.VII.10 propose continence as a habitus perfecting the will. In addition, *Secunda secundae*.137.2 and 143.1 offer a view of continence that had evolved beyond the position of the *Prima secundae* and of *Secunda secundae*.53.5, but which is not yet the final view of question 155.3 of the latter work nor of *SLE*.VII.10. From these facts, Gauthier concluded that *SLE*.VII.10 was composed after *Secunda secundae*.53.5, as also after questions 137.2 and 143.1 of that work. Finally, given that *SLE*.VII.10 appears to be very much a summary of the doctrine of question 155.3, Gauthier accepted the *Secunda secundae*'s final position on continence to be earlier than the parallel discussion in *SLE*.VII.10.⁷⁸

76. *SLE*.IV.10.131-36.S771: "Dicit ergo primo quod ad magnanimum pertinet quod sit otiosum, ex eo scilicet quod non multis negotiis se ingerit, et quod sit tardus, id est quod non de facili se ingerat negotiis sed solum illis actibus insistat quid pertinent ad aliquem magnum honorem vel ad aliquod magnum opus faciendum."

77. Gauthier: "La date du commentaire," pp.98-104.

78. For Aquinas's positions on the subject of continence and perseverance, see: *Ia-IIae*.58.3.ad 2 (continence and perseverance are perfections of the rational part of the soul, i.e., by implication, perfections of reason itself); *Ibid.*109.10 (perseverance is a *habitus mentis*); *Ia-IIae*.53.5 (continence and perseverance are only in reason);

Almost certainly, Aquinas's advocacy of continence as a habitus of reason had its source in Albert's lectures in Cologne, if not also in their published version, the *Super Ethica*. In his first major work, the *Sentence Commentary*, written within little more than four years after his student days under Albert at Cologne, Aquinas explains that a virtue is needed in every human potency to insure the goodness of the potency's act; in agents who experience vehement concupiscible passions without being led by them, there exists in their reason the virtue of continence enabling them to withstand the pull of their passions.⁷⁹

That this is Albert's doctrine is beyond doubt. In the opening *lectio* of *Super Ethica*.VII, Albert proposes continence as an intellectual habitus perfecting reason in as much as reason mixes with passions in its capacity as the moving cause of the body's activities.⁸⁰ Additionally, the same *lectio* describes continence as a habitus imparting a certain ease of acting to its subject, that is, to reason as commanding activity.⁸¹ In *lectio* 8 of the same book, continence is mentioned as a type of virtue related to tactile pleasures and pains: just as temperance is the principal moral virtue directing pleasures for the good of the agent, continence is

*Ibid.*137.2.ad 2 (perseverance strengthens reason and will); *Ibid.*143.1 (continence represses the movement of the will disturbed by passion); *Ibid.*155.3c & ad 2 (continence is in the will as in a subject); *SLE*.VII.10.87-97.S1463 ("from what has been said in this context, it is clear that for Aristotle the subject of continence is the will.")

79. *Sent.*III, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4b: "...virtutes humanae sunt quibus opus hominis bonum redditur; unde in omni potentia quae est principium humani operis, oportet esse habitum virtutis, quo opus ejus bonum redditur;...oportet quod in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes sicut in subjecto, quibus efficitur ut facile rationi obediant illae potentiae in quibus sunt; quod quidem contingit in quantum passionibus reprimuntur, ut non rationem perturbent. Unde in illo qui passionibus vehementiores patitur, sed non deducitur, est quidem habitus in ratione, qui tenet eam ne deducatur, non autem in viribus illis in quibus sunt passionibus; sicut patet in continente;..."

80. *Super Ethica*.VII.1.p516,40-54: "Concedimus, quod [continentia et heroica virtus] sunt intellectuales. Ad hoc autem intelligendum est, quod ratio dupliciter considerari potest: aut per comparationem ad obiectum suum et sic perficitur intellectualibus virtutibus...; aut secundum quod est regitiva aliarum virtutum et aliae oboedientes ipsi. Et ita oportet, quod habeat duas perfectiones, quia anima potest considerari aut per essentiam suam,...et sic oportet, quod perficiatur anima virtute quadam divina; aut in quantum est anima et motor corporis et sic immiscetur passionibus et compatitur quodammodo eis, et sic oportet quod perficiatur continentia."

81. *Ibid.*p517,21-25.

an intellectual habitus, similar to a virtue, which conquers pleasures for the good of reason.⁸² Finally, in opening the discussion of friendship in *Super Ethica*.VIII, Albert proposes three different sorts of intellectual virtue giving the agent's reason the tendency toward imposing the good of reason on the inferior powers. One of these intellectual virtues is continence.⁸³

All the passages noted are found in the context of questions Albert raises in regard to Aristotle's text, not in his direct comment on Aristotle's words. As the *Tabula* only intends to propose statements of doctrines found in the *Ethics*, it does not draw from anything Albert proposes in the context of a question. Consequently, although the *Tabula* points to Aquinas's study of Albert's comments in the lessons from which the above doctrines of continence were drawn, in this case they provide no direct evidence concerning Aquinas's awareness of the content of Albert's questions on continence.⁸⁴ One can only conclude that Albert's doctrine of continence, which had influenced Aquinas's *Sentence Commentary*, was in the forefront of the latter's memory when he proposed continence as a habitus of reason in *Prima secundae*.58.3 and 109.10, as well in *Secunda secundae*.53.5. Whether this resulted from his work in developing the *Tabula*, or whether he simply retained the memory of Albert's lectures cannot be determined. Supposedly, the further study of Aristotle necessarily preceding the composition of the *SLE* accounts for Aquinas's evolution to the position expressed in *Secunda secundae* 155.3 and *SLE*.VII.10.

As mentioned, on the basis of the comparison of Aquinas's explanations of continence as a habitus of the will, Gauthier postulated that Aquinas wrote first, the *Secunda secundae*'s exposition and then, at a later point, summarized the same doctrine in the *SLE*. Here are the texts which, I suggest, justify that conclusion.

82. *Ibid.*8.p553,8-17: "...circa huiusmodi delectabilia tactus et tristias sunt quidam habitus principales, scilicet temperantia ut moralis virtus,...et inter intellectuales continentia, quae est similis virtuti,...quae etiam vincit eas [id est, delectationes] propter bonum rationis."

83. *Ibid.*VIII.1.p592,69-75: "Virtus enim intellectualis aut perficit rationem in se, et sic sunt illae de quibus determinatum est in Sexto, aut secundum quod per bonum rationis tendit in inferiorem potentiam, et sic est continentia,...aut secundum quod tendit in proximum, et sic est amicitia."

84. For the identity of statements concerning the content of *Super Ethica*.VII.1, see the listing on page B 169 of the *Tabula* relative to *NE*.VII.1.1145a16-31; for those regarding *Super Ethica*.VII.8, see page B 169 relative to *NE*.VII.7.1150a9-b16.

Ila-Ilae.155.3: Respondeo dicendum quod omnis virtus in aliquo subiecto existens facit illud differre a dispositione quam habet dum subiicitur opposito vicio. Concupiscibilis autem eodem modo se habet in eo qui est continens, et in eo qui est incontinens: quia in utroque prorumpit ad concupiscentias pravas vehementes. Unde manifestum est quod continentia non est in concupiscibili sicut in subiecto. - Similiter etiam ratio eodem modo se habet in utroque: quia tam continens quam incontinens habet rationem rectam; et uterque, extra passionem existens, gerit in proposito concupiscentias illicitas non sequi. - Prima autem differentia eorum inventiur in electione: quia continens, quamvis patiatur vehementes concupiscentias, tamen eligit non sequi eas, propter rationem; incontinens autem eligit sequi eas, non obstante contradictione rationis. Et ideo oportet quod continentia sit, sicut in subiecto, in illa vi animae cuius actus est electio. Et haec est voluntas...

The simplicity and precision of the *SLE*'s reasoning indicates an author more in control of his material than does the more wordy and less tightly organized exposition of the *Secunda secundae*. *SLE.VII.10* is then perhaps a later composition than *Secunda secundae.155.3*.

The complete list of passages of the *Secunda secundae* that, because of their dependence on the *Super Ethica*, appear to have been written earlier than the parallel section of the *SLE* is as follows:

- Ila-Ilae.47* on prudence preceded *SLE.VI.1, 4, & 7*;
- Ila-Ilae.120* on *epieikeia* preceded *SLE.V.16*;
- Ila-Ilae.123* on pseudo-courageous action preceded *SLE.III.16*;
- Ila-Ilae.135* on *apurocalia* preceded *SLE.II.8 & IV.6*;
- Ila-Ilae.144* on a disposition to be ashamed preceded *SLE.IV.17*;
- Ila-Ilae.117* on generosity preceded *SLE.IV.1 & 8*;
- Ila-Ilae.47*'s use of "*piger*" preceded the use of "*tardus*" in *SLE.IV.10*;
- Ila-Ilae.53, 137, 143, & 155* on continence preceded *SLE.VII.10*.

SLE.VII.10.87-97.S1463: Ex his autem quae dicta sunt accipere possumus quid sit subiectum continentiae et incontinentiae: non enim potest dici quod utriusque subiectum sit concupiscibilis, quia non differunt secundum concupiscentias quas uterque, scilicet continens et incontinens, habet pravas; neque etiam subiectum utriusque est ratio, quia uterque habet rationem rectam; relinquatur ergo quod subiectum utriusque sit voluntas, quia incontinens volens peccat, ut dictum est, continens autem volens immanet rationi.

There is no need to repeat the conclusions drawn earlier in this Chapter respecting each of the above. But if the comparisons made present evidence for regarding with some probability individual sections of the *SLE* as posterior to parallel articles of the *Secunda secundae*, what does that tell us of the nature of the commentary? If the *SLE* is, at least in part, the later work, was not Aquinas attempting to let stand now on its own merits the moral system of the *Ethics* that he had transformed piecemeal in his other works? Should this be granted, then in combination with the results of Chapters 1-4, there is more than a little evidence for regarding the *SLE* as Aquinas's final and most mature statement of moral philosophy. Do not the history of 13th century interpretations of the *Ethics*, as well as the difference between the *Super Ethica* and the *SLE*, bear witness to Aquinas's commentary as one in a series of attempts to present the correct view of Aristotle's system of moral philosophy? Does not Aquinas's role in the philosophical discussions at Paris between 1268 and 1272 make at least a *prima facie* case for regarding the composition of the commentary on the *Ethics* as partially motivated by the desire to present philosophical doctrines he regarded as correct? Is not the philosophical nature of the *SLE* shown by uncovering the philosophical character of the supposedly Christian principles undergirding that work's version of the *Ethics*?⁸⁵

A brief statement of Aquinas's understanding of the *Ethics* is now our concern.

85. In addition to the passages studied in this Chapter, there are three others in the *Secunda secundae* differing from parallel sections of the *SLE*. These were not discussed above as their evidence is not particularly direct. (1) *Ila-Ilae.182.1* asserts *Ethics.X* offers eight proofs that the contemplative life is "simply better" than the active. *SLE.X.10-11* have a different interpretation of Aristotle's text, for Aquinas finds the first six arguments of the *Ila-Ilae* to conclude only that ultimate happiness lies in speculative activity. The *Ila-Ilae*'s seventh argument is admitted by the *SLE* to be Aristotle's sole proof for the superiority of the contemplative life, and the eighth argument of the *Ila-Ilae* is for the *SLE* Aristotle's response to an erroneous view. *Super Ethica.X.11 & 13* offer an interpretation identical to that later given in the *SLE*. The relevant *Tabula* statements point very strongly to the conclusion that, in their development, Aquinas did not examine Albert's interpretation, but worked directly and solely from the *Ethics* itself. (2) *Ila-Ilae.142.2* on the childishness of intemperance offers an apparently less mature reading of *Ethics.III.12* than does *SLE.III.12*. The *Tabula*'s statements reveal a considerable debt to *Super Ethica.III.15*. (3) *Ila-Ilae.168.2* on the virtue concerning recreation, has a strong resemblance to *Super Ethica.IV.15*. The *Tabula* clearly depends on the *Super Ethica* in this case. However, *SLE.IV.16* differs from the *Ila-Ilae* only in not containing any of the elements shared by the *Ila-Ilae* and the *Super Ethica*.

THE *SLE* IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the preceding Chapters, numerous doctrines and passages of the *SLE* were viewed in historical context. On that basis, the *SLE* was characterized as Aquinas's statement of what he believed to be the correct moral philosophy that might be legitimately proposed in a commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*. However, the discussions permitting that conclusion, of their nature, militated against seeing in its historical setting the *SLE*'s moral philosophy as a whole. The present Chapter offers a partial remedy for that situation by proposing in outline form the orderly development of the doctrine offered by Aquinas as he moves through the ten books of his commentary.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUESTION OF HUMAN HAPPINESS

Aquinas might well have seen his predecessors's principal misunderstanding of the moral philosophy being proposed in the *Ethics* as rooted in their misunderstanding of the nature of the human agent. The question in the background of Aristotle's investigation is that of how human agents are to act so as to reach the goal that is naturally theirs. Obviously, the answer to this question depends on one's conception of the human agent.

Aquinas saw that, according to Aristotle's *De anima*, a human agent is constituted by an intellectual soul perfecting as an act a body potentially alive in vegetative and sensitive ways. However, the soul, as intellectual, is unable to express all its powers through the body whose act it is. The soul, accordingly, has a range of cognitive and appetitive activity transcending the body. That is, the agent can intellect meanings and will goods, activities totally non-material.¹

Since Aquinas agreed with what he regarded as Aristotle's conception of the human agent, the *Ethics* appeared to him as a work adopting the correct procedure to develop a moral philosophy. The moral philosopher, i.e., Aristotle, correctly begins by seeking in Book I to discover the goal that can satisfy an agent

1. Cf. above, "Personal immortality taught by Aristotle," pp. 135-51.

endowed with an intellectual appetite. Once that goal is identified, even if that be possible only in some minimal way, then the philosopher turns to the task of deciding what types of activity will enable the agent to move toward the goal; this investigation occupies Books II-IX of the *Ethics*. Because the *Ethics* is a moral philosophy, and so not aided by revelation in regard to the agent's ultimate goal, Aquinas could acknowledge the impossibility of completely delineating that goal in the initial stage of moral philosophy (i.e., in *Ethics*.I). A more adequate description of the goal can be had only after the philosopher understands something of the activity proper to the human agent, for it is by that activity that the human goal is to be reached. Since the investigation of this activity comprises Books II-IX, only in *Ethics*.X does the moral philosopher complete the description of happiness, and this he accomplishes because he now understands the virtues by which happiness can be reached.

The dependence of the procedure followed by the moral philosopher on his conception of the human agent illustrates Aquinas's conviction that earlier commentaries on the *Ethics* were insufficient. As far as he was concerned, neither Eustratius in the *Greek Commentaries*, nor Averroes, nor Albert had correctly understood the agent of whose life Aristotle wrote. For all three of these earlier commentators, the practical cognition of day-to-day living, together with the subsequent correct choices, constitute the arena in which the happiness proper to human beings is to be achieved. For Averroes, what is proper to a human agent is the social life on earth as determined by the only reason actually "in" man, namely, practical reason. Contemplation and the happiness associated with it are possible for the agent only through a connection with the separated intellect in its act of understanding the meanings materialized in the agent's phantasms. Although Eustratius's position on the human soul differs from that of Averroes, the former too sees human happiness to be had through moderating the passions; hence, it is in social living that the agent is genuinely human. The contemplative life, conceived as solitary, is more divine than human. Then there was Albert, for whom the proper work of man is the governing of his life by practical reason, the highest potency he truly possesses. In contrast, the intellect is a power in which the agent can only share and something whose activity leads to a life more proper to that of separated substances than to the life of a human agent.

Armed with a conception of man at odds with views such as those described, Aquinas saw *Ethics*. I-IX building toward the final answer to human happiness that is proposed in the description of contemplative activity in *Ethics*.X. Only such happiness could be the goal of a corporeal agent whose act is an intellectual soul.

THE INTRODUCTION TO THE *SLE*

Before he turns directly to Aristotle's text, Aquinas offers a two-paragraph introduction devoted first, to moral philosophy's subject matter and then, to the threefold division of moral philosophy. Two equivalent formulae express the subject matter: "human activity ordered to the end" and "man as voluntarily acting for the end."² Concerning the subdivisions of moral philosophy, Aquinas offers these: *monastica* or the investigation of the activities of one man ordered to his end; *conomica* or the study of the activities of the domestic society ordered to the end of a family; and politics or the discussion of the activities of the civil society ordered to the common good of all its members.³

Yet before proposing the above doctrines, Aquinas introduces the discussion of the subject matter of moral philosophy by reference to order, and follows this immediately with the example of the order of an army as proposed in *Metaphysics*.XII.

A twofold order is found in things. Each of the parts of any whole or of any group is ordered to the other parts, just as the parts of a house are ordered to one another. However, the order of things to their end is a different order, and a more fundamental order than the first; as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics*.XI [read: "XII"], the order of the parts of an army to one another is because of the order of the entire army to its leader.⁴

From this example, Aquinas turns to a listing of the four ways reason can be related to order, one of which is the order of the human agent's actions to his end, or the subject of moral philosophy.

The implications of this opening pertain to an understanding of the *SLE*. Moral philosophy aims at discovering the morally good order the agent is to put into actions, i.e., the objective order. This order will be specified by what the human agent is, or by his nature. But, in keeping with the example of the twofold order of an army, the correct order of human actions to one another is for the sake of the correct order of those actions to their end, which is determined by the "leader" or God. In keeping with the example of the army, God is the principle external to human nature which conceives and imparts to human nature the

2. I.1.50-54.S3. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this Chapter are to the *SLE*.

3. I.1.99-106.S6.

4. I.1.7-14.S1.

objective ground for the order that ought to be put into human actions. Accordingly, there are certain things that are naturally just, and it is these that are the guide of human activity toward its end. Such are the implications of Aquinas's use of the image of order, and the reader of the *SLE* will find these implications spelled out bit by bit.

As concerns the threefold division of moral philosophy, Aquinas explains that, despite man's natural social condition because of which he falls under *oconomica* and politics, the totality of activity possible to the agent is not considered when he is studied only as a member of a domestic household or of a civil society. The proper end of the agent, as well as the activities directed toward that end, are only studied in *monastica*, and that is the study undertaken in the *Ethics*.⁵ As indicated by the image of the army, the agent has an end surpassing his ordered relation to family and society.

When considered from the perspective of the entire *Ethics*, the point just made indicates for the *SLE* a direction distinct from that of its predecessors. Since the agent's proper end is not studied in considering his role in either familial or political society, that end transcends in some way whatever other ends the agent may have as a social being. For the same reason, whatever may be the types of activities by which an agent's roles in the family and in civil society are fulfilled, those activities are distinct from the ones by which he attains his proper end.

Guided by the understanding of the task for moral philosophy implied above, the moral philosopher, here, Aquinas, reminds the reader of the conception of human activity that is to function throughout the *Ethics*. That is, the agent's human activities result either from the intellect itself or from the intellectual appetite. Human activity can be further divided into first, a speculative intellectual kind whose goal is truth reached through the development of science; second, a practical intellectual activity whose goal can be either art or correct prudential reasoning; third, choice, an activity of the intellectual appetite which is correct as directed by prudence; and fourth, the external execution by the intellectual appetite of what has been chosen.⁶

THE END OF HUMAN ACTIVITY - AN INITIAL DESCRIPTION

The moral philosopher begins the search for the end of human activity

5. I.1.55-109.S4-7.

6. I.1.128-47.S8.

with the reflection that the end is the motivating cause of all the agent does: "good is that which everything desires."⁷ In this definition, the "desire" of good is understood as the "tendency toward" good. Hence, behind this notion of good as the object of desire is the more fundamental notion of "a natural desire" or a natural tendency toward good intrinsic in every being in virtue of the being's place in the order imposed by the divine intellect.⁸ Finally, because everything that can be desired as good is ultimately good by a limited share in the goodness of the supreme good, Aquinas concludes that the supreme good is desired in every desire of any good whatsoever.⁹ By these references to "divine intellect" and to "supreme good," Aquinas situates Aristotelian moral philosophy within the broader philosophical view he believed present in the *Metaphysics*, namely, the world seen as dependent on the providence of a creator God.¹⁰ - The implications of the example of order from *Metaphysics*.XII continue to appear.

As concerns the human end, moral theology, as developed by Aquinas in the *Summa theologiae*, depends on a distinction between God himself or the *finis cuius*, on the one hand, and, on the other, the *finis quo* or human activity as attaining the vision of God.¹¹ If this philosophical distinction between the two sense of "end" is applied to the discussion of good in the *SLE*, we realize that the *finis cuius* is meant when Aquinas asserts that the supreme good is desired in the desire of any particular good. Yet, as has already been implied, the end or good of interest to moral philosophy is the *finis quo* or the human activity by which the human person comes as close as possible in this life to fulfilment of the natural desire for the good.

But what is the end or good which human beings seek? The question must first be answered "figuratively."¹² That is, an extrinsic definition is first sought. As a point of departure, there is the fact that everyone agrees that the highest human good or the ultimate human end is happiness; additionally, nearly

7. I.1.155-60.S9.

8. I.1.165-75.S11.

9. I.1.175-83.S11.

10. Cf. "Divine particular providence" above in Ch. 4, pp. 110-22, and "Special creation of souls" above in Ch. 4, pp. 151-57.

11. *ST.Ia-IIae*.1.7c; 8c.

12. I.3.59-63.S35.

everyone agrees that happiness is a matter of "living well and acting well."¹³ But, at this point, agreement seems to end.

A way to move forward in the investigation of the end identified as happiness is had in the notion of the "movement of natural desire" for the good. This good, or the ultimate human end, must be only one, for since human nature is a unity, so too must be its end.¹⁴ - If an army, as such only accidentally and not substantially one, has both an order among its parts and an order to its leader's goal, how much more so does the human agent have a double order. As substantially one, the agent's nature not only embodies the law governing the activities proper to the agent's parts or potencies; as well, the nature has implanted in it the law by which the agent's activities are to be ordered to the agent's ultimate end or happiness. - Moreover, the ultimate terminus of natural desire must be both perfect and of itself sufficient. These two aspects will be the conditions of happiness. As perfect, happiness is something finished, in contrast to a mere disposition toward something else that is itself finished. Thus, as perfect, happiness is sought for its own sake, rather than for the sake of some further goal. As well, happiness must be of itself sufficient in the sense that it contains all that is necessary to a human person considered as a social being living in a political society.¹⁵

Regarding the notion of something "of itself sufficient," there is room to distinguish two senses of "something considered sufficient insofar as it is distinct from other entities." First, as in the case of God, the total good, there is no possibility of an increase in goodness; in this sense, God is "of itself sufficient." But something else, and here happiness is meant, can be sufficient of itself insofar as it contains all that a human agent requires, even though not every good that could come to human agent. As concerns this latter sense of "of itself sufficient," Aquinas remarks that a person whose life is ruled by reason will not desire anything other than what is necessary; accordingly, this person would be happy.¹⁶

Since Aquinas understands the *Ethics* as fundamentally a philosophical discussion of the problem of achieving human happiness, the presence of this distinction of two senses of the expression "of itself sufficient" is not surprising, even though the distinction is not one found in Aristotle's text. By proposing the two senses, Aquinas makes clear that he works in a philosophical, not a Christian

13. I.4.40-47.S45.

14. I.9.41-61.S106-107.

15. I.9.61-76.S107; 123-35.S111; 140-56.S112.

16. I.9.181-205.S115-16.

context where union with God is the ultimate end of human life. Man's natural desire for good, implying as it does a teleological view of human activity, plays a crucial role in Aquinas's understanding of the *Ethics*, for the doctrine of the natural desire is linked inseparably to the notion that happiness or the ultimate good attainable in this life is to be reached through the exercise of man's proper activity - a topic to be raised shortly. However, the two conceptions, i.e., the natural desire and man's proper activity, are the same notions which, transformed by the Christian notion of grace, underpin Aquinas's theological understanding of the human journey toward happiness with God after death. Hence, it must have seemed important to Aquinas to distinguish moral philosophy from the Christian theological view that to medievals could be exemplified by the statement of their great authority, Augustine: "For Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee."¹⁷ Thus, by offering the distinction between the sufficiency characteristic of God and that proper to human happiness in this life, Aquinas reminds his reader that he speaks of a happiness quite distinct from that proper to a theological discussion.

A related comment is appended by Aquinas to the explanation of the meaning of "sufficient of itself" as applied to happiness when he remarks a limitation of Aristotle's ethical thought which is simultaneously a limitation of moral philosophy: "In this book, the Philosopher speaks of happiness such as can be had in this life, for the happiness of the other life exceeds all investigation of reason."¹⁸ Accordingly, in this limited sense the happiness of the present life, as described extrinsically at this early stage in the development of moral philosophy, is something perfect and sufficient of itself. Given the fear of philosophy that had developed by this time, Aquinas may by this statement be attempting to calm the fears many at Paris had concerning the *Ethics*.

Yet even at this stage of moral philosophy, the philosopher ought not be content with such a description of happiness, for a general definition can be had through an investigation of the activity of the human agent. Happiness or the human good is, after all, to be gained through the activity proper to human persons. In fact, since the final or ultimate good of an entity is its ultimate perfection, and because an entity's ultimate perfection is the activity issuing from its form or first perfection, human happiness will consist in that activity which is most properly called human and which, as such, derives from the human form or soul. Even under the supposition, which there is at present no reason to make,

17. *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, trans. F. J. Sheed (New York; Sheed & Ward, 1943) I, 1.

18. I.9.162-65.S113.

that something external to human activity is the ultimate end, that external entity would be the end only through the activity by which a human person attains it. Hence, happiness or the ultimate good of human life will be had in the activity proper to a human being. In other words, one genus under which happiness is found can be expressed as "the activity proper to man."¹⁹

That it is reasonable to speak of "the activity proper to man" was implicitly proved in what was said immediately above. However, that proof can be spelled out as follows. Each and every entity exists in virtue of the form making it be the type of entity it is. Further, that form is the principle of whatever activity the entity can perform. Accordingly, from each entity's form there can arise activity proper to the entity.²⁰

Ad additional proof can be offered. Just as the form or soul is the act of the human body considered as a whole, so parts of the soul are the acts of parts of the human body and are at the source of those bodily parts's proper activities. For instance, the sensitive part of the soul insures that the eye has the activity of sight. Granted this relation of parts of the soul to corresponding parts of the body, it follows that the human person as a whole has a proper activity because of the presence of the entire human soul.²¹ - Since Aquinas is convinced that Aristotle held the intellect to be properly a power of the human soul, he could have seen here in Aristotle's doctrine of the activity proper to the human agent an indication that this activity will eventually be discovered to be intellectual in nature. However, no mention of that doctrine is made for several lines yet.

While "activity proper to man" can be taken as the remote genus of happiness, what is needed is its proximate genus. To find the latter, the philosopher looks further into human activity. Although human beings share some types of activity with lower forms of life, the happiness proper to human beings does not consist in those types. Thus, activity of nourishment and growth, as well as sensitive activity, are ruled out as constitutive of human happiness.²²

The only form of human activity not thus set aside is rational activity. But this itself can be subdivided into activity essentially rational in distinction from activity which, while not essentially rational, is yet ruled by reason. This distinction is exemplified by, on the one hand, the essentially rational act of understanding a meaning such as "temperance" in contrast with, on the other

19. I.10.22-41.S119.

20. I.10.46-66.S121.

21. I.10.67-76.S122.

22. I.10.77-103.S123-25.

hand, the performance of a temperate act ordered by one's reason. Since what is essentially rational is clearly more properly the activity of an intellectual being than is activity only sharing in rationality, the former is the activity proper to human beings. Accordingly, the happiness human beings seek as their ultimate end falls under the genus of activity essentially rational. To be even more precise, Aquinas adds the thought that human happiness is found in contemplative activity rather than in the activity by which reason rules human appetites.²³

By suddenly identifying contemplative life as the source of human happiness, Aquinas has stepped back from presenting the orderly development of moral philosophy and introduced what cannot be fully understood until much later. However, as noted shortly above, this connection of happiness with contemplative activity would, for Aquinas, already have been implied, given his conviction that Aristotle's *De anima* proposes the intellect as a power proper to the human agent. Notwithstanding, this sudden identification of the agent's end as happiness found in intellectual contemplation most likely expresses Aquinas's desire to speak against earlier interpretations of the *Ethics*, especially that of Albert. In his parallel comment, Albert explained that Aristotle identifies the activity proper to man with the active life of moral virtue, for the highest and most proper power of the human agent is his practical reason.²⁴

Subsequent to discovering the proximate genus of happiness to be activity essentially rational, moral philosophy determines the specific difference needed to complete the definition. In a first step, rational activity considered in abstraction from any qualification is shown to be rational activity considered as performed properly or well. That is, the proper work of a harpist is to play the harp, and unless he plays the harp well, we justly assert that he does not play the harp at all. But to do something well is to do it virtuously, for by its essence virtue is that by which something is done well. Hence, we have this argument: "If the activity of the best man, namely, the happy person, is to act by reason well and in the best way, it follows that the human good or happiness is activity according to virtue." Of course, if there are many human virtues, happiness will be activity according to the highest virtue.²⁵

However, it is not sufficient to define happiness as "activity proper to man according to virtue," or even as "essentially rational activity according to virtue." There is more to the specific difference than the reference to virtue. When an intellectual being has a natural desire for happiness, it desires to be

23. I.10.103-21.S126.

24. *Super Ethica*.I.8.p38,51-71. Cf. above, pp. 20-21 with note 75.

25. I.10.122-52.S127-28.

happy not just for the present moment, but continuously and forever. As a result, the specific difference included in the definition of happiness must refer to the continuity and perpetuity of essentially rational activity. This reference is included by adding the expression "in" or "through a perfect life." Thus, the complete definition of happiness is this: "happiness is the activity proper to man according to virtue in a perfect life."²⁶

At this point in the *Ethics*, Aristotle makes what Aquinas, Albert, and Averroes regard as a statement on the procedure of moral philosophy. Reflecting on what has thus far been accomplished, Aristotle wrote - in the translations used by all three commentators - that happiness has been "circumscribed" or "written around"; that is, a "figurative" approach was necessary, but later happiness will be described anew.²⁷ In their comments, all three authors agree that the "writing around" and "figurative" treatment of happiness signifies that the moral philosopher's initial investigation resulted only in a general definition or description of happiness, one comprised of external characteristics.²⁸ However, the promise of a later description or definition is variously understood. For Albert, the philosopher's promise is fulfilled in "determining individually the virtues comprehended by happiness," i.e., the moral virtues had together with prudence.²⁹ Averroes's view of the promised completion of the study of happiness is expressed more concisely, for he proposes it only as the task of "determining the parts of happiness."³⁰ When regarded in its context, this expression indicates that the moral philosopher is now to determine the parts of the life of moral virtue insofar as that life is guided by reason.³¹ In contrast with these predecessors, Aquinas explains that "after certain other points have been made clear, what was first determined figuratively will be taken up again and more fully described." That is, Aristotle "will afterwards complete the treatise of happiness at the end of

26. I.10.154-76.S129-30.

27. *NE*.I.7.1098a20-21. Aquinas: *SLE*, p. 38. Albert: *Super Ethica*, p36,79-80. Averroes: *In I Ethic.*, fol.8rE.

28. *SLE*.I.11.7-17.S131. *Super Ethica*.I.8.p42,39-42. *In I Ethic*.7.fol.9vI.

29. *Super Ethica*.I.8.p42,43-45; p43,1-3; p44,61-63.

30. *In I Ethic*.7.fol.9vI.

31. *Ibid*.fol.9vG-I.

the book [of the *Ethics*]."³² Once again Aquinas has proposed his vision of moral philosophy in opposition to that of his predecessors.

Subsequent to this promise of a future completion of the description of happiness, the moral philosopher turns to the topic of the cause of happiness. Is it a gift of God? or is it acquired by man through his own efforts? or, finally, is the acquisition of happiness a matter of luck?

The possibility that happiness is caused by God is characterized by Aquinas as "the most especially reasonable" of the three.³³ In this proposal, Aquinas is not only supported by his conviction that Aristotle taught the doctrine of divine providence,³⁴ but also by his Latin version of Aristotle's text. Put in English, the passage on which Aquinas is commenting reads: "Therefore, if anything of the gods is a gift to men, it is reasonable that happiness is a gift of God [for it is] most especially the best of human things."³⁵ Among the gifts of "the gods," i.e., of the separated substances, Aquinas elsewhere cited the effects of the sun such as generation.³⁶ Yet here in the *SLE*, he is content to recall that the separated substances impart to the human intellect its power.³⁷ Additionally, and yet more importantly, the hierarchy of causes in the universe entails the conclusion that God is the cause of human happiness: just as in a series of ordered human arts the art having the highest or more inclusive goal leads the lower arts toward its goal, so too it is reasonable to assume that man's ultimate goal, happiness, comes to man from the supreme power of God.³⁸ While Aquinas introduces here a more nuanced notion of divine providence than appears implied in Aristotle's words, he is justified in the addition by his conviction that Aristotle teaches particular divine providence in *Metaphysics*.XII, where the example of an army's order is proposed.

Notwithstanding, one ought to accept the possibility that happiness results

32. I.11.17-21.S131.

33. I.14.35-36.S167.

34. Cf. "Divine particular providence" above in Ch. 4, pp. 110-22.

35. *NE*.I.9.1099b11-13. Cf. *SLE*, p. 49.

36. Cf. *SCG*.III.83.

37. I.14.50-56.S168.

38. I.14.40-50.S167.

from human causality.³⁹ In justification of this assessment, there is the fact that, even if happiness is principally from God, man cooperates in some fashion in arriving at happiness. Because of man's cooperation, and regardless of whether happiness is gained by virtuous activity, by study, or in some other way, happiness is only mediately, not immediately, a gift of God. As such, however, happiness remains something divine and the best.⁴⁰

There is yet another reason in favor of considering human activity as the cause of happiness. If it is accepted, the doctrine itself safeguards an important related doctrine, namely, that happiness is a possibility for all possessing human nature. To be sure, there are instances of human nature where a defect entails that those possessing the nature cannot reach nature's goal. But in most cases, human beings can reach the happiness that is the ultimate goal given by their nature.⁴¹

Having proposed the above doctrine, Aquinas pauses to mark Averroes's error regarding happiness: "From this, it is clear that the happiness of which the Philosopher speaks does not consist in a connection with a separated intelligence, by which connection man would understand everything..."⁴² Aquinas would certainly have felt justified in this criticism by what he finds in many places in Aristotle's writings, namely, the doctrine of the human intellectual soul as the form and act of the body and the source of all human activity.⁴³ Additionally, one assumes that here Aquinas is aware of the need to speak to the followers of Averroes in the Faculty of Arts.⁴⁴

As concerns the third candidate for the cause of happiness, namely, fortune or luck, two arguments point to it as unacceptable. First, God intends something good in creating human nature. As a consequence, human nature would be as well disposed toward its ultimate end as is possible. That fact in turn entails that the end, happiness, is to be reached by a cause that is the cause by what it is or *per se*. A divine and a human cause could be *per se* causes of happiness, whereas luck or fortune could be only accidentally the cause. As a

39. I.14.60.S169 characterizes this view as "*tolerabiliter dici*."

40. I.14.59-76.S169.

41. I.14.77-90.S170.

42. I.14.90-95.S170.

43. Cf. "Personal immortality taught by Aristotle" above in Ch. 4, pp. 135-51.

44. Cf. Ch. 3 above, pp. 94-95.

result, happiness is not caused by luck.⁴⁵ - It is quite understandable that Aquinas introduced here the doctrine of a creator-God. After all, he is commenting on Aristotle's statement that "If however it is better to be happy thus [i.e., by the agent's activity] than by luck, it is reasonable to assume it is so; if those things which are by nature come to be in the best possible way, similarly [it is so] with things made by art and by any cause, especially by the greatest cause."⁴⁶

A second argument against the proposition that happiness is the result of luck revolves around happiness as the best of human goods. Since all other human goods are ordered to happiness as to an end, if the possession of happiness were a matter of luck, even more so would all other human goods depend on luck. But if this were so, there would be no reason for human beings to attempt anything whatsoever.⁴⁷

There is yet one more approach to solving the question concerning the cause of happiness. Above, happiness was defined in part as "the activity of the rational soul by virtue." Whatever activity is by virtue, that is, whatever activity is indeed virtuous, that activity is moved according to reason by some divine cause, whereas what results from luck stands outside all rational order. Accordingly, happiness is caused proximately by human reason, although its first and principal cause is divine.⁴⁸

At this stage in moral philosophy, the final question asked is whether happiness can be gained in the present life, given the frequent changes in fortune so common in the life of most persons. The answer is not difficult to come by in view of what was said above about the cause of happiness. If, as was proposed, happiness comes primarily from God, but requires on the part of man activity according to virtue in a perfect life, then happiness is indeed possible in this life.⁴⁹ However, agents living as described can only be "blessed as men." That is, insofar as every human person is subject to fortune's changes, as well as to the limitations of corporeal nature, there is no perfect happiness to be had in this life.⁵⁰

45. I.14.96-115.S171.

46. *NE*.I.9.1099b20-23. Cf. *SLE*, p. 49.

47. I.14.116-24.S172.

48. I.14.125-36.S173.

49. I.16.197-204.S200.

50. I.16.215-22.S201-202.

As an appendix to this affirmation of the possibility of gaining only imperfect happiness, Aquinas proposes this philosophical argument: "Because a natural desire is not in vain, it is correct to opine that perfect beatitude is reserved to man after this life."⁵¹ - With this doctrine, Aquinas has broadened the meaning of "imperfect happiness," for now happiness is seen as imperfect by comparison with the perfection of happiness in an after life. Yet by this addition and modification of Aristotle's doctrine, Aquinas is only placing the moral philosophy of the *Ethics* in the broader philosophical context he has been proposing since the time of his *Summa contra gentiles*. Additionally, it is perhaps permissible to assume that here, by this reference to a life after death, Aquinas intends to assert the compatibility of Aristotelian moral philosophy and Christian belief and so, indirectly strike a blow in defense of Aristotelian philosophy.⁵²

THE GENERAL NOTION OF VIRTUE

Since the human good known as happiness has been said to be activity according to perfect virtue, the moral philosopher turns now to the discussion of virtue and virtuous activity. Only after completing this investigation, will he be able to return to the notion of happiness and complete the study of the ultimate human goal.⁵³ However, because virtuous activity leading to happiness has its source in the soul, the study of virtue is preceded by recalling certain doctrines concerning the soul.⁵⁴

As the *De anima* explained, the soul can be divided into a rational and an irrational part.⁵⁵ While the irrational part can in turn be subdivided into the

51. I.16.222-25.S202.

52. For the earlier works in which Aquinas proposes this same philosophical point, see "Imperfect happiness in this life," above in Ch. 4, pp. 122-35.

53. I.19.15-22.S224.

54. I.19.47-85.S226-28.

55. I.19.94-104.S229. The intended reference is to *De anima*.III.9.432a26. In his 1267-1268 comment (*SLDA*.III.8.50-58.P797), Aquinas noted that this is not a proper division of the soul, but only one used to indicate parts with and without reason "...and thus Aristotle uses them in *Ethics*.I." These reciprocal references exemplify Aquinas's constant attention to the overarching Aristotelian context of whatever work he is explaining.

nutritive part and the sensitive appetite, only the latter has a direct share in moral activity insofar as it shares in reason.⁵⁶

As proof of the existence of a sensitive part or appetite of the soul which, while irrational, yet shares in reason, there is the evidence of continent and incontinent actions. In both types of action, the individual experiences strong desire for sensual pleasure while entertaining a rational conviction that the sensual pleasure ought not be pursued. The sensual desire, which is contrary to reason, is a sign of the presence of an irrational sensitive appetite in the soul.⁵⁷

That the sensitive appetite, although irrational, is to be considered as sharing in reason, is evidenced in continent action where the desiring appetite for sensual pleasure obeys the dictate of reason. However, an even clearer indication that the sensitive appetite shares in reason is had in the case of a temperate agent. In temperance, as in continence, the appetite's desires are held in check by reason insofar as reason is obeyed. But in the temperate agent, unlike what occurs in one only continent, the sensitive appetite obeys reason to such an extent that vehement desires for sensual pleasure do not even arise.⁵⁸

On the basis of the above discussions, the rational part of the soul can be spoken of as divided into intellect or reason, which is essentially rational, and the appetitive part, non-rational in itself, but rational by participation.⁵⁹ In accord with this division of the rational soul, moral philosophy divides the virtues which govern activity. In regard to appetitive activity, there are virtues properly called moral, for these have the task of governing activities of the appetites which are the conduits through which the natural desire for happiness becomes manifest. Intellectual activity, or activity essentially rational, will be controlled by intellectual virtues.⁶⁰

56. I.20.9-18.S231; 69-74.S236.

57. I.20.75-95.S237.

58. I.20.140-50.S240.

59. I.20.171-77.S242.

60. I.20.185-202.S243. On the basis of the example of incontinence, the appetite governed by moral virtue would seem to be the sensitive appetite insofar as the example emphasizes the conflict between the sensitive appetite and reason. However, Aquinas's position is that continence and incontinence are habitus in the intellectual appetite or will, and so it is the will or the intellectual appetite that is ultimately important in continence and incontinence. This provides the opening for the doctrine that moral habitus can be situated in the intellectual as well as in the sensitive appetite.

Moral virtues are studied prior to the intellectual. First of all, the moral virtues are better known; for example, we are better acquainted with courage than with the workings of scientific knowledge. Then too, moral virtues prepare the way for the acquisition of the intellectual virtues.⁶¹ Think of the control of one's emotions and of one's desires without which the application of energy to the acquisition of systematic knowledge is difficult, when not impossible.

The last-mentioned fact throws light on virtue by reminding us that moral virtues, or the sources of good action, have to do with controlling appetites. Appetites act, desires are had, when they are moved by an apprehended good. When an appetite is repeatedly moved by its object, i.e., when a certain type of action is performed again and again, an inclination develops which resembles a nature in its spontaneity and determination to a definite type of action. When this inclination is in accord with correct reasoning about what to do and what not to do, the inclination is what we call virtue.⁶²

A presupposition of the study of virtue is hidden in the observations just made about the acquisition of virtue, that determined inclination to a certain type of action in accord with correct reasoning. That presupposition is this: an activity is good if it is in agreement with the agent's form; since the human form is the intellectual soul, human activity is good if it is in accord with correct reasoning.⁶³

One final observation needed before moral philosophy turns to the definition of virtue involves the notion of mean. Actions directed toward the acquisition of virtue and so, which entail the control of appetite, can be performed in either an excessive or a defective manner. For example, if an agent responds to danger with fear and flight, he will become timid rather than courageous; however, on the other hand, if he does not fear danger, but rushes toward it, he becomes foolhardy. Somewhere in between these extremes of too little and too much in the response to danger, there is a midpoint for each individual agent, that is, a mean. By repeatedly acting in the mean in regard to certain types of danger, an agent becomes courageous.⁶⁴

A problem arises from what has just been said. Virtue is acquired by acting in the mean, which surely is the same as saying that virtue is acquired through the performance of good actions. Yet, it was asserted above that virtue

61. II.1.12-13.S245.

62. II.1.98-114.S249.

63. II.2.40-50.S257.

64. II.2.94-124.S260-62.

is the source of good actions.⁶⁵ How then does one acquire virtue, if to perform good actions, one must already possess virtue?⁶⁶ To this problem, Aquinas responds that the solution depends on the fact that the perfection which is moral virtue lies in the regulation of the appetite by reason. Reason is capable of such regulation because the first principles of practical reason are naturally "implanted" within each person just as are the principles of speculative reason. The agent can act according to these practical principles even when virtues are not possessed. By repeatedly following reasoning that is faithful to these principles, a person will become actually virtuous.⁶⁷

While the introduction of these practical principles into an Aristotelian moral philosophy has appeared to some as the intrusion of Aquinas's Christian belief, nothing would have been more natural than for Aquinas, working within the "culture of synderesis," to assume the compatibility, if not the implied presence, of a doctrine of synderesis in the *Ethics*. Does not Aristotle write of the "naturally just" as opposed to what is just only because of positive law?⁶⁸ When one wonders why at this point Aquinas raised the problem of the acquisition of virtue, and why he then mentions the first practical principles, one need look no further than Albert's *Super Ethica*. At the parallel place in his commentary, Albert asks, "whether someone without the habitus of justice can act justly."⁶⁹ In answering, Albert proposes that prior to their development virtues are potentially in the soul very much as forms are potentially in matter, that is, as seeds. In accord with this Augustinian conception, Albert proposes that reason, disposed by the possession of justice in a seminal fashion, orders just actions. Even though the just actions which can lead to the acquisition of virtue do not themselves possess the perfect form of justice, nothing prevents a just action from being caused by what has justice only imperfectly. Actually, the causal relation between reason and just action is very much the same as that between a generative power and the seed it produces from which an animal is born.⁷⁰

It is evident that Aquinas not only learned a great deal about synderesis

65. Cf. II.1.98-114.S249

66. II.4.7-18.S280.

67. II.4.97-106.S286.

68. *NE.V.7.1134b18-20*. Cf. *SLE*, p. 303.

69. *Super Ethica*.II.4.p105,37-38.

70. *Ibid.*p105,85 - p 106,9.

from Albert, as was noted above in Ch. 4,⁷¹ but also that he regarded the doctrine of synderesis as providing a much better and less metaphorical answer to the puzzle raised by Albert concerning the acquisition of virtue. Hence, paralleling Albert's treatment of the topic, Aquinas proposes his solution based on the natural habitus of first practical principles.

The task of defining virtue is not difficult subsequent to the above discussions. Since virtue is an acquisition affecting the soul, the only viable candidate for the genus of virtue is habitus, i.e., a disposition determining a potency of the soul in relation to something. In explaining habitus, Aquinas does not discuss its general notion. Instead, he speaks in terms of a habitus's relation to passion: a habitus is what disposes potencies to act well or in the morally good manner in the arena involving passions of some kind. For instance, by a habitus an agent is disposed or prepared to respond with anger to certain kinds of events; if the angry response is too vehement or is not sufficiently strong, the habitus is evil, whereas if the angry response is correct, that is, in the mean, then the habitus is good, is a virtue.⁷²

This last point brings to mind the condition common to virtue: "Every virtue makes its subject exist in a good way and makes its work good." - Here, it is helpful to recall that the Latin term, "*virtus*," has the meaning of "power"; the power to do something properly is the heart of the notion of "moral virtue." With this in mind, Aquinas's examples are more intelligible. - For example, an eye is made good by its virtue, and through that virtue the eye sees well; similarly, the virtue of a horse makes the horse good, and through it the horse performs its work well, running say, or carrying its rider smoothly.⁷³

Not satisfied with merely asserting this common condition of virtue, Aquinas probes its meaning, while simultaneously invoking the authority of Aristotle's *De caelo* for the explanation being proposed: "The virtue of a particular entity is related to the ultimate of which the entity is capable." In this sense, the virtue of a person able to carry a 100 lb. weight does not have its complete effect when a lesser weight is carried. By the ultimate activity is meant the activity *good* for the entity concerned. That is, by referring to the "ultimate of potency," Aquinas emphasizes virtue as insuring a potency's ultimate condition in the sense of perfection, rather than in a quantitative sense. Thus it is that the

71. E.g., above, pp. 174-79.

72. II.5.126-37.S298. Since passions are only in the sensitive appetite, the above notion of habitus must be modified when used to indicate dispositions of non-sensitive potencies.

73. II.6.10-22.S307.

virtue of anything whatsoever is oriented toward the activity good for the possessor of the virtue. Further, because a good or perfected action proceeds only from a good or perfected entity, virtue always makes its possessor good. Just as this was true in the case of the earlier examples of the eye and the horse, so too a human person's virtue makes the person formally good, that is, good as a person, in addition to enabling the person to act well.⁷⁴ - As is clear, the *dictum* concerning the "ultimate of potency" was not invoked to indicate that virtue is to be conceived in some quantitative fashion as if only in its most perfect instance is a genuine virtue.⁷⁵

With this common condition of virtue in mind, Aquinas's moral philosopher narrows his focus to moral virtue, asking now about the specific difference of virtue. What kind of habitus disposes potencies to act morally well? On the basis of the earlier discussions, he sees that moral virtue is a habitus relative to the mean.⁷⁶ That is, virtue disposes the agent to respond to circumstances by acting in the mean between too little and too much.⁷⁷ Since there is only one right way to respond to circumstances, but many wrong ways, virtue enables its possessor to steer the proper course between the many incorrect responses to circumstances, thus finding the correct action.⁷⁸

Against this background, Aquinas proposes as the definition of virtue Aristotle's expression: "a habitus operating by choice, existing in the mean relative to the individual agent, where the mean is determined by reason as a wise man would determine it."⁷⁹ - According to our contemporary exegetes of Aristotle, the wise man's outlook was equivalent to society's mores. Aquinas, however, has already introduced as Aristotle's the notion of first practical principles. Hence, the wise man is he whose reason functions according to these principles.⁸⁰ It is

74. II.6.22-38.S308.

75. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, pp. 70-74 offers this quantitative interpretation of the use of the expression "ultimate of potency."

76. II.6.46-53.S309.

77. II.6.167-92.S317.

78. II.7.3-44.S319-21.

79. II.7.49-78.S322-23.

80. See, e.g.: III.10.75-91.S494. Léon Elders has pointed out this change in the wise man as a criterion for virtuous action in: "The Criterion of the Moral Act according to Aristotle and their criticism by St. Thomas," in *Autour de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*.

surely not extraneous to note that Aquinas's citation in the *SLE*'s introduction of the example of order from *Metaphysics*.XII virtually entailed this interpretation of the wise man as one who knows correctly the order of human activity toward the human end, i.e., the laws implanted in human nature by the external principle who establishes the order the agent is to follow.

THE FOUR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES

After discovering the general notion of virtue, moral philosophy turns to the principal virtues, that is, to those virtues whose acts are the principal ones within certain areas. There is first of all the area of passions, those corporeal responses to objects known by the sensitive appetite.⁸¹ Since these passions are of two types, irascible and concupiscible, two principal virtues are discernible in the sensitive appetite, namely, courage and temperance. A second area where virtues are needed concerns equality between persons; here, the principal virtue is justice. Finally, the agent has need of a virtue by which he discovers and commands the activity proper to himself in whatever situation he is found; this virtue is prudence.

In the irascible appetite, courage has as its object passions of fear or of daring which can arise from the recognition of the presence of danger.⁸² Aristotle speaks most frequently of life-threatening danger encountered in defense of one's political society. Courage in that context will consist in the response in the mean between giving in to fear and being guided by a sense of daring.⁸³ Aquinas remarks that Aristotle speaks of courage in time of battle because that type is the most common way in which courage is shown. Yet strictly speaking, facing death in battle in defense of one's political society is the greatest form of courage.⁸⁴ Responding correctly to fear and daring in situations other than those occurring

Recueil d'étude sur sa pensée philosophique et théologique, T. 2: *L'Agir Moral. Approches théologiques* (Paris/Brugge: Fac-éditions/Tabor, 1987) pp. 54-56.

81. II.5.68-71.S292.

82. III.14.29-34.S529.

83. III.18.134-39.S594.

84. III.14.140-59.S537-38.

in war is courage "in a certain genus."⁸⁵

In the sensitive appetite, temperance is needed to moderate the passions of pleasure and hope, pain and despair in regard to objects of concupiscible desire. For instance, when an object appeals greatly to the sensible appetite, it can happen that the judgment of reason no longer appears important. In that case, the appetite and not reason will guide the agent. It is to control the sensitive appetite and make more secure reason's sway that temperance is needed.⁸⁶

While the sensitive appetite can find many sorts of pleasure other than those of touch, think for instance of the pleasures of music or of painting, temperance concerns principally tactile pleasures.⁸⁷ Especially significant are the tactile pleasures derived from objects and activity useful in conserving life, whether for the individual as is true in the case of food and drink, or in regard to the conservation of the human species as in sexual activity.⁸⁸ Under the guidance of temperance, the agent will desire those tactile pleasures that contribute to bodily health and so enable him to be ready for the activity fundamental to his way of life. Desires for superfluous pleasures, as well as the sorrow consequent on their lack, will be passions repressed by temperance.⁸⁹

Justice is the third principal virtue and is found in the intellectual appetite or will. As a habitus of the will, justice differs from courage and temperance whose objects are the irascible and concupiscible passions of the sensitive appetite. Whereas courage and temperance repress and control the sensitive appetite, justice as a habitus is an inclination of the will toward acts of justice.⁹⁰

The first and crucial division of justice is into legal and "particular"

85. III.14.103-14.S535. Jaffa: *Thomism and Aristotelianism*, pp. 73-74, is critical of Aquinas for interpreting genuine courage as involving the response to life-threatening danger in war. However, Aquinas appears to be speaking about the use of "courage" rather than asserting that only responding to life-threatening dangers in war is genuine or true courage.

86. VI.4.124-42.S1169-70; III.21.34-45.S628.

87. III.19.131-86.S604-09; 216-24.S612; 20.11-31.S613-14.

88. II.8.113-16.S340; 132-35.S342.

89. III.21.101-22.S633-34.

90. V.1.62-76.S888-89.

justice.⁹¹ Legal justice has as its object activity determined by the laws of a political society.⁹² Laws prescribe acts of virtue, e.g., soldiers must perform acts of bravery in battle rather than throw down their arms and flee from the enemy; or, meekness is required in as much as the law forbids injuring another out of anger.⁹³ Accordingly, legal justice can be referred to as "every virtue."⁹⁴

Notwithstanding, legal justice is one determined habitus or virtue inclining the agent's will to those actions prescribed by law. To be sure, the soldier's act of bravery can be the same whether performed because he chooses to be courageous or because he chooses to abide by his society's laws. Yet insofar as the act just mentioned can be performed with two different intentions - or, we can also say, for two different goals - the habitus from which the act can proceed are different, in one case courage, in the other legal justice.⁹⁵

Insofar as legal justice enables the agent to use any of his virtues for the common good of the members of his political society, the virtue is considered higher and more perfect than the individual virtues whose activities it governs.⁹⁶

Distinct from legal justice is the justice characterized as "particular" to denote its identity as a virtue of the agent distinct from every other habitus of virtue such as courage, temperance, or even legal justice. While the term "justice" is used univocally of both legal and particular justice, in species the two habitus of justice differ. Legal justice envisions the common good of society's members, while by his particular justice the agent is concerned with a good belonging to another agent.⁹⁷

When determining whether a certain type of activity is just or unjust, the moral philosopher works with the distinction between the legally just and the naturally just. Whereas the former is what has been determined by the lawgivers within a certain society and binds only members of that society, the naturally just

91. The second division is one into distributive and commutative. Cf. V.4.12-31.S927-28.

92. V.2.1-27.S900-01.

93. V.2.58-81.S904-05.

94. V.3.2-3.S913.

95. V.2.154-70.S912.

96. V.2.103-08.S907; 114-18.S908.

97. V.3.97-127.S918-20.

binds all agents everywhere. The basis for the binding force of the naturally just is had in its origin in human nature which is the same in all human agents.⁹⁸ Accordingly, the naturally just is impressed on the mind of each agent.⁹⁹

Admittedly, Aquinas speaks of the naturally just in a way not found in Aristotle's moral philosophy. In practical affairs, just as in speculative, Aquinas explains, certain principles are naturally known. For instance, naturally known are the practical principles, "Evil is to be avoided," and "One ought not steal." The legally just, in contrast to the above-mentioned principles, is arrived at only by the effort of lawgivers considering how their society is to function.¹⁰⁰

Aquinas becomes more explicit in discussing these first practical principles of the naturally just when he notes that "the naturally just is that to which nature inclines man." However, there are two natures in man; that is, we can speak of the agent as both human and animal. Because of this, jurists distinguish a "natural law" (*ius naturale*) respecting the inclination of the animal side of the agent from a "law of nations" (*ius gentium*) which concerns the inclinations having their source in the agent's rationality. Contained in the natural law are those principles that speak to the sexual union of man and woman, the education of offspring, and related affairs. As for the law of nations, so called because its principles are used by all peoples, included here are principles respecting the keeping of agreements, the safety of delegations a society sends to its enemies, and so on. Even though none of these first principles of practical reason is referred to by Aristotle, "both of those [types] are comprehended under the naturally just as that expression is used here by the Philosopher."¹⁰¹

The doctrine of a natural cognition of first practical principles is also proposed on two additional occasions in the *SLE*. As noted in the previous section, when he comments on a passage in *Ethics*.II, Aquinas asks how one can perform actions which result in the development of virtues unless one is already virtuous.¹⁰² The answer depends on the natural cognition of the first practical principles, cognition enabling reason to determine the actions leading to virtue.¹⁰³

98. V.12.35-48.S1018.

99. V.15.77-79.S1072.

100. V.12.49-57.S1018.

101. V.12.57-75.S1019.

102. Cf. pp. 246-48 above.

103. II.4.87-106.S285-86.

To a similar problem, *SLE.VI* proposes a more detailed answer: the presence in reason of a natural cognition of first practical principles and in the will of a natural inclination to the good apprehended by the intellect found the possibility of performing the actions from which the moral virtues grow.¹⁰⁴

As was suggested earlier in Chapter 4, Aquinas came to the task of commenting on the *Ethics* clothed with the "culture of synderesis."¹⁰⁵ As was true of many before him, he assumed that any discussion of morally good action must include the doctrine of a natural cognition of first practical principles; especially important in this regard was the influence of Albert's teaching. Aquinas's conviction of the propriety of attributing to Aristotle a doctrine of synderesis was manifested in the *Sentence-Commentary* when he explained that an "intellectus in practical affairs" is posited in *Ethics.VI* "in place of synderesis."¹⁰⁶ Of course, when he commented on *Ethics.VI* he realized that Aristotle refers by an "intellectus in practical affairs" to an intellectual grasp through the cogitative power of the singulars from which are formed the minor premises of practical syllogisms.¹⁰⁷ Notwithstanding this change in his understanding of one passage of *Ethics.VI*, Aquinas's comments on other passages make quite clear that a doctrine of first practical principles is, in his mind, needed to make intelligible Aristotle's moral doctrine.

Subsequent to the discussion of courage, temperance, and justice, as well as of a host of secondary virtues such as generosity, veracity, and magnanimity, intellectual virtues are examined in *SLE.VI*. The rationale for the study of this latter type of virtue lies partially in the definition of virtue proposed much earlier in *SLE.II*. Since virtue was defined in part as a habitus whose choice is of the mean determined "by reason as a wise man would determine it,"¹⁰⁸ moral philosophy must discover the intellectual virtue that constitutes reason as able to make the correct determinations respecting practical activity.¹⁰⁹

Prior to the examination of the intellectual virtues in *Ethics.VI*, Aristotle offered a discussion of the parts of the soul having reason. This division is needed

104. VI.11.22-42.S1276-77.

105. Cf.: "A natural habit of the moral virtues" above in Ch. 4, pp. 158-192.

106. Cf. above, pp. 179-80.

107. VI.9.152-86.S1247-49.

108. Cf. above, pp. 249-50.

109. VI.1.9-19.S1109.

because different virtues will perfect different parts of the essentially rational soul. The two-fold division proposed comprises first, the scientific part by which necessary beings are known and second, the ratiocinative part by which cognition of contingent beings is possible.¹¹⁰ The basis of this division is proposed as one in the objects themselves known by each part: "Necessarily, generically diverse parts of the soul are adapted to generically diverse objects."¹¹¹

After presenting the above paraphrase of Aristotle's words, Aquinas announces that Aristotle is proposing a problem for his reader rather than offering his own doctrine. Subsequently, Aquinas presents four reasons for this appraisal and then the solution to Aristotle's problem, thus informing us of what he regards as the genuine Aristotelian doctrine respecting the scientific and ratiocinative parts of the soul.

It has been asserted that in this passage Aquinas "rejects" and "repudiates" Aristotle's division of the parts of the soul having reason.¹¹² Such language gives a false impression of Aquinas's intention. As explained above in Ch. 2, Aquinas points out by reference to *De anima.III* that Aristotle could not have intended his reader to see the scientific and ratiocinative parts as two distinct parts of the rational soul; the only two intellectual powers Aristotle recognized were the agent and possible intellects.¹¹³ Subsequent to making this point, Aquinas offers two arguments, both certainly Aristotelian in nature, pointing to the possible intellect's ability to know both necessary and contingent beings.¹¹⁴ Finally, Aquinas remarked the erroneous basis of the division of the intellect into a scientific and ratiocinative part. That is, powers are distinguished not by every kind of generic diversity in objects, but only by the diversity in the formality of objects (*formalis ratio*).¹¹⁵ Thus, considered in terms of its universal nature or quiddity, any reality, whether contingent or necessary, can be known by the human intellect; yet diverse parts of the soul having reason are necessary for cognitive acts distinct as are the universal cognition of a quiddity on one hand,

110. VI.1.101-12.S1115; 136-49.S1118.

111. VI.1.114-21.S1116.

112. Bradley: *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, pp. 195 ("repudiates") and 241 ("rejects").

113. VI.1.150-59.S1119. See above, p.43.

114. VI.1.160-75.S1120-21. See above, p. 44.

115. VI.1.176-89.S1122. See above, pp. 44-45.

and, on the other, cognition of a singular as singular. The former or universal cognition is to be called "scientific," and it can be related to a "scientific" part of the soul, if one wishes to use that term. The latter or particular cognition of singulars is had by the intellect only through an intermediary, namely, an interior sense. This sense, known as "particular reason" or "cogitative power," is concerned with deliberation and practical activity.¹¹⁶

As also indicated earlier in Ch. 2, not only is the doctrine Aquinas offers here in *SLE.VI* one he regarded as Aristotle's doctrine, but by it he was countering the understandings of Aristotle proposed by Albert and Averroes. The latter saw in Aristotle's "scientific" part of the soul a reference to the separated intelligence, and in the "ratiocinative" part, the only reasoning power possessed by the human agent.¹¹⁷ Albert's reading was not so dangerous, yet he had seen Aristotle proposing two potential parts of the intellect corresponding to the cognition achieved by reasoning relative to the necessary and contingent aspects of reality. Additionally, in the background of Albert's interpretation was the doctrine of practical reason as the highest properly human power, with the intellect conceived as a power proper to separated intelligences and one only shared by the human agent.¹¹⁸ Hence, to refer to Aquinas's comment on the passage we have considered as a "rejection" and a "repudiation" of Aristotle's division of parts of the soul having reason in no way indicates what Aquinas actually does there.

After Aquinas solved the problem Aristotle was seen to raise in speaking of the scientific and ratiocinative parts of the essentially rational soul, he connects the discussion of intellectual virtues he is about to undertake with the examination of moral virtues that had already been completed. In *SLE.II*, the search for the definition of virtue had been initiated with the statement of the condition common to virtue, namely, "Every virtue makes its subject exist in a good way and makes the subject's work good."¹¹⁹ Since he now looks for the virtues of the intellect, i.e., the virtues making the intellect "exist in a good way," he announces that the common condition to have in mind is that "virtue is what makes its possessor's

116. VI.1.190-214.S1123. Melina: *La Conoscenza morale*, p. 38, remarks that the distinction between universal and singular ways of knowing contingents founds the distinction between ethics as moral science and ethics as prudence. - This interpretation does not account for the distinction between ethics and prudence where the latter adds to the former "rectitude of will." Cf. VI.7.87-97.S1200; 4.185-96.S1174.

117. Cf. above, pp. 36-37.

118. Cf. above, pp. 38-42; p. 20.

119. II.6.11-16.S307.

work good."¹²⁰

Here it suffices to speak only of the intellectual virtue of prudence, although the virtue of wisdom must be discussed later in the context of contemplative happiness. There are actually three types of prudence: political prudence, which legislates regulations for and applies them to civic society; economic or domestic prudence, performing the parallel functions for the domestic or familial society; and prudence in the ordinary sense of correct reasoning concerning the activity of an individual person.¹²¹ The moral philosophy proposed in the *Ethics* is directly interested only in prudence taken in the final sense mentioned, since the *Ethics* is, for Aquinas, a study of the problem of the happiness of the human agent.

As noted above, the condition to keep in mind in examining intellectual virtue is that "virtue makes its possessor's work good." As concerns prudence, it is to be understood as making good the work of the ratiocinative part of the soul. And "to make a work good" entails that the presence of prudence denotes the agreement of practical reason with correct appetite. A correct appetite is one rightly oriented to the human person's ultimate goal of happiness, and this orientation is assured through the acquisition of the moral virtues in the agent's appetites.¹²²

In proposing prudence as "not with reason alone," but as "having something in the appetite," i.e., as requiring "the rectitude of appetite," Aquinas adopts a more personalistic or holistic perspective than is normally to be found in an Aristotelian discussion of habitus. In distinction from the view of prudence as a cognitive habitus which is "applied to work" - a doctrine typical of the *Super Ethica* and the *Secunda secundae* - Aquinas asserts that that type of habitus of correct reason is a only a practical science, either ethics, *yconomica*, or politics.¹²³

120. VI.2.12-17.S1124.

121. VI.7.73-87.S1199.

122. VI.2.109-27.S1131.

123. VI.7.88-95.S1200. Rather than recognize Aquinas's approach as more holistic, Melina: *La Conoscenza morale*, p. 180 reads the references to "having something in the appetite" and to prudence's need of the "rectitude of appetite" as indicating prudence is in part a moral virtue. In the following text, Melina reads "*ad modum moralium virtutum*" as signifying prudence is a moral virtue, when the obvious meaning is only that prudence resembles moral virtue in requiring a correct appetite: VI.4.174-77.S1173: "...prudentia non est ars, quasi in sola veritate rationis consistens, sed est virtus ad modum moralium virtutum requirens rectitudinem appetitus." - Additionally,

Notwithstanding this holistic approach to the essence of prudence in the *SLE*, Aquinas speaks most often there of the habitus as a disposition or perfection of a potency. Thus, prudence's "good work" is the determination and prescription of what is good and of what is evil for the agent, that is, the particular activity that will lead to the ultimate end of human living.¹²⁴

In speaking of this function of prudence, Aquinas blurs the distinction later proposed between prudence and the annexed virtues of *eubulia*, *synesis*, *gnome*, and the intellectus of principles of practical reason. Each is a distinct habitus with its own proper work. By these distinctions, Aquinas conforms to the conception of a habitus as a permanent disposition for a certain type of work.

The virtue of prudence, we are told, has as its principal act the prescription of what is to be done or omitted. The work of *eubulia*, or good counsel, is the correct deliberation in regard to attaining in appropriate ways the end simply good.¹²⁵ *Synesis* judges the results of deliberation insofar as the situation prompting deliberation falls under "what generally happens," while *gnome* is correct judgment in regard to situations other than those generally occurring.¹²⁶ Finally, there is the intellectus of particular reason understood as singular propositions used as minor premises in practical syllogisms. An example of such a principle is this: "The application of such-and-such a herb had a good effect on such-and-such a person's health." While the habitual cognition of such singular propositions is called "intellectus," this habitus must be distinguished from the intellectus of first speculative principles, as well as from the habitus of first practical principles. Although the latter two are habitus of the intellect, the intellectus of singular propositions is a habitus of the interior sense known as the "cogitative power" or "particular reason," or, according to *De anima*.III, as the "passive intellect."¹²⁷

Not only is this intellectus of singular propositions a habitus of virtue

Melina erases the difference between "the application to work" of a habitus of prudence spoken of in the *Ila-Ilae* and the *SLE*'s identification of such a habitus as only a habitus of science and not the virtue of prudence. Cf. esp. pp. 187-88 where he incorrectly reads the political ruler's "application of universal reason to some particular action" as the *SLE*'s expression of the "proper task of prudence."

124. VI.4.77-79.S1166.

125. VI.8.189-92.S1234.

126. VI.9.96-104.S1243.

127. VI.9.152-86.S1247-49.

perfecting the cogitative power, but so too are prudence, *synesis*, and *gnome*.¹²⁸ While there should be little doubt that Aquinas in the *SLE* considers prudence as an intellectual virtue perfecting an interior sense, this is not the doctrine proposed earlier in the *Secunda secundae*. In the later work, prudence was said not to be "in an interior sense as in its principle subject, but principally in reason; however, through a certain application, it pertains to the interior sense."¹²⁹ Yet in the *SLE*, Aquinas asserts that "the judgment of prudence pertains to the interior sense by which one judges well of singulars."¹³⁰ To be sure, in speaking of one of the two functions of the essentially rational part of the soul, he writes: "Prudence is the virtue of one of these parts, namely, of the opining [or ratiocinative] part... ..prudence is in this part of reason as in a subject, because of which it is called an intellectual virtue..."¹³¹ Notwithstanding, this denomination of prudence as an intellectual virtue is explained insofar as the cogitative power is known as "intellect" to the extent it has judgments regarding singulars; similarly, Aquinas insists this power is called "particular reason" because it reasons from one thing to another.¹³²

The problem here lies in the fact that Aquinas appears to be caught between the awareness of experience - which is holistic - and loyalty to the Aristotelian conception of cognitive potencies. As an Aristotelian, Aquinas holds that the intellect is the sole power by which the human agent can understand a universal moral principle and use such a principle in reasoning. Also Aristotelian is the need to assign to an interior sense the actual unified perception of a singular. Yet holistically, Aquinas experiences himself as "this man who perceives this action in this particular moral light," that is, as one to be performed or avoided. - Recall his anti-Averroist assertion of experience: "*Hic homo intelligit*."¹³³ - Hence, Aquinas asserts that the intellect grasps the singular action to be performed or omitted through the intermediary of the cogitative or sense power. Yet in Aquinas's mind, this assertion needs to be amplified. What are the respective roles or functions of the intellect and the cogitative power? I suggest

128. VI.9.239-51.S1255.

129. *Ila-Ilae*.47.1; 3.ad 3..

130. II.11.166-68.S381; see also IV.13.207-10.S813.

131. VI.4.185-87.S1174. Also, VI.7.255-58.S1215.

132. VI.9.243-49.S1255.

133. *SLDA*.III.1.282.P690.

that Aquinas, seemingly influenced by the data of his experience, stresses in the *SLE* the fact that the prudent agent exists in some intellectual-sense contact with the singular. This contact with singular realities is experienced as a sense contact permeated with intellectual awareness. Because it is through such contact that the agent perceives that such-and-such is or is not to be done, the presupposed powers of deliberation and judgment are exercised through the cogitative or sense power. In the resultant doctrine, Aquinas merges the holistic and the Aristotelian: the internal sense power judges and so, is called "intellect," and to it belongs the virtue of prudence as well as the connected virtues of *synesis* and *gnome*. As well that sense power reasons from one particular thing to another, thus meriting the title of "particular reason"; its aid in fulfilling this role is the virtue of *eubulia*, or "excellence in deliberation."

Cajetan's attempt to explain away the difference between the doctrines of the *Secunda secundae* and the *SLE* is a testimonial to the opposition between them and provides thus one more reason for regarding these passages cited from the *SLE* as posterior to that of the moral part of the *Summa theologiae*. Additionally, one recalls that Albert's *Super Ethica* also proposes the doctrine Aquinas offered in the *Secunda secundae* but is opposing in the *SLE*.¹³⁴

The relation between prudence and the moral virtues has already been spoken of. To act virtuously, an agent must intend the correct end of human life, and that intention is had insofar as the appetites are disposed to the correct end by moral virtue. However, just as necessary for virtuous activity is the correct choice of activity leading to the correct end, and the prescription of that choice is the work of prudence.¹³⁵

A more complex manner of expressing the relation of the moral virtues and prudence is to assert with Aristotle that virtue is both "according to" correct reason and "with" correct reason. The expression "according to" signifies that the actions of virtue are in agreement with what correct reason or prudence would prescribe. "With" correct reason, however, indicates that moral virtues cannot exist unless integrated with prudence or correct reason.¹³⁶

The doctrinal exposition that permits the above conclusion that virtue is both according to and with correct reason is one dependent on an explanation of the possibility of acquiring virtue which in turn assumes the doctrine of the innate principles of practical reason.

134. On Cajetan and Albert, as well as the opposition between *Ila-Ilae.47.1* and the *SLE*, see "Aspects of prudence" above in Ch. 5, pp. 199-206.

135. VI.10.151-62.S1269.

136. VI.11.107-24.S1284-85.

Aquinas begins his exposition of this point by remarking that human agents possess *dinotica* or a natural cleverness, that is, an ability to envision activity in relation to a goal, in short, a natural type of ingenuity.¹³⁷ If the agent repeatedly uses this natural ingenuity correctly, he acquires the habitus disposing him to select the activity leading to his end. If the end intended in all the activity of this habitus is the ultimate end of human life, then the habitus acquired is prudence. However, what guided the repeated use of the agent's natural ingenuity in choosing activity oriented to an end? That is, what gave the end to the agent?¹³⁸

The answer to that question involves the doctrine of the natural cognition of the first principles of practical reason, e.g., "No one is to be harmed." Such principles resemble a natural disposition inclining toward works of virtue. Also proper to the human agent is the will's natural response to whatever the intellect apprehends as good; for instance, the will naturally tends to the avoidance of injuring others, although that does not mean the will never chooses not to injure someone. By these doctrines, Aquinas proposes the underpinnings of his explanation of the acquisition of virtue: if a human agent repeatedly chooses to follow the natural dispositions of intellect and will, the moral virtues, as well as prudence, will gradually develop.¹³⁹ In this sense, the virtues are not only according to correct reason, but in addition are with correct reason.

As remarked in Ch. 2, by this explanation of the relation of prudence and the moral virtues, Aquinas offers an alternative to Albert's doctrine of seminal prudence from which a habitus of imperfect prudence can develop in tandem with the acquisition of a particular moral virtue. As well, by affirming the integration of reason and will, that is, by asserting that correct reason or prudence does not exist without the correct orientation of the appetites, Aquinas offers a significant aspect absent from the doctrine of Albert's *Super Ethica*.¹⁴⁰

In the doctrine of the connection of the moral virtues is had a further spelling out of the implications of Aquinas's use of the example of an army's order from *Metaphysics.XII* in his introduction to the *SLE*. Insofar as that example was proposed as a means of remarking that moral philosophy will study the agent's activities as directed toward the agent's end, the stage was laid for some future presentation of the order of those activities to one another and to their end. Accordingly, just as the parts of an army are ordered to one another in light

137. VI.10.211-17.S1272.

138. VI.10.224-53.S1273-74.

139. VI.11.22-72.S1276-80.

140. Cf. "Some aspects of prudence" in Ch. 2 above, pp. 48-67.

of their order to the leader's good, so the agent's potencies are ordered to one another by the acquired virtues, whose interdependence and interrelationships are for the sake of activity leading to the human end in this life assigned by the author of human nature.

CONTINENCE

Following the completion of the study of virtue in *SLE*.II-VI, Aquinas announces that *Ethics*.VII-IX treat "some things that follow virtue (*de quibusdam quae consequuntur ad virtutem*)."¹⁴¹ The first of these, continence, is described as "something imperfect in the genus of virtue," and the other, or friendship, is said to be "a certain effect of virtue."¹⁴² Friendship's status as an effect of virtue is a sufficiently clear notion since Aristotle will state early in *Ethics*.VIII that friendship "is a certain virtue or with virtue."¹⁴³ But the sense in which continence "follows on virtue" and "is something imperfect in the genus of virtue" is not so evident. A related statement later in the same opening chapter of *SLE*.VII also speaks of the relation of continence and virtue, but without completely clarifying the notion: "as concerns incontinence... and continence..., we do not consider these habitus as either the same as virtue and vice, nor as different in genus."¹⁴⁴ With this, Aquinas appears to have offered his final word on the issue.¹⁴⁵

Aquinas recognized that Aristotle begins *Ethics*.VII by stating, "After these [things that have been said, and] making a new beginning, we must affirm that in regard to mores there are three species of things that ought to be fled, [namely,] vice, incontinence, bestiality."¹⁴⁶ Concerning this statement, Aquinas

141. Kleber: *Glück als Lebensziel*, p. 74, 77 remarks that continence and friendship would be more easily integrated into a discussion of virtue than they are into the study of human happiness.

142. VII.1.2-7.S1292.

143. *NE*.VIII.1.1155a3-4. Cf. *SLE*, p. 441.

144. VII.1.165-72.S1304.

145. Aquinas also asserts in VIII.1.3-4.S1538 that *Ethics*.VII has treated continence, "something imperfect in the genus of virtue."

146. *NE*.VII.1.1145a15-17. *SLE*, p. 379. - Jaffa asserts that Aquinas fails to note this text in which Aristotle says he will make a "fresh beginning." Cf. *Thomism and*

remarks that the "new beginning" is the examination of the above-mentioned three species of improper things. Continuing, he explains that Aristotle must make this new beginning "so that nothing pertaining to morality is omitted."¹⁴⁷ Yet Aquinas finds Aristotle turning immediately to the three habitus that oppose vice, incontinence, and bestiality, namely, virtue, continence, and heroic virtue.¹⁴⁸ Additionally, Aquinas is aware that *Ethics*.VII does not speak of vice as such, and accordingly, he explains the reason for this omission, namely, that the nature of vice was made clear in the earlier discussions of various types of virtue.¹⁴⁹ Then too, Aquinas was certainly aware that *Ethics*.VII treats principally continence, and only secondarily heroic virtue. Thus, as concerns the ordering of the ten books of the *Ethics* to one another, Aquinas must have seen the chief problem with *Ethics*.VII to be that of integrating the examination of continence into the study of virtue that occupied *Ethics*.II-VI and that continues with the examination of friendship in *Ethics*.VIII-IX. In solving this problem, Aquinas appears to have been aided by Albert's *Super Ethica*.

Immediately subsequent to the introduction to his direct comment on *Ethics*.VII, Albert introduces his initial question with this assertion: "First, concerning [Aristotle's] mode of proceeding. It seems that this book [VII] is inappropriately placed."¹⁵⁰ In examining this issue, Albert admits that continence and the heroic habitus do not belong to a treatise whose books are divided according to the virtues discussed in them. "For continence is not a virtue, but something less than a virtue, and the heroic habitus is something greater than virtue." Further, he notes that Aristotle admitted the difference between the earlier discussions of virtue in Books II-VI and the new topic of Books VII-IX by announcing that he was "making a new beginning." To this thought, Albert adds his conclusion, "But continence and the heroic habitus do not belong to another genus [than virtue], for they concern the same matter and are ordered to the same acts as are virtues."¹⁵¹ Later, in his direct comment, Albert implies that the "new

Aristotelianism, p. 73. As will become clear, Aquinas noted this point, interpreting it just as Albert had.

147. VII.1.24-30.S1293.

148. Cf. *NE*.VII.1.1145a17-20. *SLE*, p. 379.

149. VII.1.162-65.S1304.

150. *Super Ethica*.VII.1.p514,48-49.

151. *Ibid.*p514,78-86.

beginning" continues, however, to investigate mores, for the topics announced - vice, animal-like behavior, and incontinence - are the habitual ways of acting that are to be avoided.¹⁵²

Albert's second question asks explicitly whether continence and the heroic habitus are virtues. His solution asserts what was implied in the previous question. That is, "virtue" can be predicated in two senses. First, it can signify the essence of virtue; here, neither continence nor the heroic habitus is a virtue, for the former is less than virtue and the latter transcends virtue. But second, "virtue" can be predicated of something by comparing it to both the matter and the act of virtue; in this sense, both continence and the heroic disposition are virtues insofar as they bring the agent to resist passions, a resistance generally resulting from virtue.¹⁵³

These two questions appear to contain the principal inspiration for the notion by which Aquinas integrated *Ethics*.VII into the overall order of the *Ethics*. Continence, he wrote, "is something imperfect in the genus of virtue," and while it is not identical to virtue, it does not fall under any other genus. As Albert had earlier asserted, and as is abundantly clear in the *SLE*, continence is the habitus by which the agent follows the judgment of his reason even while experiencing the force of his passions.¹⁵⁴ As this doctrine indicates, Aquinas agrees with Albert that continence concerns the same matter and is ordered to the same acts connected with the virtue of temperance. Additionally, Aquinas follows Albert in regarding Aristotle's "new beginning" as indicating that habitus related to virtues, but not quite virtues, were now to be considered: "after what has been said about moral and intellectual virtues, so that no topic pertaining to morality is omitted, it is necessary to resume the discussion from a new beginning and explain that the behavior that must be fled is of three types, namely, vice, incontinence, and animal-like behavior."¹⁵⁵

Although agreeing with Albert on the above point, Aquinas differs in regard to the subject of the habitus of continence. As explained in Ch. 5 above, Albert considers continence to be a habitus of reason and so, as an intellectual virtue. For Aquinas, however, continence is in the will as that appetite's habitual disposition to follow reason in matters of tactile pleasure despite the experienced strength of the desire of the sensible appetite. By proposing this doctrine in the

152. *Ibid.* p519,18-23.

153. *Ibid.* 1.p515,77-87.

154. E.g., VII.9.219-34.S1452-53.

155. VII.1.25-30.S1293.

SLE, Aquinas moves beyond the position he had expressed in both the *Prima secundae* and the first two thirds of the *Secunda secundae*.¹⁵⁶

This brief discussion of continence in the *SLE* reveals that aspects of Albert's interpretation of the *Ethics* assisted Aquinas even as the latter composed a commentary intended to supplement that of his teacher.¹⁵⁷

FRIENDSHIP

As announced in the opening lines both of *SLE*.VII and VIII friendship is an effect of virtue.¹⁵⁸ For Aquinas, moral philosophy's study of virtue is completed with the discussion of friendship.

Very early in *Ethics*.VIII, Aristotle asserts that friendship is "virtue or with virtue."¹⁵⁹ Aquinas reads this as asserting that "friendship" is a term to be reserved for the relation between friends: "Above the Philosopher did not state absolutely that [friendship] was a virtue, but he added, 'or with virtue,' because it seems to add something beyond the reality of a virtue."¹⁶⁰ Notwithstanding, there exists in each friend a habitus by which the actions constituting friendship are performed. This habitus must be in the will as it falls under the genus of justice.¹⁶¹ Although this latter doctrine is proposed in part only implicitly, Aquinas's meaning can be seen by recalling an aspect of the notion of continence. Continence is neither the same as virtue, nor different from virtue generically. This expression appears to be Aquinas's way of asserting that the matter and the act of continence are the matter and the act of the virtue of temperance.¹⁶² Thus, when Aquinas asserts that in the genus of justice is the habitus by which an agent

156. Cf. "A development concerning continence" above in Ch. 5, pp. 225-28.

157. Additionally, the examination of the opening of *SLE*.VII illustrates a theme of the present study, namely, that the reading of Aquinas's comment on the *Ethics* ought always be accompanied by an examination of Albert's *Super Ethica*.

158. VII.1.7.S1292; VIII.1.5-6.S1538.

159. *NE*.VIII.1.1155a3-4.

160. VIII.5.141-44.S1605.

161. VIII.1.23-24.S1538.

162. Cf. above, p. 264.

can act toward another as a friend, very likely he intends that the matter and the act of the habitus at the root of friendship concern the equality between persons, even though they concern it differently than does justice.¹⁶³ Justice deals with equality between two agents in terms of what each owes the other. But the habitus at the basis of friendship has the function of establishing an equality of proportion between the love given by each agent to the other and the worth or dignity of each as an object of love.¹⁶⁴ Yet it remains that this latter habitus falls under the genus of justice, for like every species of justice, it concerns the establishment of an equality of proportion between persons. The reservation of "friendship" as a term to be used of the reciprocal love between two agents, as well as the assigning of the habitus at the root of friendship to the genus of justice, are positions by which Aquinas opposes the interpretations offered in the *Super Ethica*.¹⁶⁵

HAPPINESS, THE GOAL OF VIRTUE

With the discussion of friendship, moral philosophy has completed the study of virtue undertaken in response to the definition of happiness discovered in *SLE*.I, i.e., activity proper to man according to virtue in a perfect life.¹⁶⁶ Now, only the notion of "pleasure" needs clarification before a more complete description of happiness can be proposed.¹⁶⁷

Pleasure is the appetite's rest in a reality attained by activity, whether the reality is an act internal to the agent or an external object or product of some sort. As such, pleasure is the perfection of activity. Yet activities are variously perfected. For instance, the object perfects an act of cognition as the act's "unmoved mover," while the intellect perfects cognition of the object insofar as the intellect is an agent cause moved, i.e., attracted, by its object. The pleasure experienced when the intellect acts well and the object is appropriate to the intellect perfects the resultant activity in a formal sense.¹⁶⁸ That is, pleasure is not

163. VIII.1.19-26.S1538.

164. VIII.7.84-92.S1630; 101-07.S1631.

165. Cf. "Friendship as 'virtue or with virtue'" above, in Ch. 2, pp. 67-75.

166. Cf. pp. 239-40 above.

167. X.1.1-27.S1953-54.

168. X.6.46-81.S2025-27.

an intrinsic form entering into the constitution of activity; rather, it is a form added to an activity specifically complete. Pleasure, in other words, follows the good disposition of the causes of activity.¹⁶⁹

As Aquinas turns directly from the topic of pleasure to the task of completing the description of happiness, he follows Aristotle in recalling what was asserted of happiness in *Ethics*.I. Apparent in this section of the *SLE* is a major portion of the reasons Aquinas, contrary to his predecessors, saw the entirety of the *Ethics* as building to the final description in Book X of the happiness naturally possible to human agents.

Ethics.I, Aquinas recalls, asserted happiness belongs to the genus of activity, rather than to the category of something habitually possessed.¹⁷⁰ Second, happiness is activity desirable of itself; as was proposed in *Ethics*.I, happiness is sufficient of itself and hence, not desirable for the sake of something else.¹⁷¹ Yet recreational activities as well as virtuous activities can be desired of themselves.¹⁷² While various reasons can be offered to show happiness is to be found in virtuous activity rather than in recreational, an especially telling fact is that it would appear both foolish and childish for someone to live for play. More important however, is the fact that happiness was initially described as "activity according to virtue."¹⁷³ To these two conditions of happiness a third can be added, namely, the most virtuous activity is that of the highest virtue or the virtue proper to the highest of human powers. Of course, this power is the intellect.¹⁷⁴

In proposing the intellect as the highest power of the human agent, Aquinas introduced a precision not in Aristotle's text at this point. The latter simply states that, because happiness is activity according to virtue, it is only rational that it is according to the highest virtue, which is the virtue of the highest human power, "whether that is the intellect, or something else." To this, Aristotle adds parenthetically that this power is the ruling power in human affairs and is the source of cognition "of good things and of divine things," whether that be what is

169. X.6.101-16.S2030-31.

170. X.9.22-23.S2066.

171. X.9.72-84.S2069.

172. X.9.85-99.S2070.

173. X.9.159-93.S2076-78.

174. X.9.181-93.S2078; 10.1-15.S2080.

itself divine or only of the most divine in us.¹⁷⁵ That Aquinas should have identified this "highest human power" with the intellect is unsurprising given his conviction that this is the genuine teaching of Aristotle.¹⁷⁶

Subsequently, Aquinas explains that Aristotle's parenthetical additions (i.e., the highest power is the ruling power and the source of things divine) are actually "signs from which it can be known that the intellect is the highest of those [powers] which are in man."¹⁷⁷ In accord with his practice of unifying the various strands of Aristotle's text, Aquinas explains that Aristotle left unstated the identity of the highest human power at this point, as the present topic was not the proper locus for such a discussion. Whatever may be the highest power, Aquinas concludes, Aristotle's point holds, namely, "perfect happiness is the activity of this highest [power] according to its proper virtue."¹⁷⁸

A final aspect of this discussion is noteworthy for the light it throws on the *SLE*. Immediately after referring to the "signs" by which we know Aristotle is referring to the intellect as the highest human power, and prior to the conclusion respecting Aristotle's point in this passage, Aquinas proposed a brief survey of philosophical positions respecting the human intellect. In offering this survey, once more he follows the lead of Albert.

In the *Super Ethica*, in preparation for his comment on Aristotle's doctrine that happiness is activity according to the greatest virtue of a human power, Albert asks whether the intellect is part of the human soul.¹⁷⁹ He responds by referring to the information provided on this topic by "the Commentator," i.e., the *Greek Commentaries*.¹⁸⁰ First, there is Plato's position, according to which our soul understands through the light received from the divine separated intellect. However, Aristotle and other Peripatetics form a second group which holds the intellect to be part of the human soul. According to *De anima*.III, the soul, through an aspect of its being, is united to matter and, accordingly, some of the soul's powers are joined to and act through bodily organs; another part of the soul, however, is elevated above the body, is free from mixture with the body, and

175. *NE*.X.7.1177a12-17. Cf. *SLE*, p. 582.

176. Cf. "Personal immortality taught by Aristotle" above in Ch.4, pp. 135-51.

177. *X*.10.19-40.S2081-83.

178. *X*.10.15-19. S2081; 50-56.S2085.

179. *Super Ethica*.X.11.p749,66-67.

180. *Ibid*.p750,45-46 & 60.

so, is the source of the agent and possible intellects whose acts are not acts of the body.¹⁸¹

Aquinas's survey is briefer than Albert's, as befits a summary of a summary. Some philosophers, Aquinas writes, posit the human intellect as something separate and divine; others, like Aristotle, posit the intellect as part of the soul. The intellect is not thus something divine, simply speaking, but the most divine thing in the human agent insofar as, like separate substances, its activity is without a corporeal organ.¹⁸²

Very evident here is Aquinas's intent to be true to Aristotle's text, while at the same time insuring that his Parisian readers are not misled by Aristotle's failure to posit here the intellect as truly part of the human soul. Perhaps too, Aquinas shows his awareness of the two commentaries currently afforded great respect at Paris, i.e., Grossseteste's *Greek Commentaries*, and Albert's *Super Ethica*. By summarizing Albert's report of the relevant views proposed in the *Greek Commentaries*, Aquinas might be doing his best to remove any need on the part of his readers to supplement the *SLE* by recourse to anyone else's comment.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas now proposes to show the virtue whose activity is perfect happiness - that is, as perfect as can be had in this life. That virtue is said to be the "speculative virtue," that is, the virtue of wisdom, understood as comprising in its activity both the intellectus of first speculative principles and the speculative, philosophical sciences. Aquinas remarks that, in offering this doctrine, Aristotle abides by the doctrine of wisdom found in *Ethics*.VI and the doctrine of happiness offered in *Ethics*.I. Even more, adds Aquinas, what Aristotle proposes is true.¹⁸³

Ethics.VI had proposed in an expanded form the doctrine of wisdom only hinted at now. "Wisdom," in that earlier treatment, was said to be used strictly when it signifies the knowledge of the totality of beings. By wisdom, one has scientific knowledge of beings insofar as their first principles are known, both the internal principles of being as such and the external, immaterial principles. Wisdom is, in other words, metaphysics.¹⁸⁴ Because some of these principles are the first principles of scientific knowledge, wisdom is also intellectus or the habitus of first speculative principles, e.g., the whole is greater than its parts. But as well, since wisdom knows the conclusions from principles, wisdom is also

181. *Ibid*.p750,45 - p751,4.

182. *X*.10.40-50.S2084.

183. *X*.10.57-78.S2086.

184. *VI*.5.85-106.S1181.

science, albeit the supreme science in keeping with its knowledge of all being.¹⁸⁵

At this juncture, Aquinas proceeds to offer Aristotle's six arguments for the doctrine previously enunciated, namely, that it is the virtue of wisdom whose activity is perfect happiness. (1) Because happiness, as remarked in *Ethics.I*, is the highest activity, it will be contemplation of truth (*speculatio veritatis*) through the activity of the highest human power, i.e., the intellect, and will concern the greatest realities, i.e., intelligible and divine things.¹⁸⁶ (2) As asserted in *Ethics.I*, happiness is the most continuous and lasting of activities, and therefore it is the activity requiring least use of the human body, that is, the contemplation of truth.¹⁸⁷ (3) Because as *Ethics.I* noted, pleasure is connected with happiness, the latter is had in the best way in the activity of contemplation, since its pleasure is the most continuous and most stable characteristic deriving from the unchanging, immaterial objects of contemplation.¹⁸⁸ (4) The condition "sufficient of itself" attributed to happiness in *Ethics.I* is best met in contemplation for the agent involved in that activity has the least need of things external to himself.¹⁸⁹ (5) *Ethics.I* teaches that happiness is desired solely for itself, a characteristic only of contemplation based on the virtue of wisdom.¹⁹⁰ (6) Although Book I is silent on this, happiness, as the ultimate end, will be associated with freedom from activity, i.e., a resting in the end achieved through activity; such freedom and rest are approached most nearly in intellectual contemplation, for there the agent comes as close as possible in this life to self-sufficiency as well as to an end of desires.¹⁹¹

As if aware that the life of contemplation, as described, appears to be a condition for which the human agent is not quite suited, Aristotle is thought to have attempted to show its appropriateness to human kind.¹⁹² In his explanation, Aquinas first contrasts "life according to man" and "life according to the divine

185. VI.5.107-26.S1182-83.

186. X.10.79-93.S2087.

187. X.10.94-112.S2088-89.

188. X.10.113-46.S2090-92.

189. X.10.147-82.S2093-96.

190. X.10.183-97.S2097.

191. X.11.1-78.S2098-2104.

192. NE.X.7.1177b26-1178a8.

element within man." The former of these entails the use of the intellect to govern affections, senses and physical activity. This is the life of the moral virtues. Life according to the divine element within man consists in the contemplative activity of the intellect, for here man acts by the intellectual virtue of wisdom.¹⁹³ By contemplation then, the agent lives by the divine within himself, i.e., by the intellect.

A second step in defending contemplative activity against the charge of being inappropriate for the human agent is by way of a contrast between the mortal and the immortal parts of human nature. The immortal part of man, the intellect, in spite of its weakness, is by far the agent's greatest aspect. The intellect, immaterial and simple, incorruptible and unchangeable, is so far superior to the corporeal, mortal side of the human agent, that it appears to be what man most centrally is. Accordingly, man ought to live the life proper to the intellect.¹⁹⁴

By the above, i.e., the six arguments for the identification of happiness and activity according to wisdom, to which was added a defense of contemplation as appropriate to man, Aquinas marks a departure from the position previously espoused in the *Secunda secundae*, where he indicated that the section of the *Ethics.X* pertinent to contemplative activity contained eight arguments concluding to the superiority of the contemplative over the active life.¹⁹⁵ The fact of this difference between the two readings of *Ethics.X* should not be surprising. The *Sentence-Commentary* bears witness to Aquinas's conviction at the beginning of his career that the *Ethics* was unified by Aristotle's search for an understanding of the happiness initially described in the work's opening book. But as should have been expected, only with and through the extensive and independent study preparatory for writing a commentary would Aquinas discover how each small section of the *Ethics* fits into the broader perspective of the problem of human happiness. Thus, only in preparing his commentary did Aquinas discover in the section we have been examining that this is the climatic point at which Aristotle finally argues for the full identification of happiness and contemplation through the virtue of wisdom. Prior to the study needed for composing the *SLE*, the passage at issue here in *Ethics.X* could easily have appeared to consist of arguments for the superiority of the contemplative over the active life. Especially is thus so, considering that the doctrine Aristotle proposes next is, according to Aquinas, precisely that of the superiority of contemplation when compared to morally virtuous activity.

193. X.11.79-108.S2105-06.

194. X.11.109-64.S2017-2110.

195. *Ila-IIae*.182.1.

Aquinas now sees four arguments concluding to the inferiority of a "secondary happiness, which consists in the activity of moral virtue." First, the activity of the intellectual virtue of wisdom differs from the activity of the moral virtues as does activity separate and divine from activity corporeal and human. Consequently, the human and bodily pleasure of the latter is inferior to the separated and divine pleasure of activity according to wisdom.¹⁹⁶ In his comment on this initial argument, Aquinas's belief in the Aristotelian character of the doctrine of intellect as an immaterial part of the human soul is again evidenced by his appeal to *De anima*.III.¹⁹⁷ Second, the agent engaged in a life of the moral virtues must devote a greater part of his attention to external affairs and the external goods required in those affairs.¹⁹⁸ Third, a life of moral virtue can in no sense be attributed to separated substances or to God, who do however live and must be supposed to live a life of contemplation of truth.¹⁹⁹ Finally, there is a sense in which non-rational animals act in ways similar to the activities found in a life of moral virtue, e.g., courage seems proper to a lion. Yet, human agents, constituted in between non-rational animals and intelligent separated substances, are capable of some share in the contemplative life of the latter, which is evidently superior. For these four reasons the happiness associated with morally virtuous activity is rightly regarded as secondary to the happiness of contemplation.²⁰⁰

When one looks back from this end-point of the *SLE* to its opening statements regarding order, Aquinas's vision of moral philosophy is transparent. In the background of that vision and serving as its foundations are the principles discerned by Jaffa, howsoever much he missed their philosophical character.

The moral philosophy proposed in the *SLE* is offered as a guide for human agents conceived as constituted from an immortal intellectual form and a body whose act is that form. In addition to this doctrine, which Aquinas found in the *De anima* and argued in numerous works prior to the *SLE*, there is Aquinas's conviction that in *Metaphysics*.II, VI, and XII Aristotle proposes a creator-God. Since the creation of a "genuine" God is an intelligible, ordered reality, God's human creatures, in addition to being ordered to a natural end, are capable of

196. X.12.17-69.S2112-16.

197. X.12.64-65.S2116.

198. X.12.70-122.S2117-20.

199. X.12.123-59.S2121-23.

200. X.12.160-81.S2124-25.

discerning that end and the characteristics of the activity that will lead toward it. Hence, Aquinas, from within the "culture of synderesis," posits the first principles of practical activity. In accord with the truth exemplified in Aristotle's image of an army, those first principles, or the divinely-given natural law, govern the order of the agent's parts to one another as well as to the end ordained by God. In accord with those principles, the agent's parts, i.e., the sensitive and rational appetites together with the intellect and other cognitive powers, must be ordered to one another through the principal virtues of courage, temperance, and prudence, as well as by a host of virtues annexed to those principal ones. Additionally, the agent's parts must be ordered by the virtue of justice to what is due other agents. With his parts so disposed by the habitus of virtue, the human agent is correctly ordered in the direction of the satisfaction of his natural desire for something perfect and sufficient of itself - happiness. However, many types and levels of pleasure or happiness are available. Beyond the obvious ones such as are available through the activities of science or friendship, as well as through service of one's family and civil society, there is another, greater type of happiness. The truly wise agent knows how the above types of activities can best be integrated with another activity more truly satisfying because it is the highest activity of the agent's greatest power - intellectual contemplation. It is such activity that will come closest to satisfying the agent's natural desire for happiness. Yet in the world in which the agent is found, many things can conspire to prevent the attainment of full intellectual contemplation. Even in the best of circumstances, contemplation will fail to be continuous and permanent. So it is that the philosopher must concede that the happiest state presently available to the human agent is a limited one. The most the agent can hope for is to be "blessed as a man." Toward that the agent must act, aware however that all does not depend on his own efforts. As a creature, he lives in a universe whose events are ordered by the God who is at its source. The agent's happiness depends on the agent's own activity quite obviously, but even more it depends on the providence of God. Thus, the human agent appears paradoxical. Although he desires complete, continuous, permanent happiness, natural events insure that he will never be more than "blessed as a man." Fortunately, an intelligent God creates only intelligible realities, ones guaranteed to achieve the goal assigned them. So it is that the human desire for happiness will not be frustrated. In some manner, therefore, the desire for happiness natural to the human agent will be fulfilled in a life after death.

In light of the above summary of the moral philosophy proposed in the *SLE*, the title chosen for this study has its significance: *Aquinas's Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics. A Historical Perspective*. The attempt has been made to present the *SLE* as the expression of a moral philosophy, one which, while incomplete, is visible in broad outline. As is true of Aquinas's other Aristotelian

commentaries, the *SLE* neither resulted from lectures, nor was composed in preparation for work on some theological document. Quite obviously, Aquinas intended these commentaries to be read by those Parisian Masters and students in need of philosophical formation. Accordingly, the *SLE*, as Aquinas's other Aristotelian commentaries, are not to be regarded as a "Thesaurus of Thomistic Quotes" into which one delves in search of doctrines and notions needed to bolster or fill a hole in some "Thomist" philosophy constructed from doctrines found in some of his theological works. If we want to know what Aquinas proposed as moral philosophy, we should look not only initially, but principally, to his *Ethics-Commentary*. Where we find omissions or incomplete discussions in the *SLE*, then we can look to a work such as the *Summa theologiae*.

Unfortunately, the words of the late Fr. Weisheipl on Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries express a message needed perhaps as much today as when written a quarter of a century ago:

The least one can say is that Thomas must have considered the valuable time and energy expended on their composition, at the very height of his maturity, worthy and necessary. In other words, Thomas must have thought that they were of sufficient importance for someone to labor over them. If Thomas thought they were important, why should we consider them unimportant? If Thomas had lectured to Dominican students on these books, which he did not, it would be easier to dismiss them. As it was, there was no compulsion to write them other than a deep personal motive to help others in need, namely, the young masters in arts.²⁰¹

201. James A. Weisheipl, O.P.: *Friar Thomas d'Aquino. His Life, Thought, and Work* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974) pp. 281-82.

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 fol.81vM - fol.82rA ---11n

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Ch. 6 ---15

Ch. 8 ---15

- fol.155rE ---15n
 fol.155vG ---15n
 fol.155vM - fol.156rA ---15n